,:0  -*&& 

Pm  **.}**.» 
AUTHOR'S  NOTE  TO  SIXTH  EDITION. 

AT  the  suggestion  of  many  leading  educators  and  librarians,  this 
edition  of  the  "  Battles  of  the  American  Revolution,"  practically  a 
continuous  military  history  of  the  War  for  American  Independence, 
assumes  a  less  expensive  form,  and  one  more  convenient  for  library 
and  family  use. 

The  Introductory  Chapters  upon  Military  Science,  or  the  "  Art  of 
War,"  originally  approved  by  General  William  T.  Sherman,  of  the 
American  Army,  and  later,  by  Colonel  Edward  Bruce  Hamley,  Com 
mandant  of  the  Queen's  Staff  College,  England,  as  well  as  by  military 
authors  and  instructors,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  remain  unchanged. 
No  variations  of  Army  Formation,  Tactics,  or  Armament  can  lessen 
the  value  of  those  principles  which  govern  all  activities,  both  in 
peace  and  war. 

In  Chapter  IV.,  entitled  "Apology  for  the  Military  Art,"  grave 
problems  respecting  the  future  of  Asia,  which,  since  the  opening  of 
the  Twentieth  Century,  more  seriously  command  the  attention  of  the 
civilized  world,  were  both  anticipated  and  carefully  considered,  as 
well  as  the  basis  upon  which  all  nations  could  realize  permanent 
peace  and  escape  the  limitless  waste  of  protracted  war. 

In  such  a  review,  along  military  lines,  the  uniform  recognition  by 
other  authorities,  of  the  value  of  original  and  official  data  herein 
applied  to  the  Revolutionary  struggle,  has  afforded  additional  induce 
ment  to  adopt  the  form  now  proposed. 


HYDE  PARK,  MASS.,  1904. 


242318 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION. 

THIS  volume  had  its  origin  at  Tarry  town,  New  York,  in  1847, 
through  the  statement  of  Washington  Irving  that  the  battle  known  as 
that  of  White  Plains  was  actually  fought  on  Chatterton  Hill.  He 
pointed  out  the  localities  minutely,  and  approved  the  sketch  which 
has  developed  as  the  present  map.  He  stated,  very  seriously,  that  a 
similar  examination  and  chart  of  other  battle-fields,  with  the  use  of 
British,  French,  and  Hessian  field-notes,  reports,  and  dispatches, 
would  be  necessary,  before  the  character  of  Washington  as  a  soldier, 
and  of  the  contest  itself,  could  be  fully  understood  ;  but  that  years, 
possibly  a  generation,  would  be  requisite  for  the  task. 

The  undertaking,  deliberately  begun  and  kept  in  view  through 
many  interruptions,  was  completed  at  the  end  of  nearly  thirty  years. 

The  proof-sheets  of  the  first  edition,  six  in  number,  were  patiently 
and  critically  read  by  Ex-President  Theodore  D.  Woolsey,  of  Yale 
College ;  Rev.  Dr.  Oliver  Crane,  of  Morristown,  New  Jersey ; 
Benson  J.  Lossing,  Esq.,  Historian,  and  Adjutant-general  Wm.  S. 
Striker,  of  New  Jersey,  and  the  chief  portion  by  General  William  T. 
Sherman.  Hon.  William  M.  Evarts,  Henry  Day,  Esq.,  and  James  B. 
Brinsmade,  Esq.,  of  New  York  city,  so  fully  examined  maps  and  text 
as  to  endorse  the  accuracy  of  the  research. 

The  subsequent  endorsement  of  George  Bancroft,  the  American 
Historian  ;  of  Earl  Derby  ;  Colonel  Hamley,  President  of  the  Queen's 
Staff  College ;  Sir  Joseph  Hooker,  President  of  the  Royal  Society ; 
Thomas  Hughes  and  others,  in  Great  Britain  ;  and  of  President  Thiers  ; 
Monsieur  A.  de  Rochambeau ;  Senator  Oscar  de  Lafayette  ;  Louis 
d'Orleans,  Comte  d'Paris,  and  others,  in  France,  inspired  special  care 
as  to  succeeding  editions. 

In  preparing  this,  the  fifth  edition,  additional  aid  has  been  ren 
dered  by  other  painstaking  scholars,  who  have  endeavored  to  eliminate 
even  typographical  errors  ;  but  in  no  material  sense  has  the  text  been 
called  in  question,  at  home  or  abroad. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE. 

Special  thanks  are  due  to  William  L.  Stone,  Esq.,  Historian,  of 
Jersey  Heights,  New  Jersey ;  Frederick  D.  Stone,  Esq.,  Librarian 
Penn.  Hist.  Society,  Philadelphia ;  Francis  S.  Drake,  Esq.,  historical 
writer,  Roxbury,  Mass.  ;  General  J.  Watts  de  Peister,  of  New  York 
City ;  General  Horatio  Rogers,  of  Providence,  R.  I. ;  Thomas  C. 
Amory,  Esq.,  of  Boston  ;  Rev.  Dr.  M.  B.  Riddle,  late  of  Hartford, 
Conn.,  and  now  of  Alleghany  Theological  Seminary,  Pennsylvania, 
and  Teacher  George  W.  Rollins,  of  the  Boston  Latin  School,  Boston, 
Mass. 

To  no  one  does  a  sense  of  personal  obligation  flow  more  spon 
taneously  than  toward  Hon.  Robert  C.  Winthrop,  late,  and  for  so 
many  years,  President  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  for 
his  personal  sympathy,  scholarly  scrutiny,  and  emphatic  endorsement. 

The  closing  examination — paragraph  by  paragraph,  before  it  goes 
to  the  publisher — by  Rev.  Dr.  William  Elliot  Griffis,  of  Boston,  him 
self  an  accurate  historical  writer,  adds  one  more  to  the  many  contri 
butions  of -scholars  and  teachers,  which  stimulate  to  effort  and  call  for 
something  more  than  the  slight  modification  of  the  text. 


HYDE  PARK,  near  Boston,  January  ist,  1888. 


CONTENTS. 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  TO  SIXTH  EDITION iii 

GREETING i 

I. — The  Revolutionary  Epoch 3 

II. — Lexington  and  Concord.     Their  Lessons 8 

III. — Military  Science  the  Key  to  Military  History 13 

IV.— Apology  for  the  Military  Art 18 

V. — Wars  between  Nations 24 

VI. — Civil  War.    Distinction  between  Insurrection,  Rebellion  and  Revolution  29 

VII. — Providence  in  War  illustrated 35 

VIII. — Statesmanship  in  War  illustrated 40 

IX. — Principles  denned.      Strategy  illustrated..  .„:''. 46 

X. — Strategy  in  War  continued \    53 

XI. — Grand  Tactics  illustrated 60 

XII. — Logistics 68 

XIII. — Miscellaneous  Considerations 73 

XIV.— The  Hour  of  Preparation 82 

XV. — Bunker  Hill.     The  Occupation 92 

XVI. —                                "     Preparation ^ 99 

XVII.—       "           "           "     Battle 104 

XVIII.— Battle  of  Bunker  Hill.     Notes 112 

XIX. — The  Northern  Campaign.      Preliminary  Operations 117 

XX. — Expeditions  to  Quebec  and  Montreal.     Their  Value 122 

XXI.— The  Assault  upon  Quebec 130 

XXII. — Campaign  of  1775.      Brief  Mention 138 

XXIII. — Campaign  of  1776.     Boston  evacuated.     Concurrent  Events 146 

XXIV. — Washington  at  New  York.     April  to  July,  1776 155 

XXV. — American  Army  driven  from  Canada .  161 

XXVI. — British  Preparations.     Clinton's  Expedition  unfolded 170 

XXVII. — The  Republic  of  South  Carolina.     Preparations  for  Defense 176 

XXVIII. — Clinton's  Expedition.     Attack  on  Fort  Moultrie 185 

XXIX. — The  two  Armies  in  July  and  August,  1776 191 

XXX. — Battle  of  Long  Island.     Preparations 199 

XXXI.— Battle  of  Long  Island 207 

XXXII. — Retreat  from  Long  Island 214 

XXXIII. — The  American  Army  retires  from  New  York 220 

XXXIV. — Harlem  Heights  and  Vicinity,  1776 228 

XXXV.— Operations  near  New  York,  White  Plains,  Chatterton  Hill 234 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

XXXVI.— Operations  near  New  York.     White  Plains  to  Fort  Washington 242 

XXXVII. — Plans  and  Counter  Plans.     Fort  Washington  to  Trenton 254 

XXXVIII. — Washington  returns  the  Offensive.     Trenton  his  first  Objective 264 

XXXIX. — Hessians  surprised  at  Trenton 270 

XL. — Miscellaneous  Events.    Washington  clothed  with  Powers  of  Dictator. 

Opinions  of  Trenton 278 

XLI. — From  Princeton  to  Morristown.     The  Assanpink  and  Princeton 284 

XLII. — Minor  Events.     January  to  July,  1777 294 

XLIII. — Burgoyne's  Campaign  opened,  1777 303 

XLIV. — From  Ticonderoga  to  Fort  Edward,  1777 313 

XLV. — Fort  Schuyler,  Oriskany,  and  Bennington,  1777 322 

XLVI. — Battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 335 

XLVII.  — Bemis  Heights,  Burgoyne's  Surrender,  1777 345 

XLVIII. — Clinton's  Expedition  up  the  Hudson.     Capture  of  Forts  Clinton  ancj 

Montgomery,  1777 355 

XLIX. — Movement  on  Philadelphia.    From  New  York  to  the  Brandyvvine,  1777  362 

L. — Battle  of  Brandy  wine 369 

LI. — Operations  near  Philadelphia.     Battle  of  Germantown,  1777 382 

LII. —         "  "  "        Minor  Mention.    Close  of  Campaign,  1777  392 

LIII. —         "  "  "        From  January  to  June,  1778.  Valley  Forge. 

Barren  Hill 401 

LIV. — From  Philadelphia  to  Monmouth.     Monmouth  and  Vicinity,  1778.. .   412 

LV. — Preparations  for  the  Battle  of  Monmouth,  1778 422 

LVI. — The  Battle  of  Monmouth,  1778 433 

LVII. — From   Monmouth  to   New  York.     Siege  of  Newport.     Concurrent 

Events 446 

LVIII. — Campaign  of  1778,  July  to  December 457 

LTX. — January  to  July,   1779.     Position  of  the  Armies.      Incidents  of  the 

•  general  Campaign 463 

LX. — July  to  December,  1779.     Desolating  Incursions.     Minor  Mention. .   468 

LXI. — Siege  of  Savannah.     General  Clinton  sails  for  Charleston,  1779 477 

LXII. — January  to  July,  1780.     Condition  of  the  Armies 485 

LXIII. — South    Carolina   and    New   Jersey  invaded.      Siege  of  Charleston. 

Battle  of  Springfield,  1780 403 

LXIV. — French  Auxiliaries.    Arnold's  Treason.     Southern  Skirmishes,  1780.  503 
LXV. — Battle  of  Camden.    King's  Mountain.     Position  of  Southern  Armies.  513 
LXVI. — Minor  Mention,  1780.     European  Coalition  against  England.     Gen 
eral  Greene  at  the  South 523 

LXVII. — Condition  of  Southern  Affairs.     Mutiny  at  the  North.     Operations  of 

Generals  Greene  and  Cornwallis.     Battle  of  Cowpens 534 

LXVIII. — From  Cowpens  to  Guilford  Court  House.    Manceuvers  of  the  Armies.  547 

LXIX. — Battle  of  Guilford  Court  House 556 

LXX. — Southern  Campaign.     Battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill 566 

LXXI. — Battle  of  Eutaw  Springs.     Closing  Events  of  Southern  Campaign, 

1781.     Partisan  Warfare 577 

LXXII. — La  Fayette's  Virginia  Campaign.      Condition  of  the  two  armies 584 

LXXIII. — La  Fayette  and  Cornwallis  in  Virginia 598 

LXXIV. — Washington  and  Rochambeau.     Arnold  at  New  London.     From    the 

Hudson  to  Yorktown 617 

LXXV. — Siege  of  Yorktown.    Surrender  of  Cornwallis.  Close  of  Campaign,  1781  631 

LXXVL— Conclusion 647 

CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX 6^5 


TOPOGRAPHICAL   ILLUSTRATIONS. 


WASHINGTON Frontispiece 

i. — Outline  of  Atlantic  Coast follows  page       2 

2. — Battle  of  Bunker  Hill follows  page  in 

3. — Siege  of  Quebec "  "  137 

4. — Boston  and  Vicinity "  ''  154 

5.  — Operations  in  Canada "  "  169 

6. — Battle  of  Long  Island "  "  213 

7. — New  York  and  Vicinity "  "  227 

8. — Capture  of  Fort  Washington "  "  253 

9. — Trenton  and  Vicinity "  "  269 

10.  — Trenton  and  Princeton "  "  277 

ii. — Operations  in  New  Jersey "  "  302 

12. — Burgoyne's  Saratoga  Campaign   "  "  312 

13. — Battle  of  Hubbardton "  "  321 

14. —      "       "  Bennington "  "  334 

15.—      "       "  Freeman's  Farm "  "  344 

16. —      "       "  Bemis  Heights "  "  349 

17. — Surrender  of  Burgoyne "  "  354 

18. — Capture  of  Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery "  "  361 

19. — Battle  of  Brandywine "  "  381 

20. —              "  Germantown "  "  391 

21. — Operations  on  the  Delaware "  "  395 

22. —                      near  Philadelphia "  "  398 

23. — Encampment  at  Valley  Forge "  "  401 

24. — La  Fayette  at  Barren  Hill "  "  407 

25. — Battle  of  Monmouth "  "  445 

26. — Siege  of  Newport "  "  456 

27. —     "       "  Savannah "  "  483 

28. —     "       "Charleston "  "  497 

29.— Battle  of  Springfield "  "  502 

30. — Outline  Map  of  Hudson  River,  Highlands "  "  512 

31. — Battle  of  Camden "  "  522 

32.— Arnold  at  Richmond  and  Petersburg "  "  533 

33. — Battle  of  Cowpens "  "  546 

34. — Operations  in  Southern  States "  "  556 

35. — Battle  of  Guilford "  "  565 

36.—     "       "  Hobkirk's  Hill "  "  575 

37. —     "       "  Eutaw  Springs "  "  582 

38. — Operations  in  Chesapeake  Bay "  '''  596 

39. — La  Fayette  in  Virginia "  "  616 

40. — Benedict  Arnold  at  New  London "  "  629 

41. — Siege  of  Yorktown "  "  645 


GREETING. 


IT  is  eminently  proper  that  an  effort  to  give  fresh  distinctness  to 
facts  and  principles  should  be  introduced  to  the  public  by  some 
outline  of  the  method  adopted. 

The  author  has  accepted  the  reports  of  commanding  officers  as  to 
all  matters  peculiarly  within  their  personal  knowledge,  unless  some 
serious  conflict  of  opinion,  or  marked  discrepancy  in  statements  of 
fact,  has  compelled  resort  to  other  authority. 

Anecdotes,  whether  authentic  or  traditional,  as  well  as  incidents 
affecting  the  personal  habits  or  life,  of  officers  engaged  in  the  Revolu 
tionary  War,  are  excluded  from  consideration.  So  long  as  military 
negligence,  errors  of  judgment,  or  of  execution,  and  incompetency, 
or  the  correlative  excellencies,  can  be  determined  from  operations  and 
results,  without  the  introduction  of  special  criticism,  it  has  been  more 
agreeable  to  the  author,  and  more  consonant  with  the  spirit  of  this 
undertaking,  to  submit  all  issues  to  that  simple  test. 

The  Bibliographical  Table,  at  the  end  of  the  volume,  embraces  the 
list  of  authors  consulted. 

No  statements  of  fact  have  been  made  without  responsible 
authority. 

No  map  has  been  completed  without  the  careful  study  of  those 
heretofore  published,  and  of  many  never  in  print  at  all,  and  a  personal 
examination  of  the  battle-fields,  or  consultation  with  those  who  have 
made  such  examination. 

In  the  correction  of  river  courses,  as  in  the  "  Plan  of  the  Battle  of 
Monmouth,"  reference  has  been  made  to  modern  atlases  and  actual 
surveys,  geological  or  otherwise. 

The  delineation  of  surface  is  not  designed  to  furnish  a  technical 
exactness  of  detail,  but  aims  to  so  impress  the  reader  with  the  objective 
of  the  text,  that  there  may  be  that  real  recognition  of  the  battle-fields 
and  battle  movements  which  topographical  illustration  alone  can 
supply. 


GREETING.  _i?75 

•'inducements  which  led  the  author  to  preface  the  historical 
record  with  simple  outlines  of  military  science  are  elsewhere  stated. 

While  it  has  appeared  best  to  avoid  technical  terms  as  a  general 
rule,  there  has  been  ever  present,  as  the  prime  incentive  to  the  whole 
work,  the  assurance  that  the  education  of  the  times,  and  the  depend 
ence  of  all  authority  upon  the  people  for  its  ultimate  protection, 
enforce  upon  the  people  the  consideration  of  military  principles,  as 
well  as  of  military  history.  A  nation  which  values  a  patriotic  record, 
and  has  the  nerve  to  sustain  that  record,  is  never  harmed  by  an  intel 
ligent  idea  of  "  The  principles  which  underlie  the  national  defence." 
The  dedication  of  this  volume  is  therefore  the  key  to  its  mission. 

The  impulse  which  started  this  venture  upon  the  sea  of  thought 
has  gained  fresh  breath  from  the  sympathy  of  scholar  and  soldier. 
The  words  of  Bancroft,  Woolsey,  Day,  Evarts,  Brinsmade  and  Crane, 
and  of  Generals  Sherman,  Townsend,  and  Humphreys,  have  imparted 
courage,  as  well  as  zest,  to  both  study  and  execution. 

If  nothing  new  has  been  evolved  out  of  fresh  readings  of  many 
authors,  there  will  be  this  satisfaction  to  the  citizen  or  stranger — that 
the  substantial  issues  of  arms  which  marked  the  war  of  American 
Revolution  have  been  compressed  into  a  single  volume ;  that  the 
topographical  illustrations  are  in  harmony  with  all  fair  historical 
narratives  of  that  war,  and  that  they  so  reconcile  the  reports  of 
opposing  commanders  as  to  give  some  intelligible  idea  of  the  battle- 
issues  themselves. 

It  would  be  indeed  rude  not  to  thank  the  British  and  French 
authorities,  American  Legations  abroad,  and  many  eminent  scholars 
of  both  countries,  as  well  as  gentlemen  in  charge  of  American  public 
libraries,  who  extended  courtesies,  facilitated  research,  and  expressed 
their  warm  sympathy,  during  visits  in  behalf  of  the  enterprise  now 
floating  out  of  port  to  meet  its  destiny. 

It  w.ould  be  a  violation  of  honor  not  to  testify  of  obligation  to  one 
who,  long  since,  visited  every  battle-field  herein  discussed,  who 
obtained  from  survivors  of  the  revolutionary  struggle  the  data  which 
otherwise  would  have  had  no  record,  and  who,  as  the  only  living  link 
which  connects  times  present  with  times  a  hundred  years  ago — has 
invited  the  author  to  share  the  benefit  of  his  labors,  and  has  made 
possible  much  that  must  have  been  crude  or  imperfect  but  for  the 
generous  cooperation  of  BENSON  J.  LOSSTNG 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE    REVOLUTIONARY    EPOCH. 

THE  soldiers  of  1775-1781  were  not  deficient  in  military  skill  and 
ready  appliance  of  the  known  enginery  and  principles  of  war. 
In  spite  of  modern  improvements  in  gunnery,  transportation,  and 
hospital  adjustments,  and  in  all  that  relates  to  pure  Logistics,  there 
has  been  no  substitution  of  agencies  that  has  involved  other  prin 
ciples  than  those  which  belonged  to  those  campaigns.  Then,  as 
now,  every  contest  was  largely  determined  by  the  skillful  application 
of  the  laws  which  underlie  all  human  success.  Even  the  introduction 
of  steam-propulsion  has  not  suspended  the  laws  of  Nature,  which 
laws,  for  all  time,  have  made  sport  of  those  who  go  upon  the  sea  in 
ships.  The  repeated  storms  which  diverted  British  and  French  fleets 
from  their  projected  course,  or  those  which  affected  the  operations  on 
land  at  times  of  real  crisis,  are  not  without  their  equally  decisive 
counterparts  in  all  wars  of  early  or  later  date.  It  is  an  instructive 
fact,  in  military  as  in  civil  life,  to  illustrate  the  inability  of  human  fore 
sight  to  force  the  future  to  its  feet  and  then  compel  its  issues.  No 
more  then  than  since  did  the  negligence  of  a  picket-guard,  the  reck 
lessness  of  a  rash  leader,  or  the  waste  of  a  commissary,  prove  fatal  to 
well-advised  movements  and  blast  a  fair  promise  of  real  fruit.  Then, 
as  since,  one  gallant  defense  at  an  unexpected  point,  one  error  of 
guides,  one  precipitancy  of  an  issue  not  fully  ripe,  determined  that 
issue  adversely. 

Then,  as  since,  injustice  to  an  antagonist,  or  an  undue  confidence 
in  attack  or  defense,  brought  dismal  defeat.  Then,  as  ever,  the 
violation  of  the  claims  of  humanity,  contempt  for  conscientious  oppo 
nents  and  attempts  to  use  force  beyond  a  righteous  limit,  worked  its 
fatal  reaction ;  and  then,  as  since,  the  interference  of  cabinets,  or  the 


4  THE   REVOLUTIONARY   EPOCH.  [1775, 

substitution  of  extrinsic  for  vital  issues,  worked  the  discomfiture  of 
wise  military  plans  on  either  side  of  the  struggle.  It  is  equally  true 
that  in  the  face  of  the  more  sharply  defined  social  grades  then  exist 
ing  the  general  spirit  of  the  warfare  was  honorable  to  both  parties  ; 
and  the  issues  between  Washington  and  Howe,  or  other  generals  of 
responsible  command,  as  disclosed  in  their  correspondence,  were  as 
courteously  discussed  as  are  like  issues  now. 

Even  with  the  modern  miracle  of  journalism,  which  fastens  its 
imprint  upon  the  minutest  word  or  fact  in  the  career  of  men  and 
nations,  there  is  as  much  of  license,  of  hyperbole  and  partisan  abuse, 
as  in  those  days  when  the  mother  country  and  the  colonies  engaged 
in  a  deadly  wrestle.  Jealousies  of  rank,  thirst  for  office,  aspersions  of 
character,  and  suspicions  of  all  who  attained  success,  had  their  place 
then,  as  since  ;  and  as  a  century  of  time  has  revived  only  the  more 
agreeable  features  of  that  struggle,  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that 
Howe  and  Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  as  well  as  Washington  and  his 
generals,  had  their  heartaches  as  well  as  their  laurels,  and  administered 
their  trusts  under  responsibilities  and  burdens  never  surpassed. 

The  war  itself  was  no  sudden  rebellion  against  authority,  nor  a 
merely  captious  and  arbitrary  assertion  of  the  popular  will.  It  was 
even  then  admitted  by  the  noblest  of  English  statesmen  that  the 
English  government,  as  so  tersely  stated  by  Mr.  Bancroft,  "  made  war 
on  the  life  of  her  own  life." 

The  era  of  facts,  therefore,  which  marks  this  volume,  was  the  fruit 
of  English  thought  relating  back  to  Magna-Charta. 

Humanity  made  constant  progress  in  the  assertion  of  normal 
rights,  and  the  passing  issues  which  ripened  into  American  independ 
ence  only  indicated  the  culmination  of  those  issues  to  a  more  substan 
tial  vindication.  Prerogative  of  church  and  state,  the  centralization 
of  property  and  authority,  the  irresponsibility  to  the  people  of  men 
who  asserted  absolutism  by  virtue  of  ancestry,  or  the  so-called  divine 
right,  had  involved  England  in  bloody  wars,  alienated  faithful  subjects, 
induced  domestic  disorders,  and  made  natural,  as  certain,  the  separa 
tion  of  the  American  colonies. 

Emancipation  from  Papal  dictation  did  not  bring  a  corresponding 
grant  of  genuine  religious  liberty  to  the  earnest  people. 

Human  conscience,  bound  to  its  Author  by  intrinsic  obligation, 
which  no  human  authority  can  long  control  or  evade,  asserted  its 
power  over  the  lives  and  conduct  of  sober-minded  men. 

The  bonds  which  confined  its  expression,  and  drove  devout  Chris- 


I775-J  THE   REVOLUTIONARY   EPOCH.  5 

tian  men  and  women  to  secret  conclave  and  worship,  became  too 
stringent  for  those  who  obeyed  God  as  the  Supreme  Arbiter  of  life 
present  and  life  future. 

The  presumption  that  the  governed  should  have  a  voice  in  shap 
ing  the  policy  which  exercised  control,  was  solved  by  its  positive 
averment  as  a  principle ;  and  the  reluctance  of  authority  to  bend  its 
measures  to  meet  this  human  craving  and  rightful  demand,  only 
quickened  the  sentiment  of  resistance  to  every  evasion  or  defiance 
of  the  right.  Every  domestic  struggle  which  marked  the  centuries 
of  British  growth,  had  this  warp  for  every  woof. 

Invisible,  but  present !  despised,  but  quick  with  life,  the  new  ele 
ment  was  giving  robustness  and  nerve  to  the  British  people,  and  both 
shape  and  endurance  to  the  British  constitution. 

The  state  itself,  as  it  began  to  feel  the  spur  of  the  new  impulse, 
began  also  to  render  tribute  to  the  true  patriotism  which  a  high  moral 
and  religious  obligation  alone  develops. 

The  interregnum  of  Cromwell  was  resplendent  with  national 
glory ;  and  the  enthusiasm  of  free  men  began  to  testify  in  clear  and 
significant  tones  of  the  greatness  of  a  people,  who  so  freely  con 
tributed  of  life  and  treasure  to  dignify  and  maintain  a  genuine  national 
liberty. 

Ripe  statesmen  and  hereditary  officials,  alike,  saw  the  drift  of 
human  thought  ;  but,  as  this  pulse-beat  strengthened,  the  hatred  of 
innovation,  and  cultivated  doubt  of  the  capacity  and  nerve  of  the 
commons  to  mingle  with  and  share  the  control  of  public  affairs  pro 
longed  the  established  contempt  for  the  commons,  while  intensify 
ing  the  popular  purpose  to  resist  the  presumption  of  caste  and  undele 
gated  authority. 

The  exodus  of  colonists   to  America,  was  the  combined  fruit  of 
this  misconception  of  the  rights   of  the  people,  and  of  the  latent 
resistance  which  rules  the  life  whenever  the  human  soul  makes  duty 
its  purpose,  and  conscience  its  guide. 

The  Puritans  of  New  England,  the  Huguenots  of  South  Carolina, 
and  the  emigrants  to  Maryland,  alike  shared  in  the  impulse  to  escape 
from  hierarchical  control,  and  work  for  freedom,  self-government,  and 
the  best  interests  of  the  governed.  The  emigration  to  Maryland 
had  its  small  element  which  maintained  the  obligation  of  conscience 
to  superior,  foreign  control ;  but  the  majority,  who  were  laboring 
men,  and  independent  of  every  such  obligation,  asserted  their  due 
share  in  giving  shape  to  the  colony,  and  thus  its  birth-hour  was 


THE   REVOLUTIONARY   EPOCH.  [1775 

accompanied  by  the  same  birth-rights  which  made  the  New  England 
colonies  memorable  for  all  time. 

A  century,  and  then  a  half  century  more,  passed  by,  while  the 
dynastic  element  persistently  failed  to  realize  the  fact,  that  the  col 
onies  were  energized  by  principles  which  belonged  to  man  by  right, 
and  which  no  physical  forms  could  long  restrain. 

They  were  the  principles  which,  in  fact,  made  Great  Britain  great. 
The  Anglo-Saxon  blood  was  directing  the  heart-beats,  but  it  had  the 
oxygen  of  a  higher  life,  and  a  bolder,  if  not  a  fiercer,  activity.  Prompt 
to  meet  obligation  and  render  legitimate  homage  to  lawful  authority, 
it  brooked  no  trammels  which  partook  of  oppression  or  injustice  ; 
still  hopeful,  and  for  a  long  time  confident,  that  sagacious  statesmen 
would  so  control  and  shape  dynastic  power  as  to  admit  of  genuine 
loyalty  without  the  loss  of  self-respect. 

The  old  French  war  of  1756,  brought  home  to  the  colonies  some 
very  heavy  responsibilities,  and  these  they  met  with  a  free  expendi 
ture  of  blood  and  treasure.  But  it  taught  them  how  much  they  must 
cultivate  their  own  resources,  and  how  little  could  be  realized  from 
the  throne,  in  the  assurance  of  a  pervasive  and  lasting  peace. 

Sacrifices  brought  only  partial  equivalents,  so  that  ordinary  taxes 
took  the  color  of  enforced  tribute.  Slowly  but  surely  the  procrasti 
nation,  uncertainty,  and  prevarications  of  officials  compelled  the  sub 
jects  to  repeated  demonstrations  of  their  wishes,  and  of  their  claim  to 
be  represented  in  the  councils  of  the  nation,  until  the  Revolution 
enforced  their  will  and  determined  their  future. 

After  the  lapse  of  more  than  a  century,  the  great  English  Nation 
and  the  American  Republic  review  that  period  of  struggle  with  equal 
satisfaction,  as  the  evidence  of  the  superintending  control  of  a  Higher 
Authority,  and  both  nations  accept  the  results  of  the  war  and  the 
developments  since  realized,  as  the  best  possible  conclusion  of  the 
ordeal  undergone,  and  the  best  pledge  to  the  world  of  the  spirit  with 
which  both  nations  shall  aim  to  dignify  national  life,  while  honoring 
the  rights  and  highest  interests  of  every  individual  life. 

The  power  and  glory  of  England,  are  not  in  her  army  or  navy,  or 
her  displays  of  physical  force,  so  much  as  in  the  development  of  all  her 
people  of  all  classes,  in  the  culture  and  ripeness  which  peace  and  free 
dom  involve.  And  the  American  Republic,  which  dismissed  to  thei* 
farms  and  merchandise  a  million  men,  when  their  use  was  needless, 
while  unarmed,  is,  by  the  compensations  of  intelligence  and  industry, 
armed  to  the  teeth  against  all  unrighteous  intervention  or  violence. 


I775-]  THE   REVOLUTIONARY   EPOCH.  7 

It  is  the  earnest  man  of  peace,  calmly  pursuing  life's  ends,  render 
ing  justice  and  thus  deserving  justice,  who,  in  the  aggregate,  makes  a 
state  respected  ;  and  thus  let  the  future  develop  both  mother  country 
and  its  first  born,  so  that  the  world  shall  render  to  each  the  homage 
which  every  true  man  deserves  ! 


CHAPTER     II. 

LEXINGTON    AND    CONCORD.      THEIR   LESSONS. 

r  I  ^HE  skirmishes  of  Lexington  and  Concord  were  such  pulsations 
J[  of  an  excited  people  as  not  to  have  a  proper  place  in  a  strict 
Battle  Record,  except  as  they  mark  the  progress  of  public  sentiment 
toward  the  maturing  issue  of  general  war. 

Raw  militia,  jealous  of  the  right  to  bear  arms,  and  thoroughly  set 
in  purpose,  to  vindicate  that  right  and  all  the  franchises  of  a  free  peo 
ple,  by  the  extreme  test  of  liberty  or  life,  had  faced  the  disciplined 
troops  of  Great  Britain,  without  fear  or  penalty. 

The  quickening  sentiment  which  gave  nerve  to  the  arm,  steadiness 
to  the  heart,  and  force  to  the  blow,  was  one  of  those  historic  expres 
sions  of  human  will,  which  over-master  discipline  itself.  It  was  the 
method  of  an  inspired  madness.  The  onset  swept  back  a  solid  column 
of  trained  soldiers,  because  the  moral  force  of  the  energizing  passion 
was  imperative  and  supreme.  No  troops  in  the  world  could  have 
resisted  that  movement.  Discipline,  training,  and  courage  are  expo 
nents  of  real  power ;  but  there  must  be  something  more  than  these 
to  enable  any  moderate  force  of  armed  men  to  cope  with  a  people 
already  on  fire  with  the  conviction,  that  the  representatives  of  national 
force  are  employed  to  smother  the  national  life.  The  troops  them 
selves  had  a  hard  ordeal  to  undergo.  Sent  out  to  collect  or  destroy 
some  munitions  of  war,  and  not  to  engage  an  enemy,  they  were  under 
a  restraint  that  stripped  them  of  real  fitness  to  meet  so  startling  an 
issue  as  one  of  open  resistance  and  active  assault.  There  was  a  clear 
reluctance  on  their  part,  to  use  force  until  the  first  hasty  delivery  of 
fire  opened  hostilities. 

The  ill-judged  policy  which  precipitated  these  memorable  skir 
mishes  was  directly  in  the  way  of  military  success.  It  impaired  the 
confidence  of  soldiers  in  their  ability  to  maintain  the  impending 


I?75  -j  LEXINGTON  AND   CONCORD.  9 

struggle,  while  at  the  same  time  intensifying  the  fever  and  strength 
ening  the  nerve  of  the  uprising  commons. 

Lexington  and  Concord  were  the  exponents  of  that  daring  which 
made  the  resistance  on  Breed's  Hill  possible.  The  invincibility  of 
discipline  was  shattered,  when  the  prestige  of  the  army  went  down 
before  the  rifles  of  farmers.  The  first  tendency  was  to  make  those 
farmers  too  confident  of  the  physical  strength  of  moral  opinions,  and 
to  underrate  the  value  of  an  organized  force.  Years  of  sacrifice  and 
waste,  enforced  an  appreciation  of  its  value  ;  and  the  failures,  flights, 
and  untoward  vicissitudes  of  many  battle-fields  were  made  their 
instructors  in  the  art  of  war. 

The  military  demonstration  of  April  igth,  1775,  was  but  supple 
mental  to  similar  movements  for  the  suppression  of  the  general  arm 
ing,  and  for  the  seizure  of  guns  and  powder,  which  began  in  1774. 

A  battery  had  been  established  on  Boston  Neck  as  early  as  Au 
gust  of  that  year.  The  citizens  had  refused  to  furnish  quarters  for  the 
royal  troops,  and  when  the  government,  during  the  month  of  Sep 
tember,  attempted  to  build  public  barracks,  the  mechanics  of  Boston 
refused  to  work  at  any  price,  and  both  artisans  and  laborers  had  to  be 
brought  from  the  colony  of  New  York.  Under  date  of  August 
twenty-seventh,  1775,  Dr.  Joseph 'Warren  wrote  as  follows  :  u  As  yet, 
we  have  been  preserved  from  action  with  the  soldiery,  and  we  shall 
endeavor  to  avoid  it  until  we  see  that  it  is  necessary,  and  a  settled 
plan  is  fixed  on  for  that  purpose."  * 

The  Provincial  Congress  that  organized  Qctober- 'twenty-sixth 
adopted  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  the  militia,  with  the  express 
understanding  that  one-fourth  of  fhe-  aggregate  force  should  be  in 
readiness  for  service  at  the  shortest  notice.  The  "  minute  men  "  of 
the  Revolution,  were  thus  called  into  being. 

Artemas  Ward  and  Seth  Pomeroy  were  chosen  general  officers. 
A  concentration  of  military  stores  and  arms  at  Concord  and  Worces 
ter  was  formally  authorized.  Under  date  of  November  tenth,  Gen 
eral  Gage  denounced  as  treasonable  the  proceedings  of  that  body. 

On  the  ninth  day  of  February,  1776,  a  second  Provincial  Congress, 
"  empowered  and  directed  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  to 
assemble  the  militia  whenever  it  was  required,  to  resist  the  execution 
of  certain  Acts  of  Parliament,"  just  then  promulged. 

The  following  citizens  composed  that  committee,  viz.,  John  Han 
cock,  Joseph  Warren,  Benjamin  Church,  Richard  Devens,  Benjamin 
White,  Joseph  Palmer,  Abraham  Watson,  Azor  Orne,  John  Pigeon, 
William  Heath,  and  Thomas  Gardner. 


10  LEXINGTON  AND   CONCORD.  [1775- 

The  following  "  Committee  of  Supplies,"  was  announced,  viz., 
Elbridge  Gerry,  David  Cheever,  Benjamin  Lincoln,  Moses  Gill,  and 
Benjamin  Hall. 

At  the  same  time,  John  Thomas  and  William  Heath  were  added 
to  the  list  of  general  officers.  That  legislative  body  went  so  far 
as  to  warn  the  people  that  it  was,  "  The  Christian  and  social  duty  of 
each  individual,  with  a  proper  sense  of  dependence  on  God,  to  defend 
those  rights  which  heaven  gave  them,  and  no  one  ought  to  take  from 
them." 

By  the  first  day  of  January,  1775,  the  garrison  of  Boston  had  been 
increased  to  thirty-five  hundred  men,  and  mounted  three  hundred 
and  seventy  men  as  a  daily  guard-detail,  besides  a  field-officers'  guard 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  on  Boston  Neck.  Three  brigades  were 
organized  and  were  officered,  respectively,  by  Generals  Lord  Percy, 
Pigott  and  Jones.  In  November  of  1774,  General  Gage  had  advised 
the  British  government,  that  he,  "  was  confident,  that  to  begin  with  an 
army  twenty  thousand  strong,  would  in  the  end  save  Great  Britain 
blood  and  treasure." 

Meanwhile,  the  militia  drilled  openly,  rapidly  completed  company 
organizations,  and  made  many  sacrifices  to  procure  arms,  powder 
and  other  materials  of  war.  The  Home  government,  in  view  of  the 
serious  aspect  of  affairs,  ordered  Generals  Howe,  Clinton,  and  Bur- 
goyne  to  join  General  Gage,  and  announced  that  "  ample  reinforce 
ments  would  be  sent  out,  and  the  most  speedy  and  effectual  measures 
would  be  taken  to  put  down  the  rebellion,"  then  pronounced  to 
already  exist. 

On  the  eighth  of  April,  the  Provincial  Congress  resolved  to  take 
effectual  measures  to  raise  an  army,  and  requested  the  cooperation 
of  Rhode  Island,  New  Hampshire,  and  Connecticut.  On  the  thir 
teenth,  it  voted  to  raise  six  companies  of  artillery,  to  pay  them,  and 
keep  them  at  drill.  On  the  fourteenth,  it  advised  citizens  to  leave 
Boston  and  to  remove  to  the  country.  On  the  fifteenth,  it  solemnly 
appointed  a  day  for  "  Public  Fasting  and  Prayer,"  and  adjourned  to 
the  tenth  day  of  May. 

The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  at  once  undertook  the  task  of 
securing  powder,  cannon  and  small  arms.  A  practical  embargo  was 
laid  upon  all  trade  with  Boston.  The  garrison  could  obtain  supplies 
only  with  great  difficulty,  and,  as  stated  by  Gordon,  "  nothing  was 
wanting  but  a  spark,  to  set  the  whole  continent  in  a  flame." 

As  a   matter  of  military  policy,  the  statesmanship  of  war,  the 


I775.J  LEXINGTON  AND   CONCORD.  II 

whole  drift  of  the  Governor's  conduct  was  not  to  placate,  but  to 
excite  the  people.  It  was  the  precursor  of  military  failure.  All 
demonstrations  were  those  of  force,  and  not  those  of  wisdom.,  or 
comity.  His  purpose  to  seize  the  stores  then  accumulating  at  Con 
cord  had  no  indorsement  of  his  officers  or  council,  for  he  advised 
with  neither.  It  was  predicated  upon  his  individual  opinion,  by 
which  he  afterwards  sought  to  justify  his  conduct,  that  the  show  of 
force  in  the  field  and  the  arrest  of  leading  patriots  would  extinguish 
the  rebellion. 

This  rapid  and  very  partial  outline  of  events  which  immediately 
preceded  the  skirmishes  of  Concord  and  Lexington,  is  important  in 
order  to  disclose  the  circumstances  which  so  quickly  culminated  in 
the  siege  of  Boston,  the  action  on  Breed's  Hill,  and  the  evacuation 
of  the  city.  General  Gage,  as  he  said,  communicated  his  plan  for 
seizure  of  the  stores  at  Concord  to  but  one  person,  and  yet  it  was 
soon  known  to  Hancock  and  Adams,  so  that  the  colonists  took 
prompt  measures  to  meet  the  issue.  When  Lord  Percy  left  Head 
quarters  on  the  evening  of  April  eighteenth,  he  passed  a  group  of 
men,  on  Boston  Common,  and  heard  one  man  say  :  "  The  British 
troops  have  marched,  but  they  will  miss  their  aim."  "  What  aim  ?" 
in  juired  Lord  Percy,  "  Why,  the  cannon  at  Concord,"  was  the  reply. 

The  detachment,  consisting  of  the  Grenadiers  of  the  garrison, 
the  Light  Infantry,  and  Major  Pitcairn,  of  the  Marines,  all  under  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith  of  the  Tenth  regiment  of  infantry, 
started  on  the  night  of  the  eighteenth,  with  every  reason  to  believe 
that  their  movement  was  a  secret  to  all  but  the  Governor  and  them: 
selves.  Taking  boats  up  the  Charles  river  as  far  as  PrftppsV-farm, 
now  Lechmere  Point,  they  landed  promptly,  &&d  pushed  for  Con 
cord,  twenty  miles  from  Boston.  The  ringing  of  bells  and  the  firing 
of  small  arms  soon  showed  that  the  country  was  aroused.  A  mes 
senger  was  sent  for  reinforcements.  Sixteen  companies  of  foot, 
and  a  detachment  of  marines,  under  Lord  Percy,  was  promptly 
advanced  to  their  support,  uniting  with  them  at  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  on  their  return  from  Concord,  and  making  the  aggre 
gate  of  the  entire  command  about  eighteen  hundred  men. 

This  eventful  day  closed.  The  stores  at  Concord,  which  had  not 
been  removed,  were  destroyed.  The  casualties  on  the  British  side 
were  seventy-three  killed,  one  hundred  and  seventy  four  wounded, 
twenty  six  missing.  The  colonists  lost  forty-nine  killed,  thirty-nine 
wounded,  and  five  missing. 


12  LEXINGTON  AND   CONCORD.  [177*. 

Stedman  thus  sums  up  the  result.  "  The  events  of  the  day  on 
which  blood  was  first  shed,  in  the  contest  between  Great  Britain  and 
her  colonies,  served  to  show  that  if  the  Americans  were  unacquainted 
with  military  discipline,  they  were  not  destitute  of  either  courage  or 
conduct,  but  knew  well  how,  and  dared,  to  avail  themselves  of  such 
advantages  as  they  possessed.  A  kind  of  military  furor  had  by  this 
time  seized  the  inhabitants  of  the  colonies.  They  were  willing  to 
risk  the  consequences  of  opposing  in  the  field,  their  juvenile  ardor  to 
the  matured  strength  of  the  parent  state,  and  in  this  resolution  they 
were  encouraged  to  persist,  by  recollecting  the  events  of  the  nine 
teenth  of  April,  by  which  it  appeared,  according  to  their  manner  of 
reasoning,  that  in  such  a  country  as  America,  abounding  in  danger 
ous  passes  and  woody  defiles,  the  British  troops,  with  all  their  valor, 
discipline  and  military  skill,  were  not,  when  opposed  to  the  Am&ri- 
cans,  so  formidable  as  had  been  generally  apprehended." 

The  promptness,  coolness  and  moderation  of  Lord  Percy  saved 
the  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith.  It  was  worn  out  by  hard 
marching,  and  the  fretful  kind  of  warfare  which  decimated  its  ranks, 
and  only  under  the  escort  of  his  command  were  they  enabled  to 
reach  Boston  in  safety.  It  is  a  historical  fact,  that  Major  Pitcairn, 
whose  reputation  and  character  were  of  a  high  order,  deeply  felt  the 
misfortune  which  so  intimately  associated  his  name  with  the  affair  at 
Lexington. 

Dr.  Dwight  says  that  the  expedition  to  Concord,  "  was  one  which 
in  other  circumstances  would  have  been  merely  of  little  tales  of 
wonder  and  woe,  but  it  became  the  preface  to  the  history  of  a  nation, 
the  beginning  of  an  empire,  and  a  theme  of  disquisition  and  astonish 
ment  to  the  civilized  world." 

The  issue  was  joined.  The  siege  of  Boston  followed.  The  begin 
ning  of  the  end  began  to  appear  in  full  view  of  many  English  states 
men,  and  thenceforth  their  disregarded  warnings,  and  their  unex 
ampled  assurance  of  sympathy  with  the  American  people,  were 
among  the  most  inspiring  elements  which  sustained  the  struggle  and 
assured  the  ultimate  result. 

And  now,  that  the  presentation  of  some  of  the  principles  which 
distinguished  the  epoch  of  the  American  Revolution  and  gave  char 
acter  as  well  as  strength  to  the  new  State,  and  a  brief  statement  as 
to  the  issue  at  arms  which  introduced  the  struggle  have  been  made, 
the  discussion  of  the  art  of  war  is  next  in  order,  to  be  followed  by 
its  application  to  the  battle-issues  themselves. 


CHAPTER     III. 

MILITARY    SCIENCE   THE    KEY   TO   MILITARY    HISTORY. 

IT  is  a  prime  factor  in  the  right  estimate  of  any  historical  epoch, 
or  issue,  that  the  data  command  confidence  ;  and  the  value  of  all 
conclusions  will  be  determined  by  the  fitness  with  which  cognate 
principles  are  applied  to  the  events  or  characters  unfolded. 

The  integrity  of  a  narrative  may  indeed  be  verified  through  the 
absolute  want  of  conformity  to  another  version  ;  but  the  consistency 
of  either  with  a  sound  final  judgment  must  depend  upon  the  success 
of  the  effort  to  clear  the  story  of  all  extrinsic  color  and  stage-effect 
which  the  locus,  or  animus  of  the  author  has  cast  upon  the  scenes  and 
actors.  To  review  the  battles  of  the  American  Revolution  and  so 
test  their  record  as  to  impart  lessons  of  value  to  the  student  of  mili 
tary  science,  is  equally  an  effort  to  interest  the  general  scholar ;  and 
the  earnest  youth  who  struggles  to  attain  ripeness  for  true  citizenship 
by  aesthetic  culture  and  faithful  brain^work,  cannot  afford  to  break 
away  from  the  examination,  as  from  some  cold  and  barren  sphere  of 
thought. 

More  than  this  is  involved  in  the  present  discussion.1  History  is 
the  life-record  of  man,  and  its  fruitage  matures  in  proportion  as 
experience  evolves  wisdom  for  the  future.  National  history  is  there 
fore  not  the  exclusive  possession  of  its  subject ;  but  stands  as  a  wit 
ness  to  all  nations,  and  it  is  their  right  as  well  as  duty  to  demand  a 
just  interpretation  of  its  facts. 

Patriotism  that  is  mature  and  abiding,  is  linked  with  charity. 
Justice  is  embosomed  with  love  of  country.  Both  elements  attach 
to  an  abiding  record. 

We  measure  a  painting  by  the  rules  of  art,  and  gauge  a  freshly 
invented  motor  by  the  principles  applied.  Thus,  also,  and  in  a  truly 
catholic  spirit,  are  battles  and  bat  tie -direct  ion  to  be  estimated,  and 


14  MILITARY   SCIENCE  THE   KEY   TO   MILITARY   HISTORY,       [i775- 

thus  alone  can  there  be  developed  out  of  human  conflict  some 
enduring  product  for  the  instruction  and  benefit  of  succeeding  gen 
erations. 

While  all  axiomatic  truth  is  but  indifferently  served  by  many 
who,  of  necessity,  bow  to  its  dicta ;  so  a  worthy  purpose  may  fail  of 
standard  fruition  through  fault  of  the  agent.  The  proposed  discus 
sion  seeks  to  analyze  all  accessible  data,  and  thus  afford  to  the  gen 
eral  student  some  basis  for  sound  judgment  as  to  the  battle-fields 
and  battle-direction  of  the  war  of  the  American  Revolution,  while 
applying  to  their  elucidation  those  accepted  principles  of  military 
science  which  impart  value  to  military  action. 

The  consideration  of  minor  issues  and  isolated  skirmishes  is 
foreign  to  the  purpose ;  but  it  is  requisite,  that  the  annual  campaigns 
of  the  struggle  shall  obtain  their  legitimate  sequence,  and  hold  their 
intrinsic  relations  to  the  ultimate  achievement  of  American  Inde 
pendence. 

The  swift  progress  of  international  courtesy  in  the  direction 
of  closer  national  affinities  imparts  signal  interest  to  the  investi 
gation  ;  and  although  an  era  of  universal  peace  is  not  already  over 
lapped  by  the  hastening  present,  it  is  safe  to  assert  that  the  time 
has  come  when  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  can  pleasantly 
do  justice  to  old-time  valor,  and  welcome,  as  already  assured,  a  future 
identity  of  aspiration  and  progress. 

Other  incidents  peculiar  to  this  age  of  general  education,  force  the 
people  themselves  to  a  closer  view,  and  wiser  appreciation  of  military 
art.  Great  Britain  already  depends  largely  upon  her  organized  militia 
for  national  defense.  Her  regular  army,  the  nucleus  for  efficient 
expansion,  is  but  a  national  police,  to  watch  over  her  world-wide 
interests,  and  assure  her  subjects  that  the  mother  country  does  not 
neglect  the  rights  of  any  who  render  homage. 

The  mobilization  of  Germany  and  the  conscript  'system  of  France 
bear  home  to  every  household  the  consideration  of  military  contin 
gencies  and  military  antecedents.  But  it  is  true  of  the  United  States, 
as  of  Great  Britain,  that  the  regular  army  has  but  light  responsibility 
for  domestic  peace.  The  conservation  of  resources,  attended  by 
education  of  the  masses  and  the  wise  development  of  industrial  labor, 
furnish  a  basis  of  resistance  to  assault  from  without,  that  will  wear 
out  any  antagonist  which  estimates  its  means  of  aggression  by  the 
numerical  list  of  bristling  bayonets  which  it  holds  in  position,  at  the 
expense  of  civil  growth. 


I775-]      MILITARY   SCIENCE   THE   KEY   TO   MILITARY   HISTORY.  15 

Continental  army  budgets,  and  continental  military  dilation  have 
mvolved  one  error  ;  and  the  American  militia  system,  notwithstanding 
its  elasticity  and  its  prodigious  expenditures  of  vital  force  in  an 
extreme  hour  of  national  peril,  has  involved  an  equally  serious  error. 
The  responsibility  for  military  direction  has  been  cast  upon  military 
experts  exclusively ;  or  the  attainment  of  high  positions  by  the 
adventurer  has  developed  the  idea  that  any  good  patriot  might,  by 
easy  transition,  leap  to  a  place  of  honorable  command,  and  discharge 
its  functions  with  eminent  success. 

But  the  philosophy  of  war  is  not  exclusively  within  the  province 
of  the  military  man,  and  there  are  governing  laws  which  translate  the 
events  of  battle  history,  and  impart  to  them  a  life  and  meaning  well 
worthy  the  sober  thought  of  the  citizen  and  scholar. 

Hitherto,  the  literature  of  military  science  has  been  addressed  to 
experts  only,  and  the  world  at  large  has  been  satisfied  with  some 
graphic  narrative,  regardless  of  the  mental  processes  which  evolved 
the  results  and  made  success  possible,  or  assured  defeat.  While 
physics  and  physiology  are  deemed  indispensable  to  every  sound 
curriculum  of  study,  the  logic  of  war  has  been  as  listlessly  and  coolly 
ignored,  as  if  its  precepts  imposed  upon  the  time  of  the  general 
scholar,  and  were  utterly  foreign  to  a  sound  education  of  the  young 
men  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

In  Continental  Europe,  however,  with  a  little  more  of  theoretical 
instruction,  the  physical  drill  in  arms  has  largely  absorbed  that  indus 
trial  labor  which  is  the  life-blood  of  a  civilized  state,  and  the  individ . 
uality  of  the  citizen  has  been  merged  in  the  military  martinet.  He 
may  be  one  small  cog  in  the  vast  complication  of  adjusted  machinery,  or 
one  little  nerve  in  the  enfolding  sheath,  but  he  is  not  a  responsible  part 
of  the  controlling  element  that  works  the  machine,  or  thrills  the  nerve 
with  its  vital  force. 

In  the  United  States,  where  military  obligation  is  feather-light  in 
time  of  peace,  and  hardly  less  in  Great  Britain,  the  assumption  is  ever 
at  hand,  that  when  a  crisis  shall  demand  the  soldier,  there  will  be 
found  the  hero  and  the  victory. 

This  is  trifling  with  grave  issues.  It  is  a  very  rare,  if  not  an  im 
possible  matter  in  modern  times,  for  a  great  war  to  ensue  without 
antecedent  deliberation  on  the  part  of  one  or  both  of  the  parties 
in  interest.  The  mighty  aggregate  of  European  armies  is  closely 
related  to  intense  brain-work,  and  no  advocate  more  exhaustively 
anticipates  the  contingencies  of  evidence  and  the  scope  of  past  ad- 


i6  MILITARY    SCIENCE   THE   KEY   TO   MILITARY   HISTORY.      [i775 

judications,  than  do  the  adepts  in  military  science  review  their  maps, 
and  speculate  upon  the  very  recesses,  as  well  as  the  resources  of  the 
country  they  purpose  to  attack. 

It  is,  therefore,  possible  and  becoming,  for  the  educated  masses  of 
a  free  people  to  learn  something  £»f  the  principles  which  underlie  the 
national  defense.  These  principles  have  not  been  unfolded  in  due 
proportion  and  with  that  familiarity,  which  has  carried  those  of  natural 
science  into  every  household.  The  heads  of  mechanics  and  of  farm 
ers'  sons,  have  ached  from  the  elaboration  of  some  fresh  invention  ; 
arid  this,  the  fruit  of  independence  of  thought  and  personal  action, 
rightly  fits  the  demand  of  the  times.  But  with  all  this,  there  is  a  sub 
tle,  unacknowledged  sentiment,  that  the  civil  functions  of  the  state 
will  be  smoothly  and  fairly  performed  by  those  in  charge.  This  is 
developed  from  the  fact  that  laws  are  in  force,  and  that  those  laws  are 
assured  of  wise  and  competent  sanction.  Here  begins  for  military 
science,  its  starting  point,  its  genesis.  And  yet,  before  its  discussion, 
there  is  to  be  established  certain  ground-work,  necessarily  ignored  by 
strictly  military  writers,  while  integral  and  fundamental  to  the  general 
purpose  in  view. 

Military  law,  while  that  of  force,  as  is  all  police  law,  is  founded 
upon  the  adaptation  of  all  necessary  means  to  meet  an  impending 
crisis,  and  its  methods  of  application  are  controlled  by  that  crisis. 
The  wisdom  of  the  statesman  is  only  different  in  degree  from  that  of 
the  householder,  and  both  aim  after  a  wise  constraint  of  offending 
elements,  and  the  radication  of  those  that  are  eminently  just  and 
proper. 

To  meet  the  demand  adequately,  wisely,  and  successfully,  to  antici 
pate  all  counter-action,  and  thereby  assure  ultimate  results,  is  the 
expressive  logic  for  personal  action,  municipal  action,  and  military 
action. 

The  brain-power  is  banded  to  various  shaftings.  The  mental  pro- 
cesses  are  different,  by  virtue  of  different  applications,  but  the  prime 
activities  are  the  same. 

The  domain  of  natural  science  has  its  departments  and  sections. 
It  is  so  with  all  physics.  And  yet,  to  the  great  enigma  of  essen 
tial  force,  the  military  art,  all  sciences  extend  their  aid.  No  labor 
atory  fails  of  experts  in  its  behalf.  All  dynamic  force  pays  tribute 
to  its  demand.  This  rests  upon  a  simple  necessity.  Inasmuch 
as  offenses  against  society  and  law,  require  the  sanction  of  force, 
so  shall  all  appliances  of  art  and  science  contribute  their  full  measure 


I775-J        MILITARY   SCIENCE   THE   KEY   TO   MILITARY    HISTORY.  I? 

so  to  perfect  and  apply  that  force  as  to  secure  to  the  state  its  integ 
rity  and  safety. 

Military  science  is,  therefore,  the  art  of  employing  force  to  vin 
dicate  or  execute  authority.  Its  offices  task  all  possible  energies, 
involve  all  possible  errors,  and  meet  all  possible  trials,  that  betide 
human  experience.  The  guerilla  and  bandit  may,  through  wisdom, 
nerve  and  commensurate  skill  become  a  soldier  ;  while  the  scholar, 
in  high  command,  may  drop  the  sceptre  of  the  state  which  he  is 
called  to  uphold,  not  from  want  of  patriotic  zeal,  but  because  he  is 
not  wise  in  a  life-and-death  struggle. 

In  the  battles  of  the  American  Revolution,  illustrations  of  the  art 
of  war,  in  the  more  scientific,  as  in  the  more  generally  accepted 
meaning  of  the  term,  were  numerous  and  memorable.  Independently 
of  the  numbers  engaged,  the  vast  territory  involved,  the  distances 
traversed  with  an  ocean  to  be  crossed,  the  consanguinity  of  the  parties 
at  issue,  and  the  new  political  principles  evoked,  that  battle  history 
has  peculiar  value.  Not  a  single  principle  put  under  tribute  by  great 
captains,  before  and  since  that  period,  failed  to  have  its  expression, 
and  not  unseldom  its  masterly  application.  The  philosophy  of 
Frederic  and  Jomini  asserts  nothing  beyond  the  skill  and  wisdom 
therein  illustrated. 

It  is  assumed  that  all  truth  which  bears  direct  relation  to  a  better 
understanding  of  those  battles,  is  of  value  to  the  student.  History 
must  be  placed  side  by  side,  with  the  philosophy  which  interprets 
that  history.  Civil  codes  bear  their  part  in  the  elucidation,  and  mil 
itary  science  must  fill  its  place,  or  the  judgment  will  fail  to  reach  the 
conclusions  which  convert  the  antecedent  experience  of  men  into  safe 
guides  for  the  resolution  of  the  future.  In  the  proposed  brief  dis 
cussion  of  military  science,  the  purpose  is  to  set  forth  only  those 
fundamental  laws  and  relations  which  will  aid  the  reader  in  his  judg 
ment  of  the  facts,  inspire  fresh  respect  for  that  talent  which  sustains 
the  commonwealth  in  an  hour  of  danger,  and  possibly  induce  a  higher 
sense  of  responsibility  for  a  fit  preparation  to  meet  all  the  contin 
gencies  which  can  come  to  the  body  politic. 

In  the   discussion  of  battles    and   battle -direction,  including   the 
topographical   illustration,  the  standard  authorities  of  both  countries 
have  been  summoned  to  the  witness-stand,  and  are  duly  accredited. 
2 


CHAPTER   IV. 

APOLOGY  FOR   THE   MILITARY   ART. 

THE  principles  of  the  military  art,  having  their  application  in  the 
use  of  force,  all  normal  elements  that  shape  or  apply  to  force, 
in  the  direction  of  establishing  or  protecting  the  state,  have  their 
appropriate  place  and  relations.  Those  principles,  as  already  inti 
mated,  are  not  of  necessity  and  exclusively  professional,  nor  are  they 
so  much  matters  of  discovery  as  the  direct  application  of  human 
wisdom  to  recognized  exigencies. 

All  primitive  questions  of  ethics  or  morals,  and  all  discussion  as 
to  the  abstract  right  to  go  to  war,  are  merged  in  the  actual,  inevi 
table  struggles  that  do  and  must  occur. 

The  progress  of  invention  has  indeed  developed  machinery  to 
intensify  physical  force  and  multiply  its  forms  of  action  ;  but  the 
essential  principles  have  not  been  created ;  they  are  only  more  fully 
detected,  unfolded  and  utilized. 

The  successful  man,  of  whatever  calling,  must  achieve  that  success 
through  intimacy  with  the  springs  and  modes  of  human  action,  and 
by  use  of  such  skill  in  the  adjustment  of  plans  as  to  meet  or  anticipate 
such  action. 

Mental  philosophy  demands  as  much  credit  for  military  success, 
is  for  any  other  success. 

Geographical  discovery,  so  called,  has  always  had  some  antecedent 
hypothesis  of  the  proper  harmony  of  the  physical  world,  and  has  thus 
been  impelled  to  push  the  conviction  to  assurance.  So  with  physics, 
whether  of  earth  or  heaven.  Even  the  diversities  of  the  earth's  sur 
face  and  all  avenues  of  inter-communication  have  proved  as  vital  to 
military  as  to  commercial  or  political  relations.  The  art  of  war,  in 
common  with  other  science,  applies  sound  reasoning  to  all  pos-sible 
contingencies  that  can  come  within  its  sphere  of  duty. 


I775-]  APOLOGY   FOR  THE   MILITARY  ART.  19 

It  shares  the  limitations  of  all  finite  knowledge,  and  is  not  closeted 
with  some  military  bureau,  nor  stored  in  any  arsenal.  It  inheres 
wherever  sagacity,  observation,  quickness,  and  precision,  have  their 
best  harmony  and  material. 

Types  of  mind  of  equal  strength  in  all  those  elements  will  drift 
with  the  circumstances  of  birth,  or  education — will  seek  various 
objectives  and  exhibit  dissimilar  manifestations,  so  that  society,  in  all 
its  civil  adjustments  and  growth,  only  employs  the  same  faculties 
which  conserve  the  rights  of  the  state,  and  vindicate  its  honor,  when 
peril  invokes  the  aid  of  sanction  and  a  corresponding  physical  sup 
port.  The  maxims  of  English  common  law  which  affect  civil  life,  and 
civil  relations,  are  but  accumulated  experience,  beyond  date  or  mem 
ory,  indicating  how  society  may  so  happily  and  securely  subsist,  that 
the  rights  of  the  many  shall  be  but  the  aggregate  of  individual 
rights. 

These  flow  from  the  past,  gaining  volume  and  illumination  with 
the  centuries :  but  these  are  not  older  nor  more  consistent  with 
human  reason  than  are  the  general  maxims  which  inspire  a  wise  self 
defense,  and  the  consequent,  national  defense.  They  flow  together, 
one  and  indivisible.  It  is  as  great  an  error  to  predicate  of  the  art  of 
war,  that  it  is  abnormal  and  beyond  the  field  of  the  scholar,  as  to 
treat  the  whole  system  of  state  and  municipal  politics  as  of  imma 
terial  concern  to  the  individual  citizen,  in  his  comparatively  passive 
sphere  of  trust  and  dependence. 

In  proportion  as  the  citizen  freely  exercises  his  civil  rights,  and 
takes  part  in  their  establishment  and  perpetuation,  so  does  it  become 
his  privilege  and  duty  to  understand,  why,  when,  and  how,  he  shall 
respond  to  their  hearty  support  if  assailed.  The  delegation  of  certain 
trusts  to  the  cabinet,  the  bench,  or  the  bailiff,  is  predicated  upon  the 
idea  that  these  are  agents  of  the  people,  duly  responsible  for  the 
trusts  in  their  charge ;  but  the  obligation  to  render  all  needed  physi 
cal  and  moral  support  to  the  faithful  discharge  of  the  functions  of 
their  trust,  is  imperative  in  every  well  ordered  state.  These  functions 
are  performed  almost  automatically  during  peace,  with  but  incidental 
friction,  and  under  light  burdens. 

But  the  contingencies  of  lawlessness  and  violence  and  a  conse 
quent  appeal  to  force  are  not  to  be  ignored,  because  in  abeyance,  or 
out  of  sight. 

In  the  state,  as  in  the  household,  during  wholesome  peace,  the 
supremacy  of  law  seems  to  be  most  positive  when  the  external  display 


2O  APOLOGY   FOR  THE   MILITARY  ART.  lf?75 

of  sanction  is  least  prominent.  The  visible  whip  stands  for  its  ready  use. 
There  is  no  exception  in  the  case  of  states  having  large  armies ;  for 
there  every  outlook  comprehends  a  possible  struggle,  which  of  itself 
precludes  the  idea  of  substantial  peace.  There  is  no  rest,  and  peace 
means  rest  from  conflict,  with  a  corresponding  devotion  of  personal 
and  national  resources  to  permanent  good. 

While  therefore,  that  sanction  which  is  the  reserve  force  to  com 
pel  order,  may  not  be  paraded  in  the  sight  of  all  men,  its  existence 
must  be  pervasive  ;  and  the  capacity  to  defend  or  assert  rights  must 
be  coextensive  with  the  ultimate  value  of  the  rights  enjoyed.  Other 
wise,  every  franchise  depends  alone  upon  outside  forbearance,  or  that 
most  fickle  of  all  elements,  falsely  styled  policy.  It  is  therefore 
accepted,  that  all  citizens  have  a  deep  concern  in  every  primary  truth 
that  lies  in  the  direction  of  national  defense,  or  guides  their  judgment 
to  a  right  estimate  of  the  national  history,  as  compared  with  that  of 
other  nations.  If  peace,  with  its  compensations  and  possibilities,  its 
sweet  domesticities  and  its  crowning  glories,  be  indeed  the  sphere 
wherein  man  can  alone  secure  renewal  of  primeval  perfection,  there 
must  be  large  wealth  of  values  in  those  deeds  of  self-sacrifice  and 
heroism  which  hasten  its  advent. 

While  the  assurance  of  penalty  acts  as  a  preventive  of  crime,  and 
the  capacity  to  vindicate  rights  wards  off  assault,  so  does  true  valor 
rescue  war  from  its  most  brutal  aspects,  and  assimilate  the  guardian 
of  public  peace  to  the  administrator  of  law  and  justice. 

The  history  of  all  legitimate  warfare  is  instinct  with  the  exhibition 
of  noble  attributes  and  profound  wisdom.  If  the  object  of  this  vol 
ume  were  but  the  simple  compilation  of  battle-narrative,  there  would 
be  no  place  for  the  present  discussion  ;  but  the  desire  is,  to  place  the 
battles  in  the  scales,  and  test  their  merits  by  the  experience  of  other 
nations  and  other  great  captains,  in  order  that  all  non-military  schol 
ars  who  have  set  up  false  standards  of  judgment,  or  have  presumed 
upon  the  ignorance  of  past  generations,  may  determine  for  themselves 
as  to  the  assumption  advanced  in  behalf  of  the  battles  and  battle- 
direction  of  the  American  Revolution. 

There  are  those  who  will  reject  the  term,  "  science  of  war." 
Some  will  deny  to  the  soldier  a  higher  purpose  than  self-support, 
and  ambition  for  place  and  power,  and  decry  the  profession  as  servile, 
or  denounce  it  as  despotic. 

There  will  not  be  wanting  those  who  will  treat  the  general  educa 
tion  of  Germany  and  the  elastic  resources  of  France,  as  at  variance 


I775-]  APOLOGY   FOR   THE   MILITARY  ART.  21 

with  the  assumption,  that  nations  habitually  armed  to  the  teeth  are 
slowly  bleeding  to  death.  Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  the  normal  con 
dition  of  society  is  peace  ;  and  in  proportion  as  the  resources  of  the 
state  are  diverted  to  warlike  uses,  except  in  extremis,  or  in  the  indis 
pensable  preparation  for  impending  or  contingent  danger,  society 
suffers,  and  suffers  just  in  proportion  as  the  obligations  of  God's  law 
are  imperative,  and  vital  prosperity  depends  upon  adherence  to  those 
obligations. 

All  similar  and  related  questions  of  every  kind  are  swallowed  up 
in  the  fact,  that  as  society  suffers  from  internal  violence,  so  nations  as 
such,  are  put  in  peril.  True  wisdom  lies  in  such  a  just  and  honorable 
discharge  of  every  duty  that  war  without  just  cause,  is  only  possible, 
as  an  outrage,  which  humanity  at  large  would  condemn  and  resent. 

Should  any  maintain  that  the  time  has  passed  for  rendering 
homage  to  military  attainment,  it  must  be  first  made  to  appear  that  all 
nations  are  prompt  to  render  justice,  and  to  accept  and  practice  the 
cardinal  principles  which  Montesquieu  declares  to  be  the  spirit  of  laws, 
or,  that  the  higher  refinement  of  duty  which  attaches  to  the  precepts 
of  the  Saviour  himself,  has  already  blossomed  into  fruit.  The  great 
fact  is,  that  true  life  is  made  up  of  struggle.  Emulation  in  labor, 
resolution  as  against  oppression,  and  ambition  for  preferment  are  parts 
of  all  inner  life.  When  these  partake  of  self-sacrifice  and  exposure 
for  holy  ends,  at  the  risk  of  life,  the  subject  is  lifted  above  the  plane 
of  mere  living,  to  that  of  monumental  worth  and  bright  example. 
Where  these  elements  work  evil,  and  assail  the  rights  of  man,  the 
issue  must  be  squarely  met  by  every  agent  available  for  their 
suppression. 

No  nation  rises  by  easy  spring  to  well  balanced  independence. 
Injustice  and  wrong  assert  their  claims,  and  unless  a  people  will  so 
far  indicate  their  self-respect  as  willingly  to  understand  their  duty 
under  any  possible  phase  of  the  future,  there  will  be  brought  home 
to  their  experience  the  bitter  lessons  which  have  involved  so  many 
listless,  corrupted,  and  conceited  nations  in  remediless  ruin. 

If  a  nation,  like  the  man,  be  doubly  armed,  in  a  just  cause,  so  tne 
conscious  dignity  that  follows  an  assured  ability  to  maintain  that 
cause,  is  strong  assurance  of  independence,  and  a  stern  warning  to 
aggressors.  No  student  of  history  will  fail  to  see  that  the  profession 
of  arms  has  ever  been  esteemed  honorable. 

The  sacred  record  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  society  itself, 
and  thus  becomes  the  vitalizing  and  essential  element  of  all  true  pro- 


22  APOLOGY  FOR  THE   MILITARY  ART.  1*775 

gress,  bears  honorable  testimony  to  the  prowess  of  those  who  bore 
arms  against  unrighteous  violence.  The  Bible,  therefore,  recognizing 
/  the  necessity  for  those  who  bear  the  shield  in  the  front  of  battle,  both 
records  and  honors  their  triumphs.  Where,  in  classic  epic,  will  be 
found  more  jubilant  refrains  over  victories  won,  than  the  song  of 
Deborah  !  and  what  can  surpass  the  majesty  and  all-embracing  full 
ness  of  the  chorus  of  Miriam  and  Moses ! 

The  very  laws  and  usages  of  chivalry  were  predicated  upon  the 
idea  that  the  true  soldier  represented  the  best  type  of  refinement  and 
honor.  Piety  itself,  now  so  exalted,  self-denying,  and  precious,  was 
once  but  a  synonym  for  generous  courage  and  true  manhood.  In 
its  manifestations  of  filial  love,  combined  with  brave  deeds,  was  found 
the  hero  of  Virgil.  There  have  indeed  been  periods  of  history,  when 
the  soldier  knight  was  almost  exclusively  the  scholar,  and  the  cloister 
alone  furnished  those  who,  besides  himself,  could  transcribe  thought 
upon  parchment  or  paper. 

Bunyan  and  Milton  assume  the  metaphors  and  terms  of  military 
life,  while  they  delineate  their  highest  characters,  and  expend  the 
best  efforts  of  their  genius  in  forms  which  borrow  strength  and  signifi 
cance  from  the  military  profession.  Both  sacred  and  profane  history 
combine  to  honor  him  who  honors  himself  in  arms.  The  "  good 
fight "  has  not  been  fought  out.  This  is  not  the  day  for  the  gracious 
glories  of  millennial  peace ;  neither  should  the  military  profession  be 
crowned  for  other  merit  than  that  which  attaches  to  its  faithfulness  to 
duty,  as  the  conservator  of  just  and  sacred  rights. 

The  ever  increasing  responsibilities  that  attend  the  rapid  increase  of 
the  world's  population,  and  the  commercial  enterprise  which  brings  half- 
civilized  and  barbarous  people  into  intimacy  and  interfusion  with  less 
populous,  but  better  educated  nations,  are  pregnant  with  iss-ues  which 
provoke  human  passion  and  human  conflict.  Tidal  waves  of  armed 
ignorance,  superstition,  and  brutalism  are  not  impossible  because  a 
select  minority  of  the  earth's  inhabitants  are  enlightened  and  civil 
ized. 

History  has  recorded  such  events  under  circumstances  no  more 
difficult  than  the  future  may  evolve.  So  also,  the  irresponsibility  of 
despotic  power,  and  the  fiery  scourge  of  religious  fanaticism,  are  not 
barred  out  because  just  now  restrained. 

There  is  already  a  relaxation  of  fealty  to  authority,  an  indepen 
dence  of  individual  obligation  to  the  rights  of  the  many,  a  jealousy 
of  superiority,  whether  of  mental  or  industrial  attainment,  which 


I775-J  APOLOGY  FOR  THE   MILITARY  ART.  23 

tend  to  anarchy ;  and  these  work  in  the  same  direction  with  the 
arrogant  spirit  of  centralization  and  oppression,  which  gradually  and 
inquiringly  lifts  its  arm  as  in  the  middle  ages. 

The  final  issue  must  be  resolved,  either  by  intelligent  recognition 
of  a  common  moral  obligation,  and  respect  for  the  rights  of  all ;  or 
the  conflicts  of  physical  force  will  go  beyond  their  true  mission  and 
introduce  unparalleled  conflict. 

There  is  no  aspect  in  which  the  knowledge  of  military  science  does 
not  commend  itself  to  the  favor  of  the  present  generation.  The  les 
sons  to  be  derived  from  history  were  never  so  pre-eminently  useful 
as  now,  and  they  will  hereafter  hold  a  more  solemn  place  in  the 
mind  of  the  thoughtful  scholar.  In  introducing  those  principles 
which  place  military  attainment  in  fellowship  with  true  science,  thereby 
stating  the  laws  by  which  to  test  the  deeds  of  the  American  Revolu 
tion,  it  can  not  be  entirely  foreign  or  discursive  thus  to  blend  their 
statement  with  honorable  mention  of  its  history. 


CHAPTER    V. 

WARS  BETWEEN   NATIONS. 

THE  use  of  force  to  assert  rights,  or  redress  wrongs, — the  inter 
ruption  of  friendly  relations  between  states, — organized  resist 
ance  to  the  supreme  authority  of  a  single  state  ;  and   the  sweep  of 
some  over-mastering  passion  or  opinion,  carrying  with  its  ebullition 
violence  and  the  upheaval  of  existing  order,  alike  bring  war. 

Whether  the  rights  asserted  be  just,  and  the  wrongs  alleged  be 
real,  is  a  matter  that  mainly  affects  that  moral  force  which  imparts  to 
physical  force  its  best  assurance  of  success.  Without  this  electric 
impulse,  the  superior  in  numbers  and  general  resources  may  become 
the  vanquished  party. 

Barbarism  and  fanaticism,  alone,  are  unrestrained  in  war. 
One  is  the  expression  of  the  brute,  the  other  of  madness;  and  yet,  by 
a  strange  anomaly  in  human  nature,  certain  classes  of  wars  among 
civilized  nations  partake  of  both  elements. 

Ex-President  WOOLSEY  defines  a  just  war,  as  "  one  that  is  waged 
in  the  last  resort,  when  peaceable  means  have  failed  to  procure 
redress,  or  when  self-defense  calls  for  it." 

The  common-law  rule  for  the  magistrate  in  the  execution  of  his 
duty,  and  for  the  citizen  in  self-defense,  admits,  however,  of  only  the 
necessary  force  required  for  the  immediate  issue.  This  principle  is 
agreeable  to  international  law  as  best  interpreted,  and  should  be 
regarded  as  the  standard  of  waste  which  a  state  can  afford  in  exercise 
of  the  right  of  war.  Excessive  or  vindicative  force  is  retro-active 
upon  the  party  exercising  it,  and  is  fatal  to  all  concert  of  nations  in 
relief  of  the  hardships  of  war. 

Vattel  declares  that,  "  whenever  justice  is  done,  all  right  of  em 
ploying  force  is  superseded."  He  divides  wars  into  two  sorts  ;  lawful 
and  unlawful,  the  latter  being  those  undertaken  without  apparent 
cause  and  for  havoc  or  pillage ;  all  others  being  lawful. 


I775-J  WARS   BETWEEN   NATIONS.  25 

Grotius  makes  the  distinction  between  those  solemnly  undertaken 
by  the  state,  and  those  non-solemn^  that  grow  out  of  the  acts  of  sub 
ordinate  authority,  not  ratified  by  the  head  of  the  state. 

Wheaton  asserts  that,  if  war  be  declared  in  form  by  one  state,  it 
entitles  both  belligerent  parties  to  all  the  rights  of  war  against  each 
other,  whether  the  war  be  just  or  not. 

Halleck  notices  the  distinction  between  perfect  and  imperfect 
wars,  when,  in  one  case,  all  the  citizens  of  two  states  are  placed  in 
antagonism,  and  in  the  other,  there  is  a  limitation  of  persons,  places, 
and  things,  as  illustrated  in  the  character  of  hostilities  authorized  by 
the  United  States  against  France  in  1798. 

The  terms  offensive  and  defensive  have  also  been  applied  to  dis 
tinguish  wars,  although  more  applicable  to  military  operations,  since 
every  war  of  considerable  magnitude  or  duration,  has  its  alternations 
of  attack  and  defense.  Even  in  the  shaping  of  cabinet  policy,  these 
terms  are  rather  those  of  action  than  of  type  of  contest,  the  verbal 
or  diplomatic  initiative  being  so  aggressive  as  to  compel  protest  and 
armed  resentment. 

An  equivalent  principle  obtains  at  common  law,  where  "  verbal 
acts,"  so  called,  may  warrant  physical  redress.  It  is  not  proposed  to 
carry  this  discussion  into  the  domain  of  international  law,  which  is 
largely  that  of  ethics,  but  to  recognize  the  distinctions  and  energizing 
principles  of  battle-issues. 

Writers  have  needlessly  enlarged  upon  the  classification  of  wars, 
and  only  a  brief  allusion  is  deemed  necessary  to  cover  all  the  ground 
which  has  real  value  to  the  citizen  or  student. 

While  wars  vary  in  the  manifestation  and  use  of  force,  their  suc 
cess  involves  the  same  principles  of  the  military  art.  The  elements 
that  inspire  hostility,  and  tender  the  battle-issue,  largely  determine 
the  character  of  the  war,  and  decide  whether  a  whole  nation  is  to 
put  its  resources  and  existence  at  risk,  or  only  to  display  a  partial 
force  for  some  temporary  advantage  to  itself,  or  in  behalf  of  another 
nation  seeking  its  support.  But  when  two  nations,  as  two  pugilists,  em 
ploy  their  resources  exhaustively  against  each  other,  the  term  national 
war  has  proper  application.  Such  wars  are  peculiarly  free  from  those 
heathenish  exhibitions  which  attach  to  internecine  types  of  conflict. 
The  national  honor,  sensitive  and  forced  to  the  issue,  aims  to  pay 
respect  to  international  law,  and  thereby  to  challenge  the  moral  recog 
nition  of  civilized  neutrals. 

It  is  not  an   error,  in  a  qualified  sense,  to  treat  as  national  wars, 


26  WARS  BETWEEN   NATIONS.  [i775 

the  struggles  of  a  once  vanquished  people  to  regain  their  indepen 
dence.  The  suppressed  nationality  has  its  patriotic  longings,  and 
although  lacking  public  recognition  until  successful,  the  straggle  par 
takes  of  a  national  character./  Poland  and  Hungary  for  example, 
tried  to  resume  their  place  among  nations,  so  that  revolt  was  not 
merely  insurrection,  but  assertion  of  national  entity,  kept  in  subjection 
by  the  force  of  conquest.  Such  cases  differ,  however,  from  a  pre 
tended  re-assertion  of  national  character  in  attempted  disruption  of  a 
union  which  had  the  consent  of  both  parties,  and  where  the  merger 
of  individuality  has  been  voluntary  and  complete.  Thus  Scotland 
became  an  integral  part  of  Great  Britain,  and  Texas  became  an 
integral  part  of  the  United  States  by  common  consent.  Turkey  has 
repeatedly  made  war  with  Russia  to  ward  off  the  accumulating  force 
which  threatened  her  independence,  her  national  life. 

The  struggle  of  the  Netherlands  against  Spain,  of  the  Spanish 
peninsula  against  France,  of  France  against  the  allies,  are  treated  by 
General  Halleck  as  wars  for  independence,  and  yet  those  were 
national  wars,  to  perfect  and  vindicate  national  existence.  The  war 
of  1812,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  has  been  treated 
as  a  war  for  independence.  It  was,  however,  largely  the  culmination 
of  misunderstandings,  put  at  issue  indeed  by  the  dawning  develop 
ment  of  those  rights  of  citizenship  which  in  later  years  have  gained 
general  acceptance.  The  claim  of  America  was  no  more  an  assertion 
of  independence  from  British  control,  than  was  that  of  Great  Britain 
a  claim  for  independence  in  the  control  of  her  home-born  subjects. 
The  former  was  the  outgrowth  of  questions  unsettled  by  the  Ameri 
can  Revolution,  and  the  latter  but  the  instinctive  adherence  to  long 
existing  prerogative.  The  former  guaranteed  to  the  adopted  citizen 
the  full  measure  of  national  protection  ;  the  latter  claimed  the  per 
petual  allegiance  of  all  once  citizens,  and  the  right  to  reclaim  their 
persons  even  on  the  high  seas,  whenever  found.  The  war,  however, 
was  truly  a  national  war.  rTCwar  for  independence  suggests  its  own 
mission.  It  is  the  struggle  of  a  colony,  a  dependent  section  of  the 
state  or  of  a  distinct  race,  to  obtain  and  maintain  public  recognition 
as  a  distinct  nation.  It  finds  its  key  in  the  first  grade  of  Revolution 
hereafter  considered. 

Baron  Jomini  declares  that.  "  the  spontaneous  uprising  of  an 
united  nation,  must  not  be  confounded  with  a  national  defense,  in 
accordance  with  the  institutions  of  the  state  and  directed  by  the  gov 
ernment."  His  statement  originates  in  the  idea,  that  the  govern- 


I775-]  WARS   BETWEEN   NATIONS.  2/ 

ment  may  act  independently  of  the  people,  and  foreign  to  their  interests 
or  wishes.  He  would  thus  limit  national  wars  to  popular  outbursts  in 
search  of  independence,  or  such  as  are  necessary  to  save  the  national 
life  which  has  been  put  in  peril.  The  statement  ignores  those  states 
whose  government  is  representative,  and  therefore  the  executive  of  the 
will  of  the  people.  He  adds :  "  The  term  national,  can  only  be 
applied  to  such  wars  as  are  waged  against  an  united  people,  or  a 
majority  of  them,  filled  with  a  noble  ardor,  and  determined  to  sustain 
their  independence."  T  Wars,  however,  may  be  precipitated  upon  an 
entire  nation  by  blunders  of  administration,  misconception  of  con 
flicting  issues,  or  want  of  that  catholicity  and  generous  negotiation 
which  will  generally  command  peace  when  nations  really  desire  peace. 
There  may  be  realized  in  such  cases  only  a  lukewarm  support  of  the 
government  by  the  people ;  but  the  nation  is  responsible  for  the  war, 
and  its  government  is  responsible  to  the  people.  Sometimes  a  war 
is  begun  which  dishonors  national  character  and  strikes  at  the  rights 
of  other  nations,  without  any  reasonable  equivalent  to  the  party  tak 
ing  the  aggressive.  Wars  for  conquest  are  of  this  type,  and  so  are 
wars  for  the  propagandism  of  ideas,  whether  political  or  religious. 
Upon  the  assumption,  not  to  be  thoughtlessly  discredited,  that  every 
nation,  as  an  abstract  matter,  has  a  rightful  independence  in  legitimate 
pursuits  of  peace,  but  no  right  to  enforce  its  domestic  policy  upon 
equally  independent  nations,  all  forms  of  propagandism  by  force  of 
arms  are  destructive  of  society,  and  violate  that  international  comity 
which,  as  between  nations,  is  but  the  application  of  the  wise  restraint 
which  governs  citizens  in  the  exercise  of  individual  personal  rights.__ 

The  Crusades  and  the  Moslem  wars  were  of  the  character  adverted 
to,  full  of  evil  passions  and  evil  fruit,  and  in  defiance  of  all  social  and 
national  rights.  Fortunately,  wars  for  mere  conquest  have  rarely 
perpetuated  the  state  which  committed  the  robbery.  The  compensa 
tions  of  time  under  Providence  brand  conquest.  The  mark  of  Cain 
shows  itself.  To  rob  a  nation  of  life,  is  not  to  be  a  glorious  mission 
in  the  future. 

Wars  of  Intervention,  once  so  common  in  behalf  of  a  so-called 
balance  of  power,  are  almost  invariably  of  doubtful  expediency,  and 
can  only  be  justified  when  there  has  been  that  willful  violation  of  the 
law  of  nations,  which  calls  upon  the  strong  to  protect  or  vindicate  the 
weak  from  an  attempt  at  conquest,  or  the  destruction  of  rights  which 
are  fundamental  and  essential  to  national  life. 

The  true  balance  of  power,  is  that  of  moral  and  industrial  excel 


28  WARS  BETWEEN  NATIONS.  [1775 

lence.  All  else  savors  of  the  dark  ages,  and  is  as  absurd  in  essence, 
as  the  impossible  equality  of  individuals  in  wealth  or  accomplishments. 
Equality  to-day,  will  end  to-morrow,  just  in  proportion  as  the  deserving 
improve  their  acquisitions  and  the  unthrifty  and  selfish  waste  them. 
When  the  French  army  shall  equal  the  German,  the  German  impulse 
will  prompt  a  fresh  expenditure  to  retain  ascendency  in  the  material 
of  war,  at  the  expense  of  domestic  rest.  Such  are  the  considerations 
which,  as  a  general  rule,  are  to  determine  the  character  of  national 
wars  and  indicate  their  limit. 

A  nation  has  in  fact  no  right  to  go  to  war  unless  it  can  pledge  its 
entire  national  resources  to  the  hazard.  Neither  has  a  nation  the  right 
to  go  to  war  if  there  be  any  attainable  settlement  of  controversy  upon 
a  just  basis  without  war.  As  a  general  rule,  one  nation  has  no  pur 
pose  to  destroy  or  absorb  its  opponent,  but  only  to  wear  it  out  a  little, 
so  that  it  will  be  too  tired  to  keep  up  controversy.  As  an  equally 
general  rule,  nations  are  left  after  war  pretty  much  where  they  started 
in  respect  of  the  issue  made,  but  fearfully  poor  in  the  elements  of  a 
truly  national  life 


CHAPTER   VI. 

CIVIL  WAR,   DISTINCTION  BETWEEN   INSURRECTION,  REBELLION, 

AND   REVOLUTION. 

CIVIL  war  is  a  war  of  one's  own  household,  intestine,  and  full  of 
bitter  issues. 

In  proportion  as  a  state  conserves  the  rights  of  its  citizens  and 
dispenses  even  justice,  a  civil  struggle  has  the  same  merit  which  the 
claim  of  any  bodily  member  might  assert  against  the  supremacy  of  the 
head  or  the  heart.  Just  as  the  mangled  limb  or  deranged  function 
imperils  the  whole  system,  and  can  only  revive  its  normal  use  by 
wholesome  acceptance  of  its  dependence,  and  such  treatment  as  sub 
serves  the  welfare  of  the  uninjured  parts,  so  do  civil  feuds  and  strifes 
endanger  the  state  at  the  expense  of  the  disaffected  members,  crown 
ing  the  struggle  with  the  ruin  of  all  alike. 

Civil  war  proper,  is  a  war  of  factions,  not  necessarily  aiming  at  the 
integrity  of  the  state,  but  involving  separate  aspirations  to  obtain 
control  of  the  state,  or  at  least  supremacy  over  the  rival  factionj  The 
South  American  States  and  Mexico  furnish  impressive  examples  of 
civil  war.  The  English  "  War  of  the  Roses,"  that  of  the  League  in 
France,  and  of  the  Guelphs  and  Ghibellines  in  Italy,  are  suggestive 
of  the  mischief  to  the  body-politic  which  must  attend  an  effort  to 
j>u  sh  personal  or  party  strifes  to  the  usurpation  of  national  authority. 
Success  itself  has  no  sound  basis  of  perpetuity,  because  essentially 
maintained  only  in  defiance  of  others'  rights.  Such  wars  were  rife  in 
feudal  times  ;  and  more  than  once  the  powers  of  Burgundy  and 
France  were  well-nigh  paralyzed  for  national  offense  or  defense,  by  the 
selfish  strife  of  rival  aspirants  for  local  power  or  influence  at  court. 

Civil  war,  however,  has  a  general  sweep  which  includes  other  and 
related  classes ;  these  having  subjective  relations  while  full  of  dis 
similar  elements,  viz.,  INSURRECTION,  REBELLION,  REVOLUTION 


30  CIVIL  WAR.  (.1775- 

Each  alike,  belong  to  civil  war,  insomuch  as  the  parties  at  issue 
belong  to  the  state  which  is  put  in  labor  by  their  struggle. 

(a)  INSURRECTION  is  resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  state  in  con 
tempt  of  existing  law.  It  has  no  dignity,  no  worthy  aspiration,  and  is 
as  lawless  as  it  is  illegal.  It  has  none  of  the  elements  which  make 
rebellion  formidable,  which  vindicate  revolution,  and  give  to  both 
rebellion  and  revolution  a  memorable  place  among  wars. 

The  failure  of  a  state  to  govern  wisely,  in  accordance  with  divine 
obligation,  may  engender  distrust,  antagonisms,  and  ultimate  over 
throw  ;  but  insurrection  is  limited  to  that  style  of  popular  outburst, 
which,  with  no  possible  hope  of  redress  for  alleged  wrongs,  or  benefit 
to  the  complaining  parties,  puts  the  rights  of  all  in  peril. 

It  mocks  at  law  and  order  and  the  remedies  of  the  courts,  and 
trifles  with  the  rights  of  property  and  person.  This  statement  is  pre 
dicated  upon  the  supposed  existence  of  legitimate  authority,  and  that 
the  functions  of  the  body-politic  are  working  in  the  usual  channels  of 
a  state  of  peace. 

Jealousy  of  a  superior  social  condition,  conflict  with  wise  social 
laws,  sudden  impulses  to  take  crimes  or  political  issues  out  of  the 
sphere  of  their  legitimate  control  and  adjudication,  and  even  political 
or  religious  enthusia,  are  among  the  causes  of  insurrection. 

The  violence  is  limited,  and  in  a  state  which  is  upheld  by  a  healthy 
moral  sentiment  on  the  part  of  the  people,  must  be  short-lived  and 
fruitless  except  for  evil.  In  this  class  of  conflict  occur  those  strikes 
of  labor  against  capital,  which  both  waste  capital  and  degrade  honor 
able  industry;  and  to  this  ephemeral  and  suicidal  ebullition  of  passion 
the  reckless  partisan,  with  no  ambition  beyond  office,  is  the  incentive. 

Insurrection  has  no  apology,  short  of  a  condition  where  the  resist 
ance  of  an  individual  to  lawless  force  is  his  only  salvation ;  and  then 
insurrection  is  merged  in  the  duty  of  Revolution.  In  a  just,  civilized 
state,  there  is  redress,  however  slow,  by  legal  methods,  and  deferred 
redress  is  better  than  law  defied.  .The  mob-law,  which  hangs  a  crim 
inal  in  advance  of  legal  process,  breathes  the  spirit  of  insurrection,  and 
its  impulse  may  shift,  and  may  in  turn,  strike  the  best  friend  of  the 
state  and  people.  History  bears  frightful  testimony  to  the  character 
of  such  demonstrations. 

In  1358,  the  Jacquerie,  on  the  assertion  that  the  .nobles  were 
oppressive  and  guilty  of  all  license,  began  an  unqualified  slaughter 
of  all  who  had  preeminence  for  education,  station,  or  wealth,  until 
the  catalogue  of  outrages  upon  person  and  life  became  the  synonym 


1775-j  CIVIL  WAK.  31 

for  all  time,  of  the  possibilities  of  insurrection  in  the  degradation 


of  man.j 


Under  the  cloak  of  religious  zeal,  an  equal  fury  burned  in  the 
breasts  of  bigots  during  the  middle  ages,  and  the  spirit  has  not  yet 
taken  its  flight  from  earth  to  its  own  place.  On  the  fifth  of  March, 
1770,  when  the  people  of  Boston  were  almost  at  open  issue  with  the 
authorities,  and  the  leaven  of  revolution  was  already  working  to  the 
surface,  a  mob  precipitated  a  needless  quarrel  with  the  soldiery, 
caused  the  death  of  Attucks  and  two  other  citizens,  and  threatened 
the  entire  city  with  fire  and  blood.  The  dignity  of  the  courts,  and 
the  vindication  of  the  soldiers  by  Quincy  and  Adams,  alone  restored 
order  and  averted  extremes. 

In  December,  1786,  Shays'  rebellion  broke  out  in  Massachusetts. 
The  claim  that  the  Governor's  salary  was  excessive,  that  the  State 
Senate  was  aristocratic,  and  that  taxes  were  odious,  was  pushed  so  vio 
lently  and  wildly,  that  courts  were  interrupted,  and  it  seemed  as  if 
anarchy  was  to  bury  all  memory  of  holy  sacrifices  made  in  the  war 
which  had  so  recently  closed. 

When  a  rightful  duty  was  imposed  upon  spirits  in  1795,  the  pop 
ular  resistance  set  Pennsylvania  on  fire  with  similar  demonstrations. 
The  mails  were  robbed,  and  nameless  crimes  against  virtue  and  inno 
cence  followed  in  the  wake  of  pretended  assertion  of  civil  rights.  It 
required  the  promptest  exertion  of  President  Washington  and  Gov 
ernor  Lee,  and  the  employment  of  fifteen  thousand  troops  to  restore 
order,  and  society  did  not  resume  a  placid  surface  for  a  long  time 

thereafter. 

-=——-" 

No  less  conspicuous,  in  a  military  relation,  were  the  uprisings  of 
both  British  and  American  troops  in  New  Jersey.  In  both  cases,  the 
exhibition  of  force  had  nothing  to  gain,  but  put  in  jeopardy  the  very 
interests  which  the  men  were  sworn  to  uphold.  In  one  case,  the 
English  proposition  to  compromise  with  the  colonies,  was  the  exclu 
sive  prerogative  of  the  state  ;  and  in  the  other,  the  very  ability  of 
Congress  to  pay  arrears  due  the  troops,  depended  eventually  and 
wholly  upon  the  moral  force  which  discipline  could  impart  to  the 
array.  Moreover,  the  officers  suffered  equally  with  the  men. 

(b)  REBELLION  has  a  broader  domain.     While  insurrection  ignores 
or  trifles  with  authority,  and  substitutes  selfishness  and  passion  for  le 
gitimate  means  of  redress,  the  former  disobeys  and  defies  the  author 
ity  of  the  state.     Halleck  defines  rebellion  as,  "  usually,  a  war  between 
the  legitimate  government  of  a  state,  and  portions   or  parts   of  the 


32  CIVIL   WAR.  [1775 

same,  who  seek  to  overthrow  the  government  or  to  dissolve  the  alle 
giance  to  it,  and  set  up  one  of  tfceir  own,"  citing  the  war  of  the  Great 
Rebellion  in  England,  and  that  of  the  Southern  States  in  America  in 
1861.  ^Rebellion  has  organization  and  method,  embraces  more  defi 
nite  plans  for  prolonged  resistance,  and  differs  therein  from  insurrec 
tion,  which  expends  its  strength  upon  sudden  and  temporary  expres 
sion,  affecting  good  order,  indeed,  but  lacking  the  coherence  and  com 
prehension  of  issues  which  characterize  its  development  into  open 
rebellion  against  the  state  itself. 

(c)  REVOLUTION  advances  with  purpose  to  overthrow  the  state 
and  substitute  a  new  form  of  government,  or  a  new  dynasty.  The 
nominal  Right  of  Revolution  is  asserted  by  many,  as  if  it  were  a  high 
reserve  franchise  belonging  to  the  people,  and  one  which  they  may 
exercise  according  to  their  choice.  This  is  not  true.  There  are 
indeed,  conditions  under  which  a  people  may  assert  such  a  choice  , 
but  these  conditions  must  have  foundation  in  principles  which  under 
lie  social  organization  itself.  To  vindicate  the  claim  of  the  people  to 
be  governed  wisely  and  justly  is  one  proposition  ;  but  to  admit  that  a 
majority  may  exercise  their  choice  as  a  matter  of  abstract  right,  and 
by  violence,  is  to  strike  a  fatal  blow  at  real  liberty.  The  dogma  savors 
of  the  worst  forms  of  civil  war,  gives  dignity  to  insurrection,  develops 
formal  rebellion,  and  refuses  to  the  minority  their  equal  rights  with 
the  majority.  The  deliberate  and  matured  modification  of  existing 
forms,  peaceably  and  constitutionally  effected,  is  of  course  an  entirely 
different  matter.  The  fluctuations  of  opinion  which  mark  all  truly 
enlightened  nations,  are  the  true  life  of  real  development,  and  the 
alternations  of  civil  control  which  attend  these  conflicts  of  opinion, 
are  designed  to  work  out  ultimate  peace  and  prosperity  for  the 
entire  body  -politic.;  A  false  assumption  as  to  this  alleged  right  of 
revolution  has  often  disguised  civil  war,  and  has  made  Mexican  Rev 
olution  an  expression  for  license,  insecurity,  and  general  waste. 
There  are  but  two  conditions  which  lift  revolution  to  the  dignity 
of  a  right,  and  then  the  law  of  duty  compels  the  revolution.  It  is  not 
sought,  but  comes  as  an  inevitable  assertion  of  the  principle  of 
self-defense. 

The  first  grade  is  that  which  devolves  upon  distant  dependencies, 
the  assertion  of  INDEPENDENCE,  when  the  controlling  authority  is 
unable  or  unwilling  to  grant  the  people  their  rights  and  proper  rep 
resentation  ;  when  laws  are  constraints  without  equivalents,  and  the 
subjects  are,  in  fact,  slaves,  without  the  filial  relation  which  people  art; 


I7V5-J  CIVIL  WAR.  33 

to  bear  to  the  state,  and  which  reciprocally  binds  the  state  to  legis 
late  for  the  common  good  of  all  who  render  homage. 

The  second  condition  is  cumulative  of  the  first ;  when  the  ab 
sorption  of  power  in  the  governing  authority  is  wholly  set  upon  its 
own  aggrandizement  in  defiance  of  popular  rights,  and  no  redress 
can  be  found  through  legislative  or  judicial  sources.  Mere  errors  of 
judgment  in  line  of  policy,  or  the  administration  of  law  through  mis 
taken  forms,  is  not  a  fair  basis  for  overthrow  of  existing  state  sov 
ereignty.  There  must  be  such  a  condition  that  no  redress  is  obtain 
able  through  established  methods,  and  existing  authority  has  lost  its 
legal  hold  upon  its  subjects,  by  subverting  the  principles  which  under- 
lie  and  impart  all  authority. 

There  is  a  divine  right  of  authority.  That  social  crystallization 
which  enlarges  the  family  relation  and  forms  the  state,  carries  with  it 
not  only  the  obligation  of  wise  control,  but  that  of  wise  obedience. 
The  parent  may  outrage  that  relation,  and  the  law  will  give  to  the 
child  a  guardian,  or  emancipate  it  from  the  abused  control.  It  is 
under  just  such  a  phase  of  civil  suffering  that  the  remedy  lies  in  rev 
olution  and  independence.  The  obligation  of  the  child  to  endure 
until  no  other  remedy  is  possible,  is  the  type  of  the  patience  and 
duty  which  must  possess  the  citizen  until  the  necessity  of  self-defense 
demands  the  ultimate  remedy 

In  its  assertion  there  must  be  an  unqualified  search  for  a  true 
social  peace,  and  not  an  ambition  for  independence  such  as  a  mind 
would  covet  under  the  irksome  restraint  of  wholesome  or  even 
stringent  control. 

The  whole  history  of  continental  revolutions  is  full  of  lessons  of 
warning  to  those  who,  for  nominal  changes,  or  nominal  forms  of  gov 
ernment,  make  haste  to  overturn  existing  order  without  the  moral 
purpose  or  capacity  to  remedy  the  evils  which  are  the  burden  of 
complaint. 

Authority  is  intrinsically  arbitrary.  So  long  as  men  are  fickle  and 
human,  there  will  be  a  tendency  to  abuse  that  authority,  and  an 
equally  fatal  tendency  to  despise  all  authority.  The  power  of  the 
many  is  no  less  despotic  than  that  of  the  few  jj  and  the  law  of  man,  is 
to  aim  at  the  highest  good  of  the  greatest  number,  and  not  to  fly  in 
the  face  of  authority  because  of  a  fancied  improvement  through 
coveted  change.  Outside  of  this  law  of  social  life  there  is  no  stability, 
no  progress,  no  abiding  peace. 

Revolution  is  therefore  a  last  resort,  and  the  subordination  of 
3 


34  CIVIL  WAR. 

temporary  issues  or  burdens  to  the  general  peace  will  bring  ultimate 
benefit  to  any  enlightened  people  who  have  legitimate  avenues  by 
which  to  control  or  shape  the  policy  of  rulers,  without  a  spasmodic 
dash  for  its  overthrow,  and  a  plunge  from  bad  to  doubtful,  or  worse. 
Revolution,  like  civil  war  in  all  its  phases,  involves  cost,  waste,  and 
long  stagnation  of  the  offices  of  true  peace.  These  must  be  risked  in 
the  last  resort,  but  only  when  legitimate  methods  fail,  and  the 
issue  hurries  the  solution  to  a  crisis. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

vr" 

PROVIDENCE   IN  WAR   ILLUSTRATED. 

r  I  ""HE  war  for  American  Independence  was  marked  by  many  crit 
ical  events  which  were  beyond  human  control  or  remedy. 
Some  of  these  changed  the  relations  of  contending  armies  in  a  single 
night.  More  than  once,  a  few  hours  of  unexpected  rain,  wind  or  fog, 
were  enough  to  assure  lasting  results.  These  determining  events, 
because  belonging  to  the  sphere  and  operation  of  physical  laws,  are 
not  beyond  the  recognition  of  nature's  Master.  They  testify  very 
clearly  at  least,  the  absolute  uncertainty  of  the  best  human  plans, 
whether  for  peace  or  war,  and  the  value  of  the  promptness  which 
seizes  every  opportunity  as  it  passes,  and  thus  gives  shape  to  material 
issues  which  are  ripe  for  solution. 

A  fe\\  facts  are  grouped  together  in  advance  of  their  relations  to 
specific  battles,  to  illustrate  the  principle. 

Early  in  the  month  of  November,  1775,  the  expedition  of  Arnold 
to  Canada  was  rashly  pushed  through  a  pathless  wilderness  to  the 
shore  of  the  river  St.  Lawrence.  The  possibilities  of  success  were  fair, 
if  the  invader  could  have  struck  the  feeble  and  astonished  garrison 
promptly  upon  arrival.  Sleet  and  rain  continuing  for  several  days, 
kept  the  adventurer  fast  at  Point  Levi,  and  prepared  the  way  for  his 
signal  failure. 

On  the  morning  of  August  twenty-eighth,  1776,  just  after  the 
battle  of  Long  Island,  a  drizzling  mist,  succeeded  by  heavy  rain  which 
continued  for  most  of  the  day,  retarded  the  approach  of  the  British 
army  to  the  American  intrenchments  at  Brooklyn,  and  prevented  the 
fleet  itself  from  approaching  New  York.  Toward  evening  the  rain 
ceased,  and  work  was  resumed  upon  the  British  lines. 

August  twenty-ninth  was  a  second  day  of  rain ;  but  every  hour 
was  improved  by  Washington  to  collect  all  kinds  of  boats,  including 


36  PROVIDENCE    IN   WAR  ILLUSTRATED.  [1775. 

sloops,  scows,  and  row-boats,  with  view  to  rescue  his  army  from 
impending  capture.  The  masterly  execution  of  the  retreat  was  made 
possible  by  an  unexampled  fog,  which  lingered  until  the  last  detach 
ment  had  taken  passage.  The  wind  itself,  which  threatened  to  drive 
the  boats  toward  sea,  shifted  suddenly  and  quickened  the  transit. 
The  fog  lifted.  The  wind,  so  long  unpropitious,  had  detained  the 
British  fleet  at  the  Narrows,  while  by  the  change  which  had  done  so 
much  for  the  Americans,  that  fleet  was  borne  up  the  bay  to  assert 
control  of  the  harbor  and  river  passage,  but  too  late  to  foil  the  move 
ment  of  the  American  commander. 

On  the  evening  of  the  thirtieth  of  October,  1776,  Earl  Percy 
joined  Lord  Howe,  then  encamped  in  front  of  the  American  lines  at 
White  Plains,  and  it  was  resolved  to  storm  the  works  at  daybreak 
following.  A  north-easter  came  down  upon  the  camps  at  midnight, 
raging  wildly  for  nearly  twenty-four  hours  ;  but  before  the  advance 
was  attempted,  Washington  had  again  rescued  his  army  by  with 
drawal  to  the  heights  of  North  Castle,  and  occupied  a  position  too 
strong  to  warrant  assault. 

On  Christmas  night,  1776,  the  parting  ice  at  McConkey's  Ferry, 
nine  miles  above  Trenton,  on  the  Delaware  river,  admitted  of  the 
safe  passage  and  landing  of  one  column  of  the  American  army, 
although  other  divisions  were  foiled  in  like  attempts  at  ferries  still 
nearer  Trenton,  and  thus  the  battle  of  Trenton  made  its  stamp  upon 
the  entire  history  of  the  struggle.  It  impressed  all  nations  with  re 
spect  for  the  prudence,  courage,  and  faith  of  Washington,  and  relieved 
the  American  troops  of  the  impression  that  the  Hessians  were  a  pecu 
liarly  fierce  and  invincible  race. 

The  renewal  of  the  offensive  by  Washington  on  the  first  of  Janu 
ary,  1777,  by  again  crossing  the  river,  and  in  force,  during  compar 
atively  mild  weather,  was  followed  by  the  abrupt  closing  of  the 
Delaware,  not  sufficiently  for  safe  retreat  over  the  ice,  but  solid 
enough  to  threaten  his  entire  force  with  destruction  or  capture.  The 
same  extreme  cold  froze  the  roads,  made  them  passable  for  artillery 
and  men,  and  the  whole  situation  was  so  skillfully  improved,  that  the 
action  at  Princeton  followed,  and  his  retreat  to  secure  winter-quarters 
on  the  heights  of  New  Jersey,  not  only  saved  his  command,  but 
threatened  the  British  posts  about  New  York  and  affected  the  entire 
New  Jersey  campaign. 

The  battle  of  Brandywine  which  occurred  September  eighth,  1777, 
was  not  accepted  by  Washington  as  decisive  of  the  fate  of  Phila- 


I?75.j  PROVIDENCE   IN   WAR    ILLUSTRATED.  37 

delphia.  After  a  brief  rest,  the  armies  were  again  face  to  face  Sep 
tember  sixteenth,  near  White  House  Tavern,  twenty  miles  from 
Philadelphia,  Washington  seeking  the  issue.  General  Howe  skillfully 
turned  the  right  flank  of  the  American  army,  and  skirmishing  had 
begun,  when  a  storm  of  unusual  severity  put  arms  and  ammunition  out 
of  condition  for  use,  filled  the  small  streams,  parted  the  combatants, 
and  ultimately  gave  to  the  British  the  barren  acquisition  of  the  city. 

The  sudden  renewal  of  the  offensive  at  Germantown,  on  the  fourth 
of  October  following,  and  with  large  promise  of  success,  was  neutral 
ized  and  turned  into  a  repulse  by  the  interposition  of  dense  fog  which 
confused  the  troops  and  compelled  a  retreat,  but  thereby  secured  the 
column  from  the  pressure  of  overwhelming  forces  which  Cornwallis 
hastened  from  Philadelphia  to  the  support  of  General  Howe. 

On  the  eleventh  of  October  of  the  same  year,  when  the  army  of 
Burgoyne  had  crossed  the  Fishkill,  and  was  supposed  to  be  in  full 
retreat,  General  Gates  pushed  Morgan's  rifle  corps  and  the  brigades  of 
Nixon  and  Glover  across  the  river  under  cover  of  a  dense  fog.  A 
deserter  gave  warning  and  the  movement  was  suspended.  As  the 
fog  lifted,  the  entire  army  was  seen  to  be  in  line  of  battle  to  meet  the 
attack. 

A  succession  of  head  winds  delayed  the  fleet  of  Count  D'Estaing 
during  the  voyage  to  America  in  17/8,  so  that  Admiral  Howe  with 
drew  his  squadron  from  the  Delaware  river.  The  prompt  evacuation 
of  Philadelphia  by  General  Clinton,  pursuant  to  orders,  was  thus  the 
means  of  saving  both  army  and  fleet. 

A  propitious  voyage  of  the  French  squadron  would  have  been 
fatal  to  both.  The  squadron  of  Lord  Byron,  which  was  to  have  sailed 
from  England,  when  information  was  received  of  the  departure  of 
Count  D'Estaing  from  France,  was  detained  until  June  the  fifth,  and 
was  so  disabled  by  a  storm  as  to  be  compelled  to  refit  before  taking 
the  offensive  on  the  American  coast. 

On  the  tenth  day  of  August,  1778,  a  storm  disabled  both  British 
and  French  fleets  off  the  harbor  of  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  deprived 
General  Sullivan  of  the  support  of  the  French  troops  in  the  siege  of 
that  city,  and  compelled  both  a  retreat  from  the  island  itself,  and 
abandonment  of  the  siege.  Almost  immediately  after,  General  Clin 
ton  arrived  with  a  reinforcement  of  four  thousand  British  troops. 

The  supposed  insecurity  of  the  southern  coast  during  the  fall 
months,  forced  Count  De  Grasse  to  a  premature  assault,  followed  by 
defeat,  at  Savannah  in  the  month  of  October,  1779,  when  completed 


38  PROVIDENCE    IN   WAR   ILLUSTRATED.  [1775. 

trenches  and   adequate    forces  gave  entire    assurance  of  a  successful 
siege.     Two  days  after  he  left,  his  fleet  was  dispersed  by  a  tempest. 

On  the  ninth  of  January,  1780,  General  Lord  Stirling  took  a  force  of 
twenty-five  hundred  men  from  Elizabethtown,  New  Jersey,  to  Staten 
Island  in  sleighs,  crossing  the  river  on  the  ice,  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  the  British  in  their  quarters.  The  harbor  itself  had  been 
closed  so  that  heavy  cannon  had  been  hauled  across  on  the  ice. 
Quite  unexpectedly,  the  channel  had  opened  between  New  York  and 
the  island,  so  that  the  British  posts  had  been  reinforced  during  that 
very  day.  The  snow  was  three  feet  deep,  and  nearly  five  hundred 
men  paid  the  penalty  of  frozen  limbs  for  this  mammoth  midnight 
sleigh-ride. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  day  of  January,  1781,  Lord  Cornwallis  march 
ing  between  Broad  and  Catawba  rivers,  pursued  Morgan  with  the  hope 
of  recapturing  the  prisoners  which  that  officer  acquired  in  the  battle 
of  Cowpens.  The  pursuit  was  successful.  Night  came  on,  and  it  was 
left  for  sunrise  to  assure  the  victory.  Morgan  crossed  the  Catawba. 
A  heavy  rain  filled  the  river  to  its  banks,  and  cut  off  further  pursuit. 

Morgan  gained  the  banks  of  the  river  Yadkin  on  the  second  day 
of  February.  An  equally  sudden  storm  came  on.  Morgan  swam  his 
horses  across  the  river,  and  transported  his  troops  in  batteaux,  which 
he  secured  on  the  other  bank,  so  that  his  pursuer  again  failed  of 
success. 

On  the  thirteenth  day  o«f  the  same  month,  Morgan  having  effected 
a  union  with  Greene,  the  whole  command  successfully  crossed  the 
river  Dan,  and  then  renewed  rain  interposed  the  shield  of  an  impass 
able  barrier  for  a  third  time,  and  Lord  Cornwallis,  disheartened, 
abandoned  pursuit  and  retired  to  Hillsborough. 

At  the  critical  period  when  the  Count  De  Grasse  entered  Ches 
apeake  bay  with  a  formidable  fleet  of  men-of-war  and  transports,  to  aid 
the  American  army  in  the  reduction  of  Yorktown,  a  Franco-Spanish 
fleet  of  more  than  sixty  sail  was  on  its  way  to  the  West  Indies  to 
operate  against  the  British  colonies.  The  former  fulfilled  its  mission. 
The  latter,  separated  by  storms,  and  thoroughly  demoralized  for  any 
concerted  action,  returned  to  Europe,  leaving  the  record  of  a  profitless 
venture. 

During  the  night  of  the  sixteenth  of  October,  1781,  when  stillness 
pervaded  the  air,  and  a  calm  surface  invited  the  attempt,  the  vanguard 
of  the  beleaguered  army  of  Cornwallis  crossed  York  river  by  boats 
and  landed  safely  at  Gloucester  Point.  It  was  the  beginning  of  a 


1 775-]  PROVIDENCE   IN   WAR   ILLUSTRATED.  39 

brave  and  earnest  effort  to  extricate  his  army  from  impending  sur 
render,  and  to  make  a  bold  push  for  New  York  by  land.  Suddenly, 
without  warning,  a  storm  of  rain  and  wind  burst  over  the  heads  of 
the  hopeful  garrison.  The  detachment  already  over,  was  safely  re 
called,  and  the  drama  of  the  war  proceeded  to  its  catastrophe. 

Such  facts  as  are  thus  grouped  from  the  record  of  the  war  of 
1775-1781,  are  not  exceptional.  Neither  was  the  overthrow  of  the 
Spanish  Armada  exceptional.  The  majority  of  large  maritime  expe 
ditions  have  had  similar  vicissitudes,  and  the  battle  of  Waterloo  itself 
vibrated  under  the  strokes  of  the  storm  king. 

Such  facts  step  in  along  the  life  record  of  nations,  to  show  on  the 
one  hand,  how  utterly  dependent  are  all  human  enterprises  upon  ele 
ments  largely  beyond  human  control,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  de 
monstrate  that  wise  and  earnest  men,  resolute  of  will,  and  prompt  to 
execute,  have  converted  storm  itself  and  seeming  misfortune  into 
permanent  benefit,  and  have  even  rescued  victory  from  the  grasp  of 
the  elements  themselves.  It  is  a  part  of  the  philosophy  of  war  to 
study  such  examples,  and  the  American  struggle  is  the  history  of 
seven  years  of  characteristic  fluctuations  which  worked  in  the  direc 
tion  of  American  Independence,  even  when  hardships  and  misfor 
tunes  seemed  to  alternate  during  the  operations  of  the  contending 
armies. 

It  is  not  alone,  however,  in  the  realm  of  physical  nature  that  life's 
issues  bear  the  impress  of  external  force.  Opportunity  is  given  to  men 
and  nations,  and  all  probation  is  full  of  the  neglect  or  improvement 
of  opportunity.  Slight  causes,  no  less  than  those  more  impressive 
and  prominent,  give  shape  to  issues  and  assure  results.  The  states 
manship  of  war  grapples  with  all  classes  of  influences  which  work 
for  or  against  success,  and  a  brief  consideration  of  its  principles  and 
obligations  is  regarded  essential  to  the  proper  fulfillment  of  the 
purpose  in  view. 


44  STATESMANSHIP  IN  WAR  ILLUSTRATED.  [1775 

commanders  when  they  have  been  wisely  selected,  or  their  success  is 
put  in  hazard  at  the  outset. 

During  the  year  1861,  the  American  Congress  and  a  portion  of  the 
American  press  reiterated  the  cry  of  "  on  to  Richmond  "  ad  nauseam, 
until  outside  non-combatant  energies  largely  precipitated  the  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  even  contributed  spectators  to  see  how 
thoroughly  a  brilliant  triumph  would  vindicate  the  manifold  criticisms 
upon  the  delay  of  the  national  army  to  move  to  the  front. 

The  movement  made  at  the  close  of  the  Mexican  war  to  super 
sede  Major-general  Scott  by  appointment  of  a  citizen  to  the  grade 
of  lieutenant-general,  was  an  intrusion  of  folly  into  matters  strictly 
military,  and  failed  through  its  inherent  simplicity. 

It  is  already  evident  that  strategical  combinations,  and  considera 
tions  such  as  Baron  Jomini  calls  "  making  war  on  the  map  in  contradis 
tinction  to  operations  on  the  field,"  fall  within  the  considerate  regard 
of  the  statesman  as  well  as  of  the  soldier  ;  and  much  that  belongs  to 
the  consideration  of  strategy  proper,  is  eminently  worthy  of  the  study 
of  that  cabinet  which  rules  the  affairs  of  states,  and  acts  by  author 
ity  in  initiating  the  war  itself. 

It  only  remains  to  add  that  wise  statesmanship  in  war  embraces  a 
careful  consideration  of  the  military  and  financial  resources  of  the 
opposing  state,  in  comparison  with  those  of  the  state  making  war,  so 
that  adequate  means  may  be  furnished  for  the  purpose  required,  with 
the  least  possible  drain  upon  the  state,  and  the  least  possible  suspen 
sion  of  the  industrial  pursuits  of  those  not  called  upon  to  take  active 
part  in  the  war  itself. 

To  break  up  a  nest  of  pirates,  to  vindicate  a  wrong  done  to  a  citi 
zen  by  a  half  civilized  or  barbarous  state,  would  involve  a  very  differ 
ent  expenditure  of  means  and  men  from  a  contest  with  a  state  fully 
up  to  all  standard  improvements  in  the  capacity  to  carry  on  war. 
Extravagant  means,  beyond  the  necessity  of  the  end  in  view,  always 
beget  a  suspicion  that  the  state  is  only  seeking  an  excuse  to  increase 
its  warlike  capacity  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  and  the  demands 
of  a  healthy  and  permanent  peace.  Strong  armaments  beget  occa 
sions  for  their  use,  and  true  statesmanship  in  war  is  that  which  is  best 
in  peace. 

Finally,  let  it  be  understood  that  "  amenities  in  war,"  belong  to 
the  age.  Christianity,  which  is  the  true  life  of  all  national  life,  only 
declares  the  demand  which  civilization  now  affirms,  that  war  shall  have 
its  issue  between  real  combatants  only,  and  that  in  the  effort  to 


I775-J  STATESMANSHIP   IN   WAR  ILLUSTRATED.  45 

deplete  the  enemy  of  resources  for  continuing  the  struggle,  there  is 
to  be  recognized  a  high  regard  for  life  itself,  and  for  those  personal 
rights  which  belong  to  the  family  and  society.  Of  this  class  are  those 
which  deal  with  prisoners  of  war  and  certain  grades  of  private  property. 
Plunder  is  no  longer  a  just  right  of  the  individual  soldier.  Starvation 
or  abuse  of  captives  only  rebounds  to  irritate  the  enemy,  and  make  a 
good  cause  partake  of  all  the  dishonor  and  natural  fatality  of  a  bad 
cause. 

High  statesmanship  in  war,  which  includes  statesmanship  during 
its  inception  and  looking  to  its  prevention,  affords  the  best  promise 
that  the  time  will  hasten  when  reason  and  charity  combined  will  dis 
arm  the  nations,  and  leave  the  settlement  of  national  issues  to  that 
kind  of  arbitrament  which  long  since  abolished  the  "  wager  of  battle." 
and  the  duelist's  senseless  "code  of  honor." 


42  STATESMANSHIP  IN   WAR   ILLUSTRATED.  [1775- 

meat  upon  which  the  resistance  hinged.  It  took  its  place  as  an 
element  of  the  war,  because  permanent  peace  under  reinstated  author 
ity  was  impossible,  so  long  as  an  abnormal  social  condition  con 
flicted  with  the  law  and  essence  of  pure  individual  and  personal 
liberty. 

The  suppression  of  the  Mamelukes  in  181 1,  and  of  the  Janizaries  in 
1826,  became  indispensably  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  legitimate 
authority,  because  the  creature  usurped  authority  over  the  state,  its 
creator,  and  would  not  accept  the  legitimate  control  which  the  state 
asserted.  It  will  not  be  questioned  now  that  the  aspiration  of  slavery 
to  hold  perfect  equality  of  footing  with  liberty,  forced  it  into  an  atti 
tude  wholly  at  war  with  the  charity  which  had  so  long  tolerated  its 
presence  as  a  transmitted  incubus  upon  the  national  life.  Hence,  it 
became  an  objective  of  attack. 

The  expulsion  or  suppression  of  the  order  of  Jesuits  by  certain 
European  states,  is  not  predicated  upon  their  holding  certain  religious 
faith,  but  upon  their  supposed  organization  to  contravene  the  author 
ity,  or  seek  the  overthrow,  of  the  very  state  which  affords  them  pro 
tection  and  a  home.  Neither  of  these  exceptions  are  in  conflict  with 
the  principles  asserted. 

In  view  of  war  once  undertaken,  it  is  equally  important  that  regard 
be  had  to  the  social  and  moral  circumstances  of  the  state  assailed.  Its 
government  may  have  forced  the  war,  while  its  people  oppose  or  reluc 
tantly  support  it.  The  whole  policy  of  operations  is  to  be  shaped  by 
regard  to  such  issues.  A  just  advocacy  of  rightful  claims,  as  between 
civilized  and  enlightened  nations,  will  gradually  constrain  a  people  to 
put  their  own  government  in  the  right,  and  compel  the  admission  of 
such  claims,  if  there  be  no  manifest  aggression  for  selfish  ends,  and  in 
disregard  of  a  sound  discussion  of  the  issues  made.  Hence,  an  un 
reasonable  ultimatum,  propositions  looking  to  national  humiliation,  or, 
a  claim  for  vindictive,  consequential  damage  for  injuries  alleged,  is 
not  only  provocative  of  protracted,  bitter  resistance,  but  will  leave 
heartburns,  thirst  for  revenge,  and  seed  for  future  conflict.  Regard 
must  be  had  even  for  national  peculiarities.  An  issue  with  Turkey  is 
not  well  presented  if  it  offend  Moslem  prejudices,  unless  that  state 
shall  intrude  such  prejudices  in  the  way  of  equal  justice  to  non- 
Mohammedan  nations.  An  issue  with  China  is  not  well  presented  if 
it  make  war  upon  its  social  customs,  irrespective  of  their  relation  to 
international  intercourse.  In  a  word,  the  instincts  of  Christian  gen 
tlemen  are  not  to  be  cast  away  by  nations  any  more  than  by  individ- 


1775J  STATESMANSHIP  IN  WAR   ILLUSTRATED.  43 

uals  when  differences  arise,  and  the  rights  of  each  are  to  be  weighed 
in  the  balances  of  even-handed  justice. 

A  policy  that  will  allay  passion,  and  impress  the  opponent  with 
the  justice  of  the  claim  at  stake,  will  hasten  peace  and  a  final  settle 
ment  of  all  interests  involved.  In  harmony  with  this  line  of  conduct, 
is  such  a  course  as  strongly  appeals  to  sound  patriotism  at  home,  and 
thus  unites  the  people  in  a  hearty  support  of  the  government  which 
carries  on  the  war  on  their  behalf. 

An  attitude  which  vindicates  a  merely  partisan  ascendency,  is 
repugnant  to  the  sober  judgment  of  an  intelligent  people,  and  such  a 
war  must  soon  languish  and  fail,  or  be  fruitless  of  substantial  benefit 
to  the  nation  involved.  It  is  therefore  just  that  the  cause  of  the  war 
be  fairly  stated,  and  that  the  men  who  are  to  furnish  lives  and  treas 
ure  to  feed  war,  shall  be  in  full  sympathy  with  its  prosecution.  Mere 
national  aggrandizement,  or  the  reduction  to  a  lower  grade  of  a  state 
which  is  confessedly  superior,  will  not  meet  the  requirements  of  sound 
statesmanship.  "  To  live  and  let  live,"  is  the  duty  of  nations  as  well 
as  of  individuals.  Predicated  upon  .such  principles,  and  working  in 
such  channels,  a  war  advances  to  execute  its  work.  Shall  the  nation 
take  the  offensive  or  await  the  attack?  This  must  be  determined  by 
the  respective  preparations  of  the  parties,  the  location  of  objectives 
most  susceptible  of  attack  with  view  to  hasten  the  final  result,  and  the 
character  of  the  issue  itself  If  a  boundary  be  in  dispute,  a  prompt 
occupation  and  armed  possession  of  the  territory  involved  may  prove 
a  virtual  solution  of  the  whole  controversy. 

Dispossession  of  a  firmly  established  force  may  be  more  costly 
than  a  surrender  of  claim  to  the  title.  Barren  points  of  this  kind 
have  cost  many  lives  and  large  treasure.  A  state  can  not  afford  to  go 
to  war  for  barren  issues,  and  when  no  national  benefit  can  possibly 
ensue  from  the  contest. 

It  is  always  bad  statesmanship  to  make  merely  nominal  issues,  or 
to  stake  the  settlement  of  differences  upon  questions  of  pride,  as  for 
instance,  the  occupation  of  an  enemy's  capital,  or  any  other  particular 
and  merely  formal  success,  which  does  not  of  necessity  work  to  the 
quickest  conclusion  in  peace. 

It  is  equally  wrong  to  over-ride  the  jurisdiction  of  military  men  to 
whom  the  armies  are  entrusted,  by  loading  them  down  with  instruc 
tions  that  are  non-military,  and  too  late  for  application  when  the 
issue  of  arms  has  been  joined.  Confidence  must  be  given  to  the 


44  STATESMANSHIP  IN  WAR  ILLUSTRATED.  [1775 

commanders  when  they  have  been  wisely  selected,  or  their  success  is 
put  in  hazard  at  the  outset. 

During  the  year  1861,  the  American  Congress  and  a  portion  of  the 
American  press  reiterated  the  cry  of  "  on  to  Richmond  "  ad  nauseam, 
until  outside  non-combatant  energies  largely  precipitated  the  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  even  contributed  spectators  to  see  how 
thoroughly  a  brilliant  triumph  would  vindicate  the  manifold  criticisms 
upon  the  delay  of  the  national  army  to  move  to  the  front. 

The  movement  made  at  the  close  of  the  Mexican  war  to  super 
sede  Major-general  Scott  by  appointment  of  a  citizen  to  the  grade 
of  lieutenant-general,  was  an  intrusion  of  folly  into  matters  strictly 
military,  and  failed  through  its  inherent  simplicity. 

It  is  already  evident  that  strategical  combinations,  and  considera 
tions  such  as  Baron  Jomini  calls  "  making  war  on  the  map  in  contradis 
tinction  to  operations  on  the  field,"  fall  within  the  considerate  regard 
of  the  statesman  as  well  as  of  the  soldier  ;  and  much  that  belongs  to 
the  consideration  of  strategy  proper,  is  eminently  worthy  of  the  study 
of  that  cabinet  which  rules  the  affairs  of  states,  and  acts  by  author 
ity  in  initiating  the  war  itself. 

It  only  remains  to  add  that  wise  statesmanship  in  war  embraces  a 
careful  consideration  of  the  military  and  financial  resources  of  the 
opposing  state,  in  comparison  with  those  of  the  state  making  war,  so 
that  adequate  means  may  be  furnished  for  the  purpose  required,  with 
the  least  possible  drain  upon  the  state,  and  the  least  possible  suspen 
sion  of  the  industrial  pursuits  of  those  not  called  upon  to  take  active 
part  in  the  war  itself. 

To  break  up  a  nest  of  pirates,  to  vindicate  a  wrong  done  to  a  citi 
zen  by  a  half  civilized  or  barbarous  state,  would  involve  a  very  differ 
ent  expenditure  of  means  and  men  from  a  contest  with  a  state  fully 
up  to  all  standard  improvements  in  the  capacity  to  carry  on  wan 
Extravagant  means,  beyond  the  necessity  of  the  end  in  view,  always 
beget  a  suspicion  that  the  state  is  only  seeking  an  excuse  to  increase 
its  warlike  capacity  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  and  the  demands 
of  a  healthy  and  permanent  peace.  Strong  armaments  beget  occa 
sions  for  their  use,  and  true  statesmanship  in  war  is  that  which  is  best 
in  peace. 

Finally,  let  it  be  understood  that  "  amenities  in  war,"  belong  to 
the  age.  Christianity,  which  is  the  true  life  of  all  national  life,  only 
declares  the  demand  which  civilization  now  affirms,  that  war  shall  have 
its  issue  between  real  combatants  only,  and  that  in  the  effort  to 


I775-J  STATESMANSHIP   IN   WAR  ILLUSTRATED.  45 

deplete  the  enemy  of  resources  for  continuing  the  struggle,  there  is 
to  be  recognized  a  high  regard  for  life  itself,  and  for  those  personal 
rights  which  belong  to  the  family  and  society.  Of  this  class  are  those 
which  deal  with  prisoners  of  war  and  certain  grades  of  private  property. 
Plunder  is  no  longer  a  just  right  of  the  individual  soldier.  Starvation 
or  abuse  of  captives  only  rebounds  to  irritate  the  enemy,  and  make  a 
good  cause  partake  of  all  the  dishonor  and  natural  fatality  of  a  bad 
cause. 

High  statesmanship  in  war,  which  includes  statesmanship  during 
its  inception  and  looking  to  its  prevention,  affords  the  best  promise 
that  the  time  will  hasten  when  reason  and  charity  combined  will  dis 
arm  the  nations,  and  leave  the  settlement  of  national  issues  to  that 
kind  of  arbitrament  which  long  since  abolished  the  "  wager  of  battle." 
and  the  duelist's  senseless  "code  of  honor." 


CHAPTER   IX. 

PRINCIPLES  DEFINED.     STRATEGY   ILLUSTRATED. 

WAR  may  be  formally  declared, — may  start  in  the  collision  of 
armies  stationed  on  the  border,  or  may  be  forced  by  invasion 
or  some  other  aggressive  act  of  another  state.  The  United  States 
and  Mexico  were  put  at  war  with  each  other  in  1845  by  the  advance 
of  General  Zachary  Taylor  upon  territory  then  in  controversy. 
Napoleon  III.  hurled  the  announcement  of  war  against  Prussia 
in  1870  only  as  he  advanced  his  army  of  invasion. 

Lexington  and  Concord  opened  the  war  of  1776-1781.  The 
principles  involved  by  the  beginning  of  war  are,  however,  entirely 
within  the  sphere  of  international  law,  except  so  far  as  policy  or  the 
statesmanship  of  war  has  considered  the  issue,  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  what  methods  shall  be  adopted  for  its  prosecution. 

At  this  period  physical  force  enters  the  arena.  Practical  questions 
take  the  place  of  theory.  Shall  the  state  take  offensive  measures, 
thereby  to  make  the  struggle  upon  foreign  soil,  or  limit  its  action  to 
defense  of  its  own  soil?  • 

The  offensive  not  only  bears  to  the  territory  of  the  adversary  the 
local  waste  of  war,  but  carries  with  it  the  incentive  which  attends  a 
first  success.  It  assumes  a  superiority  by  assertion  of  the  aggressive, 
and  often  excites  enthusiasm  at  home  while  discouraging  the  adver 
sary.  The  offensive  must  work  by  careful  plans,  with  close  counsels, 
and  thus  keep  the  enemy  busy  to  meet  them  as  they  unfold.  But  it 
must  be  followed  up  with  vigor  and  with  adequate  resources.  These 
resources,  whether  of  men,  munitions,  provisions,  or  transportation, 
must  be  continually  renewed  and  continually  protected.  Otherwise, 
the  advancing  force  will  be  so  wasted  by  casualties  as  to  become 
inferior  to  the  resisting  force,  and  will  then  fall  an  easy  prey  to  a 
revived  adversary  backed  by  an  aroused  people,  restored  to  a  fresh 


I775.J  PRINCIPLES  DEFINED.  47 

consciousness  of  their  ability  successfully  to  resist.  Failure  to  sustain 
the  offensive  is  generally  the  prelude  to  ultimate  defeat.  The  defens 
ive,  on  the  other  hand,  inspires  a  nation  to  earnest  resistance,  if  its 
people  are  united  in  thought  and  policy,  and  if  there  be  no  elements 
in  the  issue  which  prompt  a  sympathy  with  the  cause  of  the  invaders 
and  induce  a  lukewarm  resistance. 

Supplies  are  more  readily  at  hand.  The  superior  knowledge  of 
the  country  is  of  great  use  in  keeping  up  communications  and  dis 
turbing  those  of  the  enemy.  The  social  instincts,  obligations,  and 
sympathies,  are  more  closely  bound  to  every  incident  of  the  struggle, 
and  the  national  life  itself  may  be  so  imperiled  as  to  evoke  the  max 
imum  of  resistance  which  the  state  and  people  combined  can  possibly 
put  forth.  Many  classes  of  supplies  which  are  essential  to  invasion, 
can  be  largely  dispensed  with  under  many  phases  of  a  simple  defense. 

When  the  defensive  by  adequate  resistance  is  enabled  to  assume 
the  offensive  in  return,  and  to  follow  this  with  vigor  and  resources 
adequate  to  the  opportunity,  the  war  may  be  considered  as  near  its 
final  crisis.  But  the  passive  or  persistent  defensive  will  ultimately  be 
fatal  in  any  struggle,  whenever  the  aggressive  force  patiently  main 
tains  its  pressure. 

The  terms  offensive  and  defensive  have  pointed  application  in 
single  actions,  which  are  often  decisive  of  a  campaign,  or  of  the  war 
itself,  whatever  may  have  been  the  original  policy  of  the  state  which 
took  the  initiative  at  the  outset  of  hostilities. 

Washington  at  Princeton,  and  Clinton  at  Monmouth,  alike  re 
turned  the  offensive,  under  circumstances  which  accomplished  for 
each  the  object  in  view,  and  alike  testified  of  their  courage,  conduct, 
and  military  skill.  In  the  war  of  1775-1781,  there  were  peculiar  cir 
cumstances  to  give  value  to  the  defensive,  having  offensive  return. 
The  territory  was  quite  generally  thickly  wooded  ;  bridges  were  infre 
quent,  the  population  was  scattered,  roads  were  poor,  water  courses 
were  not  only  numerous  and  large,  but  were  peculiarly  susceptible  to 
overflow,  because  of  the  mountains  and  hills  which  everywhere 
abounded. 

In  regions  not  hilly,  or  near  the  sea-coast,  the  numerous  swamps 
interposed  equally  serious  obstacles  to  the  movements  of  organized 
commands,  and  afforded  special  opportunity  for  that  partisan  species 
of  warfare  which  is  then  so  efficient  in  defense,  and  so  annoying  to  an 
invader. 

War  having  in  fact  begun,  the  elements  which  control  its  destiny 


48  PRINCIPLES  DEFINED.  L*775- 

are  embodied  in  simple  propositions.     These  embody  five  universally 
recognized  divisions  of  the  art  of  war,  and  will  be  defined  as  follows : 

I.  Strategy. 

To  secure  those  combinations  which  will  assure  the  highest  possi 
ble  advantages  in  the  employment  of  military  force. 

II.  Grand  Tactics. 

To  handle  that  force  on  the  battle-field. 

III.  Logistics. 

The  practical  art  of  bringing  armies  fully  equipped  to  the  battle- 
issue. 

IV.  Engineering. 

The  application  of  mathematics  and  mechanics  to  the  mainte 
nance  or  reduction  of  fortified  places,  the  interposition  or  removal  of 
natural  or  artificial  obstacles  to  the  passage  of  an  army,  and  the  erec 
tion  of  suitable  works  for  defense  of  territory  or  troops. 

V.  Minor  Tactics. 

The  instruction  of  the  soldier  individually  and  en  masse,  in  the 
details  of  military  drill  and  the  perfection  of  discipline. 

With  regard  to  the  last  two  divisions,  it  is  only  necessary  to  notice 
that  the  early  drill  of  Washington,  as  a  practical  civil  engineer  and 
frontier  officer,  was  made  conspicuously  useful  in  the  selection  of 
military  positions  for  his  army  in  the  progress  of  the  war  of  1775-1781. 
Although  he  had  the  cooperation  of  several  foreign  officers  of  real 
attainment,  he  gave  his  personal  attention  to  the  location  of  field- 
works  on  occasions  of  great  necessity.  He  had  strong  faith  in  a 
system,  now  so  indispensable,  of  casting  up  light  earthworks  when  his 
army  halted,  and  an  enemy  was  within  a  short  march  of  his  lines. 
•  Baron  Steuben  and  Generals  Lee,  Greene,  Wayne,  Varnum,  and  Max 
well,  were  among  his  most  skillful  and  urgent  officers  in  imparting 
instruction  in  the  details  of  minor  tactics.  The  success  was  only 
limited  by  the  fluctuations  of  army  organization,  and  the  short  terms 
of  enlistment.  The  continental  troops  which  were  enlisted  for  the 
war,  very  properly  styled  the  "  American  Continental  Army,"  vindi 
cated  their  drill  and  discipline  in  the  field.  The  first  three  divisions  of 
':he  art  of  war,  in  their  order  as  named,  will  receive  brief  consider 
ation. 

Strategy  deals  first  with  the  theatre  of  war.  This  involves  a  clear 
consideration  of  several  included  topics,  viz., — the  character  of  the 
country,  its  natural  resources,  its  topographical  features,  its  means  of 
inter-communication,  in  short,  all  elements  which  form  or  impede  the 


I775-J  PRINCIPLES  DEFINED.  49 

movement  of  an  army  under  the  changing  circumstances  which  affect 
all  armies  in  the  field. 

During  the  war  of  1775-1781,  the  theatre  of  war  extended  from 
the  St.  Lawrence  river  to  Florida,  and  from  the  Atlantic  ocean 
nearly  to  the  Mississippi  river.  It  was  not  then,  and  never  is,  enough 
simply  to  take  cognizance  of  the  theatre  of  active  operations. 

In  the  contingency  of  a  collision  between  England  and  the  United 
States,  Canada  would  be,  as  then,  a  possible  base  of  British  operations, 
requiring  observation  at  least  as  a  hostile  border,  if  it  did  not  become 
an  actual  field  of  operations  by  intrusion  of  American  troops. 

Equally  important,  in  case  of  trouble  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  would  be  such  a  naval  observation  of  Cuba  as  to  anticipate 
a  concentration  of  troops  on  the  island  and  a  descent  upon  the 
American  coast.  Either  Canada  or  Cuba  might  become  a  field  of 
active  operations,  and  neglect  to  anticipate  these  contingencies,  would 
violate  the  demands  of  sound  strategy  as  well  as  wise  statesman 
ship. 

Arnold's  fatal  attempt  upon  Quebec  will  be  hereafter  considered 
in  connection  with  the  battle  record  proper.  Sufficient  to  say  in  this 
connection,  that  it  had  but  one  possible  element  of  merit,  and  that, 
the  wild  conjecture  that  Canada  had  a  common  interest,  and  was 
willing  to  make  common  cause  in  the  issue  with  the  mother  country. 

In  a  wise  examination  of  the  theatre  of  war,  the  outlook  must 
include  natural  strategic  positions,  just  as  in  the  operations  of  a  cam 
paign  there  will  be  found  accidental  and  conditional  strategic  positions, 
having  their  sole  value  in  the  temporary  strength  or  opportunity  which 
they  afford  to  one  army,  and  the  temporary  detention  or  reverse 
which  they  involve  for  the  adversary  force. 

The  wise  location  of  an  army  at  the  end  of  a  day's  march,  will 
often  secure  determining  positions  which  directly  involve  ultimate 
success,  while  a  corresponding  error  will  bring  a  quick  attack  and 
a  speedy  reverse. 

Compactness,  so  that  the  whole  force  can  be  handled,  and  such 
disposition,  that  no  surprise  can  be  effected,  are  alike  indispensable  to 
such  a  position.  West  Point  was  a  natural  strategic  point  in  respect 
of  operations  along  the  Hudson  river.  Forts  Lee  and  Independence 
had  a  similar  element  of  value,  inasmuch  as  these  positions,  if  sub 
stantially  supported,  were  links  to  assure  speedy  communication 
between  New  England  and  the  other  colonies,  and  impart  to  each  sec 
tion  the  confidence  which  a  prompt  mutual  support  would  engender. 
4 


5O  PRINCIPLES  DEFINED.  [1775. 

Their  early  reduction,  and  that  of  Forts  Clinton,  Montgomery,  and 
Stony  Point,  crowded  this  link  of  inter-communication  far  up  the 
Hudson  river.  Such  positions  as  the  "  straits  of  the  Dardanelles  " 
have  a  similar  permanent  strategic  value,  to  be  regarded,  whether 
actually  occupied  or  not. 

Strategic  movements  have  as  their  philosophy  the  use  of  all  meas 
ures,  other  than  those  of  detail  and  the  mere  physical  struggle  of  the 
field,  which  tend  to  enhance  success,  and  reduce  to  their  lowest 
grade  of  destructive  force  the  resources  of  the  enemy.  Thus  a  vic 
tory  may  be  won  without  a  battle,  whenever  a  prompt  and  felicitous 
strategic  movement,  or  the  timely  seizure  of  a  single  position,  shall 
compel  an  enemy  to  abandon  his  own  position  as  untenable,  in  view 
of  the  movement  made. 

The  simulated  attack  upon  New  York  by  Washington,  in  1781 
which  was  carried  so  far  as  to  have  brick  bread-ovens  erected  in  Ne\\ 
Jersey,  opposite  Staten  Island,  was  a  strategic  movement  which  held 
the  garrison  fast  to  that  city,  induced  a  call  upon  Lord  Cornwallis  for 
reinforcements,  and  ultimately  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Yorktown. 
Thus  the  American  army  had  substantially  a  double  presence,  repre 
sented  a  double  force,  and  presented  a  double  front, — one  false,  and 
one  real. 

The  establishment  of  Washington's  Head-quarters  at  Morristown 
was  of  high  strategical  value,  inasmuch  as  New  England,  New  York, 
New  Jersey,  and  the  Southern  States,  were  all  on  radii  from  that 
centre,  and  almost  equally  accessible  by  his  command.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  occupation  of  Philadelphia  by  General  Howe,  lost  the  value 
which  was  predicated  upon  the  movement,  for  want  of  adequate  force 
by  which  to  reduce  the  army  of  Washington  still  in  the  field.  It 
simply  afforded  a  comparative  rest  in  comfortable  winter  quarters,  but 
was  barren  of  military  results. 

Lord  Rawdon  exercised  sound  strategy  at  the  battle  of  Camden, 
when  he  secured  for  his  army  the  protection  of  both  flanks  by  an 
impassable  marsh,  while  maintaining  communication  with  his  base,  as 
the  means  of  turning  the  American  left. 

A  base  of  operations  is  of  prime  importance  to  an  invading  army, 
and  is  equally  important  in  the  consideration  of  suitable  and  deter 
mining  objective  points. 

The  general  purpose  of  the  campaign  will  largely  determine  the 
choice  of  the  base  and  the  immediate  objective.  Jomini  declares 
that  "  it  is  important  to  establish  the  base  upon  those  points  where  it 


I775-J  PRINCIPLES   DEFINED.  5 1 

can  be  sustained  by  all  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  at  the  same 
time  insure  a  safe  retreat." 

During  the  American  war  of  1861-1865,  when  the  federal  troops 
of  the  middle  zone  of  operations  made  Louisville,  Kentucky,  their 
military  base,  as  well  as  the  base  of  supplies,  with  Nashville  as  the 
objective  point  to  be  reached,  it  became  necessary  first  to  drive  the 
confederate  force  from  Bowling  Green,  a  fortified  position  between 
Louisville  and  Nashville,  and  then  to  reduce  Forts  Donaldson  and 
Henry  on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers.  The  former  was 
directly  on  the  railroad  line  to  Nashville.  The  latter  made  possible 
the  control  of  the  Ohio  river  by  hostile  vessels,  or  a  flank  movement 
to  the  rear,  by  land,  and  the  loss  of  the  base  itself.  Their  capture 
gave  a  second  line  of  operations  by  water,  in  concert  with  the  main 
movement  upon  Nashville,  which  lay  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Cumber 
land,  and  thus  realized  the  desired  result. 

New  York  was  made  the  chief  base  of  General  Howe's  operations 
not  long  after  the  evacuation  of  Boston.  In  one  sense  it  was  a  double 
base.  While  Staten  Island  gave  peculiar  facilities  for  operations 
towards  Philadelphia  and  the  south,  the  control  of  New  York  Island 
and  of  the  accompanying  entrance  to  Long  Island  Sound,  was  equally 
valuable  in  view  of  operations  up  the  Hudson  river  and  toward  New 
England.  As  a  depot  of  supplies  and  the  general  rendezvous  of  the 
British  naval  forces,  it  also  operated  as  the  primary  base  for  all  enter 
prises  in  the  direction  of  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas. 

One  objective,  as  already  stated,  was  the  capture  of  Philadelphia. 
Although  this  result  was  finally  consummated,  only  by  a  detour 
through  Chesapeake  bay  by  aid  of  the  fleet ;  the  movement  was 
originally  organized  as  an  operation  by  land.  This  involved  the 
military  occupation  of  New  Jersey. 

Washington's  offensive  return  at  Trenton  and  Princeton,  modified 
the  original  purpose,  and  his  command  was  suffered  to  hold  the  posi 
tion  at  Morristown  in  the  very  heart  of  New  Jersey,  and  to  become  a 
source  of  constant  uneasiness  and  even  of  danger  to  New  York  itself. 

The  selection  and  successful  occupation  of  Charleston,  South 
Carolina,  as  the  immediate  base  of  operations  in  the  Southern  States 
was  eminently  wise  and  timely,  but  was  not  supported  by  a  force 
adequate  to  the  necessities  of  the  movement. 

Canada  was  made  a  base  for  a  third  line  of  operations,  threatening 
the  separation  of  New  England  from  the  other  colonies ;  but  the 
failure  to  destroy  the  army  of  Washington,  which  remained  on  the 


52  PRINCIPLES  DEFINED.  [1775 

alert,  within  striking  distance  of  New  York,  still  paralyzed  the  arm 
which  was  to  strike  with  Burgoyne,  and  his  operations  closed  at  Sara 
toga.  While  a  base  resting  on  the  sea  must  be  adequately  supplied, 
as  was  New  York,  through  superior  maritime  resources,  it  is  equally 
true  that  an  army  forced  back  upon  the  sea  by  a  competent  force,  as 
was  that  of  Cornwallis,  is  lost. 


CHAPTER   X. 

STRATEGY   IN  WAR   CONTINUED. 

THE  prime  objective  of  the  war  of  1775-1781,  was  the  reduction 
of  the  colonial  armies  and  enforcement  of  the  authority  of  the 
crown.  The  occupation  of  territory  or  cities  by  an  inadequate  force, 
while  the  opposing  armies  kept  the  field,  was  therefore  of  transient 
benefit. 

Philadelphia  was  made  the  objective  of  the  British  army  during 
the  campaign  of  1777,  mainly  because  it  was  the  capital  of  the  enemy. 
Congress  removed  to  Wilmington, — Washington  struck  a  blow  at 
Germantown,  close  to  the  city,  and  the  issue  was  as  far  as  ever  from 
conclusion.  A  single  remark  is  therefore  proper  as  to  the  value  of  a 
national  capital  as  a  chief  military  objective. 

Colonel  Hamley,  commandant  of  the  British  Staff  College,  in  his 
excellent  volume  upon  "  The  Operations  of  War,"  (edition  of  1875) 
states  the  proposition  very  precisely.  "  The  mere  possession  of  the 
capital  is  not  final,  so  long  as  the  enemy  can  still  make  head  in  the 
field.  It  is  when  the  seizure  of  the  capital  is  coupled  with  such 
ascendency  over  the  defensive  armies  that  they  can  never  hope  to 
retake  it,  that  further  resistance  is  felt  to  be  hopeless,  as  leading  only 
to  national  extinction,  and  that  any  terms  not  absolutely  unendurable, 
are  accepted  by  the  vanquished." 

This,  as  a  general  rule,  is  true  as  between  independent  nations. 
During  the  American  war  of  1861-1865,  another  element  entered  into 
the  question.  If  Washington,  with  its  archives,  public  buildings,  and 
foreign  representation,  had  fallen  under  Confederate  control,  especially 
as  its  soil  was  within  the  original  territory  under  influence  of  Southern 
sympathy,  there  would  have  been  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the  success 
ful  party,  that  the  Confederacy  was,  de  facto,  the  United  States. 
Neither  would  there  have  been  wanting  a  certain  extent  of  foreign 
sympathy  with  the  demand,  and  also  a  color  of  right.  On  the  other 


54  STRATEGY  IN  WAR    CONTINUED.  [1775 

hand,  Richmond,  while  a  legitimate  base  of  operations,  was  not  a 
national  capital,  in  any  permanent  sense.  The  transfer  of  its  execu 
tive  and  of  its  legislative  body  to  Montgomery,  was  not  analogous  to 
that  of  the  removal  of  the  American  Congress  to  Baltimore,  during 
the  war  of  1775-1781.  The  popular  pressure  for  the  premature  occu 
pation  of  Richmond  at  great  hazard,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a 
capital  was  sentimental  and  unsound.  Its  sole  value  was  in  its 
character  as  a  military  base,  having  solid  relations  to  an  advance  upon 
Washington.  Moreover,  European  capitals  have  been  repeatedly 
occupied,  with  no  permanent  benefit  to  the  invader,  and  with  no  appre 
ciable  effect  upon  the  issues  of  the  war  itself. 

Immaterial  objectives  only  impair  general  operations.  The  vari 
ous  British  expeditions  to  Connecticut  and  Virginia  committed  waste, 
but  accomplished  nothing  else,  except  to  embitter  the  struggle  and 
arouse  fresh  passion  to  resist. 

Lines  of  operations  are  the  pathivays  of  armies,  and  include  such 
contiguous  territory  as  render  the  march  secure  and  practicable. 

Deep  lines  are  those  which  advance  far  beyond  the  base.  Napo 
leon's  march  to  Moscow  is  the  type  of  an  extreme  line.  The  Burgoyne 
campaign  was  another  instance  in  point.  It  assumed  impossible  data 
as  certain.  It  threw  away  communication  with  its  base,  which  also 
included  its  base  of  supplies,  since  the  supply-train  was  too  limited 
for  the  entire  movement ;  it  over-estimated  the  resources  of  the 
country  invaded,  and  depended  upon  the  support  of  another  far  dis 
tant  army  for  success,  while  that  army  was  to  operate  from  an  oppo 
site  base,  with  no  such  assured  readiness  of  communication  as  to 
assure  the  concert  of  action  indispensable  to  the  result.  That  other 
army  projected  a  line  of  operations  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  beyond 
its  base,  with  the  positive  knowledge  that  if  the  movement  were  made 
with  adequate  force,  it  must  imperil  that  base,  and  put  the  whole 
purpose  of  the  war  in  peril.  Justice  to  the  high  military  qualities  of 
Burgoyne  and  Clinton,  requires  the  statement  that  this  measure  was 
at  the  dictation  of  bad  statesmanship  which  controlled  the  English 
commander  at  New  York. 

Lines  of  operation  may  be  parallel  with  or  perpendicular  to  the 
base,  this  depending  upon  the  strength  of  the  forces,  and  the  topog 
raphy  of  the  country  occupied.  It  may  be  along  a  river,  or  through 
a  region  which  gives  strategic  value  to  the  movement,  and  thereby 
gain  additional  advantages  to  that  of  a  mere  advance.  Thus  the 
river  Raritan,  in  New  Jersey,  repeatedly  exercised  a  marked  influence 


1775-J  STRATEGY   IN    WAR  CONTINUED.  55 

in  giving  direction  to  the  lines  of  operation  respectively  adopted  by 
the  British  and  American  armies  in  their  movements  to  and  from  the 
Delaware  river.  Washington's  retreat  from  Fort  Lee,  in  1776,  was 
secured  only  by  a  prompt  withdrawal  behind  the  Hackensack,  and  a 
movement  down  its  right  bank,  holding  the  river  itself  as  a  cover  from 
the  left  flank  of  the  army. 

A  front  of  operations  includes  not  merely  the  territory  occupied 
towards  the  enemy,  but  so  much  as  must  be  observed,  in  order  to 
anticipate  a  hostile  advance,  while  also  affording  margin  for  counter 
manoeuvers.  Jomini,  as  well  as  other  writers,  limits  this  front  to  the 
equivalent  of  a  two  days'  march.  This  is,  however,  an  artificial  dis 
tance,  wholly  dependent  upon  the  nature  of  the  country.  The  strict 
front  of  the  army  itself,  has  been  called  the  strategic  front.  If  an 
army  be  behind  an  impassable  stream,  its  front  is  sharply  defined. 
This  becomes  an  indication  of  the  tract  within  which  the  army  may 
operate  with  decisive  advantage,  so  that  the  actual  front  and  the 
strategic  front  may  thus  coincide. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  little  value  in  maintaining  the  dis 
tinction,  since  it  must  be  assumed  of  any  wise  commander,  that  he 
will  pay  special  attention  to  an  issue  which  presents  such  a  pressing 
demand  as  the  presence  of  an  enemy  within  easy  striking  distance. 
It  often  devolves  upon  a  commander  to  maintain  a  double  strategic 
front.  This  invariably  attends  the  presence  of  a  substantial  foice 
upon  either  flank.  It  may  also  become  necessary  by  the  very  con 
figuration  of  the  country,  and  this  necessarily  increases  as  the  army 
advances  into  an  enemy's  territory.  This  involves  the  separation 
from  the  command  of  large  detachments.  The  failure  of  General 
Sullivan  to  maintain  such  a  front  to  the  right  flank  of  the  American 
army  at  Brandywine,  coupled  with  defective  reconnoissance,  precip 
itated  that  action  before  the  army  could  be  adjusted  to  meet  the 
skillful  flank  movement  of  Generals  Howe  and  Cornwallis. 

A  line  of  defense,  independent  of  the  base,  is  not  always  indispens 
able,  when  the  protection  of  the  base  is  adequate,  and  the  forces  in 
hand  are  equal  to  any  required  advance  movement. 

Washington's  policy  being  the  preservation  of  his  army,  he  adopted 
a  line  of  defense  across  the  New  Jersey  hills,  which  not  only  served 
as  a  base,  but  gave  a  definite  character  to  his  operations,  and  repeat 
edly  saved  that  army.  Natural  or  artificial  obstacles  should  be  made 
to  serve  as  supports  to  the  army  when  driven  to  the  stationary  de 
fensive.  Rivers  often  form  lines  of  defense,  as  in  repeated  instance; 


50  STRATEGY    IN   WAR   CONTINUED.  [i775 

during  the  campaign  of  1781  in  the  Southern  States.  The  winter 
quarters  of  the  American  army  at  Valley  Forge,  17/7-8,  were  a  line 
of  defense  no  less  than  a  peculiarly  well  selected  strategic  position. 
A  large  back  country  was  accessible  for  supplies,  although  greatly 
impoverished  by  the  waste  of  war,  and  the  distance  from  the  British 
army  at  Philadelphia  fulfilled  all  the  conditions  which  were  necessary 
to  secure  reasonable  safety,  keep  the  troops  on  the  alert,  and  afford 
both  opportunity  and  inducement  for  observation  and  operations  to 
the  front. 

A  line  of  defense  should  be  as  compact  as  possible,  with  a  strategic 
front  so  limited  as  to  give  prompt  concentration  of  the  army  upon 
critical  points.  One  consideration  is  worthy  of  suggestion  to  the 
student  who  would  rightly  estimate  the  merits  of  an  issue,  when  one 
army  is  assured  of  artificial  means  of  defense.  If  forces  be  otherwise 
equal,  that  army  which  holds  a  firm  position,  has  plus  strength  equal 
to  the  advantage  of  that  position,  while  the  assailant  has  minus 
strength  equal  to  the  estimated  loss  involved  in  forcing  that  position. 
In  an  open  field  where  successful  movements  and  hard  fighting  make 
up  the  issue,  the  force  of  discipline  and  both  the  moral  and  physical 
elements  which  command  success  are  left  to  their  free  exercise. 

No  line  of  defense  should  be  passively  occupied.  The  advance  of 
La  Fayette  to  Barren  Hill,  and  Washington's  attack  at  Germantown, 
were  expressions  of  force  which  gave  value  to  the  position  at  Valley 
Forge,  exalted  its  defensive  properties,  and  put  the  British  army 
itself  upon  a  quasi-defensive.  The  latter  army  during  the  New  Jersey 
campaign,  had  two  ultimate  lines  of  defense.  The  banks  of  the  Dela 
ware,  with  the  cordon  of  posts  extending  to  New  Brunswick  and  Perth 
Amboy,  formed  one,  and  the  river  Raritan  on  the  right,  was  auxiliary 
to  the  former,  so  long  as  the  fleet  controlled  the  waters  about  Staten 
Island.  The  latter  was  practically  an  advanced  base  for  operations 
working  southward  from  New  York,  with  a  strategic  front  looking  to 
the  movements  of  Washington's  army  which  occupied  the  heights  of 
middle  New  Jersey. 

Zones  of  operation  are  belts  of  territory  controlled  by  moving  col 
umns,  or  those  within  which  columns  can  act  in  real  concert.  Several 
lines  of  operation  may  fall  within  one  zone. 

During  the  war  of  1775—1781,  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  were 
within  the  centre  zone,  while  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  belonged  to 
the  left. 

During    the  American   war  of   1861-1865,  the    trans-Mississippi 


I775-]  STRATEGY   IN  WAR    CONTINUED.  57 

states  filled  the  right  zone  ;  the  country  eastward  to  Virginia,  indi 
cated  the  centre;  while  the  Atlantic  belt,  with  operations  on  Rich 
mond,  determined  the  zone  of  the  left. 

It  is  possible,  with  the  modern  telegraph  and  railroad  system,  for 
a  competent  commander  to  ordain  a  general  policy,  by  which  opera 
tions  in  different  zones  may  determine  together  toward  the  general 
result.  Thus  General  Grant  on  the  left,  and  General  Sherman  in  the 
centre,  acted  in  full  concert  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  1864, 
so  to  occupy  the  Confederate  forces  as  to  neutralize  the  benefit  which 
otherwise  enured  to  the  latter  by  virtue  of  a  series  of  interior  railroad 
lines,  which  enabled  their  armies  to  operate  alternately  against  the 
Federal  armies  of  either  zone,  by  a  shorter  route  than  was  available 
for  the  latter  troops. 

During  July,  1862,  the  author  was  instructed  by  competent  author 
ity,  to  meet  Generals  Halleck  and  Pope  on  their  arrival  at  Wash 
ington,  to  which  place  they  had  been  called  by  telegram,  and  to 
inform  them  that  an  immediate  interview  was  desired  by  the  Presi 
dent,  then  at  the  Soldiers'  Home,  a  short  distance  from  the  city.  The 
whole  object  of  the  proposed  interview  was,  that  the  President  might 
determine  in  his  own  mind  whether  the  different  operations  in  Mis 
souri,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee,  were  the  result  of  one  forecast,  or 
judgment,  or  merely  accidental.  As  the  result  of  their  arrival,  Gen 
eral  Halleck  was  placed  in  general  command,  under  the  style  of  chief 
of  staff  to  the  President,  who  thereby  asserted  his  constitutional  pre 
rogative  as  commander-in-chief,  upon  the  assumption  that  General 
Halleck  had  the  mental  scope  and  executive  ability  to  handle  all 
the  armies  over  the  entire  theatre  of  war.  General  Pope  was  also 
assigned  to  a  highly  responsible  sphere  of  duty. 

The  details  of  separate  zones  are  necessarily  distinct,  as  are  many 
operations  of  single  armies  moving  on  separate  lines  in  the  same  zone. 
General  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea  was  practically  but  one  line  of 
operations,  because  he  kept  up  such  constant  communication  with  his 
entire  command,  that  it  was  at  all  times  in  hand  for  concentration,  and 
the  efficient  accomplishment  of  his  plans.  If  it  be  regarded  as  the 
equivalent  of  two  lines  of  operations  acting  together  within  one  zone, 
it  had  the  perfect  accord  of  purpose  and  action,  which  under  skillful 
hands,  makes  every  key  in  music  to  vibrate  in  harmony  together. 
The  grand  divisions  of  his  army  moved  as  a  unit,  on  their  mission. 

During  the  war  of  1775-1781,  the  operations  of  General  Clinton 
were  marked  by  great  wisdom,  and  a  fixed  purpose  to  secure  a  suf- 


5&  STRATEGY    IN  WAR  CONTINUED.  1*775- 

ficient  concentration  of  force  to  realize  success  on  the  three  zones  of 
proposed  operation.  The  right  zone,  bounded  on  the  left  by  the 
Hudson  river  and  its  defenses,  was  favored  by  Lord  George  Germaine, 
but  at  the  sacrifice  of  results  elsewhere,  and  without  an  appreciation 
of  the  resistance  with  which  he  had  to  cope,  and  the  character  of  the 
country  in  which  the  war  was  carried  on. 

Although  Massachusetts  was  left  unassailed  by  British  troops, 
after  the  evacuation  of  Boston,  a  base  was  secured  at  Newport, 
Rhode  Island,  which  was  far  more  eligible  for  operations  in  that  zone 
than  was  Boston  itself.  Its  distance  from  that  city  was  but  seventy 
miles.  General  La  Fayette  went  from  Newport  to  Boston,  during  the 
siege  of  Newport  in  1778,  in  seven  hours,  and  returned  in  six  and  a 
half  hours.  It  was  sufficiently  near  to  threaten  the  former  city,  and 
to  somewhat  restrict  Massachusetts  in  contribution  of  troops  to  the 
central  army  of  Washington.  The  harbor  was  excellent.  Long 
Island  Sound  afforded  a  safe  interior  passage  to  the  head-quarters  at 
New  York,  so  that  the  success  of  the  apparently  useless  diversions 
into  Connecticut  would  have  had  substantial  method,  if  troops  had 
been  furnished  up  to  the  demand  of  the  British  General-in-chief. 
Herein,  as  elsewhere,  the  military  judgment  was  superseded  in  opera 
tions  strictly  military,  by  a  purely  civil  control.  If  military  policy  was 
considered  in  the  English  cabinet  at  all,  it  omitted  to  make  the 
movement  independent  by  the  supply  of  means  adequate  to  assure 
results. 

Lines  of  communication  are  defined  by  their  title.  Modern  science 
has  facilitated  the  connection  of  armies  with  their  base  and  with  each 
other.  It  was  with  difficulty  that  Colonel  Hamilton,  aid-de-camp  of 
General  Washington,  could  determine  the  position  of  his  own  flanking 
parties,  which  were  watching  the  movements  of  General  Clinton's 
army  during  the  retreat  of  that  officer  from  Philadelphia  in  the  year 
1778  ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  afternoon  before  the  battle  of  Mon- 
mouth,  that  he  could  report  the  exact  facts. 

Interior  lines,  exterior,  concentric,  and  divergent  lines,  are  also  self- 
expressive.  It  is  obvious  that  in  covering  a  capital  or  any  other 
commercial  centre,  which  is  approached  by  different  army  corps  on 
different  roads,  the  defense  can  concentrate  a  superior  force  more 
speedily  than  the  advancing  army,  unless  the  advance  be  made  a  sur 
prise,  or  with  greatly  superior  numbers. 

In  the  advance  upon  Germantown,  during  October,  1777,  the 
extreme  left  wing  of  the  American  army  was  too  widely  spread  so 


I775-]  STRATEGY   IN   WAR   CONTINUED.  59 

that  the  right  wing  of  the  British  army  actually  reinforced  the  centre, 
and  settled  the  issue  without  receiving  a  single  blow  from  the  force 
which  had  been  sent  to  occupy  its  attention  during  the  main  attack. 

On  the  British  left  a  similar  concentration  took  place,  the  observ 
ing  party  sent  by  General  Washington  to  engage  the  Hessian  forces 
having  utterly  failed  to  follow  up  the  enjoined  movement. 

The  inferior  forces  employed  during  the  war  of  1775-1781,  as 
compared  with  great  continental  armies,  limited  the  range  of  strategic 
operations,  although  demanding  the  right  use  of  all  general  principles  ; 
and  while  army  formations  have  been  modified,  and  greater  mobility 
has  been  secured  during  the  century  and  more  which  has  passed  since 
that  struggle  began,  the  review  of  the  actions  themselves  will  prove 
that  the  lessons  of  antecedent  warfare  were  carefully  studied,  and 
judiciously  applied,  up  to  the  extent  of  the  then  realized  facilities 
for  war. 


CHAPTER   XT. 

GRAND   TACTICS   ILLUSTRATED. 

~^O  handle  well  a  military  force  on  the  battle  field,"  which  the 

J_  author  offers  as  a  concise  exposition  of  the  term  "  Grand 
Tactics,"  involves  several  principles  which  all  military  writers  accept 
as  fundamental. 

Although  these  truths  have  been  elaborated  and  illustrated  by 
eminent  scholars  of  modern  times,  they  obtained  recognition  and 
application  at  very  early  periods,  and  thus  imparted  success  to  mili 
tary  enterprise  as  long  ago  as  the  days  of  Hannibal  and  Caesar.  Their 
maxims,  and  their  instructions  to  commanders  are  sound  and  practical 
now,  as  they  were  then.  Baron  Jomini  states  them  thus : 

First.  "  To  throw  by  strategic  movements  the  mass  of  an  army  suc 
cessively  upon  the  decisive  points  of  a  theatre  of  war,  and  also  upon 
the  communications  of  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible,  without  com 
promising  one's  own." 

Second.  "  To  manoeuvre  to  engage  fractions  of  the  hostile  army 
with  the  bulk  of  one's  forces." 

Third.  On  the  battle  field,  to  throw  the  mass  of  the  forces  upon 
the  decisive  point,  or  upon  that  portion  of  the  hostile  line  which  it  is 
of  the  first  importance  to  overthrow." 

Fourth.  "  To  so  arrange  that  these  masses  shall  not  only  be 
thrown  upon  the  decisive  point,  but  that  they  shall  engage  at  the 
proper  time  and  with  energy." 

To  apply  military  force  upon  these  conditions,  involves  the  high 
est  wisdom, — a  keen  perception  of  the  relations  and  circumstances 
which  attend  the  changing  issues  of  war; — a  lightning-like  logic,  by 
which  to  interpret  both  relations  and  circumstances,  and  both  skill 
and  nerve  to  strike  home  the  blow,  with  precision  and  force. 

The  introductory  chapters  have  demonstrated  the  philosophy 
which  underlies  the  conduct  of  war. 


I775-J  GRAND   TACTICS   ILLUSTRATED.  6l 

As  with  all  theories,  however  perfect,  the  issues  themselves  are 
often  confronted  with  facts  which  no  human  foresight  can  anticipate. 
If  all  great  battles  could  be  traced  through  the  minute  details  which 
marked  their  progress,  the  human  mind  would  be  humbled  by  the 
evidence,  that  very  often,  an  unexpected  and  apparently  trivial  event 
has  been  the  pivot  upon  which  the  entire  event  changed  its  drift  and 
destiny. 

Notwithstanding  these  contingencies,  common  to  all  pursuits  in 
life,  the  operations  of  the  battle  field  have  general  features  which 
work  in  the  direction  of  the  conditions  laid  down,  and  these  are 
entitled  to  a  brief  review. 

The  war  of  1775—1781,  afforded  illustrations  of  the  changes  which 
have  characterized  modern  warfare  from  the  time  that  Frederic 
William,  of  Prussia,  father  of  Frederic  the  Great,  combined  rigid 
drill  and  exact  discipline,  with  swift  and  impetuous  movement  upon 
exposed  or  cramped  bodies  of  the  enemy. 

The  British  Light  Infantry  and  Light  Dragoons  were  active  troops, 
and  both  mobility  and  flexibility  began  to  take  the  place  of  those 
heavy  strokes  which  simply  measured  the  relative  momentum  of 
colliding  bodies. 

Braddock's  campaign  was  a  type  of  the  old  method.  Tarleton's 
operations  were  characteristic  of  that  new  system  which  gained  fresh 
spirit  during  the  French  revolution  and  afterwards  distinguished 
Napoleon  I. 

The  first  Italian  campaign  of  that  commander,  which,  in  a  mere 
handful  of  days,  made  memorable  the  names  of  Legnano,  Castiglione, 
Mendola  and  Mantua,  has  the  magic  thrill  of  romance.  Like  Habib, 
of  the  Arabian  Nights,  he  seemed  to  wield  the  sword  of  Solomon, 
and  at  every  stroke,  its  talismanic  emblem,  "power"  only  shone 
forth  with  increasing  lustre, — disenchanting  all  machinations  to  check 
his  advance,  and  melting  all  barriers  of  men,  or  matter,  as  the  summer 
sun  dissolves,  dissipates  and  bears  away  the  lingering,  contending 
snows  of  winter. 

It  was  in  the  maturing  ascendency  of  this  new  system  of  tactics, 
that  the  British  and  American  armies  came  to  an  issue.  The  colonists 
had  been  thoroughly  proven  in  the  skirmishing  warfare  of  the  Indian, 
had  acquired  signal  skill  in  the  use  of  the  rifle,  and  by  contempt  of 
exposure  and  repeated  battles  upon  the  frontier,  had  been  taught  many 
lessons  which  were  wild,  but  impressive,  in  the  direction  of  attack  and 
defense. 


62  GRAND   TACTICS  ILLUSTRATED.  [i775- 

Upon  this  training,  if  but  slowly,  the  stern  discipline  and  military 
vigor  of  Washington,  Greene,  Steuben  and  Lee  were  to  be  grafted. 

Another  element  gave  character  to  the  American  army,  and  made 
soldiers  quickly.  Independently  of  the  spirit  of  the  struggle  itself, 
the  colonists  possessed  unusual  intelligence  and  mental  culture  for 
men  of  that  period  ;  and  those  who  controlled  the  public  policy  were 
men  whose  capacity  and  moral  worth  were  preeminent  above  all 
others. 

The  great  skill  in  manoeuvre  which  characterized  Frederic  was  well 
represented  by  Clinton,  Knyphausen,  Percy  and  Tarleton,  and  the 
German  troops  came  promptly  up  to  duty  in  accordance  with  the 
methods  of  severe  schooling  to  which  they  had  been  trained. 

Washington,  Greene,  Lee,  Maxwell,  and  other  competent  com 
manders,  both  American  and  foreign,  who  took  the  American  army 
in  hand,  were  compelled  to  enter  the  contest  before  their  soldiers, 
however  well-drilled,  individually,  could  possibly  acquire  that  concert 
of  action  which  makes  of  an  educated  army  a  perfect  machine. 

This  affords  the  clew  to  many  disasters  which  attended  operations 
in  the  field.  An  illustration  of  recent  date  will  define  the  point  in 
view. 

Before  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  in  the  American  war  of  1861-1865, 
the  single  regiments  of  the  Federal  army  had  been  thoroughly 
instructed  in  battalion  drill.  These  movements  were  exact.  Brigade 
commanders  had  been  assigned,  so  far  as  possible,  from  the  colonels 
of  the  regular  army,  and  evolutions  of  the  line,  in  skeleton  and  by 
divisions,  had  been  commenced  and  well  advanced.  Practically,  how 
ever,  the  regiment  was  the  unit,  and  these  units  largely  maintained 
their  organic  coherence,  when  the  freshly  organized  brigades  and 
divisions,  parted,  in  the  first  trial  at  arms  with  an  earnest  adversary. 
The  general  commanding,  McDowell,  himself  a  model  type  of  the 
complete  soldier,  was  crowded  to  the  front,  and  did  all  that  any  great 
captain  could  have  done  with  an  army  not  yet  perfected  in  that 
discipline  which  must  inter-penetrate  all  parts  and  hold  them  fast  to 
system,  even  in  the  decimation  of  battle. 

But,  as  with  that  army,  so  with  the  army  of  Washington,  the 
opportunity  was  forced,  while  the  exigencies  were  too  pressing  to 
give  time  to  make  a  really  perfect  army,  and  that  result  had  to  be 
evolved  out  of  the  battle  struggle  itself. 

The  most  difficult  position  which  troops  can  hold,  is  that  which 
requires  them  to  stand  under  fire,  in  passive  waiting  but  with  entire 


I775-]  GRAND   TACTICS  ILLUSTRATED.  63 

confidence  that  this  position  is  for  eventual  benefit,  whenever  the 
controlling  mind  shall  unfold  his  purpose.  A  "'forlorn  hope  "  has  a 
stimulus.  The  other  demands  supreme  steadiness,  the  hardness  of 
adamant.  This  text  is  not  discursive,  nor  without  interest  and  direct 
relations  to  the  battle  narrative  hereafter  furnished.  All  that  has 
been  said  is  but  a  meagre  indication  of  that  exhaustive  drain  which 
war  makes  upon  all  possible  resources  that  can  apply  force  to  the 
resolution  of  battle  issues. 

As  grand  tactics  deals  with  the  conflict  of  armies,  so  their  organ 
ization  and  composition  is  worthy  of  consideration.  Moreover,  it 
involves  good  combinations  before,  as  well  as  during  the  progress  of 
battle. 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  in  passing  on,  that  military  nations  promptly 
seize  and  apply  all  improvements  that  any  single  nation  originate,  so 
that  the  balance  stands  nearly  the  same  as  when  war  was  waged 
under  systems  of  an  earlier  period.  Brain  and  muscle  give  force  and 
value  to  all  alike. 

As  a  full  discussion  of  the  military  art  is  reserved  for  a  future 
volume,  only  those  elements  will  be  considered  which  afford  a  key  to 
the  battles  of  the  period  under  review. 

The  chief  branches  or  arms  of  military  service,  Artillery,  Cavalry 
and  Infantry,  proportioned  as  in  order  named,  from  least  to  most 
numerous,  have  varying  values,  according  to  the  service  required, 
Infantry  composing  the  fundamental  strength  of  all  armies. 

Improvements  in  artillery  have  made  impossible  that  mighty  sweep 
of  mounted  troops,  which  now  and  then,  in  early  days,  bore  down 
whole  armies  by  their  intrinsic  weight.  Swift  desolation  may  still  be 
carried  over  a  wide  range  of  country,  communications  may  be  cut  off 
and  distant  points  may  be  struck  suddenly  by  such  a  force  ;  but  there 
can  be  no  overwhelming  assault,  by  cavalry,  upon  a  strong  army  well 
supplied  with  well  handled  guns. 

During  the  war  of  1775-1781,  a  real  restriction  was  imposed  upon 
the  movements  of  cavalry  by  the  nature  of  the  country,  so  that  their 
service  was  largely  confined  to  attack  upon  columns  already  broken, 
independent  operations  against  similar  forces,  raids  upon  supply 
trains,  or  the  dispersion  of  small  detachments. 

The  British  dragoons  did  substantial  service  at  Germantown, 
Monmouth  and  Brandywine,  although  in  the  last  named  action  they 
were  not  employed  until  after  the  division  of  General  Sullivan  was  in 
full  retreat.  Some  of  the  Royalist  volunteer  cavalry  proved  quite 


64  GRAND  TACTICS  ILLUSTRATED.  [i?75 

efficient ;  but  Tarleton's  Legion  was  especially  known  for  its  sleepless 
activity,  its  keenness  of  scent  in  pursuit,  and  sometimes,  for  its  relent 
less  vigor  of  stroke. 

During  the  early  part  of  the  war,  the  American  army  was  deficient 
in  this  arm  of  the  service.  Colonel  Lee,  known  as  "  Light  Horse 
Harry,"  and  Colonel  Washington,  handled  mounted  men  with  signal 
ability,  and  the  latter,  at  the  battle  of  Cowpens,  inflicted  a  blow  upon 
Colonel  Tarleton  which,  according  to  his  own  "  Narrative,"  almost 
ruined  "  The  Legion."  Sumter,  Marion  and  Horry  performed 
brilliant  feats  and  made  their  respective  corps  distinguished  for  a 
semi-ubiquitous  warfare  in  the  swamp  districts  of  the  Carolinas. 

It  was  rarely  the  case  that  artillery  determined  an  action  in  the 
field,  simply  by  superior  weight  of  metal  and  its  destructive  force. 
The  short  range  of  the  guns  then  in  use,  the  difficulty  of  moving  them, 
and  the  general  reliance  upon  infantry,  in  close  action,  limited  the 
supremacy  of  this  great  arm  of  war. 

The  infantry  had  its  scouts  and  skirmishing  parties,  but  such 
detachments  were  more  frequently  mounted  men  ;  and  modern  skir 
mishing  was  hardly  known  until  the  French  initiated  the  system  of  a 
thin  line  of  sharp-shooters  in  advance  of  moving  columns. 

General  Morgan's  rifle  command,  or  brigade,  was  the  nearest 
approach  to  a  systematic  skirmishing  force,  while  equally  efficient  in 
general  action.  The  British  army  itself,  especially  in  the  southern 
districts,  followed  the  example  of  the  Americans  and  organized  inde 
pendent  rifle  corps,  which,  more  than  once,  did  efficient  service.  The 
brigades  were  generally  small  in  numbers,  often  not  exceeding  eight 
hundred  men,  and  by  this  means  the  number  of  opposing  forces  was 
often  greatly  over-estimated  on  both  sides. 

Although  the  artillery  was  then  employed,  as  now,  wherever 
actually  needed,  it  was  habitually  posted  in  the  centre  unless  required 
at  the  flank,  and  was  used  mainly  to  hold  or  assail  positions  occupied 
by  troops.  It  lacked  the  mobility  which  the  light  artillery  of  modern 
times  has  attained.  General  Burgoyne  was  sharply  criticised  before 
the  "  House  of  Commons  "  for  taking  too  many  heavy  guns  upon  his 
expedition  from  Canada,  and  yet,  it  appears  from  a  careful  review  of 
the  evidence  offered  in  his  case,  that  he  was  simply  cumbered  with 
the  exact  proportion  which  rigid  precedent  assigned  to  his  com 
mand,  irrespective  of  the  field  of  service  it  was  to  be  dragged 
over. 

The  engineer  corps  of  that  period  was  well  organized   and  well 


I775-]  GRAND  TACTICS   ILLUSTRATED.  65 

handled,  and  by  virtue  of  the  short  range  of  guns,  they  had  full  as 
much  active  work  in  the  trenches  as  in  more  modern  times. 

The  Order  of  Battle  varies  with  the  features  of  the  country,  the 
position  of  the  armies,  and  the  object  in  view.  Whether  the  move 
ment  be  offensive  or  defensive,  which  circumstances  alone  can 
determine,  there  are  certain  prevailing  methods  of  arranging  a  com 
mand  to  meet  the  issue. 

The  parallel  order  must  have,  on  one  or  both  sides,  elective  posi 
tions  to  be  held  or  seized,  or  the  issue  will  be  simply  one  of  physical 
strength  and  the  contingency  of  superior  numbers  or  skill.  In  this 
order,  whether  the  centre  or  one  wing  be  the  object  of  attack,  it  is 
certain  that  the  concentration  must  be  prompt  for  the  blow  or  it  will 
fail,  provided  that  the  enemy  is  closed  up,  so  as  to  be  able,  quickly,  to 
reinforce  the  part  assailed.  It  can  rarely,  if  ever,  be  of  indifferent 
value  whether  to  strike  the  centre,  or  one  wing,  unless  the  force  be 
so  small  as  to  meet  either  attack  equally  well. 

At  the  battle  of  Germantown,  Washington  advanced  with  his 
main  force  upon  the  British  centre,  striking  full  at  the  outpost  in  the 
village,  while  large  detachments  were  sent  to  confront  each  wing  and 
hold  them  back  from  giving  support  to  their  centre. 

The   parallel   order   may    be    modified    by    reinforcement   of  the 
centre  or  either  wing,  and  this  will  often  happen  during  the  manoeu- 
vers  or  feints,  which  are  resorted  to,  that  the  enemy  may  not  antici 
pate  the  genuine  attack. 

A  crochet  upon  the  flank  like  the  letter  |_,  is  often  of  value,  —i,  r-, 
thus  offering  two  faces  for  defense,  or  presenting  a  second  front  per 
pendicular  to  the  first,  for  the  purpose  of  turning  the  flank  of  the 
enemy  or  striking  to  his  rear.  The  advance  of  the  British  right  wing 
at  Long  Island  secured  the  latter  result,  first  capturing  the  American 
centre,  and  then  cutting  off  the  right  wing  and  capturing  its  com 
mander.  In  this  action  the  flanking  force  swept  the  whole  American 
line,  routing  it  utterly. 

The  crochet  proper  is  susceptible  of  being  roughly  dealt  with,  if 
the  adversary  can  mass  artillery  at  the  angle  ;  and  the  movement 
generally  is  hazardous,  unless  to  resist  an  attempt  upon  a  flank,  or 
the  force  be  strong  enough  to  take  some  risk  in  an  advance. 

The  convex  and  concave  orders  of  battle  are  self-expressive.  One 
advances  and  the  other  refuses  its  centre.  At  the  battle  of  Cowpens 
the  display  of  the  American  centre,  as  a  feint,  followed  by  its  prompt 
withdrawal,  enticed  Tarleton  within  a  trap  and  it  was  sprung  upon  him. 


66  GRAND   TACTICS   ILLUSTRATED.  LJ775 

The  oblique  order  has  advantages  for  an  inferior  force,  as  it  may 
rapidly  gather  up  the  refused  wing  to  support  the  advance,  or  concen 
trate  rapidly  if  compelled  to  retire. 

The  order  by  echelon  on  the  centre,  or  one  wing,  is  flexible;  and 
while  holding  the  refused  battalion  as  a  reserve,  affords  prompt 
support  by  a  direct  advance,  and  so  disposes  the  whole  command  that 
it  may,  with  equal  promptness,  operate  toward  either  flank,  or  to  the 
rear. 

Modifications  of  these  forms  are  various,  but  unimportant  in  this 
connection.  The  exact  formation  of  parade  is  never  long-lived  in 
real  action.  Whatever  may  be  the  form  adopted,  there  must  be  care 
not  to  prolong  the  line  beyond  support  and  thus  leave  a  gap  which 
will  admit  a  quick  and  intelligent  adversary.  This  gap  at  Bunker 
Hill  will  be  noticed  hereafter.  A  wise  determination  of  choice  in  this 
important  matter,  may  enable  an  inferior  force  to  retard  a  superior 
force,  may  persuade  it  to  fight  at  disadvantage,  or  even  force  it  to 
movements  which  will  set  the  inferior  force  free  from  peril. 

In  this  connection  may  be  applied  the  suggestion,  that  both  van 
guard  and  rear-guard  of  armies  which  are  on  the  verge  of  action,  are 
to  be  especially  warned  of  the  importance  of  their  trusts. 

When  Cornwallis  approached  Trenton  in  January,  1777,  with  full 
purpose  to  capture  or  destroy  Washington's  army,  his  rear-guard  was 
dropped  so  far  behind  as  to  involve  a  severe  contest  to  extricate  it 
from  the  grasp  of  his  adversary. 

Before  the  battle  of  Camden,  the  van-guard  of  the  two  armies,  each 
intent  upon  surprising  the  antagonist,  met  after  midnight,  and  by 
their  mutual  surprise,  hurried  the  American  army  prematurely  into 
action,  at  bitter  cost. 

On  the  other  hand  the  strong  van-guard  of  the  American  army 
was  so  loosely  handled  at  Monmouth,  that  Clinton  put  in  jeopardy 
one  half  of  the  entire  American  army,  and  extricated  his  own  army 
from  a  position  of  no  little  peril. 

To  these  general  remarks  as  to  the  battle-issue,  there  may  well  be 
added  the  opinion  of  Colonel  Hamley.  "  Orders  of  battle  establish 
the  relations  existing  between  the  hostile  lines  before  or  during  the 
encounter."  "  The  great  object  in  modern  battles  is  to  bring  at  a 
certain  point  of  the  battle  field  a  superior  number  of  troops  to  bear 
upon  the  enemy.  The  design  is  screened  by  false  attacks,  by  features 
of  the  ground,  by  a  general  advance  of  skirmishers,  and  by  deceptive 
formations  and  manoeuvers.  The  attacking  force  must  be  strengthened 


I775-]  GRAND   TACTICS  ILLUSTRATED.  67 

at  the  expense  of  some  other  portion  of  the  line.  To  engage  that 
other  part  would  be  to  offer  to  the  enemy  the  opportunity  of  restor 
ing  the  equilibrium  of  the  battle  which  it  has  been  the  object  of  the 
manceuver  to  disturb.  Therefore  modern  battles  have  been  for  the 
most  part  partial  attacks,  when  the  assailant  puts  his  foot  no  farther 
than  he  can  be  sure  of  drawing  it  back  again." 

The  following  is  a  brief  epitome  of  Baron  Jomini's  views  upon  the 
selection  of  tactical  positions  : 

That  it  be  easier  to  fall  upon  the  enemy  than  for  him  to 
approach. 

That  artillery  have  all  its  possible  effect  in  defense. 

That  the  ground  selected  conceal  subordinate  movements  from 
the  enemy,  while  commanding  a  view  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

That  the  line  of  retreat  be  unobstructed,  and  the  flanks  well 
secured. 

The  matter  of  retreats  will  have  brief  notice  in  another  connection. 
Those  of  the  war  under  review  were  frequent  and  often  masterly. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

LOGISTICS. 

LOGISTICS  was  defined  as,  "  The  practical  art  of  bringing  armies 
fully  equipped  into  the  field." 

The  primary  necessity  for  a  thorough  preparation  of  all  the  ele 
ments  which  go  to  equip,  transport,  and  sustain  an  army,  is  apparent 
without  discussion. 

It  is  equally  obvious  that  while  the  strategist  and  tactician  must 
have  wisdom  in  all  elements  that  make  the  successful  soldier,  it  is 
impossible  for  all  the  details  of  army  outfit  and  army  movement  to  be 
under  their  immediate  care,  while  laden  with  the  burden  of  directing 
war  and  fighting  battles. 

The  details  of  logistics  are  therefore  more  especially  within  the 
sphere  of  various  staff  duty,  and  that  department  of  public  trust  which 
superintends  army  supply.  But  it  is  far  from  sufficient,  that  arsenals 
be  filled,  that  provisions  abound,  that  hospital  supplies  have  accumu 
lated,  and  that  every  possible  item  which  can  be  needed  in  camp  or 
field,  in  victory  or  defeat,  by  night  or  by  day,  has  been  provided, 
unless  each  item  shall  be  accessible  at  the  right  time  and  at  the  right 
place.  Certain  materials  must  accompany  the  first  advance  of  an 
army  ;  some  attend  the  main  army,  and  others  are  supplied  as  con 
tingency  requires.  All  these  must  be  at  hand  in  fit  proportion  to  the 
force,  with  no  surplus  to  embarrass  movements,  and  no  deficit  to 
retard  them.  The  supply  must  never  fail,  but  flow  on  as  the  army 
moves,  smoothly,  adequately,  and  inevitably. 

It  is  in  small  details,  numberless  and  perplexing,  which  worry 
men  more  than  grave  issues,  that  logistics  finds  its  great  burden.  In 
one  contingency,  a  box  of  horse-shoes  may  be  of  more  value  than  a 
box  of  cartridges  ;  and  in  another,  a  roll  of  lint  may  do  more  service 
than  a  bale  of  clothing. 

The  wants  of  the  soldier  as  well  as  the  requirements  of  the  gen- 


Notes  to  Ckapf  era; 


Farallet.  Order  of  Battle. 


Jfe-ift 'forced Wing. 


A. 


II\ 


1        1 


D,  Mates  reinforced  Crottftetto  tfo 
front,  to  gain  Me  f  /ante.  C#ta%esa 
Crotchet  to  t/te  rear*. 

X  EcJieton  fyftotftjvlMgs,  refusing 


formation. 

F.  OMfyue  Order, 

tioft  to  tte  2,  eft,  orFroxf. 

G.  f  ft  Echelon  fy  t/teHigAt;  indica- 

oftf/tartge  of 


to  original  /enna£im» 


,  ou 


F. 


Y 


s 

* 
s 

I*""6 

fe 


1   Ori 


Original  'ISrma/ion. 


H. 

3          4-  S 


-Fraat  advanced  L 


OrtgirratLine. 


I775-]  LOGISTICS.  69 

eral,  are  to  be  met  promptly  and  sufficiently,  or  embarrassment  must 
attend  every  movement,  and  the  entire  campaign  will  be  imperiled 
or  sacrificed. 

It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  the  failure  of  the  movement  of 
Napoleon  III.  upon  Prussia,  was  considerably  promoted  by  bad 
logistics,  and  that  the  success  of  the  allies  during  the  Crimean  war 
was  secured  through  excellent  adjustments  and  prompt  execution  in 
this  very  branch  of  military  art.  The  Prussian  logistics  in  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war  were  admirable,  and  no  operations  of  modern  times, 
within  a  period  so  short  and  decisive,  have  evinced  a  more  thorough 
preparation  and  adaptation  of  materials  to  meet  the  demands  of 
battle-issues. 

The  Abyssinia  and  Coast  of  Guinea  campaigns  of  Great  Britain 
were  marked  by  commensurate  skill  in  adjusting  the  outfit  of  the 
command  to  its  necessities,  whether  of  service  or  climate.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  estimate  the  expenditure  of  material  which  entered  into 
the  American  war  of  1861-1865.  The  several  staff  departments  were 
severely  tasked  by  the  enormous  drain  upon  their  resources,  and  yet 
the  exacting  demand  was  fully  met. 

The  division  of  labor  alone  made  the  result  possible.  The  sphere 
of  logistics  however,  is  not  bound  up  in  merely  mechanical  work.  In 
modern  war  the  single  direction  of  transportation  requires  the  control 
of  a  master  mind.  Great  talent  is  found  at  the  head  of  railroad  cor 
porations  ;  and  similar  capacity  is  necessary  to  move  armies. 

The  Prussian  railways  moved  more  than  six  hundred  thousand 
troops.  The  advance  upon  Paris  involved  the  adjustments  of  rolling 
stock  and  material  to  different  roads.  Every  department  of  bridge 
building  and  engineering  was  called  into  requisition,  and  such  was 
the  precision  and  omnipresent  control,  that  accidents  were  rare,  and 
the  vast  army  was  unfailingly  supplied  with  all  things  essential  to  its 
comfort  and  its  offensive  work.  The  inspection  of  troops  and  of 
supplies  belong  to  this  department. 

There  can  be  no  deficiency  in  the  means  of  equipping  an  army  that 
is  not  referable  to  bad  logistics.  To  give  effect  to  this  responsible  trust, 
there  must  be  thorough  concert  of  purpose  and  exact  system  in  the 
execution.  Overcrowded  transports  or  trains,  the  indiscriminate 
shipment  of  supplies,  the  confusion  of  material  belonging  to  different 
arms  of  the  service,  and  the  misdirection  of  these  supplies  are  inevi 
table,  unless  the  method  be  laid  down  clearly,  and  competent  officers 


70  LOGISTICS.  [1775. 

discharge  the  duty.  It  is  not,  however,  the  whole  of  logistics  to  fur 
nish  the  army  in  the  manner  indicated. 

The  duties  of  warehouse  man,  and  forwarder  of  merchandise, 
however  wisely  planned  and  executed,  are  not  up  to  the  demands  of 
the  army.  Depots  and  hospitals  are  to  be  established  and  sustained  ; 
a  watchful  eye  must  constantly  guard  against  any  deficiency  at  every 
point  where  the  army  will  make  its  demands,  and  this  demand  is 
coextensive  with  every  army  movement  whether  of  general  or  of 
minor  concern.  The  broken  down  bridge  must  find  a  guardian  at 
hand  to  restore  it  promptly. 

Siege-guns  must  be  found,,  side  by  side  with  the  means  and  talent 
necessary  to  put  them  in  position  ;  the  regulation  of  the  movement  of 
the  troops  themselves  must  be  so  discriminating  and  exact,  that  no 
conflict  of  route  or  orders  shall  cross  the  plan  of  the  general  command 
ing;  and  the  assignments  for  rest,  for  intrenching,  or  advancing,  must 
be  intelligently  communicated  to  the  officers  who  are  respectively 
called  upon  to  discharge  these  special  duties.  The  protection  of  all 
supplies,  and  their  location  and  movement,  so  that  they  shall  not  be 
mere  impedimenta,  to  cripple  the  general  command,  is  equally  impor 
tant  to  the  highest  success. 

No  department  of  duty  in  military  operations  is  more  imperative 
in  its  necessities,  or  more  painfully  embarrassing  under  neglect,  than 
the  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded  ;  and  no  other  department,  if  neg 
lected,  is  such  a  trying  encumbrance  during  the  active  issues  of  a 
campaign.  Here  logistics  must  come  in  with  the  fullest  possible 
equivalent  for  distress  that  is  inevitable,  and  here  the  stern  machinery 
of  war  must  have  the  appliances  of  a  great  heart,  so  that  even  in  its 
rigid  outline,  the  soldier  shall  feel  that  there  is  represented  the 
abundant  sympathy  of  the  state  for  which  he  imperils  life. 

Independently  of  all  these  mechanical  adjustments,  however  intel 
ligently  administered,  there  is  a  vast  field  of  intellectual  labor  that  is 
behind  the  physical  facts.  Whatever  may  be  the  capacity  of  the 
master  brain  which  directs  the  battle  and  shapes  its  antecedents,  the 
details  must  be  so  conformed  as  to  exactly  accord  with  his  purpose. 
Details  themselves  must  be  modified  by  circumstances,  and  the  fluc 
tuations  of  battle  issues  are  often  as  critical  as  those  of  a  game  of 
chess,  calling  for  new  adaptation  of  material  to  meet  the  modified 
relations  of  the  forces  employed. 

Clear  instructions  are  indispensable  to  military  success,  and  these 
must  be  as  clearly  understood  by  those  who  are  to  execute  those 


I775-J  LOGISTICS.  /I 

instructions.  Battle  history  is  full  of  disasters  which  attach  discredit 
to  great  captains,  when  the  responsibility  properly  belonged  to  those 
who  failed  to  appreciate,  or  accurately  to  execute,  the  will  of  the 
commander. 

It  is  authoritatively  stated,  that  on  the  evening  of  July  4th,  1809, 
before  the  battle  of  Wagram,  the  night  being  dark,  and  the  rain  fall 
ing  in  torrents,  when  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  were 
pushed  across  the  arm  of  the  Danube,  there  one  hundred  and  fifty 
yards  wide,  by  three  bridges,  that  it  was  assigned  to  Davoust,  who 
commanded  the  right  wing,  to  cross  the  centre  bridge,  and  to  Oudinot, 
who  commanded  the  centre,  to  cross  the  bridge  to  the  right.  These 
commanders  obeyed  the  orders  as  received,  and  such  was  the  marvel 
lous  discipline  of  the  troops  that  the  armies  passed  each  other  with 
out  disorder,  and  the  movement  was  accomplished  without  knowledge 
of  the  enemy.  While  the  error  is  attributed  to  Napoleon's  haste  in 
dictating  the  order,  Berthier  is  criticised  for  not  observing  the  mis 
take,  since  he  was  called  upon  to  make  ten  copies  of  the  order  for 
information  of  the  army. 

Jomini  broadly  asserts,  that  "  Napoleon  made  no  provision  for  the 
contingency  of  retreat,  and  lived,  not  only  to  demonstrate  what  might 
be  done,  but  what  a  good  general  should  avoid." 

It  was  in  the  sphere  of  logistics  that  the  British  army  excelled,  and 
the  American  army  was  deficient.  The  colonies  had  furnished  army 
contingents  in  the  old  French  war,  but  these  operated  under  the 
control  of  experienced  officers  of  the  British  army.  - 

The  sudden  demand  for  the  thorough  equipment  of  twenty 
thousand  men  designated  for  the  siege  of  Boston,  devolved  vast  mili-' 
tary  responsibilities  upon  inexperienced  citizen  militia.  The  public 
trusts  which  involved  the  purchase  of  supplies  were  too  often  con 
fided  to  ignorant  or  dishonest  parties.  The  eager  struggle  for  place 
and  preferment  entered  into  the  army  at  the  outset,  and  almost  as 
soon  as  certain  regiments  received  an  outfit,  the  expiration  of  their 
short  enlistment  involved  a  new  issue  of  arms  and  equipments,  or  the 
transfer  of  those  already  issued  from  the  returning  to  the  incoming 
recruits.  Those  considerations  will  find  their  illustration  in  the  his 
tory  of  successive  campaigns,  and  will  be  therefore  passed  by  until  the 
effect  of  bad  logistics  shall  mark  the  issues  themselves. 

The  British  army  realized  difficulties  of  a  different  kind  in  the 
same  general  direction,  until  taught  that  the  antagonist  was  one  that 
would  enforce  respect  at  their  cost,  if  the  full  measure  of  military 


72  LOGISTICS.  [1775. 

preparation  was  not  made  to  meet  an  enemy  fully  competent  to  test 
their  mettle. 

The  first  action  itself,  that  of  Breed's  Hill  (Bunker's  Hill),  was 
marked  by  carelessness,  which  amounted  to  gross  neglect,  the  shot  for 
the  guns  first  landed  being  of  larger  caliber  than  the  guns  themselves. 

The  Army  of  Burgoyne,  as  already  indicated,  was  inadequately 
furnished  for  the  expedition,  and  many  similar  defects  in  preparation 
were  predicated  upon  the  supposition  that  the  adversary  was  to  be 
dealt  with  as  an  inferior  in  all  military  qualities,  and  therefore  the 
risks  taken  were  not  unmilitary,  but  either  economical  or  non-essen 
tial  elements  in  the  struggle. 

A  crowning  element  of  logistics  obtains  in  all  truly  military  opera 
tions,  and  that  is,  that  so  far  as  possible,  they  shall  be  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  enemy.  The  battle  of  Bennington  had  its  incentive 
in  the  purpose  of  General  Burgoyne  to  complement  his  own  scanty 
supplies  from  the  depot,  reported  to  have  been  accumulated  near 
that  place  for  the  army  of  General  Schuyler.  Many  of  the  minor 
operations  of  each  army  were  predatory,  and  to  secure  rations  for  the 
needy  troops.  The  British  forces  endeavored  at  times  to  live  off  the 
country,  and  the  American  troops  during  the  scarcity  of  genuine 
money,  were  compelled  to  seize  horses,  cattle,  flour,  and  other  pro 
visions  which  merchants  and  farmers  refused  to  sell. 

During  the  term  that  General  Greene  was  quarter-master-general 
of  the  American  army,  the  logistics  were  as  good  as  possible  under 
the  changing  circumstances  of  that  fluctuating,  uncertain  force;  and 
Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  had  been  introduced  by  General 
Greene  to  Washington  as  a  young  man  of  promise,  gained  deserved 
credit  for  his  skill  in  the  preparation  of  orders  and  accuracy  in  their 
distribution. 

In  this  department,  however,  the  remark  which  Baron  Jomini 
applies  to  Napoleon,  can  with  truth  be  said  of  Washington.  "  He 
was  his  own  best  chief  of  staff." 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS. 

"  A  FINE  RETREAT,"  says  Baron  Jomini,  "  should  meet  with 
£\^  a  reward  equal  to  that  given  for  a  great  victory." 

"  A  beaten  army,"  says  the  Archduke  Charles,  "  is  no  longer  in 
the  hands  of  its  general." 

"  When  an  army  makes  a  compulsory  retreat,"  says  Colonel 
Hamley,  "  it  is  not  in  a  condition  to  renew  the  contest.  The  troops 
that  have  been  driven  from  the  field  will  be  slow  to  form  front  for 
battle ;  confusion,  too,  will  be  added  to  despondency,  for  regiments 
will  be  broken  and  mixed,  artillery  will  be  separated  from  its  ammu 
nition,  supply  trains  will  be  thrown  into  disorder  by  the  sudden 
reflux,  and  the  whole  machine  will  be  for  the  time  disjointed." 

In  the  American  war,  1861-1865,  the  Federal  retreat  under  Gen 
eral  Banks  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  those  of  the  Confederate 
army  from  Yorktown,  Antietam,  Corinth,  and  Murfreesboro,  were 
signal  for  their  good  military  dispositions  and  preeminent  success. 

But  during  the  war  of  1775-1781,  the  fluctuations  of  the  tide  of 
war  induced  retreats,  under  even  more  pressing  exigencies  and  with 
equally  skillful  execution. 

The  march  of  Ge'neral  Clinton  from  Philadelphia  to  the  shelter  of 
the  fleet  near  Sandy  Hook,  was  in  all  respects  a  proof  of  his  merit  as 
a  soldier  and  brave  commander  ;  but  while  it  was  a  retreat,  it  was  not 
the  sequel  of  defeat,  and  a  desperate  race  for  an  asylum  of  safety. 
The  transfer  of  his  army  to  the  original  base  with  view  to  a  new  des 
tination,  was  a  prudential  and  strategic  movement  ;  but  failure  to 
achieve  anticipated  results  at  Philadelphia,  did  not  so  demoralize  his 
command  as  if  it  had  been  beaten  out  of  its  city  quarters  by  a  hostile 
force. 

The  retreats  of  Washington  from  Long  Island  to  Pennsylvania, — 
from  Princeton  to  the  hills  of  New  Jersey — and  from  the  field  of 


74  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  [1775 

Germantown — of  Lafayette  from  Barren  Hill,  and  of  Morgan  and 
Greene  from  the  Carolinas,  were  made  under  circumstances  of  extreme 
peril.  The  rescue  of  the  armies  from  impending  ruin,  was  in  each 
case  quite  material  to  the  fate  of  the  whole  war.  The  most  cursory 
reference  to  the  maps  will  vindicate  the  claim  of  those  officers  to  the 
tribute  which  introduces  this  chapter. 

The  movement  of  Cornwallis  to  Yorktown  in  1781,  while  embrac 
ing  ulterior  plans,  was  substantially  a  retreat,  and  neither  his  general 
ship  nor  that  of  General  Clinton  is  impeached  by  the  circumstance 
which  enforced  his  final  surrender.  The  record  will  vindicate  this 
position,  and  show  that  the  misunderstanding  between  those  officers 
which  so  long  annoyed  parliament  and  the  British  public,  was  unne 
cessary,  provided  that  the  burden  of  their  failure  had  fallen  where  the 
responsibility  belonged,  upon  the  ministry. 

The  conditions  of  a  wise  retreat  are  many.  The  tendency  is  to 
panic.  The  whole  matter  of  essential  supplies  is  thrown  into  con 
fusion.  All  facilities  for  food  or  rest  are  disturbed,  and  the  only 
remedy  lies  in  the  self-possession,  firmness,  and  daring  of  the  com 
manding  officers.  Absurd  panics  have  attended  the  best  of  troops. 
False  alarms  have  converted  a  well  organized  retreat  into  a  precipi 
tate  flight,  and  more  than  once  the  real  victor  has  lost  his  laurels  by 
failure  to  realize  his  success. 

While  the  army  of  Washington  was  embarking  at  Brooklyn  for 
passage  to  New  York,  on  the  night  of  September  twenty-ninth,  1776, 
that  general  dispatched  an  aid-de-camp  to  General  Mifflin,  who  was 
superintending  the  movement,  with  orders  to  hasten  all  the  troops 
on  their  march.  This  order,  given  in  the  broadest  sense,  started  the 
very  troops  which  had  been  posted  in  the  redoubts  and  trenches,  to 
keep  up  the  appearance  of  vigilant  watch  over  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  These  men,  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  haste,  pushed 
for  the  landing;  but  Washington's  prompt  measures  suspended  their 
march,  and  they  coolly  resumed  their  positions.  This  temporary 
desertion  was  not  known  to  the  beseigers,  and  thus  the  retreat  was 
secured  and  the  army  saved.  It  is  just  such  crises  which  dignify 
retreat,  and  exalt  the  wisdom  and  heroism  of  its  execution. 

The  rear  guard  in  a  retreat,  while  adequate  to  check  pursuit,  must 
not  be  so  strengthened  as  to  recall  the  whole  army  for  its  support, 
unless  some  position  be  secured  which  will  warrant  a  renewal  of  battle. 
The  elements  as  stated  by  Colonel  Hamley,  are  too  significant  to 
warrant  hope  of  such  coolness  and  concentration  of  material  and  men 


1775-]  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  75 

as  will  warrant  success  under  the  ordinary  phases  of  a  positive  retreat 
from  a  beaten  field. 

The  pursuit  of  a  retreating  army  involves  hardly  less  wisdom, 
unless  the  victor  has  sufficient  cavalry  to  harass  his  adversary,  suc 
cessfully  cut  off  all  fugitive  detachments,  and  occupy  the  rear  guard 
until  adequate  force  can  be  brought  up  to  induce  a  new  action.  The 
pressure,  however,  upon  the  retiring  force,  should  be  so  constant 
and  earnest  as  to  keep  it  too  busy,  in  escape,  to  allow  time  for  the 
destruction  of  bridges  and  the  interposition  of  obstacles  to  the  pur 
suit.  Cavalry  and  artillery  may  thus  be  stopped  for  a  sufficient 
length  of  time  to  save  the  army  pursued. 

It  is  of  high  importance  that  the  pursuit  shall  be  so  directed  by 
flank  movements,  as  to  crowd  the  retiring  army  upon  rivers  or  por 
tions  of  country  which  check  their  progress,  and  give  strategical 
advantage  to  the  adversary  pursuing. 

Diversions,  such  as  those  made  by  the  British  army  from  New 
York  into  Connecticut,  are  calculated  to  interfere  with  the  general 
plans  of  the  adversary.  They  have  value  in  proportion  as  that  result 
is  effected,  and  the  army  which  spares  the  detachment  still  retains 
an  adequate  force  for  its  general  operations.  It  is  due  to  General 
Washington  to  state,  that  he  was  so  bent  upon  his  purpose  to  strike 
those  armies  which  kept  the  field  in  force,  that  he  could  not  be 
diverted  from  chief  and  paramount  objects  by  those  which  were  minor 
and  transient,  even  while  such  movements  inflicted  local  waste  and 
real  loss  in  property  and  life. 

The  diversions  of  Greene  and  Morgan  in  1781,  which  threatened 
Ninety-six  and  other  posts  to  the  rear  of  the  British  headquarters  at 
Camden,  really  exposed  the  army  to  be  beaten  in  detail.  The  feint 
was  however  successful.  Fearing  lest  the  base  so  far  advanced  from 
Charleston  would  be  imperiled,  and  every  benefit  of  the  recent 
victory  over  Gates  would  be  lost,  the  army  was  divided  for  the  pro 
tection  of  the  threatened  posts,  and  the  American  detachments 
rejoined  the  army  with  safety. 

Improvement  of  success.  After  the  battle  of  Bennington  in  1777, 
the  American  troops,  elated  with  the  result  of  the  day's  fight,  occupied 
themselves  so  intently  with  the  plunder  of  the  battle  field,  that  the 
artillery  of  Colonel  Breyman,  alone,  aroused  them  to  the  conviction 
that  another  enemy  was  on  their  hands,  and  that  victory  itself  was 
well  nigh  lost. 

General  Howe  habitually  failed  to  realize  the  best  fruits  ot  success 


76  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  [1775 

It  was  characteristic  of  Wellington  and  Napoleon,  as  of  Marlborough 
and  Frederic,  that  there  was  no  rest  after  victory.  What  next  ? 
Strike  on  and  finish  war,  that  peace  may  replace  conflict.  If  either 
of  these  great  captains  failed  to  achieve  the  highest  possible  results, 
it  was  Napoleon,  when  ambition  and  restless  pursuit  of  military 
supremacy  would  not  let  him  rest  when  peace  was  within  reach,  and 
when  its  blessings  were  most  of  all  things  essential  to  the  well  being 
of  France. 

Passage  of  rivers.  The  multiplication  of  machinery  and  the  great 
respect  paid  to  mechanical  skill,  have  greatly  facilitated  the  passage 
of  streams.  The  British  army  transported  a  bridge  of  boats  and 
pontoons  to  New  Jersey  in  December,  1/77,  but  returned  it  to  the 
coast,  as  soon  as  Washington  refused  to  be  enticed  from  the 
fastness  of  Morristown.  Upon  his  original  retreat  to  Pennsylvania, 
he  had  cleared  the  left  bank  of  every  accessible  craft,  so  that  although 
he  was  landing  his  rear  guard  as  the  British  troops  reached  the  river, 
there  were  no  facilities  for  further  pursuit. 

While  at  Valley  Forge,  the  American  army  established  a  bridge 
across  the  Schuylkill,  for  the  double  purpose  of  communication  with 
the  country,  and  to  secure  a  means  of  retreat  in  case  the  British  army 
should  threaten  his  camp. 

During  the  war  of  1861-1865,  "The  Board  of  Trade  Battery,"  and 
regiment  from  Chicago,  was  so  thoroughly  composed  of  skilled 
mechanics,  that  their  bridge  building  and  their  cooperation  in  the 
passage  of  streams  by  the  armies  of  the  middle  zone  was  simply 
wonderful. 

Such  movements  are  generally  to  be  anticipated,  or  covered  by 
light  earthworks  or  bridge  heads — t£tes  de  pont.  A  memorable 
instance  of  the  value  of  such  a  position  is  that  of  the  defense  of  the 
bridge-head  and  a  light  earthwork  at  Franklin,  Tennessee,  just  after 
the  principal  action,  November  thirtieth,  1864,  when  a  Federal  corps 
commanded  by  General  Schofield,  crowded  by  the  entire  army  of  Gen 
eral  Hood,  successfully  crossed  the  Harpeth  river,  and  effected  their 
retreat  upon  Nashville  together  with  artillery  and  baggage.  The 
river  banks  were  precipitous,  the  stream  was  not  fordable,  a  single 
railroad  bridge  had  to  be  adapted  to  the  pressing  emergency ;  and  the 
assailing  force,  more  than  double  in  numbers,  was  that  army  which 
immediately  after  attempted  the  capture  of  Nashville  itself. 

The  neglect  to  establish  a  sufficient  rear  guard  and  light   earth- 


T7V5-J  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  77 

work  at  Cowan's  Ford,  in  1781,  especially  ordered  by  General  Greene, 
gave  to  the  advance  of  Cornwallis  a  brilliant  success. 

The  passage  or  attempted  passage  of  rivers,  is  often  a  feint  to 
mislead  an  enemy.  Such  movements  involve  strategical  no  less 
than  tactical  considerations,  and  this  in  proportion  as  the  hostile 
force,  the  character  of  the  river,  and  the  immediate  issue  assume 
importance.  The  passage  of  the  East  river  at  New  York,  September 
twenty-eighth,  1 7/6,  and  of  the  Delaware  river  on  Christmas  night  of 
the  same  year,  are  characteristic  operations  in  the  passage  of  streams. 

Obstructions.  In  the  war  of  1775-1781,  the  movements  of  armies 
were  largely  affected  by  that  class  of  labor,  which,  without  fighting, 
gave  distinctive  shape  to  more  active  operations  by  obstructing  the 
advance  or  retreat  of  armies.  The  destruction  of  bridges,  the  felling 
of  trees,  and  other  obstructions  were  of  signal  service.  The  policy 
of  the  British  army  was  to  strike  quickly  and  hard,  before  the  colonies 
could  concentrate  men,  improve  discipline,  procure  arms,  and  inter 
pose  substantial  defense.  The  American  army  was,  constructively,  on 
the  defensive.  Its  policy  was  to  delay  and  wear  out  its  opponent, 
postpone  premature  collisions,  and  as  far  as  possible,  only  to  engage 
under  such  local  advantages  as  would  encourage  troops  and  enhance 
the  promise  of  success.  Familiarity  with  the  country,  the  scarcity  of 
skillful  engineers  at  the  outset,  ami  a  large  experience  in  frontier  war 
fare  encouraged  them  to  pursue  this  policy  with  success. 

In  every  struggle  when  invasion  threatens  the  homes  of  a  people, 
there  has  been  this  spontaneous  movement,  even  of  non-combatants, 
thus  to  add  to  the  efficiency  of  military  defense  and  imperil  the 
hostile  advance.  It  becomes  the  business  of  everybody,  and  the  troops 
in  the  field  are  both  stimulated  and  strengthened  by  all  such  mani 
festations  of  popular  zeal. 

Guards  and  outposts.  A  single  word  only  is  required  to  magnify 
the  office  of  scouts  and  pickets.  Vigilance,  obedience  and  nerve  mark 
the  true  picket-man.  In  darkness  and  storm  he  is  the  uncompro 
mising  guardian  of  the  safety  of  the  entire  army.  Indifference  is  trea 
son  !  To  sleep  on  post  in  an  enemy's  presence  is  worthy  of  death, 
its  established  penalty.  He  holds  the  key  of  the  outer  door.  He 
has  the  pass-word  !  The  Sacred  record  thus  testifies  of  the  faithful 
and  the  faithless  watchman. 

"  Son  of  man,  I  have  made  thee  a  watchman  unto  the  House  of 
Israel,  therefore  hear  the  word  at  my  mouth,  and  give  them  warning 
from  me.' 


78  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  [1775. 

"  His  watchmen  are  blind  ;  they  are  all  ignorant ;  they  are  all 
dumb  dogs,  they  can  not  bark ;  sleeping,  lying  down,  lying  down  to 
slumber !" 

Thus  signals  of  alarm,  often  by  watch-fires  and  smoking  beacons, 
had  early  introduction,  and  there  will  appear  in  this  narrative  more 
than  one  instance  when  the  salvation  of  armies  and  detachments 
entirely  hinged  upon  skillful  reconnoissance  and  faithful  picket  duty. 

The  use  of  spies  very  naturally  comes  within  this  general  class. 
Prisoners  of  war  are  also  the  source  of  valuable  information.  Each 
class  is  a  doubtful  .dependence,  unless  corroborating  circumstances 
confirm  their  statements.  The  memories  of  Andre  and  Hale  are 
embalmed.  Their  loyalty  to  their  cause,  their  intrinsic  excellence  as 
men,  and  their  noble  conduct  in  the  extreme  hour,  have  given  them 
a  like  place  of  honor  in  British  and  American  history.  If  Greene 
blotted  his  final  signature  to  the  order  for  Andre's  execution  with  a 
tear,  it  was  but  the  tribute  which  many  an  English  soldier  paid  to  the 
memory  of  Hale. 

The  sinews  of  war.  The  fluctuation  in  the  numbers  of  the  Ameri 
can  army,  was  not  more  striking  than  their  uncertainty  of  pay,  and 
the  scarcity  of  arms  and  proper  equipments.  Several  battles  were 
affected  by  their  skill  as  marksmen.  Others  were  changed  at  critical 
moments  by  possession  and  prompt  use  of  the  bayonet.  If  as  a  general 
rule,  the  American  soldiers  were  individually  better  "shots"  and  could 
give  an  effect  to  the  rifle  which  was  beyond  the  reach  of  the  "  king's 
arms,"  the  opposing  force  had  the  advantages  which  the  bayonet  and 
a  complete  equipment  afforded.  It  had  adequate  supplies  of  powder, 
suitable  camp  equipage,  an  organized  commissariat,  and  money.  The 
history  is  not  more  instructive  and  interesting  in  respect  of  the  par 
ticular  deeds  done,  than  in  the  really  extensive  operations  compassed 
through  disproportioned  means  and  under  discouraging  circumstances. 

Neither  side  was  ready  for  war  when  it  began.  The  British  army 
fought  with  inadequate  forces.  The  American  army  fought  with 
inadequate  means,  only  complemented  by  numbers  and  faith  in  their 
ultimate  independence.  This  last  consideration  was  the  potent  magic 
which  transmuted  continental  paper  into  a  semblance  of  money,  and 
dignified  semi-starvation  into  a  heroic  waiting  for  the  rewards  of  the 
future. 

The  assumption  of  independence,  so  long  merely  nominal,  was 
found  to  be  a  poor  antidote  for  hunger  and  rags,  and  Congress  finally 
instituted  that  system  of  bounties  so  largely  adopted  in  the  war  of 


I775-]  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  79 

1861-1865,  and  clothed  Washington  with  dictatorial  powers,  which 
were  absolute  and  supreme.  As  the  war  progressed,  artillery  and 
other  material  of  war  were  furnished  by  France,  and  the  timely  contri 
bution  of  six  million  dollars  by  Louis  XVI.,  as  well  as  a  loan  then 
effected,  inspired  some  fresh  sentiment  that  nationality  was  at  last 
real.  This  practical  support,  in  addition  to  its  moral  value,  greatly 
enlarged  the  facilities  for  carrying  on  this  conflict. 

Alliances.  The  history  of  nations  is  full  of  treaties  of  alliance, 
offensive  and  defensive.  They  need  no  explanation.  That  of  France 
with  the  United  States  had  as  its  incentive  the  reduction  of  British 
power,  and  was  not  intrinsically  an  assurance  of  sympathy  with  the 
primary  causes  of  the  American  war  and  of  the  principles  which  it 
asserted.  That  some  phases  of  the  asserted  freedom  reacted  upon 
France,  and  made  Louis  XVI.,  and  Lafayette  indeed,  to  suffer  under 
that  license  which  affected  the  form  of  liberty,  is  a  fact.  That  the 
French  revolution  reacted  in  like  manner,  and  threatened  America 
with  the  supremacy  of  a  fanatical,  godless,  and  irresponsible  democ 
racy  is  equally  true.  The  names  of  Washington  and  Genet  embody 
the  whole  history  of  that  event. 

The  proposition  announced,  does  not  lie  in  the  discussion  of  the 
political  issues  of  that  period.  It  states  that  fezu  alliances  have  a  natu- 
ral  and  binding  force.  The  interests  of  few  families  are  exactly  com 
mon.  Those  of  nations  are  common  only  within  the  province  of 
rightfully  accepted  international  law,  just  as  families  have  a  common 
relation  to  social  law. 

The  French  alliance,  valuable,  and  to  be  honored  for  real  aid  ren 
dered,  was  repeatedly  put  in  jeopardy  by  distinctness  of  interests  ; 
and  the  proposed  diversion  of  a  portion  of  the  American  army  to 
reassert  and  enforce  French  sovereignty  over  Canada  was  but  one 
illustration  in  point.  The  extraordinary  tact,  unselfishness,  and  solid 
judgment  of  Lafayette  are  monumental,  as  determining  elements 
which  gave  to  the  alliance  much  of  its  harmony  and  enhanced  its  value. 

If  the  cooperation  of  several  powers  in  the  Crimean  war  be  cited 
as  disproof  of  the  proposition,  let  it  be  noticed  that  the  Crimean  war 
was  based  upon  the  supposed  purpose  of  Russia  to  control  the  Dar 
danelles  at  the  expense  of  Turkey,  and  of  all  interested  maritime 
nations,  and  was  predicated  upon  a  principle  similar  to  that  which 
binds  society  to  protect  its  members  against  lawless  assault.  It  was 
another  protest  against  a  war  for  conquest. 

Military  commanders.     The   selection  of  men  who  shall  vindicate 


8O  MISCELLANEOUS  CONSIDERATIONS.  [1775, 

the  authority  of  the  state,  and  apply  military  force  in  the  battle-issue 
tasks  the  highest  capacity.  Probity,  wisdom,  unselfishness,  and 
energy  belong  to  such  a  trust.  Appreciation  of  the  issue,  and  intelli 
gent  comprehension  of  the  resources  of  either  contestant,  and  a  cor 
dial  adoption  of  sound  military  policy,  which  is  in  harmony  with  the 
best  interests  of  the  state,  are  vital  to  the  highest  success. 

Baron  Jomini  says  : — "  He  must  have  a  physical  courage  which 
takes  no  account  of  obstacles,  and  a  high  moral  courage  capable  of 
great  resolution.  Unfortunately,  this  choice  of  a  general  is  influenced 
by  so  many  petty  passions,  that  chance,  rank,  age,  favor,  party  spirit, 
jealousy,  will  have  as  much  to  do  with  it  as  the  public  interest  and 
justice." 

If  this  eminent  scholar,  so  long  confidential  with  Alexander  of 
Russia,  as  well  as  with  Napoleon,  can  so  broadly  state  his  conviction, 
it  might  be  a  source  of  congratulation  both  for  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  and  indeed  for  civilization  itself,  that  in  the  fore-front 
of  the  battles  of  1775-1781,  and  during  the  introduction  of  the  Great 
Republic  to  a  place  among  nations,  there  stands  in  bold  relief  the 
name  of  WASHINGTON. 

Leaving  to  the  battle  record,  however,  the  test  of  battle  direction, 
it  is  not  impolitic  or  discursive  to  state  the  training  of  one  single  gen 
eral  of  that  period,  thus  to  indicate  the  type  of  mind  and  preparation 
which  the  period  developed. 

A  Quaker  youth  of  fourteen  spared  time  from  the  forge  to  master 
Euclid  and  geometry.  Providence  threw  in  his  way  Ezra  Stiles, 
president  of  Yale  College,  and  Lindley  Murray,  the  grammarian. 
They  became  his  friends  and  advisers.  Before  the  war  began,  and 
while  yet  a  young  man,  he  carefully  studied  Caesar's  Commentaries, 
Marshal  Turenne's  Works,  Sharp's  Military  Guide,  Blackstone's  Com 
mentaries,  Jacob's  Law  Dictionary,  Watts'  Logic,  Locke  on  the 
Human  Understanding,  Ferguson  on  Civil  Society,  Swift's  Works, 
and  some  other  models  of  a  similar  class  of  reading.  In  1773  he 
visited  a  Connecticut  militia  parade  to  study  its  methods.  In  1774 
he  visited  Boston,  to  watch  the  movements  of  British  troops,  and  took 
back  to  Rhode  Island  a  British  sergeant  who  deserted,  as  the  in 
structor  of  the  Kentish  Guards,  a  militia  company  of  which  he  was  a 
member.  Such  was  the  proficiency  attained  by  this  company,  that 
more  than  thirty  of  the  private  members  became  officers  in  the  sub 
sequent  war.  He  commanded  the  brigade  of  sixteen  hundred  men 
which  Rhode  Island  sent  to  the  siege  of  Boston. 


I775-]  MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS.  8l 

Modest,  faithful,  dignified,  cool  in  danger,  unprovoked,  and  un 
daunted  by  rebuffs  or  failures,  equable,  self-sacrificing,  truthful,  and 
honest,  a  man  like  General  George  H.  Thomas  in  simple  grandeur  of 
character  and  the  fullness  of  a  complete  manhood — such  a  man  for  the 
hour,  the  peril  and  the  duty,  was  NATHANIEL  GREENE. 
6 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

THE   HOUR   OF   PREPARATION. 

AT  length,  the  thrill  of  action  drove  forth  on  errands  of  war  the 
long  smothered  passions  which  so  slowly  deepened  into  a  settled 
conviction  that  peace  could  never  smile  upon  the  colonies  while  the 
supremacy  of  Great  Britain  endured.  Multiply  all  assumptions  of 
superiority,  all  public  tokens  of  contempt,  all  enforcements  of  unpal 
atable  law,  all  restraints  upon  provincial  commerce,  and  all  espionage 
upon  the  brain-work  which  really  wrought  in  behalf  of  peace,  seeking 
a  fair  reconciliation  with  guarantees  of  representation  and  personal 
rights,  and  their  product  represents  that  incubus  whose  dead  weight 
was  upon  the  American  colonies. 

That  is  the  statement  of  history.  The  longer  that  burden  re 
mained,  the  heavier  it  felt.  It  fretted,  then  aroused,  then  inspired, 
and  at  last  set  free  the  pent-up  fires  which  cast  it  off  forever. 
Rocked  to  and  fro  by  the  heaving  of  the  heart  it  would  smother,  it 
was  compelled  to  increase  its  force  in  proportion  as  the  real  vitality  of 
a  true  soul  life  pervaded  the  masses.  British  will  was  firm  and  daring 
in  the  child  as  with  the  parent. 

The  legacies  of  English  law,  the  inheritance  of  English  liberty  had 
vested  in  the  colonies.  Their  eradication  or  withdrawal  was  impos 
sible.  The  time  had  passed  for  compromise  or  limitation  of  their 
enjoyment.  The  issue  long  before  fought  out  on  English  soil,  and 
bearing  fruit  in  English  ascendency  almost  world-wide,  had  to  be 
renewed  ;  and  the  authority  which  might  have  gladly  welcomed  the 
prodigious  elasticity  and  growth  of  the  American  dependencies  as  the 
future  glory  of  Great  Britain,  was  armed  to  convert  the  filial  relation 
into  one  of  slavery. 

Lord  Chatham  announced  that,  "  it  would  be  found  impossible  for 
freemen  in  England  to  wish  to  see  three  millions  of  Englishmen 
slaves  in  America  " 


1775-1  THE   HOUR   OF   PREPARATION.  83 

Lord  Dartmouth  declared,  "  the  effects  of  General  Gage's  attempt 
at  Concord  to  be  fatal." 

Granville  Sharpe  of  the  Ordnance  department  resigned  rather 
than  forward  stores  to  America. 

Admiral  Keppel  requested  not  to  be  employed  against  America. 

Lord  Effingham  resigned  his  commission  when  he  learned  his 
regiment  was  ordered  to  America. 

It  was  such  demonstrations  as  these  that  indicated  how  deeply 
the  mother  country  was  jealous,  even  of  the  efforts  of  her  own  gov 
ernment  to  assert  a  doubtful  policy  by  force  of  arms. 

John  Wesley  declared,  that  neither  twenty,  forty,  nor  sixty  thou 
sand  men  could  end  the  dawning  struggle.  Thus  revolution  alone 
could  roll  off  oppression. 

The  year  1774  witnessed  the  formation  of  new  militia  companies 
in  all  the  colonies.  New  England  had  made  especial  progress  in  that 
direction.  The  noiseless  arming  of  the  people,  and  the  formation  of 
independent  organizations  was  of  still  earlier  date.  The  experience 
of  the  old  French  war  had  developed  a  necessity  for  fair  military 
acquirements,  and  had  educated  many  leaders  fully  competent  for 
small  commands  ;  while  a  growing  uneasiness,  in  view  of  the  increasing 
influx  of  British  troops,  inspired  others  to  a  studious  preparation  for 
the  probable  issue  of  force  with  the  mother  country. 

The  attempts  of  official  authority  to  prevent  the  people  from 
obtaining  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  and  to  seize  those  already  in 
their  possession,  were  not  limited,  as  will  hereafter  appear,  to  Massa 
chusetts  and  other  New  England  colonies. 

The  fortification  of  Boston  Neck  by  General  Gage  had  elicited 
from  the  first  Continental  Congress,  which  met  on  the  fifth  day  of 
September,  1774,  an  unequivocal  declaration  of  sympathy  with  the 
people  of  Boston  and  Massachusetts,  and  thus  the  local  struggle  was 
swiftly  changing  its  character,  and  becoming  the  basis  for  organized 
general  resistance. 

It  has  been  noticed  during  comment  upon  the  affairs  of  Lexington 
and  Concord,  how  rapidly  the  provincial  congress,  which  succeeded 
the  Massachusetts  assembly,  developed  its  purpose  to  place  its  militia 
on  a  war  footing. 

During  September,  1774,  a  report  had  become  current  that  Boston 
had  been  attacked.  The  removal  of  powder  from  Cambridge  and 
Charlestown,  which  belonged  to  the  colony,  was  magnified,  and  taken 
as  the  open  offensive,  until  the  whole  country  was  excited.  One 


84  THE   HOUR  OF  PREPARATION.  [1775- 

author  states  that,  "  within  thirty-six  hours,  nearly  thirty  thousand 
men  were  under  arms,"  and  a  profound  impression  was  made  even 
upon  the  American  Congress  then  in  session  in  Philadelphia.  This 
only  indicated  the  breadth  of  that  feeling  which  already  panted  for 
armed  expression. 

On  Sunday,  the  twenty-second  day  of  April,  1775,  Massachu 
setts  declared  a  necessity  for  the  employment  of  thirty  thousand  men 
in  defense,  and  called  upon  adjoining  colonies  for  their  proportional 
quota,  assuming  as  her  own  burden  the  enrollment  of  thirteen  thou 
sand  six  hundred  men. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  April  Rhode  Island  devoted  fifteen 
hundred  men  to  "  An  army  of  Observation." 

On  the  day  following,  Connecticut  voted  a  contingent  of  six  thou 
sand  men. 

On  the  twentieth  day  of  May,  New  Hampshire  tendered  her  pro 
portion,  which  was  two  thousand  men. 

Each  colonial  contingent  went  up  to  Boston  as  a  separate  army, 
with  independent  organization  arid  responsibility.  The  powder  and 
food  of  each  of  these  armies  was  distinct,  and  there  was  little  that 
was  homogeneous,  except  the  purpose  which  impelled  them  to 
concentrate. 

Massachusetts  selected  Artemas  Ward,  who  had  served  under 
General  Abercrombie,  to  be  general-in-chief,  John  Thomas  to  be 
lieutenant-general,  and  Richard  Gridley,  an  experienced  soldier  and 
engineer,  to  organize  artillery  and  act  as  engineer  in  chief. 

Connecticut  sent  General  Putnam,  whom  active  service  in  the  old 
French  war  and  in  the  West  Indies,  had  inured  to  daring  and  ex 
posure  ;  General  Wooster,  an  old  veteran  of  the  expedition  to  Louis- 
burg  thirty  years  before,  who  had  served  both  as  colonel  and  briga 
dier-general  in  the  French  and  Indian  war,  and  General  Spencer. 

Rhode  Island  entrusted  her  troops  to  General  Greene  ;  with  Var- 
num,  Hitchcock,  and  Church  as  subordinates. 

New  Hampshire  furnished  General  Stark,  also  a  veteran  of  former 
wars. 

Pomeroy  and  Prescott  were  also  experienced  in  the  operations  of 
the  old  French  and  Indian  wars. 

Thus  these  armies  came  together,  and  General  Ward  was  by 
courtesy  accepted  as  acting  commander-in-chief.  It  was  there  before 
Boston,  early  in  June,  1775,  that  General  Greene  declared  that  there 
were  six  indispensable  conditions  to  the  promptest  success. 


I775-]  THE   HOUR   OF  PREPARATION.  85 

First.  That  there  be  one  General-in-chief. 

Second.  That  the  army  should  be  enlisted  for  the  war. 

Third.  That  a  system  of  bounties  should  be  ordained  which  would 
provide  for  the  families  of  soldiers  absent  in  the  field. 

Fourth.  That  the  troops  should  serve  wherever  required  through 
the  colonies. 

Fifth.  That  funds  should  be  borrowed  equal  to  the  demands  of 
the  war,  for  the  complete  equipment  and  support  of  the  army. 

Sixth.  That  Independence  should  be  declared  at  once,  and  every 
resource  of  every  colony  be  pledged  to  its  support. 

The  history  of  the  war  furnished  its  indorsement  of  the  wisdom 
of  these  propositions.  His  patriotism  was  like  that  of  Patrick  Henry, 
who  declared  that  "  landmarks  and  boundaries  were  thrown  down, 
that  distinctions  between  Virginians,  Pennsylvanians,  New  Yorkers, 
and  New  Englanders  were  no  more,"  adding,  "  I  am  not  a  Virginian, 
but  an  American" 

By  the  middle  of  June,  and  before  the  battle  of  Breed's  Hill,  the 
colonies  were  substantially  united  in  the  war.  During  March,  1775, 
Richard  Henry  Lee  offered  resolutions  before  the  second  Virginia  con 
vention,  "  that  the  colony  be  immediately  put  in  a  state  of  defense,"  and 
advocated  "  the  reorganizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  of  the  militia." 

The  winds  seemed  to  carry  the  sound  of  the  first  conflict.  In  six 
days  it  aroused  Maryland.  Intermediate  colonies  in  turn  responded 
to  the  summons.  Greene's  company  of  Kentish  Guards  started  the 
morning  after  the  Lexington  skirmish.  The  citizens  of  Rhode  Island 
took  possession  of  more  than  forty  cannon,  and  asserted  their  claim 
to  control  all  colonial  stores. 

NEW  YORK  organized  a  committee  of  one  hundred,  and  then  of 
one  thousand  leading  citizens,  to  assure  her  support  in  the  struggle, 
declaring,  that  "  all  the  horrors  of  civil  war  could  not  force  her  sub 
mission  to  the  acts  of  the  crown."  The  City  Hall  and  Custom  House 
were  seized  by  the  patriots. 

Arming  and  drilling  were  immediate.  "  An  association  for  the 
defense  of  colonial  rights  "  was  formed,  and  on  the  twenty-second 
day  of  May,  the  colonial  assembly  was  succeeded  by  a  Provincial  Con 
gress,  and  the  new  order  of  government  was  in  full  force  and  effect. 

In  NEW  JERSEY  the  people  seized  one  hundred  thousand  dollars 
which  were  in  the  Provincial  treasury,  and  devoted  it  to  "  raising 
troops  to  defend  the  liberties  of  America  "  The  news  reached  Phila 
delphia  on  the  twenty-fourth  day  of  April.  Prominent  men  at  once 


86  THE   HOUR   OF  PREPARATION.  [i?75 

accepted  command,  among  them  General  Dickinson,  afterwards 
prominent  in  duty  ;  and  on  the  first  day  of  May,  the  assembly  made 
an  appropriation  of  money  to  raise  troops.  Dr.  Franklin,  just  returned 
from  England,  was  made  chairman  of  the  committee  of  safety,  and 
the  city  was  fully  aroused  to  a  hearty  support  of  the  common  cause. 

In  MARYLAND,  the  inhabitants  seized  the  Provincial  magazine  and 
fifteen  hundred  stand  of  arms,  enrolled  "  volunteers  for  the  army 
about  Boston,"  appointed  a  committee  of  observation,  "  and  recom 
mended  a  system  of  economy,  and  abstinence  from  horse-racing,  fairs, 
and  other  extravagant  amusements  as  derogatory  to  the  character  of 
patriots  at  that  solemn  hour." 

VIRGINIA  was  as  tinder,  ripe  for  the  spark.  A  positive  issue  had 
been  made  between  Lord  Dunmore  and  the  people.  The  former  had 
sent  powder  of  the  colony  on  board  of  a  vessel  lying  in  the  harbor. 
The  militia  gathered  in  force  under  Patrick  Henry.  The  powder  was 
paid  for  by  way  of  compromise,  but  Henry  was  denounced  as  a  traitor. 
The  storm  gathered  hourly,  and  Lord  Dunmore  took  refuge  on  board 
of  the  Fowey,  ship  of  war,  then  lying  in  York  river. 

The  governor  of  NORTH  CAROLINA  had  also  quarreled  with  the 
people,  in  his  effort  to  thwart  the  organization  of  a  Provincial  Con 
gress  in  April.  It  was  organized,  however,  and  while  the  people  were 
consulting  as  to  a  permanent  separation  from  Great  Britain,  the  mes 
sage  from  Boston  intensified  their  purpose  and  ratified  their  judgment. 

In  SOUTH  CAROLINA,  on  the  twenty-first  day  of  April,  committees 
appointed  for  the  purpose,  took  eight  hundred  stand  of  arms,  and 
two  hundred  cutlasses  from  the  magazine  for  the  use  of  the  patriots, 
upon  receiving  information  that  orders  had  been  sent  to  all  governors 
to  seize  the  arms  and  ammunition  of  the  colonists.  This  order  was 
based  upon  the  act  of  parliament  forbidding  the  exportation  of  arms 
to  the  colonies.  The  news  from  Lexington,  received  twenty  days 
after  that  skirmish,  added  fuel  to  the  flame. 

At  Savannah,  GEORGIA,  six  members  of  the  "  council  of  safety," 
broke  open  the  public  magazine,  seized  the  powder,  placed  it  in  secret 
places  for  safety,  and  thus  testified  of  their  readiness  to  meet  the 
grave  future  with  decision  and  spirit,  and  this,  before  receiving  news 
of  the  beginning  of  war. 

Such  is  the  briefest  possible  outline  of  the  state  of  concurrent 
feeling  and  preparation,  which  harmonized  with  the  resistance  offered 
at  Lexington  and  Concord. 

The   first  Colonial  Congress  had  authorized  the  formation  of  an 


I775-]  THE   HOUR  OF  PREPARATION.  87 

"  American  Association,"  under  a  "  declaration  of  colonial  rights,"  hav 
ing  for  its  purpose  entire  non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain,  Ireland, 
and  the  West  Indies.  This  was  a  measure  of  policy  designed  to  force 
a  financial  crisis  before  the  British  cabinet,  and  compel  a  modification 
of  its  laws  ;  but  it  also  was  aggressive  in  spirit,  and  gave  warning  of 
ulterior  measures  in  reserve.  The  second  Continental  Congress  met 
on  the  tenth  day  of  May,  1775,  immediately  after  Allen's  capture  of 
Ticonderoga. 

Prompt  measures  were  taken  for  the  purchase  of  materials  for  the 
manufacture  of  powder  and  of  cannon.  Authority  was  given  for  the 
emission  of  two  millions  of  Spanish  milled  dollars,  and  a  resolution 
was  adopted  that  the  "  Tzvelve  Confederate  Colonies  "  be  pledged  for 
the  redemption  of  bills  of  credit,  then  directed  to  be  issued. 

A  formal  system  of  "  Rules  and  Articles  of  war"  was  adopted,  and 
due  provision  was  made  for  raising  an  additional  armed  force,  sufficient 
to  meet  the  British  reinforcements  then  expected  from  England,  for 
the  enforcement  of  acts  of  parliament  which  were  denounced  as  "  un 
constitutional,  oppressive  and  cruel." 

Meanwhile,  the  colonial  troops  continued  in  position  before  Boston, 
and  the  state  of  war  was  so  fully  accepted,  that  a  regular  exchange  of 
prisoners  was  made  on  the  sixth  day  of  June. 

On  the  twelfth  of  June  General  Gage  offered  pardon  to  all,  Sam 
uel  Adams  and  John  Hancock  excepted,  who  would  lay  down  their 
arms;  following  this  proclamation  with  a  declaration  of  martial  law. 

This  second  Continental  Congress  promptly  adopted  the  forces 
before  Boston,  and  such  as  should  be  afterwards  organized,  as  THE 
AMERICAN  CONTINENTAL  ARMY. 

A  light  infantry  organization  was  authorized  on  the  fourteenth  of 
June,  to  consist  of  "  expert  riflemen,"  of  which  six  companies  should 
be  raised  in  Pennsylvania,  two  in  Maryland,  and  two  in  Virginia,  who 
should  join  the  army  at  Boston  as  soon  as  possible.  Additional 
companies  were  authorized  before  the  adjournment  of  Congress. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  June,  the  appointment  of  commander-in-chief  of 
all  continental  troops  then  raised,  or  to  be  raised,  was  authorized,  and 
George  Washington  was  unanimously  elected  upon  a  vote  by  ballot. 

A  brief  outline  of  the  personal  and  military  antecedents  of  that 
officer  is  highly  proper,  since  his  identification  with  the  struggle  for 
American  Independence  is  a  memorial  lesson  for  his  countrymen  to 
study,  and  no  less  valuable  to  the  intelligent  appreciation  of  American 
history  by  the  world  at  large. 


88  THE   HOUR  OF  PREPARATION.  [.1775, 

The  author  does  not  propose  to  fill  up  his  volume  with  biography 
or  to  enlarge  upon  civil  issues.  All  readers  have  access  to  complete 
histories.  He  exercises  a  choice,  freely  to  use  whatever  his  limits 
will  warrant  in  carrying  out  his  own  purpose. 

Washington  was  ready  to  enter  the  British  navy  as  a  midshipman 
at  fifteen  years  of  age,  but  withdrew  from  his  chosen  profession  upon 
his  mother's  request. 

At  the  age  of  nineteen,  full  of  zeal  in  military  studies,  and  those 
relating  to  civil  engineering,  he  accepted  an  appointment  as  an  Adju 
tant-general  of  Virginia,  with  the  rank  of  major. 

In  the  year  1753,  while  organizing  militia  for  frontier  service,  he 
was  detailed  by  General  Dinwiddie  upon  a  delicate  mission  to  the 
French  commandants  of  the  frontier  posts,  and  made  the  trying 
journey  through  a  country  infested  by  hostile  Indians,  with  signal 
credit.  During  this  journey  he  selected  the  forks  of  the  Mononga- 
hela  and  Alleghany  rivers  as  the  proper  site  of  a  fort,  subsequently 
established  by  the  French  as  Fort  du  Quesne,  (now  Pittsburgh). 

The  journal  of  that  winter's  expedition  is  marked  by  critical  notes 
of  the  military  features  of  the  country  ;  and  that  journey  without 
doubt,  formed  the  basis  of  that  peculiar  skill  and  strategical  exact 
ness  with  which  he  adopted  military  positions  during  his  subsequent 
career.  At  Great  Meadows,  Fort  Necessity,  and  during  Braddock's 
campaign  he  gained  a  high  reputation  for  sagacity,  practical  wisdom, 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  courage.  These  operations  were 
followed  by  a  careful  inspection  of  all  posts,  and  the  careful  organiza 
tion  of  the  Virginia  militia,  which  was  widely  dispersed  in  small  parties 
over  an  extensive  range  of  wild  country. 

During  these  inspections  he  caused  the  posts  to  be  made  more 
secure  by  felling  trees  which  would  cover  an  advancing  enemy,  and 
otherwise  instructed  officers  and  men  in  the  details  of  a  peculiarly 
trying  service.  With  a  thousand  men,  he  was  charged  with  the  care 
and  defense  of  four  hundred  miles  of  frontier. 

His  formal  suggestions  as  to  army  organization,  movements,  and 
supply,  made  from  time  to  time,  furnish  maxims  which  are  the  equiva 
lent  of  those  which  obtain  with  standard  modern  writers,  and  indicate 
the  thoroughness  of  his  study,  and  the  practical  use  he  made  of  real 
experience.  After  his  occupation  of  Fort  du  Quesne,  abandoned  by 
the  French,  and  the  establishment  of  comparative  quiet  along  the 
frontier,  he  became  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  troops  raised  in 
Virginia. 


I775-J  THE  HOUR  OF  PREPARATION.  89 

As  an  engineer  and  disciplinarian  he  achieved  credit,  and  when 
summoned  to  the  command  of  the  Continental  army,  he  brought  to 
the  public  service  those  qualities  which  enforced  success. 

The  officers  who  were  associated  with  Washington  in  high  com 
mand  were  as  follows  : 

MAJOR  GENERALS. 

1st.  Artemas  Ward ;  already  noticed. 

2d.  Charles  Lee  ;  an  officer  once  in  the  British  army,  and  well 
skilled  in  military  affairs. 

After  a  life  of  rare  adventure  a  soldier  of  fortune  from  his  eleventh 
year,  a  professional  adventurer,  he  still  possessed  remarkable  faculties 
as  a  disciplinarian,  and  at  least  brought  to  the  army  such  a  reputation 
for  brilliant  deeds  in  various  European  service  that  strong  endeavor 
was  made  to  give  him  the  first  command  in  place  of  General  Ward. 
His  aspirations  were  even  higher  still. 

3d.  Philip  Schuyler;  a  man  of  rare  excellence  of  character,  who 
served  in  the  French  and  Indian  war,  took  part  in  Abercrombie's 
campaign  against  Ticonderoga,  and  was  a  member  of  the  Continental 
Congress  from  New  York  at  date  of  his  appointment. 

4th.  Israel  Putnam  ;  already  noticed. 

BRIGADIER  GENERALS. 

1st.  Seth  Pomeroy  ;  already  noticed. 

2d.  Richard  Montgomery  ;  who  had  served  gallantly  under  Wolfe, 
and  in  the  West  Indies  in  1762. 

3d.  David  Wooster  ;  already  noticed. 

4th.  William  Heath ;  who  before  the  war  was  a  vigorous  writer 
upon  the  necessity  of  military  discipline  and  a  thoroughly  organized 
militia. 

5th.  Joseph  Spencer ;  who  had  served  as  major  and  colonel  in  the 
French  and  Indian  wars. 

6th.  John  Thomas  ;  also  a  soldier  of  the  old  French  and  Indian 
war  already  in  camp  at  Boston,  at  the  head  of  a  regiment  recruited 
by  himself. 

/th.  John  Sullivan  ;  a  lawyer  of  New  Hampshire;  of  Irish  blood,  a 
member  of  the  first  Continental  Congress,  and  a  man  quick  in 
sympathy  with  the  first  movement  for  the  organization  of  armed 
resistance. 


90  THE   HOUR   OF   PREPARATION.  [1775, 

8th.  Nathaniel  Greene ;  then  at  the  head  of  the  Rhode  Island 
troops  before  Boston,  and  already  noticed. 

Congress  elected  Horatio  Gates  as  adjutant-general.  He  had 
served  in  the  British  army,  commanded  a  company  during  Braddock's 
campaign,  accompanied  General  Monckton  as  aid-de-camp  to  the 
West  Indies,  and  gained  laurels  at  the  capture  of  Martinico. 

Both  Gates  and  Lee  had  settled  in  Virginia  after  leaving  the 
British  army,  and  had  there  formed  the  acquaintance  of  the  future 
commander-in-chief. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  June,  Washington  left  Philadelphia  for 
Boston,  and  on  the  third  of  July  assumed  command  of  the  Continental 
army  with  head-quarters  at  Cambridge.  Thenceforth  the  war  pro 
ceeded  with  slow  but  steady  progress  to  its  accomplishment. 

At  this  point  the  mind  instinctively  turns  from  the  general  retro 
spect  of  these  wide-spread  pulsations,  to  again  look  upon  the  imme 
diate  theatre  of  active  force.  For  two  months  the  yeomanry  of  New 
England  laid  a  close  grasp  upon  all  land  approaches  to  the  city  of 
Boston.  The  pressure,  now  and  then  resisted  by  efforts  of  the  gar 
rison  to  secure  supplies  from  the  surrounding  country,  only  brought 
a  tighter  hold,  and  incited  a  prime  purpose  to  crowd  that  garrison  to 
an  escape  by  sea.  The  islands  of  the  bay  were  miniature  fields  of 
conflict,  and  the  repeated  efforts  to  procure  bullocks,  flour,  and  other 
needed  provisions,  through  the  use  of  boats  belonging  to  the  British 
fleet,  only  developed  a  counter  system  of  boat  operations  which  neu 
tralized  the  former,  and  gradually  limited  that  garrison  to  the  range 
of  its  guns. 

And  yet,  the  beleaguering  force  fluctuated  every  week,  so  that  few 
of  the  hastily  improvised  regiments  maintained  either  identity  of  per 
son  or  permanent  numbers.  The  sudden  summons  from  industrial 
duty  was  like  the  unorganized  rush  of  men  upon  the  alarm  of  fire, 
quickened  by  the  conviction  that  there  was  wide-sweeping  and  com 
mon  danger  to  be  withstood,  or  a  devouring  element  to  be  mastered. 
That  independence  of  opinion,  however,  which  began  to  assert  a  claim 
to  independent  nationality  was  impatient  of  restraint,  and  military 
control  was  irksome,  even  when  vital  to  success.  Offices  were  con 
ferred  upon  those  who  raised  companies,  regardless  of  character  or 
other  merit. 

Jealousies  and  aspirations  mingled  with  the  claims  of  families  left 
at  home,  and  many  local  excitements  threatened  disorder  wherevei 
officers  of  the  crown  were  stationed. 


I775-J  THE  HOUR  OF  PREPARATION.  91 

The  flash  of  Lexington,  and  the  hot  heat  of  its  fire  had  passed 
by,  and  it  was  dull  work  enough  to  stand  guard  by  day,  lie  upon  the 
ground  at  night,  live  a  life  of  routine,  receive  unequal  and  indifferent 
food,  and  wonder  when,  and  how,  the  affair  would  end. 

These  elements,  however,  were  not  sufficiently  depressing  to  lei 
loose  the  pent-in  British  forces.  Strong  wills  carried  men  of  strong 
convictions  everywhere  among  the  people.  The  raw  troops  were 
under  wise  guardianship ! 

The  integrity  and  far  reaching  forecast  of  great  citizens,  united 
their  influence  with  that  of  a  few  real  soldiers,  to  keep  an  adequate 
force  in  the  field.  The  idle  were  at  length  set  to  work.  Occupation 
lightened  the  restraints  of  camp  life.  Earthworks  and  redoubts  grad 
ually  unfolded  their  purpose,  and  out  of  seeming  chaos  there  was 
lifted  into  perpetual  remembrance  the  issue  of  Bunker  Hill. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

BUNKER   HILL.     THE   OCCUPATION. 

THE  peninsula  of  Boston  connects  with  Roxbury  by  the  narrow 
neck  of  land  which  had  been  fortified  by  General  Gage  as  early 
as  October,  1774. 

North  of  Boston,  and  separated  by  the  Charles  river,  is  a  second 
peninsula,  fully  a  mile  long,  and  a  little  more  than  half  a  mile  wide  ; 
also  connected  with  the  main  land  by  a  narrow  isthmus,  formerly  sub 
ject  to  overflow  at  unusually  high  water. 

By  reference  to  the  maps, — "  Boston  and  vicinity"  and  "  Battle  of 
Bunker  Hill" — the  reader  will  gain  a  fair  impression  of  the  topography 
of  the  immediate  field  of  operations.  The  positions  there  assigned  to 
American  commanders  are  such  as  were  established  after  the  arrival 
of  General  Washington  ;  but  the  entire  circuit,  with  the  exception 
of  Dorchester,  was  in  possession  of  the  Provincial  troops  at  the  date 
of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  although  with  less  completeness  of  earth 
works  and  redoubts  than  after  the  investment  was  permanently 
developed. 

Mortorfs  Hill,  at  Moulton's  Point,  where  the  British  army  landed 
on  the  seventeenth  day  of  June,  1775,  was  but  thirty-five  feet  above 
sea  level,  while  "  Breed's  pasture,"  as  then  styled,  and  Bunker  Hill, 
were  respectively  seventy-five  and  one  hundred  and  ten  feet  high. 
The  adjoining  waters  were  navigable,  and  under  control  of  the  British 
fleet. 

Bunker  Hill  had  an  easy  slope  to  the  isthmus,  but  the  other  sides 
were  quite  steep,  the  position  having  control  of  the  isthmus  itself,  as 
well  as  commanding  a  full  view  of  Boston  and  the  surrounding  coun 
try.  The  strategic  value  of  this  summit  was  very  decided  for  either 
army,  yet  it  had  been  overlooked  or  neglected  by  the  British  com 
mander,  even  although  the  arrival  of  Generals  Howe,  Clinton  and 
Burgoyne,  with  reinforcements,  had  swelled  the  nominal  strength  of 


1775  J  BUNKER   HILL.  93 

the  garrison  to  about  ten  thousand  men,  and  the  importance  of 
aggressive  movements  upon  the  colonial  militia  had  been  carefully 
considered  and  rightfully  estimated. 

This  garrison  had  been  gradually  weakened  by  constant  skirmishes, 
by  sickness  and  other  causes,  leaving  an  effective  force,  even  for  gar 
rison  duty,  of  hardly  eight  thousand  men.  Scarcity  of  supplies, 
especially  of  fresh  meat,  bore  some  share  in  a  depreciation  of  physical 
fitness  for  the  field.  The  troops,  however,  that  were  fit  for  duty,  were 
under  excellent  discipline  and  ably  commanded. 

The  American  army  received  information  the  thirteenth  of  June, 
that  General  Gage  had  definitely  decided  to  take  immediate  pos 
session  of  the  Charlestown  peninsula,  and  also  of  Dorchester  Heights. 

As  early  as  the  middle  of  May,  however,  the  "  committee  of 
safety,"  and  the  "  council  of  war,"  had  resolved  to  occupy  and  fortify 
Bunker  Hill  as  soon  as  artillery  and  powder  could  be  adequately  fur 
nished  for  the  purpose  ;  while  from  want  of  definite  knowledge  of 
the  military  value  of  Dorchester  Heights,  a  committee  had  been 
appointed  for  examination  and  report,  respecting  the  merits  of  that 
position  as  a  strategic  restraint  upon  the  garrison  of  Boston. 

On  the  fifteenth  day  of  June,  the  "  Massachusetts  committee  of 
safety,"  and  the  same  "  council  of  war,  "  voted  to  take  immediate 
possession  of  Bunker  Hill.  This  action  was  predicated  upon  positive 
information  that  the  British  council  of  war  had  resolved  upon  a  sim 
ilar  movement,  and  had  designated  the  eighteenth  day  of  June  for 
execution  of  that  purpose. 

There  is  no  more  significant  fact  of  the  want  of  thorough  military 
oversight  and  system  in  the  then  existing  Provincial  army,  than  the 
looseness  of  discipline  with  which  the  enterprise  under  consideration 
was  initiated,  and  the  want  of  specific  responsibility  which  attended 
its  execution. 

It  is  unquestionably  true  that  the  presence  of  Doctor  Warren  was 
one  of  the  chief  elements  which  inspired  the  prolonged  resistance 
after  the  action  began  ;  and  the  chief  credit  at  the  redoubt  belongs  to 
Colonel  Prescott.  There  was  at  first  no  unanimity  in  approval  of  the 
plan,  no  thorough  support  of  the  detachment  sent  upon  so  serious  an 
expedition,  and  there  was  a  complete  failure  to  furnish  that  detach 
ment  with  adequate  means  to  maintain  a  serious  contest  with  an 
enemy  of  considerable  force. 

More  than  a  hundred  writers  have  made  this  action  the  theme  of 
diverse  criticism,  and  many  of  them  have  run  tilts  for  or  against  some 


91  BUNKER  HILL.  [1775. 

candidate  for  special  honor  in  connection  with  the  first  forma!  battle- 
issue  of  the  war  of  1775-1781. 

The  peculiarly  loose  organization  of  the  army,  also,  had  much  to  do 
with  the  inefficiency  of  the  movement  upon  Bunker  Hill ;  and  yet,  the 
specific  work  of  the  detachment,  independent  of  the  want  of  support 
to  back  the  movement,  was  well  done. 

There  were  special  considerations  that  undoubtedly  exerted  their 
influence  at  the  time  when  the  expedition  was  first  considered.  The 
supineness  of  the  British  army,  the  limitation  of  its  outside  demon 
strations  to  simple  excursions  for  supplies,  and  the  impression  that  it 
was  unable,  or  unwilling,  to  renew  active  hostilities  against  the  force 
which  controlled  the  main  land  and  surrounding  country,  must  have 
had  effect  upon  the  officers  in  command  of  the  American  army. 

If  the  contingency  of  a  battle,  such  as  transpired ;  that  is,  of  an 
attempt  in  force,  to  dislodge  a  successful  occupation  of  the  hill,  had  any 
consideration  whatever,  there  was  terrible  neglect,  in  failure  to  supply 
ammunition  and  rations  for  that  emergency.  That  the  occupation  of 
Breed's  pasture,  instead  of  Bunker  Hill  proper,  was  a  departure  from 
the  text  of  the  original  instructions,  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but  a  prompt 
and  sufficient  support  would  have  assured  the  control  of  both,  and 
have  realized  the  complete  repulse  of  the  British  assault.  It  will 
appear  hereafter,  that  under  all  the  circumstances,  the  judgment  of 
Colonel  Gridley,  who  laid  out  the  intrenchments,  was  eminently  wise 
and  proper. 

The  narrative  will  be  cleared  of  extrinsic  issues,  and  no  attempt 
will  be  made  to  supply  facts  which  history  omitted  and  the  grave 
buried. 

Few  modern  battles  are  described  alike  by  different  critics,  and 
many  a  general  would  be  puzzled  to  know  whether  he  was  in  an  action, 
where  he  actually  commanded,  if  he  sought  information  from  con 
testants  who  scramble  for  honors  beyond  their  experience  or  reach. 
The  controversy  as  to  General  Putnam's  relation  to  the  battle  of 
Bunker  Hill  alone,  has  burdened  the  minds  of  many  authors,  and 
tried  the  brains  of  thousands  of  readers  who  could  not  see  the  impor 
tance  of  the  discussion.  But,  Bunker  Hill  was  to  be  occupied.  The 
decision  was  made.  The  emergency  was  pressing. 

General  Ward,  advanced  in  years  and  feeble  in  body,  was  unequal 
to  active  service,  and  lacked  that  military  acuteness  and  decision 
which  the  crisis  demanded.  He  had  no  alternative  but  to  obey  the 
instructions  of  the  committee  of  safety  and  the  council  of  war. 


I775-J  BUNKER    HILL.  95 

Mr.  Bancroft  clearly  states  an  important  element  of  pressing  im 
portance  at  the  time.  "  The  decision  was  so  sudden  that  no  fit  pre 
paration  could  be  made.  The  nearly  total  want  of  ammunition 
rendered  the  service  desperately  daring." 

The  decision  to  occupy  the  \r\\plcdged  support.  As  in  fact  trans 
pired,  the  success  was  only  limited  by  scarcity  of  powder.  That 
should  have  been  furnished  or  the  expedition  withdrawn.  Prescott 
and  Putnam  had  favored  the  movement,  and  urged  it  upon  the  coun 
cil  of  war.  Ward  and  Warren  wished  to  avoid  a  general  engagement, 
and  the  expenditure  of  powder  necessarily  involved  in  occupying  a 
post  so  exposed  to  British  attack.  The  latter,  however,  concurred  in 
the  final  decision,  and  on  the  day  of  action  left  his  place  as  president 
of  the  Provincial  Congress,  and  traveled  seven  miles  to  bear  part,  as 
he  offered  his  life,  in  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 

Formation  of  the  command.  Colonel  William  Prescott,  of  Pepperill, 
Massachusetts,  was  eager  to  lead  the  enterprise,  and  was  intrusted 
with  its  execution.  The  men  detailed  to  form  the  detachment,  were 
for  the  most  part  from  his  own  regiment  and  those  of  Colonels  Frye 
and  Bridge.  The  three  colonels  were  members  of  the  council  of  war 
which  had  been  organized  on  the  twentieth  day  of  April,  when  Gen 
eral  Ward  assumed  command  of  the  army  about  Boston. 

Captain  Thomas  Knowlton,  of  Putnam's  regiment,  who  afterwards 
fell  ir.  gallant  fight  on  Harlem  Plains,  at  the  head  of  the  Connecticut 
Rangers,  "  Congress'  Own,"  was  to  lead  a  detachment  of  two  hundred 
men  drafted  from  the  Connecticut  troops. 

Colonel  Richard  Gridley,  chief  engineer,  with  a  company  of  artil 
lery,  was  also  assigned  to  the  command.  An  order  was,  in  fact,  issued 
for  the  first  named  regiment  to  parade  at  six  o'clock  on  the  evening 
of  the  sixteenth,  "  with  all  the  intrenching  tools  in  the  encampment." 
The  original  purpose  was  also  to  have  the  detachment  number  one 
thousand  men.  The  field-order,  however,  covered  about  fourteen 
hundred  men.  Frothingham,  in  his  valuable  "  Siege  of  Boston," 
shows  conclusively  that  the  force  as  organized,  including  artificers  and 
drivers  of  the  carts,  was  not  less  than  twelve  hundred  men. 

Cambridge  Common  was  designated  for  the  rendezvous.  Beneath 
the  elms,  solemn  with  that  occasion,  that  band  of  earnest  men,  fresh 
from  peaceful  homes,  but  hurrying  into  the  face  of  battle  for  home  and 
country,  was  formed  in  perfect  silence  for  the  last  duty  which  was  to 
precede  the  onward  movement. 

Rev.  Samuel  Langdon,  president  of  Harvard  College,  invoked  the 


96  BUNKER    HILL  [1775. 

favor  of  high  heaven  upon  their  mission,  and  with  a  benediction  pecu 
liar  to  his  stern  and  stately  carriage,  dismissed  them  to  their  silent 
march. 

"  It  was  soon  after  sunset,"  says  Bancroft  ; — "  then— as  the  late 
darkness  of  the  mid-summer  evening  closed  in,  they  marched  for 
Charlestown,  in  the  face  of  the  proclamation  issued  only  four  days 
before,  by  which  all  persons  taken  in  arms  against  their  sovereign,  were 
threatened,  under  martial  law,  with  death  by  the  cord  as  rebels  and 
traitors." 

The  command  moved  silently  but  rapidly,  crossed  Charlestown 
Neck,  and  then  halted  for  consultation  and  definition  of  the  enjoined 
duty.  Major  Brooks,  of  Colonel  Bridge's  regiment,  here  joined  with 
a  small  detachment,  as  well  as  a  company  of  artillery  with  their  guns. 

Orders.  The  confused  account  of  instructions  given  on  this 
expedition  is  significant  of  the  want  of  system  then  existing  in  the 
American  camp.  There  has  also  been  a  needless  worry  about  the 
matter,  according  as  partisan  authorities  have  selected  favorites  for 
the  honors  of  the  day.  No  general  officer  was  embraced  in  the  detail, 
and  no  general  officer  asserted  authority  over  the  operations  of  the 
eventful  twenty-four  hours  that  followed  the  advance  movement. 

Such  as  were  present  at  any  time,  advised  as  occasion  required, 
worked  hard  and  well,  but  enforced  no  personal  authority  over  the 
command  especially  assigned  to  the  duty. 

Frothingham  furnishes  ample  evidence,  that  written  orders  from 
General  Ward  designated  Bunker  Hill  as  the  summit  to  be  occupied, 
and  that  these  orders  were  to  be  communicated  to  the  command 
after  crossing  the  isthmus.  The  first  order  issued  after  the  halt,  was 
the  detail  of  Captain  Nutting's  company  with  a  small  detachment  of 
Connecticut  men,  to  patrol  Charlestown  and  the  adjoining  shore.  A 
second  consultation  took  place  after  the.  command  reached  Bunker 
Hill.  Captain  Maxwell's  company,  from  Prescott's  own  regiment,  was 
detailed  for  patrol  of  the  shore,  and  to  keep  watch  of  the  British 
works  at  Copp's  Hill,  directly  opposite,  and  of  the  ships  of  war 
then  anchored  within  a  short  distance  of  the  peninsula. 

The  Annual  Register,  1775,  thus  indicates  the  fleet ;  Somerset,  68 
guns,  Captain  Edward  Le  Cros  ;  Cerberus,  36  guns,  Captain  Chads  ; 
Glasgow,  34  guns,  Captain  William  Maltby  ;  Lively,  20  guns,  Captain 
Thomas  Bishop  ;  Falcon, guns,  Captain  Linzee,  and  the  Sym 
metry,  transport,  with  18  nine-pounders. 

The  details  thus  made,  not  only  to  watch  those  vessels,  but  to 


17750  BUNKER  HILL.  97 

occupy  Charlestown,  not  only  discharged  their  duty  well,  but  by 
availing  themselves  of  houses,  proved  active  annoyances  to  the  left 
wing  of  the  British  army  in  its  ultimate  advance  upon  the  American 
works. 

Occupation  of  the  heights.  The  chief  engineer,  Colonel  Gridley, 
laid  out  the  intrenchments  at  "  Breed's  pasture  "  shortly  after,  first 
known  as  Breed's  Hill.  This  was  done  after  careful  consultation  with 
Colonel  Prescott,  Captain  Knowlton,  and  other  officers,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  a  position  giving  the  quickest  control  of  the 
beach,  in  case  of  the  landing  of  British  troops.  The  eligibility  of  the 
situation  will  be  noticed  in  the  "  military  notes  "  belonging  to  the 
record  of  the  action. 

Packs  were  unslung,  arms  were  stacked,  the  intrenching  tools  pre 
viously  unloaded  from  the  carts,  were  brought  forward,  and  the  troops 
were  noiselessly  distributed  for  duty.  The  bells  of  Boston  struck 
twelve ;  and  the  new  day,  so  fatal,  so  memorable,  began  its  history,  to 
the  dull  thud  of  the  pick-ax  and  the  grating  of  shovels.  Those  men 
knew  how  to  handle  their  tools  / 

Martin  states,  as  appears  from  a  foot-note  in  Frothingham's  his 
tory,  that  "  about  a  thousand  men  were  at  work,"  and  that  "  the  men 
dug  in  the  trenches  one  hour,  and  then  mounted  guard."  All  night 
that  work  went  on,  in  solemn  stillness,  only  relieved  by  the  sentries' 
monotonous  and  encouraging  "all's  well,"  which  sounded  from  the 
battery  across  the  river,  and  from  the  decks  of  the  shipping.  At  dawn 
of  day,  the  redoubt,  about  eight  rods  square,  had  been  nearly  closed, 
presenting  a  face  nearly  six  feet  high,  with  such  hasty  accommoda 
tions  behind  the  parapet,  as  would  bring  the  men  to  a  convenient 
position  for  delivering  fire. 

More  than  once,  Colonel  Prescott  and  other  officers  quietly  drew 
near  the  river,  to  be  assured  that  no  small  boats  were  afloat,  and  that 
the  apparent  security  was  not  the  prelude  to  a  surprise.  He  was 
everywhere  present  to  inspire  zeal  and  hope,  and  Bancroft's  statement 
that  General  Putnam  himself  visited  the  works  during  the  night  and 
encouraged  the  men,  is  verified  by  respectable  authority,  and  the  con 
temporaneous  statement  of  soldiers  who  had  no  possible  inducement 
to  befog  the  narrative  of  events.  The  character  of  his  aid  rendered 
during  the  entire  day  is  perfectly  consistent  with  this  statement. 

The  situation.     With  daylight,  the  outline  of  the  intrenchments, 
and  the  throng   of  busy   workers,  brought  to  the  notice  of  British 
sentries  the  night's  aggressive  work.     It  had  veiled  the  work  of  the 
7 


98  BUNKER   HILL.  [i77b- 

advancing  patriots.  The  colonists  were  in  earnest !  The  Lively  put 
a  spring  on  her  cable  and  opened  fire.  The  battery  of  Copp's  Hill 
responded.  The  roar  of  cannon  awoke  the  sleeping  garrison  of 
Boston  ;  and  while  the  streets  resounded  with  the  swift  transit  of 
messengers,  and  the  tramp  of  assembling  battalions,  and  the  house 
tops  were  crowded  with  anxious  observers,  the  quickened  and  patient 
laborers  were  perfecting  their  preparations,  resolute  of  purpose  to 
meet  face  to  face  the  veteran  troops  of  George  the  Third.  The  vig 
orous  action  of  the  land  batteries  and  ships,  only  wasted  their  powder 
and  ball.  One  man  fell,  and  to  convince  his  comrades  that  there  was 
no  time  for  fear  or  rest,  Colonel  Prescott  walked  the  parapet,  openly 
exposed,  and  re-inspired  the  men. 

Continuous  labor,  under  high  pressure,  began  to  wear  upon  the 
stoutest.  At  nine  o'clock  a  council  of  war  was  called.  The  activity 
of  the  Boston  garrison,  the  accumulating  array  of  boats,  and  all  the 
activities  of  that  city,  were  prophetic  of  a  resolute  purpose  to  resent 
the  offensive  movement  of  the  Americans,  and  still  no  reinforcements, 
no  relieving  party,  had  appeared. 

The  rations  hastily  issued  for  twenty-four  hours  of  duty,  had,  as 
usual  with  raw  and  over-worked  troops,  become  nearly  exhausted,  and 
urgent  requests  were  made  that  men  should  be  relieved  by  others 
who  were  fresh,  and  that  reinforcements  should  be  sent  for,  with  an 
ample  supply  of  food.  In  this  emergency  Major  John  Brooks  was 
dispatched  to  head-quarters  to  present  these  demands. 

NOTE.  As  with  the  shield,  one  side  gold,  the  reverse,  silver;  so  may  critics  ignore  the 
double  aspect  of  the  command  at  Bunker's  and  Breed's  Hills.  The  credit  which  is  due  to 
Prescott,  for  occupying  and  defending  the  latter,  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  universal 
industry  of  Putnam,  elsewhere.  Extreme  partisans  of  either  must  violate  the  laws  of  evi 
dence  and  impeach  witnesses  who  are  the  chief  authority  for  other,  more  important  facts  of 
American  history. 

NOTE.  Moulton*s  Point  or  Mortons  Point,  both  are  family  names  of  that  period  ;  each 
adopted  by  reputable  authority.  The  author  has  preserved  both,  in  connection  with  Hill 
or  Point.  No  injustice  is  done.  Life  is  too  short  and  history  too  remiss,  for  settlement 
of  this  doubtful  point. 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

BUNKER   HILL.     THE   PREPARATION. 

REINFORCEMENTS.  General  Putnam  was  very  early  at 
head-quarters  of  the  army  at  Cambridge,  and  urged  that  an 
additional  force  be  sent  to  Charlestown  Heights  to  reinforce  Colonel 
Prescott's  command.  General  Ward  finally  consented,  so  far  as  to 
order  one-third  of  Colonel  Stark's  regiment  to  the  front.  The  sequel 
will  show  that  this  was  timely  aid. 

Major  Brooks  met  General  Putnam  and  pushed  forward  on  his 
errand,  while  the  general  himself  proceeded  directly  to  the  field  of 
danger. 

General  Ward  gave  little  heed  to  the  urgent  demand  of  Major 
Brooks,  declining  further  to  reduce  his  own  force,  lest  the  British 
garrison  should  make  a  movement  upon  Cambridge,  and  thus  imperil 
the  safety  of  accumulating  stores,  and  even  that  of  the  entire  army 
The  committee  of  safety  was  in  session.  Richard  Devons,  one  of  its 
most  valuable  members,  is  credited  with  the  influence  which  per 
suaded  them  to  furnish  additional  reinforcements.  Colonel  Sweet 
states,  that  orders  were  also  issued  to  recall  from  Chelsea  the  com 
panies  there  stationed,  in  order  to  increase  the  force  at  head-quarters. 

The  committee  rested  under  a  grave  responsibility.  "  Their  entire 
supply  of  powder,  which  could  be  obtained  north  of  the  Delaware," 
according  to  Bancroft  and  other  eminent  authority,  "  was  twenty- 
seven  half  barrels,  and  a  present  from  Connecticut  of  thirty-six  half- 
barrels  more."  Bancroft  adds:  "The  army  itself  was  composed  of 
companies  incomplete. in  numbers,  enlisted  chiefly  within  six  weeks, 
commanded,  many  of  them,  by  officers  unfit,  ignorant,  and  untried, 
gathered  from  separate  colonies,  and  with  no  reciprocal  subordination 
but  from  courtesy  and  opinion." 

Fearful  to  waste  ammunition,  solemnly  bound  to  have  regard  to 
the  whole  army  and  ultimate  ends,  as  well  as  constrained  to  support 


100  BUNKER    HILL.  [1775. 

the  movement  which  they  had  themselves  enjoined,  it  is  not  strange 
that  calm  deliberation  foreran  the  decision  of  the  committee  when  the 
appeal  of  Major  Brooks  was  made. 

It  was  therefore  as  late  as  eleven  o'clock  when  the  whole  of  the 
New  Hampshire  regiments  of  Stark  and  Read  were  ordered  to  re 
inforce  Prescott.  This  detachment  reached  its  destination  in  time  to 
participate  in  the  action,  although  not  until  after  the  landing  of  the 
British  troops. 

Sweet  credits  the  regiments  of  Colonels  Brewer,  Nixon,  Wood- 
bridge,  and  Major  Moore,  with  a  contribution  of  three  hundred  men  each. 

Frothingham  shows  conclusively  that,  "  several  of  the  companies 
of  Little's  regiment  were  elsewhere  on  duty,  one  at  Gloucester,  one 
at  Ipswich,  one  at  Lechmere's  Point,  and  some  at  West  Cambridge  " ; 
but  adds  that,  "  Lunt's  company  arrived  on  the  field  near  the  close 
of  the  battle." 

Bancroft  carefully  compiles  from  official  reports  and  depositions,  a 
statement,  approximately  as  correct  as  can  be  derived  from  existing 
evidence,  and  thus  states  the  force  which  "  hastened  to  the  aid  of 
Prescott. 

"Of  Essex  men,  (Little's  regiment)  at  least  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  ;  of  Worcester  and  Middlesex  men,  (Brewer's)  seventy  or 
more,  and  with  them,  Lieutenant-colonel  Buckminster  ;  of  the  same 
men,  (Nixon  s)  fifty  men,  led  by  Nixon  himself;  forty  men  (Moore's) 
from  Worcester ;  of  Lancaster  men,  (Whitcomb's)  at  fifty  privates, 
with  no  officer  higher  than  captain." 

The  hot  day  wore  out  its  hours,  as  the  tired  troops  resting  from 
their  assigned  duty, — panted  for  water,  hungered  for  food,  and  waited 
for  the  enemy  ;  and  neither  food  nor  reinforcements  appeared  in  view, 
while  the  hostile  forces  were  rapidly  marshaling  for  attack. 

The  surrounding  waters  were  salt  sea  water,  or  its  brackish  mix 
ture  with  the  flow  from  the  Charles  and  Mystic  rivers,  and  no  fresh 
water  was  easy  of  access.  A  conviction  that  they  were  deserted 
began  to  spread  through  the  ranks,  that  they  had  been  pushed  for 
ward  rashly,  upon  an  ill-considered  enterprise,  and  that  there  was 
wanting  the  disposition  or  nerve  to  undertake  risks  for  their  support 
or  rescue. 

It  was  at  such  a  moment,  terrible  in  its  doubts  and  grand  in  its 
resolution,  that  Seth  Pomeroy,  then  seventy  years  of  age,  having 
wisely  declined  his  commission  as  Brigadier-general,  found  hi*  way  to 
the  redoubt,  musket  in  hand,  to  fight  as  a  private  volunteer. 


I775-J  BUNKER    HILL. 


And  it  was  just  then  that  Dr.  Joseph  Warren,  President  of  the 
Provincial  Congress,  loved  and  honored  of  all,  the  undoubted  patriot, 
and  already  monumental  for  worth  and  courage,  added  his  presence 
and  the  beams  of  his  animation  to  cheer  the  faltering  and  faint.  He 
also  declined  command,  served  under  Prescott,  and  plied  his  musket 
with  the  best  when  the  crisis  came  on. 

Ward  himself,  when  the  embarkation  of  the  second  British  detach 
ment  furnished  evidence  that  Cambridge  was  not  in  peril,  hurried 
other  troops  toward  the  isthmus,  but  too  late  to  avert  the  swift 
catastrophe. 

Disposition  of  the  American  forces.  Upon  completion  of  the  re 
doubt,  it  became  painfully  evident  that  the  preliminary  work  was  not 
yet  complete.  A  new  line  of  breastwork,  a  few  rods  in  length,  was 
hastily  carried  backward  and  a  little  to  the  left  ;  and  very  hasty  efforts 
were  made  to  strengthen  a  short  hedge,  and  establish  aline  of  defense 
for  a  hundred  and  twenty  rods  in  the  same  direction,  thereby  to  con 
nect  with  the  stone  fence  and  other  protection  which  ran  perpendic 
ularly  toward  the  Mystic  river.  This  retreating  line  was  begun  under 
the  personal  direction  of  Prescott  himself,  but  was  never  fully  closed 
up.  A  piece  of  springy  ground  on  this  line  was  left  uncovered  by 
any  shelter  for  troops  acting  in  its  rear,  or  passing  to  and  fro  behind 
the  main  lines.  The  stone  fence,  which  took  its  course  nearly  to  the 
river,  was  like  those  so  common  in  New  England  at  the  present 
day.  Posts  are  set  into  a  wall  two  or  three  feet  high,  and  these 
are  connected  with  two  rails,  making  the  entire  height  about  five 
feet. 

Freshly  mown  hay  which  lay  around  in  winrows  or  in  heaps,  was 
braided  or  thatched  upon  these  rails,  affording  a  show  of  shelter,  while 
the  top  rail  gave  resting  place  for  the  weapon.  In  front  of  this,  an 
ordinary  zig-zag,  "  stake  and  rider  "  fence  was  established,  and  the 
space  between  the  two  was  also  filled  with  hay. 

This  line  was  nearly  six  hundred  feet  in  rear  of  the  front  face  of 
the  redoubt,  and  near  the  foot  of  Bunker  Hill.  To  its  defense  Pres 
cott  assigned  Connecticut  men  under  command  of  Captain  Knowlton, 
supported  by  two  field  pieces  on  the  right,  adjoining  the  open  space 
already  mentioned. 

Still  beyond  the  rail  fence  eastward,  towards  the  river,  and  extend 
ing  by  an  even  slope  to  its  very  margin,  was  another  gap  which 
exposed  the  entire  command  to  a  flanking  movement  of  the  enemy, 
endangering  the  redoubt  itself,  as  well  as  the  more  transient  works  of 


BUNKER  HILL.  1.1775. 

defense.  To  anticipate  such  a  movement, subsequently  attempted,  an 
imperfect  stone  wall  was  quickly  thrown  together  by  the  assistance 
of  Colonel  Stark's  detachment,  whose  timely  arrival  had  cheered  the 
spirits  of  the  worn  out  pioneer  command. 

Meanwhile,  Putnam  was  everywhere  present  to  encourage  the 
men,  and  superintended  the  establishment  of  light  works  on  Bunker 
Hill  summit,  to  cover  the  troops  in  case  of  forcible  ejection  from  the 
advanced  defenses.  He  caused  the  intrenching  tools,  no  longer 
needed  at  the  front,  to  be  taken  to  that  position.  In  spite  of  his 
entreaties  and  commands,  some  who  thus  carried  the  tools,  threw 
them  down  upon  reaching  the  summit,  and  took  refuge  behind  the 
isthmus  ;  others  returned  to  their  places  at  the  front. 

His  movement,  which  would  have  been  appreciated  by  well  dis 
ciplined  troops,  carried  with  it  the  suggestion  of  a  contingency  which 
defeated  its  purpose  in  the  hands  of  men  not  soldiers.  Putnam's 
efforts  accomplished  nothing  of  value  in  the  preparation  of  ulterior 
defenses.  The  time  was  too  short,  the  control  of  men  too  feeble  ;  and 
the  organization  and  discipline  of  the  reinforcements  which  arrived, 
were  too  slack  for  their  immediate  subjection  to  authority,  while  the 
advancing  enemy  began  to  absorb  the  whole  attention.  Prescott's 
force  at  the  redoubt  had  dropped  off  to  less  than  eight  hundred  men 
when  Colonel  John  Stark  arrived.  "  Next  to  Prescott,  he  brought 
the  largest  number  of  men  into  the  field,"  says  Bancroft.  The  British 
were  already  landing,  as  they  crossed  the  isthmus  under  a  heavy  fire. 
The  execution  of  that  movement  was  characteristic  of  their  brave 
commander,  and  well  calculated  to  impart  the  courage  which  after 
ward  sustained  his  men.  When  Captain  Dearborn,  advised  a  quick 
step,  he  decided,  that  "  one  fresh  man  in  an  action  was  worth  ten 
fatigued  ones,"  and  then  deliberately  advanced  to  his  position. 

As  he  descended  the  southern  slope  of  Bunker  Hill,  his  eye  took 
in  the  whole  plan  of  preparation  for  the  battle.  He  saw,  as  he  after 
ward  related  the  affair,  "  The  whole  way  so  plain  upon  the  beach 
along  the  Mystic  river,  that  the  enemy  could  not  miss  it."  He  went 
to  work.  Reed's  regiment,  which  had  been  detailed  with  Starks'  early 
in  the  morning,  upon  the  importunity  of  Putnam,  was  at  the  rail  fence 
with  the  Connecticut  men.  With  every  possible  strain  upon  the  New 
Hampshire  men,  this  last  obstruction  was  not  sufficiently  perfected  to 
cover  Starks'  command,  so  that  their  ultimate  defense  was  made  while 
many  were  kneeling  or  lying  down  to  deliver  fire. 

No  other  troops  than  those  already  named,  arrived  in  time  to  take 


I775-J  BUNKER  HILL.  10$ 

part  in  the  action,  and   the  total  force  which  eventually  participated 
in  the  battle  did  not  exceed  fourteen  hundred  men. 

Six  pieces  of  artillery  were  in  partial  use  at  different  times,  but 
with  inconsiderable  practical  effect,  and  five  of  these  were  left  on  the 
field  when  the  retreat  was  made. 

The  landing.  The  embarkation  of  the  British  troops  was  the 
signal  for  renewed  activity  of  the  fleet. 

The  base  of  Breed's  Hill,  and  the  low  ground  extending  to  the 
river,  was  swept  by  a  fire  so  hot,  that  no  troops,  if  any  had  been  dis 
posable  for  such  a  movement,  could  have  resisted  the  landing. 

Perfect  silence  pervaded  the  American  lines.  A  few  ineffectual 
cannon  shots  were  fired,  the  guns  were  soon  taken  to  the  rear,  and  a 
still  deeper  calm  enveloped  the  hill.  The  day  was  intensely  bright 
and  hot.  Barge  after  barge  discharged  its  fully  equipped  soldiery, 
then  returned  for  more.  This  brilliant  display  of  force,  nowhere  sur 
passed  for  splendor  of  outfit,  precision  of  movement,  gallant  bearing, 
and  perfect  discipline,  was  spread  out  over  Morton's  Hill  in  well 
ordered  lines  of  matchless  array.  With  professional  self-possession, 
these  men  took  their  noonday  meal  at  leisure,  while  the  barges 
returned  for  still  another  division. 

Simultaneously  with  this  reinforcement,  the  roar  of  artillery  was 
heard  from  beyond  Boston.  As  if  to  threaten  General  Ward,  then  at 
Cambridge,  and  General  Thomas,  who  with  several  thousand  Massa 
chusetts  men  was  then  at  Roxbury,  and  to  warn  both  that  they 
could  spare  no  more  troops  for  the  support  of  Prescott ;  or,  from  the 
apprehension  that  an  attempt  might  be  made  by  the  Americans  to 
force  an  entrance  to  the  city  over  Boston  Neck,  the  batteries  which 
covered  the  Neck  opened  forth  a  heavy  fire  of  shot,  shell  and  car 
casses  upon  the  village  of  Roxbury  and  its  defenses.  It  was  no  less 
an  indication  to  the  silent  yeomen  on  the  hill,  that  mortal  danger 
demanded  a  supreme  resistance. 

The  crisis  was  at  hand.  The  veterans  were  ready.  The  people 
were  also  ready. 

The  shaft  of  war,  in  the  grasp  of  the  trained  legions  of  Great 
Britain  was  poised,  and  to  be  hurled  at  last  upon  the  breasts  of 
Englishmen,  whose  offense  was  the  aspiration  to  perpetuate  and 
develop  the  principles  of  English  liberty. 

It  was  a  blow  at  Magna  Charta  itself,  a  home  thrust,  suicidal,  and 
hopeless,  except  for  evil !  Its  lesson  rolls  on  to  attend  the  march  of 
the  centuries. 


CHAPTER   XVIT. 

BUNKER   HILL.     THE   BATTLE. 

IT  was  nearly  three  o'clock  of  the  afternoon  of  the  seventeenth  of 
June,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
seventy  five,  that  the  solid  mass  of  silent  veterans  which  had  landed 
upon  Moulton's  Point,  and  had  prepared  themselves  with  due  delib 
eration  to  execute  the  order  of  the  day,  moved  forward  to  attack  the 
American  army,  then  intrenched  on  the  summit  of  Breed's  Hill. 

To  General  Howe  himself  was  intrusted  the  responsibility  of 
breaking  up  the  American  left  wing,  to  envelope  it,  take  the  redoubt 
in  the  rear,  and  cut  off  retreat  to  Bunker  Hill  and  the  main  land. 
The  light  infantry,  therefore,  moved  closely  along  the  Mystic  river, 
threatening  the  extreme  left,  while  the  grenadiers  directed  their 
advance  upon  the  stone  fence,  with  their  left  wing  demonstrating 
toward  the  unprotected  gap  which  was  clearly  exposed  between  the 
fence  and  the  short  breastwork  next  the  redoubt.  General  Pigot,  who 
commanded  the  left  wing,  advanced  directly  against  the  redoubt 
itself. 

The  movements  were  heralded  by  a  profitless  artillery  fire  from 
Morton's  Hill,  but  this  soon  ceased,  for  the  solid  shot  all  ready  for  use, 
were  designed  for  twelve-pounder  guns,  and  those  in  position  had  the 
caliber  of  sixes.  The  prompt  order  to  use  only  grape,  was  followed 
by  an  advance  of  the  pieces  to  the  edge  of  an  old  brick-kiln,  the 
spongy  ground  and  heavy  grass  not  permitting  their  ready  handling 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill  slope,  or  even  just  to  its  right.  The  guns,  thus 
advanced,  thereby  secured  a  more  effective  range  of  fire  upon  the 
skeleton  defenses  of  the  American  centre,  and  an  eligible  position 
from  which  subsequently  to  effect  a  more  direct  fire  upon  the  exposed 
portion  of  the  American  front,  and  upon  the  breastwork  and  redoubt 
themselves. 

The  advance  of  the  British  army  was  like  a  solemn  pageant  in  its 


C775-]  BUNKER   HILL.  105 

steady  headway,  and  like  a  parade  for  inspection  in  its  completeness 
of  furnishment.  This  army,  bearing  their  knapsacks  and  the  full 
equipment  for  campaign  service,  moved  forward  as  if  by  the  very 
force  of  its  closely  knit  columns  it  must  sweep  away  all  obstructions, 
and  overturn  every  barrier  in  its  way.  But  right  in  the  way  was  a 
calm,  intense,  and  energizing  love  of  liberty. 

It  was  represented  by  plain  men  of  the  same  blood,  and  of  equal 
daring.  Contrast  marked  those  opposing  Englishmen  very  distinctly 
that  summer  afternoon.  The  plain  men  handled  plain  fire-locks. 
Ox-horns  held  their  powder,  and  their  pockets  held  the  bullets. 
Coatless,  under  the  broiling  sun,  unincumbered,  unadorned  by  plum 
age  or  service  medals, — looking  like  vagabonds  after  their  night  of 
labor,  and  their  day  of  hunger,  thirst  and  waiting,  this  live  obstruction 
was  truly  in  the  way  of  that  advancing  splendor.  Elated,  conscious, 
assured  of  victory,  with  firm  step,  already  quickened  as  the  space  of 
separation  lessens,  there  is  left  but  a  few  rods  of  interval — a  few  steps 
only,  and  the  work  is  done. 

A  few  hasty  shots  impulsively  fired,  but  quickly  restrained,  drew 
an  innocent  fire  from  their  front  rank.  The  pale  men  behind  the 
mock  defense,  obedient  at  last  to  one  will,  answered  nothing  to  that 
reply,  and  nothing  to  the  audible  commands  of  those  steady  columns, 
waiting  still. 

It  needs  no  painter  to  make  the  scene  seem  clearer  than  it  appears 
from  the  recital  of  sober  deposition  and  the  record  of  surviving  par 
ticipators  on  either  side.  History  has  no  contradictions  to  confuse  or 
explain  away  the  realities  of  that  fearful  tragedy. 

The  left  wing  is  near  the  redoubt.  It  is  nothing  to  surmount  a 
bank  of  fresh  earth  but  six  feet  high,  and  its  sands  and  clods  can 
almost  be  counted,  it  is  so  near,  so  easy, — sure  ! 

Short,  crisp,  and  earnest, — low  toned,  but  felt  as  an  electric  pulse 
from  redoubt  to  river,  are  the  words  of  a  single  man — of  Prescott ! 
Warren  by  his  side  repeats  it !  That  word  runs  quickly  along  the 
impatient  lines.  The  eager  fingers  give  back  from  the  waiting  trigger. 
"  Steady  men  !  "  "  Wait  until  you  see  the  white  of  the  eye  !  "  "  Not 
a  shot  sooner  ! "  "  Aim  at  the  handsome  coats ! "  "  Aim  at  the 
waist-bands."  "  Pick  off  the  commanders  !"  "  Wait  for  the  word, 
every  man,  steady  !  " 

Those  plain  men,  so  patient,  can  already  count  the  buttons,  can 
read  the  emblem  on  the  belt-plate,  can  recognize  the  officers  and  men 
whom  they  have  seen  on  parade  at  Boston  Common.  Features  grow 


100  BUNKER   HILL.  [1775 

more  and  more  distinct.  The  silence  is  awful.  These  men  seem 
breathless — dead!  It  comes,  that  r<.vord,  the  word,  waited  for — 
"  Fire  !  "  On  the  right,  the  light  infantry  gain  an  equal  advance, 
almost  at  the  same  instant  that  the  left  wing  was  treading  so  near  the 
humble  redoubt.  Moving  over  more  level  ground,  they  quickly  make 
the  greater  distance,  and  have  passed  the  line  of  those  who  marched 
directly  up  the  hill.  The  grenadiers  also  move  upon  the  centre  with 
the  same  serene  confidence,  and  the  interval  has  lessened  to  the 
gauge  of  space  which  the  spirit  of  the  impending  word  defines.  That 
word,  waits  behind  the  centre  and  the  left  wing,  as  it  lingers  behind  the 
breastwork  and  redoubt.  Sharp,  clear,  and  deadly  in  tone  and 
essence  it  rings  forth — "  Fire  !  " 

From  redoubt  to  river,  along  the  whole  sweep  of  devouring  flame, 
the  forms  of  brave  men  wither  as  in  a  furnace  heat.  The  whole  front 
goes  down  !  For  an  instant  the  chirp  of  the  cricket  and  the  grass 
hopper  in  the  freshly  cut  grass,  might  almost  be  heard,  then  the 
groans  of  the  suffering,  then  the  shouts  of  impatient  yeomen  who  leap 
over  obstacles  to  pursue,  until  recalled  to  silence  and  to  duty. 

Staggering,  but  reviving,  grand  in  the  glory  of  their  manhood  and 
the  sublimity  of  their  discipline,  heroic  in  the  fortitude  which  restores 
them  to  self-possession  ;  with  a  steady  step  in  the  face  of  fire,  and 
over  the  bodies  of  the  dead,  the  remnant  dare  to  renew  the  battle. 
Again,  the  deadly  volley,  and  the  shattered  columns,  in  spite  of 
entreaty  or  command,  move  back  to  the  place  of  starting,  and  the 
first  shock  of  battle  is  over. 

A  lifetime  when  it  is  past,  is  but  as  a  moment !  A  moment  some 
times,  is  as  a  lifetime  !  Onset,  and  repulse  !  Three  hundred  lifetimes 
ended  in  twenty  minutes. 

Putnam  hastened  to  Bunker  Hill  to  gather  scattering  parties  in  the 
rear,  and  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  reinforcements  across  the  isthmus, 
where  the  fire  from  the  British  shipping  was  maintained  with  destruc 
tive  energy.  But  the  battle  at  last  had  to  depend  mainly  upon  the 
men  who  had  toiled  all  night,  and  who  had  gained  confidence  and 
firmness  by  the  experience  of  those  eventful  hours.  Nothing  could 
bring  the  reinforcements  in  time. 

The  British  troops  rapidly  re-formed  their  columns.  Never,  on 
other  battle  fields,  did  officers  more  gloriously  evince  the  perfection 
of  discipline,  and  the  perfection  of  self-devotion.  The  artillery  was 
pushed  to  the  front,  and  much  nearer  to  the  angle  made  by  the 
breastwork  next  the  redoubt,  and  the  retiring  line  through  the  open 


I775-J  BUNKER  HILL.  IO7 

gap  to  its  left.  The  American  officers  animated  their  men,  and  added 
fresh  caution  not  to  waste  a  single  shot.  The  guns  of  Gridley  and 
Callender  were  temporarily  employed  at  the  unprotected  interval  near 
the  breastwork,  and  then  withdrawn  to  the  rear.  The  company  of 
the  latter  officer  became  scattered  and  never  returned  to  the  fight. 
The  remainder  of  the  line  kept  up  to  duty,  and  resumed  the  silent 
waiting  which  had  been  so  impressive  before  the  attack  began. 

The  British  columns  again  advanced,  and  deployed  as  before 
across  the  entire  extent  of  the  American  lines.  The  ships  of  war 
redoubled  their  effort  to  clear  the  isthmus  of  advancing  reinforcements. 
Shot  and  shell  cut  up  the  turf,  and  dispersed  the  detachments  which 
had  reached  the  summit  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  the  companies  which 
had  been  posted  at  Charlestown  to  annoy  the  British  left,  were  driven 
to  the  shelter  of  the  redoubt. 

Charlestown  had  already  been  fired  by  the  carcasses  which  fell 
through  its  roofs,  and  more  than  four  hundred  wooden  houses  kin 
dling  into  one  vast  wave  of  smoke  and  flame,  added  impressiveness  and 
terror  to  the  scene,  while  a  favoring  breeze  swept  its  quivering  vol 
ume  away  from  the  battle  field,  leaving  to  the  American  forces  a  dis 
tinct  and  suggestive  view  of  the  returning  tide  of  battle. 

Nearer  than  before,  the  British  troops  press  on  !  No  scattering 
shots  anticipate  their  approach  this  second  time.  It  is  only  when  a 
space  of  hardly  five  rods  is  left,  and  a  swift  plunge  could  almost  fore 
run  the  rifle's  flash,  that  the  word  of  execution  impels  the  bullet,  and 
the  front  rank,  entire,  from  redoubt  to  river,  is  swept  away.  Again, 
again,  the  attempt  is  made  to  inspire  the  paralyzed  troops,  and  rally 
them  from  retreat ;  but  the  living  tide  flows  back — flows  back  even 
to  the  river. 

Another  twenty  minutes,  hardly  twenty-five,  and  the  death  angel 
has  gathered  his  battle  harvest,  five  hundred  sheaves  of  human  hopes, 
as  when  the  Royal  George  went  down  beneath  the  waters  with  its 
priceless  values  of  human  life. 

At  the  first  repulse,  the  38th  regiment  had  halted  under  the  shelter 
of  a  stone  wall  by  the  road  which  passes  around  the  base  of  Breed's 
Hill,  between  the  slope  and  Morton's  Hill.  At  the  second  repulse,  the 
same  regiment  supported  on  its  left  by  the  5th,  held  a  portion  of  its 
command  in  check,  just  under  the  advanced  crest  of  the  hill,  and 
gradually  gathered  in  the  scattering  remnants  for  a  third  assault. 

The  condition  of  the  British  army  is  one  of  grave  responsibilities 
and  grave  issues.  That  which  had  the  color  of  a  simple  dispersion,  and 


108  BUNKER  HILL.  1775 

punishment  of  half  organized  and  half  armed  rebels,  begins  to  assume 
the  characteristics  of  a  "forlorn  hope"  in  a  most  desperate  struggle. 

"A  moment  of  the  day  was  critical"  said  Burgoyne. 

"  A  continuous  blaze  of  musketry  incessant  and  destructive,"  says 
Stedman. 

The  British  officers  pronounced  it,  "  downright  butchery  to  lead 
the  men  afresh  against  those  lines,"  says  Gordon. 

"  Of  one  company  not  more  than  five,  and  of  another  not  more 
than  fourteen  escaped,"  says  Ramsay. 

"  Whole  platoons  were  laid  upon  the  earth  like  grass  by  the  mow 
er's  scythe,"  says  Lossing. 

"  The  British  line  totally  broken,  fell  back  with  precipitation  to 
the  landing  place,"  says  Marshall. 

"  Most  of  our  grenadiers  and  light  infantry,  the  moment  they 
presented  themselves,  lost  three-fourths,  and  many  nine-tenths  of 
their  men.  Some  had  only  eight  and  nine  men  a  company  left,  some 
only  three,  four,  and  five,"  is  the  statement  of  a  British  letter,  dated 
July  5th,  1/75,  and  cited  by  Frothingham. 

"  A  shower  of  bullets.  The  field  of  battle  was  covered  with  the 
slain,"  says  Botta. 

"  A  continuous  sheet  of  fire,"  says  Bancroft. 

"  The  dead  lay  as  thick  as  sheep  in  a  fold,"  said  Stark. 

It  was  just  at  this  protracted  interval,  yet  less  than  a  single  hour, 
that  each  army  evinced  the  great  qualities  of  their  common  blood. 

Clinton  and  Burgoyne  had  watched  the  progress  of  events  from 
Copp's  Hill,  and  with  true  gallantry  and  courage,  the  latter  threw  him 
self  into  a  boat  with  reinforcements,  and  volunteered  to  share  the 
issue  of  a  third  advance.  Four  hundred  marines  additional  to  the 
1st  battalion  which  had  remained  at  the  landing  place,  hurried  across 
the  narrow  river,  and  these  united  with  the  4/th  regiment  under 
General  Clinton,  were  ordered  to  flank  the  redoubt,  and  scale  its  face 
to  the  extreme  left,  while  General  Howe  with  the  principal  part  of  the 
grenadiers  and  light  infantry,  supported  by  the  artillery,  undertook 
the  storming  of  the  breastworks  bending  back  from  the  mouth  of  the 
redoubt,  and  so  commanding  the  entrance. 

The  remnants  of  the  5th,  38th,  43d,  and  52d  regiments  under 
General  Pigot,  were  ordered  to  connect  the  two  wings,  and  make  an 
attack  upon  the  redoubt  in  front. 

A  demonstration  was  also  made  against  the  American  left,  more 
to  occupy  its  attention  than  to  force  the  defenses.  The  artillery  was 


I775-J  BUNKER  HILL.  IO£ 

to  advance  a  few  rods,  and  then  swing  about  to  the  left,  to  sweep  the 
breastwork  for  Howe's  advance. 

The  preparations  were  nearly  complete.  It  only  remained  to  bring 
the  men  to  their  duty.  Knapsacks  were  unslung,  every  needless 
incumbrance  was  laid  aside,  and  the  troops  moved  forward  stripped 
for  fight. 

The  power  of  discipline,  the  energy  of  wise  commanders,  and  the 
force  of  every  possible  incentive  which  could  animate  British  veterans 
of  proud  antecedents,  and  established  loyalty,  combined  to  make  the 
movement  as  memorable  as  it  was  momentous. 

Within  the  American  lines  the  preparation  involved  equal  respon 
sibility,  but  under  fearful  discouragement.  Few  of  the  troops  had 
three  rounds  of  ammunition  left.  During  the  second  attack  a  part 
of  the  men  loaded  while  others  fired,  and  the  expenditure  of  powder 
was  commensurate  with  the  results.  The  remaining  cannon  cartridges 
were  economically  distributed,  and  there  was  no  longer  any  hope  that 
substantial  aid  would  come  to  their  relief.  There  were  less  than  fifty 
bayonets  to  the  entire  command,  and  gloomy  apprehensions  began 
to  be  entertained,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  a  firm  purpose  to  fight 
to  the  last. 

During  the  afternoon  General  Ward  sent  forward  his  own  regiment 
and  those  of  Patterson  and  Gardner.  The  last  named  officer  led  three 
hundred  of  his  men  safely  across  the  isthmus,  reached  Bunker  Hill, 
and  commenced  to  throw  up  earthworks  under  the  direction  of  Gen 
eral  Putnam,  but  was  soon  ordered  to  the  lines,  and  was  mortally 
wounded  while  executing  the  order.  Few  of  his  men  actually  par 
ticipated  in  the  fight,  the  majority,  after  his  fall,  returning  to  Bunker 
Hill.  Adjutant  Febiger,  a  Danish  officer,  gathered  a  portion  of 
Colonel  Gerrish's  regiment,  reached  the  redoubt  as  the  last  action 
commenced,  and  did  good  service,  but  the  other  regiments  were  too 
late. 

Putnam,  impressed  with  the  critical  nature  of  another  attack,  de 
voted  himself  wholly  to  an  attempt  to  establish  another  position  on 
Bunker  Hill  for  accumulation  of  reinforcements,  and  a  point  of  resist 
ance,  in  case  the  advanced  positions  should  be  abandoned,  but  he 
could  accomplish  nothing  in  the  face  of  the  activity  of  the  shipping, 
now  delivering  its  fire  at  short  range. 

Within  the  redoubt  itself,  and  along  the  slender  line,  all  was 
resolution  and  attention  to  duty.  Colonel  Prescott  appreciated 
thoroughly  the  purpose  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the  sudden  wheel  of 


HO  BUNKER   HILL.  1775 

the  British  artillery  to  the  left,  indicated  their  power  to  concentrate 
its  fire  upon  his  lines  of  retreat,  and  the  reduction  of  the  redoubt. 
The  order  was  given  to  reserve  every  shot  until  the  enemy  should 
come  within  twenty  yards.  One  single  volley  was  delivered  as  the 
attack  was  made  at  the  same  moment  upon  three  sides  of  the  ill-fated 
work.  For  an  instant  the  columns  were  checked,  but  in  another  they 
dashed  forward  with  bayonets  fixed.  Those  who  first  surmounted 
the  parapet  fell.  Major  Pitcairn  was  mortally  wounded  as  he  entered 
the  works.  Lieutenant-colonel  Abercrombie,  Majors  Williams,  and 
Speedlove  shared  his  fate.  A  single  artillery  cartridge  was  distributed 
for  a  last  effort,  and  then,  intermingled  with  the  assailants,  fighting 
with  clubbed  guns  and  stones,  the  garrison  yielded  the  contest,  and 
each  for  himself,  under  Prescott's  order,  made  a  quick  retreat.  Pres- 
cott  and  Warren  were  the  last  to  leave,  and  the  latter,  just  without 
the  redoubt,  shot  through  the  head,  gave  life  to  the  cause  he  had  so 
valiantly  defended. 

But  with  the  capture  of  the  redoubt,  the  struggle  was  not  ended. 
Major  Jackson  rallied  Gardner's  men  on  Bunker  Hill,  and  with  three 
companies  of  Ward's  regiment  and  Febiger's  party,  an  effort  was  made 
to  cover  the  retreat,  and  a  vigorous  fire  was  for  a  short  time  maintained 
upon  the  advancing  enemy.  It  saved  more  than  half  of  the  garrison. 

At  the  rail  fence  and  clear  to  the  river,  Starks',  Colt's,  Reed's,  and 
Chester's  companies  twice  repulsed  an  attack,  and  by  a  resistance, 
prolonged  as  long  as  their  powder  held  out,  they  afforded  opportunity 
for  the  fugitives  from  the  redoubt  to  make  good  their  retreat.  Then 
they  also  fell  back,  in  no  precipitate  flight,  but  with  a  fair  front,  and  a 
steadiness  worthy  of  their  brave  resistance. 

Putnam  made  one  more  effort  to  halt  the  men  at  Bunker  Hill,  but 
without  bayonets  or  ammunition,  worn  out  in  physical  strength,  and 
hopeless  of  a  successful  resistance,  the  retreat  became  general,  and  the 
day  closed  with  their  occupation  of  the  field  works  of  Prospect  Hill, 
and  other  defenses  nearest  of  approach. 

The  British  army  occupied  Bunker  Hill,  but  did  not  pursue  be 
yond  the  isthmus.  General  Clinton  advised  an  immediate  attack 
upon  Cambridge,  but  General  Howe  declined  the  attempt.  Both 
armies  were  too  worn  out  to  renew  battle,  and  Colonel  Prescott's 
gallant  offer  to  retake  the  position  if  he  could  have  three  fresh  regi 
ments,  found  no  response  from  the  committe  of  safety  and  council  of 
war.  Both  armies  lay  on  their  arms  all  night,  equally  apprehensive 
of  attack. 


I775-J  BUNKER   HILL.  Ill 

The  losses  are  given  as  officially  stated,  and  as  adopted  by  Sted 
man,  and  Bancroft. 

British  casualties.  Nineteen  officers  killed,  and  seventy  wounded ; 
of  rank  and  file,  two  hundred  and  seven  killed,  and  seven  hundred  and 
fifty-eight  wounded.  Total  casualties,  1054. 

American  casualties.  One  hundred  and  forty  five  killed  and  miss 
ing,  and  three  hundred  and  four  wounded.  Total  casualties,  449. 

Thus  each  army  lost  nearly  one-third  of  the  forces  brought  into 
real  action. 

Thus  brief  is  the  record  of  a  battle,  which,  in  less  than  two  hourb 
destroyed  a  town,  laid  fifteen  hundred  men  upon  the  battle  field, 
equalized  the  relations  of  veterans  and  militia,  aroused  three  millions 
of  people  to  a  definite  struggle  for  National  Independence,  and  fairly 
inaugurated  the  war  for  its  accomplishment. 

NOTE.  The  prompt  occupation  of  Prospect  Hill,  referred  to  in  the  text,  was  in  keep 
ing  with  General  Putnam's  purpose  to  resist  at  every  point ;  and  the  ultimate  value  of  this 
position  which  he  occupied,  as  he  stated  to  the  "  Committee  of  Safety,"  "without  having 
any  orders  from  any  person,"  was  very  determining  in  its  relations  to  the  siege.  Its 
advanced  flanking  posts  of  Lechmere  Point,  Cobble  Hill  and  Ploughed  Hill,  afterwards 
developed  by  General  Washington,  combined  their  cross  fire,  and  thus  sealed  Charlestown 
Neck.  A  protracted  halt  on  Bunker  Hill,  as  appears  from  notes  on  the  battle,  would  have 
been  fatal  to  the  whole  detachment :  but  his  occupation  of  Prospect  Hill  was  eminently 
judicious. 

NOTE.  General  Washington's  report  to  Congress  states  the  casualties  at  Bunker 
Hill,  by  regiments.  It  has  already  appeared  that  the  organization  of  the  command  was 
loosely  and  hastily  effected :  but  the  purpose  was  so  far  realized  that  about  the  required 
number  of  men  accompanied  Colonel  Prescott. 

MISSING 
4 


COLONEL  OF  REGIMENT. 

KILLED.                    "N 

VOUNDED. 

18 

Little  

•  7 

23              

Brewer  

12            

22               

Gridley  

4 

Stark  

15            

45 

Woodbridge  

5          

Scammon  

2              

Bridge  

17           

25              

Whitcomb 

5" 

8 

Ward  

I            

6           

Gerrishe  

3         

5          

Reed  

2 

Prescott  

43         K.  &M. 

46          

Doolittle  , 

6         

9           

7          

Patterson  

I           

Nixon  

3         K.&M. 



CHAPTER   XVIII. 

BATTLE   OF  BUNKER   HILL.     NOTES. 

THE  siege  of  Boston  was  protracted  until  the  spring  of  1776.  It 
will  be  well,  therefore,  to  devote  a  short  space  to  the  examina 
tion  of  the  military  relations  which  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  sus 
tained  to  the  investment  of  that  city.  It  will  also  afford  material  for 
a  clearer  appreciation  of  the  battle  itself. 

The  evacuation  of  Boston  was  made  necessary  by  the  ultimate 
American  occupation  of  Dorchester  Heights.  The  decision  of  the 
British  council  of  war  made  during  the  month  of  April,  in  which 
Clinton,  Burgoyne,  and  Percy  concurred,  and  which  decision  affirmed 
the  necessity  of  an  immediate  occupation  of  Dorchester  Heights,  was 
therefore  correct  ;  but  Howe  postponed  action  until  a  peaceable  occu 
pation  was  impossible. 

The  corresponding  course  of  the  "  Committee  of  Safety  "  in  that 
direction,  showed  a  like  appreciation  of  the  strategic  value  of  the 
position ;  but  their  means  were  too  limited,  and  the  time  had  not 
arrived  for  their  action.  The  Americans  burned  their  harbor  light 
house  quite  early  during  the  investment,  and  the  inner  harbor  itself 
was  unsafe,  unless  absolutely  under  the  control  of  the  British  forces. 
Charlestown  Heights  was  therefore  more  important  for  protection  of 
the  shipping,  and  afforded  a  better  base  for  active  operations  than  did 
Boston  itself.  It  was  therefore  sound  military  policy  for  the  British 
army  to  seize  the  positions  named  as  soon  as  the  first  attempt  was 
made  to  invest  the  city. 

The  ostensible  theory  of  the  crown  was  to  reconcile  the  colonies ; 
but  the  actual  policy  and  the  physical  demonstrations  repelled,  and 
did  not  conciliate.  Military  acts  which  were  done  easily  by  force,  and 
which  should  have  remained  undone,  were  done  !  Military  acts  which 
were  sound  upon  the  basis  of  anticipated  resistance  were  not  done. 
Threats  and  blows  toward  those  supposed  to  be  incapable  of  defense 


THE 
BATTLE  OF  BKEEDS  HIT,! 

OK 

BUNKER  HILL. 


Compiled  and  Dra-ffU-T>y  Col.  Carrington. 


I775-]  BUNKER   HILi..  113 

were  freely  expended.  Operations  of  war,  as  against  a  competent 
and  skillful  adversary,  were  ignored. 

Inasmuch  as  the  British  authorities  assumed  that  their  force  was 
adequate  for  any  military  purpose,  when  opposed  to  the  Provincial 
militia,  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  in  all  its  phases  must  be  judged 
critically  as  a  military  demonstration. 

The  occupation  of  Charlestovvn  Heights,  which  had  been  pro 
nounced  necessary,  was  also  assumed  to  be  feasible,  and  without  risk 
to  Boston  itself.  It  was  undertaken  with  the  purpose  announced  by 
General  Gage  in  advance,  that  he  would  burn  Charlestown  if  its  citi 
zens  committed  overt  acts  of  hostility.  To  say  nothing  of  the  value 
of  the  town  to  a  British  garrison  for  Bunker  Hill,  its  destruction  had 
no  value  as  a  military  measure.  It  was  one  of  those  wanton  acts 
which  treated  men,  women,  and  children,  as  parts  of  an  openly  hostile 
force,  and  the  town  itself  as  part  of  a  hostile  country.  It  expressed 
vengeance,  not  the  spirit  of  negotiation.  Its  destruction  violated 
every  element  which  bore  in  the  direction  of  restored  British  suprem 
acy,  and  had  no  apology  consistent  with  a  sincere  desire  for  the 
honorable  pacification  of  aroused  passions. 

A  still  greater  mistake  was  made  in  the  conduct  of  the  occupation 
itself;  and  its  mere  statement  shows  how  daring  was  that  pre-occu- 
pation  by  the  Americans,  and  how  utterly  the  British  commander 
failed  to  appreciate  the  character  of  the  men  with  whom  he  was 
waging  war.  It  may  very  well  be  suggested  that  General  Howe  had 
largely  imbibed  his  impressions  of  the  real  state  of  affairs  from  General 
Gage,  whose  ill-judged  conduct  had  precipitated,  if  it  had  not  largely 
induced,  the  conflict. 

The  mistake  is  thus  stated.  Irrespective  of  inexcusable  delay 
after  the  movement  had  been  pronounced  necessary,  the  method 
adopted  was  only  an  armed  expression  of  contempt  for  the  opposing 
militia,  entirely  unbecoming  any  wise  commander.  The  law  of  mili 
tary  action  requires  the  use  of  adequate  force  for  a  proposed  end,  but 
does  not  imply  or  warrant  a  needless  waste  of  life  or  property. 

General  Clinton,  when  advised  of  the  action  of  Colonel  Prescott, 
promptly  suggested  the  proper  counter  movement.  Precisely  as  the 
fire  of  the  shipping  cut  off  reinforcements  for  the  Americans  on  the 
seventeenth  of  April,  so  would  a  prompt  occupation  of  the  isthmus, 
under  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  have  enabled  the  British  commander  to 
have  seized  Bunker  Hill  summit  in  the  rear  of  the  American  works,  and 

would  have  placed  those  works  at  his  mercy.     A  similar  landing  along 
8 


114  BUNKER   HILL.  LJ775 

the  Mystic  river  behind  the  slender  defenses,  would  have  accomplished 
the  same  result.  The  advance  as  made,  had  the  single  element  of 
supposed  invincibility,  as  against  a  timid,  unorganized,  and  ill-armed 
adversary.  As  against  a  mere  mob,  it  would  have  carried  moral 
weight, — would  have  been  just  the  thing.  Assertion  of  authority 
then,  is  not  merely  to  vanquish  force,  but  to  restore  public  con 
fidence  in  law.  Its  very  momentum,  when  put  in  motion,  generally 
does  the  work.  As  against  a  detachment  out  of  nearly  twenty  thou 
sand  men  who  represented  public  sentiment  itself,  and  would  make 
no  terms  while  arms  were  used  to  assert  prerogative,  it  was  unmilitary, 
mere  waste — madness.  It  had  physical  courage,  without  the  moral 
sanction  which  is  so  essential  to  highest  military  success. 

The  movement  wrongly  begun,  was  badly  managed.  It  was 
Clinton's  own  suggestion,  made  at  the  moment  of  his  gallant  enlist 
ment  in  the  enterprise,  and  when  the  risk  seemed  extra  hazardous, 
that  secured  the  degree  of  success  actually  attained.  He  advised 
concentration  of  the  assault  upon  the  redoubt,  because  it  commanded 
the  other  defenses.  Even  this  movement  would  have  been  of  doubt 
ful  success,  if  the  Americans  had  been  supplied  with  ammunition — if 
two  half-barrels  of  the  Connecticut  powder  then  at  Cambridge,  could 
have  been  poured  through  the  gun-barrels  of  the  earnest  defenders. 

The  delay  of  the  movement  was  equally  faulty.  The  force  as 
signed  to  the  attack  was,  after  it  had  landed,  deemed  insufficient,  and 
re-inforcements  were  obtained.  One  half  of  the  force  that  first  landed, 
could  have  passed  along  the  shore  of  the  Mystic  river  unobstructed, 
and  could  have  turned  the  American  left  long  before  Colonel  Starks' 
command  came  upon  the  field.  When  the  British  troops  were  lei 
surely  dining,  the  question  of  sending  re-inforcements  had  been  only  a 
little  while  decided  in  the  American  camp. 

The  British  general,  with  a  good  military  training,  and  as  will  more 
fully  appear  hereafter,  with  sound  strategical  conceptions  as  to  army 
operations,  and  of  undoubted  physical  courage,  was  seldom  ready  at 
the  right  time,  invariably  waited  for  reinforcements,  and  never  improved 
success. 

His  army  fortified  Bunker  Hill,  but  besides  the  loss  or  disabling 
of  more  than  a  thousand  men,  to  demonstrate  the  invincibility  of  his 
troops,  he  had  actually  thrown  away  all  the  prestige  of  their  past 
reputation,  and  enfeebled  the  power  of  his  own  will,  as  well  as  the 
capacity  of  the  troops,  for  offensive  measures  against  the  American 
army. 


1775-1  BUNKER   HILL.  115 

It  is  of  interest  to  the  reader  to  notice  the  characters  who  figured 
in  this  action,  that  they  may  see  how  far  its  lesson  made  an  impres 
sion  upon  their  future  military  operations  in  America. 

General  Clinton  proved  his  capacity  to  apprehend  the  situation,  to 
devise  and  execute  a  purpose.  General  Burgoyne  saw  the  whole  bat 
tle,  and  knew  that  Provincials  would  fight.  Lord  Percy  afterward 
commanded  a  division  at  Long  Island,  White  Plains,  Brandywine, 
and  in  other  important  actions.  Lord  Rawdon,  then  a  lieutenant, 
who  received  in  his  arms  the  body  of  his  own  captain  (Harris  of  the 
5th  infantry),  as  he  was  shot  from  the  parapet  of  the  redoubt,  was 
afterwards  to  win  his  laurels  at  Camden  and  Hobkirk's  Hill. 

If  the  battle  be  examined  with  regard  to  the  original  occupation 
of  the  heights  by  the  American  forces,  some  additional  elements  are 
exposed.  It  is  known  that  after  due  consultation,  Colonel  Gridley 
deemed  best  to  fortify  Breed's  Hill ;  and  at  the  same  time,  it  was  the. 
intention  to  establish  a  second  position  upon  Bunker  Hill,  as  soon  as 
re-inforcements  should  come  upon  the  ground.  The  spirit  of  the 
order  was  the  occupation  of  the  Charlestown  Heights,  At  that  time 
the  local  distinctions  afterwards  recognized  did  not  obtain,  and  Breed's 
Hill  was  known  as  a  pasture,  a  dependent  slope,  if  not  essentially  a 
part  of  Bunker  Hill,  which  represents  the  summit  of  the  peninsula. 
It  was  impossible  for  Prescott  not  to  anticipate  the  arrival  of  re-inforce 
ments  in  time  to  hold  the  summit  also ;  and  in  that  view,  he  fortified 
the  proper  position  to  prevent  a  permanent  lodgment  of  the  British 
troops. 

If  he  had  occupied  Bunker  Hill  proper,  the  British  forces  if  wisely 
led,  would  have  gained  Breed's  Hill  without  loss, — would  have  secured 
a  safe  position  for  accumulating  their  forces,  and  an  equally  good 
position  for  a  battery  to  play  against  the  summit. 

It  is  profitless  to  go  back  and  inquire  whether  the  Americans  were 
justified  in  their  offensive  movement,  in  view  of  the  crude  organization 
of  their  army,  and  the  scanty  supply  of  powder  then  in  store.  The 
danger  that  the  British  garrison  would  assail  their  incomplete  intrench- 
ments,  was  in  fact  averted  by  the  expression  of  conscious  power  which 
the  American  advance  and  resistance  indicated.  Its  moral  effect  was 
as  great  as  if  their  large  numbers  represented  similar  courage,  similar 
capacity,  and  the  military  resources  to  back  them.  The  committee 
of  safety  and  the  council  of  war,  seem  to  have  apprehended  the  situa 
tion,  and  by  the  application  of  proper  courage  and  that  good  sense 
(which  largely  underlies  all  military  success)  to  have  struck  a  blow 


Il6  BUNKER  HILL.  [1775 

which  in  fact  intimidated  the  British  commander,  and  dissuaded  him 
from  any  further  tilts  with  provincial  militia. 

It  made  a  square  issue  between  the  country  and  the  British  army. 
It  was  no  longer  an  issue  between  citizens  and  the  state.  Franklin 
stated  truly,  when  advised  of  the  facts, — "  The  king  has  lost  his  col 
onies."  English  statesmen  made  the  same  assertion. 

It  is  true  that  the  American  army,  then  encamped  about  Boston, 
was  at  no  point  fully  prepared  to  meet  veteran  troops.  The  hesita 
tion  of  the  British  army  to  force  their  defenses,  however,  was  one  of 
the  strongest  elements  of  that  defense  ;  while  assumption  of  the 
offensive  was  not  only  the  best  employment  of  the  half  idle  and 
impatient  militia,  but  the  best  method  of  insuring  success. 

Only  disciplined  men  can  patiently  stand  fire  under  exposure. 
Habit  renders  the  casualties  but  the  necessary  incidents  to  duty. 
Raw  troops,  however,  must  be  pushed  forward  ;  and  in  the  enthu 
siasm  of  an  advance,  the  casualties  are  lost  sight  of,  and  thus  militia 
sometimes  equal  the  most  brilliant  efforts  of  veterans  in  the  line  of 
daring  adventure. 

Men  thus  pushed  forward,  rarely  know  exactly  when  they  arc 
defeated,  and  take  a  victory  by  surprise.  If  they  halt,  they  recognize 
danger,  feel  its  power,  and  defeat  is  certain.  It  was  thus  that  the 
Americans  were  enabled  to  realize  from  the  offensive  a  result  beyond 
the  real  scope  of  their  military  training ;  and  by  the  memory  of  Lex 
ington  they  were  led  to  rightly  estimate  both  the  offensive  and  defens 
ive  value  of  protecting  earth-works,  however  inartificial  and  defective. 
The  individual  was  thus  enabled  to  do  his  best. 

The  company  organizations  were  so  crude,  that  the  men  of  differ 
ent  companies  were  intermingled,  and  the  pressure  of  imperative 
necessity  became  the  substitute  for  organization  and  discipline.  They 
had  few  officers,  these  for  the  most  part  inexperienced,  and  each  man 
acted  for  himself,  under  the  general  direction  of  Prescott  and  his  chief 
associates.  The  file-firing  of  regular  troops  could  not  have  surpassed 
the  intense  vigor  of  that  actually  delivered. 

The  result  was  the  best  possible  end  of  the  conflict.  The  impa 
tience  of  the  two  armies  to  have  a  fight  was  gratified  ;  the  British  army 
was  practically  shut  up  in  Boston,  and  the  American  army,  as  they 
now  realized  the  necessity  for  more  thorough  training,  and  the  accu 
mulation  of  military  supplies,  secured  opportunities  to  perfect  their 
defenses,  and  thereby  compel  the  evacuation  of  Boston. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

THE   NORTHERN   CAMPAIGN.     PRELIMINARY   OPERATIONS. 

NO  expedition  during  the  American  Revolution  had  less  elements 
of  permanent  value  than  those  which  were  undertaken  against 
Canada  during  the  year  17/5.  Great  results  were  anticipated,  but 
none  were  realized.  The  obstacles  were  too  substantial,  and  failure 
was  inevitable.  Wonderful  endurance  and  great  physical  courage 
were  manifested,  and  these  were  accompanied  by  a  prodigious  amount 
of  faith,  but  there  was  neither  ability  nor  opportunity  for  works  com 
mensurate  with  the  faith.  Certain  Acts  of  Parliament,  known  as  the 
Canadian  Acts,  were  as  offensive  to  Canadians  as  other  legislation  was 
to  Americans ;  but  the  former  were  not  pressed  to  the  extremity  of 
armed  resistance.  The  people  themselves  having  no  harmony  of  re 
ligious  or  political  views,  were  equally  divided  in  language  and  race. 

Neither  did  the  Canadians  invite  the  aid  of  the  colonies.  The 
hypothesis  that  Canada  would  blend  her  destiny  with  that  of  New 
England,  and  would  unite  in  resistance  to  the  crown,  certainly  involved 
some  identity  of  interest  as  well  as  of  action.  But  the  characters  of 
the  two  people  were  too  unlike  to  be  unified  by  simple  opposition  to 
English  legislation,  and  Canadians  had  no  antecedents  such  as  would 
prompt  a  hearty  sympathy  with  New  England  and  its  controlling 
moral  sentiment.  Neither  was  there  such  a  neighborly  relation  as 
admitted  of  prompt  and  adequate  aid  from  one  to  the  other,  in 
emergencies  calling  for  a  combined  effort. 

As  a  base  of  operations  for  a  British  army  moving  upon  the  col 
onies,  Canada  had  the  single  advantage  of  being  less  distant  from 
England  than  an  Atlantic  base,  and  many  supplies  could  be  procured 
without  the  expense  and  delay  of  their  transportation  across  the 
Atlantic ;  but  between  Canada  and  the  American  colonies  there  was 
an  actual  wilderness. 

Hence  a  British  offensive  movement  from  Canada  involved  con- 


\ 


Il8  THE  NORTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  [i?75 

stant  waste  of  men  and  materials,  a  deep  line  through  an  uninhabited 
or  hostile  region,  and  such  a  constant  backing,  as  was  both  inconsist 
ent  with  the  resources  of  the  base,  and  with  a  corresponding  support 
of  armies  resting  upon  the  sea  coast. 

The  British  government  was  not  ready  for  operations  so  extensive 
and  so  exhaustive  of  men  and  treasure  ;  neither  did  it  realize  the 
necessity  for  that  expenditure.  There  were  two  alternatives,  one 
illustrated  by  General  Carleton's  plan,  viz.,  to  hold  the  forts  of  Lake 
Champlain,  as  advanced,  defensive  positions  ;  and  the  other,  that  of 
Burgoyne,  to  strike  through  the  country  and  depend  upon  support 
from  the  opposite  base. 

The  true  defense  of  the  colonies  from  such  expeditions^  depended 
upon  the  prompt  seizure  and  occupation  of  the  frontier  posts.  An 
American  advance  upon  Canada,  was  not  only  through  a  country 
strategically  bad,  but  the  diversion  of  forces  for  that  purpose  en 
dangered  the  general  issue,  and  entrusted  its  interests  to  the  guar 
dianship  of  an  army  already  insufficient  to  meet  the  pressing  demands 
of  the  crisis. 

The  occupation  of  New  York  in  1775,  by  an  adequate  British 
force,  would  have  infinitely  outweighed  all  possible  benefit  from  the 
complete  conquest  of  Canada.  At  the  very  time  when  Washington 
could  hardly  hold  the  British  garrison  of  Boston  in  check, — when  he 
had  an  average  of  but  nine  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man,  he  was 
required  to  spare  companies,  ammunition,  and  supplies  for  a  venture, 
profitless  at  best, — with  the  certainty  that  reinforcements  could  not 
be  supplied  as  fast  as  the  enemy  could  draw  veteran  regiments  from 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  to  defend  or  recover  Canadian  soil. 

In  giving  a  rapid  outline  of  this  first  attempt  of  the  colonies  to 
enlarge  the  theatre  of  active  operations,  it  should  be  noticed  that  the 
initiative  had  been  taken  before  General  Washington  had  been  elected 
commander-in-chief,  and  that  Congress  itself  precipitated  the  final 
movement. 

A  passing  thought  is  noted,  as  historic  characters  now  come  into 
view. 

The  crater  of  passion  casts  out  every  kind  of  element  that  has 
been  seething  and  boiling  under  pressure.  So  the  impulse  from  Lex 
ington  and  Concord  brought  to  the  surface  some  elements  of  great 
variety  of  value  and  endurance.  Arnold,  then  living  at  New  Haven, 
and  commanding  the  company  still  known  as  the  "  Governor's  Guards," 
was  so  heated,  that  he  could  not  wait  for  orders  or  preparation  ;  but 


I775-J  THE   NORTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  1 19 

after  taking  ammunition  by  force,  started  with  forty  of  his  men  for 
Cambridge  on  the  third  day  after  those  skirmishes  occurred.  He 
rushed  for  Ticonderoga  without  men,  as  soon  as  he  could  handle  a 
commission.  He  was  one  of  the  heroes  of  Quebec. 

Lee  was  another  man,  who  with  hardly  less  ambition,  eccentricity, 
and  lack  of  moral  force,  had  every  volcanic  symptom, — with  more  of 
military  knowledge,  and  sufficient  worldly  wisdom  to  be  careful  that 
Congress  made  up  the  loss  of  income  which  his  patriotism  would 
involve.  What  Arnold  was  to  the  northern  expedition,  Lee  fore-prom 
ised  for  a  more  rational,  and  a  truly  legitimate  expedition  to  the 
southern  colonies,  when  they  were  afterwards  threatened  by  Clinton 
and  Parker. 

(This  digression  purposely  associates  with  two  prominent  early 
military  movements,  the  two  men  who  started  forth  at  the  outset  as 
meteoric  lights,  challenging  place  as  stars  of  the  first  magnitude,  and 
going  out  in  darkness. 

The  two  expeditions  to  Canada  only  anticipated  the  fate  of  their 
leaders.  Both  expeditions  are  associated  with  other  and  related 
operations  which  give  character  to  the  campaign  of  1776, — the  first  of 
the  war. 

The  facts  are  as  follows : 

Arnold  arrived  at  Cambridge,  and  immediately  proposed  to  the 
Committee  of  Safety,  that  he  should  be  sent  to  capture  Ticonderoga. 
He  was  promptly  commissioned  as  colonel,  was  supplied  with  money, 
powder,  lead,  and  ten  horses,  and  was  authorized  to  enlist  not  to 
exceed  four  hundred  men  for  the  enterprise.  Learning  that  a  sim 
ilar  expedition  had  already  started,  he  entrusted  his  recruiting  to 
parties  selected  for  the  purpose,  and  joined  the  other  enterprise  at 
Castleton,  its  place  of  rendezvous.  Here  he  found  Ethan  Allen  in 
command,  and  after  a  vain  effort  to  assert  authority  by  virtue  of  his 
commission,  he  followed  its  destinies  as  a  volunteer.  Upon  reaching 
the  head  of  Lake  Champlain,  it  was  found  that  boats  could  not  be 
procured  for  the  whole  force,  and  Allen,  who  took  the  lead  with  less 
than  ninety  men,  crossed  over  to  the  fort,  surprised  the  small  gar 
rison  by  night,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  tenth  day  of  May  took 
command  of  Ticonderoga.  Nearly  two  hundred  cannon  of  all  sorts 
were  included  among  the  trophies  of  the  capture.  The  original 
inventory  of  trophies  in  the  handwriting  of  Arnold,  is  now  in 
the  possession  of  Dr.  Thomas  Addis  Emmett,  of  New  York.  Seth 
Warner,  a  volunteer  at  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  afterwards  dis- 


120  THE    NORTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  [i77b 

tinguished  in  active  service,  was  associated  with  Allen  in  this  enter 
prise.  On  the  morning  of  the  twelfth  of  May,  Warner  embarked  a 
small  force  in  boats,  and  captured  the  fort  at  Crown  Point,  which  had 
been  left  with  only  a  nominal  garrison  to  protect  the  public  property. 

At  this  juncture,  Arnold  reasserted  his  right  to  command,  but  the 
colony  of  Massachusetts  recognized  the  prior  claims  of  Allen.  Hav 
ing  been  joined  by  fifty  recruits  whom  his  agents  had  enlisted,  he 
embarked  this  force  upon  a  schooner  belonging  to  Captain  Skene, 
placed  cannon  on  board,  and  captured  St.  John's  with  its  nominal 
garrison,  and  a  king's  sloop  then  lying  in  the  river  near  the  fort. 

Allen,  who  had  started  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  in  bateaux 
upon  the  same  errand,  was  outstripped  by  the  schooner,  and  met 
Arnold,  as  he  returned  from  the  conquest.  An  attempt  to  occupy 
St.  John's  permanently,  was  given  up  as  soon  as  advised  that  adequate 
forces  had  been  ordered  from  Canada  to  maintain  the  post. 

Arnold's  force  gradually  increased  to  one  hundred  and  fifty  men. 
With  these  he  manned  a  small  fleet,  and  assumed  command  of  this 
miniature  navy  as  well  as  of  Crown  Point.  Protests  against  his 
assumption  of  so  large  authority,  brought  a  committee  from  the  Con 
necticut  Provincial  Assembly ;  and  Massachusetts  decided  that  the 
conquest  belonged  to  Connecticut,  so  that  Arnold  was  not  rightfully  in 
command.  The  latter  colony  at  once  forwarded  four  hundred  men  to 
garrison  the  two  posts.  Arnold  discharged  his  men,  and  returned  to 
Cambridge,  highly  offended.  Before  leaving  Crown  Point  in  June,  he 
wrote  to  the  Continental  Congress  stating  that  General  Carleton's 
force  in  Canada  was  less  than  six  hundred  men,  asking  for  the  com 
mand  of  two  thousand  troops  for  the  capture  of  the  whole  of  Canada, 
and  assumed  responsibility  for  success.  He  had  formerly  traded  with 
citizens  of  Quebec,  was  familiar  with  the  city,  and  claimed  to  have 
assurance  of  hearty  support  if  he  could  have  a  small  nucleus  for  fur 
ther  operations.  On  the  second  day  of  June,  Allen  made  a  proposi 
tion  to  the  Provincial  Congress  of  New  York,  embodying  a  similar 
undertaking. 

Allen  and  Warner  also  visited  Congress,  and  requested  authority 
to  raise  new  regiments.  This  authority  was  not  given,  but  a  recom 
mendation  was  made  to  the  Provincial  Congress  of  New  York,  that 
the  "  Green  Mountain  boys,"  so  styled,  should  be  recognized  as  reg 
ular  forces,  with  the  privilege  of  electing  their  own  officers. 

A  formal  expedition  against  Montreal  was  also  authorized,  and 
Generals  Schuyler  and  Montgomery  were  assigned  to  its  command. 


I775-]  THE   NORTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  121 

The  force  to  be  employed  consisted  of  three  thousand  New  York  and 
New  England  troops,  which  were  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Ticon- 
deroga  during  the  month  of  August.  Allen  and  Warner  joined  this 
command. 

During  the  same  month  a  committee  from  Congress  visited  Cam 
bridge,  and  persuaded  General  Washington  to  send  a  second  army  to 
Canada,  via  the  Kennebec  river,  having  for  its  objective  the  capture 
of  Quebec.  Gardner,  a  town  on  the  Kennebec,  was  made  the  base 
of  departure  ;  and  skillful  carpenters  were  sent  forward  to  prepare  two 
hundred  bateaux  for  the  use  of  the  troops. 

Arnold  prominently  urged  the  movement,  earnestly  solicited,  and 
finally  received  the  command,  with  the  rank  of  colonel  in  the  Conti 
nental  army.  Ten  companies  of  New  England  troops  under  Lieu 
tenant-colonels  Enos  and  Christopher  Green,  and  Majors  Meigs  and 
Bigelow,  and  three  ^  companies  of  riflemen,  one  from  Virginia,  and 
two  from  Pennsylvania,  under  the  command  of  captain,  afterwards 
General  Daniel  Morgan,  composed  this  army  of  invasion.  The  aggre 
gate  force  was  eleven  hundred  men,  furnished  with  rations  for  forty- 
five  days.  Aaron  Burr,  then  but  nineteen  years  of  age,  accompanied 
the  expedition. 

NOTE. — The  following  condensed  statement  embodies  Mr.  Bancroft's  record: 
"The  great  deed  which,  in  the  meanwhile,  was  achieved  in  the  north,  began  in  Con 
necticut,  was  planned  by  her  sons,  and  executed  at  her  cost.  Col.  Samuel  H.  Parsons, 
on  his  way  to  Hartford,  crossed  Arnold,  bound  for  Massachusetts,  and  from  him  learned 
of  brass  cannon,  then  at  Ticonderoga.  On  the  27th  of  April,  he  advised  with  Samuel 
Wyllis  and  Silas  Deane,  and,  with  three  others,  planned  the  capture  of  the  fort.  On 
their  own  receipts,  they  obtained  money  from  the  public  treasury,  and  on  the  28th  set 
forward  with  Noah  Phelps  and  Bernard  Romans,  to  carry  forward  their  design.  Cap 
tain  Edward  Mott,  of  Preston,  was  made  chairman,  and,  with  five  associates,  proceeded 
on  his  mission.  The  men  were  to  be  raised  from  the  New  Hampshire  Grants,  to  pre 
vent  discovery  of  their  plans,  and  Ethan  Allen  was  encouraged  by  an  express  messenger 
to  hold  them  in  readiness."  Bancroft's  Hist.,  Ed.  1876,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  553-4.  Conn. 
Hist.  Col.,  Vol.  I,  163-188.  The  latter  volume  gives  the  reports  of  Mott,  Parsons,  and 
others  associated  in  the  undertaking,  with  the  bill  of  costs  paid  by  Connecticut. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

EXPEDITIONS  TO   QUEBEC   AND  MONTREAL.     THEIR  VALUE. 

ON  the  seventeenth  day  of  September,  1775,  Arnold's  command 
marched  from  Cambridge  to  Bedford  ;  sailed  from  Newburyport 
on  the  nineteenth,  and  on  the  twentieth,  entered  the  Kennebec  river, 
and  landed  at  Gardner,  Maine. 

A  small  scouting  party  was  sent  forward  to  blaze  the  trees,  and 
thus  mark  out  a  route  to  Lake  Megantic,  at  the  source  of  the  Chau- 
diere  river;  and  another  party  was  dispatched  to  Dead  river  to  select 
the  best  point  for  transferring  the  bateaux  from  the  Kennebec.  A 
glance  at  the  map,  "  Outline  of  the  Atlantic  coast,"  will  indicate  the 
route  pursued. 

Morgan's  corps  of  riflemen  was  assigned  to  the  advance,  and 
started  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  September.  The  rest  of  the  com 
mand  embraced  three  divisions,  which  marched  at  a  day's  interval 
between  them,  each  having  charge  of  its  own  support.  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Enos  with  three  companies  commanded  the  rear  division. 

The  progress  of  the  army  was  impeded  by  a  swift  current,  and 
from  the  third  day  it  became  necessary  for  men  to  wade  in  deep 
water  and  force  the  boats  along  by  main  strength.  Upon  reaching 
Norridgewock  Falls,  the  real  difficulties  of  the  march  began.  Seven 
days  were  consumed  in  carrying  the  boats  and  provisions  around  the 
falls,  a  distance  of  only  a  mile  and  a  half.  Precipitous  rocks  bounded 
the  river  on  either  side,  and  the  transfer  was  not  completed  without 
injury  to  boats  as  well  as  provisions.  The  swift  current  of  the  river 
was  confined  within  closer  banks  as  they  advanced  :  the  eddies  and 
exposed  rocks  rendered  it  necessary  almost  daily  to  drag  or  carry  the 
boats  along  the  shore,  and  on  the  tenth  of  October,  when  the  army 
reached  the  divide  between  the  Kennebec  and  Dead  rivers,  it  was 
found  that  the  force  had  been  reduced  by  desertion  and  sickness  to 
nine  hundred  and  fifty  effective  men. 


I775-J  EXPEDITIONS  TO   QUEBEC  AND   MONTREAL.  133 

On  the  thirteenth  of  October,  Arnold  wrote  to  the  commander  of 
the  expedition  from  Ticonderoga,  giving  his  plans,  and  also  sent  an 
Indian  messenger  to  his  correspondents  at  Quebec,  with  report  of 
his  purpose  and  progress.  This  messenger  betrayed  his  trust. 

The  march  of  fifteen  miles  across  to  Dead  river  was  one  of  severe 
trial.  Three  shallow  ponds  which  were  choked  with  fallen  trees, 
many  ravines,  quagmires,  and  swamps,  lay  in  the  way  ;  the  mud  was 
often  knee  deep, — the  water  was  up  to  the  arm-pits ;  and  even  when 
oxen  were  used  for  hauling,  the  men  were  required  to  render  aid 
and  extricate  the  loaded  boats  from  the  mire. 

October  fifteenth,  the  boats  were  launched  into  Dead  river,  a  com 
paratively  still  stream,  but  broken  by  shallows,  falls,  and  ripples,  so 
that  in  a  distance  of  eighty-three  miles,  the  boats  had  to  be  carried 
seventeen  times,  with  constant  loss  of  supplies  and  injury  to  the  boats. 
Men  deserted  daily,  some  froze  to  death,  others  who  were  sick  were 
left  behind  in  charge  of  one  or  two  convalescents,  and  still  the  army 
moved  on. 

October  twenty-second,  rain  fell  in  torrents. 

October  twenty-third,  continued  rain  raised  the  river  nearly  eight 
feet — seven  boats  were  overturned  and  their  contents  lost.  Rations 
for  only  twelve  days  remained  on  hand,  and  the  army  was  still  thirty 
miles  from  Lake  Megantic. 

A  council  of  war  was  held.  Orders  were  sent  to  Lieutenant-colo 
nels  Green  and  Enos  to  forward  every  able  bodied  man  for  whom 
rations  for  fifteen  days  could  be  made  up,  and  to  send  all  others  back 
to  Norridgewock  Falls.  Enos,  short  of  provisions,  as  he  afterwards 
claimed,  marched  his  division  of  three  companies  back  to  Cambridge. 

Suddenly  rain  changed  to  snow!  The  ponds  froze  over,  and  the 
ice  had  to  be  broken  with  the  butts  of  muskets  to  effect  a  passage  for 
the  boats. 

The  barges  had  been  hauled  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles,  and 
had  been  carried  forty  miles.  The  men  began  to  go  without  shoes. 
Clothing  was  in  rags  ;  their  limbs  were  torn  by  briars  ;  provisions 
became  scarce  ;  their  dogs  were  eaten  for  food  as  well  as  all  their  cat 
tle  ;  fish,  plants,  and  roots  made  up  their  chief  diet.  Blankets  not 
worn  out,  were  continually  wet  or  frozen,  and  hemlock  boughs  sup 
plied  the  demand  for  shelter  and  bedding.  Marvellous  was  the 
endurance  of  those  men  ;  and  as  if  in  his  element,  Arnold's  courage 
never  abated,  his  confidence  in  success  never  failed  him.  It  was 
indeed  a  great  ordeal,  but  a  great  triumph  would  compensate  for  the 


'• 


124  EXPEDITIONS   TO   QUEBEC  AND   MONTREAL.  [1775. 

suffering,  if  it  only  secured  the  surprise  of  Quebec  and  the  conquest 
of  Canada. 

For  three  days  the  army  rested  near  Mount  Bigelow.  A  quaint 
tradition  is  cited  by  Lossing,  which  asserts,  "  that  this  officer  whose 
name  is  still  identified  with  the  mountain,  visited  its  top  to  behold  the 
towers  of  Quebec." 

Lake  Megantic  was  reached,  and  another  inventory  of  supplies  was 
taken.  Less  than  three  days'  rations  remained.  Starvation  seemed 
to  be  the  inevitable  destiny  of  the  entire  command. 

October  twenty-seventh,  Arnold  started  with  five  boats,  some 
dug-out  canoes,  and  less  than  seventy  men,  to  seek  the  nearest  French 
settlements  for  the  purchase  of  provisions.  The  government  had  fur 
nished  him  with  a  thousand  dollars  before  his  departure,  so  that  he 
felt  confident  of  success  among  the-  French  provincials.  The  Chau- 
diere  river  flowed  with  impetuous  velocity,  three  of  the  boats  were 
dashed  in  pieces  upon  rocks,  and  the  party  were  in  the  utmost  peril. 

October  thirtieth,  they  reached  Sertigan,  seventy  miles  from  Lake 
Megantic,  were  kindly  received,  purchased  flour  and  cattle,  and  sent 
them  back  to  the  army  in  charge  of  some  Canadians  and  Indians.  In 
a  few  days,  the  troops,  having  lost  all  their  boats,  gathered  by  small 
detachments  at  Sertigan,  and  the  army,  reunited,  was  within  twenty- 
five  miles  of  Quebec.  For  thirty-two  days  of  that  march,  no  human 
being  had  been  met  with  in  the  wilderness,  and  the  trail  made  by 
the  troops  was  obliterated  as  soon  as  made.  Retreat  had  become 
worse  than  to  advance. 

November  ninth,  the  remnants  of  the  expedition  reached  Point 
Levi,  opposite  Quebec,  and  there  established  their  base  of  operations 
for  the  conquest  of  Canada.  But  the  garrison  of  Quebec,  small  as  it 
was,  had  been  forewarned ;  the  outworks  were  undergoing  repair,  and 
all  boats  had  been  removed  to  the  other  side  of  the  river.  An  imme 
diate  advance  just  at  that  time,  might  have  secured  the  capture  of  the 
city.  The  garrison,  or  such  officers  as  had  been  entrusted  with  the 
news  of  Arnold's  expedition,  had  no  faith  in  his  ability  to  complete 
his  march,  and  the  people  were  so  apprehensive  that  resistance  would 
involve  the  ruin  of  the  city,  that  the  opportunity  was  ripe  for  an  im 
mediate  and  bold  assault.  But  Arnold  had  to  build,  capture,  or  pur 
chase  boats  before  he  could  advance  to  conquest.  His  resolution  was 
still  equal  to  the  emergency,  and  the  men  were 'put  at  work. 

As  if  to  test  his  endurance  to  the  utmost,  a  furious  tempest  of 
wind,  rain,  and  sleet  set  in,  and  the  army  was  again  in  peril.  He 


I775-]  EXPEDITIONS  TO   QUEBEC  AND   MONTREAL.  125 

might  overcome  the  terrors  of  the  wilderness,  but  the  tempest  was 
his  master ! 

The  expedition  to  Montreal  was  being  organized  at  Ticonderoga, 
when  the  attention  of  the  reader  was  invited  to  Arnold's  journey 
through  the  wilderness. 

General  Schuyler's  ill  health  greatly  retarded  operations,  and  he 
soon  found  that  the  strength  of  the  army  which  was  hastily  gathering 
at  that  post  was  only  in  mere  numbers  and  the  physical  capacity  of 
individual  men.  There  was  no  discipline,  no  respect  for  officers,  but 
a  perfect  independence  of  thought,  judgment,  and  action,  with  no 
time  for  proper  preparation  and  instruction.  Unless  the  advance 
could  be  nearly  simultaneous  with  that  of  Arnold,  both  expeditions 
would  lose  the  objective  in  view. 

It  is  just  here  that  some  attention  may  be  given  to  the  theory 
which  led  General  Washington  to  authorize  these  demonstrations 
against  Canada. 

He  believed  that  the  occupation  of  Montreal  and  Quebec,  while 
they  were  almost  destitute  of  regular  troops,  and  the  season  of  the 
year  precluded  reinforcements  from  England,  would  afford  the  best 
opportunity  for  testing  the  people  of  Canada,  and  would  also  furnish 
them  a  basis  for  the  assertion  of  independence,  if  they  were  ripe  in  sen 
timent  for  such  a  movement.  His  well-conceived  circular  addresses 
which  were  largely  distributed,  as  well  as  the  policy  which  he  enjoined 
upon  the  officers  and  men  of  both  expeditions,  were  eminently  wise 
and  inspiring.  He  judged  the  Canadian  opponents  of  British  policy 
by  the  expression  of  feeling  which  pervaded  the  colonies,  and  assumed 
that  very  many  would  gladly  avail  themselves  of  the  opportunity 
which  the  presence  of  colonial  troops  would  afford  for  throwing  off  the 
yoke  of  the  mother  country.  It  seemed  clear  that  General  Carleton, 
having  no  fears  for  Quebec,  would  concentrate  at  Montreal  all  effect 
ive  forces  for  the  recovery  of  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point.  Upon 
the  supposition  that  Carleton's  troops  did  not  exceed  seven  or  eight 
hundred  regulars,  and  as  many  provincials,  he  decided  that  an  army 
of  three  thousand  men  would  be  adequate  for  operations  from  Lake 
Champlain  to  Montreal.  This  estimate  was  a  correct  one.  Popular 
demonstrations  had  indeed  been  made  in  the  portion  of  Canada  lying 
south  from  Montreal,  which  indicated  sympathy  with  the  American 
movement.  This  expression  of  feeling,  however,  was  rather  for  the 


126  EXPEDITIONS   TO   QUEBEC  AND   MONTREAL.  [1775 

purpose  of  keeping  on  friendly  terms  with  the  American  troops  who 
threatened  the  border,  than  to  indicate  their  readiness  to  take  up 
arms  for  themselves  as  a  people. 

Arnold  had  freely  declared  his  opinions,  and  claimed  to  have  pos 
itive  knowledge,  that  the  provincials  desired  to  act  in  full  concert  with 
the  (American  forces.  The  occupation  of  Montreal  was  therefore 
regarded  as  both  practicable  and  wise  ;  and  it  was  near  enough  to  the 
Sorel  river  and  Lake  Champlain  to  be  well  supported,  so  long  as  the 
British  army  was  not  augmented  along  the  Atlantic  coast. 

There  was  still  another  consideration.  The  navigable  waters  of 
the  St.  Lawrence  exposed  Montreal,  which  was  on  the  north  side  of 
the  river,  to  naval  attack  ;  and  the  strategical  character  of  Quebec  was 
so  positive,  as  to  make  the  occupation  of  any  part  of  Canada  very 
hazardous,  so  long  as  that  fortress  was  left  for  a  base  and  rendezvous 
of  British  armies  and  fleets.  Thus  the  capture  of  Quebec,  as  well  as 
of  Montreal,  was  necessary  to  any  substantial  control  of  Canada  itself. 
The  concurrence  of  Washington  in  the  proposed  expedition  of  Arnold, 
was  therefore  predicated  upon  the  possibility  of  striking  quickly,  and 
by  surprise,  before  a  substantial  defense  could  be  interposed,  and  did 
not  provide  for  the  contingency  of  a  formal  siege.  No  artillery  was 
furnished,  because  not  within  the  scope  of  the  proposed  duty,  and  its 
transportation  would  have  been  impossible. 

Upon  the  assumption  that  Congress  was  rightly  advised  of  the  sen 
timents  of  the  Canadian  people,  the  expedition  was  rightly  planned. 
As  a  matter  of  history,  its  signal  failure  repressed  the  public  avowal 
of  Canadian  sympathy  with  the  American  Revolution,  and  demon 
strated  the  bad  policy  of  attempting  such  distant  enterprises  as  were 
not  essential  to  colonial  defense  proper. 

Still  another  element  entered  into  the  calculations  of  the  Amert- 
can  Congress  and  affected  its  action.  That  body  early  in  June,  dis 
claimed  all  purpose  to  operate  against  Canada. 

Bancroft  states,  that  the  invasion  of  Canada  was  not  determined 
upon  until  "  the  proclamation  of  martial  law  by  the  British  governor, 
his  denunciation  of  the  American  borderers,  and  the  incitement  of 
savages  to  raids  against  New  England  and  New  York,  had  made  that 
invasion  a  substantial  act  of  self-defense." 

The  letters  of  Washington  to  Schuyler,  Arnold,  Wooster,  Mont 
gomery,  and  to  Congress,  show  clearly  that  he  estimated  the  difficul- 


I775-J  EXPEDITIONS   TO   QUEBEC  AND   MONTREAL.  12? 

ties  that  attended  both  expeditions,  and  the  contingencies  which 
awaited  their  execution. 

Washington  wrote  earnestly  on  the  fifth  of  October,  "  that  if  Carle- 
ton  is  not  driven  from  St.  John's,  so  as  to  be  obliged  to  throw  him 
self  into  Quebec,  it  must  fall  into  our  hands,  as  it  is  left  without  a 
regulai^bldier,  as  the  captain  of  a  brig  from  Quebec  to  Boston  says. 
Many  of  the  inhabitants  are  most  favorably  disposed  to  the  American 
cause,  and  that  there  is  there  the  largest  stock  of  ammunition  ever 
collected  in  America." 

A  second  letter  of  the  same  date  states  that  "  Arnold  expected  to 
reach  Quebec  in  twenty  days  from  September  twenty-sixth,  and  that 
Montgomery  must  keep  up  such  appearances  as  to  fix  Carleton,  and 
prevent  the  force  of  Canada  from  being  turned  on  Arnold,"  but,  "  if 
penetration  into  Canada  be  given  up,  Arnold  must  also  know  it  in 
time  for  retreat."  And  again,  "  This  detachment,"  Arnold's,  "  was 
to  take  possession  of  Quebec  if  possible ;  but  at  any  rate  to  make  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  General  Schuyler." 

The  narrative  will  now  follow  the  second  expedition  in  its  course. 

In  spite  of  bad  health,  Schuyler  worked  vigorously  to  hasten  the 
organization  of  his  army. 

The  Green  Mountain  boys  reorganized  on  the  twenty-seventh  of 
July,  and  elected  the  gallant  Seth  Warner  as  their  lieutenant-colonel, 
in  place  of  Ethan  Allen.  Boats  were  built  with  great  rapidity,  and 
yet,  as  late  as  the  sixth  day  of  August,  the  maximum  force  that  was 
willing  to  cross  the  border  did  not  exceed  twelve  hundred  men,  and 
the  supply  of  powder  was  insufficient  even  for  these.  Washington 
then  wrote  to  Schuyler :  "  In  the  article  of  powder  we  are  in  danger 
of  suffering  equally  with  you." 

Meanwhile,  Major  John  Brown,  a  discreet  and  brave  officer,  had 
been  sent  to  Canada  to  learn  the  condition  and  disposition  of  the 
British  troops.  On  his  return  about  the  middle  of  August,  he  reported 
the  number  of  regulars  in  Canada  to  be  about  seven  hundred  men  ; 
that  nearly  half  this  number  was  at  St.  John's,  and  that  the  Canadian 
militia  were  disaffected  towards  their  officers,  who  had  been  purposely 
selected  from  the  old  French  nobility  of  the  frontier. 

On  the  seventeenth  day  of  August,  Montgomery  arrived  at 
Ticonderoga. 

Upon  receiving  a  letter  from  Washington  that  "  not  a  moment  of 
time  was  to  be  lost,"  Schuyler  suspended  his  negotiations  with  cer- 


128  EXPEDITIONS   TO   QUEBEC  AND   MONTREAL  [1775. 

tain  Indian  tribes  whom  he  had  met  in  council  at  Albany,  and  joined 
the  army.  The  first  objective  point  of  importance  was  the  reduction 
of  St.  John's,  already  well  garrisoned,  and  greatly  strengthened  since 
the  visit  of  Arnold  in  the  spring. 

/  -  Montgomery  started  with  a  little  more  than  a  thousand  men,  but 
was  so  retarded  by  storms  as  not  to  reach  Isle  La  Motte  until  Sep 
tember  third.  On  the  fourth  Schuyler  joined  him,  and  they  advanced 
to  Isle  Aux  Noix.  On  the  sixth  they  embarked  for  St.  John's.  The 
enterprise,  undertaken  without  artillery,  failed,  as  did  a  second  attempt 
of  a  similar  force  on  the  tenth. 

Schuyler's  ill  health  compelled  his  return  to  Ticonderoga,  but  with 
infinite  resolution,  system,  and  patience,  he  pushed  forward  supplies  to 
Montgomery,  who  assumed  the  active  command  with  a  force  aug 
mented  to  about  two  thousand  men.  Week  after  week  passed  by, 
and  little  progress  was  made  in  the  reduction  of  the  fort.  The  diffi 
culties  of  his  position  were  mainly  those  of  discipline.  All  wanted  a 
voice,  and  few  recognized  the  fact  that  in  a  regiment  of  five  hundred 
men,  there  could  not  be  five  hundred  colonels.  The  single  question 
of  the  location  of  a  battery  was  made  to  hinge  upon  what  the  men, 
not  the  commander,  deemed  best.  An  unauthorized  and  unfortunate 
enterprise  occurred  just  at  this  moment,  still  more  to  embarrass  the 
army. 

Ethan  Allen  was  endeavoring  to  recruit  Canadian  volunteers  near 
Chambly.  After  partial  success,  and  without  consulting  Montgom 
ery,  he  resolved  to  surprise  Montreal  as  he  had  captured  Ticonderoga. 
He  failed,  was  taken  prisoner  by  General  Prescott  and  sent  to  Eng 
land.  His  hasty  enterprise,  undertaken  with  inadequate  forces,  com 
promised  many  Canadians,  and  repelled  others  who  had  been  ready 
to  join  his  command. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  October,  General  Washington  wrote  to 
Schuyler  the  following  consolatory  words :  "  Colonel  Allen's  misfor 
tune  will,  I  hope,  teach  a  lesson  of  prudence  and  subordination  to 
others  who  may  be  too  ambitious  to  outshine  their  general  officers, 
and  regardless  of  order  and  duty,  rush  into  enterprises  which  have 
unfavorable  effects  on  the  public,  and  are  destructive  to  themselves." 
Justice  to  Allen  requires  the  statement  that  Major  Brown  had 
pledged  his  aid  in  the  enterprise,  and  to  furnish  two  hundred  men 
Brown  had  assured  him  that  Montreal  was  practically  defenseless 
Allen  crossed  the  St.  Lawrence  from  Longuenil,  September  twenty- 
fourth,  upon  the  supposition  that  Brown  had  crossed  the  river  higher 


I775-]  EXPEDITIONS   TO   QUEBEC  AND    MONTREAL.  129 

up,  and  was  waiting  for  his  arrival.  Major  Brown  must  have  known 
that  such  an  enterprise  needed  Montgomery's  sanction,  and  was 
unwise  ;  but  his  failure  to  support  Allen,  compelled  the  latter  to  fight 
against  overwhelming  numbers.  General  Carleton  also  collected 
nearly  a  thousand  Provincial  militia,  but  their  desertion  was  so  imme 
diate  that  he  was  soon  left  with(only  a  nominal  command  of  less  than 
three  hundred  men.  At  this  juncture  he  wrote  to  General  Howe 
that  u  the  Americans  had  poisoned  the  minds  of  the  Canadians." 

On  the  eighteenth  day  of  October,  Major  Brown,  aided  by  many 
citizens,  then  organized  as  a  battalion  under  James  Livingston  of  New 
York,  who  had  resided  at  Chambly,  and  was  very  popular  with  the 
people,  captured  the  fort  at  that  place,  sent  the  prisoners  to  Connecti 
cut,  and  turned  over  to  the  American  army  the  trophies,  which 
included  nineteen  cannon,  and  most  valuable  of  all,  one  hundred  and 
twenty  barrels  (six  tons)  of  powder. 

General  Wooster  arrived  just  at  this  time,  approved  of  Mont 
gomery's  general  plans,  aided  him  to  advance  his  batteries  to  a  com 
manding  position,  and  thereby  made  the  investment  of  St.  John's 
complete.  The  garrison  had  no  hope  except  from  Canada. 

General  Carleton  had  by  this  time  again  collected  a  mixed  and 
unreliable  force  of  nearly  eight  hundred  men,  and  made  an  attempt 
to  cross  the  St.  Lawrence  at  Montreal,  but  was  thrust  back  by  War 
ner's  Green  Mountain  boys,  and  a  portion  of  the  second  New  York 
regiment.  On  the  third  day  of  November  the  garrison  of  St.  John's, 
consisting  of  nearly  five  hundred  regulars,  more  than  half  the  British 
regular  force  then  in  Canada,  and  a  hundred  Canadians,  became 
prisoners  of  war,  among  them  Andre, — and  this  siege  of  fifty  days 
ended. 

As  an  evidence  of  the  peculiar  state  of  the  regiments  at  that  time, 
it  is  to  be  noticed  that  one  of  them  mutinied  because  Montgomery 
allowed  the  prisoners  to  retain  their  extra  suit  of  clothing,  instead  of 
treating  it  as  plunder. 

On  the  twelfth  of  November,  Montgomery  took  possession  of 
Montreal,  and  the  expedition  of  the  left  zone  of  operations  attained 
its  objective. 

The  British  flotilla  was  also  captured,  together  with  General  Pres- 
cott,  the  captor  of  Allen,  but  General  Carleton  escaped  under  very 
favoring  circumstances,  and  thus  was  enabled  to  participate  in  the 
defense  of  Quebec. 
9 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE   ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBEC. 

"  'TT^HE  drums  beat  to  arms,  and  the  city  was  thoroughly  aroused 

It  was  hardly  daylight  on  the  morning  of  November  ninth, 
1775,  when  Arnold's  men  appeared  upon  the  river  shore,  just  opposite 
the  citadel  of  Quebec.  His  daring  spirit  was  moved  to  an  immediate 
advance.  ^That  instant  of  time  was  one  of  those  which  contain  vast 
possibilities,  and  Arnold  was  a  man  peculiarly  prompt  to  seize  oppor 
tunities  for  daring  adventure. 

He  resolved  to  cross  at  all  hazards,  with  numbers  however  small, 
if  canoes  or  any  other  floating  fabric  could  be  applied  to  the  move 
ment  of  men  ;  but  it  was  just  then,  as  already  stated,  that  the  Storm 
King  held  mastery  by  day  and  by  night  for  three  successive  days,  and 
even  Arnold  must  obey  and  wait. 

During  this  interval  there  occurred  substantial  changes  in  the 
character  and  condition  of  the  garrison  of  Quebec. 

Colonel  Allen  McLean,  who  had  been  operating  with  General 
Carleton  in  the  western  zone,  had  abandoned  it  upon  the  successful 
advancement  of  Montgomery's  army  to  Montreal,  and  retreated  in 
safety  to  Quebec,  reaching  that  fortress  with  one  hundred  and  seventy 
"  Royal  Scotch,"  on  the  twelfth  day  of  November. 

On  the  fifth,  one  hundred  carpenters  arrived  from  Newfound 
land.  The  deputy-governor,  Cramahe,  had  in  fact  commenced  to 
repair  the  defenses  as  early  as  September,  and  the  arrival  of  Arnold 
was  at  the  last  moment  of  possible  success.  Two  vessels  of  war,  the 
Lizard  and  the  Hunter,  lay  in  the  harbor,  and  the  crews  of  merchant 
vessels  were  also  impressed  into  the  service. 

Arnold,  unapprised  of  the  reinforcement  of  the  garrison,  took 
advantage  of  his  enforced  delay,  and  secured  thirty  birch-bark  canoes 
for  the  use  of  his  troops.  On  the  night  of  the  thirteenth  of  Novem- 


I775-J  THE   ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBEC.  13  / 

her,  by  making  three  trips  for  the  purpose,  he  crossed  the  river  with 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  men.  Daylight  revealed  his  movements,  and 
prevented  his  return  to  Point  Levi  for  the  last  detachment  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  all  the  ladders  which  had  been  prepared 
for  storming  purposes. 

The  landing  had  been  made  at  Wolfe's  cove,  a  deep  notch  in  the 
bank  up  the  river  just  below  Sillery,  and  indelibly  associated  with  the 
name  of  that  brave  soldier  who  captured  Quebec  in  1759.  Was  the 
name  suggestive  ?  That  was  indeed  a  little  army  which  Arnold  was 
about  to  hurl  against  the  parapets,  where  Wolfe  "  died  happy'  in  victory. 

They  climbed  the  steep  ascent  undisturbed,  took  their  position 
about  half  a  mile  in  front  of  St.  Ursula  bastion,  between  the  gates  of 
St.  John  and  St.  Louis,  aroused  the  garrison  by  loud  huzzahs,  and  sent 
forward  a  formal  flag  with  the  demand  for  immediate  surrender. 

-  At  that  very  moment,  the  army  of  Arnold  was  but  poorly  pre 
pared  for  meeting  an  enemy.  Over  one  hundred  of  their  muskets 
were  unserviceable,  many  cartridges  were  ruined,  and  much  powder 
was  spoiled.  A  careful  inspection  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  sound 
ammunition  only  averaged  five  rounds  per  man. 

The  flag  elicited  no  reply ;  and  a  second  flag,  accompanied  by 
threats  of  terrible  things  unless  the  surrender  should  be  immediate 
and  complete,  was  fired  upon. 

It  was  entirely  unnecessary  for  McLean's  Royal  Scotch  to  make  a 
sortie  upon  the  American  army.  Their  steadfast  hold  upon  the  city, 
not  only  repressed  any  efforts  of  disaffected  citizens  to  open  the  gates 
to  that  army  ;  but  was  a  warning  to  Arnold  that  his  victory  must  be 
won  by  storming  the  fortress  itself. 

It  is  historically  true,  that  Morgan,  Febiger  and  other  officers  of 
equal  merit,  painfully  realized  the  contrast  with  those  expectations 
which  had  inspired  their  departure  from  Cambridge,  and  had  sustained 
them  in  the  perils  of  the  wilderness. 

Arnold  now  learned,  for  the  first  time,  of  the  re-inforcements 
which  had  reached  Quebec ;  and  was  also  advised,  by  personal 
acquaintances,  that  a  sortie  from  the  city  would  soon  be  made,  and 
that  general  Carleton  had  escaped  from  Montreal  and  was  on  his  way 
to  the  city. 

For  two  or  three  days  the  formalities  of  a  blockading  force  were 
kept  up,  guards  were  posted  upon  the  roads  leading  to  Lorette,  St. 
Foy  and  Three  Rivers,  thus  cutting  off  all  country  supplies  of  wood 
or  meat  which  were  intended  for  the  garrison  ;  but  on  the  nineteenth 


132  THE  ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBEC.  [1775 

Arnold  retired  to  Point  Aux  Trembles,  to  await  the  arrival  of 
Montgomery. 

On  that  very  day,  Washington  sent  a  communication  to  Congress 
in  which  the  following  words  occur : 

"  It  is  likely  that  General  Carleton  will,  with  what  force  he  can 
collect,  after  the  surrender  of  the  rest  of  Canada,  throw  himself  into 
Quebec,  and  there  make  his  last  effort." 

Carleton  was  at  Aux  Trembles  in  the  morning,  barely  missed 
Arnold,  and  entered  Quebec  during  the  afternoon  of  the  nineteenth. 
His  first  official  act  was  to  require  all  persons  who  refused  to  aid 
in  defense  of  the  city,  to  leave  it  within  four  days.  Upon  removal 
of  these  dangerous  elements,  his  available  force  consisted  of  at  least 
three  hundred  regulars,  three  hundred  and  thirty  Anglo-Canadian 
militia,  five  hundred  and  forty-three  French  Canadians,  four  hundred 
and  eighty-five  seamen  and  marines,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty 
artificers,  fit  for  duty. 

The  sole  dependence  of  Arnold  was  now  upon  Montgomery,  and 
he  sent  Captain  Ogden  with  an  urgent  request,  that  he  would  come 
to  his  aid  with  artillery  and  at  least  two  thousand  men. 

That  officer  had  indeed  occupied  Montreal,  which  was  an  open 
city,  but  by  reason  of  the  expiration  of  terms  of  enlistments  and  the 
unwillingness  of  the  troops  to  serve  any  longer,  so  far  from  home,  he 
was  left  with  only  about  eight  hundred  men  as  the  month  of  Novem 
ber  drew  to  its  close.  Even  the  Green  Mountain  boys  had  returned 
home,  greatly  to  his  disgust.  The  loss  in  numbers,  however,  did  not 
represent  the  real  state  of  his  army.  Officers  and  men  were  alike 
fractious,  dictatorial  and  self-willed.  They  claimed  the  right  to  do 
just  as  they  pleased,  and  to  obey  such  orders  only  as  their  judgment 
approved. 

General  Schuyler's  letter  books,  and  orderly  book,  and  the  letters 
of  Montgomery  written  during  that  campaign,  are  very  extraordinary 
exhibitions  of  the  characters  of  the  two  men,  of  their  appreciation  of 
the  issues  of  the  day,  and  of  their  wise  and  unremitting  efforts  to 
secure  an  exact  and  thorough  army  discipline.  The  aspiration  for 
national  liberty  had  evoked  a  sense  of  personal  liberty,  which  was 
eminently  destructive  of  all  real  liberty. 

The  American  army  at  Montreal,  at  Ticonderoga  and  at  Cam 
bridge,  was  so  intractable  and  so  short-sighted,  as  very  nearly  to  fulfill 
Milton's  apothegm,  "  License  they  mean,  when  they  cry  Liberty !  " 

The  effort  of  Montgomery  to  provide  humanely  for  prisoners  of 


THE  ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBEC.  133 

war,  was  not  only  treated  with  contempt,  but  was  made  the  excuse 
for  insubordination  and  outrage.  On  one  occasion  he  tendered  his 
resignation  ;  but  canceled  it  when  due  apology  was  made.  Schuyler 
had  trouble  in  the  same  direction,  and  officers  refused  to  take  clothing 
and  food  to  suffering  prisoners  until  he  made  his  authority  stringent. 

Another  difficulty  grew  out  of  the  refusal  of  troops  to  serve  under 
generals  from  other  colonies  than  their  own.  Colonies  had  their  dis 
tinctive  military  codes,  which  limited  the  obligation  of  the  men.  To 
serve  in  the  continental  army  involved  some  abnegation  of  self,  and 
the  surrender  of  the  individual  will  to  that  of  authority. 

Montgomery  could  not,  at  that  time,  go  to  the  support  of  Arnold, 
without  leaving  a  competent  officer  in  command.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
armies  at  Ticonderoga  and  Montreal  were  about  to  melt  away  entire 
ly ;  and  both  generals  were  ready  to  retire  from  the  service,  when 
Washington  addressed  them  a  letter,  quite  characteristic  of  himself 
and  of  the  crisis. 

"  God  knows,"  wrote  Washington,  a  there  is  not  a  difficulty  that 
you  both  (Schuyler  and  Montgomery)  complain  of,  which  I  have  not, 
in  an  eminent  degree,  experienced,  that  I  am  not  every  day  experi 
encing ;  but  we  must  bear  up  against  them  and  make  the  best  of 
mankind  as  they  are,  since  we  cannot  have  them  as  we  wish.  Let 
me  therefore  conjure  you  and  Mr.  Montgomery  to  lay  aside  such 
thoughts  (of  leaving  the  service)  ;  thoughts  injurious  to  yourselves  and 
extremely  so  to  your  country,  which  calls  aloud  for  gentlemen  of  your 
abilities." 

Late  in  November,  General  Wooster  arrived  at  Montreal.  With 
a  patriotism  characteristic  of  the  man,  and  especially  complimented 
by  Washington,  this  officer  waived  his  rank  in  the  Connecticut  army, 
and  accepted  continental  assignment,  which  was  below  that  of  Mont 
gomery  by  one  day's  date  of  commission.  He  took  command  of  the 
Montreal  district,  and  Montgomery  with  about  three  hundred  men 
and  a  few  pieces  of  artillery,  started  for  the  relief  of  Arnold  and  the 
capture  of  Quebec.  A  sufficient  supply  of  clothing  which  had  been 
captured  upon  the  first  occupation  of  the  city,  was  taken  on  board  the 
vessels  for  Arnold's  command. 

Montgomery  landed  at  Point  Aux  Trembles,  on  or  about  the  first 
day  of  December,  and  swelled  the  combined  army  to  a  force  of  nearly 
one  thousand  men.  This  included  the  detachment  originally  left  at 
Point  Levi,  which  had  subsequently  crossed  the  river  with  safety. 

The  strongest  fortress  in  America  defended  by  two  hundred  heavy 


134  THE  ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBEC.  [1775- 

cannon,  and  a  garrison  of  nearly  or  quite  two  thousand  effective  men, 
was  to  be  subjected  to  the  assaults  of  this  handful  of  men. 

The  advance  was  made  during  a  driving  snow  storm,  through  drifts 
ten  feet  high  ;  and  yet  the  army  was  quartered  in  houses  of  the  suburb 
of  St.  Roche,  on  the  Charles  river,  before  dark,  December  fifth. 

December  sixth,  Montgomery  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  city. 
This  communication  eliciting  no  response,  another  was  sent.  This 
contained  exaggerated  statements  of  his  force,  and  threatened  dire 
results,  if  resistance  should  be  prolonged.  No  reply  was  made. 

December  ninth,  a  battery  of  six  small  guns  and  two  mortars  was 
established  about  seven  hundred  yards  from  St.  John's  gate.  The 
ground  was  too  hard  for  earthworks,  and  snow  with  water  poured 
over  it  and  frozen,  supplied  the  filling,  which  with  gabions  and  fas 
cines  was  made  to  answer  for  cover  to  the  battery.  The  small  caliber 
of  the  guns((rendered  them  useless,  and  on  the  sixteenth  of  December 
it  was  determined  to  resort  to  assault,  as  the  only  means  of  gaining 
access  to  Quebec. 

At  this  juncture,  three  of  Arnold's  captains  refused  to  serve  under 
him  any  longer.  Their  time  of  service  would  expire  at  the  end  of  the 
month,  and  there  was  every  indication  that  open  mutiny  would  re 
place  the  harmony  which  had  thus  far  prevailed.  An  earnest  appeal 
from  Montgomery  restored  them  to  duty. 

The  weather  had  become  so  cold  that  men  could  not  handle  their 
arms  except  for  a  few  minutes  at  a  time,  and  the  month  was  drawing 
to  its  end.  On  Christmas,  the  officers  held  a  council,  and  resolved  to 
make  an  assault  as  soon  as  the  weather  would  permit.  The  next 
night  was  one  of  intense  cold  even  for  that  latitude,  and  great  suffer 
ing  ensued.  Succeeding  moderation  of  temperature  induced  imme 
diate  preparation  for  offensive  action  ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  night 
of  the  thirtieth,  when  but  one  day  of  legal  service  remained  for  a 
large  portion  of  the  troops, that  the  preparations  were  complete. 

The  army  was  divided  into  four  divisions.  The  Canadians  about 
two  hundred  in  number,  under  Colonel  Livingston,  of  Chambly,  and 
Major  Brown  with  his  own  companies,  were  to  demonstrate  in  front 
of  St.  John  and  St.  Louis  gates,  and  at  Cape  Diamond  bastion,  while 
Montgomery  and  Arnold  were  to  make  bona  fide  attacks  through  the 
lower  town.  The  signal  for  these  attacks  was  to  be  a  discharge  of 
rockets  at  Cape  Diamond. 

Montgomery  commanded  the  New  York  militia  and  a  part  of  the 
Eastern.  He  was  to  advance  from  the  south  and  west,  directly 


I775-J  THE  ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBEC.  135 

under  Cape  Diamond,  while  Arnold  from  the  north  and  west,  with 
Lamb's  artillery,  Morgan's  riflemen,  and  other  troops,  was  expected  to 
pass  along  the  head  of  the  stone  jetty,  and  meet  Montgomery  at 
Mountain  street,  when  an  attempt  would  be  made  upon  the  city  by 
the  rear,  at  Prescott  gate. 

Montgomery  moved  his  men  to  Wolfe's  cove,  and  at  least  two 
miles  up  the  river,  and  then  followed  the  narrow  passage  which  is  left 
between  Cape  Diamond  and  the  river.  His  course  was  almost  directly 
north-east,  and  in  the  face  of  drifting  snow,  which  soon  changed  to  fine 
hail,  rendering  it  impossible  to  recognize  his  men  at  the  distance  of  a 
few  feet,  and  equally  impossible  to  communicate  orders  except  by 
messengers.  Men's  breathing  soon  covered  the  face  with  ice,  the 
single  trail  became  hard  and  slippery  after  a  few  had  led  the  way,  and 
the  march  was  along  a  ledge  where  a  single  careless  step  would  pre 
cipitate  a  man  to  an  abyss  on  the  right. 

Unexpectedly,  and  half  an  hour  too  soon,  the  rocket  signal  put 
the  garrison  on  the  alert.  Lanterns  flashed  on  the  parapet,  and 
Montgomery  with  a  mere  handful  of  men  had  just  passed  under  Cape 
Diamond,  while  his  principal  force,  with  the  ladders,  still  struggled 
through  the  snow  half  a  mile  in  the  rear.  It  was  a  moment  of  intense 
interest ! 

The  first  barrier  of  timber  and  pickets  extending  from  the  slate  rock 
upon  which  Cape  Diamond  rested,  to  the  river  precipice,  had  been  left 
to  its  intrinsic  excellence  as  an  obstruction,  and  was  without  a  guard. 

Hatchets  and  saws  made  quick  work  !  Sending  a  messenger  to 
the  rear  to  hurry  men  forward,  Montgomery  with  his  aid,  McPherson, 
and  parts  of  Cheeseman's  and  Mott's  companies,  pushed  through  this 
barrier,  and  advanced  upon  the  second,  which  consisted  of  a  log-house, 
loop-holed  for  muskets,  and  defended  by  two  pieces  of  cannon. 

The  pathway  now  descended  and  approached  the  foot  of  King's 
Yard.  Only  three  or  four  men  could  march  abreast,  yet  Montgomery, 
as  soon  as  sixty  men  were  collected,  advanced  to  force  the  defenses. 
A  master  of  a  transport  with  a  few  seamen,  and  not  more  than  thirty- 
eight  militia,  manned  the  block-house.  The  forlorn  hope  was  already 
within  a  hundred  feet  of  the  barrier.  Montgomery  shouted,  "  Men 
of  New  York,  you  will  not  fear  to  follow  where  your  general  leads  ; 
push  on,  Quebec  is  ours  J  "  Suddenly  the  lighted  matches  sparkled 
like  fire-flies  in  the  gloom  ;  a  whirl  of  grape-shot  swept  the  narrow 
pathway,  and  Montgomery,  McPherson,  Cheeseman,  and  ten  others 
were  instantly  killed  ! 


136  THE  ASSAULT   UPON  QUEBEC.  (.1775- 

In  vain,  Captain  Mott  urged  the  survivors  to  renew  the  advance. 
A  continuous  fire  from  the  loop-holes  of  the  block-house  and  repeated 
discharges  of  grape,  were  followed  by  the  descent  of  fire-balls  from  the 
heights  to  light  up  the  scene  of  conflict,  and  as  daylight  began  to 
appear,  the  whole  detachment  could  be  seen  in  full  retreat. 

Montgomery  lay  stiff  and  cold  in  death  ;  but  his  memory,  honored 
by  the  garrison  which  rescued  his  body,  and  buried  it  with  the  honors 
of  war,  is  ever  a  theme  of  praise ;  and  that  perpetual  tribute  is  the 
spontaneous  offering  of  foes  and  friends  alike. 

Arnold  moved  on  his  errand  with  equal  promptness,  and  under 
equally  trying  risks.  The  ice  had  gorged,  and  had  been  forced  upon 
the  shore  by  the  heavy  tides,  so  that  his  men  also  were  confined  to  a 
narrow(passage  along  the  rock.  The  north-east  storm  beat  with  un- 
broken  force  upon  their  left  flank,  and  the  eddies  of  wind  which  curled 
about  the  cliff,  lifted  great  drifts  in  their  path. 

Arnold  led  the  advance  with  merely  five  picked  men.  Morgan's 
riflemen  and  Lamb's  artillery  followed,  the  latter  dragging  a  field- 
piece  on  a  sled.  It  was  soon  abandoned. 

Already  they  had  passed  the  stone  jetty  ;  had  passed  the  Palace 
gate,  and  were  pushing  forward  into  the  narrow  street  of  Sault  au 
Matelot,  where,  under  a  projecting  rock  in  a  narrow  passage,  a  barrier 
had  been  established  and  was  strongly  supported. 

The  advance  had  been  so  far  made,  and  as  yet  no  report  of  fire 
arms  gave  notice  that  Colonel  Livingston  had  made  his  demonstration 
before  St.  John's  gate,  to  occupy  the  garrison,  and  divert  their  atten 
tion  from  the  assault  upon  the  Lower  town.  But  in  its  place,  the 
beat  of  drums,  and  the  roar  of  cannon,  gave  warning  of  the  hot  wel 
come  which  awaited  the  assailants.  r 

A  storm  of  grape  and  musketry  received  Arnold's  advance  !  At 
the  first  discharge  his  right  knee  was  shattered  by  a  musket  ball,  and 
he  was  carried  back  to  St.  Roche.  Morgan  and  Lamb  passed  on, 
planted  ladders,  and  the  first  barrier  was  gained. 

At  the  end  of  the  same  street,  and  not  far  from  the  anticipated 
union  with  Montgomery's  column,  a  second  barrier,  supported  by  a 
well  defended  stone  house,  was  in  the  way.  Once  it  was  surmounted 
by  Morgan,  but  only  to  learn  that  a  strong  force  was  posted  in  its 
rear.  Seizing  houses  for  cover,  and  answering  back  the  fire  from  other 
houses  across  the  street,  the  fight  continued  for  nearly  four  hours. 
Ignorant  of  the  localities,  but  determined  not  to  recede,  Morgan 
fought  on.  Lamb  was  wounded,  nearly  sixty  of  his  men  had  fallen, 


775-]  THE  ASSAULT  UPON   QUEBEC.  13; 

and  still  the  expected  command  of  Dearborn  did  not  come  to  his  sup 
port.  A  well  conceived  sortie  from  the  Palace  gate  had  been  made 
under  General  Carleton's  orders,  and  Dearborn's  company,  divided 
into  two  detachments,  were  already  prisoners  of  war. 

Hopeless  of  success,  unsupported,  destitute  of  ammunition,  and 
without  bayonets,  apprised  of  the  fate  of  Montgomery  and  his  com 
panions,  Morgan  also  surrendered  his  command,  and  entered  Quebec, 
but  as  a  prisoner  of  war.  Thus  failed  the  second  movement  as  the 
first  failed ;  and  four  hundred  and  twenty-six  officers  and  men,  one 
half  of  the  entire  American  force,  were  with  him  prisoners  of  war. 

They  were  captives,  but  let  it  be  recorded  to  the  perpetual  mem 
ory  of  General  Carleton,  that  these  captives  were  treated  with  soldierly 
respect.  When  his  officers  complained  of  his  kindness  toward  rebels, 
his  answer  was  characteristic,  and  more  and  more  to  be  valued  as 
England  and  America  enjoy  the  fruits  of  comity  and  peace. 

"  Since  we  have  tried  in  vain  to  make  them  acknowledge  us  as 
brothers,  let  us  at  least  send  them  away  disposed  to  regard  us  as  first 
cousins." 

Arnold  withdrew  to  a  distance  of  three  miles  from  the  town, 
intrenched  himself  as  well  as  he  could,  confined  his  operations  to 
shutting  the  city  off  from  supplies,  and  his  share  in  the  campaign  of 
1775  closed. 

The  invasion  of  Canada  came  to  a  full  stop.  The  invasion  of  the 
colonies  was  to  follow  its  abandonment.  Of  the  brave  men  who  took 
part  in  those  exciting  events,  many  had  a  future  history ;  and  their 
after  conduct  will  bear  testimony  of  the  value  of  the  experience  which 
so  thoroughly  tested  their  patriotism  and  valor. 

Morgan  was  General  Morgan,  of  Morgan's  riflemen. 

Meigs  and  Febiger  are  associated  with  the  forlorn  hope  of  Stony 
Point. 

Greene  defended  Red  Bank  on  the  Delaware. 

Thayer  was  heroic  at  Fort  Mifflin. 

Lamb  fought  at  Montgomery  and  Yorktown. 

Oswald  is  identified  with  Monmouth. 

Porterfield  was  killed  in  the  battle  of  Camden. 

Many  ot  these  began  their  training  at  Bunker  Hill,  and,  through 
the  \viiderness  and  before  Quebec,  continued  their  education  in  the 
art  01  war. 


CHAPTER    XXII. 

CAMPAIGN   OF    1775.— BRIEF   MENTION. 

THE  campaign  of  1775  was  characterized  by  greater  offensive 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  colonists  than  of  the  British  troops. 
The  defensive  returned  the  offensive.  The  occupation  of  Charlestown 
Heights  was  supplemented  by  the  invasion  of  Canada.  The  impulse 
which  surrounded  Boston  with  the  militia  of  New  England  necessarily 
made  that  camp  the  head-quarters  of  the  American  army,  and  the 
capture  of  Boston  its  primary  objective. 

At  all  other  sea-port  cities  there  was  disaffection  of  the  people, 
and  partial  assertion  of  force  ;  but  there  were  no  British  garrisons  to 
support  the  British  governors,  and  few  occasions  for  open  rupture. 
The  policy  of  Congress  still  comprehended  the  possibility  of  an 
amicable  settlement  of  the  difficulties  with  the  mother  country. 

The  fact  is  also  to  be  noticed,  that  the  militia  from  Northern  New 
England  were  peculiarly  concerned  in  the  defense  of  their  own  border, 
because  the  forts  upon  Lake  Champlain,  its  navigable  waters,  and  the 
presence  of  British  troops  in  Canada,  afforded  the  only  then  existing 
opportunity  for  British  offensive  movements.  There  was  no  external 
force  which  could  be  employed  to  disturb  the  investment  of  Boston, 
and  none  which  was  disposable  for  occupation  of  Atlantic  ports.  It 
was  therefore  a  wise  strategic  movement,  to  take  the  control  of  Lake 
Champlain,  to  hold  its  forts  for  defensive  purposes,  and  so  demon 
strate,  in  force,  as  to  ward  off  British  attack.  An  adequate  army  of 
invasion  from  Canada,  if  in  secure  possession  of  Ticonderoga  and 
Crown  Point,  supported  by  armed  vessels,  would  be  a  constraint  upon 
New  York,  the  Green  Mountain  country,  and  New  Hampshire. 

These  elements  dictated  the  military  movements  of  1775.  The 
few  minor  operations  of  the  year,  including  that  at  Great  Bridge, 
Virginia,  in  December,  were  only  significant  of  an  increasing  sentiment 
of  hostility  to  any  compromise.  On  the  other  hand,  wherever  there 


133* 


I775-J  CAMPAIGN  OF    1775.  139 

were  no  expressions  of  force,  and  no  committal  of  overt-acts,  there  was 
evidence  afforded  through  many  citizens,  that  they  wished  to  avoid 
such  acts  and  constrain  some  settlement  with  Great  Britain. 

It  needed  just  such  a  protracted  suspension,  or  withholding  of 
open  hostilities,  over  the  country  at  large  ;  and  just  such  a  display  of 
force  about  Boston,  to  prepare  the  colonies  for  real  war,  and  at  the 
same  time  develop  an  army  and  test  both  officers  and  men.  The 
army  was  organized  at  Cambridge.  Washington  was  so  doubtful  of 
some  of  the  appointments  of  general  officers  that  he  withheld  for  a 
time  the  delivery  of  commissions  which  had  been  entrusted  to  his 
charge  when  he  left  Philadelphia  to  assume  command. 

The  character  and  composition  of  the  army,  O£,  the  armies, — the 
various  and  distinctive  systems  adopted,  and  the  jealousies  and 
antagonisms  which  prevailed,  have  been  illustrated  by  incidents  of  the 
northern  campaign. 

They  were  infinitely  provoking  and  provokingly  constant  !  Gen 
eral  Schuyler  affrmed  that  "  if  Job  had  been  a  general,  in  his  situation, 
his  memory  had  not  been  so  famous  for  patience."  Washington 
assured  him  that  "  he,"  Schuyler,  "  only  had,  upon  a  very  limited 
scale,  a  sample  of  his  own  perpetual  trials." 

No  sooner  had  the  troops  assembled  than  a  set  repugnance  was 
manifested  to  all  proper  instruction  in  the  details  of  Minor  Tactics. 
"  They  had  been  trained  to  have  their  own  way  too  long,"  said  Wash 
ington.  Guard  duty  was  odious !  Superiority  by  virtue  of  rank,  was 
denied  !  The  abuse  of  places  of  trust,  and  their  prostitution  for  selfish 
ends,  was  constant.  Profanity,  vulgarity,  and  all  the  vices  of  an 
undisciplined  mass  became  frightful,  as  soon  as  any  immediate  danger 
passed  by. 

The  good,  the  faithful  and  the  pure  were  hardly  less  restless  under 
the  new  restraint ;  and  few  appreciated  the  vital  value  of  some 
absolutely  supreme  control.  The  public  moneys  and  public  property 
were  held  to  belong  to  everybody,  because  Congress  represented  every 
body.  Commands  were  considered  despotic  orders,  and  exact  details 
were  only  another  form  for  slavery. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  when  Washington  assumed  command 
at  Cambridge. 

Even  officers  of  high  position,  whether  graded  above  or  below 
their  own  expectations,  found  time  to  indulge  in  petty  neglect  of  plain 
instructions,  and  in  turn  to  usurp  authority,  in  defiance  of  discipline 
and  the  paramount  interests  of  the  colonies  at  large. 


140  CAMPAIGN    OF    1/75.  L*775. 

Washington  gave  the  army  work  in  perfecting  earth-works,  build 
ing  redoubts,  and  policing  the  camp, — enforced  the  observance  of  the 
Sabbath,  court-martialed  officers,  and  tried  soldiers  for  swearing, 
gambling,  fraud,  and  lewdness  ;  introduced  a  thorough  system  of 
guard  and  picket  duty,  and  made  the  nights  subservient  to  proper 
rest,  in  the  place  of  dissipation  and  revelry.  Good  order,  discipline, 
was  the  first  purpose  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

These  statements  fall  far  below  a  fair  review  of  the  situation  as 
given  by  Washington  himself. 

The  logistics  of  war  became  his  next  care.  The  army  was  deficient 
in  every  element  of  supply.  The  men  who  held  their  colonial  obliga 
tions  to  be  supreme,  came  and  went,  just  as  their  engagements  would 
permit,  and  the  comfort  of  their  families  required.  Desertion  was 
considered  as  nothing,  or  at  the  worst  but  venial,  and  there  were 
times  when  the  American  army  before  Boston,  through  nine  miles  of 
investment,  was  less  in  numbers  than  the  British  garrison  within  the 
city. 

The  deficiency  in  the  number  of  men  was  not  so  conspicuous  as 
in  the  matter  of  powder,  lead,  arms,  tents,  horses,  carts,  tools,  and 
medical  stores.  Ordinary  provisions  were  abundant.  The  country 
about  Boston  fed  the  men  generously  ;  but  it  was  difficult  to  convince 
the  same  men  that  all  provisions  must  go  into  a  general  commis 
sariat,  and  be  issued  to  all  alike,  and  that  stores  must  be  accumulated, 
and  neither  expended  lavishly,  nor  sold  at  a  bargain  as  soon  as  a  sur 
plus  was  on  hand. 

Such  items  as  cordage,  iron,  horse-shoes,  lumber,  fire-wood,  and 
every  possible  article  that  could  be  used  by  an  army  for  field  or 
frontier  service,  were  included  in  his  inventory  of  essential  stores  ;  and 
in  his  own  expenditure  of  the  most  trivial  item  of  public  property,  he 
kept  a  detailed  and  exact  account. 

Of  the  single  article  of  powder,  he  once  stated  that,  "  his  chief 
supply  was  furnished  by  the  enemy,"  as  during  one  period,  the  armed 
vessels  which  patrolled  the  coast,  captured  more  powder  than  Con 
gress  had  been  able  to  furnish  in  several  months. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  November,  Captain  John  Manly,  who  was 
the  most  prominent  officer  of  this  hastily  improvised  navy,  captured  a 
British  store-ship  containing  a  large  mortar,  several  brass  cannon,  two 
thousand  muskets,  one  hundred  thousand  flints,  thirty  thousand  shot, 
thirty  tons  of  musket  shot,  eleven  mortar  beds,  and  all  necessary 
implements  for  artillery  and  intrenching  service. 


17750  CAMPAIGN   OF    1775.  141 

The  strategical  value  of  the  operations  during  1775,  was  limited 
by  defective  discipline,  bad  logistics,  and  the  changeable  character  of 
the  army.  Schuyler  and  Montgomery,  who  deservedly  shared  his 
confidence  and  commanded  his  respect,  performed  their  work  fully 
up  to  the  limit  of  the  means  furnished. 

The  feeble  results  realized  from  the  invasion  of  Canada,  do  not 
impair  the  proposition,  that  its  direction  from  head-quarters  showed 
a  clear  conception  of  the  strategical  relations  of  the  points  involved, 
and  the  proper  methods  by  which  to  attain  success. 

The  deep  line  of  operations  which  left  no  track  through  the 
wilderness  would  have  been  a  memorable  folly  as  an  independent 
movement.  When  it  attempted  to  strike  the  capital  of  Canada,  which 
was  at  the  same  time  the  base  of  operations  and  of  supplies  for  the 
entire  British  provinces,  at  a  time  when  its  last  garrison  was  far 
advanced  towards  Lake  Champlain,  it  had  method. 

When  taken  in  connection  with  the  American  movement  on  the 
left,  which  had  for  its  purpose  the  destruction  or  capture  of  those 
advanced  troops,  it  became  a  bold  enterprise  of  a  thoroughly  scientific 
and  well  related  value. 

When  it  had  the  supposed  assurance  that  the  people  of  Canada 
were  ready,  and  only  needed  the  nucleus  for  organization  and  prac 
tical  revolution  against  a  common  adversary,  it  combined  sound  strat 
egy  with  the  wisest  military  policy. 

When  it  contemplated  the  fact  that  the  principal  military  stores 
of  North  America  were  at  Quebec,  and  that  its  possession  substan 
tially  controlled  the  St.  Lawrence,  overawed  all  Canada,  and  com 
pelled  England  to  employ  a  great  army  to  recover  its  possession,  if 
recoverable  at  all,  it  becomes  memorable  for  its  conception  and  its 
illustration  of  the  science  of  war. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  Washington's  Orderly  book: 
"  November  fifth.  As  the  commander-in-chief  has  been  apprised  of  a 
design  formed  for  the  observance  of  that  ridiculous  and  childish  cus 
tom  of  burning  the  effigy  of  the  Pope,  he  cannot  help  expressing  his 
surprise  that  there  should  be  officers  and  soldiers  in  this  army,  so  void 
of  common  sense  as  not  to  see  the  impropriety  of  such  a  step  at  this 
juncture,  at  a  time  when  we  are  soliciting,  and  have  really  obtained, 
the  friendship  and  alliance  of  the  people  of  Canada,  whom  we  ought 
to  consider  as  brethren  embarked  in  the  same  cause,  the  defense  of 
the  general  liberty  of  America.  At  such  a  juncture  and  in  such  cir 
cumstances  to  be  insulting  their  religion,  is  so  monstrous  as  not  to  be 


142  CAMPAIGN   OF    1775.  Lr775 

suffered  or  excused  ;  indeed,  instead  of  offering  the  most  remote  insult 
it  is  our  duty  to  address  public  thanks  to  those  our  brethren,  as  to 
them  we  are  so  much  indebted  for  every  late  happy  success  over  the 
common  enemy  in  Canada." 

The  closing  events  of  the  year  were  full  of  discouraging  features. 

As  early  as  September  there  was  no  money,  and  but  little  clothing. 
Economy  in  the  use  of  powder  was  more  than  balanced  by  its  poor 
quality  and  its  waste  through  bad  management  and  inadequate  store 
houses  for  its  protection.  Fire-wood  was  scarce,  arid  the  troops  whose 
time  was  soon  to  expire  were  unwilling  to  work  in  advance  for  the 
comfort  of  those  who  were  to  succeed  them.  A  large  number  of  the 
Connecticut  troops -had  been  enlisted  for  six  months,  and  their  time 
would  expire  November  thirteenth. 

Washington  was  determined  to  make  a  decisive  movement  while 
the  army  was  at  its  best  estate.  The  British  had  advanced  their 
works  beyond  Charlestown  Neck,  upon  the  main  land.  As  a  counter- 
movement,  with  the  hope  that  it  would  be  resisted,  Washington  put 
his  army  in  readiness  to  resist  an  attack,  and  commenced  the  thorough 
fortification  of  Ploughed  Hill  and  Cobble  Hill,  and  also  increased  the 
strength  of  works  at  Lechmere  Point,  hoping  to  elicit  an  attack  from 
the  enemy. 

The  British  troops,  however,  made  no  counter  demonstration,  and 
after  twenty-four  hours  of  preparation,  these  redoubts  were  capable 
of  defense  against  the  whole  British  army.  He  also  entertained  a 
purpose  to  assault  Boston  itself  and  to  burn  the  city  if  it  seemed  to 
be  a  military  necessity.  Lee  opposed  the  movement  as  impossible, 
and  the  council  of  war  concurred  in  the  postponement  of  such  an 
enterprise. 

Meanwhile  the  citizens  of  sea-coast  towns  began  to  be  anxious  for 
their  own  safety.  A  British  armed  transport  cannonaded  Stonington, 
and  other  vessels  threatened  New  London  and  Norwich.  All  these 
towns  begged  Washington  to  send  them  troops.  Governor  Trumbull, 
of  Connecticut,  whose  extraordinary  comprehension  of  the  military 
as  well  as  the  civil  issues  of  the  day,  made  him  a  firm  supporter  of 
Washington's  policy,  ever  reliable  and  ever  just,  inquired  his  opinion 
upon  this  very  matter. 

Washington  wrote :  u  The  most  important  operations  of  the  cam 
paign  cannot  be  made  to  depend  upon  the  piratical  expeditions  of  two 
or  three  men-of-war  privateers." 

Gage  had  been  ordered  home,  and  left  October  tenth.     General 


I775-J  CAMPAIGN   OF    1775.  143 

Howe  assumed  command  over  all  the  Atlantic  Colonies  from  Nova 
Scotia  to  West  Florida  inclusive. 

Offensive  proclamations,  bad  in  policy,  fruitless  for  good,  and 
involving  the  immediate  crushing  out  of  all  sympathy  from  those  who 
were  still  loyal  to  the  crown,  marked  his  advent  to  command.  He 
threatened  with  military  execution  any  who  should  leave  the  city 
without  his  written  consent,  enjoined  all  the  citizens  to  arm,  and 
placed  Washington  under  the  necessity  of  taking  active  measures 
against  all  "  who  were  suffered  to  stalk  at  large,  doing  all  the  mis 
chief  in  their  power."  Up  to  this  time  the  officers  of  the  crown  and 
neutral  citizens  had  not  been  interfered  with  by  the  American  author 
ities.  Acting  under  his  orders,  Admiral  Graves  determined  to  give 
greater  efficiency  to  his  small  fleet,  and  Lieutenant  Mowatt,  under 
general  instructions  to  burn  all  towns  that  fitted  out  or  sheltered 
privateers,  began  his  work  by  the  destruction  of  Falmouth,  now  Port 
land,  Maine. 

An  American  privateer,  soon  after  sent  by  Washington  to  the  St. 
Lawrence  river,  to  cut  off  two  brigantines  which  had  left  England 
with  supplies  for  Quebec,  plundered  St.  John  Island.  Washington 
sent  back  the  citizen-prisoners,  and  restored  all  their  private  effects, 
denouncing  the  movement  as  a  violation  of  the  principles  of  all  civ 
ilized  warfare. 

Crowded  by  these  multiplying  demands  upon  his  resources,  and 
equally  conscious  that  there  would  soon  be  neither  army  nor  supplies, 
equal  to  the  emergency,  he  made  an  independent  appeal  to  Con 
gress,  covering  the  whole  ground  of  his  complaints  and  his  requisi 
tions. 

He  wanted  money, — a  thoroughly  organized  commissariat, — a 
permanent  artillery  establishment, — more  adequate  control  over  all 
troops, — a  longer  term  of  enlistment, — an  enlargement  of  the  rules 
and  articles  of  war,  and  power  to  enforce  his  will.  He  also  asked  for 
a  separate  organization  of  the  Navy,  and  that  it  be  placed  upon  a 
sound  footing,  as  to  men  and  vessels. 

Congress  acted  upon  these  recommendations.  On  the  fourth  of 
October,  a  committee,  consisting  of  Benjamin  Franklin,  Thomas 
Lynch,  of  South  Carolina,  and  Benjamin  Harrison,  of  Virginia,  started 
for  Washington's  camp,  with  three  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  Con 
tinental  money,  and  after  a  patient  consideration  of  his  views,  advised 
the  adoption  of  his  recommendations  by  Congress.  A  council  of  the 
New  England  Governors  was  called  to  meet  this  committee. 


144  CAMPAIGN   OF    17/5.  [i775 

At  this  interview,  a  new  organization  of  the  army  was  determined 
upon,  fixing  the  force  to  be  employed  before  Boston  at  twenty-three 
thousand,  three  hundred  and  seventy-two,  officers  and  men. 

Washington  submitted  to  this  committee  his  plan  for  attacking 
Boston.  It  was  approved,  and  Congress  soon  after  authorized  him  to 
burn  the  city  if  necessary  to  the  prosecution  of  military  operations 
against  the  British  army. 

October  thirteenth  ;  Congress  authorized  the  building  and  equip 
ment  of  one  cruiser  of  ten  and  one  of  fourteen  guns. 

October  thirtieth ;  one  vessel  of  twenty  and  one  of  twenty-six 
guns  was  authorized.  A  naval  committee  was  appointed,  composed 
of  such  men  as  Silas  Deane,  John  Langdon,  Christopher  Gadsden, 
Stephen  Hopkins,  Joseph  Hewes,  Richard  Henry  Lee,  and  John 
Adams. 

November  twenty-eighth  ;  a  code  of  regulations  was  adopted  for 
the  navy,  and  on  the  thirteenth  of  December  the  construction  of 
thirteen  vessels  of  war  was  authorized.  As  some  of  these  vessels  are 
necessarily  noticed  in  the  course  of  the  narrative,  their  names,  them 
selves  memorial  of  the  crisis,  are  given. 

"  Ordered  to  be  built  at  Philadelphia,  the  Washington,  32  guns  ; 
Randolph,  32 ;  Effingham,  28,  and  Delaware,  24 ;  at  Portsmouth,  the 
Raleigh,  32 ;  at  Boston,  the  Hancock,  32,  and  the  Boston,  28 ;  at 
Providence,  the  Warren,  32,  and  the  Providence,  28 ;  at  Annapolis, 
the  Virginia,  28  ;  at  New  London,  the  Trumbull,  28  ;  at  Poughkeepsie, 
the  Congress,  28,  and  the  Montgomery,  24  guns. 

Among  the  officers  commissioned  December  twenty-second, 
Nicholas  Biddle  appears  in  the  list  of  captains,  and  John  Paul  Jone3 
among  the  lieutenants. 

As  the  year  approached  its  close,  the  British  leveled  their  advanced 
works  on  Charlestown  Neck,  and  concentrated  their  right  wing  in  a 
strong  redoubt  upon  Bunker  Hill,  while  their  left  wing  at  Boston 
Neck  was  more  thoroughly  fortified  against  attack. 

Congress  now  intimated  to  Washington  that  it  might  be  well  to 
"  attack  on  the  first  favorable  occasion  and  before  the  arrival  of  rein 
forcements." 

Washington  replied  that  he  "must  keep  his  powder  for  closer 
work  than  cannon  distance." 

November  nineteenth,  Henry  Knox  was  commissioned  as  Colonel 
vice  Gridley, — too  old  for  active  service ;  two  lieutenant-colonels  and 
two  majors,  as  well  as  twelve  companies  of  artillery,  were  authorized, 


1775- 1  CAMPAIGN  OF    17/5.  145 

and  thus  the  American  artillery,  as  well  as  the  navy,  was  put  upon  a 
substantial  basis,  with  Knox  as  its  chief, 

The  year  closed,  with  the  prospect  that  the  army  would  be  imme 
diately  replaced  by  raw  troops  ;  and  in  spite  of  the  advances  made 
toward  a  substantial  paper  organization,  the  period  was  one  of  the 
most  perilous  of  the  war. 

NOTE.  The  fate  of  the  American  navy  is  worthy  of  record. 

^Washington,  32,  destroyed  by  the  British  in  the  Delaware 1778 

Randolph,  32,  blown  up  in  action  with  the  Yarmouth,  64 1778 

*Effingham,  28,  destroyed  by  the  British  in  the  Delaware 1778 

Delaware,  24,  captured  by  the  British  in  the  Delaware 1777 

Raleigh,  32,  captured  by  the  Experiment  50,  and  Unicorn,  22 1778 

Hancock,  32,  taken  by  Rainbow,  44,  and  Victor,  16 1777 

Boston,  28,  captured  at  Charleston 1780 

Warren,  32,  burned  in  the  Penobscot  by  the  Americans 1779 

Providence,  28,  captured  at  Charleston 1780 

*Virginia,  28,  taken  by  British  fleet  near  Cape  Henry 1778 

Trumbull,  28,  taken  by  Isis,  32,  and  General  Monk,  18. 1781 

*  Congress,  28,  burned  in  the  Hudson  to  avoid  capture 1777 

*Montgomery,  24,  "      "      "         "          "      "         "         1777 

Andrea  Doria,  14,  burned  in  the  Delaware  to  avoid  capture 1777 

The  Alliance,  32,  (afterwards  built  and  identified  with  La  Fayette,  was  sold  after  the 
war,  and  converted  into  an  Indiaman. 

The  Confederacy,  32,  was  taken,  off  Virginia,  by  a  ship  of  the  line 1781 

Queen  of  France,  18,  captured  at  Charleston 1780 

*  Never  -went  to  sea.    (Reference  is  made  to  Cooper's  naval  history,  for  the  fate  of  the  otfcer  vessels, 
not  incidentally  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  British  occupation  of  the  Atlantic  ports  ) 

10 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1776.— BOSTON  EVACUATED.— CONCURRENT  EVENTS 

THE  year  1776  enlarged  the  theatre  of  operations.  The  demon 
stration  before  Boston  attained  its  objective ;  and  the  city  was 
evacuated  by  the  British  troops.  At  all  other  points  of  active  service 
the  Americans  were  driven  to  the  defensive;  and  it  was  not  until  the 
month  of  December,  of  that  year,  that  the  offensive  return,  at  Trenton, 
imparted  a  new  character  to  the  struggle  and  interrupted  the  general 
success  of  the  royal  forces. 

On  the  thirtieth  day  of  December,  Admiral  Shuldham  brought 
reinforcements  to  General  Hov/e  and  at  the  same  time  took  command 
of  all  naval  forces,  vice  Graves,  relieved. 

The  troops  in  garrison  were  kept  under  the  most  rigid  discipline. 
General  Howe  exacted  the  most  formal  observance  of  all  military 
ceremony,  and  issued  orders,  sharply  reprimanding  some  soldiers,  who 
had  been  careless  in  minute  details  of  personal  neatness  and  outfit, 
An  order  of  January  thirteenth  particularly  calls  those  to  account, 
"whose  hair  was  not  smooth,  but  badly  powdered ;  who  had  no  frills 
to  their  shirts,  whose  linen  was  dirty,  whose  leggins  hung  in  a  slovenly 
manner  about  their  knees,  and  other  unsoldier-like  neglects," — 
"  which  must  be  immediately  remedied." 

Amusements  were  also  provided  for  the  entertainment  of  the 
troops,  a  theatre  was  opened,  and  a  sense  of  perfect  security  pervaded 
all  ranks. 

The  condition  and  style  of  doing  things,  in  the  adversary  army, 
was  quite  in  contrast  with  all  this  nursing  process,  so  good  in  itself — 
so  inefficient  for  real  work  at  the  time. 

For  many  weeks  it  had  been  a  matter  of  the  greatest  concern  with 
Washington,  how  to  keep  up  appearances  of  military  preparation, 
while  all  things  were  in  extreme  confusion.  He  had  to  demonstrate, 
as  if  urgent  to  attack  the  city  at  the  first  moment,  while  the  extra- 


I776.J  CAMPAIGN   OF    1776.  147 

ordinary  operation  was  going  on,  of  disbanding  one  army  and  creating 
another  in  its  place,  directly  in  front  of  an  enemy. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  indicate  the  difficulties  of  that  operation. 

Washington,  as  well  as  Howe,  had  ideas  respecting  military  dis 
cipline,  and  he,  also,  issued  orders  upon  the  habits,  personal  bearing 
and  want  of  neatness  among  the  men,  closing  on  one  occasion  thus 
emphatically,  "  Cards  and  games  of  chance  are  prohibited.  At  this 
time  of  public  distress,  men  may  find  enough  to  do,  in  the  service  of 
their  God  and  country,  without  abandoning  themselves  to  vice  and 
immorality."  "  It  may  not  be  amiss  for  the  troops  to  know,  that 
if  any  man  in  action  shall  presume  to  skulk,  hide  himself,  or  retreat 
from  the  enemy  without  the  orders  of  his  commanding  officer,  he  will 
be  instantly  shot  down  as  an  example  of  cowardice ;  cowards  having 
too  frequently  disconcerted  the  best  formed  troops  by  their  dastardly 
behavior." 

Meanwhile,  General  Greene  kept  his  little  army  well  in  hand.  On 
the  fourth  of  January,  he  wrote,  from  Prospect  Hill, — "  The  night 
after  the  old  troops  went  off  I  could  not  have  mustered  seven  hun 
dred  men,  notwithstanding  the  returns  of  the  new  enlisted  troops 
amounted  to  nineteen  hundred  and  upward.  I  am  strong  enough  to 
defend  myself  against  all  the  force  in  Boston.  Our  situation  has  been 
critical.  Had  the  enemy  been  fully  acquainted  with  our  situation,  I 
cannot  pretend  to  say  what  might  have  been  the  consequences." 

Washington  wrote  to  Congress  January  first,  leaving  the  last  word 
blank,  lest  the  letter  should  miscarry.  "  It  is  not  perhaps  in  the 
power  of  history  to  furnish  a  case  like  ours ;  to  maintain  a  post  within 
musket  shot  of  the  enemy,  within  that  distance  of  twenty  old  Brit 
ish  regiments,  without ." 

The  winter  was  memorable  for  its  mildness. 

"  Give  me  powder  or  ice"  was  Washington's  ejaculation,  when 
writing  to  a  friend.  It  was  his  intention  as  soon  as  the  river  froze 
over  to  march  directly  to  Boston,  across  the  ice.  The  presence  of 
ships  of  war  prevented  any  attempt  by  the  use  of  small  boats  while 
the  river  remained  open.  There  had  been  "  one  single  freeze,  and 
some  pretty  strong  ice,"  and  he  suddenly  proposed  to  the  council  that 
the  opportunity  be  seized  at  once  to  cross  over  and  take  or  burn 
Boston.  On  the  twenty-sixth  of  February,  he  wrote  to  Joseph  Reed, 
saying, — "  Behold,  though  we  have  been  waiting  all  the  year  for  this 
favorable  event,  the  enterprise  was  thought  too  hazardous.  I  did  not 
think  so,  and  I  am  sure  yet  that  the  enterprise,  if  it  had  been  under- 


148  CAMPAIGN    OF    1776.  [1776. 

taken  with  resolution,  must  have  succeeded  ;  without  it  any  would  fail, 
and  I  am  preparing  to  take  post  on  Dorchester  Heights,  to  try  if  the 
enemy  will  be  so  kind  as  to  come  out  to  us." 

"  What  I  have  said  respecting  the  determination  in  council,  and 
the  possessing  of  Dorchester  Heights,  is  spoken  under  the  rose?' 

A  great  improvement  had  been  made  in  the  ordnance  department, 
through  the  great  business  capacity  of  Colonel  Knox.  He  made  a 
journey  to  Fort  George  during  the  preceding  December,  and  by  the 
latter  part  of  February,  had  hauled,  upon  sleds  over  the  snow,  more 
than  fifty  pieces  of  artillery  from  that  fort  to  Cambridge.  This  had 
enabled  him  to  make  the  armament  at  Lechmere  Point  very  formida 
ble,  and  by  the  addition  of  several  half-moon  batteries  between  that 
point  and  Roxbury,  it  was  possible  to  concentrate  nearly  every  mortar 
which  the  army  had  upon  the  city  itself. 

During  the  first  week  in  January,  Washington  was  advised  that 
General  Clinton,  relying  upon  the  new  troops  which  arrived  with 
Admiral  Shuldham,  was  to  be  detailed  with  an  independent  command 
for  some  remote  expedition,  or  at  least  beyond  the  waters  of  New 
England. 

Believing  that  New  York  must  be  the  immediate  objective  of  such 
a  movement,  he  ordered  General  Lee,  then  upon  detached  service  in 
Connecticut,  "  to  take  such  volunteers  as  he  could  quickly  assemble 
on  his  march,  and  put  the  city  of  New  York  in  the  best  posture  of 
defense,  which  the  season  and  circumstances  would  admit  of."  Lee 
had  already  written  to  the  commander-in-chief,  urging  "  the  imme 
diate  occupation  of  that  city,  the  suppression  or  expulsion  of  certain 
tories  from  Long  Island,"  and  that  "  not  to  crush  the  serpents  before 
their  rattles  are  grown  would  be  ruinous." 

The  control  over  disaffected  citizens  on  Long  Island  had  already 
been  desired  by  the  New  York  convention,  and  Lord  Sterling,  then  at 
Elizabethtown  with  his  regiment,  was  ready  to  cooperate  with  any 
other  forces  that  might  be  available  for  the  purpose,  as  "  none  could 
be  spared  from  Cambridge." 

Lee  entered  New  York  with  two  regiments  from  Connecticut, 
amounting  to  nearly  fifteen  hundred  men,  on  the  same  day  that  Clin 
ton  cast  anchor  near  Sandy  Hook.  Notwithstanding  the  assurances 
of  that  officer  that  he  called  to  consult  with  Governor  Tryon,  and 
that  he  was  imperatively  ordered  to  the  south,  fortifications  were 
immediately  begun  at  New  York  and  Brooklyn  Heights.  This  was 
timely,  and  a  matter  of  military  obligation. 


1776.]  CAMPAIGN   OF    1776.  149 

It  must  be  noted  in  this  connection,  that  General  Lee  had  secured 
troops  from  Connecticut,  and  placed  them  upon  a  continental  basis  of 
service,  when  he  was  instructed  only  to  assemble  volunteers  for  a 
special  duty,  and  thereby  deliberately  exceeded  his  authority.  One 
of  these  regiments  had  been  disbanded  by  order  of  Congress  ;  and 
its  reassembling  as  a  regiment  of  the  continental  army,  although 
countenanced  by  the  authorities  of  the  colony,  was  a  breach  of  military 
subordination  on  the  part  of  Lee.  Neither  did  he  hesitate  as  to  the 
style  of  language  in  which  he  spoke  of  Congress  itself.  He  was 
equally  unjust  to  the  leading  men  of  the  New  York  convention.  The 
exact  condition  of  Manhattan  Island  must  be  stated  in  this  connec 
tion,  as  some  writers  persistently  claim  that  New  York  failed  in  duty 
at  this  juncture.  The  British  fleet  controlled  the  adjoining  waters.  It 
could  destroy  the  city;  but  the  city  had  neither  the  numbers  nor  the 
guns  to  make  any  substantial  resistance.  There  was  a  general  under 
standing  that  each  party  should  attend  to  its  own  business  ;  that  the 
officers  of  the  crown  would  keep  within  the  technical  line  of  their 
duty,  and  that  the  citizens  would  not  interfere.  Congress  had  no 
troops  to  spare,  and  there  was  a  general  suspension  of  public  arming, 
except  to  keep  up  the  armies  already  in  the  field.  This  was  of  itself 
a  great  undertaking.  The  precipitation  upon  Congress,  or  upon  special 
localities,  of  exacting  issues,  was  therefore  unwise.  The  disaffected 
citizens  of  New  York  were  not  forgotten  ;  neither  were  the  patriotic 
leaders  who  responded  promptly  in  1775. 

The  movement  of  Clinton  was  a  fortunate  opportunity  for  bringing 
this  condition  of  armed  neutrality  to  an  end,  and  it  was  accomplished 
peaceably  and  at  the  right  time. 

It  is  to  be  admitted,  however,  that  Lee  asserted  a  very  high  prerog 
ative  in  this  his  first  independent  command,  and  that  it  called  forth 
criticism  from  Washington  as  well  as  Congress.  A  committee  of  that 
body  met  him  at  New  York  and  accommodated  the  occupation  to  the 
judgment  of  all  well  disposed  citizens.  His  denunciation  of  the 
''accursed  Provincial  Congress  of  New.  York  "  was  characteristic  of 
Lee's  temperament,  his  erratic  career,  and  his  subordination  of  all 
things  to  the  wishes  of  Charles  Lee,  but  it  was  neither  politic  nor 
becoming  a  great  commander. 

On  New  Years  day,  Norfolk,  Virginia,  was  bombarded  and  burned 
under  the  direction  of  Lord  Dunmore.  This  was  one  of  a  series  of 
acts  perpetrated  by  the  colonial  governors,  which  induced  a  second 
series  of  southern  demonstrations  in  behalf  of  independence,  very 


CAMPAIGN   OF    1 7/6  [i77<> 

similar  to  those  which  attended  their  attempt  to  disarm  the  people 
during  the  spring  months  of  1/75- 

Sparks  embodies  the  matter  thus  clearly.  "  These  expeditions 
were  undertaken  at  the  suggestion  of  the  colonial  governors  and  zealous 
partisans,  whose  hopes  and  wishes  betrayed  them  into  a  deplorable 
ignorance  of  the  state  of  the  country  and  character  of  the  people." 
Lord  Dartmouth  himself  planned  this  expedition,  and  sent  instructions 
to  Lord  Howe  under  date  of  October  twenty-second,  1775,  directing 
him,  "  to  gain  possession  of  some  respectable  post  to  the  southward, 
from  which  to  make  sudden  and  unexpected  attacks  upon  sea-coast 
towns  during  open  winter."  Clinton  had  orders  "  to  destroy  any 
towns  "  that  refused  submission.  Lord  Dunmore  protested  against 
sending  seven  regiments  from  Ireland  to  North  Carolina  upon  the 
solicitation  of  Governor  Martin  of  that  colony,  while  he  was  living  in 
the  very  hot  bed  of  rebellion  itself,  and  almost  defenseless. 

Lord  Howe  himself  advised  that  New  York  should  be  the  first 
objective  of  attack,  and  the  permanent  base  of  future  army  movements. 

After  these  essential  diversions  to  contemporaneous  matters,  which 
had  their  quickening  element  to  inspire  Washington  to  offensive 
measures,  the  narrative  takes  up  the  closing  scenes  of  the  siege  of 
Boston. 

The  month  of  February  was  drawing  near  its  close.  Washington 
determined  to  delay  no  longer  to  test  his  strength  against  the  gar 
rison  of  Boston.  He  collected  forty-five  bateaux,  each  capable  of 
transporting  eighty  men,  and  built  two  floating  batteries  of  great 
strength  and  light  draught  of  water.  Fascines,  gabions,  carts,  bales 
of  hay,  intrenching  tools,  two  thousand  bandages  for  wounds,  and  all 
other  contingent  supplies  that  might  be  needed  were  gathered,  and 
placed  under  the  guard  of  picked  men. 

General  Thomas  Mifflin,  quartermaster-general,  who  had  originally 
accompanied  him  from  Philadelphia  as  an  aid-de-camp,  was  thoroughly 
aroused  to  the  importance  of  the  impending  movement.  He  shared 
the  confidence  of  Washington. 

The  movement  was  carried  through  with  that  inflexibility  of  pur 
pose  which  marked  Washington's  career  during  crises  of  imminent 
peril.  It  seemed  as  if  the  very  fact  of  his  submission  of  a  military 
movement  to  a  council,  awakened  questions  as  to  its  feasibility. 
Jomini,  in  connection  with  his  statement,  that  Napoleon  never  seemed 
to  provide  for  a  retreat,  adds,  that  "  when  Napoleon  was  present  no 
one  thought  of  such  a  provision." 


177&-J  CAMPAIGN   OF    1776.  151 

The  great  acts  of  Washington's  career  were  performed  when  he 
was  clothed  with  ample  authority  by  Congress,  or  the  emergency 
forced  him  to  make  his  own  will  supreme.  This  was  the  reason  which 
led  Congress  at  last  to  emancipate  him  from  the  constraint  of  councils. 
If  he  doubted,  others  doubted  ;  if  he  was  persistent,  he  inspired  the 
courage  and  nerve  which  secured  results.  He  was  in  such  a  mood 
on  the  first  day  of  March,  1776.  He  had  a  plan,  a  secret,  and  he 
kept  it  secret  until  the  hour  for  execution. 

Just  after  sunset  of  that  New  England  spring  evening,  from  Lech- 
mere  Point,  past  Cobble  Hill,  and  through  the  long  range  of  encir 
cling  batteries,  clear  to  Roxbury  lines  on  the  right,  every  mortar  and 
cannon  which  could  take  the  range  opened  their  fire  upon  the  quiet 
city.  It  was  a  test  of  the  location,  range,  and  power  of  the  adversary's 
fire.  That  fire  was  returned  with  spirit,  and  when  morning  dawned 
the  American  camp  resumed  its  quiet,  the  men  were  kept  within  their 
lines,  and  only  behind  the  head-quarters  at  Cambridge  was  there 
ceaseless  activity,  where  Putnam,  Thomas,  Knox,  and  Mifflin  were 
"  putting  the  house  in  order  for  moving  day." 

On  the  night  of  the  third  of  March,  the  bombardment  was 
renewed,  with  equal  vigor,  and  as  promptly  answered  ;  and  again  the 
camp  was  still  and  patient.  One  shot  had  reached  Prospect  Hill 
but  no  appreciable  damage  accrued  to  the  American  works.  Some 
houses  had  been  penetrated  in  Boston,  and  six  soldiers  were  wounded 
in  one  guard-barrack.  Places  of  safety  began  to  be  hunted  out ;  and 
artificial  obstructions  were  arranged  for  a  cover  from  the  random  shot 
and  shell ;  but  no  special  parade  was  ordered,  no  detail  was  moved 
forth,  to  silence  the  offensive  batteries,  no  scheme  was  put  on  foot,  to 
break  up  the  investment.  No  excited  commander  tendered  his  ser 
vices,  to  lead  a  forlorn  hope  against  Cambridge,  to  seize  and  try  for 
treason  the  arch-commander  of  the  defiant  Colonists.  Bunker  Hill 
was  in  sight  !  Red  uniforms  were  conspicuous  in  the  sun-light ;  but 
these  had  no  promptings  to  an  assault  upon  earth-works,  which 
screened  twenty  thousand  men  and  were  the  work  of  months. 

The  fourth  of  March  closed,  and  the  night  was  bright,  mild  and 
hazy.  The  moon  was  at  its  full.  It  was  a  good  night  for  rest. 
Surely  the  Americans  cannot  afford  such  waste  of  powder !  They 
impoverish  themselves  :  but  Boston  is  safe  ! 

But  on  the  night  of  the  fourth  of  March,  and  through  all  its  hours, 
from  "  candle-lighting  time,"  to  the  clear  light  of  another  day,  the  same 
incessant  thunder  rolled  along,  over  camps  and  city ;  the  same  quick 


152  CAMPAIGN   OF    1776.  [1776. 

flashes  showed  that  fire  was  all  along  the  line,  and  still,  both  camps 
and  city  dragged  through  the  night,  waiting  for  the  day-light  to  test 
the  work  of  the  night,  as  day-light  had  done  before. 

Two  strong  redoubts  capped  Dorchester  Heights  ! 

"  If  the  Americans  retain  possession  of  the  heights,"  said  Admiral 
Shuldham,  "  I  cannot  keep  a  ship  in  the  harbor."  Howe  wrote  to 
Lord  Dartmouth,  "  It  must  have  been  the  employment  of  at  least 
twelve  thousand  men."  "  They  were  raised,"  wrote  an  officer,  "  with 
an  expedition  equal  to  that  of  the  Genii,  belonging  to  Aladdin's 
lamp." 

"  The  rebels  have  done  more  in  one  night  than  my  whole  army 
would  have  done  in  a  month,"  said  Lord  Howe. 

"  Perhaps,''  said  Heath,  "  there  never  was  as  much  work  done  in 
so  short  a  space." 

The  works  were  very  simple  of  construction.  The  earth  was  frozen 
to  the  depth  of  eighteen  inches.  But  hurdles,  fascines,  and  bundles 
of  branches,  and  abatis,  cut  from  apple  orchards,  had  been  supplied 
in  great  quantities,  and  large  bales  of  compressed  hay,  which  were 
proof  against  any  ordinary  cannon  ball,  had  also  been  furnished,  so 
that  the  heaping  up  and  arranging  of  these,  under  the  direction  of 
Rufus  Putnam,  according  to  a  plan  thoroughly  digested,  was  but  easy 
work  for  a  class  of  soldiers  peculiarly  handy  with  the  material  em 
ployed.  On  the  tops,  there  were  barrels,  filled  with  stones,  having 
for  their  ultimate  purpose — to  be  rolled  down  hill,  and  thus  discon 
cert  the  advance  of  any  regulars  from  Boston.  The  manner  of  doing 
this  work  was  also  very  simple. 

Eight  hundred  soldiers  marched  very  quietly  out  of  Roxbury, 
after  dark,  on  the  previous  evening,  and  placed  themselves,  a  part 
between  Boston  and  Dorchester  Heights,  and  a  part  at  the  east  end 
of  the  peninsula,  opposite  Castle  Island.  Men  with  tools,  and  a  work 
ing  party  of  twelve  hundred  soldiers  under  General  Thomas,  followed 
the  advance.  Then  three  hundred  carts,  loaded  with  the  proper 
material,  followed. 

To  thwart  curiosity,  and  prevent  impertinent  interference  with 
the  work  which  Washington  had  ordered  to  be  done,  some  of  these 
large  bundles  of  hay  had  been  placed  in  a  long  row  along  the  most 
exposed  part  of  the  way,  so  that  carts  passed  to  and  fro  all  night  be 
hind  this  cover,  and  the  moon  itself  was  unable  to  betray  the  secret, 
even  if  some  sentry  at  Boston  Neck  had  accidentally  allowed  his 
eyes  to  turn  away  from  the  rival  exhibition  of  shot  and  shell  practice. 


1776.]  CAMPAIGN   OF    1776.  153 

There  was  a  north  wind  that  night  which  took  all  the  sound  of  the 
rolling  carts  into  the  country  below  Boston.  This  was  also  very 
matter  of  fact,  but  of  real  service. 

During  this  time,  Generals  Greene  and  Sullivan  were  standing  in 
front  of  four  thousand  men  near  Fort  Number  Two,  as  indicated  on  the 
map,  with  bateaux  and  floating  batteries  manned  for  crossing  to  Bos 
ton,  if  the  garrison  should  move  out  and  interfere  with  the  order  of 
the  day.  The  incessant  firing  all  night  seems  to  have  been  but  play 
ing  a  trick  upon  the  garrison.  It  was  of  course  a  feint. 

The  silent  movement  of  the  two  thousand  men,  and  of  the  three 
hundred  carts  was  not  as  at  Bunker  Hill,  a  forlorn  hope  affair.  It  was 
not  hurried  nor  expensive  of  strength  and  patience.  Reliefs  came 
and  went,  and  the  system,  order,  and  success  that  marked  each  hour, 
could  not  have  been  better  realized  by  daylight.  An  eminent  his 
torian  explains  this  movement  in  a  few  words,  and  tells  it  all. 

"  One  unexpected  combination  concerted  with  faultless  ability,  and 
suddenly  executed,  had  in  a  few  hours  made  General  Howe's  position 
at  Boston  untenable."  This  was  "  Grand  Strategy." 

General  Howe  immediately  detailed  Lord  Percy  with  twenty-four 
hundred  men  to  dislodge  the  Americans  from  Dorchester  Heights, 
The  command  moved  by  boats  to  Castle  Island  first,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  night  attack.  During  the  afternoon  a  storm  came  up 
from  the  south,  increasing  to  a  gale ;  rain  poured  in  torrents  all  night ; 
some  of  the  boats  were  driven  on  shore  and  the  project  was  abandoned. 

By  the  tenth  of  March  the  Americans  had  fortified  Nook's  Hill, 
and  this  drove  the  British  troops  from  Boston  Neck.  Eight  hundred 
shot  and  shell  were  thrown  into  the  city  during  that  night. 

On  the  morning  of  the  seventeenth  of  March,  the  British  troops 
embarked  in  one  hundred  and  twenty  crowded  transports  for  Halifax, 
the  total  force  including  seamen  of  the  fleet  being  not  quite  eleven 
thousand  men.  It  is  proper  to  say  that  historians  differ  as  to  the 
damage  done  to  private  property  by  the  retiring  garrison.  Distinc 
tions  of  property  are  always  lost  sight  of  in  war.  This  evil  attaches 
to  its  skirts  and  follows  its  track.  General  Howe  issued  an  order  for 
bidding  plunder,  and  he  is  entitled  to  this  credit.  Washington  did 
not  give  him  time  to  watch  its  execution,  but  took  charge  of  the  city 
himself  as  soon  as  possible. 

Five  thousand  troops  under  Ward  entered  as  the  last  boats  left. 

General  Putnam  was  placed  in  command,  and  on  the  twentieth 
Washington  entered  at  the  head  of  the  whole  army. 


154  CAMPAIGN  OF    1776.  [1776. 

For  ten  days  the  British  fleet  was  weather  bound  in  Nantasket 
Roads,  then  bore  away  for  Halifax.  Valuable  stores  were  left  be 
hind,  including  two  hundred  and  fifty  cannon,  half  of  them  serviceable, 
and  these  were  still  farther  increased  by  the  capture  of  store-vessels 
which  entered  the  harbor  without  knowledge  of  the  evacuation  of  the 
city. 

The  siege  of  Boston  was  at  an  -end.  Less  than  thirty  lives  had 
been  lost  during  the  investment,  and  New  England  was  freed  from 
the  presence  of  British  troops. 

NOTE.  A  manuscript  narrative  of  the  experience  of  Mr.  Edward  Stow  during  the 
siege  of  Boston,  besides  portrait  sketches  of  the  British  commanders,  relates  his  attending 
upon  a  performance  of  the  play,  "  Boston  Besieged,"  at  Faneuil  Hall,  in  company  with  his 
mother,  upon  the  invitation  of  Lieutenant  Haley  of  the  British  Fourth  regiment.  During 
the  play,  composed  by  General  Burgoyne,  and  on  the  night  of  March  3d,  "  one  cannon  ball 
from  the  American  batteries  whizzed  directly  over  the  roof,"  "  another  struck  Dr.  Cooper's 
Meeting  House."  It  was  the  first  demonstration  that  the  city  was  in  real  danger.  Mr. 
Stow  was  then  but  a  boy,  but  states,  that  he  remembers  perfectly  well  that  "  General  Bur 
goyne  suddenly  came  upon  the  stage,  and  ordered  the  officers  to  their  posts,"  and  that  him 
self  and  mother  were  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  a  sentry,  who  met  them  near  the  Liberty 
tree,  for  a  safe  escort  home.  Several  of  the  officers  were  his  mother's  guests,  Colonel  Cleve 
land  among  the  number.  On  one  occasion  he  accompanied  one  of  the  officers  to  the  Neck 
where  the  British  artillery  made  a  test  of  the  Roxbury  lines.  The  author  acknowledges  the 
courtesy  of  Mr.  A.  S.  Barnes  for  the  perusal  of  the  manuscript,  which  abounds  with  inci 
dents  of  interest 


CHAPTER   XXIV. 

WASHINGTON   AT  NEW   YORK.—  APRIL   TO  JULY,    1776. 


British  troops   evacuated  Boston  on    the    seventeenth   of 
March,  1776,  but  did  not  leave  Nantasket  Roads  until  ten  days 
afterward. 

Washington  had  reason  to  believe  that  General  Howe  would  make 
New  York  his  immediate  objective.  His  movement  to  Halifax  was 
such  a  grave  military  error,  that  its  apology  must  be  derived  from  the 
fact  that  his  fleet  transported  more  than  a  thousand  loyalists,  and  a 
large  quantity  of  their  personal  effects. 

The  British  government,  however,  had  not  held  on  to  Boston  so 
long,  without  some  suspicion  that  it  was  attaching  a  false  value  to  that 
occupation.  It  was  treating  a  post  as  vitally  important,  which  had 
no  strategic  value  whatever  in  determining  the  result  of  the  war.  As 
soon  as  it  became  impossible  to  break  up  the  investment,  the  base 
should  have  been  changed  to  one  which  had  real  offensive  value. 
Failure  in  an  immaterial  issue  only  gave  to  that  failure  a  gravity  far 
beyond  the  importance  of  the  issue  itself,  impaired  its  own  strength, 
and  developed  an  adversary  army  of  permanent  resistance. 

During  the  fall  of  1775,  Lord  Dartmouth,  as  appears  from  the 
British  archives,  expressly  advised  that  Boston  should  be  evacuated, 
and  that  Newport  or  New  York,  or  both,  should  be  occupied  by 
strong  armies  well  supported  by  a  competent  naval  force.  This  was 
not  a  random  suggestion,  but  it  appears  from  one  of  his  letters,  that 
he  considered  Newport  as  the  key  to  an  absolute  control  of  all  the 
New  England  colonies.  This  matter  has  been  adverted  to  under  the 
topic,  ''  Base  of  operations,"  and  is  again  mentioned  in  connection 
with  the  events  which  immediately  followed  the  enforced  evacuation 
of  Boston. 

Within  twenty-four  hours  after  General  Howe  embarked  his  com 
mand,  Washington  began  to  plan  for  the  future. 


156  WASHINGTON  AT  NEW   YORK.  [1776 

On  the  eighteenth  day  of  March,  and  before  the  main  army  had 
entered  Boston,  General  Heath  was  ordered  to  march  to  New  York 
with  five  regiments  of  infantry,  and  a  portion  of  the  field  artillery. 

On  the  twenty-seventh,  when  the  British  fleet  actually  put  to  sea 
and  left  the  coast,  he  ordered  the  whole  army  to  the  south,  with  the 
exception  of  five  regiments,  which  were  left  as  a  garrison  command^ 
under  Major  General  Ward.  On  the  same  day  General  Sullivan 
marched.  Another  division  marched  on  the  first  of  April  ;  and  on 
the  fourth  of  April,  General  Spencer  left,  with  the  last  brigade. 
General  Washington  started  for  New  York  that  evening. 

Owing  to  the  badness  of  the  roads,  which  threatened  to  delay  the 
troops,  and  the  great  number  of  small  inlets  from  Long  Island  Sound 
which  had  to  be  crossed,  or  avoided  by  a  march  through  Connecticut, 
Washington  requested  Governor  Trumbull  to  reinforce  the  New  York 
garrison  with  two  thousand  men  from  western  Connecticut,  and  also 
requested  the  commanding  officer  at  New  York  to  apply  to  the  Pro 
vincial  convention,  or  Committee  of  Safety  of  New  Jersey,  to  furnish 
a  thousand  men  for  the  same  purpose.  As  an  apology  for  this  addi 
tional  expense,  he  wrote  to  Congress — "  Past  experience,  and  the 
lines  in  Boston  and  on  Boston  Neck,  point  out  the  propriety  and  sug 
gest  the  necessity  of  keeping  our  enemies  from  gaining  possession 
and  making  a  lodgment. 

Before  leaving  Cambridge,  he  had  perfected  his  arrangements  for 
the  movement  of  the  army,  so  that  vessels  should  meet  the  regiments 
at  Norwich,  Connecticut,  and  thereby  save  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
seven  miles  of  land  travel ;  had  written  to  General  Lee,  who  had  been 
assigned  to  the  command  of  Canada  and  then  to  the  Southern  Depart 
ment,  that  he  must  not  take  south  with  him  the  guard  which  had 
been  detailed  from  regiments,  to  escort  him  to  New  York:  had  pre 
pared  detailed  instructions  for  Colonel  Mifflin,  Quarter-master  Gen 
eral,  under  which  he  was  to  procure  barracks,  forage,  quarters  and 
supplies  for  the  army,  by  the  time  of  its  arrival  at  New  York  :  had 
ordered  two  companies  of  artillery,  with  shot  and  shell,  to  report  to 
General  Thomas,  then  ordered  to  Canada,  vice  Lee,  ordered  south  : 
had  so  digested  an  itinerary  for  the  marching  divisions  and  brigades 
that  they  would  not  crowd  one  upon  another  during  their  march  : 
had  instructed  Arnold,  recently  promoted,  that  shot  and  shell  might 
be  made  at  a  furnace  not  far  from  Montreal :  had  proposed  a  new 
and  more  complete  system  for  keeping  the  pay  accounts  of  officers 
and  men  •  had  corresponded  with  the  governors  of  all  the  New  Eng- 


1776.]  WASHINGTON   AT   NEW   YORK.  157 

land  States,  upon  the  necessities  and  possible  contingencies  of  the 
crisis,  and  had  provided  for  the  anticipated  incursions  of  small  bodies 
of  the  enemy  upon  the  exposed  towns  of  the  New  England  coast. 

Such  were  some  of  the  branches  of  Logistics  which  underwent 
review,  and  left  him  free  to  go  to  his  new  head-quarters,  with  all  ante 
cedent  details  in  process  of  execution.  One  of  his  last  acts  was  to 
inquire  into  an  alleged  instance  of  an  officer  carrying  on  trade  in  sup 
plies  while  holding  a  commission  in  the  army. 

All  the  acts  referred  to  are  particularly  noteworthy  at  this  early 
stage  of  the  army  organization,  before  field  operations  had  been  prop 
erly  commenced. 

Washington's  journey  to  New  York  was  made  via  Providence, 
Norwich  and  New  London,  for  the  purpose  of  inspecting  and  expe 
diting  the  embarkation  of  the  troops.  His  first  act,  after  arrival  at 
his  destination,  was  to  detail  four  battalions  as  a  reinforcement  to 
the  army  in  Canada,  sending  them  by  water  to  Albany,  "  to  ease  the 
men  of  fatigue."  He  also  sent  five  hundred  barrels  of  provisions  to 
Schuyler's  command.  Brigadier  General  Thompson,  with  Colonels 
Greaton,  Patterson,  Bond  and  Poor,  accompanied  the  division,  which 
sailed  from  New  York  April  twenty-second. 

An  immediate  communication  to  the   New  York  Committee  of 
Safety  laid  down  the  law  that  further  correspondence  with  the  enemy 
must  cease  :  that  "  we  must  consider  ourselves  in  a  state  of  peace,  or 
war,  with  Great  Britain,"  and  enforced  his  views,  with  emphasis. 

Late  at  night  on  the  twenty-fifth,  Washington  received  an  order 
from  Congress  to  send  six  battalions  to  Canada,  in  addition  to  four 
already  sent,  and  requested  him  to  report,  at  once,  whether  addi 
tional  regiments  could  be  spared  for  that  purpose.  General  Sullivan 
accompanied  this  division,  and  with  him  were  such  men  as  Stark, 
Reed,  Wayne  and  Irvine.  Washington  declared  that  "  there  was 
danger  by  this  division  of  forces,  that  neither  army, — that  sent  to 
Canada,  and  that  kept  at  New  York,— would  be  sufficient,  because 
Great  Britain  would  both  attempt  to  relieve  Canada  and  capture  New 
York,  both  being  of  the  greatest  importance  to  them  "  if  they  have 
men." 

On  the  twenty-eighth  of  April,  the  whole  army  at  New  York 
amounted  to  ten  thousand  two  hundred  and  thirty-five  men,  of 
whom  eight  thousand  three  hundred  and  one  were  present,  and  fit 
for  duty. 

The  Orderly  Book  at  this  time  rebukes  certain  disorderly  conduct 


158  WASHINGTON   AT   NEW   YORK.  [1776 

of  the  soldiers,  in  these  memorable  words.  "Men  are  not  to  carve 
out  remedies  for  themselves.  If  they  are  injured  in  any  respect,  there 
are  legal  modes  to  obtain  relief,  and  just  complaints  will  always  be 
attended  to  and  redressed." 

Rhode  Island  called  for  troops  to  protect  her  ports,  and  two  regi 
ments  of  her  militia  were  taken  into  continental  pay. 

During  the  month  of  May,  advices  were  received  that  Great  Britain 
had  made  a  contract  with  various  European  States,  for  certain  mili 
tary  contingents  : — that  the  sentiment  in  Canada  had  been  changed 
to  that  of  antipathy,  and  that  continual  disaster  was  attending  all 
military  operations  in  that  Department.  On  the  twenty-fourth  of 
May  Washington  wrote  to  Schuyler  :  "  We  expect  a  very  bloody 
summer  at  New  York  and  Canada,  as  it  is  there,  I  presume,  that  the 
great  efforts  of  the  enemy  will  be  aimed,  and  I  am  sorry  to  say  that 
we  are  not  either  in  men  or  arms  prepared  for  it." 

General  Putnam  was  placed  in  command  at  New  York,  and  Gen 
eral  Greene  took  charge  of  the  defenses  on  Brooklyn  Heights  and  of 
their  completion. 

June  first,  Congress  resolved  that  six  thousand  additional  militia 
should  be  employed  from  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  Connec 
ticut,  and  New  York,  to  reinforce  the  army  in  Canada,  and  that  two 
thousand  Indians  should  be  hired  for  the  same  field  of  service. 

Three  commissioners,  Messrs.  Franklin,  Chase,  and  Carroll,  had  been 
appointed  by  Congress  February  fifteenth,  with  instructions  to  visit 
Canada,  and  learn  the  actual  condition  of  the  army  and  the  temper 
of  the  people.  These  gentlemen  accompanied  by  Rev.  John  Carroll, 
afterward  archbishop  of  Baltimore,  arrived  at  Montreal  on  the  twenty- 
ninth  day  of  April,  and  reported  that  "  negligence,  mismanagement, 
and  a  combination  of  unlucky  incidents  had  produced  a  confusion  and 
disorder  that  it  was  now  too  late  to  remedy."  The  ill  health  of  Dr. 
Franklin  compelled  his  immediate  return  ;  the  others  remained  until 
the  army  began  to  evacuate  Canada. 

To  the  proposition  to  hire  Indians,  General  Schuyler  replied  that, 
"if  this  number,  two  thousand,  can  be  prevented  from  joining  the 
enemy  it  is  more  than  can  be  expected.  They  have  but  one  maxim 
in  their  alliances  with  the  whites,  which  is  to  adhere  to  the  strongest 
side,  where  they  are  paid  most  liberally  and  run  the  least  risk." 

The  commissioners  wrote  from  Montreal,  giving  a  most  terrific 
picture  of  the  condition  of  the  troops,  "  who  were  thoroughly  dis 
organized,  half-starved,  and  visited  by  the  scourge  of  the  small  pox." 


1776.]  WASHINGTON  AT   NEW   YORK.  159 

General  VVooster  was  recalled  as  too  old,  inefficient,  and  ill-suited  to 
the  command. 

General  Thomas  died  of  the  small  pox  on  the  second  day  of  June, 
and  was  succeeded  in  command  by  General  Sullivan.  This  officer  had 
already  written  letters  to  General  Washington,  "  clearly  'ndicating 
that  he  was  aiming  at  the  command  of  Canada,"  but  he  failed  to  advise 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  actual  extremity  to  which  the  army 
had  been  reduced.  These  letters,  although  marked  personal,  were 
forwarded  to  Congress  with  the  following  comment. 

"  He  (Sullivan)  is  active,  spirited  and  zealously  attached  to  the 
cause.  He  has  his  wants  and  his  foibles.  The  latter  are  manifested 
in  his  little  tincture  of  vanity  which  now  and  then  leads  him  into 
embarrassments.  His  wants  are  common  to  us  all.  He  wants 
experience  to  move  on  a  large  scale  ;  for  the  limited  and  contracted 
knowledge  which  any  of  us  have  in  military  matters  stands  in  very 
little  stead,  and  is  quickly  overbalanced  by  sound  judgment  and  some 
acquaintance  with  men  and  books,  especially  when  accompanied  by 
an  enterprising  genius,  which  I  must  do  General  Sullivan  the  justice 
to  say,  I  think  he  possesses.  Congress  will  therefore  determine  upon 
the  propriety  of  continuing  him  in  Canada,  or  sending  another  as  they 
shall  see  fit." 

Gates  was  immediately  sent  to  take  command  of  the  troops  of  the 
United  Colonies  in  Canada,  with  power  to  appoint  his  own  staff  and 
a  department  staff,  and  a  large  discretion  over  officers  as  well  as  troops, 
and  over  their  appointment,  discipline,  and  removal  for  cause.  To 
General  Schuyler,  still  in  command  of  the  northern  department  below 
Canada,  was  entrusted  the  responsibility  of  making  a  treaty  with  the 
Six  Nations,  and  the  earliest  possible  completion  of  Fort  Stanwix. 

On  the  third  of  June,  Congress  resolved  to  reinforce  the  army  at 
New  York  by  thirteen  thousand  eight  hundred  militia  from  Pennsyl 
vania,  Delaware,  and  Maryland. 

By  the  twenty-ninth  of  June,  forty  British  ships  were  reported  as 
having  been  sighted  off  Sandy  Hook.  The  crisis  which  had  already 
visited  Canada  was  on  the  wing  for  New  York. 

Washington  in  connection  with  Putnam  had  previously  laid  out 
the  fortifications  which  bore  his  name,  had  critically  inspected  the 
progress  of  all  defenses  about  New  York,  and  entered  so  closely  into 
calculations  of  their  value  as  to  lay  down  the  following  instructions  for 
officers  and  men. 

"  Not  to  throw  away  fire  ;  fire  first  with  ball  and  shot,"  — "  that  the 


l6o  WASHINGTON  AT  NEW  YORK.  [1776 

brigadiers  should  order  a  circle  to  be  marked  round  the  several  re 
doubts,  by  which  their  officers  are  to  be  directed  in  giving  orders  for 
the  first  discharge."  "  Small  brush  to  be  set  up  to  mark  the  line  more 
distinctly,  and  make  it  more  familiar  to  the  men,  who  are  by  no  means 
to  be  ordered  to  fire  before  the  enemy  arrive  at  the  circle." 

Such  are  some  of  the  leading  military  features  of  Washington's 
career  while  at  New  York  during  the  early  summer  of  1776. 

The  colony  felt  confidence  in  his  capacity  and  judgment,  and  with 
the  exception  of  certain  special  localities,  the  people  were  meeting  his 
demand  for  means  and  supplies  with  as  much  promptness  and  cheer 
fulness  as  could  have  been  expected. 

Throughout  the  colonies  there  was  a  rapid  gravitation  toward  a 
permanent  union  and  the  assertion  of  national  independence. 

That  Declaration  was  made  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  1776.  It  was 
a  birthday  of  momentous  peril.  From  Canada  to  the  Carolinas,  the 
armies  and  fleets  of  Great  Britain  were  about  to  strike  together,  and 
still  the  people  faced  the  responsibility  squarely. 

Within  a  few  weeks  at  furthest,  the  blow  would  reach  New  York, 
and  yet,  before  it  fell,  the  other  fields  of  operation  were  to  be  heard 
from,  and  their  impressions  were  to  give  character  to  the  struggle. 

The  narrative  will  now  take  up  the  history  of  operations  within 
the  two  extreme  zones  of  active  war,  and  then  resume  the  history  of 
the  expedition  against  New  York. 

NOTE.  It  has  not  been  deemed  necessary  to  enter  into  the  details  of  General  Lee's 
brief  administration  while  at  New  York,  en  route,  to  the  South.  The  visit  of  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  ostensibly  to  visit  Governor  Tryon,  inspired  fears  that  he  would  bombard  the  city. 
Lee  threatened  summary  destruction  to  the  prisoners  and  property  of  loyalists,  if  a  gun  were 
fired.  He  was  energetic,  self-willed  and  efficient ;  but  forever  bore  with  impatience  the 
yoke  of  responsibility  to  Congress  for  his  official  acts. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

AMERICAN  ARMY  DRIVEN  FROM  CANADA. 

FIVE    thousand  men  perished    by  disease  or   the    casualties  of 
battle  during  the  last  two  months  of  the  campaign  for  the  con 
quest  of  Canada,  which  commenced  in   1775  and  ended  early  in  the 
summer  of  1776. 

Arnold's  expedition  reached  Quebec.     Montgomery  also  reached 
Quebec.     At  the  end  of  their  assault,  the  remnant  of  both  commands 
was  less  than  five  hundred  effective  men.     Up  to  March  first,  1776, 
including  all  reinforcements,  the  number  never  exceeded  seven  hun 
dred  able-bodied  men,  present  at  one  time  for  duty. 

During  the  month  of  March  the  army  increased  to  about  seven 
teen  hundred  effective    men.     The    detached  guards,  upon  Orleans 
Island,  at  Point  Levi  and  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  left  but  a  small 
force  to  protect  earth-works,  to  say  nothing  of  the  absurdity  of  any 
assault  upon  Quebec. 

Small-pox  broke  out  in  the  camp.  Many  enlistments  were  to 
expire  April  fifteenth,  and  no  rational  reason  could  be  urged  upon 
the  dispirited  men  to  induce  their  reenlistment. 

Supplies  became  scarce,  and  continental  money  had  no  value. 
Arnold  made  proclamation  on  the  fourth  of  March,  that  paper  money 
then  put  in  circulation,  would  be  redeemed  in  four  months,  and  that 
those  who  refused  to  take  it  should  be  treated  as  enemies.  Already 
every  promise  of  sympathy  from  the  people  had  vanished,  and  when 
General  Wooster  arrived  to  take  command  on  the  first  of  April,  he 
found  that  the  army  itself  was  fast  melting  away.  That  there  had 
been  much  kind  feeling  toward  the  colonies  on  the  part  of  very  many 
Canadians  is  manifest  from  the  success  which  attended  the  efforts  of 
Colonels  Livingston  and  Allen  and  Major  Brown  to  organize  Canadian 
battalions  as  soon  as  Montgomery  appeared  in  force  before  St.  John. 

Ramsey  writing  in  1793,  particularly  notices  the  fact  that  the  Amen- 
ii 


I6U  AMERICAN  ARMY  DRIVEN  FROM   CANADA.  [1776. 

can  express  messengers  freely  passed  between  Montreal  and  Quebec 
without  molestation,  everywhere  receiving  kind  treatment;  and  that 
a  Mr.  Price  actually  advanced  five  thousand  dollars  in  specie  to  relieve 
the  embarrassments  of  the  officers  who  could  not  purchase  supplies 
with  continental  money.  This  was  a  large  amount  when  it  is  con 
sidered  that  Congress  was  able  to  send  but  a  little  over  sixteen  thou 
sand  dollars,  at  a  time  when  a  hundred  thousand  was  actually  needed. 
On  the  second  day  of  April  General  Wooster  examined  the  Brit 
ish  works  and  declared  his  purpose  to  begin  active  work.  A  few 
small  cannon  and  two  small  mortars,  then  in  position,  were  vigorously 
exercised  to  see  what  they  could  do  :  but  their  light  metal  was  simply 
insignificant  and  made  no  impression  upon  the  parapets  of  Quebec. 

During  this  time,  scattered  all  the  way  from  Albany  on  the  Hud 
son  river  to  Montreal,  there  could  have  been  found  companies  of 
the  regiments  which  Congress  had  sent  to  Canada,  and  which  Wash 
ington  and  the  colonies  could  so  poorly  spare  at  such  a  crisis. 

On  the  day  of  Wooster's  sham  cannonading,  Arnold's  horse  fell 
with  him  and  bruised  his  wounded  limb,  so  that  he  was  confined  to  the 
bed,  and  to  his  reflections  upon  the  progress  of  the  campaign  thus 
far  realized.  As  soon  as  able  to  move  he  retired  to  Montreal  on  leave 
of  absence. 

As  spring  approached  and  the  ice  broke  up,  the  ground  thawed, 
and  it  became  simply  impossible  to  move  troops  over  the  intermediate 
country  to  their  support,  and  the  river  was  not  sufficiently  open  foi 
transportation  purposes.  On  the  first  of  May,  General  Thomas,  a 
man  of  culture,  wisdom  and  courage,  assumed  command  of  the  troops, 
then  amounting  to  hardly  nineteen  hundred  men,  of  whom  less  than 
a  thousand,  including  officers,  were  fit  for  duty.  Among  those  really 
effective,  not  less  than  three  hundred  claimed  a  discharge,  their  term 
of  legal  service  having  expired.  The  previous  separation  of  the  army 
into  detachments,  for  the  sake  of  blockading  Quebec  and  cutting  off 
supplies  from  the  country,  involved  the  constant  use  of  three  ferries, 
so  that  it  was  impossible  upon  any  short  notice  to  rally  more  than 
three  hundred  men  to  resist  an  attack,  and  even  the  medical  appoint 
ment'*  could  not  be  kept  up  to  their  best  efficiency. 

Ax  the  time  of  his  arrival  the  army  was  increased  to  the  nominal 
strength,  all  told,  of  about  three  thousand  men  ;  but  this  accession 
was  simply  a  contribution  to  the  grave,  a  stimulus  to  the  growing  dis 
like  of  the  provincials,  and  the  assurance  of  a  more  speedy  expendi 
ture  of  supplies  and  an  ultimate  retreat. 


1776.]  AMERICAN  ARMY   DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA.  163 

The  ice  was  moving  rapidly.  Reinforcements  were  known  to 
have  left  England  and  Ireland,  and  there  was  no  possibility  of  sub 
stantial,  offensive  activity. 

A  fire-ship  was  prepared  and  floated  toward  the  shipping  then  in 
the  channel,  but  it  did  no  harm,  and  the  men  in  charge  had  a  narrow 
escape  from  capture.  The  supply  of  powder  had  been  reduced  to 
one  hundred  and  fifty  barrels,  and  the  store  of  provisions  on  hand  was 
barely  sufficient  for  six  days  of  economical  use. 

A  council  of  war  was  held,  and  an  immediate  retreat  to  the  Three 
Rivers  was  decided  upon  as  the  only  means  of  saving  the  army  from 
starvation  or  capture. 

Orders  were  issued  for  the  embarkation  of  the  sick  and  the  artillery 
except  one  gun  ;  and  orders  were  also  sent  to  Orleans  Island,  Point  Levi, 
and  other  points  where  detachments  were  stationed,  in  order  to  make 
the  utmost  expedition  before  the  garrison  should  learn  of  the  design. 

On  the  very  next  day,  during  the  confusion  incident  to  the  emer 
gency,  the  frigate  Surprise,  the  Isis,  54>  and  the  sloop  of  war  Martin, 
arrived  with  two  companies  of  the  Twenty-ninth  regiment,  which  were 
promptly  landed  as  well  as  a  considerable  force  of  marines. 

General  Carleton  did  not  wait  for  these  new  forces  to  rest,  but 
sallying  forth  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  with  nearly  a  thousand 
men  and  six  pieces  of  artillery,  he  made  a  vigorous  attack  upon  the 
American  position.  One  piece  of  artillery,  and  about  three  hundred 
men  constituted  the  resisting  force  then  available,  and  General  Thomas 
wisely  retreated,  and  in  order,  but  with  necessary  precipitation. 

Nearly  a  hundred  prisoners,  beside  the  sick  in  hospital,  his  stores, 
baggage,  and  artillery  were  captured,  and  with  these,  nearly  two  tons 
of  powder,  and  five  hundred  muskets,  which  had  arrived  that  very 
morning  from  General  Schuyler.  Some  of  the  sick,  many  of  them 
still  suffering  with  the  small-pox,  dragged  themselves  along,  thoroughly 
desperate  in  their  purpose  to  work  their  way  homeward  rather  than 
remain  as  captives,  and  the  retrograde  movement  was  not  interrupted 
until  the  army  reached  Deschambault,  about  fifty-eight  miles  toward 
Montreal.  The  command  made  no  halt  during  the  march,  and  the 
night  was  one  of  fearful  terrors  to  the  hungry  and  weary  command, 
staggering  through  woods,  streams,  and  swamps,  with  everything  to 
discourage,  and  nothing  to  hope  for  except  to  escape  from  the  con 
quest  of  Canada. 

Dr.  Gordon  writing  from  Roxbury,  July  nineteenth  of  that  year, 
says,  "  Their  condition  could  not  be  expressed  in  words." 


164  AMERICAN  ARMY  DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA  [1776. 

The  army  rested  a  few  days  at  Deschambault.  A  council  of  war 
decided  that  there  could  be  no  safety  short  of  Sorel.  The  British 
fleet  had  followed  fast  after  them,  and  were  even  then  at  anchor 
at  Jacques  Cartier,  only  nine  miles  below  their  camp.  This  fleet  had 
been  largely  increased.  On  the  eighth  of  May,  the  Niger  ship  of  war 
arrived  from  Halifax,  convoying  three  transports  and  bringing  the 
Forty-seventh  regiment,  and  on  the  tenth  the  Triton  arrived  with 
other  transports  loaded  with  veterans  and  the  European  contingent. 

General  Thomas  proceeded  directly  to  Sorel,  where  he  found  four 
regiments  awaiting  orders.  Additional  battalions  arrived  in  a  few 
days.  Here  he  was  taken  down  with  the  small-pox,  and  died  on  the 
second  June. 

On  the  first  of  June,  General  Riedesel  arrived  with  Brunswick 
troops,  and  Burgoyne  with  troops  from  Ireland.  These  reinforce 
ments  swelled  the  command  of  General  Carleton  to  nine  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  eighty-four  effective  men,  and  preparations  were 
made  to  take  the  offensive  in  force,  and  expel  the  American  troops 
from  Canada. 

General  Sullivan  arrived  at  Sorel  on  the  sixth  of  June,  and  assumed 
command.  His  words  were  to  the  point.  "  I  can  reduce  the  army 
to  order,  and  put  a  new  face  upon  our  affairs  here." 

To  Washington  he  wrote, — "  I  am  determined  to  hold  the  most 
important  posts,  so  long  as  one  stone  is  left  upon  another."  He  did 
not  appreciate  the  position,  neither  did  Congress. 

A  single  minor  operation  of  this  disastrous  campaign  is  worthy  of 
mention  at  this  stage  of  the  narrative. 

There  is  a  narrow  pass  in  the  St.  Lawrence  river  above  Perrot 
Island,  nearly  forty-three  miles  above  Montreal,  and  a  projecting 
point  called  the  Cedars. 

Sir  John  Johnson,  who  had  previously  stirred  up  Indian  aggression 
upon  New  York  settlements,  had  received  a  British  commission  as 
Colonel,  and  was  engaged  in  exciting  the  Indians  of  the  north-west, 
and  from  Detroit  eastward,  to  offensive  movements  against  the 
American  forces  then  in  Canada. 

Colonel  Bedell  of  New  Hampshire,  who  had  been  associated  with 
Colonel  Livingston  and  Major  Brown  in  the  capture  of  Chambly, 
during  1775,  had  been  assigned  to  post  command  at  the  Cedars  with  a 
garrison  force  of  three  hundred  and  ninety  troops  and  two  field  pieces. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  May  a  hostile  force  consisting  of  forty  regulars 
of  the  Eighth  regiment  from  Detroit,  one  hundred  Canadians,  and 


1776.]  AMERICAN  ARMY   DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA.  165 

five  hundred  savages  under  Colonel  Beadle  and  Captain  Foster,  but 
without  artillery,  descended  from  the  lakes  and  approached  the  fort. 

Colonel  Bedell  hastened  to  Montreal  for  reinforcements,  leaving 
Major  Butterfield  in  command. 

Major  Sherburne  started  for  the  fort  the  next  day  with  one  hun 
dred  and  forty  men,  and  was  soon  followed  by  General  Arnold  with  a 
still  larger  detachment.  The  facts  as  stated  by  Gordon,  Stedman, 
Marshall,  Bancroft,  and  other  writers,  British  and  American,  do  not 
substantially  differ  from  the  finding  of  the  standing  committee  upon 
Indian  affairs  which  was  reported  to  Congress,  and  adopted  by  that 
body  on  the  tenth  of  July,  1776,  except  as  to  the  extent  of  injury 
done  by  the  Indians.  Congress  received  an  exaggerated  report  of  the 
matter.  A  brother  of  General  Sullivan,  who  was  one  of  the  prisoners, 
wrote  shortly  after  the  so-called  massacre  that  "  Captain  Foster  treated 
them  well  after  the  surrender,  or  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability." 

The  transaction  is  memorable  as  one  of  the  incidents  attending  the 
evacuation  of  Canada,  and  more  particularly  as  the  occasion  of  a 
formal  notice  to  Generals  Howe  and  Burgoyne  on  the  part  of  Con 
gress,  that  the  Americans  would  measure  out  exact  and  literal  retal 
iation  for  any  departure  from  the  rules  and  usages  of  honorable  war 
fare.  Major  Butterfield  having  plenty  of  ammunition  and  provisions 
for  nearly  thirty  days,  without  permitting  his  officers  to  sally  out  and 
attack  the  enemy  as  they  desired  to  do,  surrendered  his  whole  com 
mand  upon  the  simple  condition  that  they  should  be  prisoners  to  the 
British  forces  and  not  to  the  Indians,  and  that  their  baggage  should 
not  be  plundered. 

On  the  day  following,  Major  Sherburne,  who  brought  reinforce 
ments,  was  attacked  as  he  approached  the  fort,  and  fought  with  great 
courage  for  nearly  an  hour,  but  finally  surrendered,  when  hotly  pressed 
by  superior  numbers,  and  upon  advices  of  the  fate  of  the  garrison. 
A  cartel  of  exchange  was  enforced,  coupled  with  the  condition  that 
"  they  would  not  in  words,  writing  or  signs,  give  the  least  informa 
tion  to  government  enemies,  or  to  their  adherents  now  in  arms,  in  the 
least  prejudice  to  his  majesty's  service,"  thus  practically  doubling  the 
exchange,  and  this  was  made  the  condition  of  their  exemption  from 
Indian  outrage. 

Captain  Foster  stated  in  the  preamble  to  the  cartel,  that  he  "  found 
from  their  threats  and  menaces  that  the  inevitable  consequences  of 
savage  custom,  to  put  prisoners  to  death,  would  ensue  ;"  hence  the 
stipulations  made. 


1 66  AMERICAN  ARMY   DRIVEN  FROM   CANADA.     .  [1776. 

The  British  took  a  strong  position  at  Vaudreuil  and  Perrot  Island. 
Arnold,  with  seven  hundred  men,  made  an  attempt  to  dislodge  them 
and  rescue  the  prisoners,  but  the  British  commander  so  positively 
threatened  to  turn  the  prisoners  over  to  the  Indians  in  case  of  attack, 
that  Arnold  himself  signed  the  proposed  cartel,  withdrew  from  St. 
Anne  to  La  Chine  and  then  returned  to  Montreal.  It  was  an  illus 
tration  of  the  far  reaching  effects  of  the  cowardice  or  incompetency  of 
a  single  post  commander. 

The  narrative  left   General  Sullivan  at  Sorel,  and   General   Carle 
ton  on  the  eve  of  aggressive  action. 

The  rendezvous  appointed  for  the  advancing  British  troops  was 
at  Three  Rivers,  about  equally  distant  from  Montreal  and  Quebec, 
and  General  Fraser  had  taken  command  of  that  station. 

Burgoyne,  Riedesel  and  Phillips  had  started  by  land  and  water, 
to  concentrate  the  army  at  that  point. 

General  Nesbit  was  near  Three  Rivers,  on  transports,  under  con 
voy.  Gordon  puts  the  British  effective  force  at  thirteen  thousand 
men  but  he  makes  no  allowance  for  the  percentage  of  non-effectives, 
clerks  and  detachments,  which  reduce  an  army  within  twenty-four 
hours  after  a  regular  muster.  Few  of  the  battalions  sent  to  America 
were  full,  and  any  estimate  of  forces  based  merely  upon  the  number  of 
battalions,  is  invariably  an  error. 

At  this  stage  of  affairs,  General  Sullivan  having  a  force  of  about 
five  thousand  men  at  Sorel,  called  a  council  of  war  and  resolved  to 
occupy  and  hold  Three  Rivers.  He  was  under  the  impression  that 
the  British  force  at  that  post  was  less  than  seven  hundred  men, 
probably  not  more  than  five  hundred  for  duty. 

Colonel  St.  Clair  was  already  at  Nicholet  with  nearly  eight  hun 
dred  men.  Colonels  Wayne,  Maxwell  and  Irvine,  with  sufficient  force 
to  make  an  aggregate  of  two  thousand  men,  were  sent  down  the  river 
and  through  Lake  St.  Peter  to  join  him.  The  command  of  the  expe 
dition  was  assigned  to  General  Thompson. 

Chief  Justice  Marshall,  in  his  life  of  Washington,  supplies  a  fact  in 
this  connection  which  reconciles  other  historical  accounts,  and  shows 
that  during  the  four  days  which  intervened  between  the  death  of 
General  Thomas  and  the  arrival  of  General  Sullivan,  General  Thomp 
son  was  in  command,  and  that  he  sent  St.  Clair  to  Nicholet  for  the  pur 
pose  of  surprising  the  British  post  at  Three  Rivers.  General  Thomp 
son,  under  the  order  of  General  Sullivan,  whom  he  must  have  advised 
of  the  state  of  affairs,  on  his  arrival,  reached  Nicholet,  a  little  after 


AMERICAN  ARMY  DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA.  167 

midnight,  or  early  in  the  morning,  of  the  seventh  of  June.  He  kept 
his  command  under  cover  during  the  day,  and  crossed  the  St.  Law 
rence  early  in  the  evening  of  the  seventh,  landing  at  Point  Du  Lac. 
Their  movement  was  not  a  secret.  If  it  had  been,  the  result  would 
have  been  fully  as  disastrous.  With  morning  light  they  found  them 
selves  flanked  by  a  swamp  and  compelled  to  march  along  the  river. 
This  exposed  them  to  the  fire  of  the  shipping  which  they  had  safely 
passed  under  cover  of  the  night,  to  the  fire  of  artillery  which  hac' 
been  landed  on  the  beach  by  General  Fraser,  to  conflict  with  a  force 
three  times  their  number,  and  to  a  class  of  risks  never  contemplated 
in  their  detail  "  to  take  and  occupy  Three  Rivers." 

Where  Wayne  went  there  was  a  fight,  always.  That  was  his 
business. 

Bancroft  thus  sums  up  the  scene  :  *'  The  short  darkness  of  that 
latitude  was  soon  over ;  as  day  began  to  appear,  the  Americans,  who 
were  marching  under  the  bank  of  the  river,  were  cannonaded  from  the 
ships  ;  undismayed  they  took  their  way  through  a  thickly  wooded 
swamp,  above  their  knees  in  mud  and  water  ;  and  after  a  most  weari 
some  struggle  of  four  hours  reached  an  open  piece  of  ground,  where 
they  endeavored  to  form.  Wayne  began  the  attack  and  forced  the 
party  to  run  ;  his  companions  then  pressed  forward  in  column  against 
the  breast-works,  which  covered  the  main  body  of  the  enemy.  They 
displayed  undisputed  gallantry  ;  but  being  outnumbered  three  to  one, 
were  compelled  to  retire." 

The  battle  was  soon  over.  One  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  were 
left  in  the  hands  of  the  British  troops,  including  General  Thompson 
and  Colonel  Irvine. 

The  men,  scattered  and  disheartened,  found  their  boats,  and  Three 
Rivers  was  not  taken. 

Sullivan  wrote — "  I  now  think  only  of  a  glorious  death,  or  a  vic 
tory  obtained  against  superior  numbers." 

The  Congressional  commission  had  already  advised  that  Canada 
be  abandoned.  Congress,  however,  voted  to  sustain  the  offensive  and 
was  still  legislating  to  maintain  that  army  as  late  as  July  eighth.  Sul 
livan's  officers  finally  advised  retreat. 

The  British  fleet  came  up  the  river  under  a  favorable  wind  on  the 
fourteenth  of  June,  and  when  they  were  within  one  hour's  sail  of  Sorel, 
.Sullivan  broke  up  his  camp  and  started'  for  St.  John's. 

Arnold  held  on  to  Montreal  with  three  hundred  men  until  the  fleet 


1 68  AMERICAN  ARMY  DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA.  [1770. 

was  within  twelve  miles  of  the  city,  and  then  crossed  to  La  Prairie, 
without  interruption. 

Sergeant  Lamb,  of  the  Royal  Welsh  Fusileers,  then  a  private  sol 
dier,  published  his  diary  of  the  events  of  that  campaign.  He  says — 
"The  sufferings  of  the  Americans  were  indeed  great,  obliged  to  drag 
their  batteries  up  the  rapids  of  the  Sorel,  by  mere  strength,  often  to 
their  middle  in  water,  and  encumbered  with  great  numbers  laboring 
under  that  dreadful  disease,  the  small-pox,  which  is  so  fatal  in  Amer 
ica.  It  was  said  that  two  regiments,  at  one  time,  had  not  a  single 
man  in  health,  another  had  only  six,  and  a  fourth  only  forty,  and  two 
more  were  nearly  in  the  same  condition.  While  the  Americans  were 
retreating,  they  were  daily  annoyed  by  the  remonstrances  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Canada,  who  had  either  joined  or  befriended  them. 
Many  of  the  Canadians  had  taken  a  decided  part  in  their  favor,  ren 
dered  them  essential  services,  and  thereby  incurred  the  heavy  penal 
ties  annexed  to  the  crime  of  supporting  rebellion.  These,  though 
Congress  had  assured  them  but  a  few  months  before,  that,  *  they 
would  never  abandon  them  to  the  fury  of  their  common  enemies  ' 
were  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  left  exposed  to  the  resentment  of 
their  rulers." 

On  the  seventeenth,  says  Bancroft,  "  all  that  was  left  of  the  in 
vading  army  met  at  St.  John's." 

"  On  the  eighteenth,  the  emaciated,  half-naked  men,  broken  in 
strength  and  in  discipline,  too  weak  to  have  beaten  off  an  assault 
from  the  enemy,  as  pitiable  a  spectacle  as  could  be  seen,  removed  to 
Isle  Aux  Noix,  where  Sullivan  proposed  to  await  express  orders  from 
Schuyler."  This  island  was  low,  badly  supplied  with  water,  and  so 
unhealthy,  that  Sullivan  retired  to  Isle  La  Motte,  where  he  received 
orders  from  General  Schuyler  to  retire  to  Crown  Point,  which  post  he 
reached  during  July. 

Colonel  Trumbull  visited  the  post,  and  thus  states  the  condi 
tion  of  the  troops.  "  I  did  not  look  into  a  tent  or  hut  in  which  I  did 
not  find  either  a  dead  or  dying  man."  "  I  wept  till  I  had  no  more 
power  to  weep,"  said  a  physician  who  attended  the  troops. 

"  Everything  about  them,  their  clothes,  their  blankets,  the  air, 
the  very  ground  they  trod  on,  was  infected  with  the  pestilence." 
"  More  than  thirty  new  graves  were  made  every  day." 

Sergeant  Lamb's  statement  was  not  exaggerated.  The  official 
muster  rolls  showed  that  on  account  of  sickness  or  inoculation,  there 
were  single  regiments  without  a  man  fit  for  duty. 


1776.]  AMERICAN  ARMY   DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA.  169 

Canada  was  free  from  the  pressure  of  American  troops.  Burgoyne 
re-occupied  St.  John's.  Gates  had  superseded  Sullivan,  and  he  was 
promised  additional  troops  to  the  number  of  six  thousand  men,  viz., 
three  from  Massachusetts,  fifteen  hundred  from  Connecticut,  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  from  New  Hampshire,  and  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  from  New  York  ;  but  none  entered  Canada.  The  death  of  Mont 
gomery  was  the  pivot  event  of  the  entire  campaign. 

His  plan  contemplated  the  establishment  of  strong  posts  at  Jacques 
Cartier,  the  Narrows,  and  at  Montreal,  and  the  occupation  of  the  plains 
of  Abraham  by  ten  thousand  men.  More  than  this  number  was 
actually  assigned  to  operations  in  Canada,  but  if  all  had  reached 
Quebec,  they  could  not  have  been  maintained  at  that  number,  unless 
all  other  operations  were  sacrificed. 

A  committee  of  Congress  gave  good  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the 
invasion,  viz.,  undertaken  too  late  in  the  fall, —  enlistments  too  short  and 
the  consequent  haste  which  forced  immature  expeditions  for  fear  there 
would  be  no  men  to  undertake  them — want  of  specie,  and  the  small- 


CHAPTER   XXVI. 

BRITISH   PREPARATIONS.     CLINTON'S   EXPEDITION   UNFOLDED. 

IT  will  give  interest   to  the   narrative  to  introduce  to  the  reader 
those  British  regiments  which  were  assigned  to  duty  in  America, 
early  in  the  year  1776,  so  that  they,  as  well  as  the  American  officers 
who  figured  early  in  the  war,  may  be  recognized  as  acquaintances  when 
the  battle  issues  shall  bring  them  face  to  face. 


STATIONED   IN   BOSTON. 


1 7th  Dragoons  .     Preston's. 


4th  Foot 

5th  " 

loth  " 

22d  " 

23d  •' 

35th  " 

38th  " 

4oth  " 


Hodgsin's. 

Percy's. 

Sandford's. 

Gage's. 

Howe's. 

F.  H.  Campbell' 

Pigot's. 

Hamilton's. 


43d  Foot 

44th  " 

45th  " 

47th  " 

49th  " 

52d  " 

63d  «• 

64th  " 

65th  " 


Gary's. 

Abercrombie  s. 

Haviland's. 

Carleton's. 

Maitland's. 

Clavering's. 

T.  Grant's. 

Pomeroy's. 

Armstrong's. 


A  detachment  of  the  65th  regiment  was  then  at  Halifax. 

Five  companies  of  the  Royal  Artillery  were  also  stationed  at  Boston. 

THEN   IN   CANADA. 

7th  Foot     .     .     .    Berlier's.  26th  Foot,     .     Lord  W.  Gordon's. 

8th      "       ...     Armstrong's. 

This  regiment  was  in  charge  of  the  upper,  or  western  parts  of  Canada,  including 
Niagara  and  Detroit.  One  company  of  Royal  Artillery  was  at  Quebec,  one  at  Mon 
treal,  and  one  "invalid"  company  at  Newfoundland.  McLean's  regiment  was  par 
tially  organized  in  Canada,  and  its  service  has  already  been  noticed. 

AT   ST.   AUGUSTINE. 

One  company  of  Royal  Artillery,  and  part  of  the  I4th  Foot,  Cunningham's.  The 
other  companies  were  with  Lord  Dunmore  in  Virginia,  or  at  Halifax. 

ON   THEIR  PASSAGE   FROM   IRELAND   TO    BOSTON. 

1 7th  Foot        .     .     Monkton's.  46th  Foot    .     .     .     Vaughan's. 

27th     "...     Massey's.  53d      "       ...     James  Grant's. 


170* 


I776.J  BRITISH   PREPARATIONS.  I /I 

READY   TO   SAIL   FROM   CORK   TO   AMERICA. 

1 5th  Foot  .     .     .     Cavans'.  420!  Foot  ..     .     .     Lord  Murray's. 

33d       "         .     .     Cornwallis'.  54th   "       ...     Frederick's. 

37th      "         .     .     Coote's.  57th   "       .     .     .     Irwin's. 

ORDERED    FOR   BOSTON. 

1 6th  Dragoons,  Burgoyne's,  and  one  thousand  of  the  King's  Guards,  to  be  drafted 
from  three  regiments,  to  be  commanded  by  Colonel  Matthews. 

The  29th  Foot,  destined  for  Quebec,  were  ordered  to  sail  so  as  to  arrive  as  early 
as  the  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  would  permit.  It  has  been  already  noticed 
how  that  regiment  obeyed  the  order  to  the  very  letter. 

ORDERED   TO    BE   IN    READINESS    FOR   EMBARKATION    TO    SAIL    FROM    IRELAND 
TO   QUEBEC   IN   APRIL,    1776. 

9th  Foot  .     .     .     Ligonier's.  34th  Foot  .     .     Lord  Cavendish's. 

2oth     "...     Parker's.  53d       "     .     .     Elphinstone's. 

24th     "...     Taylor's.  62d       "     .     .     Jones. 

The  two  Highland  battalions,  viz.,  Lord  John  Murray's  and 
Fraser's,  were  to  consist  each  of  one  thousand  men.  The  marching 
regiments  for  the  American  service  were  to  consist  of  twelve  com 
panies  of  fifty-six  rank  and  file,  each  company,  while  two  companies 
of  each  battalion  were  to  remain  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  for 
recruiting  purposes. 

It  will  be  seen  that  each  battalion  sent  to  America  only  six  com 
panies,  instead  of  eight,  two  battalions  forming  the  regiment.  The 
use  of  the  term  battalion  in  connection  with  the  British  army,  will 
therefore  be  construed  nominally  as  half  a  regiment ;  while  the  Ameri 
can  regiments  had  but  one  battalion,  and  the  terms  are,  ordinarily,  con 
vertible  expressions  when  referring  to  the  latter  army. 

The  nominal  colonel  of  a  British  regiment  then,  as  since,  may  also 
be  a  general  officer,  and  the  American  reader  will  do  well  to  bear  this 
in  mind,  since  Percy,  Grant,  Cornwallis,  Pigot,  and  many  colonels 
already  named,  are  scarcely  known  to  popular  history,  except  by  thei* 
high  rank,  which  was  in  the  nature  of  a  brevet. 

The  recruits  for  the  regiments  ordered  to  America  were  especially 
enlisted  to  be  discharged  at  the  end  of  three  years,  or  at  the  end  of 
the  war,  at  the  option  of  the  king. 

During  the  winter  of  1775-6,  the  British  government  entered  into 
treaties  with  the  landgrave  of  Hesse  Cassel,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
and  the  hereditary  prince  of  Hesse  Cassel,  ruling  the  principality  of 
Hanau,  by  which  men  were  hired  to  do  military  service  in  America. 
This  was  done  by  arbitrary  impressment.  The  force  thus  furnished 
amounted  to  seventeen  thousand  and  three  hundred  men. 


1^2  BRITISH   PREPARATIONS. 

The  prince  of  Waldeck  also  tendered  a  regiment  which  was 
accepted,  and  with  other  troops  from  that  state  was  sent  forth  under 
the  command  of  the  veteran  Baron  Riedesel. 

There  never  was  a  doubt  among  military  men  as  to  the  bad  mili 
tary  policy  of  this  arrangement.  The  men  were  paid  by  their  own 
state,  but  the  state  was  paid  a  much  larger  rate  by  Great  Britain,  so 
that  it  was  a  speculation  entirely ;  but  it  robbed  the  English  crown 
of  prestige,  maddened  the  colonists,  and  was  unworthy  of  a  great 
nation  which  was  still  claiming  from  the  colonies  the  allegiance  due 
to  paternal  authority. 

These  treaties  were  stubbornly  opposed  in  both  houses  of  parlia 
ment.  A  few  extracts  from  the  debate  will  illustrate  the  principles 
laid  down  under  the  title  "  statesmanship  in  war." 

"  An  army  of  foreigners  is  now  to  be  introduced  into  the  British 
dominion,  not  to  protect  them  from  invasion,  not  to  deliver  them 
from  the  ravages  of  an  hostile  army,  but  to  assist  one  half  of  the 
inhabitants  in  massacring  the  other,"  said  the  duke  of  Richmond, 
adding:  "Unprovided  with  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  for  the 
cruel  purpose  designed,  or  unable  to  prevail  upon  the  natives  of  this 
country  (England)  to  lend  their  hands  to  such  a  sanguinary  business, 
ministers  have  applied  to  those  foreign  princes  who  trade  in  human 
blood,  and  have  hired  armies  of  mercenaries  for  the  work  of  destruc 
tion."  "  The  colonies  themselves,  after  our  example,  will  apply  to 
strangers  for  assistance." 

The  bill  passed  the  Commons  by  a  vote  of  242  to  88,  and  the 
House  of  Lords  by  a  vote  of  100  to  32.  A  protest  was  made  in  strong 
words,  one  single  sentence  of  which  will  illustrate  the  folly  of  the 
policy,  and  its  bearings  upon  the  future.  "  We  have  reason  to  appre 
hend  that  when  the  colonies  come  to  understand  that  Great  Britain  is 
forming  alliances  and  hiring  foreign  troops  for  their  destruction,  they 
may  think  that  they  are  well  justified  by  the  example  in  endeavoring 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  like  assistance,  and  that  France,  Spain,  and 
Prussia,  or  other  powers  of  Europe  may  think  they  have  as  good  right 
as  Hesse,  Brunswick,  and  Hanau  to  interfere  in  our  domestic  quarrels. 

Lord  Inham  declared,  that,  "  the  landgrave  of  Hesse  had  his  pro 
totype  in  Sancho  Panza,  who  said  that  if  he  were  a  prince  he  should 
wish  all  his  subjects  to  be  blackamoors,  so  that  he  could  turn  them 
into  money  by  selling  them  ;  that  Hesse  and  Brunswick  rendered 
Germany  vile  and  dishonored  in  the  eyes  of  Europe, — a  nursery  of 
men  for  those  who  have  most  money." 


1776.]  BRITISH   PREPARATIONS.  1/3 

The  King  wrote  personal  letters  to  Catharine  of  Russia,  asking  for 
twenty  thousand  men.  She  replied  "  that  there  were  other  means  of 
settling  the  dispute  in  America,  than  by  force  of  arms,"  and  declined 
to  furnish  any,  although  the  application  was  made  for  a  much  less 
force,  subsequently  to  the  first  refusal. 

The  States-General  of  Holland  were  also  requested  by  the  king 
to  dispose  of  their  Scotch  brigade,  for  service  in  America;  but  the 
proposition  was  declined  and  strict  neutrality  was  maintained. 

During  the  war  that  followed,  Brunswick  furnished  a  total  of  seven 
thousand  and  twenty-three  men,  "  amounting,"  says  Bancroft,  "  to 
more  than  one-sixth  of  the  able-bodied  men  of  the  principality." 

The  Hessian  force  originally  designated  at  four  thousand  men,  was 
ultimately  increased  to  twelve  thousand,  besides  three  corps  of  artil 
lery,  three  hundred  chasseurs  and  three  hundred  dragoons. 

Lieutenant  Generals  De  Heister  and  Knyphausen  commanded 
these  troops,  the  former  having  senior  command.  Among  the 
Colonels,  Donop,  Rahl,  Wurmb-Minigerode  and  Loos  were  better 
known  than  others,  in  their  connection  with  the  wars. 

If  Great  Britain  had  drafted  from  England  and  Wales,  a  quota 
of  troops,  proportionally  equal  to  the  drain  made  upon  the  industry 
of  Hanau  and  Hesse  Cassel,  through  those  treaties,  she  would  have 
raised  an  army  of  more  than  four  hundred  thousand  men. 

It  is  the  affirmation  of  history  that  Hesse  Cassel,  Brunswick  and 
Hanau  matured  bitter  fruit  by  their  sale  of  men,  and  that  it  did  not 

Pay- 
According  to  the  estimate  laid  before  parliament,  there  would 
be,  including  the  foreign  mercenaries,  about  fifty-five  thousand  men 
for  American  service  without  counting  Canadians,  Indians  and  other 
Loyalists,  who  were  estimated  at  four  thousand  more  ;  and  that  the 
greatest  possible  allowance  for  possible  deficiencies  could  not  reduce 
the  number  below  forty  thousand. 

These  troops  were  put  in  motion  with  commendable  activity.  Sir 
Peter  Parker  and  Earl  Cornwallis  were  ready  to  sail  from  Cork  by  the 
twentieth  of  January,  but  were  detained  until  the  thirteenth  of  Feb 
ruary,  through  technicalities  as  to  the  authority  of  the  king  ;  and  legis 
lation  was  deemed  necessary  by  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland 
before  he  would  permit  the  departure  of  the  expedition. 

The  squadron  consisted  of  forty-three  vessels  and  more  than 
twenty-five  hundred  troops  ;  but  it  had  not  left  the  Irish  Channel 
before  a  severe  storm  drove  many  of  the  ships  to  Cork,  Plymouth, 


1/4  BRITISH   PREPARATIONS.  [1776 

Portsmouth  and   other  harbors   for  refuge.     The   larger  portion  was 
speedily  collected  and  sailed  for  Cape  Fear  river,  North  Carolina. 

Meanwhile,  the  loyal  governors  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina 
were  doing  their  part  in  the  preparation  for  active  operations  under 
instructions  from  the  king.  In  the  former  colony,  Lord  Dunmore  had 
already  armed  slaves  and  thus  held  out  the  threat  of  a  servile  war  ; 
but  the  influence  of  Lee  and  Henry  and  other  men  of  strong  will, 
and  their  self-sacrifice  and  wide-spread  popularity,  kept  him  under 
some  restraint,  since  he  had  not  the  force  for  a  boldly  offensive  action. 

Governor  Martin,  of  North  Carolina,  had  promised  the  king  to 
raise  ten  thousand  men  and  that  number  of  arms  had  been  ordered  to 
the  colony.  Upon  receiving  positive  assurance  that  the  regular  troops, 
applied  for  during  the  fall  of  1775,  had  been  detailed,  and  ordered 
to  sail  for  Wilmington,  he  began  to  assert  vice-regal  powers.  Not 
daring  to  trust  himself  away  from  Wilmington  and  the  ship  which  was 
both  his  head-quarters  and  home,  he  appointed  one  Donald  McDonald 
to  the  office  of  Brigadier  General,  gave  Donald  McLeod  the  next 
position,  and  sent  them  out  with  thirteen  other  Scotchmen,  to  raise  an 
army  for  the  king.  They  induced  him  to  believe  that  at  least  four 
thousand  men  could  be  put  under  arms  before  the  arrival  of  regular 
troops.  A  force  of  nearly  eighteen  hundred  men  was  gathered,  and 
on  the  twenty-seventh  of  February  they  attacked  the  Wilmington 
and  Newbern  minute-men  and  the  militia  of  Craven,  Johnson,  Dobbs 
and  Wake  counties,  who  were  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Caswell, 
afterward  Brigadier  General,  and  Colonel  Lillington,  at  Moore's  Creek 
Bridge. 

The  result  of  this  hot  skirmish  was  quickly  determined.  McDonald 
was  taken  prisoner ;  McLeod,  Campbell  and  several  other  leaders  were 
killed,  and  the  whole  command  was  dispersed.  Thirteen  wagons, 
three  hundred  and  fifty  muskets,  nearly  fifteen  hundred  country  rifles 
and  two  medicine  chests,  just  from  England,  were  among  the  trophies 
which  the  colonists  bore  away  in  triumph.  A  box  of  gold  of  the  value 
of  fifteen  thousand  pounds  sterling,  which  was  the  chief  reliance  of 
McDonald  in  his  work  of  recruiting,  was  another  acquisition  of  the  day. 

This  event  happened  quite  opportunely  for  the  Americans.  Gen 
eral  Lee  had  been  ordered  to  the  Southern  department,  and  it  was 
known  that  General  Clinton  intended  to  attack  the  coast  at  some 
eligible  point.  During  the  few  weeks  following  the  affair  at  Moore's 
Creek  Bridge,  nearly  nine  thousand  citizens  of  the  colony  organized 
in  behalf  of  the  common  cause  of  colonial  independence. 


I776.J  BRITISH   PREPARATIONS.  1/5 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  North  Carolina  ever  after  was  conspic 
uously  faithful  to  her  obligations,  and  no  local  organization  gained  any 
considerable  headway  against  the  national  sentiment  of  the  people. 

Colonel  Moore  was  in  command  of  the  Continental  regulars,  and 
the  advent  of  Clinton  was  anticipated  without  apprehension.  The 
colonists  were  ready. 

On  the  third  of  May,  Sir  Peter  Parker  and  Earl  Cornwallis  entered 
Cape  Fear  river  with  twenty  transports. 

General  Clinton  had  already  reached  Wilmington,  After  leaving 
New  York,  he  first  entered  Chesapeake  Bay  to  have  a  conference  with 
Governor  Dunmore. 

During  the  month  of  April,  beginning  with  the  eighteenth,  when 
the  Ann  and  Isabella  arrived  with  a  part  of  the  Seventeenth  regiment, 
thirteen  transports  had  reached  Cape  Fear  river  in  advance  of  the 
flag-ship. 

The  united  forces  of  Clinton,  General  Vaughan,  and  Earl  Cornwallis 
were  too  large  to  be  of  special  service  upon  the  North  Carolina  coast, 
and  Charleston  was  finally  adopted  as  objective  of  attack.  Before  his 
departure,  Clinton,  acting  under  instructions  from  the  king,  issued 
from  on  board  the  Pallas  transport,  a  formal  proclamation  of  an  un 
popular  nature,  denouncing  persistent  rebels,  conventions  and  con 
gresses  ;  offering  pardon  to  all  penitents  except  Colonel  Howe,  of  the 
continental  army,  and  Mr.  Cornelius  Harnet,  and  closed  his  duties  at 
Wilmington  by  sending  Cornwallis  on  shore  with  nine  hundred  men, 
to  lay  waste  Brunswick.  Colonel  Howe's  house  and  mills  were  burned, 
and  some  injury  was  done  to  the  town  of  a  profitless  nature,  only 
aggravating  the  people,  and  the  army  took  sail  for  Charleston  harbor 


CHAPTER    XXVII. 

THE   REPUBLIC   OF   SOUTH   CAROLINA.     PREPARATIONS   FOR 

DEFENSE. 

A  QUAINT  old  map  bearing  date  August  3ist,  1776,  was  found  in 
London  during  the  year  1875.  Eleven  companion  maps  were 
found  with  it  in  a  rude  atlas  called  "  The  North  American  Pilot," 
which  the  tremulous  old  man  who  guarded  the  street  book-stand  said, 
"  ought  to  be  worth  a  shilling."  His  judgment  was  respected,  and  a 
shilling  bought  the  relic  ! 

Those  maps  proved  to  be  the  record  of  official  work  done  by  Gas- 
coine,  Fisher,  Blamer,  and  other  officers  and  pilots  in  his  majesty 
George  the  Third's  service,  for  the  special  information  of  officers, 
soldiers,  and  seamen  who  should  have  occasion  to  perform  military 
duty  anywhere  upon  the  coast  of  North  America. 

The  special  map  which  bore  the  date  already  given,  was  "  An 
exact  plan  of  Charleston  and  harbor ;  From  an  Actual  Survey,  with 
the  Attack  of  Fort  Sullivan  on  the  28th  of  June,  1776,  by  his  Majesty's 
Squadron  commanded  by  Sir  Peter  Parker." 

The  soundings  and  bearings  are  profusely  indicated,  as  they  were 
tested  during  June,  1776,  for  the  use  of  the  fleet  which  subsequently 
made  the  attack,  and  with  due  allowance  for  an  extraordinary  per 
spective  view  of  the  city,  which  seems  to  have  puzzled  the  ingenuity 
of  the  draughtsman  himself,  the  chart  is  excellent  and  very  complete. 

In  the  attempt  to  throw  ourselves  more  than  a  century  into  the 
past,  to  study  its  facts  and  their  lessons,  it  is  certainly  but  just  that 
we  include  the  topography  of  places  as  it  was  then  viewed  by  con 
temporaries,  so  that  we  may  seem  to  stand  by  their  side  as  the  scenes 
and  actors  pass  by. 

On  the  right  of  the  harbor  entrance  to  Charleston,  there  was  then, 
as  now,  a  low  sandy  island  called  Sullivan  Island.  Marshes,  thickets, 
and  trees  abounded. 


1776.]  THE   REPUBLIC   OF   SOUTH   CAROLINA.  177 

Northward,  near  by,  but  up  the  coast  a  short  distance,  there  was 
then,  as  now,  a  larger  island  called  Long  Island.  To  the  left  of  the 
harbor  entrance,  there  was  then,  as  now,  a  large  island  of  several 
thousand  acres,  with  Cummins  Point  and  Fort  Johnson  defined,  and 
this  was  James  Island. 

Upon  Sullivan  Island  a  fort  had  been  begun,  and  was  "  unfinished," 
according  to  the  quaint  old  map  ;  but  on  either  side  of  it  was  a  small 
redoubt,  and  near  the  entrance  of  the  fort  was  a  "  mark-tree,"  to  guide 
pilots  as  they  made  the  port.  Just  across  the  intervening  water  and 
marsh,  a  little  more  than  a  mile,  was  another  redoubt  at  Mt.  Pleasant, 
(Haddrell's  point),  and  close  by  two  houses,  marked  Jonathan  Scott's, 
and  Mr.  Poang's,  was  "  The  American  Army." 

The  channel  mark  shows  seven  feet  of  water  at  low  tide,  between 
Sullivan  Island  and  the  "  American  Army."  At  the  north  end  of  this 
island  there  appear  to  be  some  earth-works,  and  these  are  occupied 
according  to  the  map,  by  fifteen  hundred  Provincials,  "  intrenched"  to 
oppose  the  landing  of  Clinton's  army. 

On  Long  Island  appears  "  British  forces,  fifteen  hundred  men 
under  General  Clinton,  landed  June  the  ninth,"  which  were  to  attack 
Fort  Sullivan  by  land.  Between  Long  Island  and  the  main  land  there 
is  indicated  deep  water,  and  between  Long  Island  and  Sullivan 
Island  the  water  varies  from  eighteen  inches  to  seven  feet  at  low  tide. 
The  deepest  water  of  the  harbor  entrance  is  in  the  north  channel 
close  by  Sullivan  Island,  and  very  near  to  the  "  unfinished  "  fort,  and 
thirteen  feet  of  water  is  indicated. 

"  On  the  bar,  the  low  water  at  neap  tides  is  twelve  and  a  half,  and 
high  water  is  seventeen  and  a  half  feet.  At  spring  tides,  low  water  is 
eleven  and  a  half,  and  high  water  is  nineteen  feet/'  All  other  chan 
nels  range  from  five  to  nine  feet  of  water,  so  that  ships  had  to  go 
near  where  the  fort  was  built  if  they  were  bound  to  Charleston,  and 
for  this  reason  Colonel  Moultrie  built  the  fort  at  that  point.  Such  is 
a  brief  suggestion  of  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sullivan,  and  of  the  cause 
of  its  failure. 

It  is  obvious  that  there  is  no  depth  of  water  which  will  give  to  a 
naval  force  a  choice  of  position  or  room  to  wear  on  or  off  at  will  ;  that 
a  landing  which  can  not  be  made  through  the  marshes  of  the  main 
land,  must  be  made  upon  Sullivan  Island,  so  as  to  control  the  bridge 
of  the  Americans  if  possible  ;  that  the  small  channels  with  seven  feet 
of  water  must  require  boats  for  a  passage,  and  that  there  must  be  some 
solid  landing  place,  or  there  can  be  no  efficient  landing  at  all  under  fire. 
12 


178  THE   REPUBLIC  OF  SOUTH   CAROLINA.  [1776 

The  historical  antecedents  of  Fort  Sullivan  and  its  defenders 
require  some  attention,  and  then  a  narrative  of  the  attack  and  defense 
will  test  the  accuracy  of  the  quaint  old  map. 

The  attack  upon  Fort  Sullivan  was  but  four  days  after  Congress 
had  solemnly  asserted  that  "  all  persons  abiding  within  any  of  the 
United  Colonies,  and  deriving  protection  from  its  laws,  owed  allegiance 
to  the  said  law,"  and  charged  the  guilt  of  treason  upon  "  all  members 
of  any  of  the  United  Colonies  who  should  be  adherent  to  the  king  of 
Great  Britain,  giving  to  him  aid  and  comfort." 

Its  issue  was  as  expressive  as  that  of  Bunker  Hill,  of  the  stubborn 
ness  of  the  defensive,  and  it  afforded  an  example  well  calculated  to 
inspire  the  troops  which  were  then  at  New  York  awaiting  an  attack  in 
force.  The  people  of  South  Carolian  were  ripe  for  just  such  a  deed 
of  valor,  and  deserved  success. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  during  April,  1775,  a  secret  committee 
of  citizens  took  the  colonial  muskets  and  cutlasses  from  the  public 
magazine  for  the  use  of  the  patriots.  This  act  was  followed  by  seizure 
of  powder,  and  a  wide-spread  effective  organization  of  the  militia. 

Thomas  Corbett,  one  of  the  committee,  and  acting  by  its  authority, 
took  possession  of  a  mail  package  just  from  England,  and  obtained 
from  it  the  private  dispatches  which  announced  the  purpose  of  the 
British  ministry  to  subdue  the  colonies  by  force  of  arms. 

These  dispatches  were  addressed  to  Governor  Dunmore,  of  Vir 
ginia,  Governor  Martin,  of  North  Carolina,  Governor  Campbell,  of 
South  Carolina,  Governor  Wright,  of  Georgia,  and  Governor  Tonyne, 
of  Augustine.  These  dispatches  were  sent  to  Congress,  and  had  a 
positive  effect  upon  their  action,  but  they  were  especially  influential 
in  stirring  up  the  people  of  Charleston  to  prepare  for  the  worst. 

A  dispatch  had  previously  been  found  upon  a  vessel  captured  in 
northern  waters,  dated  at  Whitehall,  December  twenty-third,  1775, 
stating  that  seven  regiments  were  in  readiness  to  proceed  to  the 
Southern  colonies,  and  that  they  would  in  the  first  place  proceed  to 
North  Carolina,  thence  to  Virginia  or  South  Carolina  as  circumstances 
should  point  out. 

A  letter  from  Governor  Wright  himself,  addressed  to  General 
Gage,  and  requesting  "  that  a  detachment  of  troops  be  sent  to  awe 
the  people,"  was  also  intercepted,  and  another  was  substituted  with 
a  counterfeit  of  his  signature,  saying  that  "  the  people  were  again  come 
to  some  order,  and  there  would  be  no  occasion  for  him  to  send  troops." 

The  excitement  attending  the  news  from  Lexington  did  not  sub- 


1776.]  THE   REPUBLIC   OF   SOUTH   CAROLINA.  Ifg 

side,  but  seemed  to  decide  the  people  of  South  Carolina  to  make 
it  the  occasion  for  permanent  resistance  to  British  supremacy.  Two 
regiments  of  foot  and  one  of  rangers  were  organized.  The  field 
officers  of  the  First  regiment  were,  Colonel  Christopher  Gadsden, 
Lieutenant-colonel  Isaac  Huger,  and  Major  Owen  Roberts  ;  and  of 
the  Second  regiment,  Colonel  William  Moultrie,  Lieutenant-colonel 
Isaac  Motte,  and  Major  Alexander  Mclntosh.  Among  the  captains 
were  Charles  C.  and  Thomas  Pinckney,  Francis  Marion,  Peter  and 
Daniel  Horry,  William  and  Benjamin  Collett,  Francis  Huger,  and 
Charles  Motte.  William  Thompson  was  elected  colonel,  and  James 
Mayson  was  elected  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Rangers. 

A  council  of  safety  was  appointed  by  the  Provincial  Congress, 
June  sixteenth,  1775,  consisting  of  Henry  Laurens,  Charles  Pinckney, 
Rawlins  Lowndes,  Thomas  Ferguson,  Arthur  Middleton,  Thomas 
Heywood  Jr.,  Thomas  Bee,  John  Huger,  James  Parsons,  William  H. 
Drayton,  Benjamin  Elliott,  and  William  Williams. 

During  the  month  of  July,  seventeen  thousand  pounds  of  powder 
was  taken  from  a  brig  near  Augustine,  and  by  the  twentieth  of  Au 
gust  more  than  thirty  thousand  pounds  had  been  accumulated  in  the 
storehouses  of  Charleston  and  Dorchester.  The  militia  of  Georgia 
had  secured  nearly  an  equal  amount. 

After  midnight  of  the  fourth  of  September,  James  Island  was 
occupied,  including  Fort  Johnson,  under  the  direction  of  Henry 
Laurens,  President  of  the  Provincial  Congress,  and  Colonel  Gadsden's 
regiment  became  its  garrison. 

Colonel  Moultrie  occupied  Sullivan's  Island,  and  during  the 
month  of  November,  a  regiment  of  artillery  was  organized,  and  the 
work  of  fortifying  all  prominent  points  of  the  city  and  adjacent  islands 
was  systematically  commenced.  Haddrell's  Point,  was  occupied  for 
this  purpose  on  the  seventeenth  of  December.  During  January,  1776, 
Colonel  Moultrie  began  to  build  a  fascine  battery  on  Sullivan's  Island, 
and  on  the  fifteenth,  the  discipline  of  the  troops  had  become  so  well 
advanced  that  every  company  had  its  designated  rendezvous  in  case 
of  alarm,  and  nearly  seventy  guns  were  in  position.  Moultrie  states 
in  his  memoirs,  that  "  everybody  supposed  that  two  small  armed 
ships  could  take  Charleston,"  but  he  never  believed  that  they  could 
not  sink  ships,  as  well  as  Frenchmen  or  Spaniards  could  do  it.  This 
impression  however,  had  its  good  effect.  The  men  were  drilled  in  the 
exercise  of  extinguishing  fires,  planting  ladders  and  whatever  might 
be  required  in  case  the  city  was  shelled  and  set  on  fire.  Governor 


1 80  THE   REPUBLIC   OF   SOUTH    CAROLINA.  [1776. 

Campbell,  S.  C.,  and  Governor  Wright,  Ga.,  had  by  this  time  become 
a  resident  upon  the  sloop  of  war  Tamar,  as  the  Governors  of  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina  had  already  made  ships  of  war  their  place  of 
refuge,  and  thus  declared  their  distrust  of  the  people  and  inability  to 
conciliate  or  govern  them. 

The  council  of  safety  ordered  the  detachment  on  Sullivan's  Island 
"to  fire  upon  ships,  boats  or  other  vessels  which  should  attempt  to 
pass,  approach,  or  land  troops  on  the  island."  Moultrie  describes  the 
island,  as  "  quite  a  wilderness  and  a  thick,  deep  swamp  where  the  fort 
stands,  with  live  oak,  myrtle  and  palmetto  trees, 

On  the  second  of  March  he  began  to  build  a  large  fort  capable  of 
containing  one  thousand  men.  Two  regiments  of  riflemen  were  also 
authorized,  and  these  were  officered,  respectively,  by  Colonels  Isaac 
Huger  and  Thomas  Sumter. 

South  Carolina  thus  boldly  led  the  way  to  general  independence 
by  asserting  her  own,  under  John  Rutledge  as  President,  with  Henry 
Laurens  as  Vice  President,  and  William  H.  Drayton  as  Chief  Justice. 
An  army  and  navy  were  created  ;  Privy  Council  and  Assembly  were 
elected,  and  the  issue  of  six  hundred  thousand  dollars  of  paper  money 
was  authorized,  as  well  as  the  issue  of  coin:  and  the  first  Republic  of 
the  New  World  began  its  life. 

Laurens,  as  well  as  Moultrie,  Huger,  Pickens  and  Warren,  already 
commissioned  in  the  colonial  militia  regiments,  had  served  with  credit 
in  the  old  Cherokee  war  of  1760-1. 

Massachusetts  had  begun  the  year  with  substantial  freedom. 
South  Carolina  put  all  the  machinery  of  a  nation  into  operation  with 
the  opening  spring. 

By  the  twenty-sixth  of  April  one  hundred  heavy  guns  were  in 
position. 

On  the  thirty-first  day  of  May  a  large  British  fleet  had  been  re 
ported  as  within  twenty  miles  of  the  harbor's  mouth,  and  on  the  first 
day  of  June  the  squadron  of  Admiral  Parker  began  to  appear  within 
view  from  Haddrell's  Point. 

The  month  of  June,  1776,  was  an  important  period  in  the  life  of 
the  young  Republic  of  South  Carolina. 

The  men  who  toiled,  endured,  and  fought  out  an  issue  which 
secured  the  inviolability  of  her  soil  for  nearly  three  years  of  the  national 
struggle,  were  men  who  had  entered  upon  military  service  with  a  real 
purpose  to  make  themselves  acquainted  with  the  art  of  war.  Their 
long  period  of  preparation  and  drill  was  destined  to  bear  its  natural 


1776]  THE   REPUBLIC  OF  SOUTH   CAROLINA.  i8l 

fruit  and   to   confer  perpetual   honor  upon  those  who  had  so  early 
anticipated,  appreciated  and  prepared  for  the  struggle. 

The  militia  about  Boston  had  been  suddenly  summoned  to  become 
soldiers  and  to  meet  all  the  demands  which  military  service  exacts  of 
disciplined  troops,  without  the  antecedent  preparation  for  so  formi 
dable  a  responsibility,  and  this  at  the  very  outset  of  the  war,  before 
experience  had  demonstrated  the  importance  of  system,  obedience 
and  self-sacrifice,  if  physical  force  were  to  be  employed  to  advantage, 
against  the  thorough  veterans  of  Great  Britain. 

The  orders  and  familiar  instructions  which  had  been  given  as 
guides  to  Moultrie's,  Gadsden's  and  Thompson's  regiments,  bore  the 
impress  of  careful  thought  ;  and  there  was  a  deliberate  steadiness,  in 
the  preparation  for  invasion,  which  was  nowhere  surpassed  in  colonial 
experience.  The  material  was  quite  homogeneous  and  the  men  who 
were  selected  as  officers,  were  so  selected,  as  it  was  claimed,  for  the 
very  purpose  of  getting  the  best  men  for  their  respective  trusts.  The 
contest  was  so  largely  dependent  upon  her  own  citizens  in  the  first 
place,  that  there  was  very  little  of  jealousy,  or  the  clashing  of  personal 
ambition  at  the  time,  and  the  lessons  of  more  than  a  year  of  national 
struggle  were  not  lost  sight  of  in  the  hour  of  peril. 

President  Rutledge,  afterwards  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States, 
was  endowed  with  a  rare  faculty  of  judging  men  and  issues  by  practi 
cal  tests,  and  his  sagacity,  nerve  and  inflexible  will,  more  than  the 
valor  of  Moultrie  and  his  companions,  secured  the  victory  achieved. 
It  was  through  his  deliberate  and  unchanging  purpose,  that  Moultrie 
was  enabled  to  achieve. 

The  month  of  June  was  full  of  that  type  of  painstaking  and  cheer 
ful  waiting  which  gave  to  Bunker  Hill  its  possibility  and  its  history. 

General  Armstrong  arrived  from  the  north  late  in  April,  assisted 
with  his  counsel,  and  was  practically,  if  not  formally,  in  command  of 
the  South  Carolina  troops  upon  the  arrival  of  the  British  fleet. 

On  the  first  day  of  June,  1776,  the  city  of  Charleston  was  full  ot 
life  and  labor.  Colonel  Pinckney's  regiment  was  prompt  to  take  the 
places  assigned  to  the  companies  upon  an  alarm.  Negroes  were  on 
duty  with  the  fire-engines,  bringing  fire-hooks,  axes,  and  all  things 
before  provided  for  an  emergency ;  the  batteries  were  manned,  and 
additional  defenses  were  begun.  Traverses  were  made  in  the  princi 
pal  streets,  and  light  works  were  thrown  up  at  every  point  which 
afforded  a  ready  landing  from  boats. 

The  lead  sash,  then  so  common,  were  taken   from   churches  and 


1 82  THE   REPUBLIC   OF   SOUTH   CAROLINA.  [1776. 

houses  to  be  run  into  bullets,  while  in  response  to  swift  messengers 
sent  into  the  country,  the  minute-men  began  to  assemble  and  go  to 
the  places  which  were  to  be  partially  under  their  charge.  Ware 
houses  and  other  buildings  along  the  river  front  were  demolished,  and 
their  sites  and  materials  were  used  to  establish  additional  defenses. 
Wherever  any  necessary  work  was  to  be  done,  however  humble,  ser 
geants  were  sent  with  a  guard  detail,  and  the  duty  was  performed  with 
expedition  and  system. 

On  James  Island,  Colonel  Gadsden,  then  the  commanding  officer 
at  Charleston,  had  established  a  well  arranged  camp,  with  tents  and 
all  necessary  protection  for  the  ordinary  garrison  of  five  hundred  men. 

That  force  was  now  increased,  and  a  battery  was  established 
directly  opposite  the  city  for  the  use  of  the  artillery  companies  which 
reported  to  him  in  case  the  shipping  should  pass  Fort  Johnson  in 
safety. 

Colonel  Moultrie  was  rapidly  completing  the  exposed  faces  of 
Fort  Sullivan,  and  new  works  were  begun  along  the  coast  east  of 
Mount  Pleasant,  to  command  the  shore  opposite  to  Sullivan  and 
Long  Islands.  Sumter's  and  Thompson's  regiments  had  reported  to 
Moultrie  for  duty.  June  third,  he  notified  President  Rutledge  that  a 
tender,  which  had  been  in  company  with  two  large  ships  and  a 
schooner,  was  taking  soundings  from  near  the  post  of  his  advanced 
guard  all  along  Long  Island. 

June  fourth,  General  Charles  Lee  arrived,  and  on  the  ninth  was 
placed  in  general  command.  He  had  kept  pace  with  Clinton  from 
Boston  to  New  York,  thence  to  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  and 
arrived  at  Charleston  just  as  that  officer  was  approaching  its  coast  to 
join  in  the  effort  to  capture  and  occupy  its  harbor  defenses. 

Lee  was  in  his  element,  that  of  independent  command,  only  re 
strained  by  the  authority  of  President  Rutledge,  who  was  as  resolute 
as  Washington  himself  when  convinced  of  duty.  Lee  made  imme 
diate  inspection  of  all  preparations,  and  was  tireless  in  his  work.  He 
insisted  from  the  first  that  Fort  Sullivan  would  be  a  mere  "  slaughter 
pen,"  and  must  be  abandoned.  This  opinion  he  maintained  until  the 
fort  had  actually  repelled  the  enemy ;  and  only  Moultrie's  persistency 
and  faith,  backed  by  the  president,  prevented  the  abandonment  of 
that  position  and  the  inevitable  loss  of  the  city. 

Moultrie  says  in  his  memoirs,  "  I  never  was  uneasy  on  not  having 
a  retreat,  because  I  never  imagined  that  the  enemy  could  force  me  to 
that  necessity. "  Notwithstanding  Moultrie's  faith  in  the  sufficiency 


1776.]  THE   REPUBLIC   OF   SOUTH   CAROLINA.  183 

of  his  defense,  Lee  never  rested  easy  until  a  large  force  had  been 
employed  to  begin  a  second  bridge  to  Sullivan  Island  ;  the  first,  which 
had  been  made  of  floating  hogsheads  with  plank  stretches,  having 
proved  capable  of  sustaining  less  than  t\vo  hundred  men  at  a  time. 

Lee  brought  great  reputation  ;  equal,  said  Moultrie,  in  its  en 
couragement  of  the  troops,  to  a  reinforcement  of  a  thousand  men. 
He  adds,  "  The  officers  could  not  at  first  reconcile  themselves  to  his 
hasty  and  rough  manners,  but  he  taught  us  to  think  lightly  of  the 
enemy,  and  gave  a  spur  to  all  our  actions." 

Lee  had  fears  that  Colonel  Moultrie's  "  good  temper  and  easy 
nature  "  interfered  with  proper  discipline,  and  repeatedly  calls  atten 
tion  to  this  matter  in  letters  written  to  him  before  the  battle.  His  own 
orders  to  the  troops  indicate  a  sound  appreciation  of  all  that  consti 
tuted  a  good  soldier,  and  his  experience  before  Boston  had  prepared 
him  to  find  a  body  of  militia  of  the  same  character  as  those  which 
first  invested  that  city.  A  few  extracts  from  his  official  papers  illus 
trate  his  views.  "  Soldiers  running  at  random  wherever  their  folly 
directs,  is  an  absolute  abomination  not  to  be  tolerated."  "  When  you 
issue  any  orders,  do  not  suffer  them  to  be  trifled  with."  "  Let  your 
orders  be  as  few  as  possible  ;  but  let  them  be  punctually  obeyed." 
u  Do  not  tease  men  with  superfluous  duties  or  labor,  but  enforce  what 
ever  is  necessary  for  the  honor  and  safety  of  your  garrison."  "  Post 
a  commissioned  officer  at  the  beach  to  prevent  the  monstrous  dis 
orders  I  complain  of."  "  If  you  expend  your  ammunition  without 
beating  off  the  enemy,  spike  your  guns,  and  retreat  with  all  the  order 
possible."  "  Never  fire  without  a  moral  certainty  of  hitting.  One 
hundred  and  fifty  yards  is  the  maximum  for  muskets,  and  four  hun 
dred  for  cannon."  "  Distant  firing  encourages  the  enemy,  and  adds 
to  the  pernicious  persuasion  of  the  American  soldiers  that  they  are  no 
match  for  their  antagonist  at  close  fighting.  It  makes  them  cowards, 
is  childish,  vicious,  and  scandalous." 

Lee  was  vigilant,  by  night  and  day,  and  as  soon  as  he  understood 
exactly  what  was  expected  to  be  done  through  his  authority,  he  dis 
charged  his  duty  promptly  and  efficiently,  and  was  one  of  the  first  to 
congratulate  Colonel  Moultrie  upon  his  final  success. 

June  seventh,  a  flag  from  Admiral  Parker  was  fired  upon  by  an 
•ignorant  sentry,  but  Moultrie  apologized  for  the  oversight  on  the  fol 
lowing  day.  General  Clinton,  in  return,  sent  a  proclamation  to  the 
colonists  similar  in  character  to  that  issued  at  Wilmington. 

June  eighth,  Colonels  Thompson's  and  Sumter's  regiments  were 


1 84  THE   REPUBLIC  OF  SOUTH   CAROLINA.  [1776 

ordered  to  Long  Island  to  dislodge  the  British  troops  who  were  effect 
ing  a  landing;  but  this  impracticable  order  of  General  Lee  was  modi 
fied,  and  they  took  position  upon  the  northeast  end  of  Sullivan  Island. 

June  tenth,  the  British  fleet  came  over  the  bar,  except  two  ves 
sels.  On  the  eleventh,  the  North  Carolina  and  Virginia  Continental 
troops  arrived,  increasing  the  American  forces  to  six  thousand  men, 
of  whom  twenty-five  hundred  were  regulars.  On  the  twelfth  the 
British  fleet  made  a  demonstration  as  if  to  attack,  but  were  driven  off 
by  a  heavy  squall  of  wind.  On  the  fifteenth  General  Lee  placed  Gen 
eral  Armstrong's  command  at  Haddrell's  Point  and  ordered  Moultrie 
to  report  to  him  as  his  immediate  commanding  officer.  On  the 
twenty-third  the  fleet  made  movement  preparatory  to  an  attack,  but 
a  contrary  wind  defeated  their  purpose.  On  the  twenty-fourth  the 
Muhlenburg  regiment  arrived  from  Virginia  well  equipped  and  in  a 
high  state  of  discipline. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  Clinton  made  a  vain  effort  to  reach  the  main 
land.  On  the  twenty-sixth  the  Experiment,  50,  also  crossed  the  bar. 
On  the  twenty-seventh,  Lee  sent  scouting  parties  in  boats,  along  the 
coast,  and  an  effort  was  made  under  his  orders,  to  remove  the  buoys 
which  had  been  established  by  the  surveying  parties  sent  from  the 
fleet.  The  enemy  made  no  movement  that  was  not  watched,  and  four 
miles  of  earth-works  had  been  completed  along  the  shore. 

Thus  four  weeks  of  preparation  passed  by. 

The  American  forces  gained  confidence,  numbers  and  discipline  : 
while  the  British  fleet  and  army  had  just  reached  the  positions  which 
were  necessary  for  offensive  action. 

Horry's  and  Clark's  regiments  were  on  the  island  or  at  Haddrell's 
Point,  while  Isaac  Motte  and  Francis  Marion,  were  comrades  of  Moul 
trie  in  the  hour  of  final  danger. 

It  was  the  eve  of  battle.  Admiral  Parker  had  drilled  his  marines 
and  seamen  in  the  motions  of  climbing  the  parapet  of  the  fort  and 
entering  the  embrasures,  and  he  was  confident  that  two  rounds  of  fire 
would  prepare  the  way  for  an  assault  ;  while  Clinton,  too  heedless  of 
warnings  as  to  the  depth  of  intervening  water,  had  his  army  in  hand 
as  he  confidently  hoped,  for  occupation  and  victory. 


CHAPTER   XXVIII. 

CLINTON'S   EXPEDITION.     ATTACK   ON  FORT  MOULTRIE. 

FORT  Moultrie  was  laid  out  for  four  bastions,  but  on  the  twenty, 
eighth  day  of  June,  1776,  the  west  and  north  faces  of  the  main 
work  were  nearly  open,  and  only  the  two  bastions  on  the  channel 
front  had  been  sufficiently  advanced  to  receive  guns.  The  soft  and 
spongy  but  tough  palmetto  trees  which  abounded  on  Sullivan  Island, 
had  been  dove-tailed  together  in  a  series  of  connecting  pens,  and  these 
were  filled  with  sand,  so  that  the  parapet  was  sixteen  feet  in  thickness, 
and  sufficiently  high  to  protect  the  gunners  and  garrison.  Thirty-one 
guns  were  in  position.  Only  twenty-one  could  have  a  combined  fire 
at  the  same  time,  and  the  ammunition  on  hand  at  the  commence 
ment  of  the  action  of  that  date  did  not  average  thirty  rounds  to  the 
piece. 

It  was  evident  very  early  in  the  morning,  that  an  immediate  assault 
was  impending.  Colonel  Moultrie  visited  the  advance  guard,  which 
was  on  the  northern  extremity  of  the  island  three  miles  from  Sullivan, 
very  soon  after  the  break  of  day.  He  found  that  Colonel  Thompson 
had  completed  the  light  breastworks  which  were  to  face  the  channel 
between  Sullivan  Island  and  General  Clinton's  camp,  and  that  one 
eighteen  and  one  six  pounder  gun  had  been  well  located  for  resisting 
a  landing  by  the  British  troops.  In  the  myrtle  bushes  near  the 
beach,  and  well  covered  by  some  drifted  sand  hills,  there  had  been 
secreted  a  company  of  expert  riflemen.  Three  hundred  "  good  shots  " 
from  Thompson's  own  regiment,  supported  by  nearly  as  many  from 
Colonel  Clark's  North  Carolina  regiment,  two  hundred  of  Horry's 
men,  and  the  "  Raccoon  Rifles,"  made  up  the  entire  command,  and 
their  officers  manifested  full  confidence  in  their  ability  to  resist  any 
attack. 

Moultrie  had  just  finished  his  inspection  of  these  preparations 
when  the  movement  of  the  troops  from  the  opposite  beach  to  their 


1 86  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION. 

boats  and  floating  batteries,  warned  him  that  the  time  had  come  for 
him  to  be  at  his  own  post  of  danger.  Motte,  his  second  in  command, 
and  Marion  who  had  been  his  lieutenant  in  the  old  Cherokee  war,  were 
anxiously  awaiting  his  arrival.  Already  the  flag-ship  of  Commodore 
Parker  was  flying  signals  for  Clinton's  army  to  cross  Breach  inlet  to 
Sullivan  Island,  and  attack  the  main  fort  in  the  rear,  and  the  ships 
had  shaken  out  top-sails  in  readiness  to  advance  to  their  own  proper 
position  in  the  channel  nearest  the  fort. 

Moultrie  was  on  horseback.  He  says,  "  I  hurried  back  to  the  fort 
as  soon  as  possible.  When  I  got  there  I  found  that  the  ships  were 
already  under  sail.  I  immediately  ordered  the  long  roll  to  beat,  and 
officers  and  men  to  their  posts,  when  the  ships  came  sailing  up,  as  if  in 
confidence  of  victory.  We  had  scarcely  manned  our  guns.  They 
were  soon  abreast  of  the  fort,  let  go  their  anchors,  and  began  their 
attack  most  furiously."' 

The  fort  was  designed  for  a  thousand  men,  but  was  occupied  by 
Moultrie's  own  regiment  only,  and  part  of  one  artillery  company, 
making  a  total  of  four  hundred  and  thirty-five,  including  officers  and 
men. 

General  Armstrong  was  in  command  of  a  force  of  fifteen  hundred 
men,  and  a  portion  of  the  artillery  regiment  at  Haddrell's  Point,  and 
General  Lee  took  up  his  head-quarters  for  the  day  at  that  post.  The 
First  regular  South  Carolina  regiment,  under  Colonel  Gadsden,  still 
occupied  Fort  Johnson,  on  James  Island,  and  a  force  of  nearly,  or 
quite  twenty-five  hundred  men  was  properly  disposed  for  the  pro 
tection  of  the  city  itself,  and  its  earthworks  and  batteries.  A  large 
force  of  negroes  was  briskly  at  work  endeavoring  to  complete  some 
additional  works;  and  another  body  had  charge  of  the  fire-engines 
and  other  fire-apparatus,  as  when  the  first  alarm  four  weeks  before 
had  called  the  city  to  arms. 

The  quaint  old  map  referred  to,  so  accurate  in  its  description  of 
the  harbor,  and  in  all  chief  respects  in  full  harmony  with  official 
reports,  is  erroneous  as  to  Clinton's  force,  which  consisted  of  over 
twenty-one  hundred  foot,  light  infantry,  and  grenadiers,  and  nearly 
seven  hundred  seamen,  making  a  total  of  nearly  three  thousand  men. 
But  the  old  map  thus  correctly  represents  the  location  of  the  advanc 
ing  vessels. 

The  Solebay,  28,  Captain  Thomas  Symonds,  led  the  van  of  the 
first  division ;  the  Experiment,  50,  Captain  Alexander  Scott ;  the 
Bristol,  50,  flag-ship  of  Sir  Peter  Parker,  Captain  John  Morris  ;  and 


17/o.J 


CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION.  187 


the  Active,  28,  Captain  William  Williams  followed.  A  second  division 
of  three  light  frigates  ;  the  Sphynx,  20,  Captain  Anthony  Hunt  ;  the 
Actaeon,  28,  Captain  Christopher  Atkins  ;  and  the  Syren,  28,  Captain 
Tobias  Furneaux,  moved  on  a  course  further  to  the  south,  with  orders 
to  pass  the  line  of  battle  ships,  and  gain  a  position  westward  of  the 
fort,  so  as  to  sweep  its  open  side  with  an  enfilading  fire,  and  give  their 
larboard  broadsides  to  the  redoubts  and  earthworks  on  Haddrell's 
Point.  The  Thunder  Bomb,  mortar  ship,  8,  Captain  James  Reid 
commander,  took  its  position  south-east  by  south  from  the  salient 
angle  of  the  east  bastion,  with  Colonel  James,  throwing  shells,  and 
covered  by  the  Friendship,  22,  Captain  Charles  Hope.  The  Ranger, 
sloop,  Captain  Roger  Willis,  and  the  St.  Lawrence  schooner,  8,  Lieu 
tenant  J.  N.  Graves,  lay  off  Breach  inlet,  which  separated  Sullivan  and 
Long  Island,  to  act  in  concert  with  the  small  boats  which  were  to 
land  the  troops  of  Clinton. 

The  plan  of  attack  was  well  conceived,  and  was  sustained  with  a 
persistent  gallantry  nowhere  surpassed  in  naval  annals. 

It  was  nearly  eleven  o'clock  when  the  first  division  advanced  under 
easy  sail,  and  disregarding  the  first  few  shots  delivered  from  the  fort, 
let  go  their  anchors  and  opened  fire.  The  Thunder  Bomb  was  already 
at  work,  and  the  roar  of  guns  from  the  northward,  brought  notice  to 
the  quickened  garrison  that  this  double  effort  to  win  their  post  was  at 
its  issue.  That  garrison,  under  the  order  of  Moultrie,  "  mind  the 
commodore,"  "  mind  the  fifty  gun-ships,"  wasted  few  shots  upon  the 
frigates,  but  steadily,  and  as  rapidly  as  the  supply  of  powder  would 
give  them  chance,  swept  the  quarter  decks  of  the  heavy  vessels,  from 
about  noon  until  sunset. 

The  first  broadside  firing  from  the  fleet  embedded  balls  in  the  pal 
metto  logs  ;  but  scattered  no  splinters,  displaced  no  material  and 
afforded  no  hopeful  sign  of  the  anticipated  victory.  Moultrie  writes, 
**  The  Thunder  Bomb  had  the  bed  of  her  mortar  soon  disabled,  she 
threw  her  shells  in  good  direction,  and  most  of  them  fell  within  the 
fort ;  but  we  had  a  morass  in  the  middle  that  swallowed  them  up 
instantly,  and  those  that  fell  in  the  sand,  in  and  about  the  fort,  were 
immediately  buried,  so  that  very  few  bursted  among  us." 

In  the  midst  of  the  actioa  the  flag  ship  swung  round,  with  her 
stern  to  the  fort.  Every  available  gun  was  trained  upon  the  ship  and 
with  terrible  effect.  Captain  Moore  lost  an  arm  and  was  carried  below. 
"  At  one  time,"  says  Edmund  Burke,  then  editor  of  the  Annual 
Register,  "  the  quarter  deck  of  the  Bristol  was  cleared  of  every  per- 


1 88  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION.  1.1776. 

son  but  the  Commodore,  who  stood  alone, — a  spectacle  of  intrepidity 
and  firmness  which  have  seldom  been  equaled,  never  exceeded." 

Until  the  position  of  the  ship  was  shifted,  there  was  every  proba 
bility  that  she  would  be  sunk  at  anchor. 

It  was  just  then  that  the  fire  from  the  fort  began  to  slacken,  for 
want  of  powder  ;  but  within  an  hour  it  was  resumed  with  increased 
vigor.  Rutledge  had  not  forgotten  Moultrie,  neither  had  he  lost  faith 
in  his  capacity  and  skill.  The  following  note,  written  in  pencil,  con 
veyed  his  sympathy  with  the  successful  resistance  thus  far  sustained. 

"DEAR   SIR, 

I  send  you  500  pounds  of  powder.  You  know  our  collection  is  not  very  great. 
I  should  think  you  may  be  supplied  from  Haddrell's  Point.  HONOR  and  VICTORY, 
my  good  sir,  to  you,  and  our  worthy  countrymen  with  you.  Yours, 

J.  RUTLEDGE." 

"  P.  S.     Do  not  make  too  free  with  your  cannon." 

"  Cool  and  do  mischief." 

This  wise  postscript  was  a  caution  against  that  rapid  firing  so 
common  with  unskilled  gunners  who  over-heat  their  pieces,  endanger 
the  lives  of  their  comrades,  and  impair  the  accuracy  of  the  aim  and 
ranges.  It  was  now  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  firing,  to 
the  northward,  which  began  at  the  time  of  the  naval  attack,  had  ceased. 
Clinton  had  loaded  his  boats  and  attempted  to  cross  to  Sullivan  island. 
The  men  could  not  wade  through  the  deep  water :  and  the  loaded 
boats  could  do  nothing  upon  intermediate  shoals,  with  a  depth  of  less 
than  eighteen  inches.  The  withering  fire  of  the  American  riflemen 
who  were  under  close  cover,  rendered  every  vigorous  effort  to  force 
the  army  to  the  shore,  a  sure  delivery  of  the  command  to  entire 
destruction. 

William  Falconer,  writing  on  the  thirteenth  of  July  from  Long 
Island,  where  Clinton  remained  until  his  departure  for  New  York, 
says,  "  If  the  ships  could  have  silenced  the  battery,  the  army  was  to 
have  made  an  attack  on  the  back  of  the  island,  where  they  had  about 
one  thousand  men  entrenched  up  to  their  eyes.  They  would  have 
killed  half  of  us  before  we  could  have  made  our  landing  good." 

General  Clinton  made  two  attempts,  and  finding  that  it  was  equally 
impossible  to  reach  Sullivan  island  or  the  main  land,  on  account  of 
the  marshes,  he  very  wisely  saved  his  troops  from  further  effort. 

The  second  division  of  the  squadron,  under  top-sails  only,  sailed 
smoothly  by  the  flag-ship,  and  by  the  Solebay,  while  the  broadsides 
of  those  ships  were  first  testing  the  palmetto  fort.  The  quaint  old 


i776.j  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION.  189 

map,  locates  them  a  little  time  after  that,  thus  —  "  A—  ground"  They 
had  run  upon  the  "  middle  ground  shoal,"  near  where  Fort  Sumter 
was  afterward  built.  "  These  three  frigates  were  to  have  gone  to 
the  westward  of  the  fort''  "  Actceon  scuttled  and  set  on  fire  on  the 


Lee  crossed  to  Sullivan  Island  during  the  fight,  to  inquire  into  the 
condition  of  the  fort,  and  returned  with  the  conviction  that  the  defense 
would  be  successful.  Moultrie  says,  "  we  opened  our  temporary  gate, 
to  admit  General  Lee.  Several  of  the  officers  as  well  as  myself  were 
smoking  our  pipes  and  giving  orders  ;  but  we  laid  them  down  when 
he  came  in." 

The  day  was  memorable  for  its  incidents.  Captain  Scott  of  the 
Experiment,  as  well  as  Captain  Morris,  lost  an  arm.  Forty  were  killed 
and  seventy-one  were  wounded  on  the  Bristol  ;  her  hull  was  struck 
seventy  times,  the  masts  and  rigging  suffered  severely,  and  a  half  hour 
of  additional  exposure  would  have  been  fatal.  The  Experiment  had 
twenty-three  killed  and  fifty-six  wounded.  The  vessels  slipped  their 
cables  at  dark,  and  retired  nearly  three  miles  from  the  scene  of  conflict. 

Within  the  fort,  behind  the  palmetto  logs  and  sand,  where  the 
people  in  shirt  sleeves  were  handling  cannon,  there  were  heroic  deeds 
performed  well  worthy  of  record  with  those  of  the  battle  deck.  "  At 
one  time,''  says  Moultrie,  "  three  or  four  of  the  men-of-war  broadsides 
struck  the  fort  at  the  same  instant,  which  gave  the  merlons  such  a 
tremble  that  I  was  apprehensive  that  a  few  more  such  would  tumble 
them  down."  "  Our  flag  was  shot  away!  Our  friends  gave  up  all  for 
lost!  Sergeant  Jasper  perceiving  that  the  flag  (blue,  with  a  silver 
crescent  in  the  dexter  corner,  corresponding  with  the  cap  ornament 
of  the  South  Carolina  troops)  had  fallen  without  the  fort,  jumped 
through  one  of  the  embrasures  and  brought  it  up  through  heavy  fire, 
fixed  it  upon  a  sponge  staff,  and  planted  it  upon  the  ramparts  again." 
Twelve  men  were  killed,  and  twenty-four  were  wounded,  nearly  every 
casualty  having  occurred  from  shot  which  entered  the  large  embra 
sures  of  the  fort.  When  Sergeant  McDonald  received  his  mortal 
wound,  addressing  the  soldiers  who  were  carrying  him  to  the  doctor, 
he  begged  them  "  never  to  give  up,  they  were  fighting  for  liberty." 
His  words  are  to  be  remembered  with  those  of  another  of  the  same 
blood,  "  England  expects  every  man  will  do  his  duty." 

With  the  next  morning,  there  came  a  clearer  view  of  the  result 
of  the  battle.  The  Actaeon  was  burned  by  her  crew  as  they  abandoned 
her.  The  Sphynx  had  fouled  with  the  Syren  and  lost  her  bowsprit. 


CAMPAIGN   OF    17/6.  [1776, 

Both  vessels  went  off  with  the  tide  and  joined  the  first  division,  and 
the  flag-ship  which  was  also  disabled  for  further  offensive  operations. 

The  British  troops  lingered  on  Long  Island  for  nearly  three  weeks. 
Falconer  thus  describes  his  own  condition  under  date  of  July  thir 
teenth.  "  We  have  been  encamped  on  this  island  for  nearly  a  month 
past,  and  have  lived  upon  nothing  but  salt  pork  and  pease.  We  sleep 
upon  the  sea-shore,  nothing  to  shelter  us  from  the  violent  rains  but 
our  coats  and  miserable  paltry  blankets.  There  is  nothing  that  grows 
upon  this  island,  it  being  but  a  mere  sand  bank,  but  a  few  bushes 
which  harbor  millions  of  mosquitoes.  Our  killed  and  wounded  num 
ber  between  two  and  three  hundred,  and  numbers  die  daily  of  their 
wounds." 

General  Clinton,  with  his  command,  left  under  the  convoy  of  the 
Solebay  frigate,  and  reached  Staten  Island  on  the  first  of  August. 
Useless  differences  arose  between  that  officer  and  Commodore  Parker. 
Each  did  his  duty  gallantly  and  well.  Neither  had  the  right  to  blame 
the  other  for  the  alternations  of  deep  and  shoal  water,  which  rendered 
impossible  the  success  of  either. 

South  Carolina  and  the  American  Congress  united  their  testi 
monials  of  gratitude  and  honor  to  the  men  who  achieved  the  victory, 
and  after  more  than  a  century  of  national  life,  the  American  Repub 
lic  reaffirms  the  tribute  which  was  given  by  the  Palmetto  State  ;  and 
the  fort  on  Sullivan  Island  is  only  to  be  remembered  as  FORT 
MOU'LTRIE  ! 


CHAPTER   XXIX. 

THE  TWO   ARMIES   IN  JULY   AND   AUGUST,    1776. 

THE  month  of  July,  1776,  began  with  the  saddest  show  for  a  vast 
expenditure  of  men  and  money  that  could  oppress  a  people  just 
entering  upon  a  great  war.  The  story  of  the  expedition  to  Canada 
was  a  tragedy  of  woe  which  carried  mourning  to  many  households, 
and  demanded  great  wisdom,  endurance,  and  faith,  if  the  costly  sacri 
fice  was  to  be  converted  into  hopeful  promise  for  the  future. 

The  lesson  was  one  which  had  for  its  text  the  primary  importance 
of  thorough  discipline  as  the  chief  requisite  of  well  applied  physical 
force,  and  most  impressively  declared  a  fact,  that  the  casualties  of  the 
battle-field  are  but  few,  when  compared  with  the  waste  which  belongs 
to  bad  logistics. 

Individual  courage  was  not  wanting.  Capacity,  self-sacrifice,  and 
great  daring  were  well  supplied  ;  but  these  elements  had  not  been 
sufficiently  combined,  systematized  and  concentrated,  at  the  expense 
of  all  individual  choice  and  preferment.  It  was  hard  to  make  it  under 
stood  that  even  veteran  soldiers  are  like  obedient  children,  at  the  same 
time  strong  and  weak.  They  obey,  but  expect  a  complete  outfit  of 
food,  clothing,  and  all  the  essential  elements  of  success.  Improvidence 
in  expenditure  will  necessarily  result  where  there  is  a  lavish  supply, 
which  costs  the  individual  nothing ;  but  with  fresh  troops  who  have 
not  learned  to  husband  everything,  even  short  intervals  for  rest,  the 
dependence  upon  authority  is  constant  and  absolute,  even  in  minute 
matters  which  would  be  absurd  in  civil  life. 

These  remarks  furnish  a  brief  epitome  of  the  experiences  of  the 
American  army  up  to  July,  17/6.  The  fireside  mourning  over  the 
Canadian  sacrifice  had  not  so  depressed  the  people,  however,  that 
hope  was  laid  aside.  The  impending  contest  at  New  York  began  to 
absorb  attention,  and  awakened  fresh  energy  and  will.  It  was  at  such 
an  hour,  when  the  consciousness  of  great  disaster  was  lost  sight  of  in 


IQ2  THE  TWO   ARMIES   IN  JULY  AND   AUGUST,    1776.  [1776. 

the  demand  for  a  still  greater  effort,  that  the  reverberations  from  Fort 
Moultrie  reaffirmed  the  lesson,  that  the  individual  soldier  was  fully 
equal  to  duty,  if  his  personal  independence  could  be  once  merged  in 
the  national  independence  just  asserted. 

To  accomplish  this  essential  condition  of  success,  was  the  task 
which  had  to  devolve  upon  some  adequate  responsible  authority,  and 
the  American  Congress  laid  this  burden  upon  the  commander-in-chief 
of  its  armies. 

The  British  government  had  placed  its  share  of  the  issue  in  the 
hands  of  Admiral  and  General  Howe,  tacking  on  to  their  instructions, 
however,  the  contingency  of  concurrent  operations  from  Canada  also. 

A  brief  statement  of  the  relations  of  both  armies  will  be  the  intro 
duction  to  the  skirmishes  which  made  up  the  battle  of  Long  Island. 

General  Howe's  fleet  of  transports  sailed  from  Halifax  June  tenth, 
under  strong  convoy,  made  offing  at  Sandy  Hook  on  the  twenty- 
ninth,  and  on  the  second  day  of  July  dropped  anchor.  On  the  fifth, 
this  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  square-rigged  vessels,  be 
sides  smaller  crafts,  effected  the  landing  of  General  Howe's  army  on 
Staten  Island.  A  portion  of  the  Scotch  brigade,  three  companies 
each  of  the  forty-second  and  seventy-first  regiments  joined  the  squad 
ron  off  Nantucket,  having  made  for  Boston,  direct  from  England,  and 
the  total  force  amounted  to  about  nine  thousand  two  hundred  men, 
under  Generals  Howe,  Pigot,  Grant,  and  Jones.  During  the  voyage, 
two  of  the  transports  carrying  the  Scotch  brigade  were  captured  by 
American  armed  vessels  after  a  short  engagement,  and  taken  into 
Boston.  Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell  of  the  seventy-first,  with  six 
teen  other  officers,  and  four  hundred  and  fifty  men  were  reported  by 
General  Howe  as  among  the  missing  then  taken  captive,  including 
General  William  Erskine.  General  Howe  himself  reached  Sandy 
Hook  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  June,  in  the  fast  sailing  frigate  Grey 
hound,  and  held  a  secret  conference  with  Governor  Tryon  on  board 
the  ship.  As  the  result  of  this  interview,  he  determined  to  land  his 
entire  force  at  Gravesend,  and  the  fleet  actually  took  position  in  the 
Gravesend  cove  on  the  first  of  July  for  that  purpose.  The  key  to  his 
change  of  purpose  is  found  in  some  letters  sent  to  Lord  Germaine  by 
a  dispatch  vessel,  July  seventh.  He  wrote  as  follows  :  "  I  had  been 
informed  during  the  night  of  a  strong  pass  upon  a  ridge  of  craggy 
heights,  covered  with  wood,  that  lay  in  the  route  the  army  must  have 
taken,  only  two  miles  from  the  point  of  the  enemy's  encampment,  and 
seven  from  Gravesend,  which  the  rebels  would  undoubtedly  have 


1776.]  THE   TWO   ARMIES    IN  JULY  AND  AUGUST,    1/76.  1 93 

occupied  before  the  king's  troops  could  get  up  to  it ;  and  from  the 
minutest  description,  judging  an  attack  upon  this  post  so  strong  by 
nature,  and  so  near  the  front  of  the  enemy's  works,  to  be  too  hazard 
ous  an  attempt  before  the  arrival  of  the  troops  with  Commodore 
Hotham,  daily  expected,  I  declined  the  undertaking."  u  I  propose 
waiting  for  the  English  fleet  or  the  arrival  of  Lieutenant-general 
Clinton,  in  readiness  to  proceed,  unless  by  some  unexpected  change 
of  circumstances  in  the  meanwhile,  it  should  be  found  expedient  to 
act  with  the  present  force."  "  In  case  Lieutenant-general  Clinton's 
southern  operations  should  prevent  his  joining  the  army  here,  I  am 
apprehensive  the  possession  of  Rhode  Island,  though  of  the  most 
important  nature,  must  be  deferred  until  the  arrival  of  the  second 
embarkation  from  Europe,  unless  General  Carleton  should  penetrate 
early  into  this  province,  which  may  enable  me  to  spare  a  corps  ade 
quate  to  that  service  "  ;  "  But,  as  I  must  esteem  an  impression  upon 
the  enemy's  principal  force  collected  in  this  quarter,  to  be  the  first 
object  of  my  attentions,  I  shall  hold  it  steadily  in  view,  without  losing 
sight  of  these  which  comparatively  may  be  esteemed  collateral." 
These  quotations  show  that  the  very  best  possible  strategical  move 
ments  had  been  selected  by  the  British  Cabinet  and  its  advisers,  for 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  adequate  force  was  not  supplied. 
Th~  fate  of  Clinton's  expedition  southward  was  unknown  at  date  of 
the  dispatch  of  General  Howe. 

It  will  be  seen  that  four  armies  were  to  act  with  substantial  unity 
of  time,  and  so  widely  apart  that  the  American  army  could  not  give 
alternate  attention  to  any  two  of  the  four.  Three  of  these  operations, 
those  at  Newport,  New  York,  and  southward,  were  supported  by 
fleets  ;  the  third  was  to  descend  from  Canada  with  the  moral  support 
which  the  failure  of  the  American  invasion  conferred  upon  the  veteran 
legions  of  the  British  army. 

One  signal  restraint  upon  a  general  plan  of  operations,  otherwise 
excellent,  was  the  monstrous  under-estimate  of  the  courage,  numbers 
and  purposes  of  the  American  people,  which  stuck  so  fast  to  the  min 
istry  that  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  Yorktown  itself  could 
make  the  error  intelligible.  Admiral  Howe  arrived  July  twelfth  with 
an  admirably  equipped  squadron  and  nearly  one  hundred  and  fifty 
transports  loaded  with  troops.  On  the  same  day,  two  men-of-war, 
the  Phoenix,  40  guns,  and  the  Rose,  20  guns,  safely  passed  the  bat 
teries  at  Paulus  Hook  and  Greenwich,  and  thus  early  interrupted 
Washington's  communication  with  Albanv,  and  the  northern  army. 


194  THE  TWO   ARMIES   IN  JULY  AND   AUGUST,    1776.  [1776, 

On  the  next  day  a  flag  was  sent  to  the  American  head-quarters  for 
the  purpose  of  opening  negotiations  for  a  settlement  of  the  issues 
between  the  mother  country  and  the  colonies.  Admiral  Howe  had 
been  deputized  to  act  jointly  with  his  brother,  as  commissioners,  in 
this  behalf.  The  proposition  was  so  weak  that  it  had  no  favor  what 
ever.  General  Washington  described  their  errand,  in  a  letter  to  Gen 
eral  Schuyler,  in  these  terms,  "  Commissioners  to  dispense  pardon  to 
repenting  sinners." 

Much  unreasonable  censure  has  been  cast  upon  General  Howe 
and  his  brother,  for  their  reluctance  to  address  Washington  in  his 
official  character,  as  if  it  implied  discourtesy  on  their  part,  or  the  fear 
that  they  would  waive  some  legal  rights  of  the  crown,  by  the  most 
ready  access  to  the  American  authorities.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
cite  the  American  war  of  1861-5,  when  the  same  reluctance  of  the 
United  States  to  address  the  Confederate  officers  by  their  title,  em 
barrassed  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  as  in  1776,  while  it  had  not  the 
weight  of  a  feather  in  determining  the  real  status  of  the  parties,  or 
the  battle  issues  themselves.  Adjutant-general  Patterson,  of  the 
British  army  had  an  interview  with  Washington,  on  the  twentieth 
day  of  July  ;  mutual  courtesies  were  exchanged,  but  no  business  was 
done,  as  there  was  no  real  basis  of  compromise  in  the  instructions  of 
Lord  Howe. 

Admiral  Howe  says  of  Colonel  Patterson's  interview:  "It  was 
more  polite  than  interesting  ;  however,  it  induced  me  to  change  my 
superscription  of  the  address  upon  the  letter,  which  had  been  George 
Washington,  Esqr.,  for  the  attainment  of  an  end  so  desirable ; — refer 
ring  to  the  effort  to  secure  the  exchange  of  General  Prescott,  who  had 
been  taken  prisoner  at  Montreal,  and  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
seventy-first  regiment,  just  captured  at  sea. 

Congress  had  its  own  Declaration  of  Independence  engrossed  upon 
parchment  on  the  nineteenth  of  July,  for  the  signature  of  members, 
and  freely  disseminated  Lord  Howe's  proposition  throughout  the 
colonies,  so  little  did  they  regard  it  as  having  a  single  element  of  value 
in  the  interests  of  peace.  There  was  another  good  reason  for  the  free 
publication  of  the  document.  Rumors  of  a  sensational  character 
were  as  thick  and  absurd  as  in  more  modern  times.  General  Rober- 
deau  notified  Washington,  on  the  nineteenth  of  August,  in  all  serious 
ness,  that  a  "  post-rider  had  told  with  great  confidence  that  General 
Howe  had  proposed  to  retire  with  the  fleet  and  army,  and  was  willing 
to  settle  the  present  dispute  on  any  terms  asked  by  Washington  :  that 


I776.J  THE   TWO   ARMIES   IN  JULY  AND  AUGUST,    1776.  195 

this  came  from  an  officer  who  was  ready  to  swear  to  it,  but  as  it  might 
have  a  tendency  to  lull  the  inhabitants,  he  made  it  the  subject  of  an 
express." 

This  was  based  upon  another  rumor  that  England  and  France 
were  at  war.  General  Washington  was  compelled  to  publish  an  order 
rebuking  the  recklessness  of  gossip-mongers.  This  was  more  impor 
tant,  since  many  of  those  who  opposed  the  war  on  account  of  business 
relations  with  the  British  civil  authorities,  were  most  active  in  words, 
while  lacking  courage  to  take  up  arms  on  either  side. 

On  the  first  day  of  August,  Generals  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  reached 
Staten  Island  with  their  united  command.  On  the  twelfth  Commo 
dore  Hotham  arrived,  having  convoyed  a  fleet  of  transports  which 
landed  twenty-six  hundred  British  troops  and  eight  thousand  four 
hundred  Hessians,  and  a  supply  of  camp  equipage  for  the  entire  army. 
On  the  fifteenth  Sir  Peter  'Parker  arrived  with  twenty-four  sail  from 
the  south. 

Admiral  Howe  made  one  more  effort  to  press  the  proposition  of 
the  British  Cabinet  to  a  favorable  consideration  by  the  American 
Congress,  but  without  effect.  His  high  character  and  sincere  desire 
for  peace  are  ever  to  be  honored,  no  less  than  his  real  merit  as  a 
naval  commander. 

The  American  preparations  were  far  less  perfect,  but  equally 
earnest  with  those  of  the  British  army. 

The  Declaration  of  Independence,  made  on  the  fourth  day  of  July, 
was  favorably  adopted  by  Maryland  on  the  sixth,  on  the  ground  that 
"  the  king  had  violated  his  compact,"  and  the  people  were  without  a 
government;  thus  starting  out  upon  the  original  basis  of  all  govern 
ment,  as  heretofore  discussed.  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  followed 
on  the  eighth  and  New  York  on  the  ninth.  Other  colonies  rapidly 
accepted  the  action  of  Congress  and  entered  upon  a  more  systematic 
organization  of  the  militia. 

On  the  ninth  of  July,  Massachusetts  was  engaged  in  hurrying  three 
additional  regiments  to  the  Northern  army,  then  having  its  head 
quarters  at  Crown  Point,  and  Congress  ordered  fifteen  hundred  addi 
tional  troops  to  be  raised  for  the  same  destination.  On  the  nine 
teenth,  Washington  ordered  three  of  the  eastern  regiments  to  join 
the  northern  army. 

Crown  Point  was  soon  abandoned,  in  accordance  with  the  recom 
mendations  of  a  board  of  officers  convened  July  seventh,  acting  upon 
the  advice  of  General  Gates,  but  contrary  to  the  judgment  of  Wash- 


196  THE   TWO  ARMIES   IN  JULY  AND   AUGUST,    1776.  [1776. 

ington  ;  and  Ticonderoga  alone  of  the  northern  posts,  remained  in  the 
occupation  of  the  American  army.  The  evacuation  of  Crown  Point  is 
mentioned  in  this  connection  as  only  one  of  the  annoying  elements  of 
the  crisis,  when  each  detached  officer  seemed  ready  to  exercise  the 
prerogative  of  a  commander-in-chief.  There  were  sanitary  considera 
tions  to  be  regarded,  on  account  of  the  remains  of  the  scourge  of  the 
small-pox,  but  General  Carleton  deemed  its  possession  of  such  military 
importance  that  he  soon  occupied  it  for  his  head-quarters. 

The  defense  of  Brooklyn  Heights  was  decided  to  be  essential  to 
the  most  efficient  prosecution  of  the  war.  To  give  value  to  this 
decision,  it  was  necessary  to  provide  for  all  possible  demonstrations 
which  lay  within  the  reach  of  the  British  naval  forces.  From  Brook 
lyn  to  Kings  Bridge  the  distance  was  nearly  fifteen  miles,  with  the 
navigable  waters  of  the  Hudson,  East  river  and  Harlem  creek,  to  be 
watched,  and  their  shores  to  be  amply  guarded.  The  battery  on 
Paulus  Hook,  then  an  island,  was  on  the  New  Jersey  shore,  making 
two  ferries  for  communication  with  Brooklyn,  and  the  entire  force  of 
the  regular  artillery  regiment  of  Colonel  Knox  was  reported  at  only 
five  hundred  and  eighty-five  men. 

The  official  army  return  for  the  third  of  August,  1776,  gives  the 
strength  of  the  American  army  as  follows.  Commissioned  officers  and 
staff,  twelve  hundred  and  twenty-five ;  non-commissioned  officers, 
fifteen  hundred  and  two  ;  present  for  duty,  ten  thousand  five  hundred 
and  fourteen  ;  sick,  present  and  absent,  three  thousand  six  hundred 
and  seventy-eight ;  on  furlough,  ninety-seven  ;  on  command,  two 
thousand  nine  hundred  and  forty-six,  making  a  total  of  seventeen 
thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  men.  Less  than  one-third 
of  this  force  had  served  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  the  arms 
were  not  only  insufficient  in  numbers,  but  many  of  those  treated  as 
serviceable  would  have  been  condemned,  upon  inspection  for  issue  to 
regular  troops.  The  crudeness  of  the  army  organization,  and  the 
short  terms  of  service  engendered  neglect  of  such  as  they  had,  and 
the  army  had  not  learned  that  a  gun  must  be  kept  in  order,  even  if 
the  soldier  goes  barefoot.  The  artillery  was  of  various  patterns  and 
caliber,  second  hand  and  neglected,  or  hastily  fabricated,  and  the  men, 
who  were  excellent  riflemen,  knew  very  little  about  the  range  or 
management  of  field  or  siege  pieces.  It  was  just  then  that  the 
American  army  was  to  renew  the  contest,  no  longer  trusting  in  num 
bers,  but  against  superior  forces  fully  equipped. 

Two  days  after  the  muster  of  the  army  above  referred  to,  Gov- 


1776.]  THE   TWO  ARMIES   IN  JULY  AND  AUGUST,    1776.  197 

ernor  Trumbull  of  Connecticut  assured  Washington  that  "  he  did  not 
greatly  dread  what  the  enemy  could  do,  trusting  Heaven  to  support 
us,  knowing  our  cause  to  be  righteous."  On  the  seventh,  Washing 
ton  sent  him  a  copy  of  his  "  Return,"  with  the  laconic  suggestion,  that 
"  to  trust  in  the  justice  of  our  cause  without  our  own  utmost  exertions, 
would  be  tempting  Providence."  Trumbull  responded  in  his  usual 
practical  way,  and  although  five  regiments  had  already  been  sent  for 
ward,  he  very  soon  called  out  nine  regiments  more,  and  sent  them, 
averaging  three  hundred  and  fifty  men  each,  in  time  to  be  present 
when  the  British  troops  subsequently  landed  in  Westchester  county. 

Two  regiments,  including  Colonel  Prescott's,  were  detailed  as  the 
garrison  of  Governor's  Island.  The  works  upon  Brooklyn  Heights 
had  been  begun  by  General  Lee,  but  prosecuted  under  the  personal 
direction  of  General  Greene,  who  had  explored  the  country  thoroughly, 
and  knew  the  range  of  each  piece  as  well  as  the  character  of  the 
approaches  to  the  works.  He  was  a  soldier  by  choice,  subordinate  at 
all  times,  and  ambitious  to  attain  excellence  for  himself  and  profi 
ciency  in  his  men.  A  redoubt  of  seven  guns  crowned  the  heights. 
The  exposed  point  of  Red  Hook,  which  was  a  combination  of  marsh 
and  thicket  and  solid  land,  was  supplied  with  five  guns,  and  the  in- 
trenchments,  more  than  half  a  mile  in  length,  were  protected  by 
abattis  and  four  redoubts,  which  mounted  twenty  guns.  Greene 
occupied  these  redoubts  and  lines  with  two  regiments  of  Long  Island 
militia,  and  six  Continental  regiments,  none  of  which  exceeded  four 
hundred  men  for  duty.  The  lines  extended  from  Wallabout  Bay,  the 
present  navy  yard,  to  the  creek  then  setting  in  from  Gowanus  Bay, 
and  some  adjoining  marshes,  which  were  impassable  at  high  tide,  and 
at  all  times  miry,  and  difficult  of  approach. 

The  Pennsylvania  rifle  battalion,  Colonel  Atlee,  Smallwood's 
Maryland,  and  Haslet's  Delaware,  which  had  just  joined  the  army 
from  the  south,  were  added  to  the  garrison,  and  were  placed  in  Stir 
ling's  brigade  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh,  before  the  attack 
was  made. 

The  total  nominal  strength  of  the  American  army  about  New 
York  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  August,  including  the  sick,  non-effectives 
of  all  kinds,  and  those  without  arms,  was  a  little  over  twenty-seven 
thousand  men.  The  Connecticut  regiments  which  last  joined,  brought 
such  arms  as  they  could  provide  for  themselves,  and  were  but  so  many 
citizens,  with  nominal  organization,  but  neither  discipline  nor  experi 
ence  in  military  drill. 


198  THE  TWO  ARMIES  IN  JULY  AND  AUGUST,    1776.  1776.] 

On  the  fifteenth  of  August,  Greene,  "  then  confined  to  his  bed  with 
a  raging  fever,"  wrote  to  Washington  that  "  he  hoped  through  the 
assistance  of  Providence  to  be  able  to  ride  before  an  attack  should  be 
made,  but  felt  great  anxiety  as  to  the  result." 

Such  was  the  relative  state  of  readiness  with  which  the  British  and 
American  armies  awaited  conflict.  Repeated  storms  and  high  winds 
postponed  the  landing  of  the  former  troops,  and  the  latter  army  was 
accumulating  in  numbers,  but  anticipating  the  coming  issue  with  the 
conviction  that  the  ordeal  would  be  one  of  surpassing  trial  and  danger. 


CHAPTER   XXX. 

BATTLE   OF   LONG  ISLAND.— PREPARATIONS. 

THE  British  commander-in-chief  determined  to  attack  the  Amer 
ican  works  on  Brooklyn  Heights  and  thereby  secure  a  land- 
footing  for  operations  against  the  city  of  New  York,  which  was  directly 
across  East  River  and  less  than  three-fourths  of  a  mile  distant. 

The  defense  of  Fort  Moultrie  had  indicated  the  kind  of  resistance 
which  provincial  troops  could  oppose  to  an  attack  by  naval  forces, 
and  the  advance  had  to  be  made  across  Long  Island,  unless  a  com 
bined  movement  should  be  attempted  through  Long  Island  Sound 
and  up  the  Hudson  river,  to  occupy  the  country  north  of  Manhattan, 
or  New  York,  island.  The  latter  plan  would  enclose  the  American 
army,  as  the  British  army  was  caught  at  Boston  ;  while  the  occupation 
of  the  heights  of  Brooklyn  would  be  a  counterpart  to  the  American 
possession  of  Dorchester  Heights  during  the  previous  June. 

The  movement  was  well  devised,  well  supported  and  faithfully 
executed.  In  determining  the  force  actually  employed  in  the  attack, 
reference  is  made  to  the  report  of  Admiral  Howe,  who  states,  that 
"  on  the  twenty-second  of  August  the  whole  force  then  destined  for 
this  service,  consisting  of  about  fifteen  thousand  men.  was  landed 
before  noon  :  and  that  on  the  twenty-fifth,  an  additional  corps  of  Hes 
sian  troops  under  General  De  Heister,  with  their  artillery  and  baggage, 
were  conveyed  to  Gravesend  Bay."  This  made  the  effective  force 
twenty  thousand  men,  leaving  at  least  four  thousand  upon  Staten 
Island,  besides  the  sick.  The  latter  force  included  one  brigade  of 
Hessian  troops.  On  the  twenty-seventh  day  of  August,  General 
Howe  made  official  report  of  the  rank  and  file  of  his  army,  as  twenty- 
six  thousand  two  hundred  and  forty-seven  men,  exclusive  of  the  bat 
talion  of  royalists  under  Brigadier-general  De  Lancey.  In  quoting 
the  Returns  of  General  Howe  which  were  laid  before  the  House 
of  Commons,  General  Clinton  says,  that  "  he  (Howe)  had  24,464 


200  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS.  [I776. 

effectives  fit  for  duty ; — a  total  of  26,980,  officers  not  included,  who, 
when  added,  amount  to  31,625  men."  Sir  George  Collier,  who  was 
present  at  the  landing  of  the  army,  says,  that  "  the  army  with  Howe 
on  Long  Island  amounted  to  upwards  of  twenty  thousand  besides 
those  who  remained  on  Staten  Island." 

The  admirable  logistics  exhibited  in  the  whole  movement  requires 
fuller  detail  of  narrative  than  would  be  desirable  in  a  more  general 
history. 

The  British  army  proper  consisted  of  an  advance  corps,  a  reserve, 
and  seven  brigades,  constituted  as  follows  : 

The  advance  corps : — Four  battalions  of  light  infantry  and  the 
light  dragoons.  The  reserve : — four  battalions  of  grenadiers,  with 
the  33d  and  42d  regiments  of  foot. 

First  Brigade :  the  44th,  i$th,  2/th  and  45th  regiments. 

Second  Brigade:  the  5th,  28th,  55th  and  49th  regiments. 

Third  Brigade  :  the  loth,  37th,  38th  and  52d  regiments. 

Fourth  Brigade:  the  I7th,  4Oth,  46th  and  55th  regiments. 

Fifth  Brigade  :  the  22d,  43d,  54th  and  63d  regiments. 

Sixth  Brigade:  the  23d,  44th,  57th  and  64th  regiments. 

Seventh  Brigade  :  the  7ist  Highland  regiment,  New  York  com 
panies  and  the  Royal  Artillery. 

Colonel  Donop's  corps  embraced  the  Hessian  grenadiers  and  chas 
seurs  ;  and  General  De  Heister's  command  consisted  of  two  brigades. 

Some  of  these  regiments  are  at  once  to  be  recognized  as  among 
those  which  were  largely  depleted  in  the  action  on  Breed's  Hill ;  but 
the  number  of  battalions  which  landed,  confirms  the  estimate  given 
by  Admiral  Howe  and  Sir  George  Collier. 

The  debarkation  was  signally  perfect.  More  than  four  hundred 
transports  were  within  the  arms  of  Sandy  Hook.  Ten  line-of-battle 
ships  and  twenty  frigates  were  their  escort  and  protection.  Seventy- 
five  flat  boats,  eleven  bateaux  and  two  galleys,  all  built  for  the  pur 
pose,  in  ten  distinct,  well-ordered  divisions,  simultaneously  touched 
the  beach  and  landed  the  reserves  and  advance  corps,  four  thousand 
strong,  near  the  present  site  of  Fort  Hamilton,  and  within  two  hours 
after  the  signal  had  been  set.  Five  thousand  additional  troops  were 
landed  with  equal  celerity  and  order,  a  little  further  down  the  bay. 
The  transports  came  up  in  their  designated  succession  to  deliver  the 
regiments  to  the  long  line  of  waiting  boats,  and  before  twelve  o'clock 
of  the  twenty-second  of  August,  fifteen  thousand  men,  with  artillery, 
baggage  and  stores,  had  been  placed  on  shore,  without  mishap  or 


I7?6.]  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS.  2OI 

delay.  On  the  twenty-fifth,  the  division  of  General  De  Heister  was 
transported  to  Gravesend  cove,  and  made  their  landing  with  equal 
skill. 

On  the  twenty-sixth,  a  naval  diversion  was  attempted  up  New 
York  Bay,  to  alarm  the  posts  on  Governor's  Island  and  Red  Hook,  and 
induce  the  belief  that  an  attack  was  to  be  made  upon  the  city  itself. 
It  so  far  succeeded  as  to  delay  the  movement  of  reinforcements  then 
under  orders  for  Brooklyn  ;  but  a  strong  north-east  wind  compelled 
the  fleet  to  drop  down  the  bay  and  come  to  anchor.  The  Roebuck 
alone  reached  Red  Hook,  but  accomplished  no  mischief,  and  soon 
dropped  out  of  fire. 

General  Cornwallis,  with  the  reserves,  ten  battalions  of  light  in 
fantry,  and  Donop's  corps  of  Hessians,  had  been  advanced  to  the 
vicinity  of  Flatbush  immediately  after  landing  on  the  twenty-second, 
to  learn  whether  the  pass  through  the  hills  at  that  point  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Americans.  Upon  finding  that  it  had  been  so  occu 
pied,  and  that  a  redoubt  and  intrenchments  had  been  interposed  in 
his  way,  his  command  was  not  pushed  to  an  attack,  but  encamped  in 
front  of  Flatbush.  The  main  army  occupied  a  line  extending  from 
the  coast  through  Gravesend  to  Flatlands,  and  active  preparations 
were  at  once  made  for  an  immediate  advance. 

The  long  range  of  hills  extending  from  the  Narrows  to  Jamaica 
was  known  to  have  four  passes  available  for  the  movement  of  troops 
with  artillery.  The  most  direct  road  was  that  along  the  bay,  cutting 
through  the  hills  just  back  of  Red  Lion,  where  Martense's  Lane  joins 
the  usual  thoroughfare,  at  the  edge  of  the  present  Greenwood  cem 
etery.  A  second  was  directly  in  front  of  Flatbush,  and  this  road  led 
directly  to  the  American  intrenchments.  The  third  was  by  the  road 
from  Flatbush  to  Bedford.  The  fourth,  which  extended  as  far  as 
Flushing,  crossed  the  Bedford  and  Jamaica  road  nearly  three  miles 
east  from  the  first  named  town.  Reference  to  the  map,  "  Battle  of 
Long  Island,"  which  is  built  upon  the  United  States  Coast  Survey 
Chart,  will  indicate  the  respective  relations  of  these  roads  to  an 
advance  upon  the  American  position.  The  disposition  of  the  British 
army  is  to  be  particularly  noticed  for  its  exact  comprehension  of  the 
situation,  and  the  assurance  of  success  which  that  disposition  secured. 

During  the  morning  of  the  twenty-second,  at  the  time  of  the  first 
landing,  Colonel  Hand's  American  regiment  had  deployed  along  the 
coast  for  the  purpose  of  checking  the  movement,  if  attempted  only  by 
a  moderate  force ;  but  the  regiment  fell  back  to  Prospect  Hill  as  soon 


2O2  BATTLE   OF  LONG  ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS.  [1776. 

as  advised  of  its  real  character.  It  does  not  appear  from  the  official 
archives,  or  other  responsible  authority,  that  he  advised  the  com 
manding  general  of  the  landing  of  the  additional  corps  on  the  same 
day,  nor  that  any  adequate  vidette  system  was  employed  to  secure 
an  intelligent  impression  as  to  the  ultimate  design  of  the  British 
army. 

On  the  twenty-sixth,  General  De  Heister  occupied  Flatbush,  and 
thereby  greatly  strengthened  the  conviction  that  an  advance  would  be 
made  in  force  from  that  point,  but  during  the  evening,  Earl  Cornwallis 
withdrew  his  own  command,  and  joined  General  Clinton  at  Flatlands. 

Shortly  after  nine  o'clock,  General  Clinton  with  the  light  dragoons, 
two  battalions  of  light  infantry,  the  reserve  under  Cornwallis,  (except 
the  forty-second  regiment  which  had  been  detached  to  the  left  of 
General  Heister,)  and  the  portion  of  the  seventy-first  regiment  which 
escaped  capture  at  sea,  with  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery,  moved 
through  New  Lots,  near  the  present  East  New  York,  and  before 
three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  arrived  within  half  a  mile  of  the  pass 
which  he  intended  to  force.  A  narrow  causeway  built  through  a  marsh, 
and  known  as  Shoemaker's  bridge,  which  only  admitted  of  the  passage 
of  a  single  column  at  a  time,  was  passed  without  interruption,  and  a  halt 
was  then  ordered  for  re-formation  of  the  command. 

Lord  Percy  followed  with  the  main  army,  which  consisted  of  the 
Guards,  the  Second,  Third,  and  Fifth  brigades,  and  ten  field  pieces. 
The  Forty-ninth  regiment,  with  four  medium  twelve-pounders,  and 
the  baggage  brought  up  the  rear.  Percy  joined  Clinton  at  least  a  half 
hour  before  daybreak.  A  small  American  patrol  was  captured,  the 
pass  was  occupied,  the  heights  were  reached,  and  the  troops  were 
allowed  an  interval  for  rest  and  refreshments,  preparatory  to  a  further 
advance. 

There  was  now  open  before  this  powerful  column,  a  clear  and 
direct  route  to  Brooklyn  Heights  by  the  rear  of  all  advanced  posts. 
Thus  far,  the  British  right  wing  had  profitably  employed  the  hours 
and  realized  its  immediate  objective,  without  loss  or  alarm  to  the 
enemy.  An  immediate  advance  upon  the  American  intrenchments 
would  have  been  successful,  but  costly  in  life.  This  was  not  the 
original  purpose,  and  the  success  already  realized  was  more  than 
should  have  been  anticipated. 

During  this  time,  General  De  Heister,  under  instructions,  only 
demonstrated  toward  the  American  force  which  held  the  Flatbush 
pass,  and  Colonel  Miles  of  the  American  army,  who  was  posted  toward 


I776.]  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS.  2O3 

the  Bedford  road,  and  Colonel  Wyllis,  who  was  posted  across  that 
road,  seem  to  have  had  no  intimation  that  a  British  force  had  already 
turned  their  flank,  and  was  advancing  between  their  own  position  and 
the  American  lines. 

Occasional  firing  took  place  about  Flatbush,  but  no  more  than 
was  incident  to  antagonistic  forces  occupying  positions  within  short 
range.  They  seem  to  have  regarded  the  Flatbush  pass  as  seriously 
threatened,  and  the  heavy  force  in  front  gave  color  to  this  opinion. 
General  Grant's  command  could  be  seen  from  Prospect  Hill,  and  the 
comparative  passivity  of  Heister's  division  would  have  suggested  that 
he  was  withholding  attack,  in  order  to  give  General  Grant  an  oppor 
tunity  to  advance  by  the  harbor  road. 

General  Grant  also  moved  late  in  the  evening  with  the  Fourth  and 
Sixth  brigades,  and  reached  Red  Lion  just  before  midnight.  His 
advance  was  promptly  checked  by  a  lively  fire  from  a  detachment  of 
militia  properly  posted  before  the  pass.  This  skirmishing  was  main 
tained  until  early  dawn.  He  advanced  slowly,  without  crowding  the 
American  pickets,  yet  pressed  firmly  on,  as  if  assured  of  abundant 
support. 

Washington  had  been  advised  of  the  landing  effected  on  the 
twenty-second,  and  that  "  Colonel  Hand  had  fallen  back  to  Prospect 
Hill,  burning  wheat  and  such  other  property  as  might  be  of  immedi 
ate  use  to  the  British  troops."  Six  regiments  were  sent  to  reinforce 
the  garrison  on  the  heights.  These  regiments  ranged  in  number  from 
three  hundred  to  four  hundred  men.  Orders  were  sent  to  General 
Heath,  then  at  the  north  end  of  Manhattan  island,  to  be  prepared  to 
forward  additional  troops,  and  five  regiments  from  the  city  force  were 
placed  in  readiness  to  cross  East  river,  as  soon  as  it  should  be  clearly 
determined  whether  General  Howe  was  making  a  final  movement  to 
cover  a  positive  attack  upon  New  York,  or  really  designed  to  make 
the  occupation  of  Brooklyn  Heights  his  single  immediate  objective. 
The  absence  of  General  Greene  became  a  matter  of  serious  concern. 
In  a  letter  to  Congress,  dated  the  twenty-third,  Washington  says, 
"  I  have  been  obliged  to  appoint  General  Sullivan  to  the  command 
on  the  island,  owing  to  General  Greene's  indisposition." 

When  Colonel  Hand  fell  back  to  Flatbush  on  the  twenty-second, 
and  gave  notice  of  the  first  landing,  the  small  picket  force  at  that  pass 
was  increased,  by  order  of  General  Sullivan.  In  a  letter  to  Washing 
ton,  written  on  the  twenty-third,  he  says,  "  This  afternoon  the  enemy 
formed,  and  attempted  to  pass  the  road  by  Bedford.  A  smart  fire 


204  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS.  [1776 

ensued  between  them  and  the  riflemen.  The  officer  sent  off  for  a 
reinforcement  which  I  ordered  immediately.  A  number  of  musketry 
came  up  to  the  assistance  of  the  riflemen,  whose  fire,  with  that  of  the 
field  pieces,  caused  a  retreat  of  the  enemy.  I  have  ordered  a  party 
out  for  prisoners  to-night.  We  have  driven  them  a  mile  from  their 
former  station.  These  things  argue  well  for  us,  and  I  hope  are  so 
many  preludes  to  a  general  victory."  This  confidence  of  General 
Sullivan  was  hardly  less  unfounded  than  his  faith  in  the  success  of 
operations  in  Canada,  and,  as  in  that  case,  he  was  immediately  super 
seded. 

On  the  next  day  General  Putnam  was  assigned  to  the  command. 
On  the  twenty-sixth,  Washington  wrote  to  that  officer,  to  "  stop  the 
scattering,  unmeaning  and  wasteful  firing,  which  prevents  the  possi 
bility  of  distinguishing  between  a  real  and  false  alarm,  which  prevents 
deserters  from  approaching  our  lines,  and  must  continue  so  long  as 
every  soldier  conceives  himself  at  liberty  to  fire  when,  and  at  what  he 
pleases."  u  Guards  are  to  be  particularly  instructed  in  their  duty." 
"  A  brigadier  of  the  day  is  to  remain  constantly  upon  the  lines,  that  he 
may  be  upon  the  spot,  to  command  and  see  that  orders  are  executed." 
"Skulkers  must  be  shot  down  on  the  spot."  "The  distinction 
between  a  well  regulated  army  and  a  mob,  is  the  good  order  and  dis 
cipline  of  the  former,  and  the  licentiousness  and  disorderly  behavior 
of  the  latter."  "  The  men  not  on  duty,  are  to  be  compelled  to 
remain  at,  or  near  their  respective  camps,  or  quarters,  that  they  may 
turn  out  at  a  moment's  warning:  nothing  being  more  probable  than 
that  the  enemy  will  allow  little  time  enough  to  prepare  for  the  attack." 
"  Your  best  men  should  at  all  hazards  prevent  the  enemy  passing  the 
woods  and  approaching  your  works." 

On  the  twenty-sixth  Washington  reported  to  Congress,  that, "  the 
fleet  had  fallen  down  to  the  Narrows,  that  the  tents  had  been  struck 
on  Staten  Island,  and  he  was  led  to  believe  that  the  main  army  had 
landed  upon  Long  Island  and  would  make  their  grand  push  there." 

The  force  on  Long  Island  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  was  not  quite 
eight  thousand  men,  inclusive  of  Stirling's  brigade,  which  crossed  the 
river  in  the  morning.  During  the  subsequent  debates  upon  this  battle 
in  the  British  House  of  Commons,  and  the  examination  of  witnesses 
who  had  participated  in  the  action,  Cornwallis  testified,  "  It  was  re 
ported  that  they  (the  Americans)  had  six  or  eight  thousand  men  on 
Long  Island."  General  Howe,  on  the  other  hand,  reported  the  Ameri 
can  force  which  occupied  the  woods  alone  at  ten  thousand  men  This 


1776.]  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS.  2O5 

was  nearly  one-half  of  the  effective  force  of  the  whole  American  army 
about  New  York.  While  the  exact  number  may  not  be  ascertained, 
it  is  best  to  settle  upon  some  final  standard,  so  that  an  approximate 
estimate  can  have  its  place  in  history.  That  standard  must  be  the 
official  returns,  with  only  those  qualifications  which  equally  valuable 
contemporaneous  judgment  will  warrant.  The  "  ration  returns  "  then 
made,  vindicate  the  above  judgment  of  the  force  at  the  post.  The 
disposition  of  the  American  advance  posts  before  Brooklyn  was  of  the 
feeblest  kind,  in  view  of  the  impending  advance  of  the  British  army. 

Johnson's  New  Jersey,  and  Hendshaw's  Massachusetts  regiments 
were  established  at  Prospect  Hill.  Colonel  Hand's  was  also  there  ; 
Miles'  Pennsylvania  rifles,  and  Wyllis'  Connecticut  were  at  or  near  the 
Bedford  pass.  Three  field  pieces,  and  one  howitzer  were  in  the 
redoubt  and  intrenchments  before  Flatbush.  General  Sullivan's  re 
port  contains  the  following :  "  Lord  Stirling  commanded  the  main 
body  without  the  lines.  I  was  to  have  commanded  under  General 
Putnam  within  the  lines.  I  was  uneasy  about  a  road,  through  which 
I  had  often  foretold  that  the  enemy  would  come,  but  could  not  per 
suade  others  to  be  of  my  opinion.  I  went  to  the  hill  near  Flatbush  to 
reconnoiter,  and  with  a  picket  of  four  hundred  men  was  surrounded 
by  the  enemy,  who  had  advanced  by  the  very  road  I  had  foretold,  and 
which  I  had  paid  horsemen  fifty  dollars  for  patrolling  by  night,  while 
I  had  the  command,  as  I  had  no  foot  for  the  purpose."  "  I  often 
urged,  both  by  word  and  writing,  that  the  enemy  would  first  try  Long 
Island  ;  and  then  New  York,  which  was  completely  commanded  by  it, 
would  fall  of  course.  In  this  I  was  unhappy  enough  to  differ  from 
almost  every  officer  in  the  army,  till  the  event  proved  my  conjectures 
were  just."  General  Sullivan  was  second  in  command.  Lord  Stirling 
was  at  the  fort,  until  awakened  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  twenty-seventh,  and  assigned  to  duty  on  the  extreme  right.  The 
standing  order  of  Washington  required  a  general  officer  to  be  always 
on  the  lines.  General  Sullivan,  in  the  absence  of  all  other  officers,  and 
as  so  recently  responsible  for  the  whole  command,  does  not  success 
fully  limit  his  responsibility  to  that  of  fighting  well  the  little  escort  to 
his  reconnoitering  trip. 

General  Putnam  already  advanced  in  years,  and  wholly  unac 
quainted  with  the  outposts,  seems  to  have  left  undisturbed  the  exist 
ing  picket  arrangements  when  he  took  command.  It  has  been  seen 
that  Washington  had  ordered  the  careful  observation  and  guard  of 
all  approaches.  As  General  Sullivan  claimed  that  he  always  expected 


206  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND.— PREPARATIONS.  [1776. 

the  British  advance  to  be  made  upon  Brooklyn,  he  must  as  a  soldier 
be  held  to  certain  implied  presumptions  which  he  alone  could,  and 
never  did,  adequately  explain. 

The  simple  fact  is  that  the  Jamaica  road  was  not  guarded.  The 
force  at  all  outside  posts  up  to  the  attack  upon  the  pickets  at  Red  Lion, 
on  the  harbor  road,  was  but  a  little  over  three  thousand  men  ;  and 
when  that  attack  was  made  it  was  assumed  to  be  conclusive  of  the 
purpose  of  General  Howe  to  make  that  route  his  line  of  operations 
against  the  American  works.  There  is  no  other  hypothesis  which 
would  warrant  the  exposure  of  troops  on  that  road,  subject  as  they 
would  be  to  lose  their  line  of  retreat,  if  General  De  Heister  should 
advance  upon  the  centre.  He  was  in  fact  nearer  the  fort  than  Red 
Lion  was. 

The  British  army  was  prepared  to  fulfill  its  duty.  The  American 
army,  without  Greene,  failed  to  understand  the  position,  and  was  not 
ready  for  duty. 

NOTE.  (Fourth  Edition?)  The  American  Army  was  not  strong  enough  to  defend 
all  approaches  by  the  Jamaica  Road,  even  if  all  had  been  closely  watched.  General 
Sullivan  believed  that  the  repulse  of  the  detachment  which  approached  Bedford,  and 
referred  to  on  pages  203-4,  gave  hope  of  success ;  and  yet,  as  he  had  formed  the 
opinion  that  the  British  would  attempt  some  flank  movement,  he  seems  to  have 
suspected  the  possibility  of  such  a  movement  as  actually  took  place  from  the  extreme 
left.  The  patrol  referred  to  on  page  202,  as  captured  by  General  Howe,  is  thus 
accounted  for  by  Henry  P.  Johnston,  Esq.,  the  pains-taking  author  of  Vol.  Ill, 
Memoirs  of  the  Long  Island  Historical  Society  (1878),  p.  159.  "On  the  night  of  the 
26th,  General  Sullivan  excised  the  same  authority  he  had  exercised  in  making  other 
details,  and  sent  out  a  special  patrol  of  five  commissioned  officers  to  watch  the  Jamaica 
Pass:  Adjutant  Jeronimus  Hoogland  and  Lieutenants  Robert  Troup  and  Edward 
Dunscomb  ;  and  the  other  two  were  Lieutenant  Gerrit  Van  Wagenen,  a  detached 
officer  of  McDougall's  old  regiment,  and  a  Lieutenant  Gilliland,  who  with  Van 
Wagenen  had  crossed  to  Long  Island  as  a  volunteer."  The  documents  cited  by 
Mr.  Johnston  confirm  this  statement. 

NOTE.  (Fifth  Edition, .)  It  would  seem  as  if  all  important  documentary  matter,  and  all 
authoritative  tradition  which  concern  the  substantial  history  of  the  battle  of  Long  Island,  had 
come  to  light.  One  fact  needs  more  emphasis  than  is  generally  conceded.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  weakness  of  the  scout  on  the  Jamaica  road,  the  American  army  was  too  small  to  cope 
with  Howe  in  the  field,  and  the  resistance  of  Sullivan  and  Stirling  was  prolonged  to  its  utmost 
capacity.  A  larger  diversion  to  the  extreme  left  would  only  have  lessened  the  resistance  actually 
made,  and  have  drawn  Howe  into  a  pursuit,  even  to  the  Brooklyn  lines.  His  enforced  delay,  to 
provide  for  his  prisoners,  was  a  real  relief  to  the  garrison.  A  prompt  and  intelligent  co-operation 
of  all  the  American  troops  outside  the  works,  separated  as  they  \vere  by  woods,  ravines,  and 
thickets,  and  poorly  supplied  with  light  troops,  was  practically  impossible.  The  lesson  of  Bunker 
Hill  depressed  Howe's  energy  and  magnified  his  characteristic  caution.  Modern  operations 
between  the  best  disciplined  armies  have  hinged  upon  incidents  far  less  significant  than  the 
failure  of  General  Sullivan,  then  fresh  from  the  bar  and  only  thirty-six  years  of  age,  to  assume 
responsibility  for  the  remote  left  as  well  as  his  proper  front.  General  Putnam,  chief  in  command, 
nearly  sixty  years  of  age  and  a  professional  soldier,  must  bear  the  chief  responsibility  for  condi 
tions  which  were  inseparable  from  an  attempt  to  oppose  the  advance  of  a  trained  army 
by  one-fourth  its  force. 


CHAPTER    XXXI. 

BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND. 

THE  twenty-seventh  day  of  August,  1776,  was  a  day  of  struggle 
from  its  first  hour. 

The  narrative  brought  General  Grant  into  conflict,  with  the  pickets 
of  the  American  outposts  on  New  York  Bay,  just  about  midnight  of 
the  twenty-sixth.  The  picket  was  commanded  by  Major  Burd,  of  the 
Pennsylvania  flying  camp.  This  camp,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
established  by  authority  of  Congress  for  the  concentration  of  ten 
thousand  men  who  were  to  be  placed  under  instruction,  as  an  ultimate 
reserve.  The  exigency  hurried  many  of  these  regiments  to  New  York 
before  they  had  in  fact  been  fully  organized. 

The  picket  at  Red  Lion  held  firmly  to  their  post,  supported  by  a 
portion  of  Huntington's  Connecticut  regiment,  and  aided  by  the  early 
presence  of  General  Parsons,  who  had  just  before  received  the  appoint 
ment  as  brigadier-general.  He  was  a  lawyer,  without  military  ante 
cedents,  and  had  been  with  the  army  but  a  few  weeks. 

Major  Burd  was  captured  during  the  pressure  of  General  Grant's 
advance  guard  upon  the  picket  line.  Messengers  were  dispatched  to 
head-quarters,  and  at  three  o'clock  General  Putnam  sent  General 
Lord  Stirling  to  the  relief  of  the  picket,  with  orders  "  to  stop  the 
advance  of  the  enemy."  Colonel  Atlee,  of  the  Pennsylvania  mus 
keteer  battalion,  was  pushed  forward  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  by  which 
the  British  must  approach,  and  a  portion  of  three  companies  uniting 
with  the  original  advance  guard,  maintained  such  vigorous  skirmishing 
just  back  of  Red  Lion,  as  to  check  the  advance  of  the  enemy  until 
quite  late  in  the  morning.  Nearly  midway  between  the  American 
lines  and  Red  Lion,  a  well  developed  ridge  extended  from  the  general 
line  of  hills  across  the  traveled  road,  nearly  to  the  shore  of  the  New 
York  Bay.  The  ground  in  front,  to  the  south-west,  was  low  and 
marshy  at  places,  while  an  orchard  occupied  the  slight  upland  imme- 


208  BATTLE   OF  LONG  ISLAND.  [1776 

diately  in  front  of  this  ridge,  which  General  Stirling  selected  as  his 
joint  of  resistance.  In  order  to  check  the  British  advance,  and  give 
time  for  the  formation  of  the  troops  then  rapidly  approaching  from 
Brooklyn,  Colonel  Atlee  promptly  concentrated  his  regiment  and  the 
retiring  picket  guard  upon  the  side  of  the  main  hills,  so  as  to  have  a 
superior  position  from  which  to  open  fire  upon  the  British  columns, 
then  preparing  to  descend  from  the  summit  near  the  pass  to  the  low 
ground  and  orchard  which  they  must  cross  in  order  to  attack  Stirling. 
This  movement  of  Colonel  Atlee  to  high  ground  which  was  well 
wooded  and  adapted  to  his  design,  was  made  under  a  fire  of  grape 
shot,  with  the  loss,  according  to  his  report,  of  but  one  man. 

It  is  necessary  to  state  in  this  connection  that  the  reports  of  Stir 
ling,  Atlee,  and  other  officers,  written  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
seventh,  and  on  the  twenty-eighth,  while  they  were  prisoners,  are 
necessarily  meager  in  detail,  and  have  value  simply  for  the  facts  within 
their  immediate  personal  knowledge.  Those  facts  only  are  here  em 
bodied  which  are  consistent  with  the  record  as  gathered  from  addi 
tional  sources.  Statements  and  omissions  are  therefore  alike  to  be 
regarded,  in  order  to  make  the  narrative  as  full  as  the  facts  will  war 
rant,  and  military  orders  themselves  are  to  be  largely  inferred  from 
acts  done.  Each  claims  for  himself  sufficient  credit  for  good  conduct, 
while  none  assume  responsibility  for  neglect. 

Colonel  Atlee  had  barely  reached  the  wooded  slope  referred  to, 
when  General  Grant  moved  the  twenty-third,  forty-fourth,  and  a  part 
of  the  seventeenth  British  foot  to  the  right,  up  the  hill,  overlapping 
Atlee's  command,  and  having  as  their  evident  purpose  to  flank  him  first, 
then  to  crowd  him  back  upon  Stirling,  and  so  flank  the  entire  command. 
Stirling  had  already  formed  his  line.  It  consisted  of  Smallwood's 
Maryland  battalion,  Haslet's  Delaware  battalion,  their  colonels  being 
absent  as  members  of  court-martial  in  New  York,  and  a  part  of 
Kiechline's  rifle  battalion,  just  then  coming  upon  the  ground.  Cap 
tain  Carpenter  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  was  already  in  sight,  and 
soon  after  joined  the  brigade.  Stirling  sent  Captain  Stedman  with 
two  Delaware  companies  to  support  Colonel  Atlee,  with  orders  to  take 
distance  still  more  to  the  left,  and  prevent  the  enemy  from  gaining 
higher  ground  for  their  flank  movement.  General  Parsons  was  also 
placed  on  the  left  with  so  much  of  Huntington's  regiment  as  was  on 
the  ground.  Two  vigorous  attacks  were  made  upon  Atlee  without 
success.  Both  were  repulsed  with  considerable  loss,  as  the  character 
of  the  ground  and  the  intervening  woods  gave  confidence  and  effi- 


1776.]  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND.  2Og 

ciency  to  the  American  troops.  After  the  second  repulse,  Colonel 
Atlee  made  a  quick  advance  to  force  a  good  position  which  the  British 
held,  but  was  forced  back  by  a  heavy  fire  from  a  superior  force.  His 
Lieutenant-colonel,  Caleb  Parry,  was  killed,  as  well  as  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Grant,  of  the  fortieth  British  foot.  The  British  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  during  these  attacks  was  a  little  over  sixty  officers  and 
men,  including  Lieutenant  Colonel  Monckton  of  the  forty-first,  dan 
gerously  wounded. 

The  British  centre  and  left  had  now  formed  in  two  lines  for  an 
advance  upon  Stirling  ;  their  left  having  been  relieved  from  pressure, 
moved  on  in  a  single  line  as  originally  deployed.  Captain  Carpenter's 
guns  were  promptly  moved  nearer  the  hill-side  to  command  the  road, 
and  a  spirited  action  was  maintained,  at  arms'  length,  for  nearly  two 
hours,  with  considerable  loss  on  both  sides,  and  little  advantage  to 
either.  The  distance  to  the  American  lines  was  much  less  than  three 
miles,  the  disparity'in  force  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant  the  sacrifice 
and  risk  of  assault,  and  the  general  plan  of  the  combined  British 
movement,  rendered  such  an  attempt  unnecessary.  It  was  enough 
for  the  British  left  wing  to  be  able  to  hold  Stirling  fast  where 
he  was. 

The  sound  of  firing  had  already  been  heard  in  the  direction  of 
Flatbush.  Shortly  before  eleven  o'clock  it  was  heard  to  the  rear  of 
Stirling,  and  the  real  issue  of  the  day  approached  its  solution.  Stir 
ling  retreated  hastily,  but  in  order  ;  and  was  soon  confronted  with  fresh 
columns  which  were  rapidly  advancing  toward  the  road  which  ran 
from  the  Upper  Mill,  to  Flatbush.  Orders  were  given  for  the  men  to 
seek  their  own  safety,  by  crossing  the  marsh  to  the  Yellow  Mill,  or 
otherwise,  each  for  himself.  The  tide  was  already  coming  in,  and 
promptness  alone  could  save  any  of  the  command.  Atlee  and  Par 
sons  fell  back,  along  the  hill,  skirmishing  as  they  retired.  The  ammu 
nition  wagon  of  Huntington's  regiment  had  joined  the  detachment, 
but  the  increasing  volume  of  fire  gave  imperative  warning  no  longer 
to  delay  retreat.  Parsons,  with  a  few  men,  attempted  to  cross  the 
Flatbush  road  and  retreat  toward  Hell  Gate.  His  men  scattered  and 
he  entered  the  works  in  the  morning,  having  escaped  through  the 
thick  woods.  Atlee  found  himself  in  danger  of  capture  by  a  Hessian 
detachment,  and  turning  to  the  right  surrendered  to  the  forty-second 
Highland  regiment,  which  was  on  De  Heister's  left,  and  had  advanced 
over  Prospect  Hill. 

General  Stirling,  with  four  hundred  men  of  Smallwood's  Maryland 
14 


210  BATTLE   OF  LONG  ISLAND.  [irjt> 

battalion,  faced  his  new  opponent,  and  made  a  grasp  to  control  the 
road  which  led  into  South  Brooklyn  and  thereby  cover  the  causeway 
at  the  Upper  Mill.  This  would  at  least  have  secured  a  retreat  for  the 
other  troops.  It  was  too  late.  Cornwallis  had  already  occupied  the 
Cortelyou  house,  and  held  fast  to  his  position  with  constantly  increas 
ing  forces.  An  attempt  was  then  made  to  force  a  passage  to  fort 
Box,  the  redoubt  at  the  nearest  point  on  the  American  lines,  but  this 
was  foiled  by  the  skillful  interposition  of  a  force  of  grenadiers  and 
two  guns. 

Finding  this  avenue  of  escape  closed,  and  that  the  army  of  Grant 
was  fast  approaching,  Stirling  moved  rapidly  into  the  woods  to  the 
right,  up  the  slope  of  the  hill,  only  to  be  confronted  by  a  Hessian 
column  which  had  crossed  over  from  Prospect  Hill.  He  surrendered 
to  General  De  Heister  in  person. 

Thus  closed  the  operations  of  the  right  wing.  It  was  marked  by 
great  courage,  pertinacity  and  presence  of  mind,  and  the  disposition 
of  Stirling's  brigade  was  such  as  to  meet  every  requirement,  that  could 
be  expected  of  a  force  hardly  exceeding  seventeen  hundred  men. 

A  single  detachment  of  prisoners  had  been  taken.  Lieutenant 
Ragg  and  twenty  men,  of  the  second  regiment  of  Marines,  as  desig 
nated  in  General  Howe's  official  report,  although  not  named  on  the 
Roster  of  the  army  as  landed,  mistook  the  well  equipped  south 
ern  troops  for  Hessians,  and  fell  into  their  hands  as  subjects  of 
exchange. 

The  retreat  was  a  trying  one,  but  without  considerable  loss,  except 
that  of  the  battle-field  and  of  prisoners.  Exaggerated  reports  were 
current  at  that  period,  as  to  the  number  of  men  drowned,  or  suffo 
cated,  while  crossing  the  head  of  Gowanus  Bay.  Many  of  the  men 
abandoned  their  arms  and  equipments  and  swam  the  narrow  belt  of 
deep  water,  but  no  reasonable  construction  of  official  or  personal  in 
formation  will  place  the  number  of  drowned  men  at  more  than  seven, 
and  Colonel  Haslet  mentions  only  one.  The  Maryland  and  Dela 
ware  regiments  fought  like  veteran  troops,  and  maintained  their  repu 
tation  on  subsequent  battle-fields.  A  loss,  in  killed,  wounded  and 
missing,  of  two  hundred  and  fifty-nine,  tells  the  whole  story ;  and  in 
the  last  struggle  to  force  the  lines  of  Earl  Cornwallis,  the  Maryland 
troops  made  repeated  assaults  under  a  heavy  fire,  with  commendable 
spirit  and  coolness. 

While  General  Grant's  division  was  thus  actively  engaged,  the 
division  of  General  Heister  was  contented  with  an  active  cannonading 


1770.J  BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND.  211 

of  the  American  redoubt  and  intrenchments,  where  General  Sullivan 
was  really  and  necessarily  in  command,  before  Flatbush. 

Generals  Howe,  Clinton,  Percy  and  Cornwallis,  after  resting  their 
troops  on  the  Jamaica  road  near  Bedford,  still  undiscovered  by  the 
Americans,  began  their  advance  again  at  half-past  eight  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  The  light  infantry  and  light  dragoons  passed  beyond 
Bedford  and  bore  to  the  left,  and  south,  directly  across  the  Flatbush 
road.  The  alarm  had  been  already  given.  A  detachment  of  the 
Guards  and  one  grenadier  company  with  three  pieces  of  artillery  soon 
joined  them  and  commenced  a  spirited  attack  upon  the  alarmed 
troops  who  were  rapidly  retiring  from  Prospect  Hill.  The  Thirty-third 
foot  and  another  detachment  of  grenadiers  pushed  across  the 
Heights  under  the  very  fire  of  the  American  lines  to  cut  off  Stirling's 
retreat  and  unite  with  General  Grant.  The  Second  grenadiers,  and 
the  detachment  of  the  Seventy-first,  followed,  in  time  to  defeat  Stir 
ling's  last  effort  to  escape.  As  soon  as  General  Clinton's  guns  opened 
fire,  De  Heister,  thus  notified  that  the  time  had  come  for  his  action, 
ordered  Colonel  Donop  with  the  Yagers  to  advance  in  open  order, 
using  only  the  bayonet,  and  put  his  whole  command  in  quick  motion 
to  support  this  impetuous  onset.  Several  light  field  pieces,  charged 
with  grape,  were  sent  in  advance  to  clear  the  way.  The  American 
army  was  between  two  fires.  Single  positions  were  held  for  a  few 
moments  with  obstinacy  and  gallantry,  but  in  a  few  moments  more, 
the  crushing  force  of  two  fronts,  enveloped  each  party  in  turn,  and 
the  whole  command  broke  up  into  small  detachments,  seeking  per 
sonal  safety  in  flight  or  hiding  places. 

The  British  loss,  as  officially  stated,  including  Hessians  and  Ma 
rines,  was  five  officers  killed  and  twenty-one  wounded  and  missing; 
fifty-eight  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  killed,  and  three  hun 
dred  and  sixteen  wounded  and  missing. 

The  British  return  of  American  prisoners  made  a  total  of  one 
thousand  and  ninety-seven,  including  sixty-seven  wounded  officers 
and  men. 

Upon  this  list  there  are  reported  Generals  Sullivan,  Woodhull 
and  Stirling.  General  Woodhull,  with  more  than  two  hundred  militia, 
was  captured  on  the  twenty-eighth,  near  Jamaica,  as  elsewhere  stated, 
but  appear  on  the  return  referred  to. 

Upon  a  muster  of  the  two  Pennsylvania  rifle  battalions,  and 
Colonel  Atlee's  musketeer  battalion,  the  day  after  the  battle,  "  after 
wards  carefully  compared  with  the  accounts  which  came  by  a  flag  of 


212  BATTLE   OF  LONG  ISLAND.  [1776. 

truce,"  their  total  of  killed,  wounded  and  missing,  added  up  two  hun 
dred  and  seventy-seven. 

Upon  a  revision  of  the  whole  returns  it  appeared  that  the  casualties 
of  Stirling's  brigade  were  one-half,  and  those  of  the  Maryland  battalion 
were  one-fourth  of  the  aggregate  losses  of  the  entire  day. 

The  American  casualties,  exclusive  of  the  Long  Island  militia, 
were,  as  nearly  as  can  be  ascertained,  nine  hundred  and  seventy  officers 
and  men,  and  the  British  casualties  foot  up  just  four  hundred. 

The  battle  of  Long  Island  had  to  be  fought.  If  the  protracted 
resistance  of  Breed's  Hill,  and  the  successful  defense  of  Fort  Moultrie, 
created  an  undue  estimate  of  the  capacity  of  militia  and  raw  troops 
when  covered  by  breast-works,  and  thereby  engendered  a  false  con 
fidence  that  the  works  on  Brooklyn  Heights  could  be  also  held  against 
a  well  equipped  veteran  army,  it  certainly  demonstrated  that  no  re 
sistance  at  all  could  be  kept  up,  without  complete  discipline.  The 
defense  was  doomed  to  be  a  failure  from  the  first,  independent  of  the 
cooperation  of  a  naval  force.  The  sole  value  of  the  advance  posts 
and  of  careful  pickets,  lay  in  the  assurance  of  prolonged  resistance, 
and  not  in  a  finally  successful  resistance.  The  ultimate  course  of 
General  Howe,  that  of  regular  approaches,  was  inevitable,  and  the 
result  was  almost  certain.  Washington  was  wise  in  his  purpose  u  to 
make  the  acquisition  as  costly  as  possible  to  his  adversary."  He 
needed  time  to  increase  and  discipline  his  army.  Occupation  and  the 
stimulus  of  action  alone  could  do  this. 

The  people  of  the  country  demanded  that  New  York  should  be 
held  to  the  last  possible  moment. 

Jay's  proposition  to  burn  and  abandon  it  without  a  show  of  resist 
ance  was  not  the  way  to  make  the  army  strong  for  future  endeavor. 
Its  immediate  abandonment  would  have  involved  the  demoralization 
of  the  entire  army,  and  would  have  been  in  marked  contrast  with  his 
efforts  to  restore  Boston  to  herself.  The  resistance  so  widened  the 
breach  between  the  parties  at  issue  and  made  the  necessity  more 
pressing  for  the  development  of  resources  equal  to  the  increased 
gravity  of  the  struggle.  General  Howe  checked  his  troops,  as  they 
acted  under  the  impulse  of  success,  and  were  ready  to  assault  the 
American  works.  In  this  much  criticised  delay  he  was  right.  A 
repulse  would  have  been  ruin.  Washington  crossed  the  river  with 
three  regiments  after  the  battle  began,  so  that  he  could  have  met  an 
assault  with  nearly  as  many  men  as  could  have  been  brought  to  the 
attack  and  thoroughly  handled  :  but  with  characteristic  resting  after 


1776.J  BATTLE   OF   LONG  ISLAND.  213 

an  exertion,  and  habitual  under-estimate  of  the  sagacity  and  wakeful- 
ness  of  his  adversary,  Howe  failed  to  improve  his  success.  His 
enemy  escaped  ;  other  battle-fields  were  to  illustrate  the  capacity 
and  military  genius  of  the  opposing  General  in  chief,  and  other 
neglects  to  improve  success  were  to  wrest  from  his,  General  Howe's, 
hands,  every  substantial  benefit  which  so  often  fell  within  their 
grasp. 

NOTE.  (Fourth  Edition?)  "  The  reinforcements  that  came  over  during  the  fore 
noon,  consisted  of  the  Regiments  of  Douglas,  Sage  and  Selden,  constituting  Wads- 
worth's  brigade,  Charles  Webb's  of  McDougall's  brigade,  and  Scott,  with  Malcom  and 
Humphrey's  men,  or  the  rest  of  the  brigade."  Vol.  Ill,  Mem.  L.  I.  Hist.  Soc.,  p.  189. 

NOTE.  (Fourth  Edition?)  See  text  of  Page  217.  The  following  order,  not  in 
Forces'  Archives,  but  in  the  possession  of  Benjamin  Douglass,  Esq.,  Middletown, 
Conn.,  as  part  of  Colonel  Wm.  Douglass'  Order  Books,  is  published  in  Vol.  Ill, 
Memoirs  L.  I.  Hist.  Soc.,  p.  31,  of  Original  Documents.  It  indicates  the  care  of 
Washington  to  anticipate  any  alarm  in  the  proposed  retreat. 

"  HEAD  QUARTERS,  LONG  ISLAND,  Aug.  2gth,  1776. 

Parole,   SULLIVAN. 

Countersign,  Green. 

As  the  sick  are  an  encumbrance  to  the  Army,  and  Troops  are  expected  this 
afternoon  from  the  flying  camp  in  Jersey  under  Genl.  Mercer,  who  is  himself  arrived, 
and  cover  is  wanted  for  the  troops,  the  commanding  officers  of  Regts.  are  immediately 
to  have  such  sick  removed.  They  are  to  take  their  Arms  and  Accoutrements  and  be 
conducted  by  an  Officer  to  the  Genl.  Hospital,  as  a  rendezvous,  and  there  to  cross 
together,  under  the  directions  of  the  Person  appointed  there,  taking  general  directions 
from  Dr.  Morgan.  As  the  above  Forces,  under  Genl.  Mercer,  are  expected  this 
afternoon,  the  General  proposes  to  relieve  a  proportionate  Number  of  Regiments,  and 
make  a  change  in  the  situation  of  them. 

The  commanding  officers  of  Regiments  are  therefore  to  parade  their  men  with  their 
Arms,  Accoutrements  and  Knapsacks,  at  7  o'clock,  at  the  Head  of  their  Encampments, 
and  there  wait  for  orders." 

Some  supposed  that  the  troops  were  thus  put  under  arms,  for  a  possible  sally  to 
interrupt  work  before  the  lines.  A  sally  would  be  the  natural  suggestion  of  a  Post 
commander,  if  he  had  confidence  in  successful  defense.  The  order  cited,  as  well  as 
that  which  provided  transportation  for  the  whole  army,  explains  Washington's 
purpose. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

RETREAT   FROM    LONG   ISLAND. 

THE  British  army  sat  down  before  Brooklyn,  opened  lines  ot 
approach,  erected  adequate  works  to  resist  any  sortie  from  the 
garrison,  and  awaited  the  operations  of  the  pick  and  shovel. 

Within  the  American  lines,  a  critical  examination  of  every  defens 
ive  appliance  or  position  was  made  by  Washington  in  person.  He 
had  organized  a  strong  detachment  for  the  relief  of  Stirling  at  the 
time  that  officer  made  his  earnest  effort  to  gain  the  position  occupied 
by  Cornwallis  at  the  Cortelyou  house  ;  but  the  swift  movement  of  the 
British  grenadiers  across  the  face  of  the  intrenchments,  within  full 
view  of  the  garrison,  rendered  any  reinforcement  to  Stirling  simply 
impossible. 

The  night  was  spent  by  the  men  in  strengthening  the  defenses, 
and  in  readiness  to  resist  any  attack.  The  officers  and  men  who  had 
disappeared  during  the  day  were  among  the  best  of  the  army.  Of 
the  general  officers  that  remained,  the  Commander-in-chief  alone  in 
spired  confidence.  He  spent  the  night  in  visiting  the  guard,  and  at 
early  dawn  of  the  twenty-eighth,  he  was  again  in  the  trenches,  per 
sonally  attentive  to  all  details,  and  cheering  the  men  by  strong  and 
hopeful  words.  General  Mifflin  arrived  before  noon  with  the  well 
drilled  regiments  of  Glover.  Massachusetts,  and  of  Shee  and  Magaw, 
Pennsylvania.  The  enthusiasm  which  greeted  their  arrival  was  an 
involuntary  tribute  of  respect  for  those  well  equipped  troops,  who  had 
been  sneered  at  as  fair  weather  soldiers,  so  "  proud  of  fine  arms  and 
fine  feathers."  The  garrison  was  now  fully  nine  thousand  strong. 
Rain  began  to  fall  heavily.  "  A  northeaster  "  set  in,  and  the  after 
noon  was  one  of  extreme  discomfort  and  trial.  The  trenches  through 
the  low  ground,  filled  with  water,  cooking  was  impossible,  the  troops 
were  without  tents  or  other  shelter,  the  supply  of  blankets  was  inade 
quate  for  half  the  command,  and  the  ammunition  itself  was  greatly 


I77C>.J  RETREAT  FROM   LONG   ISLAND.  215 

injured  for  want  of  proper  protection.  General  Washington  took 
neither  rest  nor  sleep,  but  spent  his  entire  time,  by  night  and  day,  as 
actively  on  duty  as  if  he  were  the  sole  picket  upon  whom  the  safety 
of  all  depended.  Such  little  skirmishing  fire  as  was  practicable  was 
encouraged,  so  that  the  British  troops  were  kept  under  the  impression 
that  it  was  useless  to  risk  small  detachments  outside  of  their  own 
guard  lines.  This  was  compensated  by  their  overrunning  adjacent 
parts  of  the  island.  General  Woodhull  with  more  than  two  hundred 
militia  were  captured  during  the  day,  near  Jamaica,  by  Delancy's  pro 
vincial  loyalists,  who  had  crossed  over  from  Staten  Island,  and  took 
lively  interest  in  all  operations  in  small  villages  which  were  occupied 
by  "  revolutionists.'' 

The  rain  was  so  incessant,  and  accompanied  by  a  wind  so  violent, 
that  the  British  troops  kept  within  their  tents,  and  their  works  made 
slow  progress  toward  completion.  During  the  entire  night  of  the 
twenty-eighth,  as  during  the  previous  night,  Washington  and  his 
aids,  made  the  entire  sentry  rounds  with  periodic  exactness,  attending 
to  matters  requiring  notice,  and  imparting  to  the  guard  the  confidence 
which  such  attentions  alone  could  secure.  The  twenty-ninth  was 
another  day  of  clouds  and  storms.  The  British,  however,  improved 
every  cessation  of  heavy  rain,  to  prosecute  work  upon  their  trenches, 
which  had  been  started  at  a  distance  of  six  hundred  yards  from  Fort 
Putnam,  the  present  Washington  Park.  If  they  had  worked  during 
the  hours  when  the  American  troops  stood  in  water  unprotected, 
sikntly  waiting  upon  the  movements  of  the  investing  army,  they  could 
have  opened  fire  by  the  evening  of  that  day.  More  than  once  in 
subsequent  campaigns,  General  Howe  suspended  movements  at  crit 
ical  times  because  of  rain,  when  his  adversary,  less  comfortably  pro 
vided  for  and  protected,  treated  the  rain  as  no  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  impending  possible  duty. 

It  is  just  here,  as  one  instance,  that  the  voluminous  discussions  as 
to  lines  of  policy  and  action  have  beclouded  the  narrative  of  the  war 
for  American  independence  ;  and  the  opinions  of  councils  of  war,  of 
general  officers,  of  committees  of  public  safety  and  of  Congress,  have 
been  confused  and  made  to  declare  irreconcilable  inconsistencies,  as 
if  the  retreat  from  Long  Island  and  New  York  had  no  intrinsic  neces 
sity,  but  was  the  accident  of  majority  opinions.  The  American  and 
British  archives  and  biography  are  full  of  contemporaneous  letters  and 
humble  data,  which  it  would  require  volumes  to  quote,  but  which 
have  but  one  possible  conclusion, — that  Washington  of  his  own 


2l6  RETREAT   FROM   LONG  ISLAND.  Li77b 

judgment,  and  acting  upon  the  same  philosophy  which  made  the 
defense  of  Brooklyn  necessary  in  the  first  instance,  resolved  to  evacu 
ate  the  Heights  in  due  time  without  a  decisive  battle. 

Washington's  policy  was  to  postpone  all  issues  which  had  a  deter 
mining  character,  and  were  beyond  mastery  by  his  army,  to  wear  out 
the  offensive  by  avoiding  its  strokes,  and  thereby  to  gain  the  vantage 
ground  for  turning  upon  it,  when  thus  worn  out  or  over-confident,  and 
off  its  guard.  The  necessities  of  the  American  cause  called  for  Grand 
Strategy,  and  improved  Logistics  rather  than  Grand  Tactics,  because 
his  army  was  unequal  to  the  latter,  and  largely  dependent  for  its  suc 
cess  upon  the  wisdom  with  which  its  undoubted  courage  could  be 
made  available  in  the  interest  of  the  new  nation.  The  retreat  from 
Brooklyn  was  characteristic  of  this  policy.  The  men  were  kept  up  to 
duty  as  if  any  hour  would  command  their  utmost  energies  in  self-de 
fense  ;  but  he  had  his  own  plan  to  develop,  and  this  he  did  not  sub 
mit  to  his  aids  or  his  officers,  until  it  was  matured  and  nearly  ripe  for 
execution.  How  well  he  kept  his  own  counsel  will  be  seen  by  his 
action. 

The  following  order  was  sent  to  General  Heath,  then  command 
ing  officer  at  Kings'  Bridge,  through  General  MifHin,  very  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-ninth  of  August. 

LONG  ISLAND,  AUGUST  29x11,  1770. 

••  DEAR  GENERAL — We  have  many  battalions  from  New  Jersey  which  are  com 
ing  over  this  evening  to  relieve  others  here.  You  will  please  therefore  to  order  every 
flat  bottomed  boat  and  other  craft  at  your  post,  fit  for  transporting  troops,  down  to 
New  York  as  soon  as  possible.  They  must  be  manned  by  some  of  Colonel  Hutchin- 
son's  men  and  sent  without  the  least  delay.  I  write  by  the  order  of  the  General. 

I  am  affectionately  Yours, 
"  To  MAJ.  GEN'L  HEATH."  MIFFLIN." 

Commissary-general  Trumbull  also  bore  an  order  to  Assistant 
Quarter-master  Hughes,  by  which  he  was  instructed  "  to  impress 
every  kind  of  craft,  on  either  side  of  New  York,  that  could  be  kept 
afloat,  and  had  either  oars  or  sails,  or  could  be  furnished  with  them, 
and  to  have  them  all  in  the  East  river  by  dark." 

After  these  officers  had  started  upon  their  missions,  Washington 
continued  his  watchfulness  and  visitations  to  all  parts  of  the  camp, 
summoning  a  council  of  officers,  however,  to  an  early  evening  inter 
view.  He  submitted  his  plan  to  that  council,  and  with  this  result : 
"  At  a  council  of  war  held  at  Long  Island,  August  2Qth,  1776,  Pres 
ent:  His  Excellency  General  Washington;  Major  Generals  Putnam, 


1770.]  RETREAT  FROM   LONG   ISLAND.  217 

Spencer,  Brigadier  Generals  Mifflin,  McDougall,  Parsons,  Scott, 
Wadsworth,  Fellows. 

It  was  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  the  council,  whether,  under 
all  circumstances,  it  is  not  eligible  to  leave  Long  Island,  and  its  depen 
dencies  and  remove  to  New  York.  Unanimously  agreed  in  the 
affirmative.  General  Putnam,  Saml.  H.  Parsons,  Jos.  Spencer,  Jno. 
Morin  Scott,  Thos.  Mifflin,  James  Wadsworth,  Alex.  McDougall." 

Eight  reasons  were  also  assigned  for  this  action. 

The  date  of  the  council  shows  that  its  action  was  not  the  origin 
of  the  retreat.  General  Heath  acted  with  such  promptness,  that 
although  more  than  fourteen  miles  from  Brooklyn  when  he  received 
the  order  for  transportation,  he  properly  conceived  its  import,  and  so 
faithfully  executed  it,  as  did  Quarter-master  Hughes  also,  that  the 
boats  reached  the  foot  of  Brooklyn  Heights  just  at  dark  that  after 
noon. 

At  about  eight  o'clock  the  regiments  were  put  under  arms,  as  if  to 
make  a  sally  upon  the  British  lines.  General  McDougall  was  stationed 
at  the  shore  to  regulate  the  embarkation.  Colonel  Glover's  regiment, 
which  had  been  recruited  at  Marblehead  and  other  sea-coast  towns 
of  Massachusetts,  was  very  appropriately  distributed  in  the  boats  to 
act  as  seamen,  and  General  Mifflin  with  the  three  regiments  which  he 
had  brought  over  on  the  previous  day,  and  those  of  Hand  and  Small- 
wood,  were  designated  as  the  new  guard  and  garrison  of  the  intrench- 
ments  and  redoubts.  As  the  latter  occupied  the  works  the  old  guard 
passed  directly  to  the  heights,  and  the  regiments  last  recruited,  and 
least  drilled,  took  the  lead  in  crossing  the  river.  (See  note,  page  213.) 

From  about  nine  o'clock  until  nearly  midnight,  through  wind  and 
rain, — company  by  company, — sometimes  grasping  hands  to  keep 
companionship  in  the  dense  gloom, — speechless  and  silent,  so  that  no 
sound  should  alarm  the  enemy, — feeling  their  way  down  the  steep 
steps  then  leading  to  Fulton  ferry,  and  feeling  their  way  as  they  were 
passed  into  the  waiting  water-craft,  these  drenched  and  weary  men 
took  passage  for  New  York.  The  wind  and  tide  were  so  violent  that 
even  the  seamen  soldiers  of  Massachusetts  could  not  spread  a  close 
reefed  sail  upon  a  single  vessel ;  and  the  larger  vessels,  upon  which 
so  much  depended,  would  have  been  swept  to  the  ocean  if  once  en 
trusted  to  the  current.  For  three  hours,  all  the  boats  that  could  be 
thus  propelled,  had  to  depend  upon  muffled  oars.  The  difficulties 
of  such  atrip,  on  such  a  night,  can  be  realized  better  by  a  moment's 
reflection.  There  is  no  record  of  the  size  of  the  waves,  or  of  narrow 


218  RETREAT  FROM   LONG  ISLAND.  [1776 

escapes  from  upset,  no  intimation  that  there  was  competition  in  entering 
the  boats  and  rivalry  in  choice  of  place — that  each  boat-load  was 
landed  hastily  and  that  the  boats  themselves  were  leaky  and  unsafe  ; 
but  any  person  who  proposes  to  himself  an  imaginary  transit  over 
the  East  river  under  their  circumstances,  can  supply  the  data  he  may 
need  to  appreciate  the  process. 

General  McDougall  himself  doubted  whether  nine  thousand  men 
could  be  thus  transferred  before  morning  and  advised  its  postpone 
ment  until  another  night,  but  there  was  to  be  no  cessation  of  the  task 
until  its  proper  work  was  done. 

It  was  about  midnight,  just  as  the  tide  turned,  that  the  north-east 
wind  which  had  steadily  prevailed  for  more  than  three  days,  and  had 
kept  the  British  fleet  in  the  lower  bay,  spent  its  strength, — the  water 
became  smooth,  the  sky  was  clear,  and  the  boats  "  loaded  to  the 
water's  edge,"  and  guided  safely,  began  to  make  productive  trips.  A 
south-west  wind  sprang  up  by  one  o'clock.  Everything  that  could 
carry  sail  now  took  its  part  in  the  movement,  and  with  more  than 
four-fold  celerity,  the  transfer  of  troops  continued.  It  was  in  the 
midst  of  this  prosperous  undertaking  that  there  occurred  one  of  those 
unexpected  incidents  which  for  a  time  threatened  the  rear  of  the 
army  with  destruction.  Washington  sent  Colonel  Scammel  to  General 
Mifflin  to  hasten  all  the  troops  forward.  The  covering  party  was  put 
in  motion,  but  returned  promptly  to  their  places;  and  the  error  was 
not  discovered  by  the  British  sentries.  Reference  was  made  to  this 
affair  under  the  subject  of  "  Retreats."  Irving  states  that  Washing 
ton  calmly  replied  to  Mifflin,  who  cited  orders,  "It  is  a  dreadful  mis 
take.  Unless  the  troops  can  regain  the  lines  before  their  absence  is 
discovered  by  the  enemy,  the  most  disastrous  consequences  are  to  be 
apprehended."  One  soldier  wrote,  "  when  the  order  came,  it  was  so 
much  sooner  than  we  expected,  that  a  rumor  went  through  the  bat 
talion  that  the  British  Dragoons  were  at  our  heels,  and  some  of  the 
men  halted,  kneeled  down,  and  prepared  to  resist  a  charge."  A  heavy 
sea-fog,  driven  in  from  the  Atlantic,  hung  above  Long  Island  and  the 
lower  bay,  while  the  peninsula  of  New  York  was  uncovered.  This 
increased  the  danger  of  panic,  but  also  prevented  discovery  of  the 
misadventure. 

The  military  stores  and  all  guns  which  were  not  too  heavy  to  be 
hauled  through  the  mud,  were  safely  placed  on  the  transports,  and 
with  the  last  boat-load,  Mifflin,  and  last  of  all,  Washington,  took 
passage. 


I776.]  RETREAT  FROM   LONG  ISLAND.  2 19 

On  the  day  following  the  troops  and  stores  were  also  removed 
from  Governor's  Island  in  safety,  and  the  evacuation  was  complete. 

"  Whoever  will  attend  to  all  the  details  of  this  retreat,"  says  Botta, 
"  will  easily  believe  that  no  military  operation  was  ever  conducted  by 
great  captains  with  more  ability  and  prudence,  or  under  more  favor 
able  auspices." 

General  Howe  states  in  his  official  report,  that  on  the  twenty- 
ninth,  at  night,  the  rebels  evacuated  their  intrenchments  and  Red 
Hook,  with  the  utmost  silence.  At  daybreak  of  the  thirtieth  their 
flight  was  discovered,  the  pickets  of  the  line  took  possession,  and 
those  most  advanced  reached  the  shore  opposite  to  New  York  as 
their  rear  guard  was  going  over,  and  fired  some  shot  among  them." 

Prompt  action  as  soon  as  General  Howe  had  notice  of  the  retreat, 
would  have  secured  the  capture  of  Washington  himself.  Stedman, 
after  stating  that  General  Howe  was  advised  very  early  that  the 
retreat  was  in  progress,  and  delayed  for  some  time  before  giving  the 
order  to  Lord  Percy  to  advance  upon  the  works,  thus  wonderfully 
philosophizes  upon  the  event :  "  In  reviewing  the  actions  of  men,  the 
historian  is  often  at  a  loss  to  conjecture  the  secret  causes  which 
gave  them  birth.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  American  army  lay 
almost  entirely  at  the  will  of  the  English.  That  they  were  therefore 
suffered  to  retire  in  safety  has  by  some  been  attributed  to  the  reluc 
tance  of  the  commander-in-chief  to  shed  the  blood  of  a  people  so 
nearly  allied  to  that  source  from  whence  he  derived  all  his  authority 
and  power.  We  are  rather  inclined  to  adopt  this  idea  and  to  suppose 
motives  of  mistaken  policy,  than  to  leave  ground  for  an  imagination 
that  the  escape  of  the  Americans  resulted  from  any  want  of  exertion 
on  the  part  of  Sir  William  Howe,  or  deficiency  in  the  military  science. 

In  the  range  of  "  historical  and  military  criticism  "  which  the 
author  has  adopted,  it  is  his  purpose  to  furnish  a  correct  record,  and 
leave  the  facts  to  the  interpretation  which  the  principles  stated  will 
evolve.  It  is  however  but  justice  to  General  Howe's  military  knowl 
edge  to  state,  that  the  element  of  character  heretofore  unfolded,  was 
the  cause  of  his  failure  at  Brooklyn.  He  was  wanting  in  details, 
sluggish  when  instant  action  was  vital,  and  could  not  improve  success. 
The  strategical  features  of  his  operations  on  Long  Island  were  admira 
ble  ;  and  the  American  army  was  saved,  through  equally  admirable 
Logistics.  (See  note,  page  213.) 


CHAPTER   XXXIII. 

THE     AMERICAN   ARMY   RETIRES   FROM   NEW  YORK. 

THE  retreat   of  Washington   from  Long  Island   saved  his  army. 
When  the  "  forty-eight  sleepless   hours,"  during  which   he  had 
been  constantly  in   the  saddle,  or  equally  active  on  foot,  had  passed 
away,  that  army  was   indeed  in  New  York,  but   under  circumstances 
of  hardly  less  peril  than  before. 

"The  militia,"  said  Washington,  "  are  dismayed,  intractable,  and 
impatient  to  return  home.  Great  numbers  have  gone  off,  in  some 
instances,  almost  by  whole  regiments,  by  half  ones,  and  by  companies 
at  a  time,"  and  adds,  "  when  their  example  has  infected  another  part 
of  the  army,  when  their  want  of  discipline  and  refusal  of  almost  every 
kind  of  restraint  and  government,  have  produced  a  like  conduct,  but 
too  common  to  the  whole,  and  an  entire  disregard  of  that  order  and 
subordination  so  necessary  to  the  well  doing  of  an  army,  and  which 
had  been  inculcated  before  as  well  as  the  nature  of  our  military  estab 
lishment  would  admit  of,  our  condition  is  still  more  alarming,  and 
with  the  deepest  concern  I  am  obliged  to  confess  my  want  of  con 
fidence  with  the  generality  of  the  troops." 

He  made  an  urgent  appeal  to  Congress  to  establish  a  regular  army, 
or  to  enlist  men  for  the  war,  and  laid  before  them  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation,  and  the  impending  necessity  of  retiring  from  New  York 
itself.  He  put  the  plain  question,  whether,  in  that  event,  the  town 
should  be  left  standing  for  British  winter-quarters. 

"  The  number  of  men  present  fit  for  duty,  on  the  second  day  of 
September,  was  under  twenty  thousand."  An  order  was  issued  on 
the  same  day,  "  for  a  new  arrangement  of  the  troops,  in  order  that 
they  might  act  with  union  and  firmness."  Three  grand  divisions  were 
organized. 

General  Putnam's  division,  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Generals 
Parsons,  Scott,  Clinton,  Fellows  and  Silliman,  was  assigned  to  duty  in 
the  city  and  its  vicinity. 


I776-]  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY   RETIRES  FROM   NEW   YORK.  221 

The  center  division,  under  General  Spencer  during  General  Greene's 
illness,  was  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to  march  immediately  to  Har 
lem,  to  prevent  the  enemy's  landing  on  the  island.  It  consisted  of 
the  brigades  of  Nixon,  Heard,  McDougall,  Wadsworth,  Douglas,  and 
Chester. 

General  Heath,  with  the  brigades  of  General  Mifflin  and  General 
George  Clinton,  were  ordered  to  Kings  Bridge  and  its  vicinity.  Colonel 
Haslet's  regiment  was  assigned  to  Mifflin's  brigade. 

September  third,  Congress  resolved  that  "  two  of  the  North  Caro 
lina  battalions  be  ordered  to  march  with  all  expedition  under  General 
Moore,  to  reinforce  the  army  at  New  York,  that  one  continental  bat 
talion  be  ordered  from  Rhode  Island  to  New  York,  and  that  the 
States  north  of  Virginia  be  recommended  to  send  all  the  aid  in  their 
power." 

On  the  same  day,  Putnam,  writing  from  Bloomingdale,  declares, 
"  there  are  so  many  places  where  the  enemy  can  land  in  superior 
force,  that  he  advises  the  fortification  of  Mount  Washington,  Harlem 
Heights,  and  the  Jersey  shore,  and  to  take  all  measures  requisite  to 
defend  the  passage  of  the  North  river."  He  adds,  "  I  know  that  this 
doctrine  gives  up  York  to  destruction,  but  what  are  ten  or  twenty 
towns  to  the  grand  object.  If  Howe  gets  to  Albany,  our  north 
western  army  must  quit  Ticonderoga  or  fall  a  sacrifice.  Burgoyne 
need  never  come  from  Canada." 

September  fourth,  General  Washington  reprimanded  such  "  dia 
bolical  practices  as  robbing  orchards,  gardens,  and  straggling  without 
arms  or  purpose,  and  advises  that  the  roll  be  called  three  times  a  day, 
to  keep  the  men  to  duty." 

September  fifth,  General  Greene  urged  a  general  and  speedy  re 
treat  from  New  York,  and  that  a  council  be  convened  to  take  action 
upon  that  question. 

September  eighth,  Washington  reported  the  militia  of  Connecticut 
then  with  him,  "  as  reduced  from  six  to  two  thousand  men,  and  in  a 
few  days  their  number  was  but  nominal,  twenty  or  thirty  to  some 
regiments,"  so  that  "  they  were  discharged  with  a  recommendation  to 
Governor  Trumbull  that  it  was  about  time  to  begin  dealing  with  de 
serters."  On  the  same  day  he  reported  to  Congress  that  a  council 
which  he  had  convened  on  the  sixth  was  opposed  to  retiring  from 
New  York,  although  they  acknowledged  that  it  "  would  not  be  tenable 
if  attacked  with  artillery,"  and  adds  significantly,  that  "  some  to  whom 
the  opinion  of  Congress  was  known,  were  not  a  little  influenced  in 


222  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY   RETIRES   FROM   NEW   YORK.  [1776. 

their  opinions,  as  they  were  led  to  suspect  that  Congress  wished  it 
to  be  retained  at  all  hazards." 

Washington  realized  daily  that  it  was  useless  labor  and  expense  to 
line  the  rivers  of  New  York  with  field-works,  which  would  require  a 
garrison  of  thousands,  so  long  as  the  rivers  themselves  were  under  the 
control  of  a  large  naval  force  and  a  veteran  army. 

That  army  had  already  extended  its  right  wing  as  far  as  Flushing 
and  Hell  Gate,  with  posts  at  Bushwick,  Newtown,  and  Astoria.  Mon- 
tressor  and  Buchanan  islands,  now  Randall's  arid  Ward's,  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  Americans  and  occupied  by  the  British.  Several 
frigates  had  passed  between  Governor's  Island  and  the  peninsula  known 
as  Red  Hook,  and  smaller  vessels  took  position  at  the  head  of  Wall- 
about  Bay,  and  Newtown  inlet,  where  they  found  depth  of  water,  and 
immunity  from  the  fire  of  the  American  guns. 

The  entire  East  river  front  of  New  York  island  was  thus  exposed 
to  incursions  which  could  be  made  more  quickly  than  troops  could  be 
concentrated  for  resistance.  Appeals  to  the  northern  States  were 
indeed  favorably  entertained,  and  Massachusetts  made  a  draft  of 
one-fifth  of  her  able-bodied  male  population,  certain  exposed  localities 
and  certain  classes  of  persons  alone  excepted  ;  and  on  the  fourteenth, 
Congress  authorized  a  total  of  eighty-five  regiments  to  be  enlisted  for 
a  term  of  five  years.  These  were  apportioned  to  the  respective  States. 
All  this  was  of  little  immediate  value  to  the  army.  Application  had 
been  made  to  Washington  for  troops  to  garrison  Fort  Montgomery, 
on  the  Hudson  river,  but  none  could  be  spared  ;  and  the  elaborate 
works  erected  at  King's  Bridge,  and  thence  southward  to  Harlem 
Plains,  were  of  no  practical  value  to  the  army  which  occupied  the 
lower  part  of  the  island. 

In  Washington's  letter  of  the  eighth  of  September  the  following 
words  occurred:  "  Men  of  discernment  will  see  that  by  such  works 
and  preparations  we  have  delayed  the  operations  of  the  campaign  till 
it  is  too  late  to  effect  any  capital  incursions  into  the  country.  It  is 
now  obvious  that  they,  (the  British  army)  mean  to  enclose  us  on  the 
island  of  New  York,  by  taking  post  in  my  rear,  while  the  shipping 
secures  the  front,  and  thus  oblige  us  to  fight  them  on  their  own  terms, 
or  surrender  at  discretion."  u  Every  measure  is  to  be  formed  with 
some  apprehension  that  all  o'ur  troops  will  not  do  their  duty.  On 
our  side,  the  war  should  be  defensive  :  it  has  even  been  called  a  war 
of  posts  ;  we  should  on  all  occasions  avoid  a  general  action,  and  never 
be  drawn  into  a  necessity  to  put  anything  to  risk.  Persuaded  that 


£776.]  THE   AMERICAN  ARMY    RETIRES   FROM    NEW   YORK.  223 

it  would  be  presumptuous  to  draw  out  our  young  troops  into  open 
ground  against  their  superiors  in  numbers  and  discipline,  I  have  never 
spared  the  spade  and  pickaxe,  but  I  have  not  found  that  readiness  to 
defend,  even  strong  posts,  at  all  hazards,  which  is  necessary  to  derive 
the  greatest  benefit  from  them.  I  am  sensible  that  a  retreating  army 
is  encircled  with  difficulties  ;  that  declining  an  engagement  subjects  a 
general  to  reproach :  but  when  the  fate  of  America  may  be  at  stake 
on  the  issue,  we  should  protract  the  war,  if  possible.  That  the  enemy 
mean  to  winter  in  New  York,  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  that  they  can 
drive  us  out,  is  equally  clear  :  nothing  seems  to  remain,  but  to  deter 
mine  the  time  of  their  taking  possession." 

The  following  is  the  journal  entry  upon  receipt  of  the  letter 
referred  to  : 

"  TUESDAY,  September  10,  1776. 

A  letter  of  the  eighth  from  General  Washington,  with  sundry 
papers  inclosed,  was  read  :  whereupon, 

Resolved,  That  the  president  inform  General  Washington,  it  was 
by  no  means  the  sense  of  Congress,  in  their  resolve  of  the  3d  instant, 
respecting  New  York,  that  the  army  or  any  part  of  it  should  remain 
in  that  city  a  moment  longer  than  he  shall  think  it  proper  for  the 
public  service  that  troops  be  continued  there." 

The  resolution  referred  to  embraced  this  clause :  "  That  General 
Washington  be  acquainted  that  Congress  would  have  special  care 
taken,  in  case  he  should  find  it  necessary  to  quit  New  York,  that  no 
damage  be  done  to  the  said  city  by  his  troops,  on  their  leaving  it  : 
the  Congress  having  no  doubt  of  being  able  to  recover  the  same, 
though  the  enemy  should  for  a  time  have  possession  of  it." 

During  the  two  weeks  which  succeeded  the  retreat  from  Brooklyn, 
the  army  was  rapidly  fading  away,  while  raw  recruits  were  gathering 
to  supply  the  vacant  files,  as  during  the  first  week  of  the  year,  before 
Boston.  The  comparative  inactivity  of  the  British  troops  was  made 
the  occasion  of  new  propositions  for  settlement  of  the  difficulty  be 
tween  the  two  countries.  General  Sullivan  was  sent  to  Congress  as 
bearer  of  Lord  Howe's  message.  John  Adams,  Edward  Rutledge  and 
Dr.  Franklin  were  elected  as  a  committee  to  meet  Lord  Howe  and  state 
the  position  which  the  United  States  assumed.  Franklin  urged,  that 
a  recognition  of  American  Independence,  to  be  followed  by  a  treaty 
of  alliance  and  friendship,  would  be  for  the  best  interests  of  both 
nations.  Lord  Howe,  thoroughly  anxious  to  secure  an  honorable  end 
to  the  conflict,  was  so  limited  by  his  instructions  that  submission 


224  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY   RETIRES   FROM   NEW   YORK.          [1776. 

the  indispensable  element  to  success  in  his  mission.     The  interview 
only  re-asserted  the  impossibility  of  compromise. 

By  the  tenth  of  September,  Washington  began  the  removal  of 
valuable  stores,  preparatory  to  ultimate  retreat  from  the  city.  On 
the  eleventh  Generals  Greene,  Nixon,  Mifflin,  Beall,  Parsons,  Wads- 
worth  and  Scott  united  in  a  request  for  a  new  council,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  re-considering  their  former  action.  On  the  twelfth,  the  coun 
cil  met.  The  vote  is  thus  recorded.  To  reconsider :  Generals  Beall, 
Scott,  Fellows,  Wadsworth,  Nixon,  McDougall,  Parsons,  Mifflin,  Greene 
and  Putnam. 

To  adhere :  Generals  Spencer,  Clinton,  Heath.  The  council  also 
decided  that  eight  thousand  men  should  be  left  for  the  defense  of 
Mount  Washington  and  its  dependencies.  A  brief  examination  of 
the  "  Returns  of  the  army  "  "  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  in  and  near  the  city  of  New  York,"  at  that  time,  will  have 
value  in  this  connection.  The  weakest  and  strongest  regiments  of 
several  brigades  are  selected  as  types  of  the  general  condition  of  the 
army,  and  the  figures  indicate  the  rank  and  file  only. 

In  Parsons'  brigade,  the  regiments  of  Huntington  and  Tyler  are 
placed  side  by  side,  Huntington  s  regiment,  Total  348.  Sick  169. 
Tyler  s  regiment.  Total,  567.  Sick,  147.  The  former  regiment  had 
seen  service  :  the  latter  was  new.  In  Silliman's  brigade.  Hinmans 
regiment.  Total  237.  Sick,  179.  Thompson's  regiment.  Total  416. 
Sick  243. 

In  Mifflin's  brigade,  composed  of  the  regiments  of  Hand,  Shee, 
Magaw,  At  lee,  Miles,  Ward,  Hutchinson,  and  Haslet :  already  famil 
iarly  known.  Atlee's  regiment.  Total  243.  Sick  60.  Shee's  regi 
ment.  Total  499.  Sick  142. 

In  McDougall's  brigade.  McDougall's  regiment.  Total,  428. 
Sick,  108.  Smallwood's,  Total  584.  Sick  161. 

The  columns,  headed  "  wanted  to  complete,"  and  "  alterations 
since  last  return  "  have  been  used  elsewhere,  as  the  basis  for  estimate 
of  the  loss  incurred  in  the  skirmishes  on  Long  Island. 

The  foregoing  statement  is  impartial  and  indicates  the  condition 
of  the  army  which  was  preparing  to  leave  New  York. 

The  Council  had  decided  to  retreat,  just  when  the  strong  arm  of 
force  was  ready  to  drive  them  out. 

There  was  hardly  time  to  do  the  work  with  decorum,  to  say  little 
of  military  order. 

On  the   thirteenth  of  September   several  frigates   entered    East 


1776.]  THE   AMERICAN  ARMY   RETIRES   FROM   NEW   YORK.  22 1, 

river  and  commanded  the  works  near  the  foot  of  Thirteenth  street, 
and  the  whole  army  was  engaged  in  removing  stores  and  heavy 
artillery.  General  Putnam  was  detailed  with  a  command  of  four 
thousand  men  to  cover  the  retreat,  while  the  remaining  divisions 
moved  to  King's  Bridge  and  Mount  Washington. 

On  Saturday  the  fourteenth  of  September,  while  at  his  head-quar 
ters  at  the  house  of  Robert  Murray,  Washington  noticed  that  "  about 
sunset  six  more  vessels,  one  or  two  of  them  men-of-war,  passed  up 
the  East  river  to  the  station  occupied  by  others  on  the  previous  day." 
"  In  a  half  an  hour"  he  "  received  two  expresses,  one  from  Colonel 
Sargent  at  Horn's  Hook  (Hell  Gate),  giving  an  account,  that  the 
enemy,  to  the  amount  of  three  or  four  thousand,  had  marched  to  the 
river  and  were  embarking  for  Montressor's  Island,  where  numbers  of 
them  were  then  encamped  " — the  other,  from  General  Mifflin  "  that 
uncommon  and  formidable  movements  were  discovered  among  the 
enemy."  "  These  having  been  confirmed  by  the  scouts  sent  out  by 
himself,"  Washington  "  proceeded  to  Harlem,  where  it  was  sup 
posed,  or  at  Morrisania  opposite  to  it,  the  principal  attempt  to  land 
would  be  made."  His  head-quarters  were  then  transferred  to  the 
house  of  Roger  Morris  very  nearly  at  the  centre  of  the  theatre  of 
operations. 

The  night  passed  without  an  attempt  at  landing.  Early  the 
next  morning  three  ships  of  war  passed  up  the  Hudson  and  took  a 
position  near  Bloomingdale,  thus  "  putting  a  total  stop  to  the  removal, 
by  water,  of  any  more  provisions  "  and  other  stores.  About  eleven 
o'clock  the  ships  in  the  East  river  began  a  heavy  cannonading. 

The  British  divisions  which  had  been  designated  as  the  force 
which  was  to  land,  under  cover  of  this  squadron,  had  already  em 
barked  upon  flat-boats,  barges,  and  galleys,  at  the  head  of  Newtown 
inlet,  and  were  carried  with  a  favoring  tide  directly  to  Kipp's  Bay, 
where  they  disembarked. 

The  light  infantry,  British  reserve,  Hessian  chasseurs,  and  gren 
adiers,  constituted  the  first  division  under  the  command  of  General 
Clinton,  having  with  him  Generals  Cornvvallis,  Vaughan,  and  Leslie, 
and  Colonel  Donop. 

"  At  the  first  sound  of  the  firing,"  writes  Washington,  "  I  rode 
with  all  possible  dispatch  towards  the  place  of  landing,  when  to  my 
surprise  and  mortification,  I  found  the  troops  that  had  been  posted 
in  the  lines,  retreating  with  the  utmost  precipitation  ;  and  those 
ordered  to  support  them,  Parsons  and  Fellows'  brigades,  flying  in  every 


226  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY   RETIRES   FROM   NEW   YORK,  [1776, 

direction  and  in  the  utmost  confusion,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  of 
their  generals  to  form  them.  I  used  every  means  in  my  power  to 
rally  and  get  them  in  order,  but  my  attempts  were  fruitless  and  in 
effectual,  and  on  the  appearance  of  a  small  party  of  the  enemy,  not 
more  than  sixty  or  seventy  in  number,  their  disorder  increased,  and 
they  ran  away  without  firing  a  shot." 

The  indignation  of  Washington  at  this  "  disgraceful  and  dastardly 
conduct,"  carried  him  directly  among  the  fugitives  nearest  the  enemy, 
and  exposed  him  to  death  or  capture.  More  than  once  afterwards,  a 
similar  daring  rallied  fugitives,  but  the  panic  on  this  occasion  was 
wild,  unreasoning,  and  impossible  of  control.  Its  story  has  been 
draped  with  high  colored  fiction,  until  a  credulous  man's  faith  in  one 
half  of  the  camp  rumors  which  stole  into  history,  would  convict  the 
American  commander  of  lunacy.  That  with  drawn  sword,  impetuous 
command,  and  fearless  exposure  of  his  person,  Washington  did  his 
best  to  retrieve  the  disaster,  is  undoubtedly  true,  so  that  he  seemed, 
in  the  strong  figure  of  General  Greene,  to  seek  death  rather  than  life. 
All  beyond  this,  so  thoroughly  examined  by  Mr.  Bancroft,  is  foolish 
tradition  or  contemporaneous  camp  gossip.  A  court  of  inquiry  which 
reported  October  twenty-sixth,  failed  to  fix  responsibility  for  the 
panic.  It  appeared  from  the  testimony,  however,  that  General  Par 
sons  rallied  a  portion  of  the  troops  under  Washington's  own  eye  ;  but 
that  almost  immediately  they  got  hold  of  some  field  rumor  and  ran  in 
every  direction. 

Finding  all  efforts  to  check  the  retreat  to  be  fruitless,  Washington 
hastened  back  to  Harlem  Heights,  put  the  army  in  condition  to  meet 
the  enemy,  sent  out  reconnoitering  parties  in  all  directions,  and 
devoted  himself  to  restoration  of  order  and  the  exigencies  of  the  hour. 
While  confident  that  his  new  position  was  almost  impregnable,  a 
single  paragraph  in  his  report  to  Congress,  which  in  his  haste  was 
unsigned  and  forwarded  by  his  secretary,  will  indicate  his  greatest 
apprehension  for  the  future.  "  We  are  now  encamped  with  the  main 
body  of  the  army  upon  the  heights  of  Harlem,  where  I  should  hope 
the  enemy  would  meet  with  a  retreat  in  case  of  an  attack,  if  the  gen 
erality  of  our  troops  would  behave  with  tolerable  bravery  ;  but  experi 
ence,  to  my  great  affliction,  has  convinced  me  that  this  is  a  matter  to 
be  wished,  rather  than  expected." 

The  disaster  was  the  more  humiliating,  since  the  roster  of  the 
army  shows  that  Parsons'  brigade  was  composed  of  the  regiments  of 
Huntington,  Prescott,  Ward,  Wyllis,  Durkee,  and  Tyler,  some  of 


1776.]  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY   RETIRES  FROM   NEW   YORK  227 

which  had  behaved  well  under  previous  fire,  and  their  returns  showed 
"present"  at  the  previous  muster,  "  fit  for  duty,  or  on  command,  an 
aggregate  of  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  thirty-six,  exclusive  of 
officers  commissioned  and  non-commissioned  and  musicians."  It  is 
another  illustration  of  the  strange  pivot  events  that  occur  in  all  mili 
tary  enterprises. 

General  Putnam's  command  was  greatly  endangered  by  this  mis 
conduct.  Colonel  Donop's  Hessians  moved  directly  for  the  city,  but 
by  the  timely  occupation  of  the  road  nearest  the  Hudson  river,  Put 
nam  extricated  his  division  without  substantial  loss. 

The  heavy  cannon  and  a  large  quantity  of  provisions,  camp  kettles, 
tents,  and  other  essentials  to  the  comfort  of  the  army,  were  sacrificed 
by  the  energetic  action  of  Clinton,  who  almost  invariably  realized  the 
best  fruits  of  success. 

The  British  army  at  once  marched  to  the  heights  of  Inclenburg,  or 
Murray's  Hill,  and  a  subsequent  debarkation  of  troops  was  advanced 
so  far  northward  as  to  make  a  chain  of  posts  across  the  island  from 
Bloomingdale  to  Horn's  Hook,  near  Hell  Gate.  General  Howe  estab 
lished  his  own  head-quarters  at  the  Beekman  mansion,  not  far  from 
those  just  vacated  by  General  Washington  on  Murray  Hill.* 

Before  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  American  flag  disappeared 
from  Fort  George,  and  New  York  was  in  the  hands  of  the  British 
army. 

*  At  the  Murray  house,  Captain  Nathan  Hale,  of  Knowlton's  Connecticut  Rangers, 
received  his  instructions  from  Washington  to  visit  Long  Island  and  obtain  accurate  knowl 
edge  of  the  movements  of  the  British  army.  At  the  Beekman  house  on  the  twenty-second 
day  of  September  he  was  executed  as  a  spy. 

Lossing  adds,  "  Hale  was  hanged  upon  an  apple  tree  in  Rutgers'  orchard  near  the  pres 
ent  intersection  of  East  Broadway  and  Market  Streets." 


CHAPTER   XXXIV. 

HARLEM   HEIGHTS   AND   VICINITY,    1776. 

THE  American  army  spent  its  first  night  on  Harlem  Heights. 
A  period  of  fifteen  hours  of  labor  was  followed  by  many  hours' 
exposure  under  rain,  without  tents,  with  limited  rations,  no  utensils 
for  cooking,  and  the  consciousness  that  many  comforts  had  been 
sacrificed  by  a  needless  panic. 

On  the  following  day  a  spirited  skirmish  revived  their  spirits,  and 
evinced  the  value  of  courage  and  promptness  in  action. 

The  official  accounts  of  this  affair  which  were  made  up  by  the  two 
generals-in-chief,  while  the  facts  were  fresh  in  mind,  are  combined  so 
as  to  indicate  their  respective  appreciation  of  the  real  issue.  They 
confirm  the  opinion  that  reports  of  officers,  as  to  facts  not  within 
their  personal  knowledge,  are  second  rate  testimony  ;  that  very  humble 
data  are  often  very  material  to  the  appreciation  of  an  issue  ;  that  the 
principal  features  of  an  engagement  are  necessarily  the  objectives  of 
an  official  report,  and  that  these  may  lack  accuracy  through  the  mis 
direction  which  a  single  error  of  fact  may  impart. 

General  Howe  says,  "  On  the  i6th  in  the  morning,  a  large  party 
of  the  enemy  having  passed  under  cover  of  the  woods,  near  to  the 
advanced  posts  of  the  army,  the  Second  and  Third  battalions  of  light 
infantry,  supported  by  the  Forty-second  infantry,  pushed  forward  and 
drove  them  back  to  their  intrenchments,  from  whence  the  enemy, 
observing  they  were  not  in  force,  attacked  them  with  near  three 
thousand  men,  which  occasioned  the  march  of  the  reserve  with  two 
field  pieces,  a  battalion  of  Hessian  grenadiers,  and  the  company  of 
chasseurs  and  field  pieces,  repulsed  the  enemy  with  considerable  loss, 
and  obliged  them  to  retire  within  their  works.  From  the  accounts  of 
deserters  it  is  agreed  that  they  had  not  less  than  three  hundred  killed 
and  wounded,  and  among  them  a  colonel  and  major  killed.  We  had 


228* 


1776.]  HARLEM   HEIGHTS   AND   VICINITY,    1776.  22Q 

eight   officers   wounded,    fourteen    men    killed,    and    about    seventy 
wounded." 

Washington  thus  reports  to  Congress  :  "  About  the  time  of  the 
post's  departure  with  my  letter  of  the  i6th,  the  enemy  appeared  in 
several  large  bodies  upon  the  plains  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from 
hence.  I  rode  down  to  our  advanced  post  to  put  matters  in  a  proper 
situation  if  they  should  attempt  to  come  on.  When  I  arrived  I  heard 
a  firing,  which  I  was  informed  was  between  a  party  of  our  rangers 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Knowlton,  and  an  advance 
party  of  the  enemy.  Our  men  came  in  and  told  me  that  the  body 
of  the  enemy  who  kept  themselves  concealed,  consisted  of  about 
three  hundred  men,  as  near  as  they  could  guess.  I  immediately 
ordered  three  companies  of  Colonel  Weedon's  Virginia  regiment, 
under  Major  Lettch,  and  Colonel  Knowlton  with  his  rangers,  to  try 
and  get  in  the  rear,  while  a  disposition  was  making  as  if  to  attack 
them  in  front,  and  thereby  draw  their  attention  that  way.  This  took 
effect  as  I  wished  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  On  the  appearance  of 
our  party  in  front,  they  immediately  ran  down  hill,  took  possession 
of  some  fences  and  bushes,  and  a  smart  firing  began,  but  at  too  great 
a  distance  to  do  much  execution  on  either  side." 

"  The  parties  under  Colonel  Knowlton  and  Major  Leitch  unluckily 
began  their  attack  too  soon,  as  it  was  rather  in  flank  than  in  rear.  In 
a  short  time  Major  Leitch  was  brought  off  wounded,  having  received 
three  balls  in  his  side,  and  in  a  short  time  Colonel  Knowlton  got  a 
wound  which  proved  mortal.  The  men  continued  the  engagement 
with  the  greatest  resolution.  Finding  that  they  wanted  a  support,  -I 
advanced  part  of  Colonel  Griffiths,  and  Colonel  Richardson's  Mary 
land  regiments,  who  were  nearest  the  scene  of  action.  These  troops 
charged  the  enemy  with  great  intrepidity,  and  drove  them  from  the 
wood  into  the  plain,  and  were  pushing  them  from  thence,  having 
silenced  their  fire  in  a  great  measure,  when  I  judged  it  prudent  to 
order  a  retreat,  fearing  the  enemy,  as  I  have  since  found  was  really 
the  case,  were  sending  a  large  body  to  support  their  party.  We  had 
about  forty  wounded,  the  number  of  slain  is  very  inconsiderable.  By 
a  sergeant,  who  deserted  from  the  enemy  and  came  in,  I  find  that 
their  party  was  greater  than  I  imagined.  It  consisted  of  the  Second 
battalion  of  light  infantry,  a  battalion  of  the  Royal  Highlanders,  the 
Forty-second  regiment,  and  three  companies  of  the  Hessian  riflemen 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-general  Leslie.  The  deserter  reports 
that  their  loss  in  wounded  and  missing  was  eighty-nine,  and  eight 


230  HARLEM   HEIGHTS  AND   VICINITY,    1776.  [1775 

killed.  In  the  latter,  his  account  is  too  small,  as  our  people  discovered 
and  buried  double  that  number.  This  affair,  I  am  in  hopes,  will  be 
attended  with  many  salutary  consequences,  as  it  seems  to  have  greatly 
inspirited  the  whole  of  our  troops." 

It  appears  that  both  generals  were  nearly  correct  as  to  the  forces 
ultimately  brought  into  the  field  by  the  adversary.  General  Howe's 
attention  was  not  called  to  the  matter  until  the  skirmish  between 
small  picket  detachments  of  the  two  armies  had  induced  Washington 
to  advance  with  reinforcements,  and  this  was  taken  to  be  an  original 
advance  in  force.  The  English  deserter,  a  sergeant,  with  professional 
exactness,  gave  an  accurate  account  of  the  condition  of  things  as  he 
obtained  it  on  the  field ;  and  the  American  deserters,  terrified  under 
fire,  as  naturally  over-estimated  their  danger,  and  the  consequence  of 
the  skirmish.  The  fall  of  Knowlton  and  Leitch  was  known  to  them, 
and  after  the  loss  of  the  two  commanding  officers  they  abandoned 
their  companies.  The  sergeant's  statement  of  the  British  casualties 
was  also  substantially  correct,  and  Washington's  presence  at  the  scene 
of  action  enabled  him  to  test  it.  General  Howe's  ignorance  of  the 
origin  of  the  skirmish  also  lent  color  to  the  deserter's  exaggeration 
of  American  losses,  and  gave  to  the  whole  the  character  of  a  deliberate 
assault  upon  his  front,  instead  of  the  collision  of  advance  guards  sup 
ported  by  reinforcements  as  occasion  required.  Another  version 
illustrates  the  difficulty  of  getting  facts  amid  the  excitements  of  a 
campaign. 

General  Greene,  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Cooke  bearing  date  the 
seventeenth,  states,  that  "  on  the  previous  day  about  a  thousand  of  the 
enemy  attacked  the  advance  post,  and  that  by  the  spirited  conduct 
of  General  Putnam  and  Colonel  Reed,  Adjutant-general,  our  people 
advanced  upon  the  plain  ground  without  cover,  attacked  them  and 
drove  them  back  ;  that  his  excellency  ordered  a  timely  retreat,  having 
discovered  or  concluded,  that  the  enemy  would  send  a  large  reinforce 
ment,  as  their  main  army  lay  so  near  by." 

In  connection  with  this  letter  there  is  a  third  history  of  the  trans 
action,  which  indicates  very  strikingly  that  the  American  officers  were 
beginning  to  see  the  importance  of  having  no  more  panics.  Adjutant- 
general  Reed  wrote  to  his  wife  that  "  General  Putnam,  General  Greene, 
Mr.  Tilghman  and  others  were  in  it."  The  excitement  incident  to  actu 
ally  chasing  a  party  of  British  troops,  had  a  very  happy  effect  in  re 
storing  the  confidence  of  the  men.  Reed  had  his  horse  shot,  and  while 
attempting  to  stop  a  runaway  soldier,  "  the  rascal  presented  his  piece 


1776-1  HARLEM    HEIGHTS   AND   VICINITY,    17/6.  23! 

and  snapped  it  at  him,  at  about  a  rod's  distance."  Seizing  a  musket 
from  a  soldier,  the  Adjutant-general  snapped  it,  also,  but  it  missed 
fire.  He  then  "  cut  the  coward  over  the  head  and  hand  with  his  sword, 
and  the  man  was  promptly  tried  and  sentenced  to  death."  He  says, 
"  I  suppose  many  persons  will  think  it  was  rash  and  imprudent  for  so 
many  officers  of  our  rank  to  go  into  such  an  action,  but  it  was  really 
to  animate  the  troops  who  were  quite  dispirited  and  would  not  go  into 
danger  unless  their  officers  led  the  way." 

Colonel  Knowlton  was  greatly  mourned.  His  gallantry  at  Breed's 
Hill  identified  him  with  the  first  battle  of  the  war,  and  he  seems  to 
have  been  as  nearly  fire-proof  and  panic-proof  as  any  man  in  the 
service. 

For  four  weeks  the  American  army  maintained  its  position.  While 
occasional  skirmishing  took  place,  the  periodical  home-sickness  broke 
out  again,  with  contagious  virulence.  Desertions,  and  the  expirations 
of  short  enlistments,  seemed  to  defy  all  attempts  at  thorough  discipline. 
Orders  were  so  frequently  overruled  or  modified,  that  Washington 
was  compelled  to  publish  the  following  on  the  seventeenth  of  Septem 
ber  :  "  The  loss  of  the  enemy  yesterday  would  undoubtedly  have 
been  much  greater  if  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-chief  had  not 
in  so  me  instances  been  contradicted  by  inferior  officers,  who  however 
well  they  may  mean,  ought  not  to  presume  to  direct.  It  is  therefore 
ordered  that  no  officer  commanding  a  party,  and  having  received  orders 
from  the  Commander-in-chief,  depart  from  them  without  counter 
orders  from  the  same  authority ;  and  as  many  may  otherwise  err, 
through  ignorance,  the  army  is  now  acquainted  that  the  general's 
orders  are  delivered  by  the  Adjutant-general,  or  one  of  his  aid-de 
camps,  Mr.  Tilghman  or  Colonel  Moylan,  the  Quarter-master  General. 

Brigade  majors  were  required  to  report  twice,  daily,  of  the  loca 
tion  and  condition  of  their  command;  plundering  and  desertions  were 
punished,  the  organizations  of  the  medical  staff,  upon  the  basis  of 
examination  of  candidates,  was  pushed  forward,  and  the  minutest 
details  which  conduced  to  the  discipline,  comfort  or  safety  of  the 
troops,  entered  into  the  routine  of  work  which  laid  its  own  burden 
upon  the  Commander-in-chief. 

The  State  of  Massachusetts  sent  General  Lincoln  in  command  of 
her  drafted  men ;  General  Greene,  was  placed  in  command  across  the 
Hudson  river,  in  New  Jersey,  Generals  Sullivan  and  Stirling  were  at 
once  exchanged,  and  the  armies  were  at  comparative  rest. 

On  the  fifth  of  October  the  Army  Return  was  made  up  by  Adju- 


232  HARLEM   HEIGHTS  AND  VICINITY,    1776. 

tant-general  Joseph  Reed  with  the  following  exhibit ;  Total  of  rank 
and  file,  twenty-five  thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-five  men,  of 
whom  eight  thousand  and  seventy-five  were  sick  or  on  furlough: 
wanting  to  complete  the  regiments  eleven  thousand  two  hundred  and 
seventy-one.  A  foot-note  states  that  "  General  Lincoln's  Massachu- 
setts  Militia,  computed  at  four  thousand  men,  are  so  scattered  and  igno 
rant  of  the  forms  of  returns,  that  none  can  be  got."  The  fourteen 
brigades  nominally  comprised  forty-four  regiments.  Major  Backus' 
light  horse  numbered  one  hundred  and  fifty-eight,  and  Colonel 
Knox's  artillery  numbered  five  hundred  and  eighty  rank  and  file,  in 
cluding  sick  and  those  on  furlough. 

On  the  eighth  of  October  the  army  in  New  Jersey  under  General 
Moore,  exhibited  a  total  of  six  thousand  five  hundred  and  forty-eight 
officers  and  men,  stationed  at  the  Amboys,  Woodbridge,  Elizabeth- 
town,  Newark  and  Fort  Constitution,  afterward  Fort  Lee.  On  the 
ninth,  the  Phoenix  and  Roebuck  safely  passed  the  forts  and  went  up 
to  Dobbs  Ferry  and  took  possession  of  two  vessels  belonging  to  the 
Americans.  On  the  tenth  General  Greene  reported  his  "  surgeons,  as 
without  the  least  particle  of  medicine,"  that  "  the  regimental  surgeons 
embezzle  the  public  stores  committed  to  their  care  so  that  the  regi 
mental  sick  suffer,"  and  that  "  they  should  have  the  benefit  of  the 
general  hospital." 

On  the  eleventh,  Adjutant-general  Reed,  in  a  letter  to  his  wife, 
expressed  his  purpose  to  resign.  He  was  disgusted  with  the  pre 
dominating  leveling  spirit, — the  equality  between  officers  and 
men,  and  says,  "  Either  no  discipline  can  be  established,  or  he  who 
attempts  it  must  become  odious  and  detestable,  a  position  which  no 
one  will  choose.  Yesterday  morning  a  captain  of  horse  who  attends 
the  General,  from  Connecticut,  was  seen  shaving  one  of  his  men  on  the 
parade  near  the  house.  I  have  expressed  myself  of  and  to  some  peo 
ple  here,  with  such  freedom,  after  the  affair  of  the  fifteenth,  that  I 
believe  many  of  these  wish  me  away.  My  idea  is  shortly  this,  that  if 
France  or  some  other  power  does  not  interfere,  or  some  feuds  arise 
among  the  enemy's  troops,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  stand  them  till 
spring." 

Notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said  and  reiterated  as  to  the 
looseness  of  discipline,  the  prime  difficulty  was  not  with  the  rank  and 
file.  In  a  report  made  to  the  Maryland  Council  of  Safety,  by  Colonel 
Smallwood,  he  properly  states  what  was  still  the  chief  bane  of  the 
army — "  could  our  officers  be  brought  to  a  proper  sense  of  their  duty 


776.J  HARLEM   HEIGHTS  AND  VICINITY,    1776.  233 

and  dignity,  and  the  weight  of  the  army,  the  enemy  might  be  checked 
in  their  course  ;  for  this  you  may  rely  upon,  however  their  parade 
may  indicate  the  contrary,  yet  it  is  a  fact,  they  are  as  much  afraid 
and  cautious  of  us,  as  we  can  be  any  of  us  of  them.  Their  officers 
alone  give  the  superiority.  Our  Commander-in-chief  is  an  excellent 
man,  and  it  would  be  happy  for  the  United  States  if  there  was  as  much 
propriety  in  every  department  below  him.  It  is  not  owing  to  any 
want  of  precaution  in  him  that  discipline  is  not  exacted  with  more 
rigor.  Much  must  depend,  respecting  this,  on  the  superior  officers 
next  under  him  in  command,  and  here  there  seems  to  be  a  total 
ignorance  of  and  inattention  to  that  system,  so  necessary  to  render  an 
army  formidable." 

At  this  time  General  Howe  himself  notified  Lord  Germaine  "  that 
he  no  longer  expected  to  finish  the  compaign  until  spring,  that  the 
provincials  would  not  join  the  English  army  in  any  considerable 
numbers,  that  additional  foreign  troops  should  be  hired,  and  that  at 
least  eight  men  of  war  should  be  sent  from  England  by  the  February 
ensuing." 

Such  are  a  few  of  the  incidents  which  attach  to  the  four  weeks  of 
interrupted  military  action  while  the  American  army  remained  at 
Harlem  Heights. 

The  location  was  admirable  to  resist  an  advance  from  New  York 
itself.  Three  lines  of  intrenchments  extended  across  the  narrow 
neck  of  land,  hardly  half  a  mile  wide,  between  the  Hudson  and  Har 
lem  rivers.  These  intrenchments  were  embraced  within  less  than  a 
mile,  from  near  one  hundred  and  forty-fifth  street  northward  ;  and 
just  within  the  upper  line,  was  the  house  of  Colonel  Morris,  occupied 
by  Washington.  Fort  Washington  was  still  a  mile  beyond.  On  the 
east  side  of  the  Harlem  river,  and  as  far  as  Throgg's  Neck,  detached 
redoubts  and  earthworks,  called  alarm  posts,  were  established,  so 
that  the  whole  front,  from  the  Hudson  to  Long  Island  Sound  was 
under  guard. 

October  eleventh  was  designated  by  Washington  for  his  personal 
inspection  of  the  troops  at  their  alarm  posts.  It  was  timely,  and 
within  twenty- four  hours  of  the  advance  of  the  British  army. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK,  WHITE  PLAINS,  CHATTERTON  HIIL, 

ON  the  twelfth  day  of  October,  1776,  General  Howe  began  the 
execution  of  his  plan  to  cut  off  Washington's  army  from  New 
England  and  upper  New  York,  and  fasten  it  to  its  own  lines,  for  future 
capture.  Unwilling  to  attempt  the  costly  enterprise  of  storming  the 
craggy  and  broken  heights,  where  the  whole  country  was  defensive 
by  small  parties  against  superior  force,  and  to  force  so  many  succes 
sive  lines  of  earthworks  and  redoubts,  he  resolved  to  move  from  the 
coast  of  Long  Island  Sound,  across  to  the  Hudson  river  where  his 
ships  were  lying,  and  also  to  occupy  the  entire  rear  of  the  American 
army  by  this  movement.  It  was  a  repetition  of  the  movements  which 
gained  Brooklyn  Heights  and  New  York  City.  It  would  also  put  him 
in  water  communication  with  New  York  and  Staten  Island. 

The  Guards,  Light  Infantry,  Reserve,  and  Donop's  Hessian  corps, 
were  embarked  upon  large  vessels,  and  were  transferred  from  the  city 
to  Frog's  Neck,  (once  known  as  Throckmorton's,  or  Throck's  Neck)  on 
the  same  day,  in  safety.  As  soon  as  the  landing  had  been  effected,  it 
was  found  that  the  tide  swept  behind  the  Neck  and  detached  it  from 
the  main  land,  so  that  even  at  low  tide  it  would  be  impossible  to  trans 
fer  the  artillery  without  a  bridge.  Colonel  Hand's  American  Rifles 
had  already  taken  up  the  planks  of  the  bridge  which  had  been  built 
to  the  Neck  ;  and  the  causeway  which  led  to  the  channel  was  covered 
by  earthworks  and  the  additional  regiments  of  Colonel  Graham  and 
Colonel  Prescott.  Colonel  Pepperill  was  also  within  supporting 
distance.  One  three  pounder,  under  direction  of  Lieutenant  Bryant, 
and  a  six  pounder,  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Jackson,  of  the  artillery, 
were  trained  upon  the  beach.  General  Howe  placed  the  troops  in 
camp,  and  awaited  reinforcements. 

Lord  Percy  had  been  left  at  McGowan's  Pass,  with  three  brigades 


1776.]  OPERATIONS   NEAR   NEW   YORK.  235 

to  cover  New  York,  and  the  troops  at  Flushing  were  ordered  to  cross 
at  once.  By  reference  to  the  map,  "  Operations  near  New  York,"  the 
position  of  the  army  will  be  understood. 

On  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth,  the  Frst,  Second,  and  Sixth 
brigades,  and  the  Third  Hessian  battalion  joined  from  Flushing,  and 
on  the  eighteenth,  the  combined  commands,  including  also  the  gren 
adiers,  were  transferred  to  Pell's  Point,  thereby  turning  the  position  at 
Westchester,  and  landing  near  the  mouth  of  Hutchinson  river.  This 
entire  country,  rough  and  broken  as  it  was,  was  also  divided,  where- 
ever  cultivated,  by  stone  walls  or  fences,  as  in  later  times,  so  that 
when  the  army  advanced  toward  New  Rochelle,  skirmishing  became 
frequent.  Colonel  Glover  with  his  regiment  made  so  persistent  a  re 
sistance  with  a  force  of  seven  hundred  and  fifty  men  behind  one  of 
these  walls,  as  to  check  the  advance  guard  until  it  was  strongly 
reinforced,  and  earned  for  himself  honorable  mention  in  orders. 

On  the  twenty-first,  General  Howe  advanced  his  right  and  centre 
two  miles  beyond  New  Rochelle,  where  he  remained  in  camp  until 
the  twenty-fifth,  waiting  for  still  additional  reinforcements.  General 
De  Heister  was  left  for  the  same  length  of  time  at  the  camping-ground 
which  Howe  had  first  occupied.  During  the  same  week,  General 
Knyphausen  arrived  from  Europe  with  the  Second  division  of  Hes 
sians,  the  regiment  of  Waldeckers,  one  thousand  strong,  the  Sixth 
foot,  and  the  Third  light  dragoons. 

These  troops  were  promptly  transferred  from  Staten  Island,  and 
landed  at  Myer's  Point  on  the  twenty-second,  taking  post  near  New 
Rochelle.  This  position  secured  the  base  of  General  Howe's  further 
advance  ;  and,  as  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  map,  afforded  the 
proper  starting  point  for  General  Knyphausen's  subsequent  movement 
against  Fort  Washington. 

As  soon  as  General  Knyphausen  was  established,  General  De 
Heister  moved  forward  to  overtake  General  Howe,  and  the  army  en 
camped  within  four  miles  of  White  Plains,  their  fixed  objective.  On 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth,  the  army  advanced  within  about  a 
mile  of  the  court-house  and  village.  It  had  thus  moved  parallel  with 
the  river  Bronx,  over  a  distance  of  at  least  thirty  miles  of  rough 
country,  and  was  now  ready  to  wheel  to  the  left,  cross  to  the  Hudson, 
and  cut  off  Washington's  retreat,  while  at  the  same  time  excluding 
supplies  for  his  army  from  Connecticut  on  the  east.  By  this  date  the 
ships  of  war  had  pushed  up  the  Hudson  as  far  as  Tarrytown,  and 
from  White  Plains  there  was  a  good  road  across  to  that  village. 


236  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK.  [1776 

It  had  been  a  difficult  and  embarrassing  march  from  the  first.  The 
Bronx  was  narrow,  but  ran  along  a  steep  range  of  hills,  thickly  wooded, 
and  as  thickly  set  with  undergrowth,  thorn  bushes,  and  briars.  A 
brief  rain  storm  easily  made  the  stream  impassable.  There  were  no 
roads  of  even  surface,  and  the  American  riflemen,  now  in  their  element, 
hung  upon  the  left  flank,  and  watched  for  opportunity  to  do  mischief. 
A  steady  movement  in  column  was  impossible,  and  the  officers  had 
to  depend  entirely  upon  countrymen  for  information  as  to  the  char 
acter  of  the  country  and  the  location  of  the  roads.  Very  much  had 
been  expected  of  the  regiment  of  cavalry  which  had  just  arrived. 
They  were  at  first  a  source  of  terror  to  new  troops.  Washington  had 
instructed  the  men  that  in  a  country  where  stone  fences,  crags,  and 
ravines  were  so  numerous,  the  American  riflemen  needed  no  better 
opportunity  to  pick  off  the  riders  and  supply  the  army  with  horses.  A 
reward  of  one  hundred  dollars  was  offered  any  soldier  who  would  bring 
in  an  armed  trooper  and  his  horse.  The  facts  confirmed  his  judg 
ment,  and  the  cavalry  were  of  very  little  service  during  that  campaign. 
On  the  twenty-second,  General  Stirling  sent  Colonel  Haslet  out 
with  a  scouting  party,  which  crossed  the  Bronx,  attacked  the  Queen's 
Rangers,  a  royalist  corps  under  Major  Rogers,  captured  thirty-six, 
left  as  many  on  the  field,  and  carried  away  sixty  muskets.  Colonel 
Hand's  regiment  also  had  a  skirmish  with  the  Hessian  Yagers,  near 
Mamaroneck,  with  considerable  success  and  credit.  Their  entire  march 
had  been  subject  to  such  annoyances  and  interruptions. 

While  the  British  army  thus  advanced  upon  its  mission,  the 
American  army  had  abandoned  New  York  Island,  leaving  a  small 
garrison  at  Fort  Washington,  still  holding  fast  to  King's  Bridge.  As 
soon  as  the  British  movement  became  general  and  well  defined,  and 
the  main  army  reached  the  northern  shore  of  Long  Island  Sound, 
Washington  transferred  his  headquarters  to  Valentine's  Hill,  ordered 
all  needed  supplies  to  be  forwarded  to  White  Plains,  and  pushed  his 
own  army  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Bronx,  division  by  division, 
establishing  earthworks  at  every  prominent  point,  and  making  a 
chain  of  small  posts  throughout  the  whole  distance.  His  object  was 
to  crowd  the  British  army  toward  the  coast,  and  use  the  shorter 
interior  line,  which  was  at  his  service,  to  thwart  the  plans  of  General 
Howe,  and  place  himself  in  a  position  to  fight  his  army  on  favorable 
ground  of  his  own  selection,  and  at  advantage.  Time  was  now  an 
element  of  real  value.  Howe  gained  a  fair  start  on  the  twelfth  of  the 
month,  but  lost  five  days  at  Frog's  Neck,  and  four  days  more  near 


1776.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK.  237 

New  Rochelle.  Washington  already  had  a  depot  of  Connecticut 
supplies  at  White  Plains,  and  prolonged  his  left  toward  that  point 
with  great  vigor,  as  soon  as  he  found  that  Howe  would  not  attack 
from  the  east,  as  he  had  already  declined  to  attack  from  the  south. 

On  the  twelfth,  when  first  advised  of  the  landing  upon  Frog's  Neck, 
General  Greene,  then  at  Fort  Lee,  asked  authority  to  cross  with  the 
brigades  of  Nixon,  Clinton  and  Roberdeau,  and  take  part  in  the  com 
ing  issue.  On  the  sixteenth  Washington  called  a  council  of  war. 
The  record  is  given  literally,  to  correct  erroneous  impressions  as  to  the 
participants  in  proceedings  which  had  important  bearings  upon  future 
operations  and  responsibility  therefor 

"  PROCEEDINGS  OF  A  COUNCIL  OF  GENERAL  OFFICERS." 

"  At  a  council  of  war  held  at  the  head-quarters  of  General  Lee, 
October  i6th,  1776:  Present,  His  Excellency,  General  Washington. 
Major  Generals  Lee,  Putnam,  Heath,  Spencer,  Sullivan,  Brigadier 
Generals  Lord  Stirling,  Mifflin,  McDougall,  Parsons,  Nixon,  Wads- 
worth,  Scott,  Fellows,  Clinton,  and  Lincoln.  Colonel  Knox,  command 
ing  artillery." 

"  The  General  read  sundry  letters  from  the  convention  and  particu 
lar  members,  of  the  turbulence  of  the  disaffected  in  the  upper  part  of 
the  State  :  and  also  sundry  accounts  of  deserters  showing  the  enemy's 
intention  to  surround  us/' 

"  After  much  consideration  and  debate  the  following  question 
was  stated  ;  whether,  (it  having  appeared  that  the  obstructions  in  the 
North  river  have  proved  insufficient  and  that  the  enemy's  whole  force 
were  in  our  rear,  on  Frog's  Point)  it  is  now  deemed  possible  in  our 
situation  to  prevent  the  enemy  cutting  off  the  communications  with 
the  country  and  compelling  us  to  fight  them  at  discretion." 

"  Agreed ;  with  but  one  dissenting  voice  (viz.,  General  £7uf/0ft)  that 
it  is  not  possible  to  prevent  the  communication  "  being  cut  off?  "  and 
that  one  of  the  consequences  mentioned  in  the  question  must  certainly 
follow." 

"  Agreed ;  that  Fort  Washington  be  retained  as  long  as  possible." 

Lee  joined  on  the  fourteenth,  only  two  days  before  the  council, 
and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  grand  division  at  Kings- 
bridge,  with  instructions  to  assume  no  direction  in  affairs,  or  active 
duty,  until  he  should  become  acquainted  with  the  existing  arrange 
ments  and  relations  of  that  post. 


238  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK.  [1776, 

Just  before  crossing  the  river  to  report  for  duty  he  wrote  the  fol 
lowing  letter  to  General  Gates  : 

FORT  CONSTITUTION,  October  14,  1776. 

"  MY  DEAR  GATES — I  write  this  scroll  in  a  hurry.  Colonel  Wood  \viil  describe 
the  position  of  our  army,  which  in  my  breast  I  do  not  approve.  Inter  nos,  the  Con 
gress  seem  to  stumble  every  step.  I  do  not  mean  one  or  two  cattle,  but  the  whole 
stable.  I  have  been  very  free  in  delivering  my  opinion  to  'em.  In  my  opinion  Gen 
eral  Washington  is  much  to  blame  in  not  menacing  'em  with  resignation,  unless  they 
refrain  from  unhinging  the  army  by  their  absurd  interference.  *  * 

The  familiarity  between  these  officers,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  entirely  consistent  with  their  intimacy  before  the  war,  and  that 
both  had  been  officers  in  the  British  army.  This  letter,  however,  in 
connection  with  subsequent  correspondence,  will  have  special  value 
in  determining  the  military  subordination  and  personal  discipline  of 
the  two  men. 

Several  embarrassments  attended  the  American  movement  at 
first.  The  conspiracy  referred  to,  before  the  council,  Tryon  county 
and  vicinity,  was  deemed  of  sufficient  importance  for  a  detail  to  watch 
the  disaffected  districts,  but  a  more  serious  matter  was  the  want  of 
flour.  Washington  at  once  importuned  Governor  Trumbull  of  Con 
necticut,  whose  resources  seemed  as  exhaustless  as  his  patriotism  and 
wisdom,  to  send  a  supply  to  White  Plains,  and  it  was  sent. 

On  the  twenty-second  of  October,  while  General  Howe,  for  the 
second  time,  was  "  awaiting  reinforcements,"  two  miles  above  New 
Rochelle,  General  Heath's  advance  division  made  a  night  march, 
reached  Chatterton  Hill  at  daylight,  and  in  the  afternoon  were 
engaged  in  strengthening  the  defenses  at  White  Plains.  General 
Sullivan's  division  arrived  the  next  night,  and  General  Lord  Stirling 
immediately  after.  On  the  twenty-third  Washington  established  his 
head- quarters  at  the  same  place.  On  the  twenty-sixth  Lee's  Grand 
Division  joined  Washington,  and  the  entire  American  army  was  await 
ing  General  Howe's  advance,  behind  rapidly  augmenting  breastworks, 
on  eligible  ground  for  defense. 

Washington's  position  was  not  intrinsically  the  best  for  final  de 
fense  ;  but  he  had  selected  an  ultimate  position,  which  fulfilled  all  the 
conditions  of  a  possible  retreat  from  the  first.  His  left  was  protected 
by  low  ground,  only  accessible  with  difficulty.  His  right  was  met  by 
a  bend  of  the  river  Bronx,  and  while  one  line  of  earthworks  was  in 
front  of  and  controlled  the  upper  Connecticut  road,  the  two  successive 
lines  to  the  rear  were  upon  a  gradual  ascent  very  capable  of  vigorous 


1776.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK.  239 

defense.  He  also  controlled  the  roads  that  led  westward  to  the 
Hudson  river.  Somewhat  advanced,  and  hardly  a  mile  to  the  south 
west,  Chatterton's  Hill  was  occupied  by  Haslet's  regiment,  supported 
by  General  McDougall's  brigade,  which  contained  two  of  the  most 
reliable  regiments  in  the  army.  Behind  the  interior  line  of  the  Amer 
ican  encampment  was  still  higher  ground,  entirely  commanding  the 
passes  through  the  hill  by  the  Peekskill  and  upper  Tarrytown  roads. 

General  Lee  criticised  the  position  taken  by  the  army  on  his  arrival, 
but  the  strategic  considerations  which  seem  to  have  induced  Wash- 
ington  to  have  taken  his  ground,  in  confidence  that  he  had  a  secure 
ultimate  defense  in  case  of  failure  to  maintain  the  first,  were  sound, 
and  realized  his  purpose.  It  is  to  be  especially  noted  that  Wash 
ington,  superior  in  numbers  to  his  adversary,  was  in  a  situation  and 
in  one  of  his  moods  when  he  courted  battle,  and  adopted  the  best 
course  to  invite  attack. 

On  the  twenty-eighth  of  October  the  armies  thus  confronted  each 
other. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  a  direct  advance  upon  Washington's  lines 
would  subject  General  Howe's  army  to  an  attack  upon  their  left 
flank  or  rear,  unless  the  force  on  Chatterton's  Hill  should  be  first  dis 
lodged.  And  yet  the  difficulties  of  a  descent  from  the  hill  would  have 
weakened  such  a  movement,  and  made  it  fruitless,  if  he  had  concen 
trated  his  army  and  broken  Washington's  centre.  General  Clinton 
would  undoubtedly  have  made  the  attack.  General  Howe  placed 
General  Leslie  in  command  of  a  division,  with  orders  to  dislodge  the 
Americans  and  occupy  Chatterton's  Hill.  This  divided  his  force,  and 
left  the  main  body  passive  spectators  of  the  movement.  The  division 
consisted  of  the  second  British  brigade,  Donop's  Hessian  grenadiers, 
the  Hessian  regiment  Lossberg,  and  Colonel  Rahl's  Hessians,  making 
a  total  force,  according  to  General  Howe's  official  report,  of  four  thou 
sand  men,  or  very  nearly  one-third  of  the  army.  At  the  time  of  this 
detail,General  Howe's  army  was  superior  in  numbers  to  that  in  his  im 
mediate  front,  because  of  the  occupation  of  the  hill  by  the  American 
extreme  right. 

The  troops  crossed  the  river  Bronx  with  some  difficulty,  and  then 
had  to  climb  a  difficult  ascent.  The  British  superiority  in  artillery 
was  more  than  compensated  by  the  American  position,  and  artillery 
was  of  little  practical  value.  Captain  Alexander  Hamilton  served  two 
light  guns  at  the  centre,  and  as  the  British  brigade  crossed  the  Bronx 
and  ascended  the  hill  he  delivered  effective  fire  ;  and  Smallwood's 
regiment  supported  by  Ritzema's,  made  two  successful  charges  down 


240  OPERATIONS   NEAR   NEW  YORK.  [1776. 

the  hill  and  checked  the  advance.  To  spectators  at  White  Plains,  it 
appeared  as  if  a  final  and  complete  repulse  had  been  achieved.  At 
this  crisis,  Colonel  Rahl,  by  a  sudden  and  well  pressed  movement  to 
the  left,  reached  and  turned  the  American  right  flank  and  stood  upon 
the  summit,  while  Donop  boldly  charged  up  the  face  of  the  hill  to 
the  left  of  the  British  brigade.  The  American  troops  overwhelmed 
by  this  attack,  fell  back  to  a  second  position  on  the  right  of  the  army, 
and  General  Leslie  could  not  pursue  without  throwing  himself  in  the 
rear  of  Washington,  or  at  least  exposing  himself  to  be  entirely  cut  off 
from  General  Howe. 

Haslet's  Delaware,  and  Smallwood's  Maryland  had  again  con 
firmed  their  reputation,  and  with  Brooks'  Massachusetts,  Webb's 
Connecticut,  and  Ritzema's  New  York  had  fought  with  commendable 
spirit,  and  as  long  as  consistent  with  safety  for  themselves  and  the 
American  right  wing.  General  Putnam  had  been  sent  to  their  sup 
port  as  soon  as  the  affair  appeared  doubtful,  but  was  too  late  to 
redeem  the  contest. 

Colonel  Haslet  afterwards  wrote,  that  he  was  first  assigned  to  the 
command  of  Chatterton's  Hill  with  his  own  regiment  and  a  force  of 
militia  ;  that  the  latter  fled,  and  that  three  companies  of  Smallwood's 
Maryland  also  retreated  precipitately  ;  that  General  McDougall's  com 
mand  supported  kim,  and  was  so  dangerously  placed  in  his  rear,  that 
he  was  in  danger  from  their  fire ;  that  upon  his  advice  General 
McDougall  changed  his  position.  Much  is  assumed  by  this  officer, 
which  is  not  supported  by  other  authority.  Colonel  Graham,  who 
commanded  the  regiment  of  New  York  militia,  was  tried  before  a 
court  martial  for  unnecessarily  abandoning  two  stone  fences  where  he 
had  been  placed  by  Colonel  Reed.  The  position  would  have  had 
value  if  properly  supported.  The  evidence  was  conclusive  as  to  his 
personal  bravery,  although  some  of  his  officers  failed  him,  and  that 
his  retreat  was  in  pretty  good  order,  and  was  directed  by  superior 
authority.  Captain  Hamilton  also  brought  off  his  guns  in  safety. 

Colonel  Smallwood  was  wounded,  and  forty-six  of  his  regiment 
were  also  among  the  killed  and  wounded.  The  total  loss  was  reported 
at  ninety,  but  Dr.  Bird,  who  visited  the  hospitals,  stated  that  it  was 
not  less  than  one  hundred  and  twenty.  Marshall  says,  "  between  three 
and  four  hundred."  General  Howe  "  estimated  the  American  loss  at 
two  hundred  and  fifty."  The  returns  and  contemporaneous  letters 
fix  the  loss  at  one  hundred  and  thirty.  General  Howe's  report  at  the 
close  of  the  year  mentions  no  prisoners  as  taken  between  the  twelfth 


I776.j  OPERATIONS   NEAR  NEW   YORK.  24! 

and  the  sixteenth  of  November  ;  but  under  the  caption  "  White 
Plains,"  enumerates  four  officers  and  thirty-five  privates.  As  this 
number  were  taken  early,  on  the  march,  it  does  not  enter  into  the 
casualties  at  Chatterton's  Hill. 

The  loss  of  the  British  brigade  was  officially  reported  by  Gen 
eral  Leslie  as  one  hundred  and  fifty-four.  Lieutenant-colonel  Carr, 
of  the  Thirty-fifth,  Captain  Goar  of  the  Forty-ninth,  and  Deming  of 
the  Twenty-eighth  regiments  were  among  the  killed.  The  Hessiah 
loss  increased  the  total  casualties  of  the  command  to  two  hundred 
and  thirty-one. 

The  heaviest  portion  of  this  loss  was  incurred  in  the  attempt  to 
scale  the  cliff,  just  after  crossing  the  river. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  the  armies  rested.  General  Howe,  "  waited 
for  reinforcements."  Washington  removed  his  sick  to  better  quarters 
and  prepared  to  move  to  his  selected  ultimate  place  of  resistance.  On 
the  thirtieth,  Lord  Percy  arrived  with  the  third  brigade  and  two  bat 
talions  of  the  fourth  brigade,  and  the  next  day  was  designated  for  an 
assault  in  force.  The  day  was  stormy,  and  for  twenty  hours  the  rain 
and  wind  suspended  the  movement.  Batteries  were  planted,  however, 
for  a  subsequent  advance,  **  weather  permitting" 

During  that  night  Washington  retired  nearly  five  miles,  to  North 
Castle  Heights,  from  which  he  could  not  be  dislodged  by  the  entire 
British  force,  and  the  "  Battle  of  White  Plains,"  had  been  fought  at 
Chatterton  Hill. 

The  Court-house  at  White  Plains  was  subsequently  burned  by 
lawless  Americans,  for  which  the  British  troops  were  in  no  way  re 
sponsible.  Washington  burned  his  excess  of  forage,  and  stores  that 
could  not  be  removed,  and  in  a  prompt  order  thus  denounced  the 
burning  of  the  public  buildings  : 

"  It  is  with  the  utmost  astonishment  and  abhorrence,  the  general 
is  informed,  that  some  base  and  cowardly  wretches  have,  last  night 
(November  5th)  set  fire  to  the  Court  house  and  other  buildings  which 
the  enemy  left.  The  army  may  rely  on  it,  that  they  shall  be  brought 
to  justice,  and  meet  with  the  punishment  they  deserve." 

The  horrors  of  civil  war  began  to  develop  fruit.  The  soldiers 
plundered  towns,  and  the  British  took  without  discrimination  of  per 
sons,  what  they  wanted.  Citizens  became  alarmed,  and  infinite  issues 
were  involved  in  the  integrity  and  faithfulness  of  Congress  and  its 
defenders. 


16 


CHAPTER   XXXVL 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK.     WHITE   PLAINS  TO  FORT  WASH- 

INGTON. 

ON  the  second  day  of  November  General  Knyphausen  broke  up 
his  camp  near  New  Rochelle,  and  at  evening  encamped  at  the 
north  end  of  New  York  Island.  On  the  fifth  General  Howe  left 
White  Plains,  and  during  the  afternoon  of  the  sixth  encamped  at 
Dobbs  Ferry,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Hudson  river.  Thus  the  army 
abandoned  the  temporary  base  at  New  Rochelle. 

General  Howe  drew  his  supplies  from  vessels  which  were  already 
at  Dobbs  Ferry,  while  the  Hessian  commander  had  direct  water- 
communication  with  New  York  city,  by  Harlem  creek.  By  the 
fourteenth  General  Knyphausen  had  accumulated  a  large  number  of 
flat-boats  and  barges  for  the  more  rapid  transportation  of-  his  troops 
toward  Fort  Washington.  Reference  is  had  to  maps  entitled  "  Opera 
tions  near  New  York,"  and  "  Capture  of  Fort  Washington." 

The  barracks  at  Fort  Independence  had  been  burned  by  Colonel 
Lasher,  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth  of  Octo 
ber,  and  three  hundred  stands  of  arms,  out  of  repair,  five  tons  of  bar 
iron,  spears,  shot,  shell,  and  numerous  additional  valuable  stores,  had 
been  abandoned,  in  the  hurried  retreat  to  Kingsbridge.  General 
Greene  crossed  over  and  gathered  as  many  as  he  could  procure 
wagons  for,  and  intended  to  have  used  the  lumber  of  the  barracks,  but 
for  their  premature  and  improvident  destruction.  On  the  sixth, 
Washington  informed  Congress  of  these  different  movements,  and  that 
"  he  expected  the  enemy  to  lead  their  forces  against  Fort  Washington, 
and  invest  it,'' — and  that  "  Howe  would  probably  make  a  descent 
into  New  Jersey."  A  council  of  war,  that  day  convened,  unanimously 
agreed,  "  that,  if  the  enemy  retreated  toward  New  York  it  would  be 
proper  to  throw  a  body  of  troops  into  New  Jersey,  immediately  :  " — 
that  the  troops  raised  on  either  side  of  the  Hudson  river  should 


1776.]  OPERATIONS   NEAR  NEW  YORK.  243 

occupy  the  side  where  they  had  been  enlisted,  and  that  a  force  of  three 
thousand  men  would  be  necessary  for  the  erection  and  defense  of  posts 
and  passes  in  the  Highlands,  which  included  Peekskill,  and  all  moun 
tain  spurs  which  commanded  the  river. 

General  Washington  wrote  to  Governor  Livingston  that  General 
Howe  "  must  undertake  something  on  account  of  his  reputation, 
that  he  would  probably  go  to  New  Jersey,  and  then  urged  that 
the  militia  be  in  readiness  to  supply  the  places  of  those  whose  term 
would  soon  expire."  To  Greene  he  wrote  in  the  same  terms  on  the 
seventh  ;  adding,  "  they  can  have  no  capital  object  in  view  unless  it  is 
Philadelphia."  It  was  then  known  that  General  Carleton  retired  from 
Crown  Point  on  Saturday  the  second  of  November,  so  that  there  was 
no  danger  of  a  British  movement  up  the  Hudson.  On  the  eighth  he 
wrote  to  General  Greene,  "  The  late  passage  of  the  three  vessels  up 
the  North  river  is  so  plain  a  proof  of  the  inefficiency  of  all  the  ob 
structions  we  have  thrown  into  it,"  referring  to  sunken  vessels  with 
submarine  abati,  designed  by  General  Putnam,  "  that  I  can  not  but 
think  it  will  fully  justify  a  change  in  the  disposition  which  has  been 
made.  If  we  can  not  prevent  vessels  passing  up,  and  the  enemy  are 
possessed  of  the  surrounding  country,  what  valuable  purpose  can  it 
answer  to  hold  a  post  from  which  the  expected  benefit  can  not  be 
had  ?  I  am  therefore  inclined  to  think  it  will  not  be  prudent  to  haz 
ard  the  men  and  stores  at  Mount  Washington ;  but  as  you  are  on  the 
spot,  leave  it  to  you  to  give  such  orders  as  to  evacuating  Mount 
Washington  as  you  judge  best ;  and,  so  far,  revoking  the  order  given 
Colonel  Magaw  to  defend  it  to  the  last." 

General  Greene  was  also  ordered  to  remove  all  stores  not  necessary 
for  defense,  adding,  "  if  the  inhabitants  will  not  drive  off  their  stock, 
destroy  it,  with  hay,  grain,  etc.,  since  the  enemy  would  take  it  without 
distinction  or  satisfaction." 

General  Greene  had  anticipated  a  movement  into  New  Jersey  late 
in  October.  It  was  evident  that  there  must  be  an  end  to  the  pursuit 
of  Washington's  army  by  General  Howe,  and  he  was  well  assured  that 
that  pursuit  would  end  at  White  Plains. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  October,  he  sketched  an  itinerary  which  is 
of  value  as  giving  a  measure  of  distance  by  which  to  appreciate  the 
subsequent  movements,  as  reported  at  their  occurrence.  It  is  as 
follows  : 

"From  Fort  Lee  to  Hackensack  bridge,  nine  miles  ;  water  carriage 
from  this  place. 


244  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  YORK.  [1776. 

'*  From    Hackensack  to  Equacanaugh,  five   miles ;    water  carriage 
from  this  place. 

"  From  Equacanaugh  to  Springfield,  sixteen  miles  ;  to  a  landing  at 
Newark. 

"  From  Springfield  to  Boundbrook,  nineteen  miles ;  seven  miles  to 
a  landing  at  Brunswick. 

"  From  Boundbrook  to  Princeton,  twenty  miles ;  twelve  miles  land 
carriage  to  Delaware  river. 

"From    Princeton   to   Trenton,    twelve    miles;    water  carriage   to 
Philadelphia." 

His  estimates  for  stores  of  flour,  pork,  hay,  and  grain,  including 
allowance  for  supplying  troops  passing  and  repassing  from  the  differ 
ent  States,  is  given  as  an  index  of  his  forethought  in  the  line  of 
logistics. 

"  Two  thousand  men  at  Fort  Lee  for  five  months  ;  at  Hackensack 
a  supply  for  the  general  hospital — the  troops  to  have  fresh  provisions; 
at  Equacanaugh,  for  the  troops  at  Newark  and  Elizabethtown,  and 
to  subsist  the  main  army  in  passing  to  Philadelphia  ;  at  Springfield  a 
week's  provisions  for  twenty  thousand  men  on  their  way  to  Philadel 
phia  ;  at  Boundbrook  the  same  ;  at  Princeton  the  same ;  at  Trenton 
to  subsist  twenty  thousand  men  for  three  months."  The  period  at 
which  this  forecast  of  the  future  was  made  is  worthy  of  notice. 

November  ninth,  President  Hancock  notified  Washington  of  the 
restoration  of  a  money  allowance  upon  reenlistment,  and  of  the  pas 
sage  of  a  resolution  that  the  American  army  might  be  enlisted  for 
three  years  or  during  the  war. 

At  this  time  more  than  one-half  the  enlistments  of  the  army  were 
on  the  extreme  limit  of  their  service,  and  reports  of  its  condition  were 
freely  circulated  in  New  York.  The  militia  of  that  State,  then  at 
Fort  Washington,  upon  the  pledge  of  General  Howe  that  "  he  would 
guarantee  to  them  the  blessing  of  peace  and  a  secure  enjoyment  of 
their  liberties  and  properties,  as  well  as  a  free  and  general  pardon," 
were  determined  not  to  reenlist,  and  became  fractious  and  insubordi 
nate.  Governor  Livingston  notified  Washington,  under  date  of 
November  ninth,  that  he  had  received  his  letter  above  referred  to, 
and  that  in  case  of  an  apprehended  invasion  he  would  call  out  the 
men  to  repel  it. 

On  the  same  date  with  Livingston's  letter,  Greene  admitted  the 
failure  of  the  river  obstructions  to  do  their  work,  adding,  "  but  upon 
the  whole  I  cannot  help  thinking  the  garrison  is  of  advantage,  and  I 


1776.]  OPERATIONS   NEAR  NEW  YORK.  245 

cannot  conceive  the  garrison  to  be  in  any  great  danger ;  the  men  can  be 
brought  off  at  anytime,  but  the  stores  may  not  be  so  easily  removed; 
yet  I  think  they  can  be  got  off  in  spite  of  them,  if  matters  grow  des 
perate.  I  was  over  there  last  evening ;  the  enemy  seems  to  be  dis 
posing  matters  to  besiege  the  place,  but  Colonel  Magaw  thinks  it  will 
take  them  till  December  expires  before  they  can  carry  it." 

On  the  same  date  Washington  ordered  the  first  division  to  cross 
the  Hudson  at  Peekskill ;  the  second  to  cross  the  day  following. 

A  brief  epitome  of  the  details  in  logistics  which  occupied  the 
attention  of  the  American  commander-in-chief  during  the  last  four 
hours  before  he  followed  these  divisions  into  New  Jersey,  is  pregnant 
with  military  and  historical  suggestions. 

To  General  Lee  he  commits  certain  trusts  ;  "  that  all  tools  not  in 
use  be  got  together  and  delivered  to  the  quartermaster-general ;  that 
the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  fix  convenient  places  for  the  unin 
terrupted  manufacture  of  musket  cartridges ;  that  no  troops  be 
suffered  to  leave  camp  until  army  accoutrements  and  tents  are  ac 
counted  for,  or  delivered  upon  proper  receipt  ;  that  the  contingency 
of  an  attack,  in  case  the  threatened  movement  to  New  Jersey  be  but 
a  feint,  be  provided  for  ;  and  that  all  stores  and  baggage  not  for  imme 
diate  use,  be  sent  northward  of  the  Croton  river  ;  that  in  case  of 
change  of  post,  all  hay  be  destroyed,  so  that  the  enemy  can  not  get 
it ;  that  supernumerary  officers  of  regiments  greatly  reduced  be  dis 
charged,  or  annexed  to  some  brigade ;  that  provisions  and  forage  be 
laid  in  for  winter  quarters  ;  that  it  is  important  to  remember  in  delib 
eration,  that  the  militia  of  Massachusetts  stand  released  from  their 
contract  on  the  seventeenth  instant,  and  the  Connecticut  militia  are 
not  engaged  for  any  fixed  period." 

The  closing  paragraph  of  this  remarkable  order,  thus  briefly  out 
lined,  is  material  to  an  appreciation  of  the  future  course  of  the  officer 
intrusted  with  these  duties.  It  is  given  with  official  exactness,  is 
placed  in  Italics,  and  reads  as  follows  : 

"  If  the  enemy  should  remove  the  whole  or  the  greatest  part  of  their 
force  to  the  west  side  of  the  Hudson  river,  I  have  no  doubt  of  your 
following  with  all  possible  dispatch,  leaving  the  militia  and  invalids  U 
cover  the  frontiers  of  Connecticut ',  etc.,  in  case  of  need. 

"  Given  at  headquarters,  near  the  White  Plains,  the  iQth  day  of 
November,  1776. 

"  GEORGE  WASHINGTON." 
"  To  Major-general  Lee" 


246  OPERATIONS   NEAR   NEW   YORK.  [1770. 

Washington  wrote  to  Governor  Livingston  in  substance,  that  the 
bounties  offered  by  New  York  would  deter  enlistments  in  States  not 
giving  bounties,  because,  "  troops  embarked  in  the  same  cause  and 
doing  the  same  duties,  will  not  long  act  together  with  harmony  for 
different  pays." 

To  Colonel  Knox  he  made  a  suggestion  as  to  a  partition  of  the 
artillery  among  different  commands,  unless  Howe  should  throw  his 
whole  force  into  the  Jerseys,  and  bend  his  course  to  Philadelphia, 
adding  this  paragraph  : — 

"  It  is  unnecessary  to  add  that  if  the  army  of  the  enemy  should 
wholly  or  pretty  generally  throw  themselves  across  the  North  river, 
General  Lee  is  to  follow."  To  General  Mifflin  :  "  that  as  enlistments  are 
to  expire,  many  will  not  reenlist,  hence  tents  and  stores  delivered,  are 
to  be  collected  and  safely  deposited  ;  tents  to  be  repaired  against 
another  season,  intrenching  tools  to  be  collected  or  placed  where 
General  Lee  should  direct,  and  magazines  of  forage  be  provided." 

To  Governor  Trumbull  he  sent  a  particular  letter  of  detail,  closing, 
"  In  case  the  enemy  should  make  a  pretty  general  remove  to  the 
Jerseys,  that  part  of  the  army  under  General  Lee  will  more  than 
probably  follow ;  notice  of  which  I  now  give" 

To  Ezekiel  Cheevers,  commissary  of  military  stores  : 

"  As  the  army,  (at  least  part  of  it)  is  near  the  period  of  dissolu 
tion," — army  and  other  stores  issued  to  continental  troops  or  militia 
are  to  be  recovered ;  unserviceable  arms  that  can  not  be  repaired  by 
the  armorers  of  the  army,  are  to  be  packed  and  sent  to  the  Board  of 
War,  other  stores  to  be  put  in  a  safe  place  near  the  winter  quarters  of 
the  troops  ;  and,  "  it  is  unnecessary  to  add,  that  the  troops  of  Gen 
eral  Lee  will  also  cross  the  Hudson  river  if  it  should  be  necessary,  in 
consequence  of  their  throwing  their  force  over." 

One  general  order  reads  like  so  many  orders  of  later  date,  that  it  is 
referred  to  in  connection  with  the  historical  statement,  that  the  or 
ganization  and  support  of  the  American  armies  in  the  war  of  1861-65, 
was  substantially  based  upon  legislation  which  reproduced  the  system 
adopted  during  the  war  of  1775-1781.  The  order  is  as  follows: 
"  Colonels  to  examine  the  baggage  of  troops  under  marching  orders  ; 
tents  and  spare  arms  to  go  first  in  the  wagons,  then  the  proper  bag 
gage  of  the  regiment ;  no  chairs,  tables,  heavy  chests  or  other  per 
sonal  baggage,  to  be  put  in,  as  it  will  certainly  be  thrown  off  and  left ; 
no  officer  of  any  rank  to  meddle  with  a  wagon  or  cart  appropriated  for 
any  other  regiment  or  public  use ;  that  no  discharged  men  be  allowed 


1776.]  OPERATIONS   NEAR  NEW   YORK.  247 

to  carry  away  arms,  camp  kettles,  utensils,  or  any  other  public  stores ; 
recruiting  officers  so  detailed,  to  proceed  with  their  duty ;  no  boys 
or  old  men  to  be  enlisted,  and  if  so,  to  be  returned  on  the  hands 
of  the  officer,  with  no  allowance  for  any  expense  he  may  be  at." 

On  November  twelfth,  at  Peekskill,  just  before  crossing  the  river, 
Washington  having  spent  the  previous  day  in  a  visit  to  the  Highlands 
in  the  vicinity  of  West  Point,  specifically  instructed  General  Heath 
that  "his  division  and  the  troops  at  Forts  Constitution,  Montgomery, 
and  Independence,  as  well  as  Colonel  Lasher's  regiment,  were  under 
his  command  for  the  security  of  the  above  posts,  the  passes  through 
the  Highlands  from  this  place,  and  on  the  west  side  of  the  river." 
General  Heath  at  once  convened  a  council  of  war  and  divided  his 
troops  in  accordance  with  the  tenor  of  Washington's  orders.  By  the 
fourteenth  all  the  troops  of  the  army  belonging  to  States  which  lay 
south  of  the  Hudson  river,  excepting  Smallwood's,  already  on  its 
march,  had  been  safely  moved  across  the  river,  and  Washington  him 
self  reached  General  Greene's  headquarters  that  morning.  At  this 
time  a  fleet  of  nearly  three  hundred  sail  lay  at  Sandy  Hook  with  a 
large  number  of  British  troops  on  board,  and  their  destination  was 
suspected  to  be  Rhode  Island,  Philadelphia,  or  South  Carolina. 

On  the  twelfth,  General  Greene  had  written,  "  I  expect  General 
Howe  will  endeavor  to  possess  himself  of  Mount  Washington,  but 
very  much  doubt  whether  he  will  succeed  in  the  attempt." 

When  Washington  arrived  at  Fort  Lee,  the  British  army  had 
already  removed  from  Dobbs  Ferry  to  Kingsbridge.  In  his  report 
of  this  fact  to  Congress,  the  following  sentence  directly  follows  the 
announcement :  "  It  seems  to  be  generally  believed,  on  all  hands,  that 
the  investing  of  Fort  Washington  is  one  object  they  have  in  view."  "  I 
propose  to  stay  in  the  neighborhood  a  few  days  ;  in  which  time  I  expect 
the  design  of  the  enemy  will  be  more  disclosed,  and  their  incursions 
made  in  this  quarter,  or  their  investiture  of  Fort  Washington  if  they 
are  intended."  This  letter  regards  the  anticipated  investment  very 
calmly.  Washington  established  his  headquarters  at  Hackensack 
bridge,  nearly  nine  miles  from  Fort  Lee.  The  garrison  of  Fort  Wash 
ington  had  been  previously  reinforced  from  the  flying  camp  and  on 
the  fifteenth  it  numbered  nearly  three  thousand  men.  Washington's 
personal  report  placed  the  garrison  at  about  two  thousand.  His 
estimate  was  too  low,  for  at  the  close  of  the  year,  a  revised  list  of  the 
prisoners  taken  on  the  sixteenth,  was  made  up  and  settled  upon,  as  the 
basis  of  exchange,  at  two  thousand  six  hundred  and  thirty-four. 


248  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW   YORK.  [1776. 

The  fort  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Magaw,  of  Pennsylvania. 
He  was  a  man  of  courage  and  capacity.  Colonels  Rawlings,  Cadwal- 
lader  and  Baxter  were  his  chief  associates,  and  to  each  was  entrusted 
a  command  bearing  upon  the  defense  of  the  fort.  Major  Otho  PL 
Williams  with  a  Maryland  rifle  battalion,  was  also  attached  to  Raw- 
lings'  command. 

Fort  Washington  was  a  hastily  built,  open  earthwork,  and  accord 
ing  to  Graydon,  "  without  a  ditch  of  any  consequence,  and  with  no 
exterior  defenses  that  could  entitle  it  to  the  name  of  a  fortress  in  any 
degree  capable  of  sustaining  a  siege."  There  was  no  well  within  the 
fort  proper,  so  that  water  was  procurable  only  from  the  Hudson  river 
nearly  three  hundred  feet  below. 

Southward,  within  less  than  two  miles,  were  the  interior  lines  of 
the  old  defenses  which  were  built  when  Washington's  army  was  on 
Harlem  Heights.  Colonel  Cadwallader  was  stationed  there.  East 
ward  was  a  ridge  called  Laurel  Hill,  a  part  of  Fordham  Heights,  and 
at  its  north  end  was  a  slight  defense  afterwards  known  as  Fort  George. 
Opposite,  on  the  prolongation  of  the  Mount  Washington  ridge,  was  a 
fort  subsequently  known  as  Fort  Tryon.  Between  these  somewhat 
commanding  positions  there  was  a  deep  and  rocky  ravine  through 
which  ran  the  old  Albany  road.  The  river  ridge,  with  a  slight  inter 
ruption  near  Tubby  Hook,  continued  as  far  as  Spuyten  Devil  Creek, 
where  light  earthworks  had  been  built,  known  as  "  Cock  Hill  Fort." 
Still  northward,  across  the  creek  on  Tetard's  Hill,  was  Fort  Independ 
ence.  From  the  point  where  the  Albany  road  left  the  pass  and  turned 
towards  the  Harlem  river  was  a  valley,  and  much  marshy  land  ;  but 
across  the  Harlem  river,  opposite  Fort  George,  and  as  far  as  Williams, 
or  Dykeman's  bridge,  the  ground  was  high  again,  and  the  British  had 
erected  two  redoubts  to  cover  the  landing  of  Generals  Matthews  and 
Cornwallis.  General  Howe  thus  gave  his  opinion  of  Fort  Washington  : 
"  The  importance  of  this  post,  which  with  Fort  Lee  on  the  opposite 
shore  of  Jersey  kept  the  enemy  in  command  of  the  North  river, 
while  it  barred  the  communication  with  New  York,  by  land,  made 
the  possession  of  it  absolutely  necessary."  This  is  the  identical  argu 
ment  used  by  General  Greene  for  its  "  retention  to  the  last  possible 
moment." 

In  Washington's  report  of  November  sixteenth  occurs  this  para 
graph  .  "  Early  this  morning,  Colonel  Magaw  posted  his  troops,  partly 
in  the  lines  thrown  up  by  our  army  on  our  first  coming  thither  from 
New  York,  and  partly  on  a  commanding  hill  lying  north  of  Mount 


I776.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR   NEW   YORK.  249 

Washington,  the  lines  being  all  to  the  southward"  The  paragraph 
now  placed  in  italics,  has  significance,  as  the  facts  indicated  enabled 
the  British,  who  operated  from  the  north  and  east,  to  enter  the  open 
sides ;  and  in  fact,  practically,  to  disregard  the  greater  portion  of  the 
nominal  lines  of  defense. 

Directly  eastward  of  the  redoubt  itself,  there  was  no  defense,  other 
than  that  assured  by  the  steepness  and  roughness  of  the  ascent.  The 
fort  was  first  built,  in  order  to  command  the  Hudson  river  ;  and  the 
principal  portion  of  the  lines,  immediately  northward,  had  a  river 
front,  but  was  nearly  open  toward  the  rear. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  fifteenth,  the  British  arrangements 
having  been  perfected  for  an  assault  on  the  following  day,  Adjutant- 
general  Patterson  was  sent  to  the  fort  with  a  peremptory  demand  for 
its  surrender,  with  the  alternative  "  to  be  put  to  the  sword."  In  reply, 
Colonel  Magaw  declared  that  "  he  would  defend  the  post  to  the  last 
extremity,"  very  generously  qualifying  a  portion  of  General  Howe's 
ultimatum,  as  follows, — "  I  think  it  rather  a  mistake,  than  a  settled 
purpose  of  General  Howe  to  act  a  part  so  unworthy  of  himself  and 
the  British  nation." 

Greene  ordered  Magaw  to  "  defend  the  place  until  hearing  from 
him  again  " — ordered  General  Heard's  brigade  to  hasten  up — sent 
the  despatch  from  Colonel  Magaw  to  Washington,  then  at  Hacken- 
sack,  and  crossed  over  to  the  fort. 

Washington  immediately  returned  to  Fort  Lee,  and  started  across 
the  river  to  determine  the  condition  of  the  garrison  himself.  He 
says : — "  I  had  partly  crossed  the  North  river  when  I  met  General 
Putnam  and  General  Greene,  who  were  just  returning  from  thence,  and 
they  informed  me  that  the  troops  were  in  high  spirits  and  would 
make  a  good  defense,  and  it  being  late  at  night,  I  returned." 

The  attack  upon  Fort  Washington  was  admirably  planned  and 
admirably  executed.  "  The  Pearl  was  stationed  in  the  North  river," 
says  General  Howe,  "  to  cover  the  march  of  the  Hessian  troops  and 
flank  the  American  lines."  On  the  night  of  the  fourteenth,  thirty 
flat-boats  under  the  command  of  Captains  Wilkinson  and  Molloy 
passed  up  the  Hudson,  eluded  the  vigilance  of  General  Greene  and 
Colonel  Magaw,  entered  Spuyten  Devil  Creek  and  thus  reached  King's- 
Bridge. 

Three  distinct  assaults  were  ordered,  and  a  fourth  movement, 
which  was  at  first  intended  as  a  feint,  was  converted  into  a  spirited 
attack,  at  a  critical  moment.  The  marginal  notes  on  the  map,  indi- 


250  OPERATIONS   NEAR  NEW   YORK.  [1776. 

eating  the  troops  assigned  to  each  column,  are  from  General  Howe's 
"  Orderly  Book." 

From  the  north,  along  the  ridge,  scattering  the  little  guard  at 
Cock  Hill  Fort,  Colonel  Rahl,  on  the  right,  moved  steadily  upon  Fort 
Tryon,  crowding  Colonel  Rawlings  back  by  weight  of  numbers,  nearly 
to  the  fort  itself.  General  Knyphausen  with  the  left  of  the  Hessian 
column  took  the  side  of  the  ridge  even  down  to  the  ravine,  and  after 
considerable  loss  while  righting  his  way  through  woods  and  over  rocks 
against  a  spirited  resistance,  joined  Colonel  Rahl  near  the  fort. 

Lord  Percy  advanced  from  the  south,  and  was  checked  for  a  little 
while  by  Cadwallader,  who  having  too  small  a  force  to  defend  the 
entire  lines,  was  then  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  interior  or  north 
ern  line  of  works,  which  had  no  guns  in  position  as  support  to  his 
resistance. 

At  this  advance  the  division  of  Matthews  and  Cornwallis,  which 
had  been  in  readiness,  landed,  although  under  heavy  fire,  pushed  back 
the  resisting  force,  and  moved  over  Laurel  Hill  to  take  the  works  in 
the  centre.     As  soon   as  advised  that  Lord  Percy  had  carried  the 
advance-work  to  the  south,  General  Howe  ordered  Colonel  Sterling 
to  land  and  cooperate  with  Matthew's  division.     At  this  point  of  de 
barkation  there  were  light  earthworks  also,  which  were  stubbornly 
held  by  the  Americans.     Cadwallader,  seeing  that  the  success  of  this 
movement   would  interpose  a  force  in  his  rear,  sent  a  detachment  to 
assist  in  opposing  the  landing ;  but  upon  failure  to  check  it,  the  de 
tachment  too  rapidly  retreated,  losing  one  hundred  and  seventy  men 
as  prisoners.     Colonel  Magaw  also  sent  a  detachment  from  the  fort 
for  the  same  purpose,  when  he  saw  the  boats  approaching  the  landing. 
The  whole  weight  of  the  British  left  and  centre   was  now  con 
verged  upon  a  direct  assault  up  the  steep  ascent   in  front  of  the  fort 
itself.     It  was  made  under  heavy  fire,  but  with  unwavering  steadiness 
and  speedy  success.     All  the  British  divisions  were  thus  within  the 
exterior  lines,  and  the  garrison  was  crowded  into  a  space  designed  for 
only  a  thousand  men.     Surrender  or  rescue  was  inevitable.     Magaw 
asked  for  five  hours'  parley.     A  half  hour  only  was  given,  and  the  sur 
render  ensued   soon  after;  but  Washington   had  been  notified  of  the 
demand.     Washington  says,  "  I  sent  a  billet  to  Colonel  Magaw  direct 
ing  him  to  hold  out,  and  I  would  endeavor  this  evening  to  bring  off 
the  garrison  if   the  fortress  could    not  be  maintained,  as  I  did  not 
expect  it  could,  the  enemy  being  possessed  of  the  adjacent  ground." 
Rawlings  and  Williams  were  wounded  on  the  left,  and  Colonel 


I77o.j  OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW   YORK.  2$ I 

Baxter  fell  on  Laurel  Hill.  Colonel  Miller,  of  the  Fifth  Pennsylvania 
battalion,  was  also  killed. 

The  American  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  did  not  exceed  one 
hundred  and  thirty. 

The  British  regiments  lost  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  one 
hundred  and  twenty-eight,  and  the  Hessian  troops,  three  hundred 
and  twenty-six.  Among  the  regiments  engaged,  the  following  were 
conspicuous  in  subsequent  stages  of  the  war:  viz.,  those  of  Rahl, 
Donop,  Losberg,  Stein,  Nessembach,  and  Dittforth. 

On  the  seventeenth,  an  additional  number  of  flat  boats  was  sent 
up  the  North  river  by  Admiral  Howe,  and  on  the  eighteenth  Corn- 
wallis  crossed  over  nearly  opposite  Yonkers,  at  a  point  not  sufficiently 
watched  and  defended,  with  six  thousand  men.  Fort  Lee  was  aban 
doned,  the  American  army  falling  behind  the  Hackensack,  and  then  to 
Aquackanonck. 

Two  officers,  one  quartermaster,  three  surgeons,  and  ninety-nine 
privates  were  taken  prisoners  at  Fort  Lee. 

The  loss  in  public  stores  by  the  capture  of  these  forts,  including 
those  taken  at  Valentine's  Hill  and  left  on  the  march,  was  a  serious 
one  to  the  American  army,  and  embraced  besides  shot,  shell,  twenty- 
eight  hundred  muskets,  and  four  hundred  thousand  cartridges,  at  least 
one  hundred  and  sixty-one  cannon,  ranging  from  three  to  thirty-two 
pounders,  and  several  hundred  tents. 

On  the  capture  of  Fort  Lee,  General  Greene  wrote  to  Governor 
Cooke  of  Rhode  Island  under  date  of  December  first,  that  "  the  enemy's 
publication  of  the  cannon  and  stores  then  taken  is  a  grave  falsehood  ; 
not  an  article  of  military  stores  was  left  there,  or  nothing  worth  men 
tioning.  The  evacuation  of  Fort  Lee  was  determined  upon  several 
days  before  the  enemy  landed  above,  and  happily  all  the  most  valu 
able  stores  were  over." 

General  Washington's  report  of  the  twenty-first  of  November,  the 
day  after  its  capture,  says,  "  we  lost  the  whole  of  the  cannon  that 
were  in  the  fort,  except  two  twelve  pounders  and  a  great  deal  of  bag 
gage,  between  two  and  three  hundred  tents,  and  other  stores  in  the 
quartermaster's  department.  The  loss  was  inevitable.  As  many  of 
the  stores  had  been  removed  as  circumstances  and  time  would  admit 
of.  The  ammunition  (of  Fort  Lee)  had  been  happily  got  away." 

This  apparent  discrepancy  of  statement  is  given  for  the  following 
reasons. 

It  indicates  the  purpose  of  the  author  to  rely  in  the  first  instance 


252  OPERATIONS   NEAR  NEW   YORK.  [1776. 

upon  official  Reports,  Muster  Rolls,  and  Returns,  and  to  reconcile 
conflicts  by  the  use  of  contemporary  papers  and  letters,  and  the  appli 
cation  of  governing  principles  ;  and  because,  as  seen  by  references  to 
operations  at  Brooklyn,  Harlem,  and  Chatterton  Hill,  the  tendency 
of  individuals  to  throw  responsibility  upon  others  when  there  was  any 
misadventure,  was  as  common  then,  as  at  all  other  periods  of  human  his 
tory  from  the  day  that  the  forbidden  fruit  was  eaten  in  the  region  of 
Paradise.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  reports  of  com 
manding  officers  are  very  often  but  summaries  of  general  results  ;  and 
that  only  exceptional  cases  of  merit  or  dement  attach  to  such  reports. 
It  would  be  impossible  to  name  everybody,  and  the  nearer  that  attempt 
is  made,  the  more  there  will  remain  to  be  dissatisfied.  Greene  had, 
in  fact,  removed  the  general  stores  and  a  portion  of  those  of  the  Fort 
proper ;  but  the  report  of  General  Washington  corroborates  that  of 
General  Howe.  General  Greene  was  smarting  under  malicious  criti 
cisms,  and  his  strong  language  was  erroneous  in  the  letter,  but  just  in 
its  general  substance. 

General  Washington  himself  is  not  without  some  inconsistencies 
of  statement  as  to  the  capture  of  Fort  Washington,  and  these  are 
important  elements  of  justice  in  stating  the  matter  exactly  as  it  trans 
pired.  It  was  then  that  the  first  distinct  insubordination  of  General 
Lee  had  its  expression,  and  calumny  seems  to  have  been  the  current 
news  of  the  crisis.  No  event  during  the  war  had  called  forth  more 
partisan  discussion.  It  shows  the  importance  of  giving  full  credit  to 
real  courage  and  general  wisdom,  and  the  folly  of  aggravating  a 
disaster  or  mistake  of  judgment  into  a  charge  of  weakness  or 
incompetency. 

In  a  letter  to  his  brother,  Washington  says,  "  what  adds  to  my 
mortification  is,  that  this  post  after  the  last  ships  went  past  it,  was 
held  contrary  to  my  wishes  and  opinions,  as  I  conceived  it  to  be  a 
hazardous  one.  ...  I  did  not  care  to  give  an  absolute  order  for 
withdrawing  the  garrison  till  I  could  get  round  and  see  the  situation 
of  things,  and  then  it  became  too  late,  as  the  fort  was  invested.  .  .  . 
I  had  given  it  as  my  opinion  to  General  Greene,  under  whose  care  it 
was,  that  it  would  be  best  to  evacuate  the  place  ;  but  as  the  order 
was  discretionary,  and  his  opinion  differed  from  mine,  it  unhappily 
was  delayed  too  long  to  my  great  grief." 

Washington  was  not  an  entirely  exceptional  man,  but  a  great  man. 
He  must  be  dealt  with  by  his  merits.  The  facts  are  simply  these. 
Putnam,  who  built  the  post,  and  had  great  faith  that  he  was  to  close 


I776.J  OPERATIONS   NEAR   NEW   YORK.  253 

the  river ;  Greene  commanding  on  the  Jersey  side,  who  was  anxious 
to  have  no  more  retreats ;  and  Colonel  Magaw,  the  brave  post  com 
mander,  must  have  satisfied  Washington  that  he  could,  as  he  wrote  on 
the  seventh,  "  take  some  risk  to  hold  it." 

His  letter  written  after  his  arrival,  showed  his  intention  to  watch 
the  British  movements  ;  and  the  investment  had  not  then  been  made. 
It  is  to  be  inferred  from  his  own  letter  that  he  could  have  withdrawn 
the  garrison.  His  army,  only  three  thousand  men,  was  inadequate  to 
reinforce  it,  without  sacrificing  all  field  movements  and  shutting  him 
self  up  for  capture.  He  was  not  prepared  to  take  responsibility  after 
the  decided  action  of  his  general  officers  and  Congress,  and  the  drift 
of  public  sentiment  was  in  a  direction  that  would  have  made  its  early 
evacuation  a  greater  disaster  than  its  defense.  Its  loss  quickened  the 
action  of  Congress,  and  ultimately  secured  to  Washington  independ 
ence  of  action  ;  but  there  is  no  occasion  for  converting  this  episode  of 
the  war  into  a  harsh  judgment  of  either  Greene  or  Washington.  The 
ordeal  was  one  which  would  have  tried  any  commander.  Governor 
Jonathan  Trumbull  of  Connecticut  had  his  opinion,  and  his  conscience 
and  wisdom  inspired  many  key-notes  to  the  conduct  of  the  war.  He 
wrote  to  the  American  commander-in-chief  as  follows:  "  The  loss  of 
Fort  Washington  with  so  many  of  our  brave  men,  is  indeed  a  most 
unfortunate  event.  But  though  we  are  to  consider  and  improve  like 
disappointments,  yet  we  are  by  no  means  to  despair, — we  are  in  this 
way  to  be  prepared  for  help  and  deliverance." 

NOTE.  (Fifth  Edition.}  Edward  F.  de  Lancey,  Esq.,  of  New  York  city,  in  a  paper  read 
before  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  December  sth,  1876,  and  more  fully  developed  in  an 
article  published  in  the  Magazine  of  American  History,  for  May,  1877,  furnished  evidence  that 
William  Demont,  Adjutant  of  Colonel  Magaw's  Pennsylvania  battalion,  deserted  Fort  Washing 
ton  nearly  two  weeks  before  it  was  stormed,  taking  with  him  such  confidential  plans  of  the  Fort 
and  such  itemized  details  of  its  strength  as  to  enable  General  Howe  to  plan  for  its  capture  with 
assurance  of  success. 

This  explains  the  "political  reasons"  which  that  officer  alleged  as  his  excuse  for  non-pursuit 
of  Washington  after  the  action  near  White  Plains,  since  the  acquisition  of  Fort  Washington,  its 
garrison  and  large  supplies,  would  better  serve  the  royal  cause  than  to  risk  an  attack  upon  the 
field-works  at  North  Castle  Heights,  to  which  Washington  retreated  from  White  Plains.  A 
verified  letter  of  Demont,  claiming  compensation  for  his  treason,  completes  the  proof  of  his  guilt. 


CHAPTER    XXXVII. 

PLANS  AND  COUNTER  PLANS.     FORT  WASHINGTON   TO  TRENTON. 

1776. 

/^*  ENERAL  HOWE  matured  a  plan  of  operations  which  clearly 
VJT  indicated  that  he  comprehended  the  gravity  of  the  undertak 
ing  which  the  British  government  had  assumed.  It  had  so  much  of 
true  value  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  improve  it  after  more  than  a 
century  of  modern  military  experience.  That  plan  proposed  :  that 
an  army  of  ten  thousand  men  should  be  established  at  Newport, 
Rhode  Island,  of  which  force  at  least  three-fourths  should  act  offen 
sively  against  the  New  England  States,  particularly  Boston  and  vicin 
ity  ; — that  twenty  thousand  men  should  be  placed  at  New  York,  of 
which  seventeen  thousand  men  should  be  available  for  field  service  ; 
— that  ten  thousand  men  should  cooperate  with  this  army,  south 
ward  ;  and  that  ten  thousand  men  should  be  sent  to  the  Southern 
States.  The  New  Jersey  contingent  was  added,  in  order  that  an 
adequate  force  from  the  New  York  command  might  be  directed  up  the 
Hudson  river,  to  cooperate  with  troops  having  their  own  base  on  the 
St.  Lawrence.  This  requisition  for  troops  was  sent  to  the  British 
government.  It  bears  upon  its  face,  its  significance  ;  and  much  of 
General  Howe's  indecision  and  carefulness  of  movement  must  be 
attributed  to  some  maturing  conviction  of  the  character  of  the  contest 
which  had  been  driven  into  his  mind  during  his  career  from  Boston 
to  Fort  Lee.  The  modern  reader  must  be  impressed  with  the  belief 
that  such  a  force,  so  disposed,  would  have  fulfilled  all  the  strategic  ele 
ments  required  for  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  It  is  certainly 
true  that  the  necessity  for  such  a  requisition  for  troops  must  have 
restrained  the  British  General  in  chief  in  his  operations  in  New  Jersey. 
The  elaborate  controversy  between  Howe  and  Clinton  does  not 
impair  his  judgment  in  this  respect  ;  and  while  constitutional  tempera 
ment  and  certain  vagaries  of  personal  habit  slipped  in  at  nearly  every 


Co/ft flittd  and  Drawn  SyCol.  C 


American. 

British,. 

Hessians. 


detachments from  ffessians  of  his  cor/is,  : 
theffriffaete  offoill's  andXegtoflVaMfrt^//]//' 


Jaltons  of  Light fn fan  try  u 


rM  attacfr  by 
of  British  and  an*  ofjft; 
under £art  fercy  ~ 


254* 


I7?6.]  PLANS  AND   COUNTER   PLANS.  255 

crisis  to  rob  him  of  the  best  fruits  of  skillful  preparation,  this  single 
scheme  for  quickening  the  war  to  a  conclusion,  must  go  upon  record 
to  his  credit  as  a  soldier.  It  was  in  substance  the  cabinet  policy ;  but 
indicated  an  appreciation  of  the  means  required  to  carry  out  that 
policy.  A  rapid  summary  of  events  up  to  the  battle  of  Trenton  is 
important  in  this  connection  so  that  the  closing  operations  of  1776 
may  have  their  appreciative  value  in  an  estimate  of  the  character  and 
operations  which  entered  into  the  permanent  history  of  the  struggle. 

General  Clinton  sailed  from  New  York  December  first  and  landed 
at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  on  the  ninth,  with  a  little  over  three  thou 
sand  men.  This  was  the  squadron  which  had  so  long  demonstrated 
near  Sandy  Hook,  creating  doubts  in  the  mind  of  Washington  as  to 
its  ultimate  destination. 

Major  General  Prescott  and  Lieutenant  General  Percy  accom 
panied  Clinton.  Sir  Peter  Parker  commanded  the  naval  forces.  The 
effect  of  this  movement  was  to  suspend  for  a  time  the  movement  of 
Massachusetts  troops.  Six  thousand  men  were  nearly  ready  to  march 
to  General  Washington's  support,  under  General  Lincoln,  in  place  of 
troops  whose  terms  of  service  had  expired. 

The  Northern  American  army  had  at  that  time  two  Major-generals 
on  duty,  each  claiming  command,  but  amicably  settling  the  differ 
ence  so  far  as  surface  manifestations  were  apparent.  General  Gates 
had  joined  Schuyler,  and  by  the  retreat  from  Canada,  lost  his  distinct 
ive  department.  He  preferred  to  retain  command  of  the  troops 
which  he  brought  back ;  but  this  was  incompatible  with  the  situation, 
which  was  handled  by  Schuyler  with  great  integrity,  patriotism  and 
energy.  Congress  settled  the  matter  by  declaring  that  "  they  had  no 
design  to  invest  General  Gates  with  a  superior  command  to  General 
Schuyler,  while  the  troops  should  be  on  this  side  of  Canada."  Schuy 
ler  actively  engaged  in  fitting  out  a  fleet  for  the  control  of  Lake 
Champlain,  which  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Arnold.  This 
fleet  was  equipped,  made  a  good  fight  with  that  of  General  Carleton, 
but  was  either  captured  or  withdrawn  to  the  south  under  the  guns  of 
Fort  Ticonderoga.  All  operations  in  that  department  were  suspended 
when  General  Carleton  withdrew  from  Crown  Point  and  returned  to 
Canada.  On  the  ninth  day  of  November  General  Gates  made  an 
official  report  of  the  troops  serving  in  the  northern  Department,  show 
ing  a  force  of  seven  thousand  three  hundred  and  forty-five  "  effective 
rank  and  file,"  present  for  duty  and  on  command,  and  three  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  sixty-one  sick,  present  and  absent.  The  terms  of 


256  PLANS  AND   COUNTER   PLANS.  [1776. 

enlistment  of  many  regiments  were  to  expire  between  that  date  and 
the  ninth  of  January  ensuing,  so  that  after  General  Gates  joined 
Washington  with  a  portion  of  the  Northern  army,  there  remained  for 
duty  at  Ticonderoga,  Mount  Independence  and  Fort  George,  on  the 
first  of  December,  only  two  thousand  three  hundred  and  eighty-four 
men.  General  Lee  still  commanded  a  grand  division  at  North  Castle 
Heights.  This  force  numbered  on  the  sixteenth  of  November,  when 
the  assault  was  made  upon  Fort  Washington,  seven  thousand  five 
hundred  and  fifty-four  "  effective  rank  and  file  present  for  duty  and 
on  command."  His  report  of  November  twenty-fourth,  shows  the 
somewhat  larger  force,  of  seven  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twenty- 
four  men.  The  enlistments  of  a  great  majority  of  these  troops  were 
however  close  to  their  limit,  and  he  ultimately  crossed  the  river  with 
less  than  thirty-four  hundred  effective  men. 

The  division  of  General  Heath  with  headquarters  at  Peekskill,  and 
commanding  the  North  river  defenses,  was  also  reported  on  November 
twenty-fourth,  as  numbering,  effective  rank  and  file,  present,  and  on 
command,  four  thousand  and  sixteen  men.  The  army  of  Washington 
was  mustered  at  Newark  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  November,  and 
amounted  to  five  thousand  four  hundred  and  ten  men  for  duty. 

Colonel  Bradley' s  brigade  which  was  to  go  out  of  service  December 
first,  had  but  sixty  men  present.  The  largest  brigade,  that  of  General 
Beall,  twelve  hundred  strong,  also  had  but  a  week  to  serve.  The  en 
listments  of  only  twenty-four  hundred  and  one  men  extended  beyond 
January  first,  next  ensuing.  On  the  first  of  December  a  general 
return  of  the  army  was  made  at  Trenton,  with  the  following  result. 
The  command  consisted  of  four  brigades,  including  sixteen  regiments, 
and  numbered  with  officers  and  staff,  four  thousand  three  hundred 
and  thirty-four,  of  whom  one  thousand  and  twenty-nine  were  sick,  and 
two-thirds  of  the  sick  were  absent. 

The  foregoing  official  data  are  substituted  for  general  statements 
as  to  the  condition  of  the  American  army.  The  army  movements 
were  as  follows.  The  American  army,  compelled  to  abandon  the  space 
between  the  Hackensack  and  Passaic,  crossed  the  latter  river  at 
Aquackanonck  on  the  twenty-first  day  of  November,  burned  the 
bridge  after  a  brief  skirmish,  and  followed  the  right  bank  of  the  Pas 
saic  river  to  Newark,  reaching  that  city  on  the  twenty-third,  and  New 
Brunswick  on  the  twenty-ninth.  Here  also  a  vigorous  skirmish  took 
place  with  the  columns  of  Cornwallis,  which  had  orders  "  to  go  no 
farther''  Washington  moved  on  to  Princeton,  and  then  to  Trenton, 


1776.]  PLANS  AND   COUNTER   PLANS.  257 

where  he  arrived  on  the  third  of  December.  He  immediately  obtained 
boats  from  Philadelphia,  and  for  a  stretch  of  seventy  miles  above  that 
city,  secured  everything  that  could  float,  and  on  the  fifth,  having  re 
moved  all  heavy  military  stores,  thus  reported  to  Congress  his  action. 
"  As  nothing  but  necessity  obliged  me  to  retire  before  the  enemy, 
and  leave  so  much  of  Jersey  unprotected,  I  conceive  it  my  duty,  and 
it  corresponds  with  my  inclination  to  make  head  against  them  so  soon 
as  there  shall  be  the  least  probability  of  doing  it  with  propriety.  That 
the  country  might  in  some  measure  be  covered,  I  left  two  brigades, 
consisting  of  five  Virginia  regiments,  and  that  of  Delaware  which  had 
just  arrived,  containing  in  the  whole  about  twelve  hundred  men  fit  for 
duty,  under  the  command  of  Lord  Stirling  and  General  Stephen  at 
Princeton,  until  the  baggage  and  stores  could  cross  the  Delaware,  or 
the  troops  under  their  respective  commanders  should  be  forced  from 
thence.  I  shall  now  march  back  to  Princeton,  and  then  govern  my 
self  by  circumstances  and  the  movements  of  General  Lee."  Wash 
ington  also  stated  that  if  the  troops  confidently  expected  (Lee's)  had 
joined  him,  he  should  have  made  a  stand  both  at  Hackensack  and 
Brunswick,  and  that  "  at  any  event  the  enemy's  progress  would  have 
been  retarded."  Upon  advancing  toward  Princeton,  he  met  Stirling 
retreating  before  superior  forces,  and  fell  back  to  Trenton,  and  on  the 
eighth  he  was  over  the  Delaware. 

On  the  twelfth,  he  heard  that  Lee  was  in  Jersey  with  over  four 
thousand  effective  troops  ;  but  neither  his  own  staff,  nor  a  messenger 
sent  by  Congress,  succeeded  for  some  time  in  finding  out  the  location 
and  movements  of  that  officer,  although  his  letters  invariably  assumed 
great  importance  for  his  successive  plans  and  positions. 

An  order  had  been  sent  to  General  Schuyler  on  November  twenty- 
sixth,  to  forward  all  the  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  troops  then  in  his 
department  to  Washington.  By  the  thirteenth  of  December,  the 
British  columns  which  had  crossed  the  Hudson  with  Cornwallis,  or 
joined  from  New  York,  were  concentrated  at  Brunswick. 

General  Howe's  "  first  design  extended  no  further  than  to  get  and 
keep  possession  of  East  Jersey.  Lord  Cornwallis  had  orders  "  not  to 
advance  beyond  Brunswick  "  ;  "  but  on  the  sixth,"  continues  General 
Howe,  u  I  joined  his  lordship  with  the  Fourth  brigade  of  British,  under 
command  of  Major-general  Grant."  On  the  seventh,  Cornwallis 
marched  with  his  corps,  except  the  Guards,  who  were  left  at  Brunswick, 
to  Princeton,  which  the  Americans  had  quitted  on  the  same  day.  Corn 
wallis  delayed  seventeen  hours  at  Princeton,  and  was  a  whole  day  in 


258  PLANS  AND   COUNTER   PLANS.  li;7fc 

marching  twelve  miles  more  to  Trenton.  This  corps  marched  in  two 
divisions,  one  of  which  reached  Trenton  just  as  the  American  rear 
guard  had  crossed  ;  the  other  led  by  Cornwallis  in  person,  broke  off  at 
Maidenhead  and  marched  to  Coryell's  ferry,  in  some  expectation  of 
finding  boats  there  and  in  the  neighborhood,  sufficient  to  pass  the 
river;  but  the  enemy  had  taken  the  precaution  to  destroy,  or  to  secure 
on  the  south  side,  all  the  boats  that  could  possibly  be  employed  for  that 
purpose.  Cornwallis  remained  at  Pennington  until  the  fourteenth, 
when  the  cantonments  having  been  arranged,  the  British  army  was 
placed  in  winter  quarters,"  "  the  weather/'  as  stated  by  General  Hower 
"  having  become  too  severe  to  keep  the  field." 

Such  were  the  relative  positions  of  the  retreating  American  army 
and  the  British  army  which  followed  its  march.  It  was  hardly  a  pur 
suit,  in  the  proper  military  sense.  General  Howe,  however,  compli 
mented  Cornwallis  in  general  orders  as  follows :  "  I  cannot  too  much 
commend  Lord  Cornwallis'  good  service  during  this  campaign :  and 
particularly  the  ability  and  conduct  he  displayed  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  from  Fort  Lee  to  Trenton,  a  distance  exceeding  eighty  miles, 
in  which  he  was  well  supported  by  the  ardor  of  his  troops,  who  cheer 
fully  quitted  their  tents  and  heavy  baggage,  as  impediments  to  their 
march." 

In  a  careful  estimate  of  probabilities,  it  is  difficult  to  determine 
how  Washington's  army  could  have  been  saved,  if  General  Howe  had 
not  limited  Cornwallis  by  exact  orders.  If  the  latter  had  left  Bruns 
wick  and  followed  closely  upon  Washington's  retreat,  the  capture  of 
the  American  army,  or  its  utter  dispersion,  would  have  been  simply  a 
matter  of  course. 

A  memorable  episode  of  the  war,  which  largely  affected  the  cam 
paign  under  notice,  and  had  its  sequel  in  subsequent  events,  must  be 
considered  in  this  connection.  On  the  fourteenth  of  December  the 
armies  were  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Delaware  river,  as  already  stated. 
On  the  previous  day  at  a  country  house,  three  miles  from  his  com 
mand,  General  Lee,  who  was  second  in  command  of  the  American 
armies,  was  leisurely  resting  after  finishing  a  letter  hereafter  cited, 
when  he  was  surprised  and  made  prisoner  of  war  by  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  Harcourt,  who  was  on  a  scout  to  find  out  that  which  puzzled  Con 
gress  and  its  general  in  chief, — the  location  of  General  Lee.  He  found 
General  Lee  at  Baskingridge,  the  best  possible  location  from  which 
easily  to  have  joined  Washington.  Lee's  division  accompanied  by 
General  Sullivan,  had  marched  to  Vealtown,  only  about  eight  miles. 


I776.J  PLANS  AND  COUNTER   PLANS.  259? 

on  the  previous  day.  He  left  Chatham  and  rode  at  least  three  miles 
outside  of  the  left  flank  and  to  the  rear  of  his  army,  and  spent  the  night 
at  White's  Tavern.  He  was  not  at  breakfast  until  ten,  when  he  was 
summarily  ordered  out  of  his  house  and  taken  away  in  morning  dis 
habille,  without  hat,  boots  or  cloak,  upon  the  horse  of  Major  Wilkin 
son,  then  picketed  before  the  house.  Major  Wilkinson  escaped. 

From  orders  already  cited  it  appears  that  General  Washington, 
before  undertaking  his  original  movement  southward,  gave  the  neces 
sary  instructions  that  the  main  army  then  at  North  Castle  Heights 
would  soon  follow.  The  necessities  of  the  crisis  compelled  him  to 
advance  in  person,  toward  Philadelphia,  and  occupy  the  field  of 
greatest  danger.  The  relations  of  General  Lee  as  a  subordinate  of 
ficer,  and  the  gravity  of  the  issue,  give  significance  to  papers  of  which 
a  few  only  are  cited.  The  letter  referred  to  was  written  in  the  pres 
ence  of  Major  Wilkinson,  a  messenger  from  General  Gates,  and  was 
not  folded  when  the  capture  was  effected.  A  former  letter  of  Lee  to 
General  Gates,  their  relations  before  the  war,  and  the  flattering 
advance  by  Congress  of  thirty  thousand  dollars  to  General  Lee  to 
enable  him  to  transfer  his  English  property  to  America,  force  them 
selves  to  notice  in  connection  with  this  paper.  The  expletives  are 

omitted. 

BASKENRIDGE,  December  13,  1776. 

"  MY  DEAR  GATES.— The  ingenious  manoeuver  of  Fort  Washington  has  com 
pletely  unhinged  the  goodly  fabric  we  had  been  building.  There  never  was  so— — 

a  stroke  : — entre  nous,  a  certain  great  man  is deficient.     He  has  thrown  me  into 

a  situation  where  I  have  my  choice  of  difficulties.  If  I  stay  in  this  province,  I  risk 
myself  and  army :  and  if  I  do  not  stay,  the  province  is  lost  forever :  .  .  .  our 
councils  have  been  weak  to  the  last  degree.  As  to  what  relates  to  yourself,  if  you 
think  you  can  be  in  time  to  aid  the  General,  I  would  have  you  by  all  means  go. 
You  will  at  least  save  your  army." 

The  above  letter  was  not  written  by  the  American  General-in- 
cnief  as  might  be  supposed,  neither  was  Lee's  situation,  however  im 
portant  in  his  own  judgment,  the  pivot  of  the  struggle.  As  he  was 
under  positive  orders,  his  safety  was  in  obedience :  and  there  was  a 
cuinmander-in-chief  who  based  all  his  actions,  at  that  very  moment, 
upon  such  obedience,  and  Lee  knew  it. 

On  the  twentieth  of  November  the  following  official  order,  signed 
by  Grayson,  of  Washington's  staff,  was  sent  to  General  Lee ;  "  His 
excellency  thinks  k  would  be  advisable  in  you  to  remove  the  troops 
under  your  command  to  this  side  of  the  North  river  and  there  await 
further  orders." 


26O  PLANS  AND   COUNTER  PLANS.  [1776. 

On  the  twenty-first  Washington  wrote,  "  Unless  some  new  event 
should  occur  or  some  more  cogent  reason  present  itself,  I  would  have 
you  move  over  by  the  easiest  and  best  passage.  I  am  sensible  that 
your  numbers  will  not  be  large  and  that  perhaps  it  will  not  be  agree 
able  to  the  troops.  You  will  doubtless  represent  to  them  that  in 
duty  and  gratitude,  their  service  is  due  where  the  enemy  make  the 
greatest  impression,  or  seem  to  do  so." 

Washington  wrote  on  the  twenty-fourth  of  November,  to  urge 
"  the  propriety  of  sending  frequent  expresses  to  advise  of  your 
approaches," — on  the  twenty-seventh — "  my  letters  were  so  full  and 
explicit  as  to  the  necessity  of  your  marching  as  early  as  possible,  that 
it  is  unnecessary  to  add  more  on  that  head.  I  confess  I  expected  you 
would  have  been  sooner  in  motion  ;  " — "  the  force  here,  when  joined  by 
yours,  will  not  be  adequate  to  any  great  opposition  ;  " — on  the  first  of 
December,  "  the  enemy  are  advancing  and  have  got  as  far  as  Wood- 
bridge  and  Amboy,  and  from  information  not  to  be  doubted,  mean  to 
push  to  Philadelphia.  I  must  entreat  you  to  hasten  your  march  as 
soon  as  possible,  or  your  arrival  may  be  too  late  to  answer  any  valu 
able  purpose  ;  "  on  the  third,  "just  now  favored  with  your  letter  of  the 
thirtieth  ultimo.  Having  wrote  you  fully  both  yesterday  and  to-day 
of  my  situation,  it  is  unnecessary  to  add  much  at  this  time.  You  will 
readily  agree  that  I  have  sufficient  cause  for  my  anxiety,  and  to  wish 
for  your  arrival  as  early  as  possible.  .  .  .  The  sooner  you  can 
join  me  with  your  division  the  sooner  the  service  will  be  benefited. 
As  to  bringing  any  of  the  troops  under  General  Heath  I  can  not  con 
sent  to  it ;  — "  I  would  have  you  give  me  frequent  advices  of  your 
approach.  Upon  proper  information  in  this  instance,  much  may 
depend  ;" — on  the  tenth  of  December, — fl  when  my  situation  is  directly 
opposite  to  what  you  suppose  it  to  be,  and  when  General  Howe  is 
pressing  forward  with  the  whole  of  his  army,  except  the  troops  that 
were  lately  embarked  .  .  I  can  not  but  entreat  you,  and  this  too  by 
the  advice  of  all  the  general  officers  with  me,  to  march  and  join  me 
with  all  your  force,  with  all  possible  expedition.  The  utmost  exer 
tions  that  can  be  made  will  not  more  than  save  Philadelphia.  With 
out  the  aid  of  your  force  I  think  there  is  but  little  if  any  prospect 
of  doing  it."  On  the  eleventh  of  December, — "  Nothing  less  than 
our  utmost  exertions  will  be  sufficient  to  prevent  General  Howe  from 
possessing  it,"  meaning  Philadelphia.  "  I  must  therefore  entreat  you 
to  push  on  with  every  possible  succor  you  can  bring.  Your  aid  may 
give  a  more  favorable  complexion  to  our  affairs.  You  know  the  inv 


1776.]  PLANS  AND   COUNTER  PLANS.  261 

portance  of  the  city  of  Philadelphia  and  the  fatal  consequences  that 
must  attend  the  loss  of  it." 

On  the  twenty-first,  with  Washington's  orders  before  him,  Lee 
wrote  to  James  Bowdoin,  President  of  the  Massachusetts  Council. 
"  Before  the  unfortunate  affair  at  Fort  Washington  it  was  my  opinion 
that  the  two  armies,  that  on  the  east  and  that  on  the  west  side  of  the 
North  river,  must  rest,  each  on  its  own  bottom  :  that  the  idea  of 
detaching  and  reinforcing  from  one  side  to  the  other  on  every  motion 
of  the  enemy  was  chimerical ;  but  to  harbor  such  a  thought  in  our 
present  circumstances  is  absolute  insanity.  Should  the  enemy  alter 
the  present  direction  of  their  operations,  I  should  never  entertain  the 
thought  of  being  succored  from  the  western  army.  We  must  there 
fore  depend  upon  ourselves ;"  and  again:  "Affairs  appear  in  so  im 
portant  a  crisis  that  I  think  even  the  resolves  of  the  Congress  must  no 
longer  nicely  weigh  with  us.  There  are  times  when  we  must  commit 
treason  against  the  laws  of  the  State,  for  the  salvation  of  the  State. 
The  present  crisis  demands  this  brave,  virtuous  kind  of  treason.  For 
my  own  part  (and  I  flatter  myself  my  way  of  thinking  is  congenial 
with  that  of  Mr.  Bowdoin)  I  will  stake  my  head  and  reputation  on 
the  measure." 

Lee  had  written  November  twenty-fourth  :  "  I  have  received  your 
orders,  and  shall  endeavor  to  put  them  in  execution  ;  but  question 
much  whether  I  shall  be  able  to  carry  with  me  any  considerable 
numbers.  I  sent  Heath  orders  to  transport  two  thousand  men  across 
the  river;  but  that  great  man  intrenched  himself  within  the  letter  of 
his  instructions  and  refused  to  part  with  a  single  file,  though  I  under 
took  to  replace  them  with  a  part  of  my  own."  Lee  in  fact  wrote 
insultingly  to  Heath,  who  was  as  independent  in  command  as  him 
self,  and  even  went  to  his  post  by  virtue  of  rank,  although  only  a  guest, 
ordered  two  of  Heath's  regiments  to  join  him,  usurping  authority, 
and  only  receded  from  his  position  when  he  realized  the  nature  of  his 
offense,  and  after  being  constrained  to  receipt  for  the  troops,  as 
"  ordered  away  by  myself,  at  this  writing,  commanding  officer  in  the 
post." 

He  wrote  to  Heath  on  the  twenty-sixth :  "  The  commander  in 
chief  is  now  separated  from  us  ;  I  of  course  command  on  this  side  the 
water  ;  for  the  future  I  will  and  must  be  obeyed."  In  the  letter  of 
the  thirteenth,  acknowledged  by  Washington,  he  wrote :  "  You  com 
plain  of  my  not  being  in  motion  sooner.  I  do  assure  you  that  I  have 
done  all  in  my  power,  and  shall  explain  my  difficulties  when  we 


202  PLANS   AND   COUNTER   PLANS.  [1776. 

both  have  leisure.  .  .  The  day  after  to-morrow  we  shall  pass  the 
river.  I  do  wish  you  would  bind  me  as  little  as  possible,  .  .  . 
detached  generals  can  not  have  too  great  latitude,  unless  they  are 
very  incompetent  indeed";  on  the  fourth,  "the  northern  army  has 
already  advanced  nearer  Morristovvn  than  I  am.  Shall  put  myself  at 
their  head  to-morrow.  We  shall  upon  the  whole  compose  an  army 
of  five  thousand  good  troops  in  spirits."  On  the  eighth  of  December 
he  wrote  from  Chatham  to  Washington  :  "  I  am  certainly  shocked  to 
hear  that  your  force  is  so  inadequate  to  the  necessity  of  your  situa 
tion.  ...  It  will  be  difficult,  I  am  afraid,  to  join  you,  but  can 
not  I  do  more  service  by  attacking  their  rear  ?  " 

On  the  same  day  he  wrote  this  reply  to  Richard  Henry  Lee  and 
Benjamin  Rush,  a  committee  from  Congress  sent  to  hunt  him  up  :  "My 
corps  that  passed  the  North  river  will  amount  (for  we  are  considerably 
diminished)  to  twenty-seven  hundred  ;  in  fact  our  army  may  be  esti 
mated  at  four  thousand.  If  I  was  not  taught  to  think  that  the  army 
with  General  Washington  had  been  considerably  reinforced,  I  should 
immediately  join  him  ;  but  as  I  am  assured  he  is  very  strong,  I  should 
imagine  that  we  can  make  a  better  impression  by  beating  up  and 
harassing  their  detached  parties  in  the  rear,  for  which  purpose  a  good 
post  at  Chatham  seems  the  best  calculated." 

On  the  ninth  he  wrote  to  Heath  :  "  I  think  we  shall  be  strong 
enough  without  you.  I  am  in  hopes  here  to  reconquer,  if  I  may  so 
express  myself,  the  Jerseys.  It  was  really  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy 
before  my  arrival." 

The  following  letter,  dated  at  Morristown.  December  eleventh, 
indorsed  "  From  General  Lee"  is  added,  "  We  have  three  thousand 
men  here  at  present,  but  they  are  so  ill-shod  that  we  have  been  obliged  to 
halt  these  two  days  for  want  of  shoes.  Seven  regiments  of  Gates  corps 
are  on  their  march,  but  where  they  actually  are  is  not  certain.  General 
Lee  has  sent  two  officers  this  day,  one  to  inform  him  where  the  Dela 
ware  can  be  crossed  above  Trenton,  the  other  to  examine  the  road 
toward  Burlington,  as  General  Lee  thinks  he  can  without  great  risk 
cross  the  great  Brunswick  road  at  night,  and  by  a  forced  night  march 
make  the  ferry  below  Burlington.  Boats  should  be  sent  from  Phila 
delphia  to  meet  him.  But  this  scheme  he  only  proposes  if  the  head  of 
the  enemy  s  column  actually  pass  the  river.  The  militia  in  this  part  of 
the  province  seem  sanguine.  If  they  could  be  sure  of  the  army  remain 
ing  amongst  them,  I  believe  they  would  raise  a  considerable  number. 

The  italicized  portions  indicate  the  discrepancy  with  letters  imme- 


r776.]  PLANS  AND   COUNTER  PLANS.  263 

diately  preceding,  as  declaratory  of  his  settled  purpose  to  act  inde 
pendently,  and  leave  to  Washington  the  responsibility  for  the  loss  of 
Philadelphia,  or  other  disasters.  Letters  to  Reed,  Greene,  Heath, 
Trumbull,  and  others  are  similar,  or  even  worse  in  spirit,  and  while 
tedious,  portions  of  them  are  essential  elements  to  a  correct  judgment 
of  this  officer's  conduct.  Washington  had  provided  boats,  and  acqui 
esced  in  Lee's  suggestion  not  to  cramp  him  by  defining  his  exact  route, 
so  that  Washington,  by  Lee's  secrecy,  was  wholly  in  the  dark  as  to 
every  detail  of  his  progress,  and  incurred  repeated  risks  through  the 
expectation  of  seeing  his  troops  arrive  with  promptness. 

The  capture  of  Lee  was  characterized  by  Washington  thus  mildly, 
*'  It  was  by  his  own  folly  and  imprudence,  and  without  a  view  to  effect 
any  good  that  he  was  taken."  General  Sullivan  succeeded  Lee  in 
command,  and  with  Gates  of  the  Northern  army,  who  brought  about 
six  hundred  men,  moved  promptly  to  the  Delaware,  crossed  the  river 
at  Phillipsburg,  and  joined  Washington.  The  army  was  reorganized 
on  the  twentieth  for  further  service.  General  Howe  had  returned  to 
New  York  on  the  thirteenth.  The  British  cantonments  embraced 
Burlington,  Bordentown,  Trenton,  Brunswick,  and  other  small  places. 
Colonel  Donop,  acting  brigadier,  was  stationed  at  Bordentown. 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  one  of  the  most  critical  periods  of  the  war, 
when  the  commander-in-chief  himself  was  on  trial,  the  man  who  next 
commanded  public  confidence  because  of  his  military  training,  failed 
him  ;  simply  because  Washington  with  the  modesty  of  a  true  desire  to 
attain  excellence  in  his  profession,  would  not  pass  final  judgment  and 
enforce  his  own  will  in  disobedience  to  the  will  of  Congress.  Congress 
itself  began  to  realize  however,  that  a  deliberative  civil  body  was  not 
the  best  commander-in-chief  for  field  service,  and  that  it  would  have 
to  trust  the  men  who  did  the  fighting.  It  adjourned  on  the  twelfth  of 
December  quite  precipitately,  and  at  the  same  time,  "  Resolved',  that 
until  Congress  shall  otherwise  order,  General  Washington  be  possessed 
of  full  power  to  order  and  direct  all  things  relative  to  the  department 
and  to  the  operations  of  war.'* 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

WASHINGTON  RETURNS  THE  OFFENSIVE.     TRENTON  HIS  FIRST 

OBJECTIVE.     1776. 

ON  the  eleventh  of  December  Washington  learned  that  the  Brit 
ish  troops  were  repairing  bridges  below  Trenton  and  had  also 
rebuilt  one  which  had  been  destroyed  by  the  Americans  at  Crosswicks. 
While  it  seemed  that  this  work  was  preparatory  to  an  attempt  to 
move  down  the  river  and  cross  it  at  a  point  nearer  to  Philadelphia,  he 
regarded  even  such  a  movement  as  likely  to  expose  the  British  post- 
detachments  to  attack,  and  began  to  make  his  plans  accordingly. 
His  army  had  increased  to  nearly  six  thousand  effectives,  rank  and  file, 
General  Maxwell  had  been  very  faithful  in  collecting  boats  to  secure 
the  anticipated  crossing  of  General  Lee's  command,  and  was  familiar 
with  the  country,  so  that  he  was  selected  to  command  at  Morristown, 
which  was  regarded  as  a  valuable  position  for  a  permanent  post. 
Meanwhile  it  was  a  rendezvous  for  troops  coming  from  the  north,  and 
a  considerable  militia  force  was  already  assembling  at  that  place. 

To  guard  against  surprise  he  divided  the  river-front  into  sections, 
under  competent  commanders.  These  orders  were  issued  on  the 
twelfth  and  thirteenth  of  December.  The  system  adopted  is  worthy  of 
notice.  Besides  light  earthworks  opposite  ferries  and  exposed  places 
easy  for  landing,  and  intermediate  sentries,  small  guard  posts  were 
established  at  short  intervals,  and  "  constant  patrols  were  ordered  to 
pass."  Points  were  assigned  for  a  rendezvous  in  case  of  a  sudden 
crossing  where  the  force  detailed  was  not  capable  of  resistance.  The 
troops  were  to  have  rations  for  three  days  always  on  hand,  and  all 
boats  were  to  be  protected  and  kept  in  good  order. 

General  Ewing  was  to  guard  the  river  from  Bordentown  Ferry  to 
Yardley's  Mills  where  he  lapped  on  to  General  Dickinson's  section. 
Four  brigades,  each  with  artillery,  under  Stirling,  Mercer,  Stephen 
and  De  Fermoy,  were  posted  from  Yardley's  to  Coryell  Ferry,  in  such 


1776.]  WASHINGTON   RETURNS  THE   OFFENSIVE.  265 

manner  as  to  guard  every  suspicious  part  of  the  river  and  to  afford 
assistance  to  each  other  in  case  of  attack.  Colonel  Cadwallader  was 
posted  above  and  below  the  Neshaminy  river,  as  far  as  Dunks  Ferry, 
at  which  place  Colonel  Nixon  was  posted  with  the  third  battalion  of 
Philadelphia.  An  order  was  issued  the  same  day,  "requiring  all  able 
bodied  men  in  that  city,  not  conscientiously  scrupulous  about  bear 
ing  arms,  to  report  in  the  State  House  yard  the  next  day  with  their 
arms  and  equipments  : — that  all  persons  who  have  arms  and  accou- 
terments  which  they  can  not  or  do  not  mean  to  employ  in  defense  of 
America,  are  hereby  ordered  to  deliver  them  to  Mr.  Robert  Towers, 
who  will  pay  for  the  same ;  and  that  those  who  are  convicted  of  secret 
ing  any  arms  or  accouterments  will  be  severely  punished." 

On  the  fourteenth,  when  advised  that  General  Howe  had  actually 
returned  to  New  York,  and  that  the  British  army  was  definitely 
entering  winter  quarters,  he  felt  the  necessity  and  entertained  a  plan, 
for  immediate  offensive  action.  He  exhausted  appeals  to  Governors 
and  State  committees  for  fresh  troops,  and  resolved  to  keep  his  army 
active  while  its  short  term  of  service  held  out.  His  determination, 
"  to  face  about  and  meet  the  enemy "  had  only  been  postponed 
through  Lee's  disobedience. 

On  the  fourteenth  he  wrote  to  Governor  Trumbull,  "  The  troops 
that  came  down  from  Ticonderoga  with  Arnold  and  Gates,  may  in 
conjunction  with  my  present  force,  and  that  under  General  Lee,  enable 
us  to  attempt  a  stroke  upon  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  who  lay  a  good 
deal  scattered,  and  to  all  appearance,  in  a  state  of  security.  A  lucky 
blow  in  this  quarter  would  be  fatal  to  them,  and  would  most  certainly 
raise  the  spirits  of  the  people  which  are  quite  sunk  by  our  late  mis 
fortunes."  On  the  same  date  he  wrote  to  Gates,  "  If  we  can  draw 
our  forces  together,  I  trust  under  the  smiles  of  Providence  we  may  yet 
effect  an  important  stroke,  or  at  least  prevent  General  Howe  from 
executing  his  plans.  I  have  wrote  to  General  Arnold  to  go  to  the 
eastward  "  (Rhode  Island)  "  on  account  of  the  intelligence  from  that 
quarter." 

The  closing  paragraph  carries  with  it  the  correction  of  a  statement 
made  in  Hughes'  History  of  England,  that  Arnold  proposed  to  Wash 
ington  the  capture  of  Trenton.  Hughes  quotes  Adolphus,  and  Adol- 
phus  had  it  "  from  private  information,  source  unknown." 

Washington  wrote  to  Heath  on  the  same  day,  "  If  we  can  collect 
our  force  speedily,  I  should  hope  we  may  effect  something  of  import- 


266  WASHINGTON   RETURNS  THE   OFFENSIVE.  [1776. 

ance,  or  at  least  give  such  a  turn  to  our  affairs  as  to  make  them  assume 
a  more  pleasing  aspect  than  they  now  have." 

On  the  twentieth  he  wrote  sternly  to  Congress,  "  that  ten  days 
more  will  put  an  end  to  the  existence  of  this  army.  This  is  not  a 
time  to  stand  upon  expense.  Our  funds  are  not  the  only  object  of 
consideration.  If  any  good  officers  offer  to  raise  men  upon  continental 
pay  and  establishment,  in  this  quarter,  I  shall  encourage  them  to  do 
so,  and  regiment  them  when  they  have  done  it.  If  Congress  disap 
prove  of  the  proceeding,  they  will  please  signify  it,  as  I  mean  it  for  the 
best.  It  may  be  thought  I  am  going  a  good  deal  out  of  the  line  of 
my  duty  to  adopt  these  measures,  or  to  advise  thus  freely.  A  char 
acter  to  lose,  an  estate  to  forfeit,  the  inestimable  blessing  of  liberty  at 
stake,  and  a  life  devoted,  must  be  my  excuse."  This  letter,  which  is 
long  and  full  of  important  details,  seems  to  start  Washington  on  a 
career  of  greater  independence  of  action,  and  with  corresponding 
advantage  to  his  army  and  its  work.  He  had  already  ordered  the 
recruiting  of  three  battalions  of  artillery :  and  as  Congress  was  then 
at  Baltimore,  more  than  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  distant,  he  pro 
ceeded  directly  to  work,  under  the  Resolution  which  they  adopted 
before  adjournment.  Major  Sheldon,  of  Connecticut,  who  had  the 
only  mounted  men  then  with  the  army,  was  also  commissioned  by 
him  as  lieutenant-colonel,  to  complete  a  battalion  of  six  troops,  and 
was  furnished  with  fourteen  thousand  dollars  for  the  purpose. 

In  order  to  learn  the  exact  disposition  of  the  British  forces,  a  scout 
was  sent  out.  On  the  twentieth,  Washington  settled  upon  his  plans, 
and  directed  the  three  regiments  from  Ticonderoga  to  halt  at  Morris- 
town,  where  he  understood  there  were  already  eight  hundred  militia 
collected,  "  in  order  to  inspirit  the  inhabitants,  and  as  far  as  possible 
cover  that  part  of  the  country."  He  adds,  "  I  shall  send  General 
Maxwell  this  day  to  take  the  command  of  them,  and  if  it  can  be  done, 
to  harass  and  annoy  the  enemy  in  their  quarters,  and  cut  off  their 
convoys." 

On  the  twenty-first,  Adjutant-general  Reed,  then  at  Bristol,  re 
ported,  "  Pomeroy,  whom  I  sent  by  your  order  to  go  to  Amboy,  and 
on  through  the  Jerseys,  and  round  by  Princeton  to  you,  returned  to 
Burlington  yesterday."  After  reporting  fully  as  to  Pomeroy's  visit  to 
Cranberry,  Brunswick,  Princeton,  and  elsewhere,  he  adds,  "  In  Bur 
lington  county  he  found  them,"  the  Hessians,  "  scattered  through  all 
the  fanners'  houses,  eight,  ten,  twelve,  and  fifteen  in  a  house,  and 
rambling  over  the  whole  country. 


I7;6.]  WASHINGTON   RETURNS   THE   OFFENSIVE.  26? 

"  Colonel  Griffin  has  advanced  up  the  Jerseys  with  six  hundred 
men  as  far  as  Mount  Holly,  within  seven  miles  of  their  headquarters 
at  the  Black  Horse.  The  spirits  of  the  militia  are  high,  they  are  all 
for  supporting  him.  We  can  either  give  him  a  strong  reinforcement, 
or  make  a  separate  attack.  .  .  .  Some  enterprise  must  be  under 
taken  in  our  present  circumstances,  or  we  must  give  up  the  cause, 
.  .  .  will  it  not  be  possible  my  Dear  General  for  your  troops,  or 
such  part  of  them  as  can  act  with  advantage,  to  make  a  diversion  or 
something  more  at  or  about  Trenton.  ...  If  we  could  possess 
ourselves  again  of  New  Jersey,  or  any  considerable  part  of  it,  the 
effect  would  be  greater  than  if  we  had  never  left  it.  Delay  with  us 
is  now  equal  to  a  defeat.  It  is  determined  to  make  all  possible  pre 
paration  to-day,  and  no  event  happening  to  change  our  measures,  the 
main  body  here  will  cross  the  river  to-morrow  morning,  and  attack 
their  post  between  this  and  the  Black  Horse."  Colonel  Reed  was 
then  with  Cadwallader.  On  the  same  day  the  army  return  was  made 
up  showing  a  total  often  thousand  one  hundred  and  six  men,  and  of 
these,  only  four  thousand  seven  hundred  and  seven  rank  and  file  were 
present  for  duty.  To  this  should  be  added  four  regiments  which 
arrived  from  the  northern  army,  twelve  hundred  men  ;  also  Cadwall- 
ader's  Pennsylvania  militia,  eighteen  hundred  men,  and  Sullivan's 
division,  late  Lee's,  three  thousand  men.  The  total  force,  deducting 
the  sick  of  the  added  commands,  numbered  nearly  or  quite  nine 
thousand  men,  but  this  was  the  entire  force  for  all  purposes  what 
ever. 

On  the  following  day  Washington  thus  disclosed  to  the  Adjutant- 
general  in  confidence,  his  own  matured  plans. 

"CAMP  ABOVE  TRENTON  FALLS,  23^ December,  1776. 

DEAR  SIR  : — The  bearer  is  down  to  know  whether  your  plan  was  attempted  last 
night,  and  if  not,  to  inform  you  that  Christmas  day  at  night,  one  hour  before  day,  is 
the  time  fixed  upon  for  our  attempt  at  Trenton.  For  Heaven's  sake  keep  this  to 
yourself,  as  ,the  discovery  of  it  may  prove  fatal  to  us ;  our  numbers,  sorry  am  I  to 
say,  being  less  than  I  had  any  conception  of;  but  necessity,  dire  necessity,  will,  nay 
must,  justify  my  attack.  Prepare,  and  in  concert  with  Griffin,  attack  as  many  of  the 
posts  as  you  can  with  a  prospect  of  success  ;  the  more  we  can  attack  at  the  same 
instant,  the  more  confusion  we  shall  spread,  and  greater  good  will  result  from  it. 
If  I  had  not  been  fully  convinced  before  of  the  enemy's  design,  I  have  now  ample 
testimony  of  their  intention  to  attack  Philadelphia,  as  soon  as  the  ice  will  afford  the 
means  of  conveyance.  As  the  colonels  of  the  Continental  regiments  might  kick  up 
some  dust  about  command,  unless  Cadwallader  is  considered  by  them  in  the  light 
sf  a  brigadier,  which  I  wish  him  to  be,  I  desired  General  Gates  who  is  unwell,  and 


268  WASHINGTON   RETURNS   THE   OFFENSIVE.  [1776 

applied  for  leave  to  go  to  Philadelphia,  to  endeavor,  if  his  health  would  permit  him,  to 
call  and  stay  two  or  three  days  at  Bristol  on  his  way.     I  shall  not  be  particular. 

We  could  not  ripen  matters  for  our  attack  before  the  time  mentioned  in  the  first 
part  of  this  letter,  so  much  out  of  sorts,  and  so  much  in  want  of  everything  are  the 
troops  under  Sullivan,  etc.  Let  me  know  by  a  careful  express  the  plan  you  are  to 
pursue." 

"  I  am  dear  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

"GEORGE  WASHINGTON." 

"  P.  S.  I  have  ordered  our  men  to  be  furnished  with  three  days'  cooked  rations, 
with  which  and  their  blankets  they  are  to  march  ;  for  if  we  are  successful,  which 
heaven  grant,  and  the  circumstances  favor,  we  may  push  on.  I  shall  direct  every 
ferry  and  ford  to  be  well  guarded,  and  not  a  soul  suffered  to  pass  without  an  officer's 
going  down  with  a  permit ;  do  the  same  with  you." 

"  To  Joseph  Reed,  Esqr.,  or  in  his  absence, 

"  To  John  Cadwallader,  Esqr.,  only,  at  Bristol." 

The  countersign  for  the  day  written  by  Washington  himself,  was 
"Victory  or  Death." 

The  letter  of  Adjutant-general  Reed  supplies  the  gap,  which  Mr. 
Sparks  refers  to,  in  foot-note  of  "  Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  iv — 
page  242,"  where  he  says,  "  The//0«  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of 
the  letter,  is  not  explained." 

In  a  letter  of  Robert  Morris  to  Congress,  written  on  the  twenty- 
sixth,  when  he  heard  of  the  success  of  the  movement,  he  writes,  "  This 
manceuver  of  the  General  had  been  determined  upon  several  days  ago, 
but  he  kept  it  secret  as  the  nature  of  the  service  would  admit.'3 

Washington  was  as  capable  of  keeping  his  own  counsels  as  was 
Frederick  the  Great,  and  there  is  no  responsible  authority  for  credit 
ing  any  other  man  with  the  plan  to  capture  the  garrison  of  Trenton. 
Others  saw  the  exposed  condition  of  the  enemy  :  but  Washington 
acted  upon  his  own  motion.  The  British  troops  in  New  Jersey  were 
so  disposed  as  if  no  enemy  was  within  striking  distance.  And  yet 
every  effort  to  cross  the  Delaware,  or  even  to  procure  boats  for  that 
purpose,  was  met  by  the  fact  that  the  entire  opposite  shore  for  miles, 
was  under  vigilant  watch.  This  alertness  to  anticipate  a  British 
advance,  carried  with  it  the  contingency  of  incursions  from  so  keen  a 
rear-guard  :  and  Colonel  Rahl,  the  post  commander  at  Trenton,  had 
been  one  of  the  most  active  officers  where  hard  fighting  had  been 
experienced,  from  the  twenty-second  day  of  August,  when  he  landed 
upon  Long  Island.  As  the  American  army  controlled  all  the  boats 
on  the  river,  they  had  the  means  of  passage  at  all  times  ready  at  hand. 
From  a  letter  written  by  General  Howe  to  Lord  Germaine  it  appears 


1776.]  WASHINGTON   RETURNS   THE   OFFENSIVE.  269 

that  he  understood  exactly  the  condition  of  Washington's  army,  and 
that  after  the  first  of  January  it  would  become  a  skeleton.  This  fact 
exposed  one  of  those  military  pauses,  when  a  force  having  capacity  to 
do,  must  do  at  once,  or  never.  The  obligation  upon  Washington  as  a 
soldier  was  imperative,  and  as  already  seen,  he  realized  the  fact. 
General  Howe  and  the  officers  of  the  corps  of  observation  along  the 
Delaware  ignored  the  American  army,  and  rested,  anticipating  an  easy 
march  to  Philadelphia.  It  was  just  when  they  should  have  seen  that 
the  last  week  of  the  year  was  the  most  hopeful  for  Washington  and 
the  most  critical  for  their  river  posts.  Already  the  militia  had  demon 
strated  toward  Mount  Holly  and  challenged  Colonel  Donop  at  Bor- 
dentown  ;  but  they  had  positive  orders  not  to  be  drawn  into  an  en 
gagement,  and  to  retire  upon  the  approach  of  the  Hessians. 

Several  small  stations  had  been  threatened  near  Trenton  itself,  and 
Washington  had  publicly  made  known  his  purpose  to  measure  out  the 
treatment  of  prisoners,  and  carry  on  war,  by  the  gauge  which  the  British 
general-in-chief  should  adopt.  If  the  weather  allowed  the  Americans 
to  keep  the  field,  it  furnished  the  more  potential  reason  why  the  bet 
ter  equipped  British  army  should  bring  boats  from  New  York,  and 
overwhelm  the  dissolving  ranks  of  the  enemy,  by  a  quick  onset. 

General  Grant,  commanding  at  Brunswick,  wrote  on  the  twenty- 
fourth,  "  It  is  perfectly  certain  there  are  no  more  rebel  troops  in  Jer- ' 
sey:  they  only  send  over  small  parties  of  twenty  or  thirty  men.  On 
the  last  Sunday  Washington  told  his  assembled  generals  that,  "  the 
British  are  weak  at  Trenton  and  Princeton.  I  wish  the  Hessians  to 
be  on  the  guard  against  sudden  attack  ;  but  at  the  same  time  I  give 
my  opinion  that  nothing  of  the  kind  will  be  undertaken." 

The  closing  paragraph  destroyed  the  benefit  of  the  previous  state 
ment,  which  showed  that  his  military  forecast  of  an  exposure  to  attack 
was  sound,  and  that  he  knew  that  Washington  appreciated  the  oppor 
tunity. 

NOTE.  Compare  above  with  first  sentence  of  General  Grant's  report  of  the  affair  at 
Trenton,  viz.,  "  On  the  twenty-fifth,  in  the  evening  a  party  of  the  enemy  attacked  an  out- 
guard  from  the  post  of  Trenton.  .  .  which  party  was  beaten  back."  Washington  certainly 
ordered  no  detail  across  the  river  to  put  the  Hessians  on  their  guard  and  defeat  his  sur 
prise.  Either  General  Grant  took  up  some  confused  report  and  therefrom  builds  an  argu 
ment  to  show  that  Colonel  Rahl  had  timely  warning ;  or  the  attack  was  from  some  random 
party,  not  in  force,  nor  under  responsible  authority.  It  is  easier  to  presume  General  Grant 
to  have  been  misinformed  than  to  define  the  occurrence.  See  Washington's  instructions 
page  268. 


CHAPTER   XXXIX. 

HESSIANS  SURPRISED   AT   TRENTON.     1776. 

ON  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  December,  1776,  the  regiments  of 
Anspach,  Knyphausen,  and  Rahl,  with  fifty  chasseurs,  and 
twenty  light  dragoons,  making  a  total  effective  force  of  not  quite 
fifteen  hundred  and  fifty  men,  constituted  the  garrison  at  Trenton. 
The  command  had  six  pieces  of  artillery,  including  two  in  front  of 
Colonel  Rahl's  quarters  ;  but  contrary  to  the  previous  advice  of  Colo 
nel  Donop,  there  were  neither  field  works  nor  defense  of  any  kind  be 
fore  the  ferry  or  at  any  of  the  approaches  to  the  town.  One  such  work 
on  the  summit,  at  the  fork  of  King  and  Queen's  streets,  and  one  on 
Front  street,  would  have  seriously  endangered  the  American  move 
ment,  especially  under  the  circumstances  of  severe  weather,  which 
almost  disarmed  the  assailants.  It  is  well  known  that  rumors  of  an 
impending  offensive  return  by  Washington  had  reached  Colonel  Rahl, 
and  that  a  small  picket  guard  had  been  stationed  on  the  old  Pen- 
nington  road,  half  a  mile  beyond  the  head  of  King  street,  and  another 
was  in  position,  equally  advanced  upon  the  river  road  leading  to  the 
next  upper,  or  McConkey's  ferry,  past  the  houses  of  Rutherford  and 
General  Dickinson. 

It  was  Christmas  day,  a  holiday  in  great  favor  with  the  troops 
which  composed  the  garrison.  It  is  profitless  for  the  author's  purpose 
to  enter  into  details  of  the  manner  in  which  that  garrison  observed 
that  holiday,  and  spent  the  night  which  closed  its  enjoyment.  It  is 
enough  to  state  that  military  negligence  was  absolute,  and  that  it  cost 
the  commander  his  life.  That  negligence  lasted  through  the  night, 
and  prevailed  up  to  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning.  It  appears  that 
the  usual  morning  parade-routine  had  been  observed,  and  the  men 
had  returned  to  their  barracks.  These  barracks,  now  cleft  by  a  street, 
were  still  standing  in  1875,  and  showed  that  they  afforded  a  good  de 
fensive  position,  if  promptly  occupied  and  firmly  held.  The  disposi- 


1776.]  HESSIANS   SURPRISED  AT  TRENTON.  271 

tion  of  the  American  army  for  the  attack  was  eminently  bold  and 
judicious.  Griffin  was  expected  still  to  occupy  the  attention  of  Donop, 
as  if  the  demonstrations  across  the  river  were  but  the  feverish  action 
of  local  militia.  A  small  centre  column,  under  General  James  Ewing, 
of  Pennsylvania,  whose  brigade  reported  but  five  hundred  and  forty- 
seven  rank  and  file  for  duty,  was  to  cross  just  below  Trenton,  to  occupy 
the  bridge  across  the  Assanpink,  and  thus  sever  communication  with 
Donop's  corps  at  Bordentown.  Still  further  down  the  river,  as  a  con 
straint  upon  the  possible  movement  of  that  corps  to  the  support  of 
Colonel  Rahl,  the  right  wing  under  Colonel  John  Cadwallader,  not  yet 
promoted,  was  ordered  to  cross  at  Bristol,  below  Bordentown,  with 
view  to  a  direct  attack  upon  Donop  from  the  south,  and  thus  cooperate 
with  the  militia  in  that  quarter.  General  Washington  reserved  for 
himself  the  conduct  of  the  left  wing,  consisting  of  twenty-four  hundred 
men,  which  was  to  cross  nine  miles  above  Trenton,  at  McConkey's 
ferry.  Learning  that  Maidenhead  was  almost  without  garrison,  except 
a  troop  of  dragoons,  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  American  commander 
also  to  include  that  sub-post  within  his  raid. 

It  was  also  expected  that  General  Putnam  would  cross  from  Phil 
adelphia  early  on  the  twenty-sixth,  with  at  least  a  thousand  men. 
The  plan  embraced  the  entire  deliverance  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Delaware. 

The  right  wing  landed  a  portion  of  its  troops  ;  but  on  account  of 
the  ice  could  not  land  the  artillery,  and  returned  to  Bristol.  Cad  • 
wallader  expressed  his  great  regret  in  his  report  to  Washington, 
remarking,  "  I  imagine  the  badness  of  the  night  must  have  prevented 
you  from  passing  over  as  you  intended." 

It  was  not  until  four  o'clock  that  Cadwallader  succeeded  in  regain 
ing  Bristol ;  and  Moylan,  who  then  started  to  join  Washington,  found 
the  storm  so  violent  that  he  abandoned  his  purpose,  believing  that 
that  officer  could  not  possibly  effect  a  crossing.  The  centre  column 
failed  to  effect  a  landing  for  the  same  reason. 

Reference  is  made  to  maps,  "  Operations  in  New  Jersey,"  "  Opera 
tions  near  Philadelphia,"  "Trenton  and  Vicinity,"  and  "  Battle  of 
Trenton."  The  narrative  will  now  adopt  official  elements  without 
formal  detail  of  the  fragments  embodied. 

The  left  wing  of  the  army  under  Washington,  accompanied  by 
Greene  and  Sullivan  as  division  commanders,  formed  evening  parade 
under  cover  of  the  high  ground  just  back  of  McConkey's  Ferry,  now 
known  as  Taylorville.  It  was  designed  to  move  as  soon  as  darkness 


2/2  HESSIANS  SURPRISED   AT   TRENTON.  [1776 

set  in,  so  as  to  complete  the  crossing  at  midnight,  and  enter  Trenton 
as  early  as  five  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-sixth. 

It  was  such  a  night  as  cost  Montgomery  and  Arnold  their  fearful 
experience  under  the  rock  of  Quebec.  It  was  cold,  snowy,  and  tem 
pestuous.  A  few  days  of  milder  weather  had  opened  the  ice  ;  now  it 
was  again  rapidly  freezing,  checking  the  current  and  skirting  the  shore. 

The  scanty  protection  of  blankets  was  as  nothing  to  protect  men 
in  such  a  conflict.  There  were  young  volunteers  from  Philadelphia  in 
that  command,  going  forth  for  the  first  time  to  study  war.  There 
were  nearly  ragged  and  shoeless  veterans  there,  who  had  faced  such 
storms,  and  the  fiercer  storms  of  war  before.  Stark,  of  Breed's  Hill, 
was  there.  Glover,  the  man  of  Marblehead,  a  hero  of  the  Long  Island 
retreat,  and  Webb  and  Scott,  and  William  Washington  and  James 
Monroe  were  there.  Brain  and  courage,  nerve  and  faith  were  there. 
Washington's  countersign  of  the  twenty-third,  "  Victory  or  Death" 
was  in  the  inner  chambers  of  many  souls,  guarding  manhood,  quicken 
ing  conscience  and  defying  nature.  This  was  all  because  the  path  of 
duty  was  so  well  defined.  The  order  to  embark  and  cross  over,  had 
been  given.  It  was  short,  and  made  no  allusion  to  the  swift  current, 
the  cold  or  snow.  These  were  almost  negative  facts,  circumstances 
of  delay  and  discomfort,  but  could  not  set  aside  duty.  Those  men 
had  been  retreating,  and  had  rested  on  the  bank  of  the  Delaware, 
almost  hopeless  of  better  times.  They  were  now  faced  upon  their 
late  pursuers.  The  "  man  of  retreats,"  and  temporary  positions,  was 
in  his  fighting  mood,  and  men  went  with  him,  counting  no  impedi 
ments  and  sternly  in  earnest. 

"  As  severe  a  night  as  I  ever  saw,"  wrote  Thomas  Rodney  ; — "  the 
frost  was  sharp,  the  current  difficult  to  stem,  the  ice  increasing,  the 
wind  high  and  at  eleven  it  began  to  snow." 

The  landing  of  the  artillery  was  not  effected  until  three  o'clock, 
but  the  army  did  not  march  until  four.  Retreat  could  not  be  made 
without  discovery,  annoyance,  and  consequent  disheartening  of  his 
troops,  and  late  as  it  was,  the  advance  was  ordered.  The  snow  ceased, 
but  sleet  and  hail  came  fiercely  from  the  northeast,  as  the  march 
began. 

A  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  landing  brought  them  to  Bear 
Tavern,  where  they  reached  the  direct  river  road  to  Trenton.  Three 
miles  and  a  half  more  brought  them  to  Birmingham.  Sullivan  here 
notified  Washington  by  a  messenger  that  the  men  reported  their 
"  arms  to  be  wet."  "  Tell  your  General,"  said  Washington,  "  to  use  the 


z77t>J  HESSIANS   SURPRISED   AT  TRENTON.  2/3 

bayonet  and   penetrate  into  the  town.     The   town   must  be  taken. 
I  am  resolved  to  take  it." 

Here  the  army  divided.  Sullivan's  division  moved  at  once  by  the 
river  road,  toward  Trenton,  then  only  four  and  a  half  miles  distant. 
Washington  with  Greene,  took  direction  to  the  left,  crossed  over  to 
the  old  Scotch  road,  and  entered  the  Pennington  road  one  mile  from 
town.  This  route  was  about  equally  distant  with  the  other  from  the 
points  aimed  at  by  the  respective  divisions.  Washington's  division, 
as  he  says,  "  arrived  at  the  enemy's  advanced  post  exactly  at  eight 
o'clock  ;  and  three  minutes  after,  I  found  from  the  fire  on  the  lower 
road,  that  that  division  had  also  got  up."  The  pickets  on  both  roads 
behaved  well,  but  were  quickly  swept  away  by  the  force  which  already 
hastened  to  its  achievement. 

Washington  moved  directly  to  the  junction  of  King  and  Queen 
streets.  The  flying  pickets  had  already  given  the  alarm,  and  the 
Hessians  were  beginning  to  rally  within  sight,  as  he  rode  in  advance. 
Under  his  direction  Colonel  Knox  placed  Forrest's  battery  of  six 
guns  in  position  so  as  to  command  both  streets,  which  there  diverged 
at  a  very  acute  angle  ;  Queen  street  running  southward  to  the  Assan- 
pink,  and  King  street  inclining  east  of  south,  to  the  crossing  of  Second 
and  Front  streets,  by  which  Sullivan  must  approach.  Colonel  Rahl 
occupied  the  large  frame  house  of  Stacy  Potts,  near  where  Perry  street 
joins  King  street.  He  promptly  put  himself  at  the  head  of  a  hastily 
gathered  detachment  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  up  King  street  to 
its  summit,  but  Captain  Forrest's  battery  of  six  guns  had  already 
opened  fire.  The  regiment  of  Knyphausen  attempted  to  form  in  open 
ground  between  Queen  street  and  the  Assanpink,  while  a  third  detach 
ment,  completely  demoralized,  moved  rapidly  toward  the  Princeton 
road  to  escape  in  that  direction.  This  last  detachment  was  met  by 
Colonel  Hand's  rifle  battalion  which  had  been  deployed  to  Washing 
ton's  left,  as  a  guard  upon  that  possible  line  of  retreat,  as  well  as  to 
watch  the  approaches  from  Princeton.  Scott's  and  Lawson's  Virginia 
battalions  had  been  thrown  still  further  to  the  left,  thus  completely 
closing  the  gap  between  Hand  and  the  Assanpink  river. 

While  Rahl  was  gathering  his  own  companies  as  rapidly  as  possi 
ble,  the  two  guns  at  his  headquarters  had  been  partially  manned  and 
were  ready  to  deliver  fire ;  when  captain  Washington,  with  lieutenant 
James  Monroe  and  an  active  party,  rushed  upon  the  gunners  and 
brought  away  the  pieces,  before  a  sufficiently  strong  infantry  support 
could  be  brought  up  for  their  protection.  Rahl  moved  his  companies 
iS 


2/4  HESSIANS   SURPRISED   AT   TRENTON.  [1776 

as  soon   as  formed,  and   joined    Knyphausen's  regiment,  but  almost 
immediately  moved  back  for  the  cover  which  the  buildings  afforded. 

Galloway,  Stedman,  and  some  other  early  writers,  have  alleged 
that  the  Hessians  returned  to  load  wagons  and  carry  off  their  accumu 
lated  plunder.  It  is  difficult  to  regard  such  statements  as  other  than 
traditional  fables.  Individuals  may  have  tried  to  save  their  effects, 
but  there  was  very  little  time  to  spare  for  that  business,  and  Colonel 
Rahl  was  too  strict  a  soldier  to  have  permitted  it  at  such  a  moment. 

Captain  Forrest's  guns  swept  the  open  ground  as  well  as  the  streets, 
and  the  adjoining  orchard  was  equally  untenable,  hopelessly  exposing 
the  men  to  a  fire  which  could  not  be  returned.  Two  of  the  guns 
which  were  afterwards  taken,  seem  to  have  been  cut  off  from  the 
reach  of  the  Hessians  when  they  were  themselves  drifted  eastward 
from  their  magazine  and  barracks  by  the  American  control  of  both 
King  and  Queen  streets  ;  and  two  guns  with  the  Knyphausen  regiment 
were  of  little  service.  General  Sullivan's  division  entered  the  town 
through  Front  and  Second  streets.  Colonel  Stark  who  led  the  column, 
moved  directly  to  the  Assanpink  bridge,  to  cut  off  retreat  toward 
Bordentown,  but  the  chasseurs,  the  light  horse  and  a  considera 
ble  infantry  force,  at  least  two  hundred  men,  had  already  crossed  the 
bridge  in  retreat  upon  that  post.  St.  Clair  took  possession  of  the 
foot  of  Queen  street,  and  as  Stark  swung  round  and  moved  up  the 
Assanpink,  the  Hessians  were  literally  between  two  fires,  while  the 
additional  enfilading  fire  upon  the  streets  closed  their  left,  and  the 
Assanpink  closed  their  right. 

For  a  short  time  small  parties  of  Hessians  who  had  been  unable  to 
join  their  companies,  kept  up  a  fruitless  scattering  fire  from  houses 
where  they  had  taken  refuge ;  but  the  fall  of  Colonel  Rahl  while 
urging  his  men  to  assault  the  summit  where  Washington  controlled 
the  action,  and  the  advance  of  Sullivan's  division  which  shut  up  all 
avenues  of  escape  to  Bordentown,  forced  the  Hessians  out  of  the 
town  to  the  open  field  and  orchard,  where  the  whole  command  sur 
rendered. 

The  American  casualties  were  two  killed  and  three  wounded,  cap 
tain  Washington  and  Monroe  being  amone  the  latter.  Several  were 
badly  frozen  ;  in  two  instances  resulting  fatally.  The  Hessian  casual 
ties  were  given  by  General  Howe  as  forty  men  killed  and  wounded 
besides  officers;  and  nine  hundred  and  eighteen  prisoners  were  taken, 
of  whom  thirty  were  officers.  Subsequently,  a  lieutenant-colonel,  a 
deputy-adjutant-general,  and  scattering  members  of  the  Hessian  corps 


I776.J  HESSIANS   SURPRISED   AT   TRENTON.  275 

were  taken,  making  the  total  number  of  prisoners,  as  reported  by 
Washington  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  December,  at  about  one  thousand." 
The  trophies  of  war  were  six  bronze  guns,  four  sets  of  colors,  over  a 
thousand  stand  of  arms,  twelve  drums,  many  blankets  and  other  gar 
rison  supplies.  General  Howe  says,  "  This  misfortune  seems  to  have 
proceeded  from  Colonel  Rahl's  quitting  the  post  and  advancing  to  the 
attack,  instead  of  defending  the  village."  The  fact  is  overlooked  that 
Washington's  position  at  the  head  of  King  and  Queen  streets  with 
artillery,  which  commanded  both  streets,  afforded  a  very  poor  oppor 
tunity  for  the  surprised  Hessians.  The  more  men  they  gathered  in 
those  narrow  streets,  the  better  it  was  for  American  artillery  practice. 
Rahl  followed  the  instincts  of  a  soldier,  and  as  he  had  not  the  force 
to  assault  the  enemy,  and  dispossess  them  of  their  commanding 
positions,  he  sought  ground  where  he  could  form  his  command 
and  fight  as  he  could  get  opportunity.  The  movement  of  Wash 
ington  which  threw  Hand,  Scott,  and  Lawson  to  the  left,  together 
with  his  superiority  in  artillery,  and  the  pressure  of  Sullivan's 
division  from  the  rear  through  Second  street,  forced  Colonel  Rahl  to 
his  fate.  His  mistakes  had  been  made  before  the  alarm  of  battle 
recalled  him  to  duty;  and  then  he  did  all  that  time  and  Washington 
permitted.  The  disparity  in  casualties  is  accounted  for  by  the  facts 
stated.  The  American  artillery  had  its  play  at  will  beyond  musket 
range  and  upon  higher  ground,  with  little  chance  for  the  Hessians  to 
render  fire  in  return.  A  few  skillfully  handled  guns  determined  the 
action.  Washington  on  this  occasion  evinced  the  force  of  individual 
will  applied,  under  extreme  necessity,  to  a  determining  issue.  The 
battle  occupied  less  than  one  hour.  Its  fruit  was  like  the  grain  of 
mustard  seed  which  developed  a  tree  under  whose  branches  a  thou 
sand  might  take  shelter.  He  marched  back  to  Newtown  with  prisoners 
of  war,  reaching  his  headquarters  the  same  night  ;  a  new  experience 
for  the  American  army.  This  countermarch  was  attended  with  great 
hardships  and  suffering.  The  entire  distance  marched  by  the  troops 
which  left  Newtown  with  Washington,  was  nearly  thirty  miles,  before 
they  again  reached  their  camp,  and  more  than  a  thousand  men  were 
practically  disabled  for  duty  through  frozen  limbs  and  broken  down 
energies. 

General  Gates  did   not   participate  in  the  action,  having  gone  to 

Baltimore   to   meet  Congress  of  his  own  volition  without  invitation, 

ind  without  advising  with  Washington.     Major  Wilkinson  of  his  staff 

•as  indeed  sent  to  report  the  fact  to  the  general-in-chief,  and  so  re- 


276  HESSIANS   SURPRISED   AT  TRENTON.  [1776. 

ported  while  Washington  was  superintending  the  crossing  of  the  troops 
during  the  evening  of  the  twenty-fifth.  General  Putnam  made  no 
demonstration,  through  apprehension  that  if  he  left  Philadelphia  there 
would  be  an  uprising  of  royalists  inhis  rear.  Colonel  Griffin,  who  had 
recrossed  the  Delaware  after  his  first  skirmish  with  Colonel  Donop 
did  not  return  to  the  Jersey  bank  to  cooperate  on  the  evening  of  the 
twenty-fifth,  so  that  the  entire  attack  was  limited  to  the  operations  of 
the  extreme  left  wing. 

The  Hessian  troops  were  marched  through  the  streets  of  Phila 
delphia  to  prove  to  the  people  that  the  dreaded  European  veterans 
were  no  longer  invincible,  and  the  effect  upon  that  city  and  the  States 
of  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  was  of  lasting  value  to  the  American 
cause. 

Colonel  Donop  did  not  wait  for  an  assault  upon  his  post.  In  his 
skirmish  with  Griffin  he  had  employed  nearly  his  whole  garrison,  con 
sisting  of  two  thousand  men,  with  little  advantage  ;  and  upon  the 
arrival  of  the  fragments  of  Rahl's  command,  he  abandoned  the  post 
altogether,  with  the  stores,  his  sick  and  wounded,  and  marched  with 
haste  to  Princeton  via  Crosswick's  and  Allentown,  and  started  on  the 
next  day  for  South  Amboy. 

On  the  twenty-seventh,  Cadwallader  crossed  over  from  Bristol 
with  eighteen  hundred  men,  and  reached  Bordentown  the  next  day, 
not  indeed  knowing  that  Washington  had  recrossed  the  river.  Gen 
erals  Ewing  and  Mifflin  followed  successively  with  five  hundred  and 
eight  hundred  men,  but  Mount  Holly  and  Black  Horse  had  already 
been  abandoned  by  the  Hessians. 

While  the  Continental  troops  who  participated  in  the  battle  of 
Trenton  rested,  Washington  perfected  his  means  for  further  offensive 
movements.  He  learned  from  a  letter  of  Colonel  De  Hart,  written 
from  Morristown  on  the  twenty-seventh,  the  gratifying  news  that  the 
three  regiments  of  Greaton,  Bond,  and  Porter,  would  extend  their 
terms  of  service  two  weeks.  That  officer  also  reported  that  only  five 
or  six  hundred  Highlanders  remained  at  Elizabethtown,  and  that  the 
outposts  at  Boundbrook  and  in  that  vicinity  had  been  withdrawn  to 
Brunswick.  Generals  McDougall  and  Maxwell,  then  at  Morristown, 
were  instructed  "  to  collect  as  large  a  body  of  militia  as  possible,  and 
assure  them  that  nothing  is  wanting  but  for  them  to  lend  a  hand  and 
drive  the  enemy  from  the  whole  province  of  New  Jersey."  On  the 
twenty-eighth  he  wrote  to  Maxwell,  "  As  I  am  about  to  enter  the 
Jerseys  with  a  considerable  force  immediately,  for  the  purpose  of 


I77&.1  HESSIANS   SURPRISED  AT  TRENTON.  2/7 

attempting  a  recovery  of  that  country  from  the  enemy,  and  as  a 
diversion  from  your  quarter  may  greatly  facilitate  this  event  by  dis 
tracting  and  dividing  their  troops,  I  must  request  that  you  will  collect 
all  the  force  in  your  power  together,  and  annoy  and  distress  them  by 
every  means  which  prudence  can  suggest."  To  General  Heath  he 
wrote,  "  I  would  have  you  advance  as  rapidly  as  the  season  will  admit 
with  the  eastern  militia,  by  the  way  of  the  Hackensack,  and  proceed 
downwards  until  you  hear  from  me.  I  think  a  fair  opportunity  is 
offered  of  driving  the  enemy  entirely  from,  or  at  least  to,  the  extremity 
of  the  province  of  Jersey." 

On  the  thirtieth  Washington,  having  again  crossed  to  Trenton, 
was  able  to  announce  that  the  continental  regiments  of  the  eastern 
governments  had  agreed  to  remain  six  weeks  longer  in  the  service, 
upon  receipt  of  a  bounty  of  ten  dollars ;  and  earnest  messages  were 
sent  out  in  all  directions,  to  eminent  citizens  as  well  as  officers,  to  make 
use  of  the  success  of  Trenton  as  a  stimulus  to  recruit  for  the  army 
and  hasten  the  concentration  of  the  militia.  The  responses  were  of 
the  most  encouraging  nature ;  but  the  great  fact  remained,  that  the 
ordeal  of  the  conversion  of  raw  material  into  soldiers  would  have  to 
be  gone  through  again  after  a  few  weeks,  and  every  hour  was  to  be 
improved  to  get  the  largest  possible  results  out  of  the  service  of  the 
four  thousand  of  old  troops  who  had  consented  to  remain  for  that 
short  period.  The  success  on  the  twenty-fifth  aroused  great  expec 
tations,  and  Congress  shared  in  the  confidence  which  the  people 
extended  to  the  Commander-in-chief  of  its  armies. 

NOTE.  Major  Wilkinson  thus  describes  the  delivery  of  General  Gates'  letter  to  General 
Washington,  at  McConkey's  Ferry,  after  dusk,  December  26th.  I  found  him  alone,  with 
his  whip  in  his  hand,  prepared  to  mount  his  horse.  When  I  presented  the  letter  of  General 
Gates  to  him,  before  receiving  it,  he  exclaimed  with  solemnity,  '  What  a  time  is  this  to  hand 
me  letters  ! !  Where  is  he  ? '  Answer.  '  I  left  him  this  morning  in  Philadelphia.'  What  was 
he  doing  there  ?  '  I  understood  him,  that  he  was  on  his  way  to  Congress.'  He  earnestly 
repeated  :  '  On  his  way  to  Congress,'  then  broke  the  seal,  and  I  made  my  bow  and  joined 
General  St.  Clair,  on  the  bank  of  the  river.  This  incident  is  given  in  connection  with 
another  statement  of  the  same  officer,  that  General  Gates  said  it  was  his  intention  to  pro 
pose  to  Congress  that  General  Washington  should  retire  to  the  south  of  the  Susquehanna. 
This  explains  his  failure  to  join  Washington.  The  success  at  Trenton  was  not  anticipated 
by  General  Gates. 

NOTE.  Rahl,  or  Rail.  Dr.  Frederick  Kapp,  of  Berlin,  in  a  letter  to  Adjutant-general 
William  S.  Stryker,  of  Trenton,  New  Jersey,  May,  1776,  says,  "Rail  is  correct."  In  modern 
usage,  the  silent  k,  their  only  silent  letter,  is  dropped  by  German  scholars.  Hence  Bancroft 
adopts  Rail.  As  Washington,  Sparks,  Irving  and  general  history  have  retained  the  h,  the 
name  is  retained  as  most  familiar  at  the  period  of  the  war.  It  is  immaterial,  as  the  pro 
nunciation,  in  either  case,  would  be  as  if  the  name  were  spelled  in  English,  Rarl.  Dr. 
Bailey  Myers,  a  German  scholar  of  repute,  and  Professor  Green,  in  his  German  element  in 
the  Rev.  War.,  retain  Rahl. 


CHAPTER   XL. 

MISCELLANEOUS  EVENTS.     WASHINGTON  CLOTHED  WITH  THE 
POWERS  OF  DICTATOR.     OPINIONS  OF  TRENTON.     1776. 

WHILE  the  land  operations  of  the  British  and  American  armies 
were  thus  constant  during  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1/76, 
the  Americans  made  considerable  progress  in  the  building  of  the  ships 
of  war  which  had  been  previously  authorized. 

The  Columbus  and  Hamden  were  at  Providence  nearly  ready  for 
sea  on  the  second  of  November,  but  were  soon  shut  up  with  the 
Warren  and  some  smaller  vessels,  by  the  British  occupation  of  New 
port.  The  Alfred  had  sailed  and  had  already  captured  several  valua 
ble  prizes.  The  New  Hampshire,  Raleigh,  Randolph,  Congress,  Dela 
ware.  Montgomery  and  several  other  frigates  were  nearly  finished  but 
needed  cannon.  Thirteen  had  been  launched,  and  two  ships  of  the 
line  and  five  additional  frigates  were  on  the  stocks  by  the  twenty-first 
of  December.  At  that  date  Robert  Morris  sent  to  the  American 
Commissioners  at  Paris  a  statement  of  the  condition  of  public  affairs, 
and  then  apologized  for  the  apparently  slow  progress  made  in  fitting 
out  vessels  to  prey  upon  British  commerce,  by  stating  the  want  of 
heavy  guns.  Besides  the  Alfred,  however,  the  Reprisal,  Andrew 
Doria  and  Lexington  were  at  sea,  as  well  as  the  sloops  Providence, 
Hornet,  Fly,  Independence  and  Sachem,  and  the  schooners  Wasp, 
Musquito  and  Georgia-Packet.  Privateering  however  monopolized 
the  chief  interest  in  naval  warfare,  because  it  was  lucrative  ;  and  it 
was  with  difficulty  that  suitable  crews  could  be  obtained,  for  other 
vessels  of  all  kinds  had  captured,  according  to  the  official  list,  three 
hundred  and  forty-two,  had  retaken  forty-four  and  burned  five. 

In  aid  of  their  operations  at  home  the  Americans  already  began  to 
count  upon  foreign  assistance.  Correspondence  had  been  opened  with 
agents  at  Paris  looking  to  the  enlistment  of  France  in  the  war;  and 
the  prizes  of  the  American  privateers  had  found  special  favor  in  the 


1776.]          MISCELLANEOUS   EVENTS.— OPINIONS   OF   TRENTON.  279 

ports  of  that  country  and  of  Spain,  by  a  skillful  avoidance  of  any 
public  act  that  would  offend  Great  Britain. 

The  proclamation  which  General  Howe  published  when  his  army 
entered  the  Jerseys  had  received  its  death-blow  when  Trenton  was 
taken  ;  and  Congress  silenced  the  still  existing  anxiety  for  some  kind 
of  a  compromise  by  an  unequivocal  course  which  left  no  alternative 
but  the  issue  of  battle. 

The  British  army  was  theoretically  in  Winter  quarters.  The  gar 
rison  of  Rhode  Island  made  no  demonstrations  which  corresponded 
to  the  force  at  disposal,  and  Massachusetts  had  so  far  recovered 
from  the  alarm  incident  to  its  first  arrival  as  to  turn  her  atten 
tion  to  a  fresh  support  of  the  national  army.  The  middle  and  south 
ern  States  were  also  active  in  the  organization  of  fresh  battalions. 
New  foundries  were  established,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  secure 
a  complete  field  outfit  for  the  army,  on  the  new  establishment  of 
eighty-eight  battalions.  One  hundred  thousand  small  arms  and  two 
hundred  bronze  cannon  were  solicited  of  France,  by  way  of  purchase, 
and,  more  needed  than  almost  anything  else,  a  gold  loan  was  also 
earnestly  urged.  As  the  certainty  of  another  campaign  became  appa 
rent,  so  the  mind  of  Washington  was  tasked  to  provide  for  its  support. 

The  British  government  found  itself  compelled  to  increase  its  own 
army  and  multiply  the  stores  for  garrison,  siege  and  field  service. 
Great  difficulties  attended  the  second  effort  to  obtain  troops  from  the 
small  German  States,  the  entire  number  of  recruits  and  reinforce 
ments  secured,  being  only  three  thousand  and  six  hundred  men.  The 
Brunswick  and  Hanau  recruits,  and  four  companies  of  Hanau  Yagers 
were  sent  to  Canada ;  but  the  residue  came  to  General  Howe.  The 
reinforcements  from  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  however,  which  sailed 
for  America  before  January  1st,  1777,  embraced  three  thousand  two 
hundred  and  fifty-two  men  for  New  York  and  nearly  eight  hundred 
for  Canada.  General  Howe  increased  his  requisition  for  troops  to 
twenty  thousand  men,  and  declared  it  as  his  opinion  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  organize  the  Canadian  army  so  as  to  reach  Albany  before 
August  or  September  of  the  year  17/7.  His  prediction  was  subse 
quently  confirmed  by  experience. 

The  cabinet  contemplated  that  a  very  considerable  Indian  force 
could  be  made  auxiliary  to  the  regular  troops ;  but  neither  Howe 
nor  Carleton  had  confidence  in  the  measure.  As  a  question  of  mili- 
tary  policy,  it  was  ruinous  to  the  supremacy  of  the  crown  to  employ 
savages  against  the  colonists. 


280  MISCELLANEOUS   EVENTS. — OPINIONS   OF  TRENTON.          [1776, 

On  the  part  of  the  Americans,  in  anticipation  of  another  northern 
campaign,  large  bateaux  were  built  to  support  a  boom  and  chain  at 
Ticonderoga.  Mount  Washington  was  ordered  to  be  fortified,  and 
Fort  Stanwix  was  ordered  to  be  put  in  thorough  order  to  anticipate 
Indian  aggression  in  conjunction  with  an  invasion  from  the  north. 
For  the  time  being  it  seemed  as  if  the  American  people  would  heartily 
facilitate  the  organization  of  the  army  up  to  the  demands  of  the  crisis. 

As  early  as  December  seventh  a  citizen  of  Pennsylvania  publicly 
proposed  a  Dictator  for  that  State,  to  serve  for  three  or  six  months, 
and  propounded  this  question,  "  Has  not  the  want  of  a  suitable  per 
son,  entrusted  with  such  powers  in  time  of  war,  ended  in  the  ruin  of 
several  of  the  most  flourishing  Republics  of  antiquity  ?  " 

At  last  Congress  realized  the  condition  of  the  army  and  the  neces 
sity  for  some  controlling  master  spirit  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and 
supplemented  its  action  of  the  twelfth  of  December  by  a  more  positive 
declaration  on  the  twenty-seventh,  clothing  Washington,  for  the  period 
of  six  months,  with  enlarged  authority,  of  which  the  following  extracts 
indicate  the  tenor.  "  Full,  ample  and  complete  powers  to  raise  and 
collect  together,  in  the  most  speedy  and  effectual  manner,  from  any 
and  all  of  the  United  States,  sixteen  battalions  of  infantry  in  addition 
to  those  already  voted  by  Congress  ;  to  appoint  officers  for  the  said 
battalions  :  to  raise  officers  and  equip  three  thousand  light  horse,  three 
regiments  of  artillery  and  a  corps  of  engineers,  and  to  establish  their 
pay  ; — to  apply  to  any  of  the  States  for  such  aid  of  the  militia  as  he 
shall  judge  necessary;  to  form  such  magazines  of  provisions  and  in 
such  places  as  he  shall  deem  proper  :  to  displace  and  appoint  all  offi 
cers  under  the  rank  of  Brigadier-general,  and  to  fill  up  all  vacancies 
in  every  other  department  of  the  American  army;  to  take,  wherever 
he  may  be,  whatever  he  may  want  for  the  use  of  the  army,  if  the  in 
habitants  will  not  sell  it,  allowing  a  reasonable  price  for  the  same,  and 
to  arrest  and  confine  persons  who  refuse  to  take  the  continental  cur 
rency,  or  are  otherwise  disaffected  to  the  American  cause." 

These  large  grants  of  power  were  made  when  a  affairs  were  in  such 
a  condition  that  the  very  existence  of  civil  liberty  depended,"  as  Con 
gress  stated,  "  on  the  right  execution  of  military  powers,"  and  when 
u  the  vigorous  decisive  conduct  of  these  being  impossible  to  distant, 
numerous  and  deliberative  bodies,"  it  was  "  confident  of  the  wisdom, 
vigor,  and  uprightness  of  General  Washington."  It  was  under  the 
burden  of  this  responsibility  that  Washington  rested  when  he  closed 
the  year  1776  in  camp  near  Trenton. 


1776.]          MISCELLANEOUS  EVENTS. — OPINIONS   OF  TRENTON.  28 1 

It  is  a  matter  of  interest  to  bear  in  mind  a  few  of  the  contempo 
raneous  criticisms  which  the  affair  at  Trenton  called  forth  from  British 
and  European  authorities. 

"  All  our  hopes  were  blasted  by  the  unhappy  affair  at  Trenton,"  said 
Lord  Germaine.  "  It  has  excited  not  less  astonishment  in  the  British 
and  auxiliary  quarters  than  it  has  done  joy  in  those  of  the  Americans. 
The  Hessians  will  be  no  longer  terrible,  and  the  spirits  of  the  Ameri 
cans  will  rise  amazingly,''  wrote  Gordon,  quoting  from  the  Annual 
Register  of  Burke.  "  Thus  ended  a  campaign  glorious  to  the  fame 
of  Washington,''  is  the  tribute  of  Hughes.  Stedman  charges  all  the 
fault  upon  General  Howe  and  his  assignment  of  foreign  troops  to  the 
posts  on  the  Delaware.  "  The  fact  is,"  wrote  Burke,  "  from  the  suc 
cesses  of  the  preceding  campaign,  and  the  vast  superiority  which  they 
perceived  in  themselves  in  army  actions,  the  *  Hessians '  had  held  the 
Americans  in  too  great  contempt,  both  as  men  and  as  soldiers,  and 
were  too  apt  to  attribute  those  advantages  to  some  extraordinary 
personal  virtue  and  excellence,  which  were  in  reality  derived  from  the 
concurrence  of  a  number  of  other  and  very  different  causes;  from 
military  skill,  experience  and  discipline  ;  from  the  superior  excellence 
of  their  small  arms,  artillery,  and  other  engines,  furniture  and  supplies 
necessary  for  war,  and  still  more  particularly  to  a  better  supply  and  a 
more  dextrous  and  effective  use  of  the  bayonet." 

Walter  in  his  "  History  of  England  on  Christian  Principles,"  says 
of  the  whole  campaign  :  "  The  same  want  of  energy  which  prevented 
Sir  William  Howe  from  making  the  most  of  the  hour  of  success,  also 
prevented  him  from  maintaining  the  strict  discipline  which  is  necessary 
to  keep  a  victorious  soldiery  from  insulting  and  injuring  the  inhabitants 
of  a  country  which  they  regard  as  their  conquest,  so  that  though  the 
prudent  care  and  pains  taken  by  General  Clinton  and  Lord  Percy 
hindered  the  people  of  Rhode  Island  from  having  any  occasion  to 
complain  of  the  conduct  of  the  troops  under  their  command,  all  the 
inhabitants  of  the  portion  of  Jersey  and  of  the  districts  on  which  the 
forces  under  the  immediate  management  of  General  Howe  were  can 
toned,  soon  became  bitter  enemies  to  England  from  exasperation  at 
the  injuries  inflicted  on  them,  not  only  by  the  Hessians,  but  by  the 
British  soldiers  ;  and  that  the  Americans  were  inspirited  by  Trenton 
with  the  hope  that  courage  might  compensate  for  their  inferiority  in 
the  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war." 

Lord  Mahon,  in  his  History  of  England,  says,  "  the  posts  that  were 
on  this  occasion  the  most  exposed  had  been  left  the  weakest  manned, 


282  MISCELLANEOUS    EVENTS. — OPINIONS   OF   TRENTON.          [1776. 

and  undefended  by  a  single  intrenchment  or  redoubt,"  and  adds, 
"  whoever  may  have  the  earliest  devised  this  scheme,  the  merit  of  its 
details  and  execution  belongs  entirely  to  Washington."  Knight  briefly 
notices  the  action,  adding,  "  Washington  went  back  to  secure  his 
prisoners,  and  again  crossed  the  Delaware,  the  outposts  of  the  British 
being  abandoned  without  a  struggle  by  panic-stricken  fugitives." 

A  London  writer  discourses  as  follows :  "  As  the  capture  of  the 
Hessians  and  the  manceuvers  against  the  British  took  place  after  the 
surprise  of  General  Lee,  we  find  that  Lee  is  not  the  only  efficient  man 
in  the  American  service.  We  find  also  that  the  mere  moving  through 
a  province  is  not  subduing  it.  Perhaps  the  small  scale  of  our  maps 
deceives  us  ;  and  as  the  word  America  takes  up  no  more  room  than 
the  word  Yorkshire,  we  seem  to  think  the  territory  they  represent 
much  of  the  same  bigness,  though  Charleston  is  as  far  from  Boston 
as  London  is  from  Venice.  It  is  a  bad  rule  to  think  the  fate  of 
America  is  to  be  decided  by  the  transient  possession  of  a  few  villages 
and  hamlets.  Our  danger  increases  as  we  penetrate  the  country,  in 
proportion  to  our  distance  from  our  fleet  and  our  dispensary." 

The  Abb£  Raynal,  writing  in  his  curious  little  book,  "  The  Revo 
lution  in  America,"  published  in  1787,  thus  philosophizes.  "  The 
effect  of  strong  passions,  and  of  great  dangers,  is  often  to  astonish  the 
mind  and  to  throw  it  into  that  kind  of  torpor  that  deprives  it  of  the 
use  of  its  powers;  by  degrees  it  recovers  itself;  all  its  faculties,  sus 
pended  for  a  moment,  display  themselves  with  redoubled  vigor  ;  every 
spring  of  action  is  awakened,  and  it  feels  its  powers  rise  at  once  to  a 
level  with  the  difficulty  it  has  to  encounter.  In  a  great  multitude 
there  are  always  some  who  feel  this  immediate  effect,  which  rapidly 
communicates  itself  to  others.  Such  a  revolution  took  place  among 
the  Confederates.  It  caused  armed  men  to  issue  from  all  quarters." 

Botta  writes  at  fever  heat  of  that  entire  winter's  campaign. 
"  Thus  by  an  army  almost  reduced  to  extremity,  Philadelphia  was 
saved,  Pennsylvania  protected,  New  Jersey  nearly  recovered,  and  a 
victorious  and  powerful  enemy  laid  under  the  necessity  of  quitting 
all  thoughts  of  acting  offensively  in  order  to  defend  itself.  Achieve 
ments  so  astonishing  acquired  an  immense  glory  for  the  Captain  Gen 
eral  of  the  United  States.  All  nations  shared  in  the  surprise  of  the 
Americans.  All  equally  admired  and  applauded  the  prudence,  the 
constancy  and  the  noble  intrepidity  of  General  Washington.  An 
unanimous  voice  proclaimed  him  the  savior  of  his  country ;  all  ex 
tolled  him,  as  equal  to  the  most  celebrated  commanders  of  antiquity 


I770J          MISCELLANEOUS   EVENTS.— OPINIONS   OF  TRENTON.  283 

His  name  was  in  the  mouth  of  all.  All  proclaimed  him  the  FABIUS 
of  America.  He  was  celebrated  by  the  pens  of  the  most  distinguished 
writers.  The  most  illustrious  personages  of  Europe  lavished  upon 
him  their  praises  and  their  congratulations."  Washington  thus 
answered  the  voice  of  Congress.  "  Instead  of  thinking  myself  freed 
from  all  civil  obligations,  I  shall  constantly  bear  in  mind  that,  as  the 
sword  was  the  last  resort  for  the  preservation  of  our  liberty,  so  it  ought 
to  be  the  first  thing  laid  aside  when  those  liberties  are  finally  estab 
lished."  "  I  shall  instantly  set  about  making  the  most  necessary  reforms 
in  the  army." 

It  was  a  source  of  inspiration  to  the  people,  an  assurance  of  the 
wisdom  of  their  chief  Captain,  and  an  earnest  appeal  to  the  courage 
and  endurance  of  the  army,  as  well  as  a  comfort  to  Washington  him 
self,  that  his  first  offensive  movement  had  been  favored  with  success : 
but  at  midnight  of  the  thirty-first  of  December,  1776,  he  realized  the 
solemnity  of  the  hour,  when  in  the  face  of  this  single  brilliant  fact, 
the  peril  of  his  army  and  of  the  cause  which  commanded  his  "  life 
devotion,"  were  again  extreme  and  oppressive. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

FROM  PRINCETON   TO   MORRISTOWN.     THE   ASSANPINK   AND 
PRINCETON.     1777. 

ON  the  first  day  of  January,  1777,  the  American  General  in  chiet 
was  at  Trenton,  New  Jersey.  The  Assanpink  or  Trenton  river 
.is  a  small  stream  just  east  of  the  town.  At  that  time  the  banks  were 
abrupt,  and  the  adjoining  hill  was  generally  thickly  wooded,  but  with 
occasional  clearings  and  cultivated  tracts  toward  Bordentown.  The 
stream  itself,  quite  inconsiderable  in  the  summer  months,  was  much 
swollen  after  rains  or  melting  snow,  and  a  bridge  was  necessary  a  little 
above  the  point  where  it  emptied  into  the  Delaware  river.  The  road 
to  Bordentown  crossed  this  bridge. 

Washington  received  advices  that  Lord  Cornwallis,  who  had  been 
on  the  eve  of  sailing  for  England,  had  resumed  the  command  of  a 
division  and  was  on  his  route  from  Brunswick,  to  attack  him  at  Tren 
ton.  Instead  of  falling  back  and  uniting  the  forces  then  at  Borden 
town  and  Crosswicks  for  a  march  down  the  Delaware  toward  Phila 
delphia,  he  ordered  the  troops  then  under  the  command  of  Generals 
Mifflin  and  Cadwallader,  the  latter  just  promoted,  to  join  him.  Du 
ring  the  night  of  the  first  and  the  following  morning  these  troops,  three 
thousand  six  hundred  in  number,  arrived  at  Trenton,  thereby  swelling 
the  nominal  force  of  Washington's  army  to  five  thousand  men. 

The  main  body  of  this  army  was  established  along  the  east  bank 
of  the  Assanpink  for  a  space  of  two  miles,  in  successive  lines,  so  as  to 
give  all  the  concentration  of  resistance  which  their  numbers  and  posi 
tion  would  warrant.  Guards  were  established  at  all  points  which 
offered  facility  for  fording,  and  several  pieces  of  artillery  were  planted 
at  the  bridge  and  supported  by  some  of  the  steadiest  of  the  continen 
tal  troops. 

An  advance  guard  from  General  De  Fermoy's  brigade,  was  with 
two  pieces  of  artillery  established  on  rising  ground  well  flanked  by 


1777-1  FROM   PRINCETON  TO   MORRISTOWN.  285 

woods,  a  little  more  than  a  mile  in  advance  of  Trenton.  Colonel 
Hand's  riflemen  were  pushed  forward  as  far  as  "  Five  Mile  creek," 
and  a  small  supporting  party  occupied  quite  a  defensible  position  at 
Shebakonk  creek,  where  heavy  timber  and  uneven  ground  afforded  a 
good  position  for  irregular  troops. 

The  weather  had  relaxed  its  severity,  as  is  usual  in  America  at  the 
mid-winter  season,  and  the  frozen  roads  had  been  partially  thawed, 
so  that  the  movement  of  troops  having  artillery  and  baggage  wagons 
was  necessarily  slow.  The  Delaware  was  filled  with  floating  ice,  large 
masses  were  banked  up  in  its  curves,  and  retreat  to  the  west  bank 
was  impracticable  in  the  face  of  an  advancing  enemy.  It  was  also 
argued  by  Washington  that  all  that  had  been  gained  in  the  way  of 
moral  support  to  the  people  of  New  Jersey  would  be  sacrificed  by  an 
attempt  to  withdraw  to  the  southward.  It  was  not  indeed  impossible 
that  the  British  troops  would  ultimately  cross  the  river  and  move 
upon  Philadelphia,  whatever  course  he  might  adopt,  and  he  resolved 
to  do  his  best  to  save  the  army,  and  leave  that  city  to  the  contin 
gencies  of  the  campaign. 

General  Cornwallis  left  Brunswick  with  the  reserve,  which  was  a 
part  of  his  old  command,  the  Waldeckers,  Colonel  Donop's  Hessians, 
and  the  former  garrisons  of  the  adjacent  posts,  two  regiments  of 
Highlanders,  and  Kohler's  heavy  artillery,  making  a  total  strength  of 
a  little  over  seven  thousand  men.  Cornwallis  led  the  advance  in  per 
son,  followed  by  the  main  army,  leaving,  however,  three  companies 
of  light  dragoons,  and  the  Seventeenth,  Fortieth,  and  Fifty-fifth  regi 
ments  of  foot  at  Princeton  ;  and  General  Leslie  with  a  small  brigade 
as  rear  guard,  was  still  at  Maidenhead  when  the  leading  battalions 
entered  Trenton.  The  advance  was  met  shortly  after  it  left  Maiden 
head  "by  Colonel  Hand's  riflemen,  who  kept  up  a  lively  skirmish  fire 
as  they  slowly  fell  back,  and  at  Shebakonk  this  resistance  was  suffi 
ciently  spirited  to  require  Cornwallis  to  push  another  regiment  with 
artillery  to  the  front.  Upon  coming  up.  to  the  position  where  the 
guns  had  been  placed,  an  additional  delay  was  interposed  to  his 
advance  by  General  Greene.  He  promptly  opened  fire  for  the  express 
purpose  of  keeping  the  enemy  from  reaching  Trenton  in  time  to  make 
an  attack,  before  night. 

Washington  visited  the  detachment  when  Greene  took  command 
and  then  returned  to  the  bridge,  to  be  prepared  to  cover  the  troops 
as  they  retired  to  the  lines  closely  pressed  by  the  British  column.  It 
was  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  nearly  sunset  in  America  in 


286  FROM   PRINCETON  TO   MORRISTOWN.  1.1777 

the  latitude  of  Trenton,  but  Cornwallis  at  once  threw  skirmishing 
detachments  along  the  river  to  feel  the  fords  and  practicable  crossings, 
and  opened  fire  with  artillery,  near  the  bridge  and  above  the  town. 
At  all  points  he  found  wooded  ascents,  an  active  adversary,  and  the 
determination  to  give  battle  if  he  should  attempt  to  force  a  crossing. 

He  sent  a  strong  column  down  Queen  street,  and  made  three 
separate  efforts  to  force  the  bridge-passage,  but  the  fire  was  so  con 
stant  and  direct  that  further  attempt  was  abandoned. 

The  British  army  had  made  a  trying  march,  and  orders  were  sent 
to  Princeton  to  forward  the  light  dragoons  as  well  as  the  Seventeenth 
and  Fifty-fifth  regiments,  and  General  Leslie  was  ordered  up  from 
Maidenhead  to  be  prepared  for  morning  work.  The  armies  were 
separated  less  than  a  mile,  and  the  picket  guards  were  within  hail, 
from  side  to  side.  Under  existing  circumstances  Cornwallis  wisely 
declined  a  night  attack;  but  his  reconnoissance  should  have  been  so 
complete  that  he  could  have  made  an  attack  when  the  American  army 
commenced  its  movement.  He  should  have  anticipated  the  possi 
bility  of  an  attack  upon  his  own  communications  and  base.  The  can 
nonading  was  kept  up  until  dark,  the  camp  fires  were  lighted  on  both 
sides  of  the  Assanpink,  and  the  armies  awaited  the  issues  of  another 
day. 

During  the  afternoon  the  hazy  weather  gave  way  to  a  clear  sky, 
and  after  sunset  the  night  became  cold,  freezing  the  ground  hard,  and 
making  travel  more  easy,  Washington  had  matured  a  plan  of  escape 
from  his  hazardous  position,  whereby  he  might  avoid  a  battle  with 
superior  and  well  drilled  troops,  without  the  loss  of  prestige  and  the 
inevitable  disaster  which  would  follow  a  retreat  from  his  adversary,  so 
soon  after  the  success  at  Trenton.  He  was  now  satisfied  that  the 
army  of  Cornwallis  had  gathered  up  its  principal  columns  for  the  pro 
posed  attack.  He  had  learned  from  reconnoissances  ordered  during 
the  latter  part  of  December,  both  the  character  of  the  roads  and  the 
most  expeditious  routes  to  Brunswick.  He  also  sent  a  small  party  to 
learn  whether  the  British  troops  had  any  detachments  on  the  old 
Quaker  road,  to  the  east  of  the  Assanpink,  and  was  assured  that  the 
path  was  clear.  Colonel  Donop  afterwards  stated  that  he  advised 
Cornwallis  to  send  a  division  by  the  old  road  east  of  the  creek,  which 
would  have  accomplished,  as  against  Washington,  the  very  movement 
which  Ewing  attempted  before  the  attack  upon  Trenton ;  but  his 
advice  was  not  followed. 

Washington   also  assumed  from  reports  of  the  original  force  at 


1777-1  FROM   PRINCETON   TO   MORRISTOWN.  287 

Brunswick  that  its  great  magazines  of  stores  and  supplies  must  have 
been  left  under  small  guard,  and  believed  that  by  a  quick  dash  he 
might  capture  or  destroy  them.  It  was  a  bold  strategic  movement, 
and  a  fit  companion-enterprise  to  his  first  return  of  the  offensive  at 
Trenton.  A  council  of  war  was  convened  for  the  consideration  of  the 
movement.  It  was  promptly  endorsed  by  the  officers  consulted,  and 
was  speedily  carried  into  effect.  No  time  was  lost.  The  baggage 
wagons  which  had  been  posted  in  the  rear  on  the  Bordentown  road, 
were  started  for  Burlington  under  a  small  guard  as  soon  as  it  was 
dark.  The  fires  were  plied  with  dry  rails  from  fences  and  fallen  trees, 
and  shortly  after  one  o'clock  the  army  was  in  motion  with  all  the  light 
artillery  that  could  be  taken  along.  The  weather  had  been  so  mild 
for  a  few  days  that  many  of  the  blankets  had  been  packed  in  the  bag 
gage  wagons,  when  the  army  first  moved  across  the  Assanpink,  and 
the  night  was  sufficiently  cold  to  cause  much  suffering;  but  the  letters 
of  officers  written  after  arrival  at  Morristown,  show  that  the  march 
was  silent,  orderly,  and  almost  entirely  without  halts.  The  route 
was  made  somewhat  longer  by  following  a  new  trail  where  the  stumps 
had  not  been  removed,  until  the  old  Quaker  road  was  reached,  when 
the  advance  was  made  with  much  more  celerity  and  compactness  of 
movement. 

The  picket  guards  who  were  left  on  post,  had  been  furnished  with 
ample  supplies  of  fuel  for  the  night,  and  they  kept  up  their  regular 
round  of  challenge,  replenished  their  fires,  and  did  not  decamp  and 
follow  the  army  until  nearly  morning.  A  small  working  party  was 
also  engaged  in  throwing  up  light  field-works  before  the  bridge,  and 
at  one  point  up  the  stream,  to  give  greater  assurance  of  watchfulness 
and  preparation  for  an  attack. 

Just  before  leaving  camp,  Washington  sent  a  messenger  to  Gen 
eral  Putnam,  advising  him  of  his  movements,  and  instructing  him  to 
send  up  troops  to  occupy  Crosswicks,  and  he  also  thereby  secured  the 
safety  of  his  baggage  train  which  had  started  down  the  river. 

The  vanguard  of  the  American  army  reached  Stony  Brook  about 
sunrise.  Washington  there  re-formed  his  columns,  sending  General 
Mercer  to  the  left,  by  the  Quaker  road,  and  intended  to  advance  di 
rectly  to  the  village  itself,  by  a  lower  road,  under  cover  of  rising  ground, 
and  thus  expedite  his  proposed  movement  upon  Brunswick.  Gen 
eral  Mercer,  upon  wheeling  out  of  column,  passed  a  thick  woods  and 
orchard  near  the  Friends'  meeting  house,  and  moved  up  the  creek  for 
the  purpose  of  destroying  the  bridges  and  thus  delaying  pursuit  from 


288  FROM   PRINCETON   TO    MORRISTOWN.  [i777. 

Trenton,  as  well  as  to  cut  off  fugitives  from  Princeton.  His  force  was 
composed  of  the  remnants  of  Haslet's  and  Smallwood's  regiments, 
the  First  Virginia  and  a  few  volunteers,  making  a  total  however  of 
less  than  four  hundred  men.  He  was  rapidly  approaching  the  Trenton 
road,  when  he  found  his  command  suddenly  confronted  by  the  seven- 
teenth  British  foot,  which  was  rapidly  crowding  for  a  commanding 
position  directly  to  his  right  toward  Princeton.  This  regiment  had 
received  the  order  of  Cornwallis  to  join  him,  had  already  crossed  the 
Stony  creek  bridge  by  the  old  road,  and  had  reached  the  summit  of 
Millett's  Hill  when  Colonel  Mawhood  first  noticed  the  small  com 
mand  of  Mercer  as  they  passed  in  front  of  the  orchard  near  the  house 
of  William  Clark. 

The  American  army  however  was  not  in  sight  and  the  column  of 
Mercer  did  not  largely  exceed  Mawhood's  own  force.  Without  any 
hesitation  he  recrossed  Stony  Brook  and  found  himself  within  five 
hundred  yards  of  their  advance  guard.  General  Mercer  moved  north 
ward  toward  the  same  elevated  ground  which  Mawhood  recognized 
as  commanding  the  situation,  and  having  reached  it  first,  then  advanced 
to  the  cover  of  a  zigzag  rail  fence  which  crossed  the  hill,  and  delivered 
fire.  The  British  returned  but  one  volley,  and  instantly  made  a 
steady,  impetuous  charge  with  the  bayonet.  The  onset  was  too  solid 
and  the  defense  too  nominal  for  Mercer's  command  to  withstand  the 
attack.  They  fell  back  in  confusion  and  took  refuge  in  Clark's  orchard 
and  other  high  ground  near  the  Friends'  meeting  house.  As  soon  as 
the  firing  began,  Washington  pushed  additional  troops  to  the  summit 
on  the  left  of  his  advancing  column,  and  this  force,  although  furnished 
with  two  guns,  was  also  assailed  by  Mawhood's  with  such  vigor  that 
several  companies  gave  way,  and  it  appeared  as  if  they  were  to  follow 
the  fate  of  the  troops  first  engaged. 

Captain  Neil  of  the  artillery  had  already  fallen,  and  the  British 
attack  was  directed  to  the  capture  of  Captain  Moulder's  guns,  which 
from  their  position  were  beginning  to  tell  upon  their  column  with 
effect.  Washington,  as  previously  at  Kipp's  bay,  spurred  his  horse 
through  the  scattering  militia  to  the  front,  and  maintained  his  place 
for  a  few  minutes  in  a  position  of  extreme  personal  danger,  directly 
in  the  line  of  fire  of  the  opposing  troops.'  The  men,  inspired  by  his 
example,  rallied  promptly  to  his  support. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  British  troops  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill 
in  the  pursuit  of  Mercer's  flying  column  before  it  came  to  the  knowl 
edge  of  Colonel  Mawhood  that  he  was  entering  the  lists  against  the 


I777-J  FROM   PRINCETON  TO   MORRISTOWN.  289 

entire  American  army.  Its  extended  column  was  then  in  full  view 
moving  toward  the  town  where  the  Fortieth  and  Fifty-fifth  were  sta 
tioned.  The  latter  regiment  had  been  in  readiness  to  march  for  Tren 
ton  when  the  action  began,  and  make  an  effort  to  support  the  Seven 
teenth  ;  but  Colonel  Hand  had  wheeled  out  of  the  main  column  and 
taken  his  position  with  the  troops  which  Washington  had  first  sent 
to  the  support  of  Mercer,  and  Colonel  Hitchcock  with  equal  prompt 
ness  turned  the  left  of  Mawhood  and  cut  him  off  from  Princeton  as 
well  as  from  assistance.  Generals  Stirling  and  St.  Clair,  and  Colonels 
Poor,  Patterson  and  Reed  were  also  advancing  upon  the  Fifty-fifth, 
and  the  only  avenue  of  retreat  was  toward  Trenton.  Abandoning 
his  cannon,  the  British  commander,  already  receiving  the  fire  of  more 
than  four  times  his  own  force,  threw  his  men  across  Stony  Creek 
at  all  practicable  places,  mostly  by  the  bridge,  and  took  refuge  at 
Maidenhead,  where  General  Leslie's  column  still  halted.  The  Fifty- 
fifth,  closely  pressed  by  weight  of  numbers,  and  these  constantly 
augmented,  took  a  position  on  the  high  sloping  ground  immediately 
south  of  Nassau  Hall,  Princeton  College,  where  a  ravine  separated 
them  from  the  Americans,  and  where  a  small  force  could  make  a  suc 
cessful  resistance  to  a  much  larger  force  of  infantry.  The  American 
artillery  was  promptly  brought  to  bear  upon  their  ranks.  Several 
regiments  passed  clear  of  the  hill  and  gained  the  main  street  in  front 
oi  the  college.  The  doors  of  the  building  were  soon  forced  and  that 
regiment  with  the  Fortieth  attempted  to  escape  to  New  Bruns 
wick,  one  by  the  Kingston  and  the  other  by  the  Rocky  Hill  route. 

The  entire  action  consumed  less  time  than  its  recital.  The  Brit 
ish  loss  was  heavy,  exceeding  one  hundred  men  in  killed  and  wounded, 
while  two  hundred  and  thirty  were  taken  prisoners,  including  four 
teen  officers.  Captain  William  Leslie,  son  of  the  Earl  of  Levin, 
was  among  the  killed,  and  was  buried  with  every  becoming  token 
of  respect. 

The  American  loss  in  rank  and  file  was  greatly  less  than  the  Brit 
ish,  but  the  efforts  of  the  officers  to  check  them  at  the  crisis  of  the 
panic  cost  valuable  lives.  General  Mercer,  who  had  already  gained 
much  credit  as  an  officer,  and  served  with  Washington  in  the  old 
Indian  war  of  1756-1766,  was  mortally  wounded  while  endeavoring 
to  rally  his  men  near  Clark's  house,  and  Colonels  Haslet  and  Potter,* 
Major  Morris,  and  Captains  Fleming,  Shippen,  and  Neil  were  among 
the  killed.  General  Mercer,  a  native  of  Scotland,  was  an  assistant  sur 
geon  at  the  battle  of  Culloden,  a  physician  of  high  attainment  at  Fred- 

19  *  See  note  on  page  293. 


290  FROM    PRINCETON   TO    MORRISTOWN.  1*777. 

ericksburg,  Virginia,  when  the  American  war  called  him  to  arms,  and 
he  was  held  in  high  estimation  by  all  who  knew  him,  as  an  officer  of 
great  judgment  and  promise. 

A  detachment  was  immediately  sent  to  destroy  the  bridge  over 
Stony  Creek,  and  the  army  advanced  to  Kingston,  only  about  three 
miles  beyond  Princeton,  on  the  other  side  of  Millstone  river. 

Upon  reaching  that  town,  Washington  hastily  consulted  his  gen 
eral  officers  as  to  further  movements.  General  Greene  had  started 
his  column  up  the  Millstone,  on  the  supposition  that  it  was  of  first 
importance  to  reach  some  strong  position  where  a  decided  resistance 
could  be  offered  to  pursuit.  The  men  were  cold,  hungry,  and  nearly 
worn  out.  The  greater  part  of  the  command  had  been  on  constant 
duty  from  the  time  they  left  Bordentown  and  Crosswicks.  Many 
were  barefooted,  and  no  time  had  been  allowed  for  the  distribution 
of  rations  since  breaking  camp  opposite  Trenton.  Before  the  main 
column  had  crossed  the  Millstone,  the  sound  of  renewed  firing  at 
Princeton  gave  warning  that  the  troops  at  Maidenhead  were  already 
in  pursuit.  The  possibility  of  striking  the  stores  at  Brunswick  de 
pended  therefore  upon  being  able  to  do  it  with  no  delay  of  resistance, 
as  a  defense,  however  brief,  would  compel  a  general  action  with  the 
approaching  British  army.  The  latter  had  "  mounted  troops,"  while 
the  Americans  were  practically  without  any.  The  fugitive  detach 
ments  of  the  Fortieth  and  Fifty-fifth  would  certainly  put  the  Brunswick 
garrison  on  the  alert. 

Farther  pursuit  of  these  troops  was  therefore  abandoned,  and  the 
army  moved  directly  and  promptly  from  Kingston,  up  the  east  bank 
of  the  Millstone,  and  the  next  day  secured  a  strong  position  at 
Pluckemin,  when  the  troops  obtained  refreshment  and  partial  rest. 

While  these  events  transpired,  Cornwallis  had  realized  the  con 
sequences  of  under-estimating  the  mental  resources  and  executive 
ability  of  his  adversary.  The  American  lines  had  been  deserted  while 
he  was  resting  for  a  triumph.  The  camp  fires  still  burned  as  day 
dawned,  but  there  were  no  pickets  on  post,  and  the  bridge  head  was 
without  defenders.  The  opinion  expressed  by  Sir  William  Erskine 
the  night  before,  which  is  well  accredited,  that  Washington  would  not 
abide  attack  but  withdraw  his  forces,  was  confirmed,  and  the  report  of 
artillery  in  the  direction  of  Princeton  and  Brunswick,  showed  that 
while  Cornwallis  was  indeed  on  the  Delaware,  his  adversary  was  be 
tween  him  and  his  base,  and  his  very  depot  of  supplies  was  in  peril. 
The  light  dragoons  were  hurried  to  the  rear,  and  the  whole  army 


I777-J  FROM   PRINCETON  TO   MORRISTOWN.  29 1 

followed  with  all  possible  expedition.  The  distance  was  but  ten 
miles,  while  Washington  had  marched  very  nearly  sixteen ;  and  the 
British  vanguard  approached  the  Stony  Creek  bridge  as  the  American 
rear  guard  was  completing  its  destruction.  There  was  nearly  an  hour's 
delay  at  this  point  before  artillery  could  be  placed  across  the  creek ; 
but  some  of  the  regiments  were  forced  over,  regardless  of  ice  and 
water,  to  quicken  pursuit.  There  was  additional  delay  at  Kingston, 
as  the  bridge  over  the  Millstone  had  also  been  destroyed,  and  the 
British  army  apparently  unconscious,  or  neglecting  to  examine  the 
trail  of  the  Americans'  retreat,  precipitately  hastened  to  Brunswick, 
where  they  found  the  public  stores  were  in  safety,  but  the  army  of 
Washington  was  not  there  awaiting  capture. 

Cornwallis  also  found  upon  his  arrival  at  Brunswick  late  on  the 
same  night,  that  the  retreating  troops  had  aroused  great  terror  in  the 
small  garrison,  and  General  Matthews  had  already  commanded  the 
removal  of  baggage  and  warlike  stores.  Seventy  thousand  dollars  in 
gold  was  at  the  post  for  payment  of  the  troops,  and  this  money  was 
promptly  returned  to  New  York. 

The  condition  of  the  American  army  during  a  rest  of  two 
days  at  Pluckemin  was  one  of  great  suffering,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  a  defense  could  have  been  maintained  if  Cornwallis 
had  immediately  made  an  attack.  On  the  fifth,  Washington  found 
time  to  send  a  report  to  Congress,  and  to  make  up  dispatches  to 
Putnam  and  Heath.  He  instructs  the  former  to  send  on  the  army 
baggage,  to  march  to  Crosswicks,  to  li  give  out  your  strength  to  be 
twice  as  great  as  it  is,  to  keep  out  spies,  to  put  horsemen  in  the  dress 
of  the  country,  and  keep  them  going  backwards  and  forwards  for  that 
purpose,  and  to  act  with  great  circumspection,  so  as  to  not  meet  with 
a  surprise." 

He  ordered  General  Heath  to  collect  boats  for  the  contingency  of 
the  detail  of  part  of  his  force  into  New  Jersey,  and  instructed  him  that 
it  had  been  determined  in  council  that  he  should  move  down  toward 
New  York  with  a  considerable  force,  as  if  with  a  design  upon  that 
city. 

On  the  seventh  the  American  army  reached  Morristown,  where 
log  huts  were  erected  and  winter  quarters  were  established.  His  own 
headquarters  during  that  winter  were  at  the  old  Freeman  Tavern,  on 
the  north  side  of  the  public  square.  On  the  seventh  additional  orders 
were  sent  to  General  Heath,  to  General  Lincoln,  who  had  arrived  at 
Peekskill  with  four  thousand  New  England  militia,  and  to  other 


2Q2  FROM   PRINCETON   TO    MORRISTOWN. 

officers,  north  and  south,  in  anticipation  of  ulterior  movements.  A 
single  letter  to  General  Heath,  which  was  subsequently  written,  after 
hearing  that  the  latter  officer  had  demanded  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Independence  in  very  strong  language,  and  followed  up  his  demand 
by  withdrawing  his  force,  will  illustrate  the  directness  with  which 
Washington  began  to  deal  with  injudicious  subordinates. 

General  Heath  was  before  Fort  Independence  on  the  eighteenth  of 
January,  1777.  General  Lincoln  advanced  by  the  Hudson  river  road, 
General  Scott  by  White  Plains,  and  Generals  Wooster  and  Parsons 
from  New  Rochelle  and  East  Chester.  A  few  prisoners  were  taken  at 
Valentine's  Hill,  and  the  garrison  of  nearly  two  thousand  Hessians 
were  allowed  "  twenty  minutes  in  which  to. surrender  or  abide  the 
consequences."  After  nearly  ten  days  of  delay  about  King's  Bridge, 
with  his  half  organized  militia  force,  without  barracks  and  under  cir 
cumstances  of  peculiar  exposure,  a  sally  from  the  garrison  created  a 
panic  in  one  regiment  at  an  advance  post,  and  the  entire  army  soon 
withdrew. 

As  a  demonstration  toward  New  York  it  undoubtedly  had  a  great 
effect  upon  General  Howe's  movements,  and  the  plan  itself  was  well 
conceived,  well  initiated.  The  divisions  arrived  at  King's  Bridge  with 
remarkable  concert  of  time ;  but  there  they  stopped,  and  the  chief 
objective  was  not  realized. 

Washington  thus  wrote,  on  the  third  of  February  :  "  This  letter  is 
additional  to  my  public  one  of  this  date.  It  is  to  hint  to  you,  and  I 
do  it  with  concern,  that  your  conduct  is  censured  (and  by  men  of  sense 
and  judgment  who  have  been  with  you  on  the  expedition  to  Fort 
Independence)  as  being  fraught  with  too  much  caution  :  by  which  the 
army  has  been  disappointed  and  in  some  degree  disgraced.  Your 
summons,  as  you  did  not  attempt  to  fulfill  your  threats,  was  not  only 
idle  but  farcical,  and  will  not  fail  of  turning  the  laugh  exceedingly 
upon  us." 

During  the  winter  and  spring,  skirmishes  were  frequent,  and  often 
with  marked  benefit  to  the  American  troops.  Washington  issued  a 
counter  proclamation  to  that  which  General  Howe  had  promulged 
during  the  original  retreat  through  New  Jersey,  and  all  offensive 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  British  forces  were  suspended. 

Mr.  Botta  thus  justly  sums  up  the  relations  of  the  contending  armies. 
"  Washington  having  received  a  few  fresh  battalions,  and  his  little 
army  having  recovered  from  their  fatigues,  soon  entered  the  field  anew 
and  scoured  the  whole  country  as  far  as  the  Raritan.  He  even  crossed 


I777-J  FROM   PRINCETON   TO   MORRISTOWN.  293 

this  river  and  penetrated  into  the  county  of  Essex,  made  himself 
master  of  Newark,  of  Elizabethtown,  and  finally  of  Woodbridge  ;  so 
that  he  commanded  the  entire  coast  of  New  Jersey  in  front  of  Staten 
Island.  He  so  judiciously  selected  his  positions  and  fortified  them 
so  formidably,  that  the  royalists  shrunk  from  all  attempts  to  dislodge 
him  from  any  of  them.  Thus  the  British  army,  after  having  overrun 
victoriously  the  whole  of  New  Jersey  quite  to  the  Delaware,  and  caused 
even  the  city  of  Philadelphia  to  tremble  for  its  safety,  found  itself  now 
restricted  to  the  two  only  posts  of  Brunswick  and  Amboy,  which  more 
over  could  have  no  communication  with  New  York  except  by  sea. 
Thus,  by  an  army  almost  reduced  to  extremity,  Philadelphia  was 
saved,  Pennsylvania  protected,  New  Jersey  nearly  recovered,  and  a 
victorious  and  powerful  army  laid  under  the  necessity  of  quitting  all 
thoughts  of  acting  offensively,  in  order  to  defend  itself." 

NOTE  to  p.  289.  Col.  James  Potter,  missing,  and  reported  by  Gen.  Washington  as  killed, 
afterwards  became  Brigadier-general  of  Pennsylvania  Militia,  as  reported  by  Adjutant-general 
Stryker  of  New  Jersey. 


CHAPTER   XLII. 

MINOR  EVENTS,  JANUARY   TO  JULY,  1777. 

THE  operations  of  the  year  1777,  comprised  a  second  invasion  ot 
New  Jersey,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  the  American  army  into 
a  decisive  battle,  a  series  of  operations  in  execution  of  the   original 
purpose  of  the  British   cabinet  to  gain   control  of  Lake  Champlain 
and  the  Hudson  river,  and  the  occupation  of  Philadelphia. 

Spirited  skirmishing,  brief  incursions,  and  some   brilliant  feats  ot 
minor  adventure  characterized  both  armies  ;  but   all  battles  proper 
are  referable  to  one  of  the  three  systems  of  endeavor  above  indicated. 

A  brief  outline  of  rriinor  facts  will  give  clearness  to  the  subsequent 
battle  details. 

The  headquarters  of  Washington  remained  at  Morristown  until 
the  twenty-fourth  of  May. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  January  two  thousand  British  troops  were 
withdrawn  from  Rhode  Island  to  reinforce  General  Howe  at  New 
York.  Generals  Spencer  and  Arnold,  then  in  command  of  about  four 
thousand  American  troops  at  Providence,  were  instructed  to  prepare  a 
plan  for  the  capture  of  Newport ;  but  they  failed  to  secure  adequate  mil 
itia  support,  and  it  was  abandoned.  General  Parsons,  then  on  recruit 
ing  service  in  Connecticut,  was  advised  by  Washington  to  make  a  de 
scent  upon  Long  Island  during  February,  but  was  unable  to  raise  the 
necessary  force  until  they  were  needed  for  general  defense.  During  the 
same  month  General  Knox  was  dispatched  to  Massachusetts  to  enlist 
a  battalion  of  artillery,  and  during  this  trip  advised  the  selection  of 
Springfield,  Massachusetts,  as  the  best  place  in  New  England,  for  the 
establishment  of  a  laboratory  and  cannon  foundry.  General  Schuyler 
was  instructed  to  draw  from  the  New  England  States  the  entire  force 
required  to  resist  the  anticipated  advance  of  Carleton  from  Canada ; 
because  "  troops  of  extreme  sections  could  not  be  favorably  combined." 
General  Maxwell  was  stationed  at  Elizabethtown  to  watch  tories  and 


I777.J  MINOR   EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO   JULY.  295 

the  movements  of  the  British.  The  exchange  of  General  Lee  and  his 
status,  whether  to  be  regarded  as  a  prisoner  of  war,  or  British  deserter, 
was  discussed.  Orders  were  issued  repressing  the  plundering  done 
by  the  American  militia;  a  protest  was  sent  to  General  Howe  against 
similar  outrages  perpetrated  by  Hessian  and  British  troops,  and  the 
usual  difficulties  of  recruiting,  equipping,  and  sustaining  the  American 
army  were  experienced. 

During  the  month  of  March  a  ship  arrived  at  Portsmouth,  New 
Hampshire,  from  France,  with  twelve  thousand  fusees,  one  thousand 
barrels  of  powder,  blankets  and  other  military  stores,  and  a  second 
ship  reached  Philadelphia  with  eleven  thousand  more  of  similar  arms. 
Congress  assigned  five  thousand  of  the  new  arms  to  Massachusetts, 
three  thousand  to  Connecticut,  and  two  thousand  to  New  Hampshire. 
On  the  second  of  the  month,  Washington  sent  to  Robert  Morris  the 
following  cast  of  the  British  plans :  "  General  Howe  can  not,  by  the 
best  intelligence  I  have  been  able  to  get,  have  less  than  ten  thousand 
men  in  New  Jersey,  and  on  board  of  transports  at  Amboy.  Our 
number  does  not  exceed  four  thousand.  His  are  well  disciplined, 
well  officered,  and  well  supplied  ;  ours,  raw  militia,  badly  officered, 
and  under  no  government." 

"  His  numbers  can  not  be  in  a  short  time  augmented,  ours  must  be 
very  considerably,  and  by  such  troops  as  we  can  have  some  reliance 
upon,  or  the  game  is  at  an  end.  His  situation  with  respect  to  horses 
and  forage  is  bad,  very  bad,  I  believe,  but  will  it  be  better  ?  No,  on 
the  contrary  worse,  and  therefore  if  no  other,  to  shift  quarters.  Gen 
eral  Howe's  informants  are  too  numerous,  and  too  well  acquainted 
with  all  these  circumstances,  to  suffer  him  to  remain  in  ignorance  of 
them.  With  what  propriety  then  can  he  miss  so  favorable  an 
opportunity  of  striking  a  capital  stroke  against  a  city  from  whence 
we  derive  so  many  advantages,  the  carrying  of  which  would  give  such 
eclat  to  his  arms,  and  strike  such  a  damp  to  ours  ?  Nor  is  his  diffi 
culty  of  moving  so  great  as  is  imagined.  All  the  heavy  baggage  of 
the  army,  their  salt  provisions,  flour,  and  stores  might  go  round  by 
water,  while  their  superior  numbers  would  enable  them  to  make  a 
sweep  of  the  horses  for  many  miles  around  them,  not  already  taken 
off  by  us."  This  letter  foreshadows  the  final  action  of  General  Howe, 
and  while  it  was  Washington's  opinion  that  the  movement  of  troops 
would  be  overland,  its  statement,  in  view  of  the  course  finally  adopted 
by  General  Howe,  is  given  in  this  connection,  and  the  elaborate  docu 
mentary  matter  which  affords  a  detailed  index  to  the  passing  phases 


296  MINOR  EVENTS,  JANUARY  TO  JULY.  [1777 

of  opinion  which  preceded  the  battle  of  Brandywine,  and  the  capture 
of  Philadelphia,  is  omitted. 

The  same  month  of  March  developed  the  fruits  of  the  promotions 
made  by  Congress.  Stirling,  Mifflin,  Stephen,  St.  Clair,  and  Lincoln 
were  made  major-generals,  and  Arnold  was  omitted.  He  tendered  his 
resignation,  highly  offended.  Poor,  Glover,  Patterson,  Learned,  Var- 
num,  Huntington,  George  Clinton,  Wayne,  De  Haas,  Hand,  Reed. 
Weedon,  Muhlenburg,  Woodford,  Scott,  Nash,  Conway,  and  Cad- 
wallader  were  appointed  brigadier-generals.  The  last  named  officer 
had  been  appointed  to  that  grade  by  Pennsylvania,  just  after  the  bat 
tle  of  Trenton,  and  declined  the  appointment  of  Congress.  As  most 
of  these  officers  appear  in  the  subsequent  narrative,  their  names 
are  given.  Their  order  of  appointment  gave  infinite  trouble,  and 
their  assignment  to  duty  gave  additional  occasion  for  jealousy  and 
conflict. 

General  Wooster  had  already  resigned  and  was  in  command  of  the 
Connecticut  militia.  St.  Clair  acted  as  adjutant-general  after  Reed  re 
signed,  and  on  the  thirtieth  of  March,  Washington  appointed  Colonel 
Timothy  Pickering  to  that  office.  General  George  Clinton  had  been 
assigned  by  Congress  to  the  command  of  the  forts  in  the  Highlands. 
General  McDougall  succeeded  General  Heath  at  Peekskill,  and  on  the 
twenty-second  a  British  fleet  ascended  the  Hudson,  effected  a  landing, 
and  destroyed  the  valuable  stores  at  that  place.  General  Sullivan 
was  so  sensitive  as  to  the  so-called  separate  commands  of  other 
officers,  as  to  call  forth  the  following  letter  from  Washington,  "  Why 
these  unreasonable,  these  unjustifiable  suspicions,  which  can  answer 
no  other  end  than  to  poison  your  own  happiness  and  add  vexations 
to  that  of  others.  I  know  of  but  one  separate  command  properly  so 
called,  and  that  is  the  northern  department,  and  General  Sullivan, 
General  St.  Clair,  or  any  other  general  officer  at  Ticonderoga  will  be 
considered  in  no  other  light,  while  there  is  a  superior  officer  in  the 
department,  than  if  he  were  placed  at  Chatham,  Baskenridge  or 
Princeton.  I  shall  quit  with  an  earnest  expostulation  that  you  will 
not  suffer  yourself  to  be  teased  with  evils  that  only  exist  in  the  ima 
gination,  and  with  slights  that  have  no  existence  at  all,  keeping  in 
mind  that  if  there  are  several  distinct  armies  to  be  formed,  there  are 
several  gentlemen  before  you  in  point  of  rank  who  have  a  right  to 
claim  preference." 

General  Greene  was  sent  to  lay  before  Congress  the  necessities  of 
the  army,  and  the  month  of  March  closed  with  an  earnest  appeal  to 


1777  J  MINOR   EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO   JULY.  297 

the  governors,  committees  of  safety,  and  Congress,  to  furnish  troops 
and  supplies  for  the  impending  summer  campaign. 

On  the  third  of  April,  General  Washington  corrected  a  popular 
impression  as  to  judging  British  forces  by  the  number  of  regiments 
reported,  placing  a  very  correct  judgment  upon  the  strength  of  the 
Hessian  troops,  but  under-estimating  the  average  of  the  British  regi 
ments.  He  wrote  to  Governor  Cooke  of  Rhode  Island,  "  The  Hes 
sian  regiments,  when  they  came  out  complete,  did  not  exceed  six 
hundred  men  each,  and  the  British  two  hundred  and  fifty  each."  The 
basis  upon  which  the  British  army  was  recruited  for  service  in  America 
has  been  previously  stated,  as  drawn  from  official  sources. 

On,  the  twenty-fifth  of  April  two  thousand  British  troops  under 
Governor  Tyron  landed  near  Fairfield,  Connecticut,  and  moved  upon 
Danbury,  to  destroy  public  stores  at  that  point  collected.  Generals 
Silliman  and  Wooster  of  the  Connecticut  militia,  and  General  Arnold, 
then  on  his  way  to  visit  Congress,  distinguished  themselves  by  their 
gallant  conduct.  Arnold  threw  up  a  breastwork  near  Ridgefield  and 
fought  with  great  spirit,  having  two  horses  shot  under  him  before  the 
British  retired.  General  Wooster  was  mortally  wounded.  The  stores 
however,  including  sixteen  hundred  tents,  were  destroyed.  Arnold 
was  immediately  promoted  :  but  did  not  obtain  the  lineal  rank  which 
he  claimed  to  belong  to  him  and  was  still  dissatisfied.  Early  in  May, 
Greene  was  sent  to  inspect  and  put  in  good  order  the  posts  in  the 
Highlands.  The  troops  under  Washington's  immediate  command 
were  at  that  time  organized  in  five  divisions  of  two  brigades  each 
under  Major-generals  Greene,  Stephen,  Sullivan,  Lincoln  and  Stir 
ling,  and  included  forty-three  regiments  from  New  Jersey,  Penn 
sylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland  and  Virginia,  commanded  by  Briga 
diers  Muhlenburgh,  Weedon,  Woodford,  Scott,  Smallwood,  Deborre, 
Wayne,  DeHaas,  Conway  and  Maxwell.  Colonel  Hand  was  also  ap 
pointed  Brigadier-general.  The  artillery  was  still  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Knox.  The  force  for  duty  was  nearly  eight  thousand  men.  The 
New  York  and  Eastern  regiments  were  near  Peekskill  or  at  Ticon- 
deroga. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  May,  Colonel  Meigs  crossed  to  Long  Island 
from  Guilford,  Connecticut,  and  at  Sag  Harbor,  Long  Island,  effected 
the  destruction  of  twelve  brigs  and  sloops,  one  of  these  carrying  twelve 
guns,  and  a  large  quantity  of  British  stores,  the  troops  having  been 
withdrawn  to  New  York  two  days  before.  This  exploit  involved 
ninety  miles  of  transportation,  most  of  the  route  in  whale  boats,  and 


298  MINOR   EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO   JULY.  [1777. 

the  command  safely  returned  in  twenty-five  hours.    On  the  twenty-ninth 
of  May,  General  Washington  established  himself  at  Middlebrook. 

On  the  seventh  of  June  Arnold  was  placed  in  command  of  Phila 
delphia,  to  act  with  General  Mifflin  in  anticipation  of  General  Howe's 
anticipated  movements  in  that  direction,  and  on  the  thirtieth  General 
Howe  marched  from  Brunswick  toward  Princeton.  His  command  in 
cluded  two  more  regiments,  which  had  joined  from  Newport,  and  with 
the  Hessians  amounted  to  the  splendid  force  of  nearly  seventeen 
thousand  men.  Orders  had  been  given  for  the  army  to  march  at 
eleven  o'clock  of  the  evening  of  the  twelfth,  thereby  hoping  to  cut 
off  Sullivan's  brigade,  which  was  at  Princeton.  After  the  march  began, 
Cornwallis  with  the  right  column  was  directed  to  Hillsborough  and 
De  Heister  to  Middlebrook,  turning  off  from  the  Princeton  road,  and 
the  line  was  definitely  prolonged  to  Somerset  court-house,  as  indicated 
on  the  map. 

In  a  subsequent  letter  of  July  fifth,  addressed  by  that  officer  to 
Lord  George  Germaine,  he  says  that  his  "  only  object  was  to  bring 
the  American  army  to  a  general  action."  The  British  army  rested 
its  left  on  Millstone  river,  while  its  right  held  fast  to  Brunswick,  hav 
ing  the  Raritan  in  front.  Two  redoubts  were  also  erected  in  the  horse 
shoe  of  the  river  bend  before  his  centre,  and  also,  near  Brunswick. 
The  subsequent  controversies  between  Generals  Howe  and  Clinton 
do  not  entirely  warrant  the  criticism  by  General  Clinton  of  this  posi 
tion,  as  it  was  naturally  assumed  by  General  Howe  that  Washington 
would  not  rest  passively  in  his  trenches  while  the  British  army  had 
control  of  the  line  of  communication  with  Philadelphia.  In  "  Letters 
to  a  Nobleman  "  General  Howe  is  very  severely  criticised  for  moving 
to  Somerset  court-house,  where  an  unfordable  river  parted  the  armies, 
and  it  is  claimed  that  if  Howe  had  moved  toward  Philadelphia,  Wash 
ington  would  have  given  him  battle.  It  was  however  then,  as  ever, 
inconsistent  with  Washington's  purpose  to  risk  his  army  for  any  city 
whatever. 

The  New  Jersey  militia  were  posted  on  Lowland  Hill,  near  Flem- 
ington,  to  which  place  Sullivan  had  retired  from  Princeton  as  soon  as 
he  observed  the  movement  of  General  Howe  to  cut  him  off  from  the 
main  army.  Orders  were  sent  to  forward  from  Peekskill  all  the  con 
tinental  troops,  except  one  thousand  effective  men,  under  Generals 
Parsons,  McDougall  and  Glover,  and  these  troops  were  to  march  in 
three  divisions,  at  one  day's  interval,  the  first  two  columns  to  bring 
two  pieces  of  artillery  each. 


1777.]  MINOR  EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO  JULY.  299 

On  the  twentieth  Washington  received  a  message  that  Burgoyne 
was  approaching  St.  John's  and  that  a  detachment  of  regular  troops, 
Canadians  and  Indians  were  to  penetrate  by  the  Mohawk  valley. 
General  Putnam  was  ordered  at  the  same  date  to  hold  four  Massa 
chusetts  regiments,  then  at  Peekskill,  in  readiness  to  go  up  the  river  at 
a  moment's  notice,  and  to  procure  sloops  from  Albany  and  keep  them 
for  that  purpose. 

Washington  and  Congress  alike  erred  in  their  opinion  as  to  the 
subsequent  operations  of  the  British  army  ;  for  both  alike  anticipated 
that  the  army  of  Canada,  then  more  than  thirteen  thousand  strong, 
would  come  down  to  New  York  by  sea,  and  participate  in  the  advance 
upon  Philadelphia.  As  a  matter  of  military  judgment  their  views  as 
to  the  propriety  of  his  march  proved  to  be  correct,  as  the  proposed 
combined  movement  of  Clinton  from  New  York  and  of  Burgoyne  from 
Canada  actually  failed  because  inadequate  forces  were  furnished  for  its 
execution.  Washington  wrote  to  Schuyler  on  the  twentieth,  upon 
receiving  intimation  of  Burgoyne's  preparations,  expressing  his  "  con 
fidence  in  the  strength  of  Ticonderoga  and  the  facility  with  which 
Putnam's  troops  could  be  sent  to  its  support,  if  threatened,"  adding, 
"  he  certainly  will  never  leave  the  garrison  of  Ticonderoga  in  his  rear: 
and  if  he  invests  it  to  any  purpose,  he  will  not  have  a  sufficient  num 
ber  left  to  send  one  body  to  Oswego,  and  another  to  cut  off  the  com 
munications  between  Fort  Edward  and  Fort  George."  General  St. 
Clair  wrote,  not  to  send  reinforcements  until  they  were  needed,  for 
"  they  would  consume  the  supplies."  Meanwhile  Washington 
strengthened  the  right  wing  of  his  position  at  Middlebrook  by  re 
doubts,  ordered  Arnold  to  watch  Trenton  and  the  upper  ferries,  and 
rested  under  the  belief  that  Howe  would  not  advance  toward  the 
Delaware  and  attempt  a  crossing,  while  his  own  army  was  in  the  rear. 
He  argued  thus  ;  "  Had  they  designed  for  the  Delaware,  on  the  first 
instance,  they  would  probably  have  made  a  secret,  rapid  march  of  it, 
and  not  halted  as  they  have  done,  to  awaken  our  attention  and  give 
us  time  to  prepare  for  obstructing  them.  Instead  of  this  they  have 
only  advanced  to  a  position  necessary  to  facilitate  an  attack  upon  our 
right,  which  is  the  part  they  have  the  greatest  likelihood  of  injuring 
us  in  :  and  added  to  this  consideration  they  have  come  out  as  light 
as  possible,  leaving  all  their  baggage,  provisions,  boats  and  bridges  at 
Brunswick,  which  plainly  contradicts  the  idea  of  pushing  for  the 
Delaware." 

On    the   morning   of  the    nineteenth,    General    Howe   suddenly 


300  MINOR    EVENTS,  JANUARY  TO  JULY.  fi777. 

abandoned  his  position  and  retired  to  Brunswick.  Maxwell  was  at 
once  sent  forward  to  take  a  position  between  Brunswick  and  Amboy, 
so  as  to  cut  off  detached  parties  or  baggage,  and  General  Greene  was 
sent  with  three  brigades  to  follow  the  river,  observe  the  crossing,  and 
attack  their  rear  as  soon  as  they  should  leave  post.  The  entire 
American  army  was  put  in  readiness  to  support  the  movement. 

General  Howe  started  on  the  twenty-second  early  in  the  morning. 
Morgan  and  Wayne  drove  the  Hessian  rear-guard  forward  upon  the 
main  body  after  a  spirited  action.  It  had  been  Greene's  intention  to 
have  Maxwell  strike  the  column  near  Piscataway,  while  he  should 
hold  them  under  fire.  The  messenger  sent  to  Maxwell  with  the  order 
was  captured  or  lost,  and  he  received  his  orders  at  last  only  after  the 
Hessian  corps  had  joined  the  advanced  troops.  Stirling  then  joined 
Maxwell,  and  Greene  carried  the  pursuit  as  far  as  Piscataway. 

Washington  promptly  advanced  the  army  to  Quibbletown,  now  New 
Market,  upon  the  counsel  of  his  officers,  that  the  retreat  was  genuine  ; 
yet  not  without  suspicion  that  the  whole  was  a  skillfully  developed 
feint  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  him  from  his  stronghold.  General 
Stirling's  command  was  stationed  in  advance  at  Metuchen. 

Few  events  of  that  war  involved  more  sharp  discussion  than  the 
advance  and  sudden  retreat  of  General  Howe.  The  anonymous 
<k  Letters  to  a  Nobleman,"  "  Galloway's  Reflections,"  "  Howe's  Nar 
rative,"  and  other  documents  of  the  kind,  still  have  freshness  and  in 
terest  ;  but  none  of  them  settle  the  controversy.  Howe  occupied  a 
position  in  which  he  could  neither  attack  nor  be  attacked.  Neither 
army  was  in  danger  from  the  other.  His  forte  was  in  the  field  proper, 
and  his  purpose  was  to  entice  Washington's  army  into  a  position  where 
the  advantages  would  be  with  himself.  If  he  had  marched  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  Washington  would  have  given  him  a  fight. 
The  chief  fact  indicated  by  his  course,  and  that  is  supported  by  his 
own  defense,  was  the  appreciation  he  began  to  entertain  of  the  char 
acter  of  Washington,  and  he  would  not  engage  at  all  under  risks. 
He  claimed  that  his  force  was  inferior  in  numbers  to  that  of  Wash 
ington  ;  but  his  advocates  as  well  as  critics  are  obliged  to  accept  the 
facts  as  already  recorded. 

Stedman,  who  served  in  the  British  general  staff  under  Howe, 
Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  and  whose  volumes  are  among  the  most  inter 
esting  which  were  published  at  the  close  of  the  war,  takes  occasion, 
while  reviewing  the  New  Jersey  campaign  of  1/77,  to  pass  judgment 
upon  the  relative  strength  of  the  armies  from  the  commencement  of 


I777-]  MINOR   EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO  JULY.  3<DI 

operations  on  Long  Island,  up  to  the  first  of  July,  1777  As  that 
period  is  under  brief  notice,  his  estimate  is  given  for  permanent 
reference. 

"  BRITISH  AND  REBEL  FORCE  IN  1776." 

Dates.  British.  Rebels. 

August  ....  24,000 16,000 

November  ....  26,600  .                  ...     4,500 

December  ....  27,700 3,300 

IN  1777. 

March         ....         27,000 4,500 

June  ....         30,000 8,000 

On  the  twenty-sixth.  General  Howe  put  his  entire  army  in  motion 
to  resume  the  offensive,  and  advanced  to  Scotch  Plains  and  Westfield. 

Cornwallis  marched  via  Woodbridge,  with  the  right  wing  of  the 
army,  at  seven  in  the  morning,  while  General  Howe  in  person  led  the 
left  wing  by  Metuchen  Meeting  House,  intending  to  connect  with  the 
rear  of  the  right  column  at  that  point,  and  then  swing  upon  the  left 
of  the  American  main  army.  Cornwallis  with  the  extreme  right,  was 
to  gain  the  passes  to  Middlebrook.  A  third  body  of  troops  with  four 
battalions  and  six  pieces  of  artillery  were  sent  to  Bonhamton,  to 
demonstrate  toward  the  American  right  wing.  Cornwallis  had  hardly 
passed  through  Woodbridge,  when  he  was  confronted  by  Stirling's 
division.  A  spirited  skirmish  ensued,  which  was  to  the  benefit  of 
Cornwallis,  whose  artillery  were  of  a  more  effective  caliber  ;  and  he 
crowded  the  retiring  division  as  far  as  Westfield,  and  the  present 
Plainfield,  capturing  three  brass  guns,  and  inflicting  a  loss  in  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners,  of  nearly  two  hundred  men,  with  a  loss  to  his 
own  command  of  not  more  than  seventy. 

Maxwell,  who  had  been  stationed  near  the  Raritan,  on  the  line  of 
the  original  retreat  of  General  Howe,  retired  without  loss.  Wash 
ington  quickly  comprehended  the  purpose  of  his  adversary,  and 
recovered  the  passes  to  his  old  post  before  Cornwallis  who  had  been 
delayed  so  long  by  Stirling  could  accomplish  his  purpose,  which  was 
to  seize  them  while  General  Howe  should  threaten  Washington's 
front.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  twenty-seventh,  the  division  of  Corn 
wallis  left  Westfield,  passed  through  Sampton  unopposed,  and  joined 
General  Howe,  who  had  effected  nothing  of  value  by  his  movement. 

On  the  thirtieth  the  British  army  crossed  to  Staten  Island,  and 
the  military  career  of  General  Howe  in  New  Jersey  ended. 


302  MINOR   EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO  JULY.  [1777. 

The  immediate  activity  of  the  shipping  at  New  York  now  satisfied 
Washington  that  a  diversion  would  be  made  up  the  Hudson  to  draw 
him  in  that  direction,  and  that  operations  toward  Philadelphia  would 
be  made  by  sea.  Letters  from  General  St.  Clair  stated  positively, 
that  Burgoyne  had  advanced  with  view  to  attack  Ticonderoga  and  its 
dependent  posts.  Orders  were  at  once  sent  to  Putnam  to  place  Var- 
num  and  Parsons'  brigades  at  Peekskill  to  observe  the  river,  in  the 
place  of  Nixon's  which  had  been  hurried  to  Albany,  and  the  expedi 
tion  from  Canada  was  at  last  on  its  march. 

The  narrative  will  follow  the  order  indicated  at  the  opening  of 
the  chapter,  and  take  under  notice  the  "  Operations  of  Burgoyne's 
Campaign." 


r 


302* 


CHAPTER    XLIII. 

BURGOYNE'S   CAMPAIGN  OPENED.     1777. 

ON  the  twenty-second  day  of  August,  1776,  Lord  George  Ger- 
maine  handed  to  Captain  Le  Maitre,  an  aid-de-camp  of  Gen 
eral  Carleton,  then  commanding  in  Canada,  a  letter,  to  be  delivered 
by  him  to  General  Carleton  upon  his  arrival  at  Quebec.  The  aid-de 
camp  found  it  impossible  to  make  the  passage  on  account  of  ice  in  the 
St.  Lawrence,  and  returned  the  dispatch  to  Lord  Germaine,  at  the 
palace  of  Whitehall,  London. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  March,  1777,  the  letter  was  again  sent, 
accompanied  by  the  instructions,  that  it  was  his  Majesty's  pleasure 
that  General  Carleton  should  return  to  Quebec  as  soon  as  he  should 
have  driven  the  American's  forces  from  Canada,  taking  with  him  such 
part  of  his  army  as  in  his  judgment  and  discretion  appeared  sufficient 
for  the  defense  of  the  Province  ;  and  that  Lieutenant-general  Bur- 
goyne  or  such  other  suitable  officer  as  General  Carleton  should  think 
most  proper,  be  detached  with  the  remainder  of  the  troops, — "  to  pro 
ceed  with  all  possible  expedition  to  join  General  Howe  and  put  him 
self  under  his  command/' 

Lord  Germaine  maintained,  that  ':  with  a  view  of  quelling  the 
rebellion  as  soon  as  possible,  it  had  become  highly  necessary  that  the 
most  speedy  junction  of  the  two  armies  should  be  effected  :  that  the 
king  had  designated  three  thousand  men  as  the  force  to  be  left  in 
Canada,  and  that  the  remainder  of  the  army  should  be  employed  in 
two  expeditions  :  the  one  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-general 
Burgoyne,  who  was  to  force  his  way  to  Albany  ;  and  the  other  under 
Lieutenant-colonel  St.  Leger,  who  was  to  make  a  diversion  on  the 
Mohawk  river. 

It  was  explicitly  stated,  also,  that  the  plan  under  consideration 
"  could  not  be  advantageously  executed  without  the  assistance  of 


304  BURGOYNE'S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED.  [i777( 

Canadians  and  Indians."  It  was  "  left  to  the  influence  of  General 
Carleton  among  those  bodies  of  men,  to  assure  a  good  and  sufficient 
number,  for  the  purpose  in  view." 

Lieutenant-general  Burgoyne  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Quebec 
forthwith,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  crown  with  the 
utmost  dispatch.  The  instructions  above  referred  to,  were  so  explicit 
as  to  indicate  the  number  of  men,  and  even  the  particular  detachments, 
which  should  be  respectively  assigned  to  the  enjoined  operations. 
The  statement  of  the  details  thus  made,  will  have  interest  during  the 
course  of  the  narrative.  The  force  detained  for  the  defense  of  Canada 
was  to  consist  of 

"  The  8th  Regt.,  deducting  100  for  the  expedition  to  the  Mohawk        .  460  men 
Battalion  companies  of  the  34th  ;  deducting  100  for  the  expedition 

to  the  Mohawk             .             ........  348  " 

Battalion  companies  of  the  29th  and  3 ist  regiments            .         .         .  896  " 

Eleven  additional  companies  from  Great  Britain         .         .         .         .  616  " 

Detachments  from  the  two  brigades           ......  300  " 

Detachments  from  the  German  troops 650  •» 

Royal  Highland  emigrants 500  " 

Total 3770 

This  assignment  of  troops  for  the  protection  of  Canada  expressly 
and  justly  presumed,  that  the  operations  in  progress  in  different  parts 
of  America  would  confine  the  attention  of  its  people  to  their  own 
necessities,  and  that  the  force  thus  designated  would  be  ample  for 
local  defense.  The  assignment  of  troops  to  the  moving  columns  was 
equally  exact. 

General  Burgoyne's  command  was  thus  stated  : 

The  grenadiers  and  light  infantry  of  the  army :  (except  of  the  8th 
regiment  and  the  24th  regiment)  :  as  the  advanced  corps,  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-general  Fraser  .  .  .  .  .  .  1 568  men 

First  brigade  :  battalion  companies  of  the  9th,  2ist,  and  47th  regiments  ; 

deducting  a  detachment  from  each  corps  to  remain  in  Canada         .    1194   " 

Second  brigade  :  battalion  companies  of  the  2oth,  53d,  and  62d  regi 
ments  ;  deducting  50  from  each  corps  to  remain  as  above  .  .  1194  " 

All  the  German  troops  except  the  Hanau  Chasseurs,  and  a  detach 
ment  of  650  ...........  3217  " 

The  artillery,  except  such  parts  as  shall  be  necessary  for  Canada 

Total 7173   " 

This  command  was  "  to  be  associated  with  as  many  Canadians  and 
Indians  as  might  be  thought  necessary  for  the  service,"  and  when  so 
organized,  it  was  "  to  proceed  with  all  expedition  to  Albany,  and  be 


f777.j  BURGOYNE'S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED  305 

placed  under  the  command  of  Sir  William  Howe."  The  force  which 
was  carefully  assigned  to  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel  St. 
Leger,  was  thus  stated  : 

Detachment  from  the  8th  regiment 100  men 

Detachment  from  the  34th  regiment  100    " 

Sir  John  Johnson's  regiment  of  New  York 133    " 

Hanau  Chasseurs 342    ' 

Total 675    " 

To  this  force,  there  was  also  "  to  be  added  a  sufficient  number  of 
Canadians  and  Indians  "  ;  the  same  "  to  proceed  to  Albany,  and  never 
to  lose  view  of  their  intended  junction  with  Sir  William  Howe  as  their 
principal  object." 

The  foregoing  instructions  are  the  voice  from  Whitehall  Palace. 
They  read  like  orders  from  a  corps  commander,  who  can  judge  from 
his  daily  returns,  exactly  of  the  force  in  hand  for  immediate  use. 

Lieutenant-general  Burgoyne  left  London,  March  twenty-seventh, 
and  reached  Quebec  on  the  sixth  day  of  May.  He  notified  General 
Sir  William  Howe  immediately  of  his  strict  instructions,  and  ex 
pressed  a  wish  that  he  had  sufficient  latitude  of  movement  to  warrant 
a  diversion  towards  Connecticut.  From  the  first  inception  of  the 
enterprise,  it  was  declared  to  be  of  necessity  that  Albany  should  be 
the  objective  of  the  march,  "  after  the  capture  of  the  American  posts 
which  lay  upon  Lake  Champlain."  General  Carleton  entered  into  the 
outfit  of  the  expedition  with  a3  much  zeal  and  energy  as  if  it  had  been 
to  his  individual  credit  to  assure  success.  Burgoyne  afterward  testi 
fied  that  u  he  could  not  have  done  more  for  his  brother." 

The  inherent  difficulties  of  the  movement  were  in  many  respects 
similar  to  those  which  affected  the  American  expedition  to  Canada. 
These  must  be  briefly  stated  in  order  to  secure  a  fair  opinion  of  the 
capacity  and  wisdom  of  the  lieutenant-general  commanding. 

The  Canadian  troops,  estimated  for  at  two  thousand  men,  could 
not  be  enlisted.  Less  than  two  hundred  reported  for  duty.  The 
pioneers  who  were  to  make  and  repair  roads,  carry  provisions,  and  do 
much  of  the  practical  part  of  the  logistics  of  the  march,  were  not  only 
greatly  deficient  in  numbers,  but  still  more  wanting  in  willingness  to 
work,  and  fitness  for  the  duty  required  of  them.  Neither  money  nor 
constraint  could  secure  the  requisite  numbers  of  carts  and  horses  for 
the  outfit.  The  weather  was  unpropitious  and  the  roads  were  almost 
impassable.  Reference  is  made  to  map  entitled  "  Burgoyne's  Saratoga 
Campaign,"  as  the  first  of  the  series  designed  to  illustrate  its  progress. 
20 


306  BURGOYNE'S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED.  [1777 

The  preliminary  camp  was  established  on  the  Boquet  river,  on  the 
western  shore  of  Lake  Champlain,  and  the  troops  reached  that  station 
as  early  as  the  twentieth  day  of  June.  The  Indians,  who  had  been 
looked  upon  as  valuable  auxiliaries,  were  yet  to  be  secured.  In  re 
sponse  to  a  well  circulated  appeal,  addressed  to  various  tribes,  about 
four  hundred  Iroquois,  Algonquins  Abenaquies,  and  Ottowas,  met 
General  Burgoyne  in  conference  on  the  twenty-first  day  of  June,  at 
his  headquarters.  In  view  of  the  odium  which  was  cast  upon  this 
officer  by  an  unwise  proclamation  at  that  time  issued,  it  is  proper  to 
say,  that  in  his  address  to  the  warriors  who  agreed  to  take  up  the 
hatchet  for  the  king,  he  expressly  stated  the  "  necessity  of  restraint 
of  their  passions,  and  that  they  must  be  under  control,  in  accordance 
with  the  religion,  laws  of  warfare,  principles  and  policy  which  belonged 
to  Great  Britain," — ^'"positively  forbidding  bloodshed,  when  not  op 
posed  in  arms," — declaring  "  aged  men,  women,  children,  and  prisoners, 
sacred  from  the  knife,  even  in  the  time  of  conflict,"  and  otherwise 
instructing  the  savages,  that  "  the  war  must  not  be  made  as  when  they 
went  forth  alone,  but  under  the  absolute  will  and  control  of  the  army 
of  the  king." 

His  proclamation  to  the  Americans,  as  well  as  the  address  to  the 
Indian  chiefs,  assumed  all  that  could  possibly  be  asserted  as  to  the 
guilt  of  rebellion  ;  and  while  extremely  pompous  and  extravagant  in 
language,  preshadowed  the  extreme  vengeance  of  savage  auxiliaries 
if  resistance  should  be  prolonged.  It  was  extremely  unprofessional, 
and  more  in  harmony  with  the  abstract  political  dogmas  of  the  crown 
than  with  Burgoyne's  own  character.  Its  much  ridiculed  assertion 
of  personal  title,  and  of  royal  prerogative,  was  quite  in  harmony  with 
his  instructions,  and  somewhat  offensive  for  its  vanity,  while  it  lacked 
the  wisdom  which  a  better  knowledge  of  his  opponents  soon  inculcated. 
It  aroused  sensible  men  to  a  more  stubborn  resistance,  and  was  more 
effective  than  appeals  of  Congress,  to  induce  the  people  of  New  Eng 
land  to  take  up  arms  for  border  defense.  They  knew  well  from  ex 
perience  just  what  a  war  with  savages  meant,  and  they  were  inclined 
to  class  the  British  troops  who  employed  them,  in  the  same  list  of 
enemies  with  the  savages  themselves. 

Washington  issued  a  counter-proclamation.  One  paragraph  is 
worthy  a  space  in  all  records  of  that  war:  and  is  peculiarly  expressive 
of  the  character,  consistency  and  faith  of  the  man,  while  it  affords  an 
index  of  his  firmness  in  the  path  of  duty.  It  reads  as  follows: 

"  Harassed  as  we  are  by  unrelenting  persecution,  obliged  by  every 


I777.J  BURGOVNE'S  CAMPAIGN   OPENED.  307 

tie  to  repel  violence  by  force,  urged  by  self-preservation  to  exert  the 
strength  which  Providence  has  given  us  to  defend  our  natural  rights 
against  the  aggressor,  we  appeal  to  the  hearts  of  all  mankind  for  the 
justice  of  our  course  ;  its  event  we  leave  to  Him  who  speaks  the  fate 
of  nations,  in  humble  confidence,  that  as  His  omniscient  eye  taketh 
note  even  of  a  sparrow  that  falleth  to  the  ground,  so  He  will  not  with- 
draw  His  countenance  from  a  people  who  humbly  array  themselves 
under  His  banner,  in  defense  of  the  noblest  principles  with  which  He 
has  adorned  humanity." 

The  army  advanced  to  Crown  Point,  rested  three  days,  and  moved 
forward  on  the  thirtieth.  The  British  light  infantry  and  grenadiers, 
with  the  twenty-fourth  British  foot,  some  Canadians  and  Indians, 
with  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  marched  down  the  west  shore  and  took 
post  within  four  miles  of  Ticonderoga.  The  German  reserve,  Bruns 
wick  chasseurs,  light  infantry  and  grenadiers  followed  the  east  shore ; 
and  General  Burgoyne  accompanied  the  fleet. 

On  the  first  of  July  the  investment  began.  General  Burgoyne's 
muster  of  that  date  gave  his  force,  rank  and  file,  as  follows : 

British  Regulars 3/24  men 

German         "  3016     " 

Artillery        "  473    " 

7213   «• 

Canadians  and  Provincials  about 250   " 

Indians  about  400   " 

Total  about 7863  men. 

As  early  as  the  twenty-eighth  of  February,  one  month  before  he 
left  England,  General  Burgoyne  embodied  his  views  in  a  letter  to 
Lord  George  Germaine.  The  document  is  a  model  paper  in  its  an 
ticipation  of  the  contingencies  of  the  proposed  service ;  and  while  the 
general  ideas  of  that  letter  were  incorporated  into  his  ultimate  instruc 
tions,  he  was  not  allowed  the  full  regular  force  which  he  deemed 
necessary  for  the  undertaking,  and  his  auxiliaries  from  Canada  and 
from  Indian  tribes  were  too  few  to  be  of  mirch  practical  value,  while 
they  burdened  him  with  an  element  which  did  more  harm  than  good, 
at  times  of  real  crisis.  His  proposed  diversion  into  New  England 
was  predicated  upon  support  from  the  troops  then  at  Newport,  Rhode 
Island,  and  the  assurance  that  there  would  be  adequate  and  prompt 
support  from  the  army  at  New  York.  He  had,  on  one  occasion, 
advised  that  the  northern  movement  should  be  limited  to  the  occupa- 


308  BURGOYNE  S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED.  [1777, 

tion  and  firm  possession  of  the  posts  on  Lake  Champlain,  and  that  the 
troops  which  were  destined  to  cooperate  with  General  Howe  should  go 
from  Quebec  to  New  York,  or  Newport,  by  sea,  and  thus  secure  the 
earliest  possible  field  service  in  the  campaign  of  1777.  It  has  been 
shown  in  another  connection  that  General  Howe  himself  expressed 
the  opinion,  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Germaine,  that  a  movement  from 
Canada  down  the  Hudson  river  could  not  be  supposed  to  be  of  prac 
tical  benefit  before  September.  General  Burgoyne  encountered  the 
difficulties  which  he,  alone,  anticipated,  and  many  trials  which  should 
have  been  spared  him  ;  and  yet  he  was  face  to  face  with  the  American 
army,  within  thirty-two  miles  of  Albany,  by  the  middle  of  August. 

He  was  before  Ticonderoga  the  first  of  July,  with  the  forces  already 
indicated. 

He  was  harshly  censured  for  taking  with  him  an  alleged  excess  of 
heavy  guns.  But  these  were  distributed  on  ships,  or  placed  in  the 
captured  posts,  so  that  the  artillery  of  his  moving  column  did  not 
average  two  pieces  to  a  battalion,  twenty-six  guns  in  all,  and  ten  of 
these  were  formed  into  a  special  park  under  General  Phillips,  to  be 
used  wherever  needed,  so  as  to  secure  a  greater  combined  effect,  as 
with  modern  batteries.  Four  howitzers  and  two  light  twenty-fours, 
constituted  his  heavy  ordnance,  and  the  remainder  were  light  threes 
and  sixes.  This  complement  of  artillery  was  the  lowest  which  the 
regulations  of  the  service  admitted  ;  and  there  was  no  reason  for  him 
to  doubt  that  he  would  be  furnished  with  adequate  transportation, 
until  the  failure  of  Canadian  allies  and  of  proper  support,  had  placed 
him  where  there  was  no  remedy  for  meagre  resources  but  in  the  des 
perate  conflict  of  battle  against  superior  numbers. 

The  advance  to  Ticonderoga  was  followed  up  with  vigor.  The 
old  French  posts  on  the  heights,  north  of  the  fort,  had  been  partially 
repaired  and  strengthened  by  new  intrenchments  ;  and  one  block 
house  had  been  erected  on  a  hill  which  commanded  the  northern 
extremity  of  Lake  George.  On  the  second  day  of  July  these  works 
were  abandoned  and  the  wooden  defenses  were  burned  by  the  Ameri 
cans.  General  Phillips  promptly  occupied  the  hill,  accepting  the  name 
of  Mount  Hope,  given  by  Abercrombie  twenty  years  before. 

On  Mount  Independence,  opposite  Ticonderoga,  there  was  a  star 
fort,  which  commanded  the  water  passage,  and  at  the  foot  of  the  hill 
batteries  had  been  established.  These  were  well  supplied  with  heavy 
guns. 

General  Riedesel  encamped  just  north  of  this  position,  and  the 


1777-j  BURGOYNE'S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED.  309 

ships  of  war  were  anchored  across  the  lake  just  within  range  of  the 
American  batteries.  At  the  head  of  Lake  Champlain,  South  river,  so 
called,  ending  in  Wood  creek,  and  in  fact  a  narrow  lake,  unites  with 
Lake  George  ;  and  the  intervening  tongue  of  land,  called  Sugar  Loaf 
Hill,  is  seven  hundred  feet  above  the  line  of  the  lake,  and  commands 
Ticonderoga.  Its  steep  ascent  had  been  regarded  by  the  Americans 
as  impracticable  of  occupation  ;  but  on  the  fourth  of  July,  Lieuten 
ant  Twiss,  commanding  the  British  Engineers,  reconnoitered  the 
summit  and  reported  that  it  commanded  a  direct  practicable  range 
of  fire  upon  both  Ticonderoga  and  Mount  Independence,  at  a  distance 
of  not  more  than  fifteen  hundred  yards  from  the  latter,  which  was  the 
more  distant  post.  It  also  commanded  the  bridge  of  communication 
which  connected  the  American  posts. 

This  bridge  had  a  double  purpose ;  one  for  communication,  and 
the  other  to  prevent  the  passage  of  ships  into  South  river.  It  was 
supported  by  twenty-two  sunken  pieces  of  large  timber  at  nearly 
equal  distances.  Between  the  piers  were  separate  floats,  fifty  feet  long 
and  twelve  feet  wide,  strongly  fastened  together  by  chains  and  rivets, 
and  well  secured  to  the  piers.  Before  the  bridge  was  a  boom,  also 
made  of  heavy  timbers,  carefully  united  by  clinched  bolts  and  double 
chains  of  inch  and  a  half  iron.  Upon  the  report  of  Lieutenant  Twiss, 
a  pioneer  corps  and  a  force  of  sappers  were  put  to  work,  and  by  the 
morning  of  the  fifth  a  British  force  crowned  the  summit  of  Sugar 
Loaf  Hill,  which  was  promptly  dignified  by  its  occupants  with  the 
name  of  "  Fort  Defiance."  A  practicable  path  had  been  made  for  the 
carriage  of  guns,  which  were  dismounted  for  the  purpose,  and  the 
battery  was  soon  in  its  new  position. 

While  these  arrangements  had  been  in  progress  for  the  complete 
isolation  and  control  of  Ticonderoga,  the  garrison  of  the  post  was  not 
indifferent  to  passing  events.  Its  exact  condition  is  worthy  of  notice, 
in  order  to  appreciate  the  erroneous  impression  which  Congress, 
General  Washington  and  the  American  people  entertained,  upon 
hearing  of  its  evacuation  by  General  St.  Clair,  without  battle.  In 
proportion  as  its  defense  was  desired  and  expected,  just  to  that  degree 
did  the  public  judgment  impute  fault  to  both  the  immediate  and 
remote  commander;  so  that  General  Schuyler  as  well  as  General  St. 
Clair  suffered  seriously  through  this  inevitable  disaster. 

The  Northern  Department,  necessarily  so  isolated  from  other 
fields  of  operation,  was  habitually  a  browsing  place  for  aspirants  after 
independent  command,  and  this  disposition  was  strengthened  by  the 


3io  BURGOYNE'S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED.  [1777, 

natural  tendency  to  repose  its  defense  in  the  hands  of  the  New 
England  militia  who  were  most  intimately  related  to  that  defense. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  of  March,  General  Schuyler  had  been  relieved 
from  the  command  by  General  Gates,  but  was  reinstated  in  May, 
after  fairly  presenting  his  case  before  Congress.  He  returned  to  his 
headquarters  at  Albany  on  the  third  of  June  and  at  once  tendered  to 
General  Gates  the  command  of  Ticonderoga,  as  the  most  exposed 
and  most  honorable  post  within  the  department.  That  officer 
declined  the  command.  It  was  his  purpose  to  obtain  the  command 
of  the  department  itself,  and  his  correspondence  is  impregnated  with 
the  spirit  of  jealous  aspiration.  While  urging  that  Albany  should 
not  be  retained  as  headquarters,  he  wrote,  "  If  General  Schuyler  is 
solely  to  possess  all  powers,  all  the  intelligence,  and  that  particular 
favorite,  the  military  chest,  and  constantly  reside  in  Albany,  I  can 
not,  with  any  peace  of  mind,  serve  at  Ticonderoga." 

At  this  period  the  valley  of  the  Mohawk  and  its  relations  to 
Indian  operations,  based  upon  British  support  through  the  lake  port 
of  Oswego,  invested  Albany  with  peculiar  value  as  a  centre  of  control. 
In  determining  the  wisdom  of  Schuyler  and  Burgoyne  in  their  subse 
quent  career,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  St.  Leger  expedition 
from  Canada,  also  had  Albany  as  its  objective,  via  Oswego,  Fort 
Schuyler  (Stanwix),  and  the  Mohawk  Valley,  and  that  both  the  Brit 
ish  armies  were  to  be  watched  by  Schuyler  ;  while  Burgoyne  not  only 
had  positive  orders  to  make  Albany  the  objective  of  his  march,  but  he 
was  held  to  a  faithful  concert  of  action  with  St.  Leger,  in  order  that 
both  expeditions  should  realize  their  common  objective.  The  drift 
of  such  action  was  to  incline  Burgoyne  to  march  down  the  west  bank 
of  the  Hudson,  and  it  was  equally  vital  to  the  American  cause  that 
the  department  commander  should  have  ready  access  to  both  lines 
of  operation  which  thus  converged  upon  Albany. 

Gates  had  accomplished  nothing  of  real  value  in  the  preparation 
of  the  lake  posts  for  defense  during  the  two  months  he  had  been  in 
command  of  the  department,  and  was  still  at  Albany  when  Schuyler 
returned.  He  had  made  a  requisition  upon  Washington  for  tents,  and 
when  the  commander-in-chief  replied,  "  As  the  northern  troops  are 
hutted,  the  tents  must  be  used  for  southern  troops  until  a  supply  can 
be  obtained,"  he  answered,  "  Refusing  this  army  what  you  have  not 
in  your  power  is  one  thing  ;  but  saying  that  this  army  has  not  the 
same  necessities  as  the  southern  army  is  another.  I  can  assure  your 
excellency  the  service  of  the  northern  army  requires  tents  as  much 


1777.]  BURGOYNE'S  CAMPAIGN  OPENED.  311 

as  any  service  I  ever  saw."  To  Mr.  Lovell,  of  the  New  England 
delegation,  he  wrote,  "  Either  I  am  exceedingly  dull,  or  unreasonably 
jealous,  if  I  do  not  discover  by  the  style  and  tenor  of  the  letters  from 
Morristown,  how  little  I  have  to  expect  from  thence.  Generals  are 
like  parsons,  they  are  all  for  christening  their  own  child  first ;  but  let 
an  impartial  moderating  power  decide  between  us,  and  do  not  suffer 
southern  prejudice  to  weigh  heavier  in  the  balance  than  the  northern." 
In  connection  with  this  outcropping  of  an  appeal  to  sectional  feeling 
which  was  the  exact  counterpart  of  that  exhibited  by  Lee  while  he  was 
at  New  Castle  Heights,  it  is  only  necessary  to  say  that  Washington 
used  the  term  southern  only  as  comparing  the  operations  of  two  geo 
graphical  departments,  and  not  in  any  personal  sense.  He  stated  a 
military  fact,  without  argument,  and  the  conduct  of  Gates  is  self- 
interpreting. 

On  the  ninth  of  June,  Gates  took  leave  of  absence  and  left  the 
department. 

Schuyler  ordered  all  forts  to  be  put  in  condition  for  service, 
appealed  to  the  States  to  forward  their  militia,  and  on  the  twentieth 
proceeded  to  inspect  the  imperiled  posts  for  himself.  Generals  St. 
Clair,  De  Rochefermoy,  Poor  and  Patterson  were  then  at  Ticon- 
deroga.  The  garrison  of  that  post  and  of  Mount  Independence  com 
bined  amounted  to  only  twenty-five  hundred  and  forty-six  conti 
nental  troops,  including  artisans,  and  about  nine  hundred  militia.  A 
council  of  general  officers  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  the  troops 
were  inadequate  to  protracted  defense,  but  that  the  posts  should  be 
maintained,  if  possible,  until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  or  until  the 
stores  and  troops  could  be  safely  withdrawn.  It  was  considered  im 
practicable  to  fortify  Sugar  Loaf  Hill.  The  troops  could  not  well  be 
spared,  it  is  true  ;  but  the  possibility  of  its  occupation  by  a  hostile 
force  was  not  considered  a  serious  question  of  fact. 

During  this  trip  General  Schuyler  found  the  condition  of  the  troops 
to  be  beyond  his  worst  apprehensions.  The  clothing  was  nearly 
worn  out,  military  supplies  other  than  pork  and  flour  had  not  accu 
mulated  as  anticipated,  the  number  of  bayonets  did  not  exceed  a  few 
hundred,  and  there  was  very  little  to  encourage  the  expectations 
which  the  country  entertained  as  to  the  ultimate  strength  of  Ticon- 
deroga  as  a  real  fortress. 

General  Schuyler  returned  to  Albany  to  hasten  forward  additional 
troops.  General  St.  Clair,  still  hopeful  of  his  ability  to  resist  assault, 


BURGOYNE  S   CAMPAIGN   OPENED.  [1777. 

wrote  to  him  on  the  last  of  June,  "  should  the  enemy  attack  us,  they 
will  go  back  faster  than  they  came." 

Schuyler's  own  aid-de-camp,  Major  Henry  B.  Livingston,  who 
remained  at  Ticonderoga  sick,  when  he  left,  wrote  in  a  similar  strain. 
General  Schuyler  was  less  sanguine,  and  wrote  to  Colonel  Varick  on 
the  first  of  July: 

"  The  insufficiency  of  the  garrison  at  Ticonderoga,  the  imperfect 
state  of  the  fortifications,  and  the  want  of  discipline  in  the  troops, 
give  me  great  cause  to  apprehend  that  we  shall  lose  that  fortress,  but 
as  a  reinforcement  is  coming  up  from  Peekskill,  with  which  I  shall 
move  up,  I  am  in  hopes  that  the  enemy  will  be  prevented  from  any 
farther  progress." 

The  departure  of  General  Schuyler  fro-m  Ticonderoga  without 
effectual  provision  for  the  contingency  of  its  abandonment,  or  waiting 
to  test  its  capacity  for  defense,  was  the  subject  of  grave  criticism,  and 
resulted  in  a  Court  of  Inquiry.  That  court  consisted  of  Major-gen 
eral  Lincoln,  Brigadier-generals  Nixon,  George  Clinton  (the  only  one 
from  Schuyler's  State),  Wayne  and  Muhlenburg,  and  Colonels  John 
Greaton,  Francis  Johnson,  Rufus  Putnam,  Mordecai  Gist,  William 
Russell,  William  Grayson,  Walter  Stewart,  and  R.  J.  Meigs,  with 
John  Lawrens  as  Judge  Advocate  ;  and  found  "  that  Major-general 
Philip  Schuyler  was  not  guilty  of  neglect  of  duty,  and  is  acquitted 
with  the  highest  honor." 

The  fall  of  Ticonderoga  was  peculiarly  aggravating  to  this  officer, 
as  he  had  sent  sloops  to  Peekskill  for  the  troops  which,  as  before 
noticed,  had  been  ordered  by  Washington  to  his  aid,  and  on  the  fifth 
he  wrote  to  Congress,  "  If  they  do  not  arrive  by  to-morrow,  I  shall  go 
on  without  them,  and  do  the  best  I  can  with  the  militia."  He 
marched  on  the  seventh  with  all  the  militia  he  could  assemble,  but 
the  activity  of  Burgoyne  had  anticipated  the  movement,  and  the 
British  troops  were  again  in  possession  of  all  posts  on  Lake  Champlain 


A  ( i  //?llMfM^/f^fe 


V/    S»    -•     '  .   ;    -'-Js—^'     /^ak^  M\/>     .*i-—  -rj-fSf 


312* 


CHAPTER   XLIV. 

FROM  TICONDEROGA   TO   FORT  EDWARD.     1777. 

ON  :he  morning  of  July  fifth,  1777,  the  British  occupation  of 
Sugar  Loaf  Hill  gave  warning  to  the  garrison  of  Ticonderoga 
that  it  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy.  Previous  to  that  occupation, 
the  British  had  been  drawn  closely  about  the  fort,  and  the  garrison 
locked  forward  to  an  assault,  with  real  courage  and  hope.  It  was  very 
evident,  however,  on  the  fifth,  that  the  post  must  fall  without  the 
credit  of  real  resistance.  A  council  of  war  fully  considered  the  con 
dition  of  affairs,  and  resolved  that  "  retreat  ought  to  be  undertaken  as 
soon  as  possible,  and  that  we  shall  be  fortunate  to  effect  it."  The 
possibility  of  maintaining  the  post  on  Mount  Independence  was  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  the  certainty  that  the  British  would  control 
South  river,  and  cut  off  all  supplies  from  New  England  and  New 
York.  General  Riedesel  had  already  swung  his  left  wing  to  the  rear, 
and  eastward  of  the  latter  post,  and  the  south  face  of  Mount  Inde 
pendence  alone  remained  open  to  American  forces. 

It  was  not  until  after  dark  that  the  army  was  notified  of  the  deter 
mination  of  its  officers.  The  invalids,  ammunition,  and  a  large  quan 
tity  of  commissary  stores  were  placed  upon  two  hundred  and  twenty 
bateaux,  then  lying  in  South  river  below  the  bridge,  and  these  were 
started  for  Skenesborough  under  Colonel  Long,  then  post  commander 
of  Ticonderoga. 

Lights  were  extinguished  at  the  usual  hour,  and  occasional  firing 
was  maintained  from  the  summit  of  Mount  Independence,  upon  the 
new  works  upon  Sugar  Loaf  Hill,  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  the 
usual  garrison  habits  and  activities,  and  to  indicate  a  purpose  to  con 
test  the  supremacy  of  the  so-called  Fort  Defiance. 

The  retreat  began  at  three  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  July  sixth, 
and  the  arrangements  for  its  execution  were  eminently  judicious. 


3 14  FROM   TICONDEROGA  TO   FORT   EDWARD.  [1777 

The  heavy  guns  had  been  spiked,  but  the  trunnions  were  not  knocked 
off,  lest  the  click  of  the  sledges  should  be  borne  on  the  night  air  to 
the  watchful  enemy,  and  give  warning  of  the  attempt  to  escape.  The 
night  was  still,  and  a  partial  moon  dimly  lighted  the  mountain  sum 
mits,  while  the  shadows  deepened  under  Mount  Independence,  just 
where  the  bridge  was  waiting  to  perform  its  last  office  for  its  builders. 
The  British  guns  made  no  response  to  the  firing  of  the  Americans,  and 
as  soon  as  Colonel  Long's  command,  with  the  American  flotilla,  had 
started  on  its  way,  General  St.  Clair  took  up  his  march  for  Castleton. 
No  other  evidence  is  required  to  show  the  skill  with  which  the.se 
troops  began  their  disheartening  retreat,  than  the  single  fact  that  the 
entire  garrison  safely  crossed  the  bridge.  At  this  most  critical 
moment,  when  the  last  detachment  was  clear  of  the  fort,  and  the 
troops  on  Mount  Independence  had  descended  its  southern  slope,  the 
house  which  had  been  occupied  by  General  De  Fermoy  (signed  De 
Rochefermoy)  was  fired  in  contravention  of  orders,  and  the  whole 
scene  was  illuminated  for  the  information  of  the  besiegers. 

The  most  active  measures  were  at  once  taken  in  pursuit.  Day 
light  was  just  coming  on.  General  Phillips  pushed  General  Fraser 
with  a  flying  column  after  the  retiring  Americans,  left  the  Sixty-second 
British  regiment  as  a  garrison,  and  embarked  his  own  division  upon 
ships  to  accompany  Burgoyne  in  pursuit  of  the  American  shipping. 
General  Riedssel  placed  the  Brunswick  regiment  of  Prince  Frederick 
in  garrison  on  Mount  Independence,  and  followed  General  Fraser 
with  three  battalions  to  give  him  support  in  the  pursuit.  Commodore 
Lutwidge,  with  a  party  of  seamen,  soon  cut  a  passage  through  the 
bridge,  and  Burgoyne,  with  the  Inflexible  and  Royal  George  frigates 
and  the  swiftest  of  the  gun-boats,  was  moving  up  South  river  before 
nine  o'clock.  This  floating  column,  constituting  the  right  wing  of  the 
British  army,  reached  Skenesborough  only  two  hours  later  than  the 
Americans,  and  at  once  began  the  attack.  A  brief  resistance  was 
made  near  the  falls  where  Wood  creek  enters  into  South  river.  The 
British  destroyed  all  that  the  Americans  did  not  burn,  including  all 
the  supplies  which  had  been  saved  with  so  much  care.  The  Ninth, 
Twtntieth,  and  Twenty-first  British  regiments  were  landed,  ascended 
the  mountains,  and  made  a  detour  to  turn  a  small  fort  which  had  been 
built  to  command  the  passage  at  Wood  creek,  but  it  was  abandoned 
by  the  Americans  without  resistance.  Mills,  storehouses,  and  other 
valuable  property  which  had  been  accumulated  at  this  station  were 
soon  destroyed. 


I777-]  FROM   TICONDEROGA   TO   FORT   EDWARD.  315 

By  reference  to  the  map,  "  Burgoyne's  Saratoga  Campaign,"  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  right  wing  of  the  British  army  had  thus  gained 
an  advance  upon  General  St.  Clair,  as  Castleton  was  nearly  thirty 
miles  south-east  from  Ticonderoga,  and  nearly  twelve  miles  north-east 
from  Skenesborough,  so  that  General  Burgoyne  followed  the  base  of 
the  triangle  of  which  Castleton  was  the  apex,  and  made  a  quick  trip 
by  water,  while  St.  Clair  made  a  tedious  march  over  land,  through  an 
almost  pathless  wilderness. 

Colonel  Long  landed  his  battalion  about  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  and  upon  the  approach  of  the  British  ships,  marched  directly  to 
Fort  Ann,  a  distance  of  eleven  miles  to  the  south.  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  Hill  and  Major  Forbes,  of  the  British  Ninth  regiment,  followed  and, 
spent  the  night  bivouacked  in  the  woods  within  three  miles  of  that 
post.  General  Schuyler  was  then  at  Fort  Edward,  about  thirteen 
miles  further  to  the  south,  on  the  Hudson  river. 

He  promptly  sent  a  reinforcement  to  Fort  Ann,  and  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  seventh  Colonel  Long  advanced  to  a  ravine  three  miles 
north  of  the  fort,  where  Colonel  Hill  had  spent  the  night,  and  attacked 
his  command.  Major  Forbes  thus  describes  the  attack,  in  evidence 
laid  before  the  House  of  Commons,  page  61  of  official  documents, 
relating  to  Burgoyne's  expedition. 

11  At  half  past  ten  in  the  morning,  they  attacked  us  in  front  with 
a  heavy  and  well  directed  fire.  A  large  body  of  them  passed  up  the 
creek  to  our  left  and  fired  from  a  thick  wood  across  the  creek  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  regiment ;  then  they  began  to  recross  the  creek  and 
attack  us  in  the  rear.  We  then  found  it  necessary  to  change  our 
ground  to  prevent  the  regiment  being  surrounded.  We  took  post  on 
the  top  of  a  high  hill  to  our  right.  As  soon  as  we  had  taken  post, 
the  enemy  made  a  very  vigorous  attack  and  they  certainly  would  have 
forced  us,  had  it  not  been  for  some  Indians  that  arrived  and  gave  the 
Indian  whoop." 

General  Powell  had  been  dispatched  by  General  Burgoyne  with 
two  regiments,  as  well  as  the  Indian  auxiliaries,  to  the  support  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Hill,  and  the  American  troops  retreated  under 
the  pressure  of  superior  numbers,  burned  Fort  Ann,  and  then  retired 
to  Fort  Edward. 

General  Phillips,  who  had  accompanied  the  British  right  wing  as 
far  as  Skenesborough,  returned  to  Ticonderoga  and  commenced  the 
removal  of  artillery,  ammunition  and  provisions  to  Fort  George,  with 
all  other  heavy  baggage  which  could  be  more  readily  moved  by  water 


3l6  FROM   TICONDEROGA   TO   FORT   EDWARD.  [1777. 

transportation  ;  while  General  Burgoyne  established  his  headquarters 
at  Skenesborough  to  await  the  movements  of  the  left  wing,  to  rest 
his  troops  and  organize  for  a  further  advance. 

The  British  left  wing  followed  the  American  line  of  retreat.  Colo 
nel  Francis,  commanding  the  American  rear-guard,  left  Mount  Inde 
pendence  about  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  sixth.  St.  Clair 
moved  through  the  forests  with  such  expedition  that  his  advance 
reached  Hubbardton  quite  early  in  the  afternoon.  Leaving  Colonel 
Warner  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  to  Collect  stragglers  and 
await  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Francis,  he  hastened  forward  and  reached 
Castleton,  six  miles  further  south,  the  same  night. 

General  Fraser  marched  seventeen  miles  on  the  sixth  and  halted, 
General  Riedesel  being  at  that  time  only  three  miles  in  his  rear.  "  At 
the  earliest  day-light,  or  a  little  before,"  he  promptly  renewed  the 
pursuit.  Colonel  Francis  had  joined  Colonel  Warner  on  the  previous 
evening  and  their  entire  force,  together  with  the  regiment  of  Colonel 
Hale,  which  also  came  up  from  the  rear,  amounted  to  nearly  thirteen 
hundred  men.  They  resolved  to  await  General  Eraser's  approach 
and  give  battle.  The  American  troops  occupied  a  plateau  between 
Castleton  creek  and  one  of  its  dependent  forks  which  offered  an  eligible 
site  for  defense.  General  Fraser's  command  descended  a  long  slope 
to  the  creek  and  were  compelled  to  ascend  directly  upon  the  plateau, 
in  order  to  meet  the  Americans  on  equal  terms.  The  latter  did  not 
await  the  attack,  but  upon  the  alarm  of  the  pickets  met  them  promptly 
and  with  vigor.  A  sharp  skirmish  ensued.  Colonel  Hale,  himself  an 
invalid,  (subsequently  acquitted  of  the  charge  of  cowardice)  with  his 
poorly  disciplined  regiment,  abandoned  the  field  precipitately,  and 
fled  in  the  direction  of  Castleton  ;  so  that  the  whole  burden  of  the 
fight  devolved  upon  Colonels  Francis  and  Warner,  who  were  left  with 
a  force  of  not  more  than  nine  hundred  men.  The  command  of  Gen 
eral  Fraser  is  officially  reported  at  eight  hundred  and  fifty-eight.  The 
Americans,  hotly  pressed  as  they  were,  took  prompt  advantage  of 
lalling  timber  and  all  other  obstructions  which  gave  effect  to  individual 
skill  with  the  rifle,  and  Stedman  thus  compliments  their  good  conduct : 
"  The  Americans  maintained  their  post  with  great  resolution  and 
bravery.  The  reinforcements  (Riedesel's),  did  not  arrive  so  soon  as 
expected,  and  victory  was  for  a  long  time  doubtful." 

The  advance  of  Fraser  was  as  spirited  as  the  unexpected  resist 
ance  was  obstinate.  He  entered  the  action  with  the  confidence  that 
his  supports  were  close  at  hand,  and  very  nearly  paid  the  penalty 


1777-J  FROM  TICONDEROGA   TO   FORT   EDWARD.  317 

which  subsequently  fell  upon  Baum  at  Bennington.  The  Earl  Bal- 
carras,  who  was  slightly  wounded  during  the  engagement,  was  ad 
vanced  on  the  right  to  occupy  the  Castleton  road  and  cut  off  the 
retreat.  The  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Americans  exposed  his 
detachment  to  be  cut  off,  when  at  the  critical  moment,  General  Rie- 
desel  moved  over  the  hill  and  came  on  rapidly  with  three  battalions, 
music  playing,  and  amid  loud  cheers  of  his  men.  This  new  force  pro 
longed  itself  upon  Fraser's  left,  ascended  the  plateau  with  fixed  bay 
onets,  turned  the  American  right,  and  compelled  its  immediate 
retreat.  Some  fled  to  Rutland,  others  over  the  mountains  to  Pitts- 
ford,  and  about  two  hundred  were  taken  prisoners.  Colonel  Francis 
was  killed.  Colonel  Warner  retired  to  Rutland  with  a  remnant  of  his. 
force,  and  joined  General  St.  Clair  two  days  after  with  eighty  rrten. 
The  latter  officer  heard  the  firing  and  promptly  sent  orders  to  two 
militia  regiments  which  were  betweei.  Castleton  and  Hubbardton  to 
return  to  that  place  to  support  Colonel  Warner,  but  instead  of  obedi 
ence  to  the  order,  they  only  quickened  their  march  to  Castleton.  St. 
Clair  had  previously  sent  an  order  to  Colonel  Warner,  that  "  if  he 
found  the  enemy  pursuing  him  too  hotly  and  in  force,  he  must  join 
him  at  Rutland."  This  place  was  selected  as  the  rendezvous,  having 
just  heard  of  Burgoyne's  occupation  of  Skenesborough,  "  because 
Rutland  was  at  nearly  equal  distances  from  both  places."  This  order 
did  not  reach  Colonel  Warner.  The  defection  of  Hale  had  forced  him 
to  so  close  a  fight  that  it  ended  only  in  the  dispersion  of-his  command. 
The  only  alternative  was  its  capture. 

The  British  casualties  amounted  to  one  hundred  and  eighty-three 
in  killed  and  wounded,  including  Major  Grant,  who  led  the  first 
attack.  The  Brunswickers  lost  but  twenty-two  men,  as  the  action  was 
closed  almost  as  soon  as  they  gained  the  American  right,  and  their 
prompt  advance  carried  with  it  the  impression*  that  a  still  larger  force 
was  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  the  American  army.  The  Americans 
lost  in  killed  forty  officers  and  men,  and  the  total  casualties  including 
wounded  and  prisoners  was  about  three  hundred  and  sixty.  The 
entire  dispersion  of  the  command  gave  currency  to  exaggerated  esti 
mates  of  the  numbers  engaged  and  of  the  losses  incurred ;  but  the 
capture  of  Colonel  Hale's  regiment  during  its  retreat,  swelled  the 
number  of  prisoners,  so  that  the  report  of  General  Burgoyne  is  recon 
cilable  with  the  facts,  when  the  entire  skirmish  near  Hubbardton  is 
taken  into  the  account.  This  fact  also  reconciles  all  conflicts  which 
have  entered  into  previous  reports  of  the  battle. 


3l8  FROM   TICONDEROGA   TO    FORT  EDWARD.  [1777, 

On  the  tenth  of  July,  General  Burgoyne  issued  a  general  order, 
beginning  as  follows:  "The  rebels  evacuated  Ticonderoga  on  the 
sixth,  having  been  forced  into  the  measure  by  the  pressure  of  out 
army.  On  one  side  of  the  lake  they  ran  as  far  as  Skenesborough  ; 
on  the  other  side  as  far  as  Hubbardton.  They  left  behind  all  their 
artillery,  provisions,  and  baggage."  (Burgoyne's  report  of  the  stores 
captured  at  Ticonderoga  included  349,760  pounds  of  flour,  and 
143,830  pounds  of  salt  provisions.)  He  also  summoned  the-people 
of  certain  designated  townships  to  return  to  their  allegiance,  making 
"  Colonel  Skene  "  the  representative  of  the  Crown  in  their  behalf,  fix 
ing  the  fifteenth  of  the  month  as  the  day  for  such  submission, 
"  under  pain  of  military  execution  on  failure  to  pay  obedience  to  such 
order." 

On  the  thirteenth,  General  Schuyler,  then  at  Fort  Edward,  issued 
a  counter  proclamation,  declaring  "  all  to  be  traitors  who  should  in 
any  way  assist,  give  comfort  to,  or  hold  correspondence  with,  or  take 
protection  from  the  enemy  ;  commanded  all  officers,  civil  and  military, 
to  apprehend  or  cause  to  be  apprehended  such  offenders,  and  closed 
with  the  demand,  that  the  militia  of  the  townships  to  which  General 
Burgoyne's  circular  was  addressed,  who  had  not  marched,  should  do  so 
without  delay,  and  join  his  army  or  some  detachment  thereof." 

On  the  tenth,  General  Schuyler  began  a  systematic  effort  to  obtain 
control  of  all  live  stock  and  and  staple  supplies  which  belonged  to  the 
country  threatened  by  Burgoyne,  and  attempted  to  make  the  entire 
route  from  Skenesborough  to  Fort  Edward  as  nearly  impassable  as 
human  skill  could  do  it.  Large  trees  were  felled  along  all  trails  or 
natural  roads,  creeks  were  choked  with  timber  and  branches,  so  as  to 
make  them  overflow  and  deepen  the  marshes,  all  bridges  were 
destroyed,  some  small  streams  were  diverted  in  their  course  so  as  to 
impair  travel ;  and  such  was  the  success  of  this  laborious  undertaking 
that  General  Burgoyne  found  himself  compelled  to  build  forty  new 
bridges,  besides  the  repair  of  old  crossings,  and  in  one  instance  to  lay 
a  timber  causeway  of  two  miles  before  he  could  move  his  column. 

The  correspondence  of  Schuyler  with  Washington  during  this 
period  was  full  of  hope,  and  the  confidence  was  mutual  and  unabated, 
notwithstanding  the  retreat  from  Ticonderoga  was  a  real  disaster,  and 
full  of  discouragement  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence.  Subsequently 
a  Court  of  Inquiry  and  Congress  itself  affirmed  the  propriety  of  that 
retreat. 

A  single  fact  is  mentioned  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  which  deserves 


1777-1  FROM   TICONDEROGA  TO   FORT  EDWARD.  319 

a  place  in  this  connection,  inasmuch  as  all  kinds  of  political  and  social 
gossip  about  the  Generals  of  the  war  of  1776-1781,  have  been  made 
pivot  points  for  judgment  of  military  conduct.  Marshall  thus  records 
the  fact  referred  to.  "  In  this  gloomy  state  of  things  it  is  impossible 
that  any  officer  could  have  used  more  diligence  or  judgment  than  was 
displayed  by  Schuyler." 

Chief  Justice  Kent  and  Daniel  Webster  have  also  left  on  record 
the  most  positive  tribute  to  the  unselfish  patriotism,  wonderful  energy 
and  executive  ability  of  this  officer ;  the  latter  using  the  following 
somewhat  enthusiastic  language :  "  I  was  brought  up  with  New 
England  prejudices  against  him  ;  but  I  consider  him  as  second  only 
to  Washington  in  the  services  he  rendered  to  the  country  in  the  war 
of  the  Revolution.  These  services,  however,  embraced  his  wise 
management  as  superintendent  of  the  Indian  affairs  of  the  north,  as 
well  as  the  more  limited  sphere  of  his  military  duty,  which  are  to  be 
judged  by  their  own  merits." 

Washington  seemed  almost  to  anticipate  the  affair  at  Bennington, 
while  all  others  were  disheartened.  On  the  twenty-second  of  July, 
he  wrote  to  Schuyler  :  "  Though  our  affairs  have  for  some  days  past 
worn  a  dark  and  gloomy  aspect,  I  yet  look  forward  to  a  fortunate  and 
happy  change.  I  trust  General  Burgoyne's  army  will  meet  sooner  or 
later  an  important  check,  and  as  I  have  suggested  before  (letter  of 
July  1 5th)  that  the  success  he  has  had  will  precipitate  his  ruin.  From 
your  accounts  he  appears  to  be  pursuing  that  line  of  conduct  which 
of  all  others  is  most  favorable  to  us :  I  mean  acting  in  detachments. 
This  conduct  will  certainly  give  room  for  enterprise  on  our  part  and 
expose  his  parties  to  great  hazard.  Could  we  be  so  happy  as  to  cut 
one  of  them  off,  though  it  should  not  exceed  four,  five  or  six  hundred 
men,  it  would  inspirit  the  people  and  do  away  much  of  this  present 
anxiety.  In  such  an  event  they  would  lose  sight  of  past  misfortunes  ; 
and,  urged  at  the  same  time  by  a  regard  for  their  own  security,  they 
would  fly  to  arms  and  afford  every  aid  in  their  power." 

On  the  thirtieth  of  July,  Burgoyne  reached  Fort  Edward.  General 
Schuyler  had  withdrawn  the  garrison  from  Fort  George,  after  destroy, 
ing  the  fort ;  and  having  first  retired  to  Saratoga,  afterwards  established 
his  camp  at  Stillwater,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Mohawk  river.  Colonel 
Warner  was  at  Manchester  recruiting  his  command  and  watching  for 
an  opportunity  to  assail  Burgoyne's  rear.  Glover  and  Nixon  had 
joined  with  less  than  a  thousand  men.  Two  thousand  militia  from 
Massachusetts,  sent  to  supply  the  places  of  others  whose  term  of 


320  FROM   TICONDEROGA   TO   FORT  EDWARD.  [1777 

service  had  nearly  expired,  returned  home  in  a  body,  and  the  harvest 
season  was  so  exacting  in  its  demands  that  it  seemed  as  if  no  large 
force  could  be  permanently  maintained.  Upon  Schuyler's  urgent 
request  that  an  active  general  officer  be  sent  to  cooperate  in  raising 
troops,  Arnold  was  selected  ;  but  the  critical  condition  of  the  main 
army,  growing  out  of  the  uncertainty  of  General  Howe's  movements, 
rendered  it  impossible  for  Washington  to  spare  any  considerable  force 
for  the  northern  department. 

Burgoyne  himself  had  been  greatly  embarrassed  during  the  last 
two  weeks  of  July  by  the  increasing  burdens  under  which  his  small 
army  labored.  He  urged  upon  General  Carleton  that  a  portion  of 
the  three  thousand  regular  troops  still  in  Canada  should  be  detailed 
as  garrison  for  Ticonderoga,  but  that  officer  had  no  latitude  in  his 
instructions  from  the  crown,  and  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  accede  to 
the  request.  Major  Skeene,  who  had  made  some  demonstrations  into 
the  New  Hampshire  Grants,  (Vermont),  conceived  the  impression 
that  the  people  were  quite  friendly  to  the  British  cause,  and  initiated 
apian  to  procure  horses  and  mount  his  dragoons,  who  were  still  doing 
infantry  duty. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  July,  General  Phillips  succeeded  in  reach 
ing  Fort  George  with  the  first  consignment  of  military  stores,  and  the 
practical  difficulties  of  the  great  separation  of  the  army  from  its  base 
began  to  unfold  their  lessons. 

The  small  garrison  at  Castleton  and  Skenesborough  had  been 
withdrawn  when  General  Riedesel  joined  Burgoyne,  so  that  the  only 
remaining  communication  with  Ticonderoga  was  through  Lake 
George  ;  and  the  garrison  of  the  former  place  was  less  than  the  strength 
of  a  full  battalion.  The  expedition  of  St.  Legerhad  reached  Oswego, 
but  no  definite  information  had  been  received  as  to  its  progress  or 
prospects. 

The  detention  of  General  Riedesel  at  Castleton  had  been  pro 
tracted  on  account  of  the  wounded  men  who  could  not  be  removed 
from  Bennington  to  Ticonderoga  after  the  battle  at  the  former  place. 

All  efforts  to  organize  a  New  England  battalion  of  Royalists 
dragged  slowly,  and  the  Indian  auxiliaries  began  to  become  un 
manageable,  so  that  at  the  end  of  one  month  after  the  occupation  of 
Ticonderoga,  the  British  army  was  but  entering  upon  the  serious 
duties  of  the  campaign,  and  the  American  army  was  in  no  suitable 
condition  to  resist  its  progress.  The  practical  success  thus  far  realized-. 
had  however  inured  to  the  benefit  of  the  royal  troops.  Both  armies 


I777-J  FROM   TICONDEROGA  TO   FORT  EDWARD.  321 

watched  with  solicitude  the  movements  of  General  Howe.  General 
Schuyler  took  advantage  of  the  reduced  garrison  at  Ticonderoga  to 
dispatch  General  Lincoln  into  New  England  for  the  purpose  of  rais 
ing  troops  to  make  an  attempt  to  regain  that  post  and  cut  off  Bur- 
goyne's  communications  with  Canada,  and  then  once  more  re 
organized  his  camp,  upon  the  islands  a  little  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Mohawk  river,  and  continued  his  importunate  requisitions  for  rein 
forcements.  Such,  substantially,  was  the  condition  of  the  northern 
campaign  on  the  first  of  August,  1777. 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 

NOTE.     From  "  Original  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."     Date,  June  3d,  1777. 
JERSEY.  NEW  YORK. 

British  Artillery 385  British  Infantry 1513 

"        Cavalry 710  "      Artillery 20 

"        Infantry 8361  Hessian  Infantry     1778 

Hessian      "     3300  

Anspach      "     1043  3,311 

13,799 
STATEN  ISLAND.  RHODE  ISLAND. 

British  Infantry 515  British  Infantry 1064 

"        Artillery II  Hessian       "       1496 

Waldeck  Infantry 330  British  Artillery 71 

856  2631 
PAULUS  HOOK. 

British  Infantry. . .   360                Total  of  the  army 20,957 

FOREIGN  TROOPS  IN  AMERICA. 

Hessian 12,777 

Anspach 1,293 

Waldeck 679 


Total 14,740 

21 


CHAPTER    XLV. 

FORT   SCHUYLER,   ORISKANY   AND   BENNINGTON.     1777. 

THE  month  of  August,  1777,  developed  and  concluded  the  expe 
dition  of  Colonel  St.  Leger  to  the  valley  of  the  Mohawk  river, 
and  with  equal  exactness  terminated  the  operations  of  Burgoyne  on 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  Hudson. 

St.  Leger  ascended  the  River  St.  Lawrence  and  Lake  Ontario, 
ascended  the  Oswego  and  Oneida  rivers  to  Oneida  lake,  crossed  that 
lake,  and  found  himself  on  Fish  creek,  within  a  few  miles  of  Fort 
Stanwix,  (Schuyler)  near  the  present  city  of  Rome,  on  the  Mohawk 
river.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  with  the  exception  of  the  short  port 
age  between  Fish  creek  and  the  Mohawk,  there  was  water  communi 
cation  for  light  boats  and  bateaux  from  Oswego  to  Albany.  The 
intervening  streams  were  all  subject  to  the  fluctuations  of  wet  and  dry 
seasons,  but  the  burden  of  military  transportation  was  greatly  light 
ened  by  the  character  of  the  route  adopted  for  the  invasion  of  New 
York  from  the  west. 

The  character  of  the  settlers  in  that  region,  particularly  in  Tryon 
county,  had  fostered  loyal  sentiments,  and  the  diversities  of  interest 
among  the  various  Indian  tribes  involved  a  constant  uncertainty  as  to 
the  integrity  of  their  conduct,  no  matter  what  might  be  the  terms  of  a 
contract  into  which  they  could  be  enticed  by  high  sounding  promises 
and  presents. 

Notwithstanding  the  protracted  negotiations  and  repeated  inter 
views  of  General  Schuyler  with  the  Six  Nations,  the  Oneidas  alone 
remained  neutral  in  the  campaign  under  notice. 

Fort  Schuyler,  at  the  bend  of  the  Mohawk  river  from  a  southerly 
to  an  easterly  course,  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Peter  Gansevoort, 
as  early  as  April,  1777.  He  found  that  it  was  actually  untenable 
against  any  enemy  whatever.  Although  in  doubt  whether  to  pro 
vide  for  resistance  to  artillery,  he  went  to  work  with  such  industry, 


.      X.;H  :-  .8 

^.  L  =£fc^r  "Y^" '  fc^-?*^  ^-^ 


ccei  Corps  of  Gen!  frazer, 
which  was  attacked  at  ilte  creek. 

"R.AtlackofjImericans  by  advance 
of  center  of  Line.  0000. 

C.Posifions  taken  JyFrazer'sCorps, 
in  litploymenl,  io  resist  attach. 

D.  Ecirl  o/  23a  Icarras  Jclactied,  to 
c  overflight  Mug  ofDrilish.lrmy. 

I.  GenfReidcselwiih  IwiyuarJ^ 
Brunswick  Chasseurs,  supporting 


X.  •  Jlmrrican  position,  after  arrhnt 


(r.Jte treat  of  JJmericnns. 
yL-JBriti.ih  position,  atler  tht action. 
J.  Jfouse  used  as  Hospital. 


and  Imam,  ty  CM. 

322* 


1777-J  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY   AND   BENNINGTON.  323 

that  when  the  test  was  made,  it  proved  fully  adequate  to  withstand 
the  fire  of  the  light  ordnance  which  accompanied  the  column  of  St. 
Leger  in  August  of  that  year. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  May,  Colonel  Marinus  Willett  was  ordered 
to  report  with  his  regiment  for  duty  at  the  same  post,  and  to  aid  in 
putting  the  fort  in  a  thoroughly  defensive  condition.  He  reached 
Fort  Schuyler  in  July.  On  the  second  of  August  five  bateaux  arrived 
with  sufficient  stores  to  increase  the  rations  and  small-arm  ammuni 
tion  to  a  supply  for  six  weeks.  The  garrison  then  numbered  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  men.  Lieut.-Col.  Mellon,  of  Colonel  Wesson's 
Massachusetts  regiment,  with  two  hundred  men,  accompanied  the 
bateaux  as  their  escort,  and  joined  the  garrison.  On  the  same  day, 
and  within  an  hour  after  the  landing  of  this  timely  invoice  of  sup 
plies,  Lieutenant  Bird  of  the  British  Eighth  regiment  approached  the 
fort,  and  established  a  position  for  St.  Leger's  advanced  guard  ;  and 
on  the  third  of  August  his  army  began  the  investment. 

The  advance  of  St.  Leger  was  conspicuous  for  its  excellent  adjust 
ments.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  presence  of  those  who  had  skill 
in  frontier  Indian  warfare.  The  entire  force  was  so  disposed  by  single 
files  and  the  wise  distribution  of  the  Indian  auxiliaries,  as  to  make  a 
surprise  impossible,  and  afford  the  best  possible  opportunity  for  their 
peculiar  style  of  skirmishing  warfare,  in  case  of  an  attack.  Stone's 
Life  of  Brant  very  clearly  represents  this  movement,  and  Lossing  repro 
duces  it  with  full  details  of  the  antecedent  Indian  operations  in 
central  New  York. 

Colonel  Daniel  Claus,  son-in-law  of  Sir  William  Johnson  ;  Colonel 
John  Butler,  afterward  conspicuous  at  the  massacre  of  Wyoming  ; 
Joseph  Brant,  a  full-blooded  Mohawk,  son  of  a  Wolf  tribe  chief ;  and 
Sir  John  Johnson,  a  son  of  Sir  William  Johnson,  who  succeeded  to 
the  title  in  1774,  were  associated  with  St.  Leger  in  command  of  this 
composite  army  of  regulars,  Hessian-chasseurs,  Royal-greens,  Can 
adians,  axe-men,  and  non-combatants,  who,  as  well  as  the  Indians, 
proved  an  ultimate  incumbrance  and  curse  to  the  expedition.  The 
investment  was  immediate.  A  proclamation  of  St.  Leger,  was  fol 
lowed  by  an  appeal  from  General  Nicholas  Herkimer  to  the  militia 
of  Tryon  county,  and  on  the  sixth  he  passed  three  scouts  into  the 
fort,  with  notice  that  he  was  at  Oriskany,  near  the  present  village  of 
Whitesborough,  with  eight  hundred  men  advancing  to  its  relief.  He 
also  requested  that  three  guns  might  be  fired  to  give  notice  of  the 
safe  arrival  of  his  couriers.  Colonel  Willett,  as  had  been  suggested  bv 


324  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON.  [1777, 

General  Herkimer,  promptly  sallied  forth  with  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  portions  of  Gansevoort's,  and  of  Wesson's  regiments,  and  one 
iron  three  pounder,  to  make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  advancing 
militia.  St.  Leger  had  been  advised  of  this  movement  of  the  militia, 
and  was  so  engaged  in  preparation  to  attack  it  in  the  woods,  and  had 
so  large  a  fatigue  detail  at  work  upon  the  intrenchments,  as  to  have 
entirely  ignored  the  possibility  of  offensive  action  on  the  part  of  the 
garrison.  The  sortie  was  therefore  successful  in  the  capture  of  much 
camp  plunder,  such  as  blankets,  arms,  flags,  and  clothing,  a  few  pris 
oners,  St.  Leger's  desk  and  papers,  and  the  destruction  of  two  sections 
of  the  intrenchments;  but  failed  to  unite  with  General  Herkimer. 
That  officer,  overborne  in  his  judgment  by  the  impetuosity  of  younger 
officers,  who  mistook  his  caution  in  approaching  the  Indian  camp  for 
cowardice,  allowed  his  march  to  be  crowded  too  rapidly,  and  while 
crossing  a  ravine  near  Oriskany  creek,  he  fell  into  an  ambuscade  which 
involved  great  slaughter.  General  Herkimer  himself  was  severely 
wounded,  and  the  total  American  casualties  were  not  less  than  one 
hundred  and  sixty  killed,  besides  more  than  two  hundred  wounded, 
and  some  prisoners.  The  Indian  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
nearly  eighty,  including  several  valuable  warriors,  and  the  field  was 
abandoned  by  the  assailants.  Colonel  St.  Leger  made  no  official  report 
cf  his  loss,  except  that  of  his  Indian  allies.  The  fight  continued  for 
several  hours,  only  suspended  for  a  short  time  by  a  thunder  storm, 
and  stands  on  record  as  one  of  the  most  fiercely  contested  conflicts 
of  the  war. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  seventh,  St.  Leger  demanded  the  surren 
der  of  the  post,  under  threat  of  giving  over  its  garrison  to  the  ven 
geance  of  the  Indians.  A  bold  defiance  was  the  sole  response.  He 
also  wrote  to  Burgoyne  on  the  eleventh,  that  "  he  was  secure  of  the 
fort  and  would  soon  join  him  at  Albany."  On  the  tenth  Colonel 
Willett,  afterwards  active  at  Monmouth  and  in  subsequent  Indian  wars, 
and  Lieutenant  Stockwell,  smuggled  themselves  through  the  lines, 
and  reached  Fort  Dayton  (now  Herkimer)  safely,  to  arouse  the  militia 
to  fresh  efforts  in  behalf  of  the  post.  General  Schuyler  had  already 
ordered  General  Learned's  Massachusetts  brigade  on  this  duty,  desig 
nating  Fort  Dayton  as  the  rendezvous  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Schuy  er. 
Colonel  Willett  went  directly  to  Albany,  and  returned  in  company 
with  Arnold  and  the  first  New  York  regiment ;  but  while  the  troops 
were  yet  forty  miles  distant  from  Fort  Dayton,  St.  Leger,  alarmed  by 
reports  of  Arnold's  march  and  rumors  of  a  disaster  to  Burgoyne  s  army, 


I777-]  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON.  325 

precipitately  abandoned  his  intrenchments  and  fled  to  Osvvego,  leav 
ing  a  portion  of  his  artillery,  baggage  and  camp  equipage  on  the  field. 
In  his  official  report,  dated  at  Oswego,  August  twenty-seventh,  St. 
Leger  explained  his  retreat  by  charges  of  treachery  and  exaggerated 
reports  of  Arnold's  force,  closing  with  the  suggestive  statement  that 
his  own  men  "  are  in  a  most  deplorable  situation  from  the  plunder  of 
the  savages." 

Thus  ended  the  British  advance  upon  Albany,  by  the  Mohawk 
valley.  The  moral  effect  of  its  failure  was  as  encouraging  to  the 
American  army,  as  the  tidings  of  its  advent,  coupled  with  the  suc 
cesses  of  Burgoyne,  had  been  depressing  ;  and  the  animation  of  the 
army  was  fully  shared  by  the  people. 

General  Washington  wrote  as  follows  to  General  Schuyler,  on  the 
twenty-first  of  August,  when  advised  of  the  battle  of  Oriskany  and  of 
his  detail  of  General  Arnold  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Schuyler :  "  I  am 
pleased  with  the  account  you  transmit  of  the  situation  of  matters 
upon  the  Mohawk  river.  If  the  militia  keep  up  their  spirits  after  the 
late  severe  skirmish,  I  am  confident  they  will,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  reinforcements  under  General  Arnold,  be  enabled  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Fort  Schuyler,  which  will  be  a  most  important  matter  just  at 
this  time." 

At  the  time  when  St.  Leger  established  his  camp  before  Fort 
Schuyler,  General  Burgoyne  began  to  realize  the  difficulties  which 
attended  the  supply  of  his  army.  He  had  received  altogether,  a  re 
inforcement  of  nearly  a  thousand  Indians,  but  the  murder  of  Miss 
Jane  McCrea  and  repeated  violations  of  the  usages  of  civilized  war 
fare,  as  well  as  the  additional  mouths  to  feed,  increased  the  discom 
fort  and  embarrassment  of  his  position.  The  reports  of  German  offi 
cers  to  their  sovereigns,  abound  in  descriptions  of  the  horrors  of  this 
warfare.  One  wrote,  that  "  to  prevent  desertions  it  was  announced 
in  orders  that  the  savages  would  scalp  runaways."  Schloozer  states, 
that  "  on  the  third  of  August,  they,  the  Indians,  brought  in  twenty 
scalps  and  as  many  captives."  It  is  clear  that  there  was  no  respon 
sibility  on  the  part  of  Burgoyne  for  the  murder  of  Miss  McCrea,  or 
other  personal  violence,  and  a  careful  sifting  of  all  accessible  reports  as 
clearly  shows  that  most  of  the  outrages  reported  at  the  time  were 
exaggerations  of  a  style  of  warfare  which  was  under  as  good  control 
as  possible  under  any  commander.  The  Indians  could  not  be  civil 
ized  instantly,  nor  be  readily  made  to  acquiesce  in  the  limit  of  rations 
which  was  assigned  to  regular  troops,  and  all  their  demands  were  of 


326  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON.  [1777. 

the  most  imperative  kind.  Burgoyne  thus  states  his  own  views  upon 
this  subject,  "  I  had  been  taught  to  look  upon  the  remote  tribes  which 
joined  me  at  Skenesborough,  as  more  warlike  : — but,  with  equal 
depravity  in  general  principles,  their  only  preeminence  consisted  in 
ferocity."  He  also  experienced  difficulty  in  managing  Indian  agents, 
and  thus  expresses  a  sentiment  which  will  be  appreciated  by  all  of 
ficers  who  have  engaged  in  frontier  Indian  service,  where  interpreters 
and  intermediate  civil  agents  are  employed.  "  The  interpreters,  from 
the  first,  regarded  with  a  jealous  eye  a  system  which  took  out  of  their 
hands  the  distribution  of  Indian  necessaries  and  presents  ;  but  when 
they  found  the  plunder  of  the  country,  as  well  as  that  of  the  govern 
ment,  was  controlled,  the  profligacy  of  many  was  employed  to  promote 
dissension,  revolt  and  desertion.  Although  I  differed  totally  with  St. 
Luc,  "then  in  general  charge  of  the  Indian  auxiliaries,"  in  opinion 
upon  the  efficiency  of  these  allies,  I  invariably  took  his  advice  in  the 
management  of  them,  even  to  an  indulgence  of  their  most  capricious 
fancies,  when  they  did  not  involve  the  dishonor  of  the  King's  cause 
and  the  disgrace  of  humanity."  "  He  certainly  knew  that  the  In 
dians  pined  after  a  renewal  of  their  accustomed  horrors  and  that 
they  were  become  as  impatient  of  his  control  as  of  any  other  :  though 
the  pride  and  interest  of  authority  and  the  affection  he  bore  his  old 
associates  induced  him  to  cover  the  real  causes,  under  various  pre 
tenses  of  discontent  with  which  I  was  daily  tormented." 

At  a  council  held  August  fourth,  it  appeared  that  the  tribes  with 
which  St.  Luc  was  immediately  connected  and  for  which  he  inter 
preted,  were  determined  to  go  home.  Burgoyne  thus  writes  to  Lord 
Germaine,  "  I  was  convinced  that  a  cordial  reconciliation  with  the 
Indians  was  only  to  be  effected  by  a  renunciation  of  all  my  former 
prohibitions  and  indulgence  in  blood  and  rapine."  Many  of  the 
Indians  did  in  fact  leave  the  next  day,  and  many  others  before  the 
expedition  to  Bennington  was  planned,  so  that  the  loss  of  valuable 
scouts  and  skirmishers  was  greatly  felt  during  operations  in  the  forests 
on  the  line  of  that  march.  An  additional  statement  of  General  Bur 
goyne  is  properly  recorded  to  his  permanent  credit. 

"  The  Indian  principle  of  war  is  at  once  odious  and  unavailing, 
and  if  encouraged,  I  will  venture  to  pronounce,  its  consequences  will 
be  severely  repented  by  the  present  age,  and  universally  abhorred  by 
posterity." 

This  statement  was  made  before  the  House  of  Commons,  but  that 
it  was  not  an  after-thought,  is  clearly  seen  from  the  statement  made 


I777-]  FORT   SCHUYLER,   ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON.  327 

by  Burgoyne  to  St.  Luc,  in  the  presence  of  the  Earl  of  Harrington  : 
"  I  would  rather  lose  every  Indian,  than  connive  at  their  enormities." 
St.  Luc  was  angry  because  Burgoyne  insisted  that  a  British  officer 
should  accompany  all  Indian  forays,  and  take  account  of  their  pro 
ceedings  and  their  plunder  ;  and  several  parties  were  brought  into  his 
camp  as  prisoners,  who  affirmed  that  they  had  been  treated  with 
proper  clemency.  It  was  not  until  this  rule  was  enforced  that  St. 
Luc  stirred  up  the  Indians  to  desertion  and  outrage.  He  is  not  a 
competent  witness  in  the  case. 

The  following  entry  appears  upon  Burgoyne's  record,  "  August 
fifth.  Victualling  of  the  army  out  this  day,  and  from  difficulties  of 
the  roads  and  transports,  no  provisions  came  in  this  night.  Sixth 
August.  At  ten  o'clock  this' morning,  not  quite  enough  provisions 
for  the  consumption  of  two  days." 

In  this  emergency  advantage  was  taken  of  the  statement  of  Philip 
Skene,  whose  cooperation  brought  mischief  only  to  the  expedition, 
and  of  others  supported  by  scouts  sent  out  by  General  Riedesel,  that 
a  large  depot  of  commissary  supplies  had  been  accumulated  at  Ben- 
nington  for  the  American  army,  and  an  expedition  was  organized  for 
the  threefold  purpose  of  securing  these  supplies,  procuring  thirteen 
hundred  horses  for  mounting  Riedesel's  dragoons  and  Peter's  corps, 
and  two  hundred  for  general  army  use,  and  of  making  a  demonstra 
tion  in  the  Connecticut  river  valley.  On  the  ninth,  carefully  written 
instructions  were  prepared  for  Lieutenant-colonel  Baume,  who  was 
intrusted  with  the  command  of  the  expedition,  and  these  were  so 
judiciously  framed  as  to  anticipate  all  possible  contingencies  of  the 
march.  They  took  into  view  the  fact  that  Colonel  Warner  was  still  at 
Manchester,  and  the  possibility  that  Arnold's  main  army,  at  that  time 
suggested  for  a  proposed  movement  to  Burgoyne's  rear,  might  attempt 
to  intercept  his  return  march.  In  view  of  the  exceptions  taken  to  the 
assignment  of  German  troops  to  this  expedition,  it  is  in  evidence 
that  even  General  Fraser,  who  considered  the  Germans  as  slow^  de 
clined  to  suggest  to  General  Burgoyne  the  substitution  of  other  troops, 
although  asked  to  do  so  by  Adjutant-general  Kingston,  "  if  he  thought 
other  troops  should  be  detailed,"  remarking  "  the  Germans  are  not  a 
very  active  people,  but  it  may  do."  This  matter  was  especially  sub 
mitted  to  General  Fraser,  "  because  the  scouts  and  guides  were 
attached  to  his,  the  advanced  corps,  and  it  was  thought  that  he  might 
know  more  of  the  nature  of  the  country."  There  was  no  declared 
difference  of  opinion  among  the  general  officers  as  to  the  value  and 


328  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY   AND   BENNINGTON.  [1777 

wisdom  of  the  expedition  itself.  It  was  to  comprehend  Arlington, 
lying  between  Manchester  and  Bennington,  and  as  wide  a  scope  of 
country  as  would  afford  opportunity  to  overawe  the  people  and  secure 
supplies,  and  was  allowed  a  margin  of  two  weeks  time,  with  adequate 
instructions  in  case  the  main  army  should  advance  towards  Albany 
before  its  return. 

Burgoyne  thus  states  the  case  :  "  It  was  soon  found  that  in  the 
situation  of  the  transport-service  at  that  time,  the  army  could  barely 
be  victualed  from  day  to  day,  and  that  there  was  no  prospect  of 
establishing  a  magazine  in  due  time  for  pursuing  present  advantages. 
The  idea  of  the  expedition  to  Bennington  originated  upon  this  diffi 
culty,  combined  with  the  intelligence  reported  by  General  Riedesel, 
and  with  all  I  had  otherwise  received.  I  knew  that  Bennington  was 
the  great  deposit  of  corn,  flour,  and  store  cattle,  that  it  was  only 
guarded  by  militia,  and  every  day's  account  tended  to  confirm  the 
persuasion  of  the  loyalty  of  one  description  of  inhabitants  and  the 
panic  of  the  other.  Those  who  knew  the  country  best  were  the  most 
sanguine  in  this  persuasion.  The  German  troops  employed  were  of 
the  best  I  had  of  that  nation.  The  number  of  British  was  small,  but 
it  was  the  select  light  corps  of  the  army,  composed  of  chosen  men 
from  all  the  regiments,  and  commanded  by  Captain  Fraser,  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  officers  in  his  line  of  service  that  I  ever  met  with." 

An  additional  statement  is  necessary  at  this  stage  of  the  narra 
tive,  to  show  exactly  the  status  of  the  British  army,  in  the  matter  of 
Logistics. 

Fort  Edward  was  sixteen  miles  from  Fort  George.  Only  one  haul 
could  be  made  each  day.  Six  miles  below  Fort  Edward  were  rapids 
which  required  a  transfer  of  all  stores  to  boats  below ;  and  the  un 
loaded  boats  had  to  be  hauled  back  against  a  strong  current.  The 
horses  from  Canada  came  by  land  from  St.  John's  to  Ticonderoga, 
through  a  country  then  hardly  less  than  a  desert,  and  the  whole 
number  of  carts  and  horses  at  that  time  received,  was  barely  enough 
to  keep  the  army  in  supplies. 

As  early  as  May  thirtieth,  while  at  Montreal,  an  order  was  issued 
that  blanket-coats,  leggings,  and  all  clothing  but  summer  wear  should 
be  left  behind,  and  before  leaving  Skenesborough  the  officers  were 
ordered  to  send  all  their  personal  baggage  to  Ticonderoga,  except  a 
soldier's  common  tent  and  a  cloak-bag. 

The  roads,  bridges,  quagmires,  and  rocks  were  constant  causes 
of  delay  in  hauling  stores.  Heavy  rains  set  in.  Ten  and  twelve  oxen 


I777.J  FORT  SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY  AND  BENNINGTON.  329 

were  often  required  to  haul  a  single  bateaux,  and  only  fifty  head  had 
been  procured  for  the  entire  army  use.  There  was  no  remedy  but 
patience,  no  honorable  retreat,  no  alternative  but  to  make  the  most 
of  the  present,  and  press  toward  Albany  and  the  anticipated  union 
with  General  Howe  and  St.  Leger. 

On  the  fourteenth  of  August,  a  bridge  of  rafts  was  thrown  across 
the  river  at  Saratoga,  where  the  vanguard  of  the  British  army  had 
been  established,  to  be  in  position  for  an  advance  upon  Albany  as 
soon  as  the  supplies  should  be  realized  from  the  expedition  then  on 
the  move.  Lieutenant-colonel  Breyman's  corps  was  posted  at  Batten- 
kill,  to  be  in  readiness  to  render  support  to  that  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Baume  if  it  became  necessary. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Baume  himself  marched,  on  the  eleventh,  with 
two  hundred  dismounted  dragoons  of  the  regiment  of  Riedesel,  Cap 
tain  Eraser's  marksmen,  Peter's  Provincials,  the  Canadian  volunteers, 
and  something  over  one  hundred  Indians,  making,  as  stated  by  Bur- 
goyne,  a  total  strength  of  about  five  hundred  men. 

He  halted  at  Batten-kill  to  await  orders,  where  General  Burgoyne 
inspected  the  command  ;  and  he  expressed  himself  satisfied  with  the 
force  placed  at  his  disposal.  In  a  note  from  his  camp,  he  adds  this 
postscript :  "  The  reinforcement  of  fifty  chasseurs  which  your  ex 
cellency  was  pleased  to  order,  joined  me  last  night  at  eleven 
o'clock." 

After  marching  sixteen  miles,  he  reached  Cambridge  at  four  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  thirteenth,  and  reported  a  skirmish  with  forty 
or  fifty  rebels  who  were  guarding  cattle ;  and  stated  that  the  enemy 
were  reported  to  be  eighteen  hundred  strong  at  Bennington.  He  also 
stated  that  "  the  savages  would  destroy  or  drive  away  all  horses  for 
which  he  did  not  pay  the  money,"  and  asked  authority  to  purchase 
the  horses  thus  taken  by  the  savages,  "  otherwise  they  will  ruin  all 
they  meet  with,  and  neither  officers  nor  interpreters  can  control  them." 
This  express  started  from  Cambridge  at  four  o'clock  of  the  morning 
of  the  fourteenth.  The  letter  closed,  "  Your  excellency  may  depend 
on  hearing  how  I  proceed  at  Bennington,  and  of  my  success  there. 
I  will  be  particularly  careful  on  my  approach  to  that  place  to  be  fully 
informed  of  their  strength  and  position,  and  take  the  precautions 
necessary  to  fulfill  both  the  orders  and  instructions  of  your  excellency." 
Burgoyne  replied,  August  fourteenth  at  seven  at  night,  instructing 
fully  as  to  the  items  of  the  dispatch  received,  adding,  "  should  you  find 
the  enemy  too  strongly  posted  at  Bennington,  I  wish  you  to  take  a 


330  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON^  [1777 

post  where  you  can  maintain  yourself  till  you  receive  an  answer  from 
me,  and  I  will  either  support  you  in  force,  or  withdraw  you." 

On  the  fourteenth  at  nine  o'clock,  he  reported  from  Sancoick  (Van 
Schaick's  Mills)  of  a  skirmish,  the  capture  of  flour,  salt,  etc.,  that  "  five 
prisoners  agree  that  from  fifteen  to  eighteen  hundred  men  are  at  Ben- 
nington,  but  are  supposed  to  leave  on  our  approach,"  adding,  "  I  will 
proceed  so  far  to-day  as  to  fall  on  the  enemy  to-morrow  early,  and 
make  such  disposition  as  I  think  necessary  from  the  intelligence  I 
receive.  People  are  flocking  in  hourly,  but  want  to  be  armed  ;  the 
savages  can  not  be  controlled.  They  ruin  and  take  everything  they 
please."  Postscript.  "  Beg  your  excellency  to  pardon  the  hurry 
of  this  letter,  as  it  is  wrote  on  the  head  of  a  barrel.'' 

This  was  the  last  dispatch  from  Baume,  and  no  reinforcements  were 
called  for,  neither  was  there  intimation  that  they  would  be  required. 
Careful  examination  fails  to  find  the  data  upon  which  many  historians 
make  the  statement.  The  record  of  this  message  made  at  head 
quarters  is  as  follows:  "  1 5th  August,  express  arrived  from  Sancoick 
at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Corps  de  reserve  ordered  to  march." 

General  Burgoyne  promptly  and  wisely  started  Breyman's  force 
of  five  hundred  men  to  the  support  of  Baume  as  soon  as  advised  that 
the  "  secret  expedition  "  had  been  discovered  by  the  enemy,  and 
that  the  American  force  was  probably  greater  than  he  had  before 
anticipated." 

Colonel  Breyman  received  his  orders  at  eight  o'clock  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  fifteenth,  and  marched  at  nine,  with  one  battalion  of  chas 
seurs,  one  of  grenadiers,  one  rifle  company  and  two  pieces  of  cannon. 
"  Each  soldier  carried  forty  rounds  of  ammunition  in  his  pouch,  and 
on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  transportation,  two  boxes  of  ammunition 
were  placed  upon  the  artillery  carts."  This  command  met  with  con 
stant  disaster.  A  heavy  rain  continued  during  the  day,  so  that  the 
troops  made  but  a  half  English  mile  an  hour  :  the  guns  had  to  be 
hauled  up  hills,  alternately  ;  one  artillery  cart  was  overturned  ;  a  tim 
brel  was  broken  up  and  its  ammunition  wasted  ;  the  guide  lost  his  way, 
and  at  night  the  detachment  was  still  seven  miles  from  Cambridge. 
Lieutenant  Hanneman  was  sent  forward  to  inform  Lieutenant-colonel 
Baume  oftheapproach  of  reinforcements. 

Breyman  reached  Van  Schaick's  mill  at  half  past  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  where  he  met  Colonel  Skene,  who  notified  him  that 
Baume  was  two  miles  in  advance.  He  pushed  on  to  his  support  with 
no  intimation  that  any  engagement  had  taken  place.  "  At  the  bridge. 


I777-J  FORT  SCHUYLER,   ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON.  33! 

a  force  of  men  was  met,  some  in  jackets  and  some  in  shirts,  whom 
Skene  declared  to  be  royalists,  but  they  proved  to  be  rebels,  attempt 
ing  to  gain  high  ground  to  his  left."  "  A  vigorous  attack  was  made, 
with  varying  success  and  lasting  until  nearly  eight  o'clock.  The  am 
munition  was  expended,  the  horses  had  been  killed,  Lieutenant 
Spangenburg  and  many  others  were  wounded,  and  the  American 
forces  were  constantly  adding  to  their  numbers.  The  guns  were 
abandoned.  The  troops  reached  Cambridge  at  twelve  o'clock  and 
regained  camp  on  the  morning  of  the  seventeenth."  Such  is  the 
melancholy  summary  of  Breyman's  report,  closing,  "  could  I  have 
saved  my  cannon  I  would  with  pleasure  have  sacrificed  my  life  to 
have  effected  it." 

General  Stark  had  returned  to  New  Hampshire  some  time  after 
the  battle  of  Trenton,  on  a  recruiting  expedition,  and  resigned  his 
commission  upon  hearing  that  Congress  had  promoted  junior  officers 
over  his  head.  The  appeal  of  his  native  State  was  not  to  be  resisted 
when  the  invasion  of  Burgoyne  took  place  ;  and  he  accepted  a  com 
mand,  upon  condition  that  he  should  not  be  compelled  to  join  the 
main  army. 

General  Lincoln  visited  Manchester,  where  recruits  were  assem 
bling,  with  an  order  from  General  Schuyler  for  Stark  to  report  for 
duty  ;  but  could  not  induce  him  to  swerve  from  his  purpose.  He  was 
at  Bennington  on  the  night  of  the  thirtieth,  when  advised  that  a  body 
of  Indians  had  reached  Cambridge.  Colonel  Gregg  was  at  once  sent 
with  two  hundred  men  to  oppose  their  advance.  During  the  night 
an  express  messenger  brought  word  that  a  large  force  of  British  troops 
was  on  the  march,  of  which  the  Indians  constituted  only  the  van 
guard.  He  immediately  sent  to  Colonel  Warner,  then  at  Manchester, 
an  appeal  for  aid,  aroused  the  militia,  and  made  preparations  to  meet 
the  enemy. 

On  the  fourteenth  Lieutenant-colonel  Baume  advanced  to  within 
four  miles  of  Bennington.  The  Americans,  unprepared  for  battle, 
retired  before  his  advance,  and  encamped  on  the  Bennington  road, 
(see  map).  General  Burgoyne  in  his  report  states  that  "  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Baume  sacrificed  his  command  by  violation  of  orders,  in  con 
tinuing  his  advance  when  met  by  superior  numbers,  and  by  too  widely 
scattering  his  force.  "  The  embarrassment  of  Baume  was  two-fold.  His 
force  was  not  homogeneous  ;  and  his  adversary  was  too  strong.  He 
followed  orders  quite  literally  in  holding  his  dragoons  together  and 
using  the  Provincials  and  other  irregular  troops  as  pickets,  but  the 


332  FORT   SCHUYLER,    ORISKANY   AND   BENNINGTON.  [1777 

latter  were  a  mile  from  his  own  position  and  there  was  no  possibility 
of  concert  of  action  in  defense. 

He  occupied  a  commanding  hill  quite  thickly  wooded  at  a  bend  of 
the  Walloomscoick,  and  at  once  intrenched  his  position.  On  the 
fifteenth,  the  rain  which  retarded  the  march  of  Breyman  suspended 
active  operations,  except  skirmishing  ;  but  Colonel  Warner  made  the 
march  from  Manchester,  and  Colonel  Symonds  arrived  at  Bennington 
with  a  detachment  of  Berkshire  militia,  so  that  on  the  morning  of  the 

o 

sixteenth  the  force  of  General  Stark  amounted  to  nearly  or  quite  two 
thousand  men.  Colonel  Warner's  regiment  halted  at  Bennington  to 
rest  from  their  march  and  dry  their  arms  and  equipments,  while  Stark 
so  distributed  the  regiments  of  his  own  brigade  and  the  militia,  as  to 
be  ready  in  the  morning  for  the  assault,  which,  after  conference  with 
his  officers,  he  had  already  arranged.  Riedesel's  dragoons  with  a  part 
of  the  rangers  occupied  the  summit  already  referred  to  ;  while  one 
company  advanced  down  the  slope,  to  cover  the  chasseurs,  who  were 
near  the  foot  of  the  hill  where  a  small  creek  enters  the  Walloomscoick. 
One  company  of  grenadiers,  with  a  portion  of  the  rangers,  occupied  a 
position  behind  the  bridge,  on  the  road  to  Bennington,  and  the  Cana 
dians  with  a  detachment  of  Royalist  Americans,  took  possession  of 
houses  south  of  the  bridge,  and  a  slight  elevation  lower  down,  near 
the  ford,  where  a  trench  was  hastily  dug  for  partial  protection.  A 
second  detachment  of  grenadiers  and  royalists  occupied  the  extreme 
British  right,  in  open  ground  to  the  northwest,  at  the  foot  of  the  hill 
near  the  Saratoga  road.  A  portion  of  the  Indian  scouts  took  posi 
tion  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road,  on  their  first  arrival,  but  they 
fled  on  the  fourteenth,  as  soon  as  the  Americans  were  found  to  be  in 
force.  The  remainder  who  encamped  in  the  woods  to  the  rear  of 
Baume,  broke  away  between  the  advancing  columns  of  Nichols  and 
Herrick  as  soon  as  the  battle  began  on  the  sixteenth. 

General  Stark  reserved  for  himself  the  direct  attack  up  the  steepest 
part  of  the  hill,  and  held  his  men  in  hand  until  the  other  troops  took 
their  assigned  positions.  Nichols  struck  the  British  left.  Herrick 
took  their  extreme  right,  in  the  rear.  Stickney  cut  off  the  detach 
ments  at  the  bridge  from  union  with  Baume  ;and  Hubbard  with  equal 
spirit  attacked  the  positions  held  in  advance  of  the  bridge.  These 
attacks  were  made  with  great  promptness  and  the  utmost  vigor. 
Hubbard  drove  the  American  volunteers  and  Canadians  across  the 
river  at  the  first  charge,  where  they  were  met  by  Stickney.  The 
Rangers  alone  retired  in  good  order  ;  but  Herrick  and  Nichols  having 


I777-J  FORT   SCHUYLER,   ORISKANY   AND   BENNINGTON.  333 

completed  their  flank  movement  and  driven  in  all  opposing  detach 
ments,  united  at  the  summit  and  participated  with  Stark  in  storm 
ing  the  breastworks  where  Baume  made  a  persistent  stand  and  offered 
real  fight.  The  battle,  which  began  about  three  o'clock,  was  soon 
over,  and  many  of  the  militia  were  engaged  in  collecting  the  trophies 
of  the  action,  when  Lieutenant-colonel  Breyman's  command  reached 
the  bridge  and  attempted  to  regain  the  heights.  His  guns  opened 
fire  upon  the  scattered  Americans,  and  this  was  the  first  intimation 
that  they  received  that  the  victory  was  still  to  be  won.  The  oppor 
tune  arrival  of  Colonel  Warner's  regiment,  fresh  and  in  good  order, 
checked  the  advancing  column,  and  a  vigorous  action  was  maintained 
until  the  ammunition  of  the  British  artillery  gave  out,  and  the  day 
closed. 

The  American  trophies  included  four  brass  field  pieces,  twelve 
brass  drums,  two  hundred  and  fifty  dragoon  swords  and  several  hun 
dred  stand  of  arms. 

The  British  casualties  are  variously  stated.  Dawson  in  his  "  Battles 
of  the  United  States  by  Sea  and  Land,"  which  is  compiled  with  remark 
able  faithfulness  and  judgment,  adopts  Gordon's  statement  and  places 
the  number  of  killed  at  two  hundred  and  seven,  and  the  prisoners  at 
seven  hundred.  Irving  states  the  prisoners  at  five  hundred  and  fifty- 
four  ;  Bancroft  at  six  hundred  and  ninety-two,  and  Lossing  at  nine 
hundred  and  thirty-four,  including  the  killed  and  wounded,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty  tories.  This  last  element  must  be  fully  considered, 
in  view  of  General  Burgoyne's  official  report  that"  many  armed  royal 
ists  joined  the  command  on  the  march."  It  is  the  only  way  by  which 
to  reconcile  the  disproportion  of  casualties  to  the  actual  British  force 
which  was  detailed  to  Lieutenant-colonel  Baume's  command. 

The  Americans  lost  about  forty  killed  and  as  many  wounded. 
The  killed  of  the  British  force  must  have  been  mainly  from  the 
Canadians  and  royalists  who  fled  and  were  shot  down  by  eager  pur 
suers,  as  nearly  four  hundred  Hessians  were  among  the  prisoners  cap 
tured.  Reports  of  the  capture  of  arms,  largely  in  access  of  the  British 
force,  are  predicated  upon  the  idea  that  these  arms  were  taken  with  the 
expedition  for  distribution  to  royalists.  The  secret  nature  of  the  ex 
pedition  at  the  start,  and  the  fact  that  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that 
arms  were  obtained  for  six  hundred  of  these  recruits,  the  maximum 
ever  secured  by  the  army,  renders  such  reports  untrustworthy. 

Thus  this  battle  added  its  trophies  to  the  gallant  fight  of  Oriskany 
and  the  successful  defense  of  Fort  Schuyler.  General  Stark  was 


334  FORT  SCHUYLER,   ORISKANY  AND   BENNINGTON.  [1777. 

promptly  promoted  by  Congress.  These  events  seemed  to  be  the 
ripe  fruit  of  Washington's  prophetic  forecast.  The  militia  began  at 
once  to  hasten  to  the  camp  of  Schuyler.  That  officer  had  been 
superseded  by  General  Gates,  under  the  direction  of  the  American 
Congress ;  but  the  latter  did  not  arrive  to  assume  command  until 
August  nineteenth,  just  in  time  to  gather  laurels  already  maturing  for 
any  discreet  commander  of  the  reviving  army  of  the  North.  General 
Schuyler  received  him  with  courtesy,  permitted  no  mortification  at 
this  sudden  removal  from  command  to  chill  his  enthusiastic  support 
and  earnest  cooperation  in  securing  men  and  supplies  for  the  prose 
cution  of  the  campaign  ;  and  although  not  invited  by  his  successor  to 
a  council  of  war  which  was  convened  to  determine  the  exact  condition 
of  the  department,  and  the  necessary  measures  which  its  interests 
demanded,  was  as  loyal  to  the  demands  upon  his  honor  and  his  zeal 
as  if  he  had  been  supreme  in  command,  and  was  about  to  put  on  a 
crown  of  victory. 


. 

j)  ffoman  Gmnadienf.  E.     a 
T£. Souses  oatpfaffyr  frMoauws 
G.  American.  Jvrc&s. 


CHAPTER  XLVI. 

BATTLE   OF   FREEMAN'S   FARM. 

GENERAL  GATES  took  command  of  the  Northern  Depart 
ment  August  nineteenth,  1777.  Congress  clothed  him  with 
large  powers,  and  conceded  to  his  demand  all  for  which  General 
Schuyler  had  in  vain  made  requisitions.  His  communications  were 
also  made  direct  to  Congress,  over  the  head  of  the  commander-in- 
chief ;  and  to  such  an  extent  was  this  practiced,  that  his  ultimate 
report  of  the  surrender  of  General  Burgoyne  entirely  ignored  the 
position  of  Washington,  as  if  Gates  already  occupied  his  place.  It  is 
not  proposed  in  this  connection  or  elsewhere,  to  enter  into  the  details 
of  his  systematic  efforts  to  attain  the  general  command  ;  but,  as  in  the 
case  of  General  Lee  and  other  officers,  to  notice  occasional  military 
facts  and  documents  which  determine  the  qualifications  of  officers  in 
respect  of  subordination,  discipline  and  military  conduct. 

His  accession  to  command  was  signalized  by  an  extraordinary 
letter  addressed  to  General  Burgoyne,  containing  the  following  para 
graph  :  "  The  miserable  fate  of  Miss  McCrea  was  peculiarly  aggravated 
by  her  being  dressed  to  receive  her  promised  husband,  but  met  her 
murderer  employed  by  you"  u  Upward  of  one  hundred  men,  women, 
and  children  have  perished  by  the  hands  of  ruffians  to  whom  it  is 
asserted  you  have  paid  the  price  of  blood." 

Burgoyne  replied,  "  I  would  not  be  conscious  of  the  acts  you  pre 
sume  to  impute  to  me  for  the  whole  continent  of  America  ;  though 
the  wealth  of  worlds  was  in  its  bowels,  and  a  paradise  upon  its  sur 
face."  The  letter  of  Gates  received  passing  applause.  The  reply  of 
Burgoyne  still  honors  his  name. 

The  army  daily  increased  in  numbers.  Congress  directed  that 
Morgan's  riflemen,  then  thoroughly  organized,  should  be  sent  to  the 
Northern  Department,  and  after  nearly  three  weeks  of  delay,  Gates 
advanced  his  command  from  Schuyler's  old  camp  on  the  islands  of  the 


336  BATTLE   OF  FREEMAN'S  FARM.  [I777- 

Mohawk,  to  a  position  about  four  miles  north  of  Stillwater,  and  twenty- 
four  from  Albany,  on  the  west  or  right  bank  of  the  Hudson  river. 

A  narrow  meadow  skirted  the  river  at  the  point  which  Kosciusko, 
then  an  engineer  in  the  American  service,  had  selected  for  the  camp. 
The  headquarters  were  established  on  the  first  hill  west  from  the 
river.  The  breastworks  proper  took  the  general  form  of  a  half  circle 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  extent,  projected  towards  the  north.  Sev 
eral  redoubts  were  established  to  command  the  front  and  the  river 
meadows  ;  and  the  old  Neilson  barn,  built  of  heavy  logs,  was  fortified 
at  the  nearest  approach  of  the  enemy.  Light  earthworks  also  rested 
upon  the  meadow  itself,  covering  both  the  old  road  and  the  bridge  of 
boats  which  established  communication  with  the  opposite  shore  of 
the  Hudson.  Still  farther  to  the  left  on  the  adjoining  hill  westward, 
additional  earthworks  were  commenced  but  they  were  never  entirely 
completed.  The  position  itself  was  well  protected  by  its  elevation  and 
steep  face.  Bemis'  Heights  was  to  the  north  and  west.  Freeman's 
farm-house  occupied  a  cultivated  tract  of  limited  extent  nearly  north 
of  the  American  left,  and  between  the  middle  and  south  ravine, 
tfhich  here  cut  through  from  the  hills  to  the  river.  Mill  creek  and 
its  branches  swept  through  the  forests  lying  between  the  American 
position  and  that  which  the  British  army  occupied  on  the  seventeenth 
day  of  August.  The  south  ravine  was  behind  and  south  of  the 
American  camp,  and  the  north  ravine,  which  was  the  deepest,  was 
nearly  in  front  and  south  of  the  British  position.  The  middle  ravine 
was  between  the  American  camp  and  Freeman's  farm,  Reference  is 
made  to  the  maps,  "  Battle  of  Freeman's  Farm,"  "  Battle  of  Bemis' 
Heights,"  for  a  general  review  of  the  respective  positions  of  the  two 
armies.  The  two  maps  alike  reproduce  the  portion  of  country  which 
was  common  to  the  military  movements  from  September  seventeenth 
to  the  eighth  of  October. 

General  Poor's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  New  Hampshire  regi 
ments  of  Cilley,  Scammel,  and  Hale  ;  Van  Cortland's  and  Henry  Liv 
ingston's  New  York  regiments ;  Cook's  and  Latimer's  Connecticut 
militia ;  Morgan's  rifle  corps,  and  Major  Dearborn's  light  infantry 
composed  the  left  wing  under  Arnold,  resting  on  the  heights  nearly  a 
mile  from  the  river.  General  Learned's  brigade,  Bailey's,  Wesson's, 
and  Jackson's  Massachusetts  regiments,  and  James  Livingston's  New 
York  regiments  occupied  the  adjoining  fortified  plateau  to  the  left 
near  the  Neilson  barn.  The  main  body  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  General  Gates,  and  composed  chiefly  of  Nixon's,  Patterson's 


1777  J  BATTLE  OF  FREEMAN  S  FARM.  337 

and  Glover's  brigades,  formed  the  right  wing  upon  the  bluff,  reaching 
across  the  low  ground  to  the  river.  General  Stark  joined  with  his 
brigade  of  militia,  but  they  did  not  remain  long  after  their  short  time 
of  service  expired.  Whipple's,  Patterson's,  Warner's,  Fellows',  Bailey's 
Wolcott's,  Brickett's,  and  Ten  Broeck's  brigades  also  joined  the 
army.  The  works  were  all  well  advanced  by  the  fifteenth  of  Sep 
tember. 

On  the  twentieth  of  August,  Burgoyne  wrote  to  Lord  Germaine, 
that  Fort  Stanwix  held  out  stubbornly  in  spite  of  St.  Leger's  victory 
(over  Herkimer), — that  he  had  accumulated  but  about  four  hundred 
loyalists,  not  half  of  them  armed,  the  rest  trimmers  merely  actuated 
by  interest — that  he  was  afraid  the  expectations  of  Sir  John  Johnson 
as  to  the  rising  of  the  country  would  fail, — that  the  great  bulk  of  the 
people  is  undoubtedly  with  the  Congress  in  principle  and  in  zeal,  and 
that  "  their  measures  are  executed  with  a  secrecy  and  dispatch  that 
are  not  to  be  equaled;"  adding,  "  wherever  the  king's  forces  point, 
militia  to  the  amount  of  three  or  four  thousand  assemble  in  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  bring  their  subsistence  with  them,  and  the  alarm  over, 
they  return  to  their  farms."  <(i  The  Hampshire  Grants,  in  particular, 
a  country  unpeopled  and  almost  unknown  in  the  last  war,  now  abounds 
in  the  most  active  and  rebellious  men  of  the  continent,  and  hangs 
like  a  gathering  storm  on  my  left." 

Of  his  correspondence  with  Sir  William  Howe  he  reports  that  he 
"  knew  that  two  of  his  messengers  had  been  hanged,  while  only  one 
letter  had  been  received  ;  "  that  "  Sir  William  Howe  informed  him  that 
his  intention  was  for  Pennsylvania,  that  Washington  had  dispatched 
twenty-five  hundred  men  to  Albany,  that  Putnam  was  in  the  High 
lands  with  four  thousand  men,  but  that  Sir  Henry  Clinton  remained 
in  the  neighborhood  of  New  York  and  would  act  as  circumstances 
might  direct."  Almost  immediately  after  this  dispatch  was  sent,  he 
received  the  news  of  the  retreat  of  St.  Leger  and  that  the  American 
army  was  relieved  from  that  pressure  upon  its  left  flank  and  rear. 

The  utmost  effort  was  made  to  secure  supplies  ;  and  by  the  twelfth 
of  September,  provisions  had  been  procured  for  thirty  days'  issue. 
The  bridge  of  rafts  had  drifted  away  by  a  rise  of  the  Hudson  ;  a  new 
bridge  of  boats  had  been  built,  and  on  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth 
of  September  the  entire  army  crossed  the  Hudson  and  encamped  on 
the  plain  of  Saratoga.  It  is  proper  to  state  in  this  connection  that 
his  crossing  of  the  Hudson  river,  was  not  only  in  the  direct  line  of 
general  instructions,  but  it  had  the  concurrence  of  his  officers,  and  was 


338  BATTLE   OF   FREEMAN'S   FARM.  [i?77 

regarded    as   the  only  method  of  meeting  the  responsibility  which 
devolved  upon  the  army. 

On  the  fifteenth  the  army  moved  to  Dovegat  (now  Coveville)  ; 
on  the  sixteenth  repaired  bridges,  reconnoitered  the  country  and 
made  a  still  further  advance,  and  on  the  seventeenth  encamped  upon 
advantageous  ground  within  four  miles  of  the  American  army,  near 
Swords'  House,  as  indicated  on  the  map  entitled  "  Battle  of  Free 
man's  Farm."  On  the  eighteenth  skirmishing  was  active  between 
the  two  armies.  On  the  nineteenth,  after  careful  reconnoitering  of 
the  great  ravine  and  other  avenues  of  approach  to  the  American  lines, 
the  British  army  advanced  to  the  attack.  An  approximate  idea  of 
the  succeeding  movements  can  be  secured. 

Major-general  the  Marquis  de  Chastellux  who  served  under  the 
Count  de  Rochambeau,  revisited  America  in  1780-81,  and  82,  and  after 
an  entertainment  at  General  Schuyler's  farm-house,  "visited  the  ground 
where  the  actions  of  the  nineteenth  of  September  and  of  the  seventh 
of  October  happened."  He  says,  "I  avoid  the  word  field  of  battle, 
for  these  engagements  were  in  the  woods,  and  on  ground  so  intersected 
and  covered,  that  it  is  impossible  either  to  conceive  or  discover  the 
smallest  resemblance  between  it  and  the  plans  given  to  the  public  by 
General  Burgoyne." 

Whether  "  the  depth  of  the  snow  through  which  he  waded,''  or 
his  "  upset  in  a  great  heap  of  snow  while  traveling  in  a  sledge,"  had 
any  thing  to  do  with  the  difficulty  in  tracing  the  route  of  Burgoyne 
or  not,  the  genial  traveler  does  not  indicate.  These  maps  however 
do  set  forth  with  substantial  distinctness  the  general  positions  of  the 
two  armies;  and  with  some  modifications  and  enlargement  of  detail, 
are  the  best  guides  from  which  to  obtain  a  fair  conception  of  the 
engagements  referred  to.  It  is  not  unseldom  the  case  that  a  single 
error  in  the  starting  point,  will  even  confuse  one  who  participated 
actively  in  field  operations,  if  it  be  only  through  approaching  the 
position  from  a  contrary  direction  ;  and  in  reports  of  nearly  all  battles, 
the  movements  made  by  different  corps  must  be  examined,  in  order 
to  understand  the  actual  relations  of  the  principal  parties  engaged. 

The  advance  of  General  Burgoyne  will  be  taken  from  his  own 
initiative,  sustained  by  the  evidence  of  officers  of  his  staff  and  his  divis 
ion  commanders  ;  and  these  will  be  combined  with  the  report  of 
Adjutant-general  Wilkinson,  of  General  Gates'  staff,  and  other  Ameri 
can  officers,  so  as  to  gain  as  accurate  an  estimate  of  the  battle  referred 
to  as  may  be  gained  by  such  analysis. 


T777-]  BATTLE   OF   FREEMAN'S   FARM.  339 

Six  companies  of  the  Forty-seventh  British  regiment  guarded  the 
bateaux  which  were  at  the  river  bank,  in  the  rear  of  the  camp.  Two 
companies  of  this  regiment  remained  behind  on  Diamond  Island,  Lake 
George.  When  the  army  left  Swords'  House,  General  Eraser's  corps, 
sustained  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Breyman's  made  a  circuit,  in  order  to 
pass  the  ravine  commodiously  without  quitting  the  heights  ;  and  after 
wards  to  cover  the  march  of  the  line  to  the  right. 

The  Canadians  were  in  advance  and  were  speedily  driven  back, 
but  rallied  upon  Eraser's  approach.  The  American  volunteers  and 
Indians  were  also  employed  on  the  flanks,  and  to  the  front.  The 
British  and  German  grenadiers  and  the  Twenty-fourth  regiment  moved 
steadily  along  the  height,  until  they  were  required  to  change  direc 
tion  to  the  left,  which  brought  them  directly  in  contact  with  the 
American  troops,  who  having  been  repulsed  by  General  Fraser,  shortly 
after  engaged  the  British  centre.  General  Burgoyne  says  of  this  par 
ticular  movement :  "  In  the  meantime  the  enemy,  not  acquainted  with 
the  combination  of  the  march,  had  moved  in  great  force  out  of  their 
intrenchments,  with  a  view  of  turning  the  line  upon  our  right,  and 
being  checked  by  the  disposition  of  Brigadier-general  Fraser,  counter 
marched,  in  order  to  direct  their  great  effort  to  the  left  of  the  British." 
"  From  the  nature  of  the  country,  efforts  of  this  sort,  however  near, 
may  be  effected  without  possibility  of  their  being  discovered." 

The  centre  column,  led  by  Burgoyne  in  person,  <;  passed  the  ravine 
in  a  direct  line  south,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle  as  soon  as  they 
gained  the  summit  (out  of  the  ravine)  at  the  first  opening  of  the  wood 
to  the  right,  to  give  time  to  Eraser's  corps  to  make  the  desired  circuit, 
and  to  enable  the  left  wing  and  artillery,  which,  under  the  command 
of  Major-generals  Phillips  and  Riedesel,  kept  the  great  road  and 
meadows  near  the  river,  and  had  bridges  to  repair,  to  be  equally 
ready  to  proceed."  The  latter  corps,  upon  reaching  the  position, 
changed  direction  and  marched  nearly  due  west,  to  connect  with  the 
left  of  the  British  centre,  which  had  engaged  the  enemy  before  their 
arrival.  "  All  columns  moved  at  signal  guns,  a  little  after  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon.  A  few  cannon  shot  soon  dislodged  the  Americans 
from  a  house  where  the  Canadians  had  been  attacked,"  and  "  Brigadier- 
general  Fraser's  corps  arrived  with  such  precision  in  point  of  time,  as 
to  be  found  upon  a  very  advantageous  height  on  the  right  of  the 
British  centre  as  soon  as  the  action  began."  This  position  has  been 
already  adverted  to.  The  American  troops  made  their  first  advance 
upon  General  Fraser's  corps  ;  but  by  three  o'clock,  or  soon  after,  the 


340  BATTLE   OF   FREEMAN  S   FARM.  [i777- 

whole  action  concentrated  near  Freeman's  Farm,  from  which  position 
the  British  army  made  a  determined  advance  for  the  purpose  of  turn 
ing  the  American  left.  The  Twentieth,  Sixty-second,  and  Twenty- 
first  regiments  advanced  directly  from  their  original  place  of  formation, 
leaving  the  N*inth  in  reserve.  The  British  grenadiers  and  the  Twenty 
fourth  were  brought  to  their  support  after  this  advance  to  Freeman'*: 
Farm  ;  and  the  light  infantry  which  had  been  on  Burgoyne's  right,  alsc 
came  into  action  on  the  left  of  the  grenadiers,  thus  connecting  with 
the  Ninth  regiment  when  it  subsequently  advanced.  Major  Forbes  of 
the  Ninth,  who  commanded  the  pickets,  states  that  "  he  was  attacked 
with  great  vigor  from  behind  rail  fences  and  a  house,  by  a  body  of 
riflemen  and  light  infantry"  ;  that  "  the  Americans  attempted  to  turn 
the  left  of  the  Sixty-second,  when  the  Twentieth  was  advanced  to  its 
support."  The  Americans  pressed  forward  also  upon  the  right  of  the 
British  column,  until  the  advance  of  the  British  light  infantry,  and  the 
movement  of  the  grenadiers  of  Fraser's  command  to  the  left,  com 
pelled  them  to  fall  back  and  take  their  final  position  on  good  ground, 
between  Freeman's  Farm  and  Chatfield's  house.  Earl  Balcarras,  in 
his  evidence  upon  this  part  of  the  battle,  says,  "  The  enemy  behaved 
with  great  obstinacy  and  courage."  The  Earl  of  Harrington  says 
that  "  the  British  line  was  formed  with  the  utmost  regularity,  that 
different  attempts  were  made  by  the  General's  orders  to  charge  the 
enemy  with  bayonets,  and  all  failed  but  the  last,  when  the  British 
troops  finally  drove  them  from  the  field,  and  that  the  action  was  dis 
puted  very  obstinately  by  the  enemy."  During  this  time  the  rifle 
men  and  other  parts  of  Breyman's  corps  were  left  on  the  heights  to 
protect  the  extreme  right  from  being  turned. 

Major-general  Phillips  and  Major  Humphreys,  with  four  pieces  of 
artillery,  arrived  from  the  extreme  left  in  advance  of  General  Riedesel, 
and  led  the  Twentieth  again  to  the  front,  "  restoring  the  action,"  (says 
Burgoyne)  "  in  a  point  which  was  critically  pressed  by  a  great  superi 
ority  of  fire."  General  Riedesel  brought  up  the  Jagers,  Specht's  com 
mand,  and  his  Brunswickers,  only  in  time  to  engage  in  the  final  charge, 
which  was  just  as  night  came  on,  and  both  armies  gave  up  the  contest. 
The  Earl  Balcarras  occupied  Freeman's  Farm  with  the  light  infantry 
and  fortified  the  position.  Colonel  Breyman  threw  up  works  to  the 
right  and  rear,  to  protect  the  right  wing,  and  the  remainder  of  the  army 
was  prolonged  to  the  river,  behind  Mill  creek,  Hanau's  corps  occupy 
ing  the  meadow  near  the  river  bank.  The  whole  line  was  at  once 
fortified,  and  five  redoubts  were  established  on  detached  hills  having 


I777.J  BATTLE   OF  FREEMAN'S   FARM.  34! 

commanding  positions.  The  British  regiments  of  the  centre  which 
had  been  held  under  fire  for  the  entire  afternoon,  went  into  action 
with  eleven  hundred  men,  and  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  more  than 
half  their  force. 

The  Twentieth  and  Sixty-second  were  almost  destroyed.  Colonel 
Anstruther  and  Major  Harnage,  and  many  other  officers,  were  either 
killed  or  wounded,  and  Adjutant-general  Kingston  states,  that  "  the 
survivors  did  not  probably  exceed  fifty,  besides  four  or  five  officers." 
Captain  Jones,  commanding  four  guns,  had  thirty-six  men  killed  or 
wounded,  out  of  a  total  of  forty-eight.  The  fight  over  these  guns 
was  desperate. 

Such  is  the  summary  of  the  British  reports  of  this  action  ;  and 
they  clearly  vindicate  the  excellence  of  the  order  of  battle  which 
Burgoyne  adopted  and  the  skill  with  which  his  force  was  handled  in 
the  midst  of  woods  and  where  there  were  few  tracts  of  open  ground 
for  manceuvering  troops.  Early  in  the  day,  upon  the  advice  of  Arnold, 
Gates  had  directed  him  to  send  Morgan's  riflemen  and  Dearborn's 
light  infantry  to  oppose  the  advance  of  the  British  right.  This  was 
the  force  encountered  by  Major  Forbes  and  afterwards  by  Earl  Bal- 
carras.  Its  temporary  success  was  turned  into  a  repulse  by  the  sup 
port  which  Major  Forbes  received,  and  Morgan  fell  back  ("  counter 
marched,"  says  Burgoyne)  with  the  loss  of  Captain  Swearingen  and 
twenty  men  and  with  his  corps  so  greatly  disorganized  that  he  thought 
it  was  "  ruined."  The  regiments  of  Scammel  and  Cilley  were  ordered 
to  Morgan's  support,  and  Arnold  pushed  a  strong  column  to  the  attack, 
from  his  division.  The  firm  resistance  of  General  Fraser  required 
additional  troops.  Arnold  finally  pushed  his  entire  division  to  the 
front  and  then  it  was  that  the  attack  shifted  and  fell  upon  the  centre, 
commanded  by  Burgoyne  in  person. 

Sergeant  Lamb  says,  in  his  Journal,  "  Here  the  conflict  was  dread 
ful  ;  for  four  hours  a  constant  blaze  of  fire  was  kept  up,  and  both 
armies  seemed  to  be  determined  on  death  or  victory."  Arnold 
finally  brought  his  whole  division  into  action  and  other  reinforce 
ments  came  up  until  at  least  three  thousand  American  troops  were 
engaged. 

The  American  casualties  were  sixty-five  killed,  two  hundred  and 
eighteen  wounded  and  thirty-eight  missing.  The  British  army  was 
unable  to  resume  the  fight ;  and  the  American  army  awaited  the 
arrival  of  ammunition  before  venturing  to  advance  again  upon  the 
enemy.  General  Gates  reported  this  action  to  Congress  in  brief  terms 


342  BATTLE   OF  FREEMAN  S   FARM.  [1777. 

declining  "  to  discriminate  in  praise  of  the  officers,  as  they  all  deserve 
the  honor  and  applause  of  Congress."  The  names  of  Lieutenant- 
colonels  Colburn  and  Adams,  who  were  killed,  are  however  specifically 
mentioned. 

To  what  extent  General  Arnold  accompanied  the  successive  por 
tions  of  his  division  which  bore  the  brunt  of  this  day's  fight,  is  not 
clearly  or  uniformly  defined  by  historians.  That  contemporaneous 
history  gave  his  division  credit,  is  nowhere  questioned  :  and  that  he 
was  a  listless  observer  or  remained  in  camp  regardless  of  the  fact  that 
he  was  responsible  for  the  entire  left  wing,  which  was  then  assailed,  is 
perfectly  inconsistent  with  his  nature  and  the  position  he  occupied. 
Wilkinson,  Adjutant-general  of  Gates,  and  by  virtue  thereof  " prima 
facie"  good  authority  as  to  the  acts  of  Gates,  makes  the  remarkable 
statement,  that  "  not  a  single  general  officer  was  on  the  field  of  battle, 
the  nineteenth  of  September  until  evening,"  and  states  the  execution 
of  this  wonderful  military  exploit,  that  "  the  battle  was  fought  by  the 
general  concert  and  zealous  cooperation  of  the  corps  engaged,  and 
sustained  more  by  individual  courage  than  military  discipline." 
Bancroft  states  that  "  Arnold  was  not  on  the  field,"  and  adds  "  so 
witnesses  Wilkinson,  whom  Marshall  knew  personally  and  believed." 
And  Marshall  says,  "  Reinforcements  were  continually  brought  up, 
and,  about  four  o'clock,  Arnold,  with  nine  Continental  regiments  and 
Morgan's  corps,  was  completely  engaged  with  the  whole  right  wing  of 
the  British  army.  The  conflict  was  extremely  severe  and  only  ter 
minated  with  the  day."* 

Gordon  says,  "  Arnold's  division  was  out  in  the  action,  but  he 
himself  did  not  lead  them  ;  he  remained  in  the  camp  the  whole  time." 
This  statement  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  Arnold  regulated 
the  resistance  before  his  lines,  although  a  curious  intimation  concern 
ing  a  man  like  Arnold.  There  was  little  disposition  on  the  part  of  his 
torians  who  wrote  just  after  the  war,  to  do  Arnold  justice  for  real 
merit ;  but  Stedman,  equally  good  authority  with  Gordon  in  most 
respects,  says,  "  The  enemy  were  led  to  the  battle  by  General  Arnold, 
who  distinguished  himself  in  an  extraordinary  manner."  Dawson,  who 
has  few  superiors  in  the  careful  examination  of  American  history,  and 
Lossing,  who  has  devoted  his  life  to  this  class  of  specialties,  and 
Tomes,  assume  his  presence ;  while  Colonel  Varick,  writing  imme 
diately  from  the  camp,  and  Neilson,  and  Hall  and  many  other  writers, 
give  to  Arnold  not  merely  the  credit  of  superintending  the  field  opera 
tions  of  his  division,  but  of  leading  them  in  person.  It  is  difficult  to 

*  See  note  on  page  344. 


I777-J  BATTLE    OF   FREEMAN'S   FARM.  343 

understand  how  the   withdrawal  of  troops  from  Eraser's  front,  and 
their  transfer  to  the  British  centre,  with  the  consequent  movements 
described  by  General  Burgoyne,  which  required  such  rapid  and  ex 
haustive  employment  of  the  whole  force  wnich  he  brought  into  action, 
could  have  taken  place  undirected,  and  with  no  strong  will  to  hold  the 
troops  to  the  attack  and  defense.     It  is  material  that  other  facts  be 
considered  in  order  to  appreciate  the  value  of  Wilkinson's  statement. 
He  was  a  young  man  about  twenty  years  of  age,  restless,  migratory  in 
the  camp,  and   like  a   boy  in   his  eagerness  to  see  everything  every- 
where.     He  exercised  his  functions  as  assistant  Adjutant-general,  as 
if  he  were  the  duplicate  of  his  chief,  and  repeatedly  gave  orders  as  if 
the  two  persons  made  the  general  commanding.     The  unprofessional 
reader  of  history  would   take    the  statement    that   "  General  Gates 
ordered  out  Morgan's  corps   on  the  morning  of  the  nineteenth,"  to 
meanyV/^/  that.     But  when  it  is  understood,  as  appears  from  Arnold's 
report,  that  General  Gates  ordered  Arnold  to  send  out  Morgans  corps, 
there  is  involved  a  negation  of  the  absence  of  Arnold  during  the 
attack  upon  his  lines.     Arnold  also,  in   his  objections  to  the  transfer 
of  Morgan  from  his  command,  and  neither  Gates  nor  Wilkinson  dis 
sent  from  his  statement,  thus  addresses  General  Gates  :  "  On  the  igth 
inst.,  when  advice  was  received  that  the   enemy  were   approaching,  I 
took  the  liberty  to  give  it  as  my  opinion,  that  we  ought  to  march  out 
and  attack  them.     You  desired  me  to  send  Colonel  Morgan  and  the 
light  infantry,  and  support  them.     I  obeyed  your  orders,  and   before 
the  action  was  over,  I  found  it  necessary  to  send  out  the  whole  of  my 
division  to  support  the  attack." 

General  Arnold  was  complaining  that  "  he  had  been  informed  that 
in  the  returns  transmitted  to  Congress  of  the  killed  and  wounded  in 
the  action,  the  troops  were  mentioned  as  a  detachment  from  the  army." 
He  also  says  :  "  I  observe  it  is  mentioned  in  the  orders  of  the  day, 
that  Colonel  Morgan's  corps,  not  being  in  any  brigade  or  division  of 
this  army,"  (just  then  withdrawn)  "  are  to  make  returns  and  reports 
only  to  headquarters,  from  whence  they  are  alone  to  receive  orders  ; 
although  it  is  notorious  to  the  whole  army,  they  have  been  in  and 
done  duty  with  my  division  for  some  time  past."  "  I  have  ever  sup 
posed  that  a  Major-general's  command  of  four  thousand  men  was  a 
proper  division,  and  no  detachment,  when  composed  of  whole  brigades, 
forming  one  wing  of  the  army  ;  and  that  the  general  and  troops,  if 
guilty  of  misconduct  or  cowardly  behavior  in  time  of  action,  were 
justly  chargeable  as  a  division."  "  Had  my  division  behaved  ill,  the 


344  BATTLE   OF  FREEMAN  S   FARM.  [1777. 

other  divisions  of  the  army  would  have  thought  it  extremely  hard  to 
have  been  amenable  for  their  conduct." 

Wilkinson  also  says,  "  This  battle  was  perfectly  accidental'''  (see 
Burgoyne's  carefully  conceived  advance,)  that  "  neither  of  the  generals 
meditated  an  attack  at  the  time,  and  but  for  Lieutenant-colonel  Col- 
burn's  report  it  would  not  have  taken  place."  He  states  that  this 
officer  was  "sent  across  the  Hudson  river  to  observe  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  by  climbing  forest  trees  or  other  practicable 
means,"  that  on  "  his  making  his  communications  to  the  General, 
that  the  enemy  had  taken  up  their  camp,  he  immediately  ordered 
Colonel  Morgan,"  (as  if  it  were  a  direct  personal  order)  u  to  advance 
with  his  corps."  When  the  firing  began,  and  Major  Wilkinson 
wanted  to  see  what  was  going  on,  and  General  Gates  answered, 
"  It  is  your  duty,  sir,  to  await  orders,"  he  "  made  an  excuse  to  visit 
the  picket  on  the  left  for  intelligence,  put  spurs  to  his  horse,  and, 
directed  by  the  sound,  entered  the  woods."  It  would  be  idle  to  fol 
low  his  extraordinary  personal  experiences  through  the  woods,  as 
related  in  his  memoirs.  The  most  eventful  elements  of  his  early 
career  are  embodied  in  data,  gathered  by  him  on  such  unofficial, 
voluntary  excursions. 

It  is  a  fact  that  General  Gates  did  not  pass  under  fire,  neither  was 
it  necessary  for  him  to  do  so  ;  but  the  whole  conduct  of  that  officer,  and 
of  his  Adjutant-general,  savors  of  the  disgust  with  which  in  an  earlier 
war,  King  Saul  heard  the  shouts  that  "  Saul  had  slain  his  thousands, 
but  David  his  tens  of  thousands."  Arnold  must  stand  credited  with 
personal  valor  and  a  gallant  defense  of  the  left  wing  of  the  American 
army  on  the  nineteenth  day  of  September,  1777. 

There  is  no  method  of  determining  the  details  of  his  conduct,  and 
the  student  of  history  must  unite  with  Sparks  and  Irving  and  Mar 
shall  in  the  general  sentiment  that  Morgan  only,  of  American  officers, 
can  compete  with  Arnold  for  the  brightest  laurels  of  the  Saratoga 
campaign.  (See  note,  pages  663,  664.) 

NOTE  to  p.  342.  Marshall  (Ed.  1839)  closes,  "and  about  four  in  the  afternoon  upwards  of 
three  thousand  American  troops  were  closely  engaged  with,"  etc.,  adding  in  foot-note,  Wilkinson's 
statement,  cited  page  342.  Mr.  Bancroft  kindly  furnishes  this  fragment  from  (MS.)  letter  of 
R.  R.  Livingston  to  Washington,  January  12,  1778,  but  has  no  data  to  relate  the  personal  pronoun. 
"  I  take  the  liberty  to  enclose  your  Excellency,  an  extract  written  to  him,  under  General  Arnold's 
direction,  by  a  gentleman  of  his  family,  he  being  unable  to  hold  a  pen  himself.  After  a  warm 
commendation  of  his  good  conduct  both  in  the  camp  and  field,  and  giving  him  and  his  regiment  a 
full  share  of  the  honors  of  the  battle  of  the  igth,  in  which  General  Arnold,  not  being  present, 
speaks  only  from  the  reports  of  those  who  were."  This  fragment  does  not  prove  that  Arnold 
did  not  superintend  movement  of  the  troops.  See  text.  (See  note,  page  354.) 


344* 


CHAPTER  XLVII. 

BEMIS'  HEIGHTS.    BURGOYNE'S  SURRENDER,  1777. 

ON  the  twenty-first  of  September,  a  letter  from  Sir  Henry  Clin 
ton,  written  in  cypher  on  the  twelfth,  advised  General  Bur- 
goyne  of  his  intention  to  attack  the  Hudson  river  posts  in  about  ten 
days.  No  other  message  was  received  from  New  York  during  the 
month  ;  and  on  the  third  of  October  the  ration-issue  was  largely 
reduced.  On  the  seventh,  the  condition  of  the  army  was  such  as  to 
compel  energetic  measures  for  its  deliverance.  The  paramount 
object  of  the  campaign  was  kept  in  view,  for  it  was  evident  that  a 
sudden  retreat  would  set  free  the  rapidly  increasing  American  army, 
for  operations  against  Clinton.  There  was  no  difference  of  opinion 
among  the  British  generals  as  to  the  duty  of  immediate  action,  and 
two  alternatives  were  considered  ;  either  to  make  a  bold  offensive 
movement  and  force  a  passage  through,  or  past,  Gates'  army ;  or,  to 
so  dislodge  and  cripple  him,  as  to  make  a  secure  retreat  practicable. 
To  rest  in  camp  was  to  starve,  or  perish  by  the  sword.  The  troops 
selected  for  the  proposed  movement  consisted  of  fifteen  hundred 
regulars,  to  be  commanded  by  Burgoyne  in  person,  accompanied  by 
Generals  Phillips,  Riedesel  and  Fraser.  Generals  Hamilton  and  Specht 
were  ordered  to  hold  the  intrenchments  and  redoubts ;  and  the 
defense  of  the  river  meadow,  with  the  magazine  and  hospital,  was 
intrusted  to  General  De  Gall.  Two  howitzers,  two  twelve,  and  six 
six-pounder  guns  were  attached  to  the  command. 

The  column  was  formed  and  deployed  within  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  of  the  American  left,  upon  high  and  quite  open  ground,  sur 
rounded  by  woods ;  and  Captain  Fraser's  rangers,  the  Indians  and 
Provincials,  were  ordered  to  make  their  way  through  by-paths  of  the 
forest,  to  attempt  a  demonstration  to  the  rear  of  the  American  army. 
These  light  troops  had  hardly  started,  when  a  sudden  and  rapid 


346  BEMIS'   HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S   SURRENDER.  [1777. 

attack  was  made  upon  the  left  of  the  line,  already  formed  for  imme 
diate  advance.  The  British  grenadiers  under  Major  Acland  met  the 
attack  with  great  resolution  ;  but  the  increasing  numbers  of  the  enemy 
gradually  bore  them  back.  Before  any  portion  of  the  German  troops 
on  the  right  and  to  the  centre,  could  be  withdrawn  to  support  the 
yielding  grenadiers,  the  centre  was  assailed,  and  then  the  right ;  so 
that  the  entire  line  was  actively  engaged  almost  as  soon  as  the  action 
commenced. 

The  fragments  of  the  Twentieth  and  the  Sixty-second,  with  a  small 
body  of  light  infantry,  were  all  that  could  be  brought  forward,  until 
Earl  Balcarras  was  withdrawn  from  the  extreme  right,  and  General 
Fraser  took  a  position  to  cover  the  impending  retreat  of  the  whole 
force.  While  thus  engaged  in  strengthening  the  left  and  securing 
some  steadiness  to  the  yielding  centre,  that  officer  was  mortally 
wounded.  A  general  retreat  was  ordered.  Sir  Francis  Clerke,  who 
bore  the  message,  was  also  fatally  wounded.  Six  guns  were  at  once 
abandoned,  the  horses  and  most  of  the  men  having  been  killed  ;  and 
as  the  troops  entered  their  old  lines,  "the  works  were  stormed  with 
great  fury  by  the  Americans,  who  rushed  on,  under  a  severe  fire  of 
grape  shot  and  small  arms."  The  intrenchments  occupied  the  night 
before  and  regained  by  Earl  Balcarras,  successfully  resisted  assault ; 
but  the  attacking  force  swept  by  them  and  successfully  stormed  those 
which  Lieutenant-colonel  Breyman  occupied.  He  was  killed,  and  his 
troops  broke  in  confusion  to  the  rear.  Such  is  the  British  history  of 
the  action. 

General  Gates  had  detailed  Colonel  Brooks  with  three  hundred 
men  to  move  around  the  British  right  and  annoy  their  outposts. 
Morgan  had  already  skirmished  with  a  small  Canadian  force  which 
threatened  the  American  pickets  on  the  comparatively  clear  ground 
between  the  middle  and  north  ravine,  and  an  officer  was  sent  to  deter 
mine  the  strength  and  disposition  of  the  British  forces  which  had  been 
reported  as  in  line  of  battle  threatening  the  left  wing  of  the  American 
army.  When  the  aid-de-camp  reached  the  hill,  near  Chatfield's  house, 
he  found  that  the  ridge  was  already  held  by  an  advanced  detachment 
from  the  British  column,  and  that  Munger's  house  was  occupied  by 
officers  who  had  been  sent  forward  to  reconnoiter  the  country  near 
the  American  lines. 

At  this  time  the  American  army  occupied  substantially  the  same 
position  as  on  the  nineteenth  of  September.  An  altercation  between 
Arnold  and  Gates,  owing  to  the  removal  of  a  portion  of  the  division 


I777-J  BEMIS'   HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S  SURRENDER.  347 

of  the  former  without  giving  him  notice,  and  other  vexatious  questions 
which  had  their  prime  root  in  the  unabated  confidence  of  Arnold  in 
Schuyler,  had  driven  him,  in  one  of  his  passionate  outbursts,  to  ask  leave 
to  goto  headquarters  and  join  Washington.  Gates  readily  granted  this 
request,  and  General  Lincoln,  who  arrived  on  the  twenty-ninth,  was  at 
once  placed  in  command  of  Arnold's  division.  Arnold,  however, 
quickly  repented  his  passionate  outburst  arid  lingered  with  the  army, 
having  the  general  sympathy  of  the  officers,  but  still  venting  his  anger 
in  daily  imprudence.  On  the  seventh  of  October  as  the  battle  came 
on,  he  was  like  a  war-horse  gnawing  his  curb  and  panting  for  the  fray. 

Gates  sent  Morgan  to  the  left  to  gain  high  ground  on  the  British 
right.  Poor's  brigade,  made  up  of  Scammel's,  Hale's,  and  Cilley's 
New  Hampshire  regiments,  was  ordered  to  cross  the  hill  by  Chatfield's 
house  and  attack  the  British  left. 

Major  Dearborn  was  placed  in  readiness  to  advance  to  Morgan's 
right,  and  the  Connecticut  regiments  of  Cook  and  Latimer,  and  Van 
Courtland's  and  Henry  Livingston's  New  York,  were  to  support  Poor. 
Learned's  brigade,  recently  under  Arnold's  command,  was  also  placed 
in  readiness  to  follow  immediately ;  and  General  Tenbroeck  was  held 
in  reserve  to  give  support  as  needed.  The  formation  was  made  under 
cover  of  the  woods,  and  as  already  indicated  by  the  British  report  of 
the  action,  the  counter  assault  was  a  practical  surprise  to  the  troops 
assailed.  The  composition  and  positions  of  the  British  corps  are  cor 
rectly  indicated  on  the  map,  "  Battle  of  Bemis'  Heights."  The  brig 
ades  of  Poor  and  Learned  crossed  Mill  creek,  reserved  their  fire,  and 
moved  up  the  slope  with  steadiness  and  in  good  order.  The  first  fire 
delivered  by  the  British  troops  was  aimed  too  high  and  did  little  mis 
chief.  The  Americans  without  hesitation  rushed  upon  the  guns. 

Again  and  again  these  pieces  were  alternately  controlled  by  the 
opposing  forces,  until  at  last  the  British  left  wing,  overwhelmed  by 
numbers,  gave  way.  Major  Ackland  was  wounded,  and  Major  Williams 
was  taken  prisoner.  Morgan  had  already  gained  the  right  flank,  and 
was  actively  engaged.  Dearborn  was  in  front,  and  the  Connecticut 
regiments  filled  the  interval  still  further  to  the  right.  The  whole  line 
was  under  the  pressure  of  a  wildly  impetuous  assault.  The  German 
troops  in  the  centre  broke.  The  Royal  artillery,  losing  their  horses 
and  half  their  men,  abandoned  their  guns,  and  the  Earl  Balcarras  with 
his  light  infantry  became  the  chief  dependence  of  General  Fraser,  who 
WAS  trying  to  rally  the  grenadiers  and  establish  behind  the  left  wing 
a  second  line,  as  cover  for  the  general  retreat  then  ordered. 


348  BEMIS'   HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S   SURRENDER.  [1777. 

At  this  stage  of  the  battle,  Arnold,  no  longer  under  self-control, 
burst  from  the  camp,  and  like  a  meteor  rode  to  the  front  of  Learned's 
brigade,  which  had  been  so  recently  under  his  command,  and  dashed 
into  the  fight.  He  was  cheered  as  he  rode  past,  and  like  a  whirlwind 
the  regiments  went  with  him  upon  the  broken  British  lines.  Fraser 
fell  mortally  wounded  in  this  assault,  and  swiftly  behind  the  half  craz}! 
volunteer  came  Tenbroeck,  with  a  force  nearly  double  that  of  the 
whole  British  line.  That  line  was  now  in  full  retreat.  Phillips  and 
Riedesel,  as  well  as  Burgoyne,  who  took  command  in  person,  ex 
hibited  marvellous  courage  in  an  hour  so  perilous,  and  withdrew  the 
troops  with  creditable  self-possession  and  skill,  but  nothing  could  stop 
Arnold.  Wherever  he  found  troops  he  assumed  command;  and  by 
the  magnetism  of  his  will  and  passion,  he  became  supreme  in  daring 
endeavor.  With  a  part  of  the  brigades  of  Patterson  and  Glover,  he 
assaulted  the  intrenchments  of  Earl  Balcarras,  but  was  repulsed.  To 
the  right  of  the  Earl  Balcarras,  the  Canadians  and  Royalists  were 
posted  under  cover  of  two  stockade  redoubts.  Arnold  here  again  met 
Learned's  brigade,  took  the  lead,  and  with  a  single  charge  cleared 
these  works,  leaving  the  left  of  Breyman's  position  entirely  exposed. 
Without  waiting  for  the  result  of  the  further  attack  at  this  point,  he 
rode  directly  in  front  of  Breyman's  intrenchments,  under  fire,  and 
meeting  the  regiments  of  Wesson  and  Livingston  and  Morgan's  rifle 
corps,  which  had  made  the  entire  compass  of  the  British  right,  he 
ordered  them  forward,  and  then  riding  on  with  a  portion  of  Brooks' 
regiment  which  joined  at  that  moment,  he  turned  the  intrenchments 
of  Breyman,  entered  the  sally  port  and  was  shot,  with  his  horse,  as  the 
victory  was  achieved. 

"  It  is  a  curious  fact,  that  an  officer  who  really  had  no  command  in 
the  army  was  the  leader  of  one  of  the  most  spirited  and  important 
battles  of  the  Revolution."  Thus  writes  Sparks,  adding,  "  His  mad 
ness  or  rashness,  whatever  it  may  be  called,  resulted  most  fortunately 
for  himself.  The  wound  he  received  at  the  moment  of  rushing  into 
the  arms  of  danger  and  of  death,  added  fresh  lustre  to  his  military 
glory,  and  was  a  claim  to  public  favor  and  applause." 

Arnold  was  promptly  promoted  by  Congress  for  his  gallant  con 
duct.  Wilkinson  says,  "  he  would  not  do  injustice  even  to  a  traitor," 
and  after  describing  his  erratic  course,  substantially  as  stated,  declar 
ing  that  he  was  in  the  field  exercising  command,  but  not  by  order  or 
permission  of  General  Gates,  makes  these  statements  which  belong  to 
history,  and  must  go  to  the  credibility  of  his  other  testimony,  "  The 


I777-]  BEMIS'   HEIGHTS.— -BURGOYNE'S   SURRENDER.  349 

General  (Arnold)  darted  off  to  another  part  of  the  field,  soon  after  this 
incident,  (referring  to  his  striking  an  officer) ;  finding  himself  on  our 
right,  he  dashed  to  the  left  through  the  fire  of  the  lines  and  escaped 
unhurt ;  he  then  turned  to  the  right  of  the  enemy,  just  as  they  gave 
way,  when  his  leg  was  broke,  and  his  horse  killed  under  him  ;  but 
whether  by  our  fire,  or  that  of  the  enemy,  as  they  fled  from  us,  has 
never  been  ascertained."  (?)  "  It  is  certain  that  he  neither  rendered 
service  nor  deserved  credit  on  that  day  ;  and  the  wound  alone  saved 
him  from  being  overwhelmed  by  the  torrent  of  General  Gates'  good 
fortune  and  popularity."  The  author  gives  these  extracts,  because 
of  their  connection  with  other  quotations  from  this  officer's  memoirs, 
and  to  vindicate  history  ;  without  claiming  the  ability  to  determine, 
by  the  accepted  rules  of  evidence  at  common  law,  just  where  the 
memoirs  of  Wilkinson  divide  between  history  and  romance.  Inas 
much  as  many  writers  state  that  during  this  battle  Major  Wilkinson 
overtook  Arnold,  and  ordered  him  to  return  to  camp,  it  is  proper  to 
give  the  incident  its  proper  place  as  stated  by  him.  "  When  Colonel 
M.  Lewis,  on  the  evening  of  the  igth  of  September,  reported  the  in 
decisive  progress  of  the  action,  Arnold  exclaimed,  with  an  oath,  '  I 
will  soon  put  an  end  to  it,'  clapping  spurs  to  his  horse,  and  galloped 
off  at  full  speed." 

This  action  seems  to  imply  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  the  move 
ment  of  his  division,  at  the  close  of  its  day's  work.  a  Colonel  Lewis 
observed  to  General  Gates,  you  had  better  order  him  back,  the  action 
is  going  well,  he  may  by  some  rash  act  do  mischief."  "  I  was  instantly 
dispatched,"  says  Wilkinson,  "  overtook,  and  remanded  Arnold  to 
camp."  Up  to  this  time  Arnold's  open  difference  with  General  Gates 
had  not  taken  place  and  he  was  in  full  command  of  the  exposed  wing 
of  the  army ;  and  on  the  previous  day  he  had  been  especially  detailed 
by  General  Gates  to  go  with  fifteen  hundred  men  and  watch  the  ap 
proach  of  the  enemy.  What  should  induce  a  deputy  Quartermaster- 
general  to  interfere,  when  the  officer  second  in  command  goes 
promptly  to  his  division,  about  which  there  is  such  a  report  as  he 
gave,  is  not  explained. 

The  battle  was  over.  The  British  troops  had  been  overwhelmed 
as  by  a  torrent,  by  a  force  at  least  three  times  their  number.  Besides 
Breyman  killed,  and  Fraser  mortally  wounded,  Sir  Francis  Clarke 
had  fallen.  He  was  borne  to  Gates'  headquarters  and  died  that 
night.  He  was  the  nominal  guest  of  General  Gates  ;  although  his 
death-bed  scene  involves  a  painful  altercation  with  that  officer.  Major 


350  BEMIS'    HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S   SURRENDER.  [1777. 

Ackland  was  also  wounded  and  a  prisoner  of  war,  and  with  Major 
Williams  he  shared  the  same  hospitality. 

Fraser  was  carried  to  the  house  of  John  Taylor  near  Wilbur's  basin, 
and  died  the  next  morning.  The  American  loss  did  not  exceed  one 
hundred  and  fifty.  The  British  casualties  equaled  nearly  half  the 
command  engaged. 

General  histories  have  room  for  the  solemn  funeral  orgies  of  Gen 
eral  Fraser,  at  sunset  of  the  eighth,  within  range  of  the  American  fire  ; 
the  devotion  of  Madames  Ackland  and  Riedesel,  and  the  number 
less  minor  events  which  give  peculiar  gravity  and  character  to  the 
termination  of  this  campaign,  and  intensify  its  tragic  experiences. 

At  night  General  Lincoln's  division  relieved  the  well-worn  troops 
and  advanced  to  the  upper  fork  of  the  north  ravine. 

On  the  eighth,  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening,  General  Burgoyne 
abandoned  his  hospital  and  needless  baggage  and  retreated,  amid 
heavy  rain,  toward  Saratoga  (Schuylersville)  across  the  Fishkill  river, 
and  compactly  intrenched  his  camp. 

As  he  approached  Saratoga  he  found  an  American  force  engaged 
in  throwing  up  intrenchments,  but  they  retired  upon  his  advance. 
The  bateaux  which  contained  the  meagre  amount  of  remaining  sup 
plies  were  under  constant  fire  from  the  opposite  shore,  where  General 
Fellows  was  stationed  with  a  large  force,  and  the  Fishkill  was  not 
crossed  until  the  morning  of  the  tenth.  Captain  Fraser's  marksmen, 
the  Forty-seventh  regiment  and  Mackey's  Provincials,  were  then 
ordered  to  escort  a  party  of  artificers  to  repair  bridges  and  open  a  road 
up  the  west  side  of  the  river  toward  Fort  Edward  ;  but  "  the  provin- 
_cials  ran  away ;  the  American  army  occupied  the  heights  in  force,  and 
the  detail  was  withdrawn." 

A  battery  of  five  guns  had  also  been  established  at  the  bridge 
head,  where  the  British  army  had  first  crossed  the  river,  and  this  was 
amply  supported  by  American  infantry.  Morgan  and  Dearborn 
hovered  about  the  skirts  of  the  camp,  cutting  off  foraging  parties  and 
all  communications  with  Fort  George,  and  all  avenues  of  retreat  were 
controlled  by  the  American  troops.  The  American  army  already 
exceeded  thirteen  thousand  effective  men,  amply  supplied  with 
artillery,  which  had  been  received  from  France.  This  force  patiently 
and  without  risk  was  pressing  more  and  more  closely  upon  the  wast 
ing  and  scantily-fed  forces  of  Lieutenant-general  Burgoyne. 

October  eleventh  it  became  necessary  to  land  the  supplies  which 
remained  in  the  bateaux,  and  to  carry  them  up  the  hill,  as  a  constant 


I777-]  BEMIS    HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S   SURRENDER  351 

fire  was  opened  upon  any  approach  to  the  river.  Scouts  sent  across 
the  Hudson  at  its  bend  to  the  westward,  reported  that  the  fords  were 
guarded  ;  a  camp  had  been  established  between  Fort  Edward  and  Fort 
George,  and  Colonel  Cochran  was  in  possession  of  Fort  Edward  itself. 

The  Americans  occupied  commanding  positions  through  three- 
fourths  of  a  circle,  so  that  no  attack  upon  any  single  position  would 
afford  hope  for  escape  of  the  British  army.  Canadians,  Provincials,  and 
Indians  had  disappeared.  Thirty-four  hundred  men  only,  remained 
fit  for  duty.  Rations  were  reduced  to  a  supply  for  three  days.  No 
message  came  from  Clinton.  "  By  day  and  night  grape  shot  and  rifle 
shot  reached  the  lines."  There  had  been  no  cessation  of  danger,  and 
"  the  men  had  become  so  worn  out,  and  at  the  same  time  so  accus 
tomed  to  the  incessant  firing,  that  a  part  slept  while  others  watched," 
and  the  army  had  no  interval  of  real  rest.  There  had  been  just  one 
half  hour's  interval  of  hope. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  tenth,  the  American  vanguard  reached 
the  ridge  between  Saratoga  church  and  the  creek,  and  General  Gates 
established  his  own  headquarters  a  mile  to  the  rear.  The  advance  had 
been  made  slowly,  on  account  of  the  heavy  rain,  and  under  the  im 
pression  that  the  British  army  was  still  at  Saratoga.  On  the  morning 
of  the  eleventh,  during  a  dense  fog,  and  while  the  British  army  was 
fully  prepared  for  an  attack,  General  Gates  ordered  an  immediate 
advance  across  Fishkill  creek  to  be  made.  Without  any  reconnoissance 
whatever,  he  summoned  his  general  officers,  and  informed  them  that 
he  had  received  reliable  intelligence  that  Burgoyne  had  started  for 
Fort  Edward,  leaving  only  a  rear-guard  in  camp.  Morgan  was  pushed 
over  the  creek.  Nixon's  brigade  followed.  Glover's  brigade,  suc 
ceeded  by  those  of  Patterson  and  Learned,  were  moving  down  the 
bank,  when  a  British  deserter  fell  into  Nixon's  hands.  He  gave  the 
information  that  the  entire  army  was  in  battle  array  immediately  on 
the  hill.  The  order  was  disobeyed,  and  then  countermanded,  and 
Nixon  retired,  but  not  without  some  loss  to  his  own  command  as  well 
as  to  Morgan's  from  the  British  artillery,  which  opened  fire  as  soon  as 
the  retrograde  march  commenced.  The  American  army  had  been 
placed  in  imminent  peril. 

On  the  twelfth,  a  council  of  war  proposed  a  retreat ;  but  the  facts 
already  cited  and  obtained  from  scouts,  terminated  the  discussion. 
Information  was  also  received  that  General  Lincoln,  before  his  union 
with  Gates,  had  made  a  successful  expedition  in  the  vicinity  of  Ticon- 
deroga,  had  captured  its  outposts,  several  gunboats,  nearly  four  com- 


352  BEMIS'    HEIGHTS.— BURGOYNE  S   SURRENDER.  [1777. 

panics  of  the  Fifty-third  regiment,  and  had  otherwise  impaired  every 
facility  for  retreat  which  depended  upon  the  British  control  of  Lake 
George  and  Lake  Champlain. 

On  the  thirteenth  a  flag  was  sent  to  General  Gates,  and  by  the  six 
teenth,  the  terms  of  capitulation  had  been  adjusted,  and  the  following 
day  was  assigned  for  their  execution.  During  that  night,  Captain 
Campbell  of  the  British  army  reached  camp  with  dispatches  from  Sir 
Henry  Clinton,  announcing  the  capture  of  Forts  Clinton  and  Mont 
gomery,  and  that  Generals  Vaughan  and  Wallace  had  started  up  the 
river  upon  an  expedition  as  far  as  Esopus  (Kingston).  It  was  too 
late  to  recede  from  the  contract  solemnly  undertaken,  and  the  sur 
render  took  place,  under  circumstances  of  honor  and  courtesy,  such  as 
were  due  to  the  valor  and  persistency  of  the  preceding  struggle. 

The  terms  are  briefly  stated, — "  The  troops  to  march  out  with  all 
the  honors  of  war  ;  to  have  free  passage  to  Great  Britain,  upon  con 
dition  of  not  again  serving  during  the  war  ;  subject  of  course  to  a 
cartel  of  exchange ;  that  the  army  should  march  to  Boston,  be  sub 
sisted  regularly,  and  not  be  delayed  when  transports  should  arrive  for 
them  ;  officers  to  retain  their  baggage  ;  Canadians  to  be  returned 
home,  and  all  corps  of  any  kind  to  be  placed  on  the  same  footing." 
Minor  items  are  embraced  in  the  details,  and  for  several  days  there 
was  a  critical  difference  between  Gates  and  Burgoyne,  the  latter  assert- 
ing  that  he  would  resort  to  the  most  desperate  resistance  rather  than 
accept  the  degrading  terms  first  offered.  The  final  terms  were  reason 
able  and  generous. 

On  the  eighth,  General  Putnam  had  written  to  General  Gates,  giv 
ing  him  a  statement  as  to  his  trouble  in  retaining  militia  and  stating 
the  presence  of  Clinton's  army  and  Sir  James  Wallace's  fleet  near  by, 
saying,  "  I  can  not  flatter  you  or  myself  with  the  hope  of  preventing 
the  enemy's  advancing ;  therefore  prepare  for  the  worst"  "  The 
enemy  can  take  a  fair  wind,  and  with  their  flat-bottomed  boats  which 
have  sails,  can  go  to  Albany,  or  Half-moon,"  (only  sixteen  miles  below 
Gates'  camp)  '*  with  great  expedition,  and  I  believe  without  any  oppo 
sition."  This  letter  without  doubt  had  its  effect  on  the  settlement  of 
the  terms  of  Burgoyne's  surrender;  as  it  seemed  as  if  the  original 
plan  of  the  British  campaign  was  at  last  to  be  consummated,  and 
Gates  could  not  afford  to  wait  until  a  fresh  enemy  should  assail  his 
rear. 

The  total  force  surrendered  was  five  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
sixty-three.  Philip  Skene  who  had  been  a  burden  to  the  army  from 


I777-]  BEMIS'   HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S   SURRENDER.  353 

his  first  affectation  of  influence  in  New  England,  who  had  been  lieu 
tenant-governor  of  Ticonderoga,  and  major,  placed  his  name  on  the 
original  parole,  for  the  record  of  history,  as  if  to  escape  undue  notice 
and  responsibility,  as  "  Philip  Skene,  a  poor  follower  of  the  British 
army."  The  people  changed  the  name  of  his  old  home  to  Whitehall  ; 
and  he  left  America  never  to  return. 

The  American  force  at  the  time  of  the  surrender,  numbered  nine 
thousand  and  ninety-three  continental  troops,  and  General  Gates' 
return  of  October  sixteenth  made  the  total  force,  including  militia, 
thirteen  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixteen  men  present  fit  for 
duty. 

The  sick  numbered  six  hundred  and  twenty-two  present,  and 
seven  hundred  and  thirty-one  absent.  The  detached  commands 
numbered  three  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-five,  and  on 
furlough,  one  hundred  and  eighty,  making  the  total  strength  of  his 
command,  eighteen  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty-four. 

General  Burgoyne  returned  to  England,  and  completely  vindicated 
his  conduct  of  the  campaign  before  the  House  of  Commons.  He 
entered  parliament,  opposed  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war,  and 
upon  failure  to  obtain  a  military  trial  or  assignment  to  duty,  resigned 
his  commission  in  the  army. 

The  prisoners  were  transferred  from  Cambridge  and  Rutland  to 
Charlotteville,  Virginia,  and  made  the  march  of  seven  hundred  miles 
during  the  winter  of  1/78.  Baroness  Riedesel  accompanied  her  hus 
band,  and  her  narrative  is  full  of  touching  experiences. 

After  frequent  changes  of  location,  the  larger  portion  ultimately 
became  settlers,  and  remained  in  the  country  after  the  war  closed. 
There  is  no  occasion  to  discuss  the  differences  between  the  Ameri 
can  and  English  authorities  which  practically  reversed  the  terms  of 
capitulation  and  prevented  the  return  of  the  troops  to  Europe,  as  the 
consideration  of  the  campaign  is  the  only  legitimate  object  of  this 
narrative. 

General  Burgoyne's  campaign  was  characterized  by  a  brave,  skillful 
and  persistent  effort  to  execute  his  orders  and  reach  the  objective 
designated  by  his  superiors. 

The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  the  idea  of  failure  on  the  part  of 
General  Howe  to  support  him  from  New  York  was  never  entertained 
by  himself  or  his  officers. 

Reinforcements  were  due  in  New  York,  during  September,  and 
although  they  did  not  arrive  until  early  in  October,  and  after  a  voyage 


354  BEMIS    HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE' S   SURRENDER.  [1777. 

of  three  months'  duration,  he  had  no  occasion  to  doubt  their  prompt 
arrival  and  proper  disposal,  under  the  original  plan  of  the  campaign. 
His  maxim  was  illustrated  in  his  career.  "  He  who  obeys  at  the 
expense  of  fortune,  comfort,  health  and  life,  is  a  soldier !  he  who 
obeys  at  the  expense  of  honor  is  a  slave."  His  independence  of 
opinion  in  matters  purely  under  the  rule  of  his  own  conscience  cost 
him  his  commission.  He  certainly  obeyed  orders  with  an  unselfish 
consecration  of  every  energy  to  his  work.  The  disaster  at  Bennington 
was  a  serious  check  to  his  expedition,  but  the  arrival  of  Stark  at  Ben 
nington,  just  at  that  crisis,  was  thoroughly  unpremeditated  and  provi 
dential  for  the  Americans,  so  that  the  memory  of  Burgoyne  unjustly 
suffered  by  the  disaster. 

He  certainly  followed  St.  Clair  promptly  and  by  the  shortest 
route ;  and  from  Fort  Edward  to  Saratoga  and  in  every  leading  move 
ment  for  which  he  was  abused,  he  was  clearly  right.  Such  is  the 
judgment  of  impartial  history.  Burgoyne  says,  with  very  natural 
emphasis,  I  reasoned  thus,  "The  expedition  I  commanded,  was 
evidently  meant,  at  first,  to  be  hazarded.  Circumstances  might 
require  that  it  should  be  devoted.  A  critical  junction  of  Mr.  Gates 
with  Mr.  Washington  might  possibly  decide  the  fate  of  the  war.  The 
question  of  my  junction  with  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  or  the  loss  of  my 
retreat  to  Canada  could  only  be  a  partial  misfortune." 

Burgoyne's  Saratoga  Campaign,  which  was  so  redolent  of  inspira 
tion  for  the  New  Republic,  must  stand  to  his  individual  credit  as  a 
SOLDIER. 

NOTE.  General  Washington  transmitted  a  Major-general's  commission  to  Benedict 
Arnold  on  the  2Oth  of  January,  1778,  using  the  following  words.  "  It  is  my  earnest  desire 
to  have  your  services  the  ensuing  campaign.  I  have  set  you  down  in  an  arrangement,  and 
for  a  command,  which  I  think  will  be  agreeable  to  yourself,  and  of  great  advantage  to  the 
public."  On  the  same  date,  in  writing  to  General  Lincoln  who  had  also  been  wounded,  he 
thus  refers  to  Arnold.  "  General  Arnold  is  restored  to  a  violated  right,  and  the  restitution. 
I  hope,  will  be  considered  by  any  gentleman,  as  an  act  of  justice." 

NOTE.  (Fottrtk  Edition.  Supplemental  to  note  on  page  344.)  In  the  Magazine  of 
American  History  for  March,  1880,  Vol.  IV,  p.  186,  John  Austin  Stevens,  Esq.,  Ed.,  the 
entire  note  is  given,  closing  as  follows:  "On  the  7th  of  October,  the  conduct  of  your 
corps  (that  of  Major  Henry  B.  Livingston),  fell  more  immediately  under  the  inspection 
of  General  Arnold  ;  he  thinks  it  but  justice  to  you  and  them  to  observe  that  great  part 
of  our  success  on  that  day  was  owing  to  the  gallant  part  they  acted  in  storming  the 
enemy's  works,  and  the  alertness  and  good  order  they  observed  in  the  dispute." 
Mr.  Stevens  sustains  the  position  of  Mr.  Bancroft.  That  of  Gordon,  cited  on  page  342, 
with  context,  harmonizes  the  chief  conflict  of  authority. 


CHAPTER    XLVIII. 

CLINTON'S    EXPEDITION   UP  THE   HUDSON.    CAPTURE  OF    FORTS 
CLINTON   AND   MONTGOMERY.     1777. 

THE  operations  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  in  the  Highlands  of  the 
Hudson,  are  among  the  concurrent  events  which  properly  fill 
up  the  outline  of  Burgoyne's  Saratoga  campaign. 

Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery  crowned  high  points  of  the  High 
lands  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson  river,  and  were  separated  by  a 
narrow  depression,  through  which  Poplopen's  creek  found  its  way  from 
the  mountains  to  the  river.  Both  were  above  the  range  of  fire  from 
ships  of  war  and  bomb-ketches ;  while  their  height  and  isolation 
afforded  peculiar  facilities  for  being  made  capable  of  protracted  resist 
ance  to  any  ordinary  force.  Fort  Montgomery  was  a  large  work,  then 
unfinished,  and  at  the  date  of  its  capture  the  garrison  consisted  of  one 
company  of  artillery,  a  few  regulars,  and  some  half-armed  militia, 
hastily  assembled  from  the  adjoining  counties.  A  boom  and  heavy 
iron  chain  extended  from  the  foot  of  the  river-cliff  to  "  Anthony's 
Nose,"  a  sharp  promontory  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Hudson. 
Colonel  John  Lamb  commanded  the  post. 

Fort  Clinton  was  on  the  south  side  of  the  creek,  and  more  com 
pactly  and  thoroughly  built,  but  much  smaller  in  extent.  Its  garrison 
consisted  of  a  few  regulars  and  raw  militia,  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier-general  James  Clinton.  The  surrounding  country  was 
mountainous,  almost  pathless,  and  here  and  there  slashed  by  deep 
and  impassable  defiles. 

On  the  east  side  of  the  river,  northward  nearly  seven  miles,  and 
opposite  West  Point,  was  Fort  Constitution. 

Twelve  miles  southward,  and  five  miles  below  Fort  Clinton  was 
Fort  Independence.  General  Israel  Putnam  was  in  general  command 
of  the  Highland  range  of  defenses,  with  his  headquarters  near  Peeks- 


356  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION  UP  THE  HUDSON.       ,       [1777. 

kill,  where  a  depot  of  supplies  had  been  established.  This  post  was 
also  the  general  rendezvous  for  the  inter-transit  of  troops  between 
New  England  and  the  Middle  States. 

The  detachment  sent  from  his  command  to  that  of  Schuyler,  after 
wards  Gates's,  had  so  reduced  his  force  that  his  chief  dependence  was 
on  the  militia  of  the  immediate  vicinity  and  of  Connecticut. 

Advices  had  been  received  that  an  expedition  had  been  organized 
in  New  York  for  a  demonstration  up  the  Hudson.  Governor  Clinton 
promptly  ordered  a  considerable  militia  force  to  report  to  General 
Putnam,  but  that  officer  furloughed  the  men  during  fall  harvest  and 
seed  time,  because  the  New  York  garrison  seemed  to  rest  quietly  in 
their  quarters.  Governor  Clinton  promptly  changed  the  programme, 
allowing  one-half  of  the  militia,  however,  to  spend  a  month  on  their 
farms,  while  the  remainder  were  ordered  to  assemble  at  the  mouth  of 
Poplopen's  creek  and  Peekskill.  Before  this  modified  order,  however, 
could  take  effect,  and  while  the  entire  force  which  had  assembled  for 
the  defense  of  Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery  was  less  than  six  hun 
dred  and  fifty  men,  the  expedition  from  New  York  was  in  full  activ 
ity.  Stedman  says,  that  "  the  enterprise  was  entirely  spontaneous  on 
the  part  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton, — was  conducted  with  more  energy 
than  most  of  the  military  operations  that  took  place  in  America," 
and  that  "  the  ulterior  view  in  the  measure  (after  taking  possession  of 
the  forts  which  forbade  the  passage  of  our  vessels  up  to  Albany)  was 
not  so  much  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  General  Burgoyne, 
the  necessity  of  which  was  not  suspected,  as  to  open  a  communication 
which  might  have  been  important  when  that  commander  should  have 
fixed  himself  at  Albany."  This  statement,  while  substantially  true,  is 
put  too  unequivocally,  in  view  of  the  whole  history  of  operations 
from  Canada  as  a  base,  as  it  involves  the  supposition  that  Burgoyne's 
command  was  considered  fully  equal  to  its  proposed  mission,  without 
any  aid  from  New  York.  The  text  of  Burgoyne's  instructions  cer 
tainly  must  be  held  to  mean  that  his  union  with  General  Howe  con 
templated  a  union  with  whoever  commanded  at  New  York ;  and 
although  General  Howe  felt  confidence  in  the  ability  of  Burgoyne  to 
complete  his  campaign  after  the  capture  of  Ticonderoga,  he  did  not, 
in  fact,  lose  sight  of  the  northern  army.  His  "  Narrative,"  states 
that  he  regarded  the  operations  against  Philadelphia  and  the  occupa 
tion  of  Washington's  army  to  the  fullest  extent,  as  a  very  substantial 
diversion  in  favor  of  Burgoyne  ;  and  on  the  thirtieth  of  July,  when 
"off  the  Delaware."  he  wrote  as  follows  to  General  Clinton,  then  at 


1777-!  CLINTONS   EXPEDITION  UP  THE   HUDSON.  357 

New  York,  "  and  having  under  his  command  a  force  of  eight  thousand 
five  hundred  men  fit  for  duty.  If  you  can  make  any  diversion  in  favor 
of  General  Burgoyne's  approaching  Albany  with  security  to  King's 
Bridge,"  (which  was  occasionally  threatened  by  General  Putnam),  "  I 
need  not  point  out  the  utility  of  such  a  measure."  The  following 
dispatch  of  Lord  Germaine,  dated  the  eighteenth  of  May,  1777,  gives 
the  view  taken  by  the  British  cabinet,  although  it  was  not  received 
by  General  Howe  until  the  sixteenth  of  August :  "  Trusting,  however, 
that  whatever  you  may  meditate,  it  will  be  executed  in  time  for  you 
to  cooperate  with  the  army  ordered  to  proceed  from  Canada,  and  put 
itself  under  your  command."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  movement  of 
General  Howe  so  crippled  General  Washington,  that  he  could  not 
adequately  support  General  Gates,  and  the  opportune  success  of  the 
Americans  at  Bennington  and  Fort  Schuyler  proved  to  be  the  best 
ally  of  the  American  army  of  the  north.  It  is  not  to  be  overlooked, 
as  intimated  in  a  preliminary  chapter,  that  much  of  the  needless  re 
crimination  that  passed  between  Howe,  Clinton,  and  other  British 
officers,  had  their  foundation  in  the  difficulties  of  prompt  communica 
tion  and  real  concert  of  action,  in  the  great  distance  which  separated 
their  armies,  and  above  all,  in  the  numerical  inadequacy  of  forces  sent 
to  the  execution  of  their  trust.  Without  further  notice  of  the  inten 
tions  of  the  parties  who  shared  the  responsibility  of  the  Saratoga 
campaign,  the  expedition  will  be  followed  to  its  end. 

On  the  third  of  October,  eleven  hundred  British  troops  were 
transported  from  New  York  to  Spuyten  Duyvel  creek,  thence  to 
Tarrytown,  where  they  landed  early  on  the  morning  of  the  fourth.  A 
second  division,  which  Commodore  Hotham  reports  at  about  the  same 
number,  marched  from  King's  Bridge  to  Tarrytown  by  land,  reaching 
that  place  the  same  day.  The  third  division  took  transports  from 
New  York  on  the  fourth  under  convoy  of  the  Preston  frigate,  the 
Mercury  and  the  Tartar,  and  in  the  course  of.  the  same  tide  arrived 
off  Tarrytown.  On  the  same  night,  the  wind  favoring,  and  by  the  use 
of  a  large  number  of  flat  boats  previously  collected,  the  entire  com 
mand  was  advanced  to  Verplanck's  Point,  where  it  landed  at  or  about 
the  fifth.  The  expedition  was  managed  with  signal  skill.  General 
Putnam's  report  shows  that  he  was  entirely  deceived  by  the  manoeu- 
vers  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton. 

His  own  force  he  states  at  twelve  hundred  continental  troops,  and 
three  hundred  militia.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  fifth,  a  detachment 
from  the  British  army  embarked  on  forty  flat  boats,  besides  ships  and 


353  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION  UP  THE  HUDSON.  [1777 

galleys,  under  convoy  of  the  vessels  of  Sir  James  Wallace,  and  "  made 
every  appearance  of  their  intention  to  land,  both  at  Fort  Independence 
and  Peekskill."  Governor  Clinton  was  keenly  watchful  of  every 
movement.  He  adjourned  the  legislature,  then  at  Kingston,  and 
hastened  to  Fort  Montgomery  to  give  his  personal  support  to  the 
garrison,  and  to  watch  the  approaches  by  the  Haverstraw  road  which 
passed  through  the  mountains,  and  with  which  he  was  familiar. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  transferred  his  army  from  Verplanck's  Point  to 
Stony  Point,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  sixth.  The  demonstration 
of  Sir  James  Wallace  up  the  river  completely  masked  the  main  move 
ment  by  King's  Ferry,  and  a  heavy  fog  so  obscured  the  view  that 
General  Putnam,  who  discovered  a  large  fire  at  the  ferry  on  the  west 
side,  supposed  that  a  party  had  landed  for  the  sole  purpose  of  destroy 
ing  the  storehouses  at  that  point. 

Reference  is  made  to  maps  u  Attack  on  Forts  Clinton  and  Mont 
gomery,"  and  <l  Hudson  River  Highlands." 

Five  hundred  regulars,  consisting  of  the  Fifty-second  and  Twenty- 
seventh  regiments,  and  Emerick's  chasseurs,  with  four  hundred  Pro 
vincials  commanded  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell,  and  Colonel 
Robinson  of  the  Provincials,  second  in  command,  marched  to  occupy 
the  pass  of  Dunderberg  (Thunder  Hill).  This  detachment  was 
ordered  "  to  make  the  detour  of  seven  miles  round  this  hill  and 
Bear  Hill,  to  the  rear  of  Fort  Montgomery."  General  Vaughan,  with 
twelve  hundred  men,  consisting  of  grenadiers,  light  infantry,  the 
Twenty-sixth  and  Sixty-third  regiments,  one  company  of  the  Seventy- 
first,  and  one  troop  of  dismounted  dragoons,  and  the  Hessian  chas 
seurs,  covering  the  corps  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell  until  it  should 
pass  Dunderberg,  was  to  halt  at  the  point  where  that  corps  took  its 
course  around  Bear  Hill  to  the  left,  and  upon  its  approach  to  Fort 
Montgomery  was  to  move  by  the  right  to  storm  Fort  Clinton  from 
the  south.  General  Tryon  with  the  Seventh  regiment,  and  the  Hes 
sian  regiment  of  Trumbach,  while  cooperating  with  General  Vaughan, 
was  to  occupy  the  pass  and  preserve  communication  with  the  fleet  ; 
and  ultimately  that  officer  joined  General  Vaughan' and  participated 
in  the  final  assault  upon  Fort  Clinton. 

The  approach  to  Fort  Clinton  was  steep  and  difficult.  Besides  an 
advanced  redoubt,  large  trees  had  been  felled  and  distributed  as 
abatis  down  the  slope,  and  a  heavy  stone  wall  crossed  the  foot  of  the 
hill  below  the  timber,  extending  from  the  Hudson  to  Sissipink  pond 
or  lake 


I777-]  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION  UP  THE  HUDSON.  359 

On  the  evening  of  the  fifth,  Sunday,  Governor  Clinton  "  sent 
Major  Logan,  who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  ground,  through  the 
mountains  to  reconnoiter.  He  returned  at  nine  o'clock  on  Monday, 
with  the  information  that  a  considerable  force  was  between  King's 
Ferry  and  Dunderberg ;  but  the  numbers  could  not  be  discovered  on 
account  of  the  fog."  Lieutenant  Jackson  marched  out  two  miles  on 
the  Haverstraw  road  with  a  small  party,  but  was  compelled  to  retire. 
Lieutenant-colonel  Bruyn  with  fifty  continental  troops,  and  as  many 
militia  under  Lieutenant-colonel  McLaughry,  were  sent  to  support 
Lieutenant  Jackson,  but  they  were  too  late  to  seize  the  pass,  and  fell 
back  slowly,  in  good  order,  "  disputing  the  ground  inch  by  inch." 
Governor  Clinton  was  the  life  of  the  defense  of  both  posts.  A  dis 
patch  was  sent  to  General  Putnam  asking  for  reinforcements,  and 
Lieutenant-colonel  Lamb  was  directed  to  send  a  six-pounder,  the  only 
field-piece  at  Fort  Montgomery,  with  sixty  men  and  a  supporting 
party  of  the  same  strength  to  check  the  advance  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Campbell,  who  was  approaching  that  fort.  This  detachment  fought 
with  great  spirit,  but  was  compelled  to  retire,  abandoning  the  gun 
after  spiking  it.  A  second  detachment  was  hurried  to  their  support, 
and  a  twelve-pounder  was  advanced  to  cover  their  retreat,  which  was 
accomplished  with  some  loss,  including  captain  Fenno,  taken  prisoner. 
This  was  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  as  stated  in  the  official 
report  of  Governor  Clinton.  The  attack  upon  the  fort  was  maintained 
until  five  o'clock,  when  a  flag  was  sent,  demanding  a  surrender.  This 
was  refused,  and  the  fight  continued  until  dusk,  when  the  works  were 
stormed  on  all  sides,  and  the  garrison  made  their  best  efforts  to 
escape. 

In  Sir  Henry  Clinton's  report  he  states  that  "  after  the  advanced 
parties  before  Fort  Clinton  were  driven  into  the  works,  Trumbach's 
regiment  was  posted  at  the  stone  wall  to  cover  our  retreat  in  case  of 
misfortune,"  and  "  the  works  were  stormed  at  the  point  of  the  bay 
onet,  without  a  shot  being  fired." 

He  reports  his  "  loss  as  not  very  considerable,  excepting  in  some 
respectable  officers  who  were  killed  in  the  attack."  Lieutenant-colo 
nel  Campbell  was  killed  in  the  assault  upon  Fort  Montgomery. 
Count  Grabowski,  aid-de-camp  of  Clinton,  Majors  Sill  and  Grant,  and 
Captain  Stewart,  were  among  the  killed.  Commodore  Hotham  in  his 
official  report,  states  the  British  loss  at  about  forty  killed,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty  wounded.  The  American  loss  was  not  far  from 
three  hundred  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  A  list  of  two  hundred 


360  CLINTON'S  EXPEDITION  UP  THE  HUDSON.  [1777 

and  thirty-seven  who  were  taken  prisoners  is  given  by  Eager  in 
his  History  of  Orange  county,  New  York.  General  James  Clinton 
received  a  bayonet  wound,  but  escaped  to  the  mountains,  as  did  the 
larger  part  of  the  garrison ;  and  Governor  Clinton  safely  crossed  the 
Hudson  in  a  skiff  and  joined  General  Putnam.  That  officer,  only  the 
day  before  the  attack  upon  the  forts,  had  withdrawn  Colonel  Mal 
colm's  regiment  from  the  pass  of  Sydham's  bridge,  had  detailed  Major 
Moffatt  with  two  hundred  men  from  the  garrison  to  supply  his  place, 
and  transferred  sixty  more  to  Anthony's  Nose.  But  for  this  ill-timed 
action  the  American  position  would  have  been  greatly  strengthened. 

One  hundred  cannon,  including  sixty-seven  in  the  forts  and  others 
on  vessels,  and  very  considerable  quantities  of  powder,  cartridges  and 
shot  were  trophies  of  the  assault.  The  boom,  chain  and  chevaux  de 
frise,  which  they  protected,  were  displaced,  and  the  frigates  Mont 
gomery  and  Congress,  which  had  been  ordered  down  the  river  by 
General  Putnam  for  defense  of  the  boom,  were  burned.  The  former 
was  against  the  chain,  without  anchor  or  wind,  and  could  not  be 
moved.  The  latter  had  been  ordered  up  the  river  by  Governor  Clin 
ton  on  the  previous  day  :  but  being  poorly  manned,  grounded  upon 
the  flats.  Both  were  burned,  to  forestall  capture. 

General  Putnam  as  already  seen,  was  led  to  expect  an  attack  upon 
his  own  immediate  post.  He  retired  to  the  heights  behind  Peekskill, 
and  after  consultation  with  General  Parsons,  "  thought  it  impracticable 
to  quit  that  position  to  attack  the  enemy."  A  reconnoissance  was 
then  made  southward.  It  was  just  two  days  too  late.  His  official 
report  states,  that  on  his  return  with  General  Parsons,  "  we  were 
alarmed  with  a  very  heavy  and  hot  firing,  both  of  small  arms  and 
cannon  at  Fort  Montgomery."  "  Upon  which  I  immediately  de 
tached  five  hundred  men  to  reinforce  the  garrison  ;  but  before  they 
could  possibly  cross  to  their  assistance,  the  enemy,  superior  in  num 
bers,  had  possessed  themselves  of  the  fort." 

As  the  result  of  the  occupation  of  these  forts,  Peekskill  was  aban 
doned,  then  Forts  Independence  and  Constitution ;  and  General  Put 
nam  retreated  to  Fishkill.  The  expedition  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  was 
a  success.  Continental  village,  three  miles  above  Peekskill,  was  burned 
by  the  British  troops,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  public  stores  were 
taken  or  destroyed. 

General  Vaughan,  under  escort  of  Sir  James  Wallace,  went  up  the 
river  as  far  as  Esopus  (Kingston)  and  burned  the  village.  On  their 
return,  Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery  were  thoroughly  ruined  and 


I777-]  CLINTONS   EXPEDITION   UP  THE   HUDSON.  361 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  retired  to  New  York.  General  Putnam,  rein 
forced  by  militia  from  Connecticut,  New  Jersey  and  New  York,  soon 
re-occupied  Peekskill ;  and  after  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne,  additional 
Continental  troops  were  sent  from  the  northern  army.  It  is  only  neces 
sary  to  add  that  the  presence  of  an  intelligent  commanding  officer  of 
reasonable  military  skill,  or  the  absolute  control  of  the  posts  by  Gover 
nor  Clinton,  would  have  prevented  the  loss  of  Forts  Clinton  and 
Montgomery.  The  patriotism  and  industry  of  General  Putnam  did 
not  supply  the  elements  which  the  importance  of  the  posts  required 
for  their  protection  ;  and  the  limited  demonstrations  northward  which 
attended  their  capture,  to  that  extent  confirms  the  statement  of  Sted- 
man  that  the  relief  of  Burgoyne  was  not  a  part  of  the  plan  of  Sir 
Henry  Clinton.  The  reasons  why  full  harmony  should  have  been 
secured  between  the  British  commanders  in  this  military  movement 
have  been  sufficiently  indicated. 

General  Howe  himself  was  now  asking  for  reinforcements,  and  the 
third  feature  of  the  main  operations  of  1777,  that  which  made  the 
occupation  of  Philadelphia  its  objective,  now  demands  attention. 


CHAPTER   XLIX. 

MOVEMENT  ON  PHILADELPHIA.     FROM  NEW  YORK  TO  THE 
BRANDYWINE,    1777. 

DURING  the  period   occupied  by  the  march  of  Burgoyne  from 
Ticonderoga  to  the  place   of  his  surrender,  there    had  been 
other  operations   in  progress  which  had  equal  significance  in  deter 
mining  the  general  result  of  the  war. 

These  movements  were  so  co-related,  while  independent  in  fact, 
that  those  which  are  material  to  our  appreciation  of  the  campaign  of 
General  Howe  for  the  acquisition  of  Philadelphia,  must  pass  under 
review.  The  uncertainty  of  that  officer's  design  was  a  determining 
element  in  the  plans  of  General  Washington.  The  following  letter  in 
the  handwriting  of  General  Howe,  signed  by  him  and  directed  to 
General  Burgoyne,  came  into  Washington's  hands  on  the  twenty- 
fifth  of  July. 

"  NEW  YORK,  July  20,  1777. 

"  DEAR  SIR — I  received  your  letter  of  the  I4th  of  May  from  Quebec,  and  shall 

fully  observe  its  contents.     The  expedition  to  B n  (Boston)  will  take  the  place 

of  that  up  the  North  river.     If,  according  to  my  expectations,  we  may  succeed  rapidly 

in  the  possession  of  B ,  the  enemy  having  no  force  of  consequences  there,  I  shall, 

without  loss  of  time,  proceed  to  cooperate  with  you  in  the  defeat  of  the  rebel  army 
opposed  to  you.  Clinton  is  sufficiently  strong  to  amuse  Washington  and  Putnam. 
I  am  now  making  a  demonstration  southward,  which  I  think  will  have  the  full  effect 
in  carrying  our  plan  into  execution.  Success  attend  you. 

W.  HOWE." 

The  British  fleet  had  already  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook,  destination 
unknown,  when  the  above  letter  reached  Washington  for  whom  it 
was  intended.  It  was  a  transparent  device  which  did  not  deceive 
the  American  Commander-in-chief.  General  Howe,  however  slow  to 
improve  opportunities,  rarely  misconceived  the  general  scope  of  a 
campaign,  and  his  field  operations  were  carefully  planned  and  scien- 


302* 


1777-]  MOVEMENT  ON   PHILADELPHIA.  563 

tifically  executed.  His  movement  toward  Philadelphia,  by  sea,  was 
subjected  to  the  strain  which  attends  all  maritime  expeditions,  and 
the  change  of  its  destination  from  the  Delaware  river  to  the  Chesa 
peake  Bay  was  an  incident  clearly  beyond  his  control.  He  was  ex 
pected  to  end  the  war  very  summarily ;  and  as  with  Burgoyne,  after 
the  disaster  at  Bennington,  and  with  all  officers  who  fail  to  do  im 
possibilities  with  inferior  resources,  he  was  to  be  made  the  scapegoat 
for  the  failure  of  any  enterprise  which  was,  theoretically,  within  his 
power.  He  did  not  overlook  New  England  ;  but  claimed  that  "  his 
movement  in  that  direction  would  draw  Washington's  army  thither, 
where  the  population  was  dense,  and  the  spirit  of  resistance  was  ani 
mated."  "  In  Connecticut,  there  was  no  object  for  which  he  could  be 
tempted  to  risk  a  general  action,  and  only  two  or  three  places  upon 
the  coast  of  the  Sound  could  be  kept  in  the  winter."  "  If  his  rein 
forcements  had  been  forthcoming,  New  England  would  have  had  a 
share  in  the  general  operations  of  the  campaign,  while  the  main  army 
acted  to  the  southward."  To  have  moved  up  the  Hudson  river,  in 
force,  would  have  imperiled  New  York,  or  "  sacrificed  all  other  opera 
tions  to  a  union  with  Burgoyne  ;  who  was  expected  to  force  his  own 
way  to  Albany.'*  To  enter  Pennsylvania,  was  not  only  to  assail  the 
capital  (reference  is  made  to  page  53  as  to  making  a  capital  the 
objective  of  a  campaign)  but  it  attempted  "  the  surest  road  to  peace, 
the  defeat  of  the  regular  rebel  army."  Such  was  the  reasoning  of 
General  Howe,  stated  in  his  own  words. 

The  embarkation  began  early  in  July,  General  Clinton  having 
arrived  at  New  York  on  the  fifth ;  and  on  the  fifteenth  an  express 
from  General  Burgoyne  informed  General  Howe  of  the  success  of  that 
officer  at  Ticonderoga, — "  that  his  army  was  in  good  health  ;  and 
that  Ticonderoga  would  be  garrisoned  from  Canada,  which  would 
leave  his  force  complete  for  further  operations/'  It  has  been  seen 
that  Carleton's  instructions,  construed  strictly,  disappointed  the  natu 
ral  expectations  of  Burgoyne. 

The  expedition  southward  sailed  from  New  York  July  fifth, 
from  Sandy  Hook  the  twenty-third,  and  arrived  off  the  Delaware  on 
the  thirtieth.  It  was  soon  found  that  the  Delaware  River  had  been  so 
obstructed  that  no  landing  could  be  effected  above  the  confluence  of 
the  Delaware  and  Christiana  Creek. 

On  the  sixteenth  of  August  the  squadron  and  transports  entered 
Chesapeake  Bay.  It  was  at  this  time  that  General  Howe  received 
the  official  letter  referred  to  in  another  connection,  which  anticipated, 


364  MOVEMENT   ON   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777 

that  "  whatever  he  might  meditate,  would  be  executed  in  time  for 
him  to  cooperate  with  the  northern  army." 

General  Howe  states  the  chief  difficulties  which  he  encountered, 
in  a  single  sentence.  "Almost  every  movement  of  the  war  in  North 
America  was  an  act  of  enterprise,  clogged  with  innumerable  difficulties. 
A  knowledge  of  the  country,  intersected  as  it  everywhere  is  by  woods, 
mountains,  water  or  morasses,  can  not  be  obtained  with  any  degree 
of  precision,  necessary  to  foresee  and  guard  against  the  obstructions 
that  may  occur." 

The  fleet  which  appeared  off  the  Delaware  was  given  by  Sir 
Andrew  Snape  Hammond,  in  his  examination  before  a  committee  of 
the  House  of  Commons,  as  numbering  two  hundred  and  fifty  sail. 

"  The  navigation  was  intricate  and  hazardous,  and  large  ships  could 
pass  certain  places,  only  at  particular  times  of  the  tide."  In  the  de 
termination  of  the  ultimate  course  adopted  by  General  Howe,  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  this  testimony,  just  as  the  facts  impressed  his 
mind  at  the  time  and  affected  his  action. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  July,  Sir  Andrew  Hammond  reported  that 
"  Washington  had  crossed  the  Delaware,  and  was  marching  down  to 
Wilmington  from  Philadelphia."  This  officer  had  been  on  duty  upon 
the  coast  of  Delaware  and  Virginia,  commanding  a  detached  squadron 
for  a  year  and  a  half,  short  intervals  excepted.  His  report  was  there 
fore  derived  from  personal  experience,  and  is  thus  condensed  :  "  The 
coast  of  Delaware  from  Cape  Henlopen  to  Ready  Island,  is  of  marshy 
low  lands,  very  full  of  creeks  ;  from  Ready  Island  to  Chester,  the 
channel  is  so  narrow  as  to  require  four  miles  of  anchorage  for  the 
fleet,  and  the  vessels  must  lie  within  cannon  shot  of  the  shore,  and 
in  many  places  within  musket  shot,  with  a  tidal  current  of  between 
three  and  four  miles  an  hour  to  stem  ;  that  the  water-guard  of 
the  Americans  consisted  of  the  Province  ship,  the  Delaware  frigate, 
two  xebecks,  one  brig,  two  floating  batteries,  besides  two  frigates, 
one  partly  manned,"  and  added  to  this  protection,  there  was  the  "  fort 
on  Mud  Island,  and  numerous  channel  obstructions  "  ;  while  the  ves 
sels  of  the  fleet,  the  "  Cornwallis  galley  excepted,"  were  illy  adapted 
to  force  a  passage  against  the  American  light  craft,  and  the  interposed 
obstructions  and  defenses."  A  rigid  cross-examination  of  this  officer 
only  elicited  the  fact  that  there  was  depth  of  water  at  Newcastle,  and 
for  a  short  distance,  a  channel  two  miles  wide  ;  but  that  the  naval  force 
of  three  frigates  and  two  gun-ships  furnished  as  convoy,  was  not  ade 
quate  to  meet  all  the  contingencies  which  the  landing  would  involve  ; 


.777.]  MOVEMENT   ON   PHILADELPHIA.  365 

and  that  the  movement  up  the  Chesapeake  was  a  wise  and  proper 
measure.  This  opinion  controlled  the  action  of  General  Howe,  whose 
duty  involved  no  responsibility  for  the  management  of  the  fleet. 

It  was  a  grave  question,  inasmuch  as  Newcastle  was  but  about 
seventeen  miles  from  the  head  of  Elk  river,  by  land,  while  the  distance 
from  Cape  Henlopen  to  the  head  of  the  Elk  by  sea,  was  nearly  three 
hundred  and  .fifty  miles.  It  is,  however,  certain  that  the  opportu 
nities  of  Washington  for  resisting  a  landing,  and  his  careful  recon- 
noissance  of  the  coast,  fully  justified  the  British  military  and  naval 
commanders  in  declining  to  imperil  the  army  by  forcing  a  landing 
where  every  advantage  was  in  favor  of  the  American  forces.  The 
*rror  lay  in  failure  to  provide  the  necessary  vessels  of  light  draught 
before  leaving  New  York,  and  in  neglect  to  obtain  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered  before  entering  the  Delaware 
river. 

The  sudden  withdrawal  of  the  fleet  from  the  Delaware,  and  its 
long  voyage,  greatly  protracted  by  contrary  winds,  completely  foiled 
the  calculations  of  Washington  as  to  its  ultimate  destination. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  August,  Washington  submitted  the  con 
dition  of  affairs  to  a  council  of  war,  which  rendered  the  unanimous 
opinion  that  General  Howe  had  most  probably  sailed  for  Charleston. 
On  the  twenty-second,  at  half  past  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Presi 
dent  Hancock  sent  the  following  dispatch  to  Washington :  "  This 
moment  an  express  arrived  from  Maryland,  with  an  account  of  near 
two  hundred  sail  of  General  Howe's  fleet  being  at  anchor  in  the 
Chesapeake  Bay." 

The  army  of  Washington  had  been  promptly  marched  to  Philadel 
phia  as  soon  as  he  became  satisfied  that  the  British  fleet  departed 
southward  from  Sandy  Hook.  The  most  active  measures  possible 
were  resorted  to  for  gathering  the  militia,  and  so  to  occupy  the  coun 
try  adjoining  the  Delaware  as  to  anticipate  any  attempt  to  effect  a 
landing.  Upon  the  disappearance  of  the  fleet,  his  army  was  removed 
to  Coryell's  Ferry,  to  be  ready  fora  march  northward,  in  case  the  fleet 
should  return  to  New  York,  either  for  the  purpose  of  ascending  the 
North  river,  or  of  making  a  descent  upon  New  England  or  New  Jersey. 
Upon  notice  of  Howe's  arrival  in  the  Chesapeake,  the  army  marched 
through  Philadelphia,  decorated  with  evergreens,  and  with  all  possible 
display  ;  thence  to  Derby,  Chester,  and  Wilmington.  General  Sullivan 
also  joined  the  command,  having  been  detained  in  New  Jersey.  On 
the  twenty-second  of  August  he  had  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt 


366  MOVEMENT   ON    PHILADELPHIA.  [1777. 

upon  the  British  posts  of  Staten  Island,  with  a  portion  of  Smallwood's 
and  Deborre's  brigades,  incurring  some  loss,  but  without  discredit. 
The  nominal  strength  of  the  American  army  which  marched  to  meet 
the  army  of  General  Howe  was  fourteen  thousand  men,  but  the  effect 
ive  force  did  not  exceed  eleven  thousand.  (See  note,  page  368.) 

On  the  third  of  September  General  Maxwell,  with  a  light  infantry 
corps  composed  of  one  hundred  men  from  each  brigade,  which  had 
been  organized  after  Morgan's  riflemen  had  been  sent  to  the  Northern 
Department,  approached  Elk  river  to  remove  public  stores;  but  found 
the  enemy  had  anticipated  their  arrival,  and  after  active  skirmish 
ing  he  retreated  to  White  Clay  creek,  and  then  toward  the  main 
army. 

On  the  seventh  the  entire  army  advanced  to  Newport  and  took 
a  position  along  the  east  bank  of  Red  Clay  creek.  On  the  same  day 
General  Howe  placed  his  vanguard  within  eight  miles  of  Red  Clay, 
and  occupied  Iron  Hill.  Maxwell  again  retreated,  after  another  sharp 
skirmish  with  a  body  of  German  Yagers  at  the  hill.  The  landing  had 
been  effected  on  the  twenty-fifth ;  the  total  force  approximating 
eighteen  thousand  men. 

On  the  twenty-eighth  the  main  body  reached  the  head  of  Elk 
Creek  (Elkton)  fifty-four  miles  from  Philadelphia,  leaving  General 
Knyphausen  with  three  brigades  at  the  landing  place, — one  brigade 
to  keep  open  communication,  and  a  detachment  to  destroy  such  ves 
sels  and  stores  as  could  not  be  removed.  General  Howe  reports, 
that  "  on  the  third  the  Hessian  and  Anspach  chasseurs  and  the  Second 
battalion  of  light  infantry  who  were  at  the  head  of  Lord  Cornwallis' 
column,  fell  in  with  a  chosen  corps  of  one  thousand  men  (Maxwell's,) 
advantageously  posted,  which  they  defeated  with  the  loss  of  only  two 
officers  wounded,  three  men  killed  and  nineteen  wounded." 

"  On  the  sixth,  General  Grant  joined  the  army,  and  on  the  eighth 
the  whole  marched,  at  evening,  via  Newark,  and  encamped  at  Hokes- 
som,  upon  the  road  leading  from  Newport  to  Lancaster,  at  which  place 
Washington  had  taken  post,  having  his  left  to  Christiana  creek  and 
his  front  covered  by  Red  Clay  creek." 

The  British  at  once  made  a  demonstration  as  if  to  turn  Washing 
ton's  right,  crowd  him  upon  the  Delaware  and  thus  cut  off  his  com 
munication  with  Philadelphia.  Reference  is  made  to  map  "  Opera 
tions  near  Philadelphia."  A  council  of  American  officers  was  sum 
moned  and  by  their  unanimous  advice  the  army  marched  at  half  past 
two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  ninth,  for  the  Brandy  wine,  and  at 


1777-]  MOVEMENT  ON  PHILADELPHIA.  367 

ten  o'clock  took  a  new  position,  selected  by  General  Greene,  upon 
the  east  bank,  on  high  ground  just  behind  Chadd's  Ford  upon  the 
Chester  and  Philadelphia  road. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  Lieutenant-general  Knyphau- 
sen  marched  to  New  Garden  and  Kennett  Square,  seven  miles  in 
front  of  Chadd's  Ford,  where  Cornwallis  joined  him  with  the  right 
wing,  on  the  morning  of  the  tenth.  The  right  wing  was  thrown  to 
the  left  and  rear,  in  the  direction  of  the  Lancaster  road,  while 
Knyphausen  was  slightly  advanced,  preparatory  to  a  direct  attack 
upon  the  American  lines.  This  division  was  not  entirely  composed 
of  Hessians  and  other  European  continental  troops,  but  included  such 
regiments  as  the  Fourth,  Fifth,  Twenty-third,  Twenty-eighth,  Fortieth, 
Forty-fourth,  Forty-ninth  and  Fifty-fifth,  with  Ferguson's  rifles,  the 
Queen's  rangers  and  two  squadrons  of  dragoons.  Generals  Cornwal 
lis,  Gray,  Matthews  and  Agnew  were  accompanied  by  General  Howe, 
although  Cornwallis  was  the  immediate  commander  of  the  column. 
It  is  a  fact,  to  be  noted, -that  General  Howe  rarely  kept  out  of  action 
when  his  army  had  fighting  to  do  ;  but  placed  himself  where  the 
example  of  the  General-in-chief  would  most  inspire  his  troops. 

The  Brandywine  which  is  formed  by  the  union  of  two  inconsidera 
ble  creeks,  called  the  North  Branch  and  the  West  Branch,  flows 
twenty-two  miles  southeasterly  from  their  fork,  joins  Christiana  creek 
near  Wilmington,  and  empties  into  the  Delaware  about  twenty-five 
miles  below  Philadelphia.  Its  banks,  then  steep,  uneven  and  bordered 
by  forests,  were  cut  through  at  such  places  as  furnished  convenient 
fords  for  public  or  local  travel. 

These  crossings  were  quite  frequent  between  Brandywine  village 
and  the  forks  of  the  river.  Pyle's  Ford  was  two  miles  below  Chadd's 
Ford,  and  Brinton's  was  one  mile  above  it.  Then  followed  Jones',  at 
a  distance  of  two  miles  ;  and  Wistar's  (Skunks)  a  mile  further  up  the 
river.  On  the  north  branch  was  Buffington's,  (now  Brinton's),  then 
Jeffries',  six  miles  above  Chadd's  Ford,  and  Taylor's,  still  higher  up,  at 
the  crossing  of  the  old  Lancaster  road.  On  the  west  branch  was 
Trimble's  Ford,  more  than  half  a  mile  west  from  the  fork  of  the  river, 
and  five  miles  or  a  little  more  above  Welsh  Tavern,  near  which  the 
British  army  encamped. 

Reference  is  had  to  the  map  "  Battle  of  Brandywine."  The 
centre  of  the  American  army  lay  near  Chadd's  Ford,  and  embraced 
the  brigades  of  Wayne,  Weedon  and  Muhlenberg,  with  Maxwell's 
light  infantry,  Major-general  Greene  commanding  the  division.  Light 


$68  MOVEMENT   ON   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777. 

earthworks  and  a  redoubt  were  at  once  laid  out,  and  Captain  Proctor 
was  in  command  of  the  artillery  thus  put  in  position. 

The  Pennsylvania  militia  under  General  Armstrong  constituted 
the  left  wing,  and  extended  through  rough  ground  to  Pyle's  Ford 
below.  The  portion  of  the  country  was  very  rugged  and  little  appre 
hension  was  entertained  that  a  crossing  would  be  effected  in  that 
direction. 

In  the  formation  of  the  right  wing,  composed  of  six  brigades,  in 
three  divisions,  the  division  of  Sullivan  was  on  the  left,  that  of  Ster 
ling  on  the  right,  and  that  of  Stephen  in  the  centre.  This  was 
exactly  right,  inasmuch  as  Sullivan  acted  in  the  light  of  a  modern 
corps  commander  and  was  theoretically  detached  from  his  division,  so 
that  Stirling, the  next  senior  Major-general, was  entitled  to  the  right. 
The  official  reports  of  Sullivan,  however,  make  no  mention  of  a  con 
flict  as  to  position,  but  give  an  adequate  cause  for  his  tardy  partici 
pation  in  the  battle. 

If  his  consultation  with  the  other  general  officers,  hereafter 
noticed,  involved  a  question  as  to  where  he  should  be  relatively 
stationed,  in  the  line,  he  omits  to  state  it  ;  neither  is  it  material  as  he 
could  not  bring  his  division,  as  such,  into  any  position  whatever  in 
good  fighting  order  on  that  occasion.  The  discussion  of  questions 
of  that  character,  in  the  absence  of  sufficient  facts  to  cover  the  whole 
battle  record,  only  confuses  the  narrative,  and  might  drop  out  of 
history  without  loss  to  history.  The  American  pickets  extended 
beyond  Sullivan's  grand  division  well  up  the  river.  Colonel  Bland 
crossed  at  Jones'  Ford,  and  Major  Spear  was  thrown  as  far  to  the 
right  as  Buffington's  Ford.* 

Such  were  the  relative  positions  of  the  tv/o  armies  on  the  night 
preceding  the  battle  of  Brandywine. 

*  It  is  somewhat  doubtful  whether  the  ford  known  as  Buffington's  in  1777,  was  not 
below  the  forks  of  the  Brandywine  ;  but  it  does  not  change  responsibility  for  proper  recon- 
noissance  toward  Jeffries'  and  Taylor's  Fords. 

NOTE.  (Fifth  Edition.}  General  Sullivan's  diversion,  which  was  designed  to  strike  the 
British  supply  depots  on  Staten  Island  just  at  the  time  when  the  British  army,  in  fancied  security 
at  headquarters,  was  planning  a  distant  offensive  movement,  was  a  brilliant,  well-conceived 
expedition.  The  mistake  of  a  guide  carried  the  successful  advance  into  a  perilous  exposure  to 
immensely  superior  numbers,  which  prevented  a  complete  surprise ;  and  limited  transportation 
embarrassed  the  necessary  forced  retreat,  although  ninety  prisoners  were  carried  away  with 
them.  A  Court  of  Inquiry,  and  Congress  alike,  vindicated  General  Sullivan. 

The  author  has  avoided  the  details  of  most  minor  operations,  but  desires  to  hold  no  ambig 
uous  attitude  as  to  an  event  of  the  campaign  of  1777,  which  has  been  construed  to  the  discredit 
of  General  Sullivan. 


CHAPTER   L. 

BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE. 

A  CAREFUL  survey  of  the  positions  first  taken  by  the  oppos 
ing  armies,  as  indicated  by  the  map,  will  aid  in  the  appreciation 
of  their  subsequent  movements. 

It  will  be  found  that  the  brigades  of  Muhlenberg  and  Weedon 
were  withdrawn  from  Chadd's  Ford  to  form  a  reserve,  while  Wayne's 
brigade  deployed  to  the  left,  in  their  place,  and  that  a  portion  of  the 
right  wing  actually  crossed  the  river  at  Brinton's  Ford,  before  the  gen 
eral  action  was  precipitated  by  the  flanking  movement  of  General 
Howe.  The  American  army  did  not  rest  on  the  passive  defensive. 
General  Maxwell  crossed  at  Chadd's  Ford  early  on  the  eleventh,  and 
advanced  to  Kennett  Meeting  House,  where  by  resort  to  trees,  fences, 
and  all  available  obstructions,  he  maintained  an  efficient  skirmish  with 
the  vanguard  of  Knyphausen,  and  sustained  himself  skillfully,  until 
forced  back  to  high  ground  near  the  ford,  and  ultimately  to  the  ford 
itself  by  the  pressure  of  greatly  superior  numbers.  Having  been 
reinforced,  he  regained  the  heights,  and  at  the  same  time  Porterfield 
and  Waggoner  crossed  and  moved  to  his  left,  vigorously  attacking 
Ferguson's  rifles,  who  were  engaged,  with  a  portion  of  the  Twenty- 
eighth  British  regiment,  in  throwing  up  light  field-works  to  put  two 
guns  in  position  on  their  right.  These  detachments  passed  up  a  nar 
row,  well  wooded  valley,  and  compelled  a  company  of  British  troops 
supported  by  one  hundred  men  from  General  Stirn's  Hessian  brigade, 
to  take  cover  behind  a  stone  house  for  protection  until  additional 
troops  came  to  their  aid.  This  movement  and  the  pertinacity  of 
Maxwell's  attack  compelled  Knyphausen  to  bring  two  brigades  and 
artillery  to  the  front ;  and  a  strong  column  was  also  sent  toward 
Brinton's  Ford,  outflanking  Maxwell,  and  compelling  him  to  fall  behind 
the  river.  At  the  same  time  the  Queen's  Rangers,  led  by  Captain 

24. 


37°  BATTLE   OF  BRANDYWINE.  [1777, 

Wemys,  of  the  British  Fortieth  regiment,  swept  the  narrow  valley  on 
the  right,  and  forced  Porterfield  and  Waggoner  to  retreat,  and  recross 
the  river.  Lieutenant  S.  W.  Werner,  of  the  Hessian  artillery,  whose 
diagram,  taken  on  the  field,  affords  the  best  data  for  a  right  judgment 
as  to  those  movements,  was  actively  engaged  in  these  skirmishes  on 
the  west  bank.  The  American  casualties  during  these  minor  move 
ments  did  not  exceed  sixty,  and  those  of  the  Hessians  and  British 
troops  were  about  one  hundred  and  thirty. 

Upon  the  retreat  of  General  Maxwell,  the  high  ground  thus 
vacated  was  occupied  by  Knyphausen  in  force,  and  guns  were  placed 
in  position  to  command  the  crossings. 

Proctor's  artillery  responded  ;  but  little  damage  was  inflicted  on 
either  side.  The  demonstrations  were  simply  such  as  engaged  the 
attention  of  the  American  troops,  but  no  attempts  were  made  to  force 
a  passage. 

Information  reached  General  Washington,  that  Cornwallis  had 
moved  northward  from  Kennett  Square,  as  if  to  seek  some  higher  and 
unprotected  crossing,  and  attempt  a  movement  against  his  right  flank. 
Knowing  that  Major  Spear  had  been  advanced  as  far  up  the  river  as 
Buffington's  Ford,  and  depending  on  General  Sullivan  for  due  notice 
of  any  such  movement  against  his  right  flank,  he  resolved  to  strike 
Knyphausen  while  thus  separated  from  Cornwallis,  and  make  up  for 
inferior  numbers  by  overwhelming  the  British  divisions  in  deta.il.  It 
was  also  known  that  Knyphausen's  column  did  not  make  its  advance 
until  about  nine  o'clock.  There  was  good  reason  to  believe  that  there 
would  be  ample  time  for  this  offensive  movement,  since  Cornwallis 
could  not  double  the  forks  unless  by  about  twelve  miles  of  marching, 
even  if  he  should  cross  near  Buffington's,  where  Major  Spear  .was  on 
duty. 

During  the  morning  a  fog  spread  over  the  creek  and  through  the 
woods  ;  and  while  this  operated  in  favor  of  Maxwell's  skirmishing 
party,  it  contributed  its  share  to  confuse  the  scouts  at  the  upper  fords, 
in  their  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  British  column  which  moved 
in  that  direction. 

It  was  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  that  Colonel 
Bland  crossed  at  Jones'  Ford  with  a  few  light  horse,  and  observed  the 
movement  of  Cornwallis,  who  was  then  approaching  Trimble's  Ford 
on  the  west  fork.  He  immediately  notified  General  Sullivan.  A 
report  similar  in  substance  was  made  by  Colonel  Hazen.  The  follow 
ing  dispatch,  which  is  a  model  for  clearness  in  all  details  then  needed, 


I777.]  BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE.  3/1 

was  sent  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Ross,  and  was  forwarded  by  General 
Sullivan  to  the  Commander-in-chief. 

"  GREAT  VALLEY  ROAD,  ELEVEN  O'CLOCK  A.  M. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL. — A  large  body  of  the  enemy,  from  every  account  five  thousand, 
with  sixteen  or  eighteen  field-pieces,  marched  along  this  road  just  now.  This  road 
leads  to  Taylor's  Ferry  and  Jeffries'  Ferry  on  the  Brandy  wine,  and  to  the  Great 
Valley,  at  the  Sign  of  the  ship,  on  the  Lancaster  road  to  Philadelphia.  There  is  also 
a  road  from  the  Brandywine  to  Chester,  by  Dilworthtown.  We  are  close  in  their 
rear,  with  about  seventy  men.  Captain  Simpson  lay  in  ambush  with  twenty  men 
and  gave  them  three  rounds  within  a  small  distance,  in  which  two  of  his  men  were 
wounded ;  one  mortally.  I  believe  General  Howe  is  with  this  party,  as  Joseph  Gal 
loway  is  here  known  by  the  inhabitants  with  whom  he  spoke,  and  told  them  that 
General  Howe  was  with  them.  Yours, 

"  JAMES  Ross,  Lieutenant-colonel" 

Washington  at  once  ordered  Sullivan  to  cross  the  Brandywine  and 
attack  this  division  of  the  British  army,  which  it  was  supposed  would 
attempt  a  crossing  at  some  point  below  the  fork;  while  the  main  army 
was  to  cross  at  Chadd's  Ford,  and  make  a  direct  onset  upon  Knyp- 
hausen's  division.  General  Greene  was  ordered  to  cross  above 
Chadd's  Ford,  in  order  to  strike  the  left  flank  of  the  Hessian  general. 
This  transpired  before  twelve  o'clock,  and  the  advance  guard  of  Gen 
eral  Greene  was  already  across  when  the  following  note  reached 
Washington  : 

"BRENTON  FORD,  September  n. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL — Since  I  sent  you  the  message  by  Major  Moore,  I  saw  Major 
Spear  of  the  militia,  who  came  this  morning  from  a  tavern  called  Martin's,  at  the  fork 
of  the  Brandywine.  He  came  from  thence  to  Welsh's  Tavern,  and  heard  nothing  of 
the  enemy  about  the  fork  of  the  Brandywine,  and  is  confident  they  are  not  in  that 
quarter  ;  so  that  Colonel  Hazen's  information  must  be  wrong.  I  have  sent  to  that 
quarter  to  know  whether  there  is  any  foundation  for  the  report,  and  shall  give  your 
excellency  the  earliest  information.  I  am,  &c., 

"JOHN  SULLIVAN." 

General  Sullivan  hastily  reached  conclusions  not  warranted  by  his 
informant's  statements  ;  since  the  route  referred  to  in  the  dispatch  of 
Lieutenant-colonel  Ross,  led  to  Taylor's  and  Jeffries'  Ferry,  as  stated, 
and  was  nearly  a  mile  west  of  the  fork,  so  that  the  truth  of  Major 
Spear's  statement  was  no  proof  that  those  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Ross 
and  Colonel  Hazen  were  not  also  true.  One  grave  fact  enters  into 
history,  that  the  question  as  to  where  "  the  large  body  of  the  enemy," 
seen  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Ross,  were,  was  not  solved,  nor  was  the 


372  BATTLE   OF  BRANDYWINE.  [1777 

solution  adequately  attempted  by  Major-general  Sullivan,  until  he 
was  compelled  to  face  them  hurriedly  in  battle. 

Sergeant  Tucker  is  said  to  have  made  a  similar  report  to  that  of 
Major  Spear  ;  but  the  fact  is  immaterial.  The  orders  issued  for  cross 
ing  the  river  were  suspended  upon  receipt  of  General  Sullivan's  note, 
and  General  Greene's  advanced  detachment  was  withdrawn.  The 
tenor  of  the  dispatch  would  indicate  that  the  main  body  of  the  enemy 
was  within  supporting  distance  of  Knyphausen.  Washington  advanced 
Colonel  Bland  to  the  extreme  right.  Another  dispatch  came  from 
General  Sullivan,  including  one  from  Colonel  Bland.  They  read  as 
follows : 

"Two  O'CLOCK  P.  M. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, — Colonel  Bland  has  this  moment  sent  me  word  that  the 
enemy  are  in  the  rear  of  my  right,  coming  down.  There  are,  he  says,  about  two 
brigades  of  them.  He  also  says  he  saw  a  dust,  back  in  the  country,  for  above  an  hour. 

I  am,  &c., 

"JOHN  SULLIVAN." 

The  enclosure  is  as  follows : 

"  A    QUARTER    PAST    ONE    O'CLOCK. 

"  SIR — I  have  discovered  a  party  of  the  enemy  on  the  heights,  just  on  the  right 
of  the  two  widow  Davis's,  (see  map)  who  live  close  together  on  the  road  called  the 
Fork  road  about  half  a  mile  to  the  right  of  the  Meeting  House  (Burmingham). 
There  is  a  higher  hill  in  their  front. 

"  THEODORE  BLAND.' 

The  column  of  Cornwallis  which  had  been  seen  on  the  Lancaster 
road  was  at  last  found.  In  order  rightly  to  estimate  the  succeeding 
battle  events,  some  additional  facts  are  to  be  noticed  in  connection 
with  this  defective  reconnoissance. 

In  a  letter  to  Washington  dated  October  twenty-fourth,  General 
Sullivan  says  :  "  Upon  my  asking  whether  there  were  no  fords  higher 
up  (than  Buffington's)  1  was  informed  in  presence,  of  your  excellency, 
that  there  was  none  within  twelve  miles  ;  to  cross  at  which  the  enemy 
must  make  a  long  circuit  through  a  very  bad  road,  and  that  all  the  light 
horse  in  the  army  were  ordered  to  the  right,  to  watch  the  enemy's 
motions  in  that  quarter.  I  had  no  orders  to  take  any  care  above  Buff 
ington's  Ford,  nor  had  I  light  horse,  or  light  troops  for  the  purpose. 
I  found  four  with  Major  Taylor  whom  I  sent  to  Brenton's  Ford,  two 
of  whom  I  sent  off  with  Colonel  Hazen  to  Jones'  Ford;  nor  did  I  see 
any  till  Major  Jameson  came  to  me  the  day  of  the  battle  at  nine 
o'clock.  On  the  day  I  came  to  the  ford  I  detached  the  Delaware 
regiment  to  Buffington's :  and  as  soon  as  I  saw  Major  Jameson,  I 


I777.J  BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE.  373 

advised  him  to  send  an  officer  over  to  the  Lancaster  road,  who 
returned  and  said  that  no  enemy  had  passed  that  way.  Major  Jame 
son  said  he  came  from  the  right  of  the  army,  and  I  might  depend, 
there  was  no  enemy  there." 

It  is  evident,  if  Major  Jameson's  visit  to  the  Lancaster  road  was 
not  made  quite  early  in  the  forenoon,  due  allowance  was  not  made 
for  the  early  march  of  Cornwallis  ;  and  no  careful  examination  of  the 
road  could  have  been  made,  or  he  would  have  confirmed  the  statement 
of  Lieutenant-colonel  Ross,  which  was  substantially  exact.  When 
the  question  afterwards  arose  as  to  the  responsibility  for  the  unex 
pected  appearance  of  the  British  army  in  force,  upon  the  American 
right  flank,  Washington,  generously  avoiding  to  reflect  upon  Sulli 
van,  who  was  both  patriotic  and  brave,  used  the  following  language 
in  reply  to  a  letter  from  that  officer  who  was  then  obtaining  certifi 
cates  to  use  before  Congress:  "With  respect  to  your  other  query, 
whether  your  being  posted  on  the  right  was  to  guard  that  flank,  and 
if  you  had  neglected  it,  I  can  only  observe,  that  the  obvious,  if  not 
the  declared  purpose  of  your  being  there,  implied  every  necessary 
precaution  for  the  security  of  that  flank.  But  it  is  at  the  same  time 
to  be  remarked,  that  all  the  fords  above  Chadd's,  from  which  we  were 
taught  to  apprehend  danger,  were  guarded  by  detachments  from  your 
division  ;  and  that  we  were  led  to  believe,  by  those  whom  we  had 
reason  to  think  well  acquainted  with  the  country,  that  no  ford 
above  our  pickets  could  be  passed,  without  making  a  very  circuitous 
march."  Washington's  information,  however,  was  obtained  through 
Sullivan. 

It  will  appear  that  the  movement  of  General  Howe  was  as  bril 
liantly  executed  as  it  was  eminently  scientific,  and  peculiar  to  his 
military  habit.  From  General  Sullivan's  communications,  afterwards 
made  to  Congress,  in  which  he  claims  that  the  movement  was  just 
what  he  anticipated,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  his  neglect  to  exhaust 
reconnoissance  and  determine  for  himself,  whether  there  was'  no  ford 
nearer  than  twelve  miles,  and  if  not,  whether ///#/  ford  was  not  available 
to  an  earnest  adversary ;  unless  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  after  the 
battle  of  Long  Island,  when  he  had  the  misfortune  to  fall  under  cen 
sure  for  similar  neglect  of  reconnoissance,  he  anticipated  the  move 
ments  of  an  enemy  in  a  similar  manner,  without  the  power  to  stop  it. 
Another  document  has  value,  in  connection  with  the  proposed  advance 
of  Washington  against  Knyphausen.  It  is  clearly  seen  that  such  a 
movement  was  in  the  spirit  of  a  true  soldier  ;  and  its  success,  on  the 


3/4  BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

basis  of  a  supposed  wide  separation  of  the  two  British  armies,  would 
have  been  brilliant. 

It  stimulated  the  enthusiasm  of  raw  troops  by  offensive  action, 
where  terrors  like  those  of  a  stolid  defense  are  unknown,  and  carried 
with  it  the  courage  which  a  sharp  offensive  return  almost  invariably 
inspires.  It  was  one  of  those  rare  instances  in  which  Washington 
assumed  great  risks,  and  the  sudden  suspension  of  the  movement 
saved  the  army. 

Additional  extracts  are  given  from  the  document  already  referred 
to,  with  the  remark  that  Washington  understood  that  the  column  of 
Cornwallis  was  still  on  the  west  bank,  and  as  a  matter  of  course,  he 
would  not  have  attacked  Knyphausen  if  he  suspected  that  two-thirds 
of  the  British  army,  fully  equal  to  his  own  entire  command,  was 
already  bearing  down  upon  his  right  and  rear. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  GENERAL  SULLIVAN'S  STATEMENT. 

"  It  was  ever  my  opinion  that  the  enemy  would  come  round  on 
our  right  flank.  This  opinion  I  often  gave  to  the  General.  I  wrote 
to  him  that  morning  that  it  was  clearly  my  opinion.  I  sent  him  two 
messages  to  the  same  purpose  in  the  forenoon,  and  the  first  intelli 
gence  I  received  that  they  were  actually  coming  that  way,  I  instantly 
communicated  to  him;  after  which  the  General  sent  me  word  to  cross 
the  Brandywine  and  attack  the  enemy's  left,"  (obviously  meaning 
Cornwallis,  i.  e.  the  real  British  left,  not  the  left  of  the  army  imme 
diately  opposite,)  "  while  the  army  crossed  below  me  to  attack  the 
right.  This  I  was  preparing  to  do,  when  Major  Spear  came  to  me 
and  informed  me  that  he  was  from  the  upper  country ;  that  he  had 
come  in  the  road  where  the  enemy  must  have  passed  to  attack  our 
right,  and  that  there  was  not  the  least  appearance  of  them  in  that' 
quarter  ;  and  that  General  Washington  had  sent  him  out  for  the  pur 
pose  of  discovering  whether  the  enemy  were  in  that  quarter.  The 
account  was  confirmed  by  Sergeant  Tucker  of  the  light-horse,  sent  by 
me  on  purpose  to  make  discoveries,  and  who  had  passed,  as  he  said, 
to  the  Lancaster  road." 

"  This  intelligence  did  by  no  means  alter  my  opinion,  which  was 
founded,  not  upon  any  knowledge  I  had  of  the  facts,  but  upon  an 
apprehension  that  General  Howe  would  take  that  advantage  which 
any  good  officer  in  his  situation  would  have  done.  I  considered, 
however,  that  if  my  opinion,  or  the  intelligence  I  had  sent  the  General, 
should  bring  him  into  a  plan  of  attacking  the  enemy  on  the  advan- 


1777:1  BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE.  3/5 

tageous  heights  of  which  they  were  possessed,  and  a  defeat  should 
thence  follow,  I  should  be  justly  censured  for  withholding  from  him 
part  of  the  intelligence  I  had  received,  and  thereby  brought  defeat  on 
our  army.  I  therefore  sat  down  and  wrote  Major  Spear's  account 
from  his  own  mouth,  and  forwarded  to  his  excellency  by  a  light 
horseman,  and  ordered  the  Major  to  follow  himself.  /  never  made  a 
iomment  or  gave  any  opinion  in  the  matter.  ...  I  beg  Congress  to 
see  whether  I  could  have  been  excused  for  withholding  that  opinion, 
merely  because  my  opinion  did  not  coincide  with  the  declaration." 

(The  opinion  of  General  Sullivan  as  to  the  reliability  of  informa 
tion  received  from  his  scouts,  was  just  what  the  Commander-in-chief 
was  entitled  to.)  Colonel  Harrison,  General  Washington's  secretary, 
wrote  to  President  Hancock  at  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  from 
Chadd's  Ford,  that  "  Sullivan,  Stirling,  and  Stephen  with  their  divis 
ions  had  gone  in  pursuit  of  a  detachment  of  the  British  army,  two  or 
three  thousand,  or  more,  which  filed  off  from  their  left  about  eleven 
o'clock,  and  were  supposed  to  have  crossed  the  Brandywine  at  Jones' 
Ford,"  and  adds,  that  "  at  half  past  four  the  enemy  attacked  Sullivan 
at  the  ford  above,  that  the  action  was  very  violent,  and  a  very  severe 
cannonading  had  begun  here  (at  Chadd's  Ford)  also."  This  letter 
confuses  the  movement  ordered,  upon  the  receipt  of  the  message  of 
Lieutenant-colonel  Ross,  with  the  general  action  which  was  in  pro 
gress  when  the  letter  was  dispatched. 

The  advance  of  General  Howe  began  at  daybreak,  according  to 
his  report,  and  the  entire  column,  after  a  march  of  seventeen  miles 
from  Kennett  Square,  crossed  Jeffries'  Ford  by  two  o'clock,  its  van 
guard  having  previously  reached  the  vicinity  of  Osborne's  Hill,  near 
Sullivan's  right. 

Its  battle  formation  was  deliberately  made  in  three  lines,  and  was 
so  complete  and  adequate  that  the  third  line  was  not  called  into  action 
at  all.  That  formation  was  as  follows  :  The  guards  were  upon  the 
right,  and  the  First  British  grenadiers  to  their  left  near  the  centre, 
supported  by  the  Hessian  grenadiers  in  a  second  line.  To  the  left  of 
the  Second  grenadiers  who  held  the  centre,  were  two  battalions  of 
light  infantry  with  the  Hessian  and  Anspach  chasseurs,  supported  by 
the  Fourth  brigade  for  a  second  line.  The  composition  of  this  brigade 
is  indicated  on  the  map.  The  Third  brigade  was  held  in  reserve. 

A  brief  summary  of  General  Howe's  report  will  prepare  the  way 
for  a  better  understanding  of  the  movements  of  the  American  army. 
The  American  position,  when  the  British  troops  began  the  attack,  was 


376  BATTLE   OF  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

on  commanding  ground  near  Birmingham  Meeting-house,  nearly 
parallel  with  Osborne's  Hill,  behind  which  the  British  army  so  delib 
erately  prepared  their  advance  movement.  "  Both  flanks  were  covered 
by  very  thick  woods,  and  the  artillery  was  advantageously  disposed. 
The  light  infantry  and  chasseurs  began  the  attack,  the  guards  and 
grenadiers  instantly  advanced  from  the  right,  the  whole  under  a  heavy 
train  (of  fire)  of  artillery  and  musketry  ;  but  they  pushed  on  with  an 
impetuosity  not  to  be  sustained  by  the  enemy,  who  falling  back  into 
the  woods  in  their  rear,  the  king's  troops  entered  with  them  and  pur 
sued  closely  for  nearly  two  miles.  The  Americans  were  dislodged 
from  the  second  position,  within  half  a  mile  of  Dilworth,  and  just  at 
dark  the  infantry,  Second  grenadiers,  and  Fourth  brigade  had  a  brief 
action  beyond  Dilworth,  between  the  two  roads  which  run  from  Dil 
worth  to  Chester."  "  The  Guards,  First  British  grenadiers  and  Hes 
sian  grenadiers  who  attacked  the  American  left,  having  in  the  pursuit 
got  entangled  in  very  thick  woods,  were  no  further  engaged  during 
the  day." 

"Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen,  as  had  been  previously  con 
certed,  kept  the  enemy  amused  during  the  day  with  cannon,  and  the 
appearance  of  forcing  the  ford  without  intending  to  pass  it,  until  the 
attack  upon  the  enemy's  right  should  take  place."  "  When  the  gen 
eral  action  began,  the  crossing  was  successfully  made  under  the  lead 
of  Major-general  Grant,  and  the  American  left  made  a  rapid  retreat." 

As  soon  as  Washington  learned  of  the  approach  of  the  British 
column,  General  Sullivan  was  ordered  to  bring  the  entire  right  wing 
to  bear  upon  its  advance.  The  position  at  Chadd's  Ford  was  entrusted 
to  Wayne.  Greene  was  placed  in  command  of  Muhlenberg's  and 
Weedon's  brigades  as  a  reserve,  and  this  force  was  posted  between 
the  extremes  of  attack.  The  American  formation  was  quite  compact, 
except  on  the  left  where  Sullivan  dropped  his  own  division,  which  was 
in  great  disorder,  and  thus  "  made  an  interval  in  the  American  line 
of  half  a  mile,"  until  he  "  rode  on  to  consult  with  the  other  general 
officers  and  settle  upon  the  location  of  the  troops."  He  states  in 
his  report,  that  it  was  "  their  unanimous  opinion  that  his  division 
should  be  brought  on  to  join  the  others,  and  that  the  whole  should 
incline  further  to  the  right,  to  prevent  our  being  outflanked  ;  "  that 
"  while  his  division  was  marching  on,  and  before  it  was  possible  for 
them  to  form  to  advantage,  the  enemy  pressed  on  with  rapidity  and 
attacked  them,  which  threw  them  into  some  kind  of  confusion." 
"  He  took  his  own  position  in  the  centre,  with  the  artillery,  and  ordered 


1777.]  BATTLE    OF   BRANDYWINE.  377 

:t  to  play  briskly,  to  stop  the  progress  of  the  enemy  and  give  the 
broken  troops  time  to  rally  and  form  in  the  rear." 

"  He  sent  four  aid-de-camps  for  this  purpose  and  went  himself, 
but  all  in  vain  ;  then  left  them  to  be  rallied  by  their  own  officers  and 
the  aids,  and  returned  to  the  artillery  and  centre."  "  Some  rallied 
and  others  could  not  by  their  officers  be  brought  to  do  anything  but 
fly."  The  resistance  of  Stirling  and  Stephen  was  such  as  repeatedly 
to  repulse  the  British  attack.  Conway's  brigade  distinguished  itself  by 
its  valor.  Hazen's,  Dayton's  and  Ogden's  regiments  alone  maintained 
a  resolute  position  on  the  left.  General  Deborre,  a  French  officer  of 
thirty-five  years'  experience,  commanded  the  right  brigade  of  the  entire 
line,  but  it  gave  way  early  in  the  action  and  the  chief  resistance  was 
made  at  the  centre.  (This  officer  almost  immediately  resigned,  so  that 
he  was  not  dealt  with  by  a  military  court.)  That  the  retreat  of  the 
two  divisions  of  Stirling  and  Stephen,  (except  Deborre's  brigade)  was 
effected  with  some  steadiness  and  repeated  returns  of  the  offensive,  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  they  took  both  artillery  and  baggage  with 
them  ;  and  there  is  abundant  evidence  that  General  Sullivan  exhibited 
a  personal  courage  which  greatly  overshadowed  his  deficiencies  as 
commanding  officer  of  a  grand  division.  There  are  circumstances 
associated  with  the  battle  which  indicate  more  clearly  than  the  battle 
itself  the  difficulties  of  the  day,  and  make  more  wonderful  the  rescue 
of  the  American  army  from  entire  destruction. 

It  would  be  presumed  from  the  order  issued  to  General  Sullivan 
and  the  position  occupied  by  the  American  troops,  that  the  three 
divisions  moved,  under  General  Sullivan's  directions,  directly  to  the 
battle-field  from  their  camp  on  the  river  bluff;  and  he  has  been 
alternately  praised  and  abused  for  the  position  taken.  The  following 
is  an  extract  from  General  Sullivan's  personal  communication  to  the 
American  Congress  : 

"  I  wish  Congress  to  consider  the  many  disadvantages  I  labored 
under  in  that  day.  It  is  necessary  in  every  action  that  the  command 
ing  officer  should  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  number  and  situa 
tion  of  the  enemy,  the  route  they  are  pursuing,  the  ground  he  is  to 
draw  up  his  troops  on,  as  well  as  that  where  the  enemy  are  to  be 
formed,  and  that  he  have  sufficient  time  to  view  and  examine  the 
positions  of  the  enemy  and  to  draw  up  his  troops  in  such  a  manneras 
to  counteract  their  design,  all  of  which  were  wanting." 

General  Hoive  did  not  intend  to  grant  these  favors  ;  and  this  excel 
lent  programme  for  a  sham  battle,  in  experimental  practice  is  not  ac- 


378  BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE. 

ceptable  to  those  who  seek  high  attainment  in  the  art  of  war.  The 
paper  continues,  "  We  had  intelligence  of  two  brigades  coming  against 
us ;  when  it  was  in  fact  the  whole  strength  of  the  British  army,  com 
manded  by  General  Howe  and  Lord  Cornwallis.  They  met  us  unex 
pectedly,  and  attacked  us  before  we  had  time  to  form,  and  upon 
ground  we  had  never  before  seen.  Under  these  disadvantages,  and 
against  those  unequal  numbers,  we  maintained  our  ground  an  hour  and 
forty  minutes;  and  by  giving  fresh  opposition  on  every  ground  that 
would  admit,  we  kept  them  at  bay  from  three  o'clock  until  after 
sunset." 

These  statements  are  to  be  considered  in  connection  with  those  on 
page  374,  where  General  Sullivan  claims  to  have  expected  General 
Howe's  approach  from  that  direction,  and  necessarily  over  the  ground 
where  the  battle  was  fought.  The  occasion  was  one  which  required 
exhaustive  reconnoissance  and  thorough  anticipation  of  the  contin 
gencies  of  such  an  attack.  Both  were  difficult  of  attainment. 

It  is  nowhere  recorded  in  official  documents,  exactly  how  the 
American  troops  gained  the  battle-ground.  The  report  of  General 
Sullivan  gives  his  views  ;  but  neither  those  of  La  Fayette,  a  volunteer 
on  this  occasion,  nor  Stirling,  explain  this  matter. 

General  Sullivan,  in  fact,  waited  for  further  orders  from  Washington, 
after  sending  him  notice  that  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand,  as  if  par. 
alyzed,  and  the  divisions  of  Stirling  and  Stephen  moved  promptly 
without  him,  to  the  nearest  good  position  from  which  they  could 
resist  the  advancing  British  columns. 

The  author  knows  full  well  that  this  statement,  predicated  upon 
examination  of  documents,  regardless  in  the  first  instance  of  all  other 
opinions,  does  not  conform  to  some  narratives,  neither  has  this  exam 
ination  from  the  first  accepted  any  opinion  which  was  not  in  harmony 
with  a  strictly  military  review  of  conditions  and  data.  It  is  therefore 
material  that  additional  documentary  matter  should  receive  attention. 
Mr.  Sparks,  in  his  Appendix  to  Vol.  V.,  page  462,  states,  that  "  when 
General  Sullivan  came  up  with  three  divisions  of  the  army,  his  own, 
Stephen's  and  Stirling's,  and  began  to  form  them  into  a  line  about 
half  a  mile  in  front  of  the  enemy,  Cornwallis  commenced  the  attack 
before  this  manceuver  could  be  completed,  and  threw  Sullivan's  troops 
into  confusion,  etc." 

Washington,  writing  to  General  Sullivan  under  date  of  October 
twenty-fourth,  1777,  says,  "  what  happened  on  your  march  to  the  field 
of  battle, — your  disposition  there  and  behavior  during  the  action,  I 


I777-]  BATTLE   OF  BRANDYWINE.  3/9 

can  say  nothing  about ;  no  part  till  the  retreat  commenced  having 
come  under  my  immediate  observation.  I  can  only  add,  therefore, 
that  the  whole  tenor  of  your  conduct  as  far  as  I  have  had  opportu 
nities  of  judging  has  been  spirited  and  active."  This  letter  also  con 
tains  the  following  allusion  to  the  information  sent  by  Major  Spear, 
"  without  comment  or  opinion."  "  It  was  not  your  fault  that  the 
intelligence  was  eventually  found  to  be  erroneous."  And  yet  when 
that  dispatch  was  sent,  General  Sullivan  believed  it  to  be  erroneous.  In 
writing  from  "Camp  on  Perkiomy,  September  twenty-seventh,  1777, 
to  President  Hancock,  General  Sullivan  thus  shows  how  he  reached 
the  battle-field.  (The  Italics  are  not  so  marked  in  the  original.) 

"  I  never  yet  pretended  that  my  disposition  in  the  late  battle  was 
perfect.  I  knew  it  was  very  far  from  it ;  but  this  I  will  venture  to  affirm, 
that  it  was  the  best  that  time  would  allow  me  to  make.  At  half-past 
two  I  received  orders  to  march  with  my  division  to  join  with  and  take 
command  of  that  and  two  others,  to  oppose  the  enemy  who  were 
coming  down  on  the  right  flank  of  our  army.  I  neither  knew  where  the 
enemy  were,  nor  what  route  the  other  tiuo  divisions  were  to  take,  and  oj 
course  could  not  determine  where  I  should  form  a  junction  with  tJiem" 
"  I  began  my  march  in  a  few  minutes  after  I  received  my  orders,  and 
had  not  marched  a  mile  when  I  met  Colonel  Hazen  with  his  regiment 
which  had  been  stationed  at  a  ford  three  miles  above  me,  who  in 
formed  me  that  I  might  depend  that  the  principal  part  of  the  British 
army  was  there  ;  although  I  knew  the  report  sent  to  headquarters 
made  them  but  two  brigades.  As  I  knew  Colonel  Hazen  to  be  an  old 
officer  and  a  good  judge  of  numbers,  I  gave  credence  to  his  report  in 
preference  to  the  intelligence  before  received.  While  I  was  conversing 
with  Colonel  Hazen,  and  our  troops  still  on  the  march,  the  enemy 
headed  us  in  the  road,  (see  positions  of  guards  and  Hessians  on  the 
map  '  Battle  of  Brandywine,')  about  forty  rods  from  our  advance 
guard.  I  then  found  it  necessary  to  turn  off  to  the  right  to  form,  and 
so  got  nearer  to  the  other  divisions,  which  I  at  that  moment  discovered, 
both  in  the  rear  and  to  the  right  of  the  place  I  was  then  at.  I  ordered 
Colonel  Hazen's  regiment  to  pass  a  hollow  way,  file  off  to  the  right, 
and  face,  to  cover  the  artillery.  The  enemy  seeing  this,  did  not  press 
on,  but  gave  me  time  to  form  my  division  on  an  advantageous  height, 
in  a  line  with  the  other  divisions,  about  almost  half  a  mile  to  the  left." 

It  thus  appears  that  Major-general  Sullivan,  to  whom  the  command 
of  the  entire  right  wing  of  the  American  army  from  its  first  establish 
ment  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Brandywine  had  been  intrusted,  arrived 


380  BATTLE   OF   BRANDYWINE.  [i?77 

only  just  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action,  and  that  his  personal  valor, 
and  that  of  three  regiments,  was  the  sole  contribution  of  his  division 
to  the  efficiency  of  the  American  resistance.  If,  as  appears  from 
some  authorities,  General  Deborre  was  in  Stirling's  division,  he  was 
in  his  proper  position  on  the  right,  and  the  entangled  controversy 
whether  there  was  a  dispute  between  that  officer  and  General  Sullivan 
as  to  the  command  of  the  extreme  right,  is  settled  by  the  documents 
already  cited,  independently  of  the  fact  that  there  was  no  occasion  for 
a  conflict  upon  such  a  question,  between  a  general  of  brigade  and  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  entire  right  wing.  General  Sullivan's  time 
was  spent  in  finding  the  army  first,  and  then  in  finding  a  place  where 
he  could  render  service  in  person,  and  with  such  of  his  own  division 
as  he  could  rescue  from  panic  and  flight. 

Washington  hastened  with  Greene's  division  to  the  support  of  the 
right  wing  ;  but  not  in  time  to  save  it  in  position.  It  had  no  retreat 
but  toward  Dilworth,  as  the  British  right  wing  out-flanked  it  to  the 
left  and  intervened  between  it  and  Chadd's  Ford.  By  a  direct  march 
nearly  to  Dilworth  of  four  miles,  effected  in  fifty  minutes,  and  a  wheel 
to  the  left  for  half  a  mile,  he  was  enabled  to  occupy  a  defile  and  sub 
stantial  ground  from  which  to  open  a  passage  for  the  retreating  bat 
talions  and  interpose  a  vigorous  resistance.  This  was  temporary,  and 
the  retreat  was  then  made  under  cover  of  Greene's  division.  In  an 
orchard  beyond  Dilworth,  three  regiments  made  another  vigorous 
stand,  and  night  separated  the  conflicting  armies. 

The  militia  brigade  of  General  Armstrong,  on  the  extreme  left 
near  Pyle's  Ford,  was  not  called  into  action,  but  rapidly  moved  in 
the  direction  of  Chester ;  and  Generals  Wayne  and  Maxwell,  after  a 
vigorous  resistance,  also  took  the  same  direction,  losing  the  guns  which 
were  at  the  ford,  and  some  others. 

The  American  army  gained  Chester,  so  that  Washington's  dispatch 
from  that  point  to  President  Hancock  was  dated  at  twelve  o'clock  at 
night,  September  nth,  1777,  and  the  British  army  remained  on  the 
field.  There  are  a  few  minor  items  which  belong  to  this  record.  At 
the  commencement  of  the  action  a  vigorous  skirmish  took  place  in 
the  orchard  north  of  the  Birmingham  Meeting-house.  Special  credit 
is  also  due  to  the  corps  of  General  Maxwell. 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  who  had  been  appointed  Major-gen 
eral  by  way  of  compliment,  as  claimed,  but  not  so  understood  by 
Washington,  served  as  his  voluntary  aid-de-camp,  distinguished 
himself  by  his  valor,  was  wounded  in  an  attempt  to  rally  troops,  and 


I77/.J  BATTLE  OF   BRANDYWINE.  381 

joined  Washington  at  Chester.  Captain  Louis  de  Fleury  fought  with 
such  gallantry  that  Congress  presented  him  with  a  horse  in  place  of 
his  own  killed  in  the  battle.  The  baron  St.  Ovary,  who  aided  La 
Fayette  in  rallying  fugitives,  was  taken  prisoner.  The  skill  of  General 
Howe  as  a  scientific  soldier,  even  amidst  woods  and  thickets,  was 
again  demonstrated  ;  and  the  wonderful  presence  of  mind,  aptitude 
for  emergencies,  and  extraordinary  capacity  for  making  the  most 
of  raw  troops,  was  never  more  thoroughly  evinced  by  Washington  in 
his  public  career.  With  all  its  mistakes,  and  the  final  retreat  of  the 
American  troops,  there  was  much  of  real  success  and  real  hope  as  the 
fruit  of  the  Battle  of  Brandywine. 

NOTE.  (Fifth  Edition.'}  The  Battle  of  Brandywine  must  be  judged  by  the  peculiar  condi 
tions  under  which  Washington  faced  a  superior  force  where  the  facilities  for  their  attack  were 
fully  equal  to  those  of  resistance.  His  scouts  and  mounted  men  were  few  and  recently  organized, 
while  the  theatre  for  reconnoissance  was  extended  and  involved.  His  bold  attempt  to  cross  the 
river  and  strike  the  enemy  in  detail,  had  a  tendency  to  disconcert  the  extreme  right  under  Sulli 
van,  who  could  not  be  expected  to  have  his  three  divisions  fully  in  hand  for  the  very  different 
movement  so  suddenly  required  of  them.  His  note  from  Brenton's  Ford,  (page  371)  however  in 
definite  as  to  the  British  movements,  saved  the  army  from  completely  crossing  to  its  ruin. 

The  closest  discipline,  absolute  unity  of  the  army  as  a  whole,  and  the  promptest  response  of 
brigades  and  divisions  to  the  changing  conditions  of  the  day,  were  essential  to  success.  The 
conditions  changed  before  any  possible  response  could  come  from  headquarters  ;  and  these  diffi 
culties  must  be  considered  in  weighing  the  conduct  of  General  Sullivan,  who  was  suddenly  called 
to  shift  his  long  front  in  the  woods,  along  the  river,  to  a  position  at  right  angles  to  the  river,  and 
there  find,  at  once,  some  tenable  ground  for  instant  defense. 

The  author  substitutes  "  difficult  of  attainment"  for  the  word  "neglected  "  on  page  378  of 
former  editions.  It  is  more  just  to  history. 

The  examination  of  the  map,  regard  for  the  intricacy  of  the  ground,  and  recognition  of  the 
good  strategy  by  which  Howe,  as  on  Long  Island,  made  the  most  of  his  superior  force,  confirms 
the  conclusion  that  the  Battle  of  Brandywine  was  not  a  conclusive  disaster,  simply  because  of  the 
extraordinary  vigor  of  the  defense. 

The  fact  that  Washington,  the  pursued,  promptly  turned  upon  his  pursuer,  and  again  offered 
Howe  battle  on  the  fifteenth,  shows  that  a  grand  faith  in  his  cause  and  in  his  men,  and  a 
marvelous  capacity  for  handling  supreme  issues  with  wisdom  and  steady  nerve,  were  never  more 
signally  called  into  exercise. 


CHAPTER   LI. 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELPHIA.    BATTLE   OF  GERMANTOWN 

1777- 

GENERAL  WASHINGTON  marched  from  Chester  directly  to 
Philadelphia  to  refit  his  army,  secure  ammunition  and  provis 
ions,  and  thence  to  Germantown  for  one  day  of  rest. 

While  Congress  was  making  an  effort  to  collect  detached  Conti 
nental  troops,  and  rally  the  militia,  the  Commander-in-chief  was  in 
motion. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  September,  orders  were  sent  to  Monsieur  de 
Coudray  to  complete  the  defensive  works  on  the  Delaware  as  rapidly 
as  possible ;  to  General  Putnam  to  send  him  fifteen  hundred  Conti 
nental  troops  forthwith  ;  and  to  General  Armstrong  to  occupy  the 
line  of  the  Schuylkill  river,  and  throw  up  occasional  redoubts  near  the 
fords,  to  be  occupied  if  necessary  in  crossing  that  river. 

The  left  wing  of  the  British  army  had  moved  from  Dilworth 
toward  Goshen,  demonstrating  toward  Reading,  as  well  as  toward  the 
Schuylkill  and  Philadelphia.  The  right  wing  under  Generals  Grant 
and  Cornwallis  reached  Ashtown  on  the  twelfth,  and  Chester  on  the 
thirteenth.  The  failure  of  General  Howe  to  move  diagonally  toward 
Crum  creek,  or  Derby,  thereby  to  make  a  direct  route  to  Philadelphia, 
shorter  than  that  of  Washington's  retreat,  received  severe  criticism 
from  his  enemies  ;  but  important  considerations  controlled  his  actions. 
The  wounded  of  both  armies  were  on  his  hands,  so  that  he  was  com 
pelled  to  procure  surgeons  from  General  Washington  to  assist  in  their 
care ;  and  he  states  that  one  reason  of  his  occupation  of  Wilmington, 
where  he  captured  the  Governor  and  considerable  coin,  was  to  provide 
better  for  their  comfort.  Inasmuch  as  Grant  and  Cornwallis  were  in 
the  rear  of  Washington's  army,  a  march  to  Philadelphia  via  German- 
town  afforded  a  fair  opportunity  to  cut  off  its  retreat,  while  at  the 


r777.]  OPERATIONS   NEAR    PHILADELPHIA.  383 

same  time  threatening  the  city.  On  the  fifteenth,  Washington  was 
again  on  the  west  side  of  the  Schuylkill,  having  crossed  at  Swede's 
Ford,  so  that  the  halt  of  General  Howe  for  a  single  day  on  the  battle 
field,  rendered  it  useless  for  him  to  make  forced  marches  for  that  city 
direct. 

Washington  moved  out  on  the  Lancaster  road  as  far  as  the  Warren 

o 

Tavern.  General  Howe,  watchful  of  these  movements,  advanced  be 
yond  Westchester,  and  both  armies  prepared  for  battle.  General 
Howe  made  a  partially  successful  attempt  to  turn  the  American  right 
wing,  in  order  to  throw  it  back  upon  the  Schuylkill ;  but  a  heavy 
storm  completely  ruined  the  ammunition  of  the  American  army,  and 
was  "  directly  in  the  faces  of  the  British  troops."  Washington  left 
Wayne,  with  fifteen  hundred  men,  in  a  peculiarly  retired  and  well 
chosen  position  near  Paoli,  to  be  ready  to  fall  upon  the  rear  of  Gen 
eral  Howe,  and  then  moved  to  Yellow  Springs,  thence  to  Warwick, 
on  French  creek ;  and  after  he  found  that  General  Howe  did  not 
intend  a  movement  toward  Reading,  crossed  the  river  by  Parker's 
Ford  and  encamped  on  the  Perkiomy,  September  seventeenth. 

On  the  twentieth  General  Wayne  was  surprised,  through  the 
treachery  of  the  people  of  the  country.  General  Grey  advanced  from 
his  camp  near  Trudruffyn  at  night,  using  only  the  bayonet,  and 
inflicted  a  loss  of  three  hundred  in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners, 
with  a  mere  handful  of  casualties  to  his  own  troops.  Wayne  saved 
his  artillery  and  most  of  his  baggage.  John  Adams  thus  criticised  the 
crossing  of  the  Schuylkill ;  and  the  criticism  does  more  credit  to  his 
interest  in  the  war,  than  to  his  judgment  of  military  conduct.  "  It  is 
a  very  injudicious  movement.  If  he  had  sent  one  brigade  of  his 
regular  troops  to  have  headed  the  militia,  he  might  have  cut  to  pieces 
Howe's  army  in  attempting  to  cross  any  of  the  fords.  Howe  will  not 
attempt  it."  He  did  attempt  it!  "He  will  wait  for  his  fleet  in 
Delaware  river.  O  !  Heaven !  grant  us  one  great  soul !  One  lead 
ing  mind  would  extricate  the  best  cause  from  that  ruin  which  seems 
to  await  it !  "  But  Howe  did  not  wait  for  his  fleet.  And  when-  Wash 
ington  crossed  the  Schuylkill,  he  knew  that  Grant  and  Cornwallis 
were  detached  to  Chester,  so  that  the  movement  against  one  wing  of 
the  British  army,  interrupted  by  the  storm,  was  soldierly  ;  and  the 
retreat  via  Parker's  Ford,  was  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  quickest 
possible  offensive  and  to  cover  the  fords.  The  disaster  of  Wayne 
alone  impaired  the  value  of  that  action.  The  brigade  of  Smaliwood, 
which  had  been  left  as  a  support  to  Wayne,  failed  to  be  on  time  to 


OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777. 

render  such  support,  although  only  about  a  mile  from  Paoli,  and  his 
misfortune  drove  them  to  a  retreat  in  partial  disorder.  The  succeed 
ing  manceuvers  of  the  armies  were  respectively  affected  by  the  affair 
at  Paoli.  The  pressure  was  taken  off  the  rear  of  Howe's  army,  and 
he  moved  on.  Washington  says  :  "  They  had  got  so  far  the  start 
before  I  received  certain  intelligence  that  any  considerable  number 
had  crossed,  that  I  found  it  in  vain  to  think  of  overtaking  their  rear 
with  troops  harassed  as  ours  had  been  with  constant  marching  since 
the  battle  of  Brandywine." 

"  One  thousand  of  his  army  were  bare-footed,"  and  Colonel  Hamil 
ton  was  sent  to  Philadelphia  to  force  a  contribution  of  shoes  from  the 
inhabitants.  A  small  portion  of  the  British  left  crossed  at  Gordon's 
Ford  on  the  twenty-second,  and  the  main  body  at  Flatland  Ford,  near 
Valley  Forge,  on  the  twenty-third,  reaching  Germantown  on  the 
twenty-fifth.  On  the  twenty-seventh  Cornwallis  entered  Philadelphia. 
Colonel  Sterling,  of  the  British  army,  was  moved  across  the  Delaware 
to  operate  against  its  defenses,  including  the  works  at  Mud  Island 
and  Red  Bank,  and  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Howe  was  already  en  route 
for  the  same  destination. 

There  was  no  rest  for  either  army  ;  and  the  occupation  of  Phila 
delphia  was  attended  by  immediate  results  which  showed  that  the 
war  was  nearer  its  close,  through  that  occupation. 

Congress  adjourned  to  Lancaster,  and  subsequently  to  York. 
The  powers  of  Washington  were  somewhat  enlarged,  and  a  peremptory 
order  was  sent  to  Putnam,  who  was  all  the  time  attempting  ill-con 
sidered  attempts  upon  the  British  outposts  near  New  York,  to  send 
twenty-five  hundred  troops  without  delay,  to  reinforce  Washington's 
army,  and  that  he  must  "  so  use  militia,  that  the  posts  in  the  High 
lands  might  be  perfectly  safe."  Application  was  also  made  to  General 
Gates  for  the  return  of  Morgan's  corps  ;  but  they  were  not  sent  to  the 
headquarters  of  the  army  until  after  the  close  of  the  Northern  Cam 
paign. 

General  Howe  had  been  one  month  in  marching  fifty-four  miles, 
from  the  head  of  the  Elk  to  Philadelphia.  His  headquarters  were  at 
Germantown. 

This  village,  six  miles  from  Philadelphia,  was  built  upon  a  single 
street,  the  old  Skippach  road,  nearly  or  quite  two  miles  in  length, 
bearing  slightly  west  of  north,  as  indicated  on  the  map  "  Battle  of  Ger 
mantown."  This  map,  so  far  as  the  positions  of  the  British  troops  are 
indicated,  is  compiled  from  that  of  Lieutenant  Hill,  assisting  engineer, 


I777-]  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  385 

of  the  British  Twenty-third  regiment,  and  while  indicating  their  modi 
fied  positions  shortly  after  the  action  began,  is  accepted  as  the  best. 
The  additions  made  afford  a  fair  estimate  of  the  successive  stages  of 
the  battle. 

The  street  is  not  straight ;  so  that  there  is  at  no  single  point  a 
complete  range  for  fire  throughout  its  entire  extent.  Neither  is  it  on 
a  uniform  or  continuous  grade  so  that  guns  stationed  at  Mount  Airy, 
or  near  the  Street  Railway  station  (as  occupied  in  January,  1876,)  and 
trained  down  the  hill,  could  have  a  clear  sweep  unobstructed  by  crown 
ing  ground.  In  other  words,  troops  would  be  at  least  twice  under  cover 
in  moving  through  the  town.  From  the  Old  School-house  lane  there 
is  another  gradual  rise  on  the  road  leading  to  Philadelphia.  Beyond 
Mount  Airy,  northward,  is  another  declining  slope,  soon  taken  up  by 
the  ascent  of  Chestnut  Hill,  still  further  on.  A  few  small  alleys,  or 
openings,  projected  east  and  west  for  a  few  rods  from  the  main  street, 
and  several  of  the  old  buildings  of  the  era  under  notice,  were  in  very 
well  preserved  condition  at  the  beginning  of  1876,  the  Centennial  year 
of  American  Independence.  In  addition  to  the  Skippach  road,  the 
town  was  approached  from  the  northeast  by  the  Lime-kiln  road 
which  entered  the  village  by  the  Market  House,  and  by  the  old  York 
road  which  entered  the  Philadelphia  road  some  distance  below.  A 
fourth  road,  called  the  Manatawney  or  Ridge  road,  came  from  the 
upper  Schuylkill  country,  and  was  located  between  that  river  and  Wis- 
sahickon  creek. 

The  British  camp  crossed  the  town  on  the  general  line  of  School- 
house  lane  and  the  Lime-kiln  road,  passing  the  Market-house. 

The  left  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen,  and 
the  troops  in  his  camp,  until  the  action  came  on,  consisted  of  seven 
British  and  three  Hessian  battalions,  and  the  mounted  and  dis 
mounted  chasseurs.  Generals  Stirn,  Grey  and  Agnew  were  in  this 
command,  although  General  Stirn  seems  to  have  been  subsequently 
transferred  to  the  right  of  the  road.  This  force  had  General  Grant  on 
the  right,  where  the  guards,  six  battalions  of  British  troops  and  two 
squadrons  of  dragoons  were  encamped  ;  there  being  no  distinct  centre, 
other  than  the  location  of  the  street  crossings,  to  the  south  of  which, 
within  half  a  mile,  General  Howe  had  his  headquarters  and  personal 
guard. 

The  chasseurs  rested  on  the  Schuylkill,  a  little  advanced,  as  a 
picket  guard  ;  and  on  the  first  alarm  the  two  battalions  of  Minnigerode 
were  detailed  to  their  support.  The  first  battalion  of  light  infantry 
25 


386  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777 

,vas  slightly  advanced  from  the  extreme  right,  and  the  Queen's  rangers 
were  thrown  beyond  the  Old  York  road  to  anticipate  an  attempt  to 
turn  the  right. 

The  Forty-ninth  British  regiment  was  pushed  up  Frankford  creek 
after  the  action  began,  and  some  sharp  skirmishing  ensued  near 
Lucan's  Mill,  upon  Greene's  advance.  At  the  head  of  the  street,  a 
mile  from  the  Market-house,  the  Second  battalion  of  light  infantry 
was  posted  with  advanced  pickets,  supported  by  the  Fortieth  regiment 
which  was  on  the  slope  westward,  out  of  the  main  street,  where  it 
commanded  a  clear  view  of  the  country  up  Wissahickon  creek.  As 
the  narrative  will  disclose  the  fact  that  the  extreme,  or  rather,  the 
detached  wings  of  the  American  army  failed  to  touch,  or  even  to 
approach,  the  corresponding  wings  of  the  British  army,  it  is  proper  to 
notice,  in  this  connection,  the  fact  that  the  British  reinforcements  sent 
to  the  left  wing  (where  the  chasseurs  were  advanced)  were  withdrawn 
when  the  action  became  general,  but  did  not  participate  in  the 
battle ;  and  the  Hessian  grenadiers  did  not  accompany  General  Grey 
when  he  made  his  subsequent  advance  movement  into  the  village 
itself.  The  Third  and  Fourth  brigades  marched  obliquely  forward  to 
the  right,  crossing  before  the  regiments  of  Du  Corps  and  Donop,  which 
had  been  designated  to  support  the  Fourth  brigade ;  but  these  regi 
ments,  General  Howe  states,  did  not  participate  in  the  action. 

General  Cornwallis,  early  apprised  of  the  American  attack  by  the 
artillery  firing  near  the  Chew  house,  brought  up  two  British  battalions, 
one  of  Hessian  grenadiers  "  on  the  run,"  and  one  squadron  of  dra 
goons,  and  joined  General  Grey  in  pursuit  of  the  column  of  General 
Greene  after  the  general  action  was  over. 

General  Howe  on  the  right,  with  Generals  Grant  and  Knyphau- 
sen  to  his  left,  made  their  advance  in  a  concave  order,  almost  envelop 
ing  Generals  Sullivan  and  Greene,  who  had  converged  toward  the 
Market-house  when  the  tide  of  battle  turned  in  British  favor. 

General  Howe  states  in  his  Narrative  that  "  he  was  not  surprised  :" 
— that,  u  the  enemy's  approach  was  discovered  by  our  patrols  and  I 
had  early  notice  of  it.  The  line  was  presently  under  arms,  and 
although  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  outposts  and  light  infantry  in 
one  quarter,  were  driven  back,  it  must  be  equally  admitted  that  they 
were  soon  effectually  supported,  and  the  enemy  was  repulsed  at  the 
only  place  where  the  smallest  impression  was  made." 

Sir  George  Osborne,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  states,  that  he  "  received  from  General  Howe, 


I777-]  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  387 

who  was  accompanied  by  his  aid-de-camp,  only  the  night  before,  the 
order  to  move  on  with  the  grenadiers  and  light  infantry  of  the  guards 
to  Major  Simcoe's  post,  about  half  a  mile  in  front  of  the  line  of  infantry, 
as  I  might  expect  the  enemy  at  daybreak  next  morning."  This  offi 
cer  adds,  "  The  firing  of  the  enemy  on  the  morning  of  the  attack  began 
exactly,  or  near  the  time  that  Sir  William  Howe  acquainted  me  the 
night  before,  it  would  do." 

Washington's  camp  was  near  Pennebeck  Mill,  twenty  miles  from 
Philadelphia.  Two-thirds  of  his  army  participated  in  the  movement 
upon  Germantown.  His  plan  was  to  occupy  the  four  roads  which 
more  or  less  directly  approached  General  Howe's  position,  and  to  make 
the  march  in  time,  first  to  bring  all  the  divisions  into  approximate 
positions,  then  to  give  them  rest,  and  make  a  combined  attack  at 
daybreak. 

The  troops  left  camp  at  seven  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  third, 
passed  Metuchen  Hill  about  nine  o'clock,  and  all  the  divisions  which 
accompanied  Washington  reached  their  halting  places,  obtained  their 
rest,  and  made  the  attack  on  time. 

Sullivan  and  Wayne,  with  Conway  in  advance  acting  as  a  flanking 
corps,  were  to  move  directly  over  Chestnut  Hill  and  enter  the  town. 

Maxwell  and  Nash,  under  Major-general  Stirling,  were  to  follow 
this  column  in  reserve. 

General  Armstrong  with  the  Pennsylvania  militia  was  sent  down 
the  Manatawny  road  to  cross  the  Wissahickon  creek,  and  fall  upon 
the  British  left  wing  and  rear. 

Greene  and  Stephen,  led  and  flanked' by  McDougall's  brigade, 
were  to  move  by  the  lime-kiln  road,  enter  the  village  at  the  Market- 
house,  and  attack  the  British  right  wing. 

Generals  Smalhvood  and  Forman  with  the  Maryland  and  New 
Jersey  militia  were  to  follow  the  Old  York  road  until  a  convenient 
opportunity  should  bring  them  upon  the  extreme  right  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy. 

Washington  accompanied  Sullivan's  division.  A  simplification  of 
the  subsequent  movements,  by  parts,  will  aid  in  reconciling  conflicting 
statements.  No  attempt  to  reconcile  reports  exactly  would  aid  in 
the  matter  ;  as  in  all  human  experience  a  diversity  of  statement,  ac 
cording  to  the  standpoint  of  observation,  is  invariable,  and  truth  is, 
found  in  the  main  features  of  the  combined  reports. 

General  Conway  led  the  way  into  the  town,  and  attacked  the  British 
pickets  who  were  stationed  north,  and  not  very  far  from  the  Allen 


388  OPERATIONS    NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777. 

House.     This  advance  picket  guard  was  promptly  supported  by  the 
British  light  infantry. 

General  Sullivan  brought  up  his  division  next,  and  crowded  the 
enemy  beyond  the  Allen  House. 

The  Fortieth  British  regiment,  Colonel  Musgrave,  moved  up  to  the 
support  of  the  light  infantry  as  indicated  on  the  map ;  and  according 
to  his  report,  finding  that  the  position  was  already  occupied  by  Ameri 
can  troops  in  force,  he  retired  down  the  main  street  fighting,  and  took 
his  stand  east  of  the  street  at  the  Chew  House,  a  stone  building  of 
considerable  strength  on  a  crowning  site.  Up  to  this  time  nothing 
had  been  heard  from  the  corps  of  Armstrong  or  Greene  ;  and  the  dis 
position  of  the  centre  had  to  be  made  independently  of  their  coopera 
tion,  and  was  modified  to  suit  the  state  of  facts. 

Conway  was  thrown  out  to  the  right,  on  the  slope  west  of  the  town, 
to  protect  that  flank  while  Sullivan  and  Nash  could  sweep  on  in  a  line, 
also  west  of  the  street,  towards  the  Market-house.  The  extreme 
advance  of  Sullivan  is  noted  on  the  map,  to  be  considered  irrespective 
of  intervening  incidents  in  point  of  time,  so  as  to  dispose  of  the  force 
division  by  division,  and  avoid  confusion. 

Wayne  was  ordered  by  Sullivan  to  take  the  slope  (as  Greene  did 
not  occupy  his  designated  position  there)  east  from  the  main  street, 
and  his  extreme  advance  is  also  noted ;  although  he  was  for  a  time 
recalled  during  the  firing  at  the  Chew  House.  One  regiment  from 
Wayne's  brigade,  and  one  from  Sullivan's  division,  however,  were  also 
placed  with  Conway  to  protect  the  right  flank,  as  the  protracted  delay 
of  Armstrong  endangered  the  advance.  The  whole  movement 
through  a  narrow  town  was  one  of  peculiar  exposure.  The  troops  of 
Sullivan  and  Wayne  passed  on  "  abreast,"  according  to  the  report  of 
the  former  officer.  Meanwhile,  Musgrave  on  his  retreat,  had  thrown 
six  companies  of  the  Fortieth  regiment  into  the  Chew  House,  had 
barricaded  the  window,  refused  to  surrender  on  demand,  and  kept  up 
a  vigorous  fire  upon  the  American  troops  near  by ;  while  Sullivan 
says  that  "  his  own  advance,  which  had  swept  past  the  Chew  House, 
was  resisted  constantly  at  every  fence,  wall,  ditch,  and  hedge."  Ad 
ditional  delay  occurred  from  tearing  up  fences  for  the  passage  of 
horses  and  artillery. 

Maxwell  was  next  brought  forward  with  Colonel  Knox,  and  two 
guns,  to  attempt  the  reduction  of  the  Chew  House.  Musgrave  suc 
cessfully  resisted  this  attack,  and  kept  them  from  advance  to  support 
the  other  troops  for  a  full  hour  or  more. 


I777-]  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  389 

Upon  the  arrival  of  Maxwell,  Wayne,  temporarily  recalled  as  before 
stated,  again  moved  to  the  front,  making  on  the  left  a  common  advance 
with  that  of  Sullivan  which  was  on  the  right  of  the  town. 

More  than  an  hour  certainly  had  passed  ;  the  division  commander* 
differing,  as  their  minds  were  differently  impressed,  when  Greene  was 
heard  from. 

His  division  shared  the  misapprehension  which  attended  the  dis 
charge  of  artillery  at  the  Chew  House,  as  the  deepening  fog  already 
confused  sight  and  confounded  sound.  General  Stephen  s  division 
moved  out  of  column,  being  on  the  west  side  of  the  Lime-kiln  road, 
without  waiting  for  orders  from  General  Greene,  followed  the  noise  of 
battle,  and  approached  the  village  just  south  of  the  Chew  House. 
Here,  unfortunately,  he  struck  the  rear  of  Wayne's  brigade,  and  mutual 
loss  was  incurred  by  each  mistaking  the  other  for  an  enemy ;  and 
their  part  in  the  action  was  practically  terminated.  As  Greene  ad 
vanced  on  the  east  side  of  the  Lime-kiln  road,  and  bore  toward  the 
Market-house,  he  was  obliged  to  countermarch  and  take  ground  to 
the  right,  westward,  to  avoid  the  extension  of  the  British  right  wing, 
which  was  already  advancing  to  envelop  the  American  troops.  He 
cleared  his  division,  passed  inside  of  the  enemy,  and  with  Scott's  and 
Muhlenberg's  brigades  approached  the  Market-house.  Colonel  Mat 
thews,  of  Virginia,  who  led  the  advance,  had  skirmished  all  the  way 
from  Lucan's  Mill,  and  had  taken  a  detachment  of  light  infantry 
prisoners.  It  will  be  seen  by  another  reference  to  the  map,  that 
Washington,  Sullivan,  and  Greene,  were  now  converging  upon  the 
supposed  British  centre,  and  that  their  action  was  in  accordance  with 
the  original  plan  of  attack,  crippled  in  its  execution  by  the  absence  of 
the  columns  which  should  have  been  at  work  upon  the  British  flanks 
and  rear,  and  embarrassed  by  various  incidents  which  had  placed  the 
commands  of  Maxwell,  Stephen,  and  Wayne  out  of  close  communi 
cation,  and  also  by  the  dense  fog  which  left  the  reserve  in  utter  con 
fusion  as  to  the  positions  of  the  troops  in  advance.  It  was,  however, 
united  in  the  resistance,  when  Washington  ordered  the  retreat.  Sul 
livan's  division  really  had  extra  assignment  of  duty  ;  expended  all  its 
ammunition,  and  began  to  feel  the  pressure  of  the  British  left  as  it 
swept  along  their  flank,  while  also  attacking  their  front.  His  two  aids- 
de-camp,  Majors  Sherbourne  and  White  were  killed,  as  well  as  Gen 
eral  Nash,  and  the  column  gave  back,  not  a  little  disturbed  in  its  for 
mation  by  exaggerated  rumors  of  losses  elsewhere.  Colonel  Matthews 
also  was  soon  enveloped ;  a  portion  of  his  men  were  captured  and  his 


3QO  OPERATIONS  NEAR    PHILADELPHIA.  [1777. 

prisoners  were  rescued.  The  retreat  became  general,  and  the  activity 
of  a  powerful  and  almost  invisible  enemy  quickened  that  retreat. 

The  artillery  was  brought  off  safely  and  the  troops  of  Wayne  and 
Greene  covered  the  forces  as  they  retired  through  town  and  by  the 
Lime-kiln  road. 

The  conduct  of  General  Stephen  was  submitted  to  a  military 
court  and  he  was  dismissed  on  the  charge  of  intoxication.  The  col 
lision  of  his  division  with  the  brigade  of  Wayne  does  not  necessarily 
involve  his  censure,  as  Wayne  was  in  an  unanticipated  position  by 
reason  of  the  delay  in  the  arrival  of  the  left  wing. 

General  Greene's  tardiness  was  incident  to  the  longer  route  taken, 
the  check  at  Lucan's  Mill,  and  the  nature  of  the  country  ;  and  possibly 
by  the  sudden  action  of  Stephen  in  abruptly  leaving  his  command. 
General  McDougall  shared  the  retreat,  but  gained  no  laurels.  Gen 
eral  Armstrong  states  in  his  letters  to  General  Gates  and  others,  that 
"  we  were  cannonading  from  the  heights  on  each  side  of  the  Wissa- 
hickon,"  "  was  called  to  join  the  General  "  "  we  proceeded  some  three 
miles,  directed  by  a  slow  fire  of  cannon,  until  we  fell  in  with  a  superior 
body  of  the  enemy,  with  whom  we  engaged  about  three-quarters  of 
an  hour,  but  their  grape  shot  and  ball  soon  intimidated  and  obliged  us 
to  retreat,  or  rather  file  off,"  "  loss  not  quite  twenty." 

The  affair  at  the  Chew  House  was  a  material  issue  in  the  battle, 
only  as  it  kept  troops  to  the  rear  ;  and  a  prompt  concert  of  action  on 
the  part  of  all  the  troops  on  duty,  according  to  the  original  order  of 
the  day,  would  probably  have  realized  success,  without  the  aid  of  Max 
well's  command.  It  was  a  diversion,  which  had  its  chief  importance 
through  the  erroneous  impressions  it  gave  of  the  positions  of  the  con 
tending  armies. 

It  is  not  a  correct  statement  that  the  whole  army  halted,  to  its 
prejudice,  "  rather  than  leave  a  fort  in  its  rear." 

Colonel  Knox  reported  that  "  the  action  lasted  two  hours  and 
forty  minutes,  by  his  watch ; "  and  this  estimate  is  confirmed  by 
other  authority. 

The  British  army  without  doubt  was  seriously  embarrassed,  if  not 
partially  disordered  by  the  suddenness  and  persistency  of  the  advance, 
and  was  satisfied  with  the  result. 

Washington  regained  Metuchen  Hill ;  and  General  Howe  returned 
to  Philadelphia. 

The  British  casualties  were  reported  at  five  hundred  and  thirty- 
hve,  including  General  Agnew  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Bird. 


I777-J  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  39! 

The  American  casualties  were  six  hundred  and  seventy-three, 
besides  prisoners,  estimated  at  four  hundred,  and  many  missing,  some 
of  whom  afterwards  regained  camp. 

Washington's  officers  had  been  divided  in  opinion  as  to  the 
prudence  of  this  attack  until  additional  troops  could  be  procured  ; 
but  there  are  few  operations  of  the  war  that  show  greater  skill  in 
design,  and  the  ease  with  which  a  victory  almost  achieved  is  more 
readily  lost,  than  the  Battle  of  Germantown. 

NOTE.  (Fourth  Edition}  Dr.  Alfred  C.  Lambdin,  of  Philadelphia,  carefully 
described  the  Battle  of  Germantown  in  a  Centennial  address,  since  published,  Vol.  I, 
Penn.  Hist.  Mag.,  pp.  368-403,  and  to  this  F.  D.  Stone,  Esq.,  Librarian  of  the  Penn. 
Hist.  Soc.,  also  resident  of  Germantown  and  familiar  with  the  country,  has  added 
valuable  notes.  The  Author  accompanied  Mr.  Stone  to  the  chief  localities  referred  to 
in  the  map. 

The  text,  on  page  388,  would  more  understandingly  read  as  follows  :  "  Wayne  was 
ordered  by  Sullivan  to  take  the  slope  east  from  the  main  street,  which  would  put  him 
in  line  with  the  right  of  Greene's  advance."  Practically,  the  movements  of  Greene  and 
Armstrong  were  independent  ;  because  the  country  was  so  rough  that  they  could  not 
unite  or  advance  with  the  center  column  as  a  compact  battle-front.  It  was  enough  if 
they  engaged  and  held  the  attention  of  the  opposing  British  commands.  The  right  of 
Greene  and  the  left  of  Armstrong  would  thereby  give  to  the  center  column  all  the 
support  of  real  association  in  line  of  battle  ;  that  is,  the  whole  enemy  would  be  engaged 
on  the  original  battle  plan.  Armstrong  seems  to  have  advanced  as  rapidly  as 
expected,  but  did  not  cross  the  Wissahicken,  neither  did  he  prevent  the  British  left 
wing  from  "  turning  front  to  the  village."  Hence,  the  regiment  from  Wayne's  brigade 
and  one  from  Sullivan's  division  (p.  388),  which  were  placed  with  Conway  on  the 
right  flank  in  the  advance,  were  indispensable  to  the  security  of  that  flank,  as  it  met 
increasing  resistance  from  the  British  line.  The  convergence  of  the  American  forces 
toward  the  Market  House,  brought  Greene  and  Wayne  into  close  concert  of  action, 
and  Armstrong  made  due  effort  to  reach  the  actual  final  field  of  decisive  action. 
Sullivan,  Armstrong,  Nash  and  Conway  were  therefore  near  School  House  Lane  upon 
the  west  of  town,  while  Greene  was  entering  on  the  east.  The  brief  halt  of  Wayne 
at  the  firing  before  the  Chew  House  was  probably  common  to  all  troops  beyond  it, 
until  its  occupation  and  the  firing  were  found  to  be  immaterial  factors  in  the  real 
issue.  Greene's  delay  was  because  he  met  the  enemy  before  he  reached  Lucans  Mill, 
the  objective  of  his  proposed  advance  ;  the  British  troops  having  advanced  during  the 
night.  General  Grey,  followed  by  General  Agnew,  undoubtedly  moved  by  the  right 
flank  into  the  main  street,  and  thus  followed  up  the  retreat  of  Sullivan.  General 
Agnew  was  shot  while  riding  at  the  head  of  his  column  in  this  street. 

NOTE.  (Fourth  Edition.}  Dr.  Lambdin  notes  the  fact  that  the  thirteen  colonies 
were  related  to  this  action.  "  New  Hampshire  gave  Sullivan  ;  Massachusetts,  Knox  ; 
Rhode  Island,  Greene  ;  New  York,  McDougall ;  New  Jersey,  Stirling  and  Wither- 
Jspoon  ;  Pennsylvania,  Wayne  ;  Maryland,  Small  wood  ;  Virginia,  Muhlenberg  and 
Matthews  ;  North  Carolina,  Nash ;  South  Carolina,  John  Laurens  and  Charles  Coles- 
worth  Pinckney;  Georgia,  Mclntosh  ;  Delaware  and  Connecticut,  each  a  regiment." 


CHAPTER  LII. 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELPHIA.    MINOR  MENTION.    CLOSE   OF 

CAMPAIGN,    1777. 

THE  battle  of  Germantown  which  demonstrated  the  tireless 
activity  and  nerve  of  Washington,  incited  foolish  expectations 
that  he  would  soon  rescue  Philadelphia  from  British  control.  When 
ever  the  promise  of  success  enlivened  the  public  spirits,  there  was  an 
instant  tendency  to  over-estimate  the  value  of  mere  courage  as  against 
thorough  discipline.  Nothing  seemed  too  exacting  at  such  times ; 
and  Congress  had  so  much  sympathy  with  clamorous  aspirants  for 
office,  that  the  life  of  Washington  is  more  memorable  for  his  calm 
faith  in  ultimate  results  and  the  dignity  of  his  contempt  for  jealousy 
and  intrigue,  from  whatever  source  it  emanated,  than  for  almost  any 
other  quality. 

The  consciousness  of  unselfish  devotion  to  duty  bore  him  up, 
when  the  spirit  of  mere  ambition  would  have  driven  many  leaders 
toward  a  dictatorship,  or  treason.  The  tidings  of  the  surrender  of 
Burgoyne  reached  him  on  the  eighteenth  of  October,  and  no  one  in 
America  more  cordially  congratulated  General  Gates  and  the  North 
ern  army,  upon  the  result.  The  secondary  fruits  of  the  personal 
honors  bestowed  upon  that  officer  were  however  prejudicial  to  army 
discipline  ;  for  they  put  the  impressive  result  of  that  campaign  in  con 
trast  with  the  slow,  so-called  "  Fabian  policy/'  of  the  Commander-in- 
chief.  This  spirit  of  exacting  criticism,  and  laudation  of  conspicuous 
deeds,  which  became  so  earnest  during  the  winter  of  1777-8  began  to 
declare  its  temper  as  soon  as  it  was  understood  that  Washington 
only  almost  defeated  Howe  at  Germantown.  The  thanks  for  that 
which  was  skillfully  devised,  soon  cooled  because  the  plan  failed  of 
complete  fruition. 

That  battle,  however,  satisfied  the  British  garrison  of  Philadelphia 


I777-]  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  393 

with  immediate  field  service.  The  next  matter  of  importance  was  to 
obtain  control  of  the  navigable  river  which  ran  past  the  post.  Its 
channel  was  obstructed  ;  and  the  American  authorities  regarded  those 
obstructions  as  substantially  complete. 

In  a  necessary  notice  of  the  closing  events  of  1/77,  the  reduction 
of  those  posts,  and  the  movements  of  the  army  until  it  went  into 
winter  quarters  at  Valley  Forge,  follow  in  natural  order. 

At  Billingsport  in  New  Jersey  (Byllinges  Point)  chevaux  de  frise 
obstructed  the  channel  of  the  Delaware.  Just  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Schuylkill,  and  within  cannon  range,  was  Mud  Island,  upon  which 
Fort  Mifflin  had  been  built.  Its  defenses  were  chiefly  directed 
toward  the  approach  from  the  Delaware  below  ;  and  the  rear  was 
provided  with  only  a  stockade  and  ditch,  with  two  block  houses  of 
comparatively  little  strength. 

On  the  opposite  shore,  known  as  Red  Bank,  Fort  Mercer  was 
located  ;  and  this  also  was  mainly  designed  for  river  defense.  The 
southern  portion  was  separated  from  the  northern  section  by  stout 
palisades,  a  ditch,  and  a  rampart,  so  as  to  have  considerable  strength , 
but  the  activity  of  Monseur  Duplessis,  engineer  in  charge,  had  been 
unequal  to  the  complete  protection  of  the  larger  area,  at  the  time 
when  the  British  demonstration  was  made  for  its  capture.  Chevaux 
de  frise  had  also  been  placed  in  the  channel  between  Red  bank  and 
Mud  Island ;  and  several  galleys  and  floating  batteries,  under  the 
direction  of  Commander  Hazlewood,  were  located  in  the  stream  for 
cooperation  in  defense. 

The  acquisition  of  these  posts,  and  the  removal  of  all  obstructions 
to  the  navigation  of  the  river,  had  been  resolved  upon  by  General 
Howe  ;  and  the  arrival  of  Admiral  Lord  Howe's  fleet  off  New  Castle, 
about  the  sixth  of  October,  increased  the  urgency  of  a  movement  to 
secure  free  communication  between  that  fleet  and  the  city. 

Washington  was  as  decided  in  his  purpose  to  maintain  these  posts. 
His  position  in  the  country  exercised  a  marked  restraint  upon  supplies 
for  the  garrison  of  Philadelphia,  and  his  control  of  the  river  kept  up 
easy  communication  with  New  Jersey. 

Colonel  Christopher  Greene,  already  noticed  for  a  prominent  part 
taken  in  Arnold's  expedition  to  Quebec,  was  assigned  to  the  defense 
of  Fort  Mercer,  with  a  detachment  of  troops  from  Rhode  Island,  his 
native  State.  Lieutenant-colonel  Smith,  of  Baltimore,  with  Maryland 
troops,  was  stationed  at  Fort  Mifflin.  These  garrisons  were  feeble  in 
numbers,  and  well  worn  by  extra  duty ;  but  Washington  reinforced 


394  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777. 

them  with  Continental  troops,  so  that  each  had  a  complement  of  four 
hundred  men.  A  detail  from  Angell's  Rhode  Island  regiment  was 
sent  to  Fort  Mercer,  and  a  portion  of  Greene's  Virginia  regiment 
joined  the  garrison  of  Fort  Mifflin. 

The  land  at  the  mouth  of  the  Schuylkill  was  marshy,  leaving  but 
two  points  sufficiently  solid  for  batteries  ;  and  these  General  Howe 
occupied.  Two  light  redoubts  were  then  thrown  up  on  the  northern 
part  of  Mud  Island,  which  was  low  and  grown  with  reeds,  as  an  offset 
to  these  batteries. 

The  first  demonstration  in  force  was  made  against  Fort  Mercer. 
The  grenadier  regiments  of  Donop,  Minnigerode,  and  Linsing,  Win- 
bach's  regiment  of  the  line,  and  the  infantry  chasseurs,  all  Hessian, 
having  their  own  guns,  viz.  eight  three  pounders  and  two  British 
howitzers,  were  detailed  to  this  attack  ;  while  the  naval  forces  of 
Admiral  Howe  were  relied  upon  to  act  in  concert  with  new  batteries 
then  being  erected  on  Province  Island,  opposite  Fort  Mifflin,  on  the 
Pennsylvania  shore. 

On  the  first  of  October,  Colonel  Sterling  crossed  the  river,  and 
without  serious  opposition  occupied  Billingsport ;  and  the  Roebuck 
frigate  broke  through  the  chevaux  de  frise  at  that  point,  making  a 
passage  wide  enough  to  admit  larger  ships. 

Colonel  Donop  crossed  Cooper's  Ferry,  at  Philadelphia,  on  the 
twenty-first  of  October,  was  interrupted  by  skirmishing  parties  at 
Timber  creek,  but  early  on  the  following  morning  suddenly  emerged 
from  the  woods  and  demanded  of  the  garrison  the  immediate  sur 
render  of  the  post. 

Upon  receiving  an  unequivocal  defiance,  he  organized  two  assaulting 
columns  for  simultaneous  advance  against  the  north  and  south  faces 
of  the  fort.  The  garrison  being  too  few  in  numbers  to  oppose  his 
whole  force,  in  the  unfinished  state  of  the  exterior  works,  retired  to 
the  interior  defenses ;  occupying  also  a  curtain  of  the  old  works,  which 
afforded  an  enfilading  fire  upon  any  storming  party  who  should  attempt 
the  stockade.  The  withdrawal  of  the  garrison  was  mistaken  for  want 
of  confidence  in  resistance  ;  and  the  assault  was  made  with  spirit  and 
a  brilliant  dash,  as  if  success  were  already  assured. 

That  resistance  was  overwhelming,  incessant,  and  deadly.  Colo 
nel  Donop  fell  mortally  wounded,  and  near  him  Lieutenant-colonel 
Minnigerode.  The  casualties  of  the  assailants  exceeded  four  hundred, 
being  one-third  of  their  number.  The  last  attempt  was  made  at  the 
escarpment  near  the  river,  which  exposed  the  column  to  fire  from  the 


I777-]  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  395 

galleys ;  and  in  less  than  an  hour  from  the  first  attack,  the  Hessians 
were  in  retreat. 

The  British  ships  accomplished  nothing.  The  Augusta  64,  and 
the  Merlin,  frigate,  grounded  ;  and  the  following  day  the  former  took 
fire  from  a  hot  shot  and  blew  up  before  her  whole  crew  could  escape, 
while  the  Merlin  was  burnt  to  prevent  her  capture. 

The  American  casualties  were  fourteen  killed  and  twenty-one 
wounded. 

Colonel  Donop  was  carefully  attended  by  Major  Fleury,  a  French 
engineer  in  the  American  service,  and  his  burial  place  at  the  south 
end  of  the  old  works  is  ever  an  object  of  interest  to  visitors. 

Colonel  Greene,  Lieutenant-colonel  Smith,  and  Commodore  Hazle- 
wood  received  testimonials  from  Congress  for  "  gallant  conduct." 

During  the  action,  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the  Schuylkill 
directed  their  fire  upon  Fort  Mifflin  ;  but  with  slight  result. 

On  the  tenth  of  November,  a  deliberate  attempt  upon  that  fort 
resulted  in  its  capture.  Four  thirty-two  pounder  guns  were  withdrawn 
from  the  Somerset  ;  six  twenty-four  pounders  from  the  Eagle,  and 
these,  with  one  thirteen  inch  mortar,  were  added  to  the  works  which 
had  been  erected  on  Province  Island,  to  bring  a  more  direct  fire  upon 
the  fort  than  could  be  secured  from  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Schuylkill.  The  following  ships,  some  of  which  are  familiar  from  their 
services  at  Boston,  Quebec,  and  New  York,  took  part  in  the  action, 
viz.,  the  Somerset,  68,  the  Isis,  50,  the  Roebuck,  44,  the  Pearl,  32,  the 
Liverpool,  frigate,  the  Cornwallis,  galley,  and  several  smaller  vessels. 
The  Vigilant,  1 6,  and  a  hulk  of  light  draft,  carrying  three  eighteen 
pounders,  took  a  position  in  the  channel  between  Province  Island  and 
the  fort,  and  sharp-shooters  from  their  tops  picked  ofT  the  gunners 
with  great  precision.  Commodore  Hazlewood  was  urged  to  assail 
them,  but  so  utterly  failed  to  cooperate  with  the  garrison,  as  to  more 
than  balance  his  good  conduct  before  Red  Bank.  Lieutenant-colonel 
Smith,  wounded  early  in  the  action,  was  removed  to  Fort  Mercer. 
Major  Thayer  succeeded  to  the  command.  Maior  Fleury,  the  en 
gineer  who  planned  the  works,  was  also  wounded  ;  and  after  a  loss  of 
two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  the  remnant  of  the  garrison,  on  the  night 
of  the  fifteenth,  retired  to  Fort  Mercer. 

The  British  loss  was  thirteen  killed  and  twenty-four  wounded. 
At  dawn  of  the  sixteenth,  the  grenadiers  of  the  Royal  Guards  occu 
pied  the  island. 

During  the  movements  preparatory  to  this  attack,  General  Wash- 


396  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1777 

ington  ordered  General  Varnum's  brigade  to  take  post  at  Woodbury, 
near  Red  Bank ;  and  General  Forman  was  also  directed  to  collect  as 
many  of  the  New  Jersey  militia  as  possible  for  the  same  purpose  ;  but 
no  attempt  was  made  by  the  British  to  land  upon  the  New  Jersey 
shore. 

In  Washington's  report  of  this  action  to  Congress,  he  says,  "  The 
defense  will  always  reflect  the  highest  honor  upon  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  garrison.  The  works  were  entirely  beat  down  ;  every 
piece  of  cannon  was  dismounted,  and  one  of  the  enemy's  ships  came 
so  near  that  she  threw  grenades  into  the  fort  and  killed  men  upon 
the  platforms,  from  her  tops,  before  they  quitted  the  island," 

On  the  eighteenth,  General  Cornwallis  landed  at  Billingsport  in 
force  ;  but  although  General  Washington  sent  General  Greene  to  take 
command  of  the  troops  in  New  Jersey  and  check  his  progress,  the 
demonstration  was  so  formidable  that  the  garrison  abandoned  the 
works  on  his  approach. 

The  Americans,  unable  to  save  their  galleys  and  other  armed  ves 
sels,  set  fire  to  them  near  Gloucester  Point ;  and  the  British  forces  had 
at  last  removed  the  obstructions  of  the  Delaware. 

Reference  is  made  to  the  map  "  Philadelphia  and  Vicinity,''  and 
*'  Operations  on  the  Delaware." 

During  this  movement,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  intrusted 
by  Greene,  with  a  detachment  of  troops  consisting  of  ten  light  horse, 
one  hundred  and  fifty  riflemen  and  a  few  militia. 

Colonels  Armand  and  Launney  and  the  Chevalier  Duplessis  and 
Gimat  were  also  with  him.  While  on  a  scout  toward  Red  Bank  in  the 
rear  of  the  army  of  Cornwallis,  he  fell  in  with  a  Hessian  force  of  three 
hundred  and  fifty  men  having  artillery,  and  drove  them  back  upon 
their  supports.  After  several  narrow  escapes  he  eluded  pursuit,  and 
joined  General  Greene  via  Haddonfield,  with  a  loss  of  only  one  man 
killed  and  six  wounded.  On  the  first  of  December  he  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  division  left  vacant  by  the  dismissal  of 
Stephen. 

At  the  same  time  four  general  officers  of  Washington's  army, 
against  eleven,  voted  to  take  advantage  of  the  absence  of  General 
Cornwallis  from  Philadelphia  to  attack  General  Howe. 

The  American  army  had  remained  near  Perkiomy  creek  until  late 
in  October,  when  it  advanced  to  White  Marsh.  General  Varnum's 
Rhode  Island  brigade  twelve  hundred  strong,  and  about  a  thousand 
additional  troops  from  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  Virginia  had 


396* 


1777.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELPHIA.  397 

arrived.  Generals  Gates  and  Putnam  unadvisedly  retained  troops  for 
their  semi-independent  commands ;  and  the  former  only  grudgingly 
sent  such  as  were  peremptorily  ordered.  He  had  already  taken  active 
part  in  movements  which  reflected  upon  Washington  as  Commander- 
in-chief,  and  it  required  the  personal  visit  of  Colonel  Hamilton,  before 
he  would  dispatch  the  troops  which  were  absolutely  indispensable  at 
headquarters,  and  as  absolutely  useless  at  Albany.  The  history  of 
the  "  Conway  Cabal"  is  omitted  ;  but  the  general  fact  is  noteworthy, 
as  it  furnished  to  the  British  commander  an  element  of  strength,  in 
proportion  as  it  weakened  the  army  and  influence  of  Washington. 

On  the  fourth  of  December  General  Howe,  with  a  force  of  fourteen 
thousand  men  and  accompanied  by  Lieutenant-generals  Cornwallis 
and  Knyphausen  advanced  to  Chestnut  Hill,  within  three  miles  of  the 
right  of  the  American  army,  and  on  the  fifth  advanced  the  Second 
battalion  and  part  of  the  First  light  infantry  battalion,  under  Lieuten 
ant-colonel  Abercrombie,  to  feel  the  position.  A  sharp  skirmish 
ensued,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Americans,  resulting  in  the  capture 
of  General  James  Irvine,  and  a  small  loss  to  both  parties. 

On  the  seventh,  the  British  army  left  Chestnut  Hill  and  took  a 
position  on  Edge  Hill,  near  the  American  left.  General  Morgan, 
only  just  arrived  from  the  Northern  department,  with  his  corps,  and 
the  Maryland  militia1  under  Colonel  Mordecai  Gist,  had  "  a  sharp  con 
flict  with  the  First  battalion  of  light  infantry,  and  Thirty-third  regiment 
under  General  Cornwallis,  resulting  in  a  loss  to  the  Americans  of  forty- 
four,  and  at  least  an  equal  loss  to  the  British  troops.  Major-general 
Grey  and  the  Queen's  Rangers,  the  Hessian  chasseurs  and  one  brigade 
of  British  regulars  made  some  impression  upon  the  left  wing,  inflict 
ing  a  loss  of  about  fifty  men  :  and  both  armies  prepared  for  a  general 
action,  the  British  pickets  having  been  advanced  within  half  a  mile  of 
the  American  lines. 

General  Howe  says,  in  his  report  of  December  thirteenth,  u  Upon 
the  presumption  that  a  forward  movement  might  tempt  the  enemy, 
after  receiving  such  a  reinforcement  (reported  afterwards  of  four  thou 
sand  men)  to  give  battle  for  the  recovery  of  this  place  (Philadelphia) 
or  that  a  vulnerable  part  might  be  found  to  admit  of  an  attack  upon 
their  camp,  the  army  marched  out  on  the  night  of  the  fourth  inst." 

General  Washington  says,  "  I  sincerely  wish  that  they  had  made 
the  attack,  as  the  issue,  in  all  probability,  from  the  disposition  of  our 
troops  and  the  strong  position  of  our  camp,  would  have  been  fortunate 
and  happy.  At  the  same  time  I  must  add,  that  reason,  prudence  and 


OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  1777 

every  principle  of  policy,  forbade  us  quitting  our  post  to  attack  them 
Nothing  but  success  would  have  justified  the  measure  ;  and  this  could 
not  be  expected  from  their  position." 

On  the  eighth  General  Howe  abandoned  his  camp  and  returned 
to  Philadelphia. 

The  army  of  Washington,  nominally  eleven   thousand  strong,  is 
stated  by  Baron  De  Kalb  to  have  had  at  that  time  but  seven  thou 
sand   effective  men   present   for  duty ;  so  general  was  the  sickness, 
owing  to  the  extreme  cold  and  the  want  of  suitable  clothing  and  other 
necessaries  of  a  campaign. 

There  were  not  wanting  officers,  as  well  as  leading  civilians,  who 
persistently  pressed  an  immediate  attempt  to  recapture  Philadelphia. 

Of  the  officers  most  officiously  antagonistic  to  Washington,  several 
were  placed  in  high  positions  by  Congress. 

On  the  sixth  of  November  Wilkinson,  aid-de-camp   of  Gates,  had 
been  made  Brigadier-general ;  and  on   the   twenty-seventh  Gates  was 
made  President   of  the   Board  of  War.     Mifflin,  withdrawn  from  his 
duties  as  Quartermaster-general,  but  retaining  his  rank  as  Major-gen 
eral,  was  also  placed  on  the  Board. 

On  the  twenty-eighth  of  December,  Congress  appointed  Conway 
Inspector-general  and  Major-general,  and  placed  him  in  communication 
with  the  Board  of  War,  to  act  independently  of  the  Commander-in- 
chief.  Lee,  then  a  prisoner  at  New  York,  through  letters,  united  with 
Gates,  Mifflin,  Wayne  and  Conway,  to  oppose  Washington's  policy  and 
dictate  his  action ;  and  more  than  that,  there  was  a  strong  influence 
thereby  exerted  to  compel  his  resignation  or  removal. 

On  the  nineteenth  of  December  Washington  went  into  winter 
quarters  at  Valley  Forge,  twenty-one  miles  from  Philadelphia.  On 
the  same  day,  a  detachment  under  General  Smallwood  was  sent  to 
Wilmington  to  occupy  the  country  south  of  Philadelphia  to  control 
supplies  for  that  city,  and  to  be  generally  useful  in  that  quarter. 
McDougall  was  at  Peekskill,  and  Putnam  was  on  the  shore  of  Long 
Island  Sound  near  New  York  until  nearly  the  middle  of  December, 
when  he  was  ordered  back  to  the  Highlands. 

The  absence  of  Mifflin  from  the  army  and  his  neglect  of  his  duties 
as  Quartermaster-general,  caused  the  "  want  of  two  days'  supply  of  pro 
visions;  and  thereby  cost,"  said  Washington,  "an  opportunity  scarce 
ly  ever  offered  of  taking  an  advantage  of  the  enemy."  Washington 
reported,  December  twenty-third,  that  "  two  thousand  eight  hundreC 
and  ninety-eight  men  were  unfit  for  duty,  because  barefoot  and  other 


I777-]  OPERATIONS   NEAR  PHILADELPHIA.  399 

wise  naked."     "  The  numbers   had    decreased   two  thousand,    from 
hardships  and  exposure  in  three  weeks,"  (from  the  fourth  of  Decem 
ber.)     "  Only  eight  thousand  two  hundred  men  were  present  fit  for 
duty,"  adding,  "we  have  not  more  than  three  months  in  which  to 
prepare  a  great  deal  of  business.     If  we  let  them  slip,  or  waste,  we 
shall  be  laboring  under  the  same  difficulties  all  next  campaign  as  we 
have  been  this,  to  rectify  mistakes  and  bring  things  to  order.     Mili 
tary  arrangements  and  movements,  in  consequence,  like  the  mechan 
ism  of  a  clock,  will  be  imperfect  and   disordered   by  the  want  of  a 
part." 

To  the  remonstrances  of  the  Assembly  of  Pennsylvania  and  others 
against  his  going  into  winter  quarters,  he  says,  "  Gentlemen  reprobate 
the  going  into  winter  quarters  as  much  as  if  they  thought  the  soldiers 
were  made  of  sticks,  or  stones.  I  can  assure  those  gentlemen  that  it 
is  a  much  easier  and  less  distressing  thing  to  draw  remonstrances  in  a 
comfortable  room,  than  to  occupy  a  cold  bleak  hill,  and  sleep  under 
frost  and  snow,  without  clothes  or  blankets.  However,  although  they 
seem  to  have  little  feeling  for  the  naked  and  distressed  soldiers,  I  feel 
superabundantly  for  them,  and  from  my  soul  I  pity  their  miseries 
which  it  is  neither  in  my  power  to  relieve  or  prevent." 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  December,  General  Sullivan,  who  appa 
rently  kept  aloof  from  active  participation  in  the  movements  of 
intriguing  officers,  urged  Washington  to  make  an  attempt  upon  Phila 
delphia,  and  u  risk  every  consequence  in  an  action." 

Nothing  moved  Washington  to  depart  from  his  matured  plans, 
and  on  the  thirty-first  of  December,  1777,  his  army  was  still  building 
huts  and  struggling  for  life  at  Valley  Forge. 

De  Kalb  had  been  made  Inspector-general  the  day  before,  vice 
Conway  resigned. 

During  the  year  thus  closed,  the  American  privateers  and  vessels 
had  made  nearly  four  hundred  captures,  and  Commodore  Nicholas 
Biddle  had  gained  great  credit  in  handling  the  Randolph  frigate  in  its 
disastrous  collision  with  the  Yarmouth  64.  A  brief  rtsumt  of  the 
disposition  of  the  American  ships  of  war  built  during  the  struggle,  will 
be  found  at  the  close  of  the  campaign  of  1781. 

The  two  events  of  the  campaign  of  1777,  which  made  the  pro- 
foundest  impression  upon  European  States,  were  the  surrender  of 
Burgoyne  and  the  battle  of  Germantown.  News  of  the  former  occur 
rence  reached  London  on  the  second  of  December.  The  language  of 
Fox  was  eminently  wise  ;  "  If  no  better  terms  can  be  had,  I  would 


400  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA. 

treat  with  them  as  allies  ;  nor  do  I  fear  the  consequence  of  their  inde 
pendence."  With  sarcastic  wit,  he  alleged  that  "  the  ministry  had 
mistaken  the  extent  of  the  colonies,  and  considered  Massachusetts  as 
including  the  whole." 

It  was  evident  that  the  seed  sown  by  the  employment  of  Euro 
pean  mercenaries,  as  predicted  by  the  Duke  of  Richmond  (page  172), 
would  bear  unexpected  fruit,  and  that  America  would  find  in  France 
abundant  aid.  The  previous  purchase  of  arms  had  not  been  kept 
secret,  and  it  was  evident  that  only  an  occasion  was  wanting  for  an 
open  declaration  of  sympathy  with  the  United  States. 

The  Duke  of  Richmond  again  advocated  peace,  and  on  the  terms 
of  "  Independence,  and  such  an  alliance  or  federal  union  as  would  be 
for  the  mutual  interests  of  both  countries."  Lord  North,  already 
worn  out  in  his  country's  service,  and  Burke,  were  solemnly  impressed 
with  the  conviction  that  "  peace  upon  any  honorable  terms  was  in 
justice  due  to  both  nations." 

The  king  unwisely  adjourned  Parliament  to  the  twentieth  of 
January. 

A  ship  from  Boston  made  a  quick  passage  to  France,  and  the 
news  from  America  made  a  profound  sensation  at  Paris.  At  an  inter 
view  of  the  American  Commissioners  with  Count  de  Vergennes,  Min 
ister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  on  the  twelfth  of  December,  that  gentleman 
in  speaking  of  the  report  of  the  battle  of  Gerrnantown,  just  received, 
said,  "  Nothing  has  struck  me  so  much  as  General  Washington  attack 
ing  and  giving  battle  to  General  Howe's  army.  To  bring  troops, 
raised  within  the  year,  to  do  this,  promises  everything."  Couriers 
were  sent  to  Spain  to  solicit  her  cooperation,  as  already,  without  real 
sympathy  with  America,  she  had  discriminated  in  favor  of  American 
privateers  which  took  prizes  to  her  ports.  Without  waiting  for  reply, 
on  the  seventeenth  of  Decemb9r,  just  when  Washington  was  about 
conducting  his  weary  and  well  worn  army  to  their  winter  huts,  for 
partial  shelter  and  rest ;  while  his  own  spirit  was  pained  by  the  small 
jealousies  which  impaired  the  value  of  his  services,  and  threatened  the 
harmony  of  his  command,  there  was  warming  up  across  the  ocean  a 
new  ally  and  friend,  and  the  power  and  prestige  of  France  were 
about  to  drop  into  the  scales  for  the  vindication  and  accomplishment 
of  American  liberty.  On  that  day  Gerard,  one  of  the  secretaries  of 
Count  de  Vergennes,  informed  Franklin  and  Dean  by  the  king's  order, 
that  "  the  king  in  council  had  determined,  not  only  to  acknowledge,  but 
to  support  American  Independence." 


CHAPTER   LIII. 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELPHIA  FROM  JANUARY  TO  JUNE,  1778, 
VALLEY  FORGE.     BARREN   HILL. 

THE  American  army  wintered  at  Valley  Forge,  and  did  not 
materially  change  its  position  until  the  evacuation  of  Philadel 
phia  in  June  ensuing. 

The  months  were  full  of  self-sacrifice  and  real  suffering  on  the  part 
of  the  troops ;  while  the  British  army  enjoyed  a  considerable  share 
of  city  comfort  and  social  entertainment.  One  army  lived  in  huts, 
and  depended  upon  forced  contributions  from  the  country  people  for 
their  scanty  food,  until  Washington  shrank  from  so  arbitrary  an  exer 
cise  of  necessary  authority ;  while  the  other  army  had  good  quarters, 
abundant  clothing,  and  such  food  and  fuel  as  money  could  purchase 
in  a  restricted  market.  One  army  was  drilling  daily  under  Baron 
Steuben,  to  learn  the  rudiments  of  military  service,  so  far  as  shoes 
and  clothing  could  be  provided  ;  while  their  comrades  sat  or  lay  down 
by  burning  stumps  and  logs  to  escape  freezing  to  death.  The  other 
army,  according  to  Stedman  and  contemporaneous  historians,  enliv 
ened  the  dull  times  with  the  "  dance-house,  the  theatre,  and  the 
game  of  faro." 

One  of  General  Howe's  inactive  intervals  had  arrived.  Philadel 
phia,  resting  on  a  sufficient  fleet,  was  not  treated  as  a  base  of  opera 
tions,  but  as  snug  and  agreeable  winter  quarters.  The  chief  activities 
of  war  were  suspended.  The  license  which  an  idle  garrison  life  invari 
ably  evokes,  began  to  arouse  popular  hatred  ;  and  the  conduct  of 
many  commissioned  officers  was  as  blameworthy  as  that  of  the  troops. 

The  occupation  of  the  city,  instead  of  a  camp  in  the  field,  actually 
restricted  all  valuable  field  service  ;  because  a  sufficient  garrison  had 
to  be  retained  to  ward  off  attack.  The  scouting  parties  from  Wash 
ington's  camp,  even  at  midwinter,  gave  warning  that  he  was  alive  and 

watchful ;  while  their  continual  success   in  cutting   off  supplies  from 
26 


402  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1778. 

the  country  as  clearly  indicated  that  the  military  occupation  was 
simply  within  its  picket  lines. 

General  Howe  stated,  that  he  "  did  not  attack  the  intrenched  sit 
uation  at  Valley  Forge,  a  strong  point  during  the  severe  season, 
although  everything  was  prepared  with  that  intention,  judging  it 
imprudent  until  the  season  should  afford  a  prospect  of  reaping  the 
advantages  that  ought  to  have  resulted  from  success  in  that  measure, 
but  having  good  information  in  the  spring  that  the  enemy  had  strength 
ened  the  camp  by  additional  works,  and  being  certain  of  moving  him 
from  thence,  when  the  campaign  should  open,  he  dropped  thoughts 
of  an  attack." 

Reference  is  made  to  map  "  Encampment  at  Valley  Forge,"  copied 
substantially  from  that  of  Sparks,  for  an  outline  of  the  defensive 
position  of  Washington. 

After  the  camp  was  occupied,  it  seemed  as  if  the  quasi  antagonism 
to  the  Commander-in-chief  began  to  fade  out,  month  by  month.  It 
drew  no  breath  from  popular  sympathy,  and  in  spite  of  sickness,  death, 
wretchedness  and  desertion,  the  soldiers  were  kept  to  duty  and  ac 
quired  toughness  and  spirit  for  future  endeavor.  A  calm  reliance 
upon  the  future,  a  strong  will,  and  a  straightforward  method  of  deal 
ing  with  men  and  measures,  vindicated  Washington's  fitness  for  the 
supreme  command. 

During  this  period  a  diversion  into  Canada  was  proposed  with 
General  La  Fayette  in  chief  command.  That  officer  accompanied  by 
General  the  Baron  De  Kalb,and  about  twenty  French  officers,  went  as 
far  as  Albany,  to  inspect  the  preparations  said  to  have  been  made  for 
the  expedition. 

The  army  of  General  Gates  had  been  previously  withdrawn,  and 
these  officers  found  that  less  than  a  thousand  effective  men  had  been 
concentrated,  and  that  neither  clothing,  provisions,  nor  transportation 
had  been  furnished.  Generals  Conway  and  Stark  were  also  assigned 
on  this  duty.  To  the  latter  was  intrusted  the  destruction  of  the 
British  vessels  at  St.  John's,  and  three  thousand  troops  had  been 
pledged  for  La  Fayette's  advance,  and  reported  by  General  Gates  as 
disposable.  Stark  could  only  send  back  the  inquiry,  "  What  am  I  to 
do  ?  "  "  And  what  troops  am  I  expected  to  raise  ?  "  He  had  nothing 
to  do  with,  and  this  winter  enterprise,  initiated  by  the  Board  of  War 
and  approved  by  Congress,  culminated  in  failure  even  to  organize. 

La  Fayette  was  not  yet  twenty-one  years  of  age,  and  at  first  felt 
some  enthusiasm  in  an  attempt  to  make  the  conquest  of  Canada,  the 


1773.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELPHIA.  403 

former  possession  of  France ;  but  independently  of  the  summary 
severance  of  his  connection  with  Washington,  which  was  made  with 
out  consulting  the  Commander-in-chief,  he  soon  discovered  the  folly 
of  the  enterprise. 

During  January  a  committee  from  Congress  visited  Washington  at 
Valley  Forge,  and  obtained  some  idea  of  his  condition  and  necessities. 
On  their  return  they  recommended  the  adoption  of  his  suggestions 
for  the  thorough  reorganization  of  the  army,  both  militia  and  regular, 
in  respect  of  all  elements  of  enlistment,  outfit,  and  supply.  Skirmish 
ing  was  frequent  as  well  as  forays  in  pursuit  of  horses ;  and  yet  the 
men  themselves  did  the  greater  part  of  hauling  logs  for  huts  and  fuel, 
and  they  were  severely  tasked  to  maintain  life  and  love  of  life. 

The  arrival  of  Baron  Steuben  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  February 
was  a  new  element  entirely,  and  it  put  the  men  at  such  work  as  stimu 
lated  their  zeal  and  enhanced  their  confidence  in  their  capacity  to 
become  soldiers.  Officers  and  men  alike  were  placed  under  the  rigid 
training  of  this  veteran  martinet.  He  was  the  man  for  the  hour  ; 
and  the  effects  of  his  stern  discipline  and  exacting  drill  were  of  per 
manent  value.  Although  he  volunteered  his  services,  he  soon  received 
an  appointment  as  Major-general,  with  this  extraordinary  bonus 
added,  that  it  was  given  "  without  dissent  or  murmur." 

In  April  Conway  resigned,  and  went  to  France. 

On  the  fourth,  Congress  authorized  Washington  to  call  upon 
Pennsylvania.  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey,  for  five  thousand  militia. 

On  the  ninth,  General  Howe  received  his  recall  to  England,  and 
began  to  arrange  for  his  departure. 

On  the  tenth,  La  Fayette  was  again  in  camp. 

On  the  thirteenth,  General  McDougall,  assisted  by  Kosciusko,  was 
busy  at  West  Point,  to  make  it  the  point  of  resistance  to  any  further 
movements  up  the  Hudson.  General  Gates  was  placed  in  command 
at  Fishkill  on  the  fifteenth.  On  the  fourteenth,  instead  of  reinforce 
ments  of  troops.  Lord  North's  Conciliatory  Bills  reached  New  York,  and 
were  published  by  Governor  Tryon  the  next  day.  They  maddened 
the  British  troops,  incited  mutiny,  conciliated  nobody  and  failed  to 
modify  the  war. 

Officers  of  the  American  army  began  to  make  plans  for  the  ensu 
ing  campaign.  Various  objectives  were  presented,  and  opinions 
greatly  differed.  It  is  proper  to  place  them  on  record,  so  that  other 
differences  with  the  Commander-in-chief  may  be  more  readily  left  to 
their  individual  merits. 


404  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1778. 

Wayne,  Patterson  and  Maxwell  recommended  Philadelphia ; 
Knox,  Poor,  Varnum  and  Muhlenberg  advised  New  York;  Greene 
advised  an  attack  upon  New  York  with  four  thousand  regulars  and 
the  Eastern  militia,  under  Washington  in  person,  leaving  Lee  to  com 
mand  in  Pennsylvania,  while  the  main  army  should  remain  at  Valley 
Forge ;  Stirling  proposed  operations  against  both  cities ;  while  La 
Fayette,  Steuben  and  Duportail  had  doubts  as  to  any  attack  until 
the  army  should  be  strengthened,  or  the  British  army  indicate  its 
plans.  This  opinion  was  also  that  of  General  Washington. 

On  the  seventh  of  May  the  British  ascended  the  Delaware  and 
destroyed  public  stores  at  Bordentown. 

General  Maxwell  had  been  sent  to  their  protection  as  soon  as  the 
expedition  was  under  way,  but  his  movements  were  retarded  by 
heavy  rains,  and  he  failed  to  be  in  time  to  prevent  the  damage.  A 
force  under  General  Dickinson  had  been  in  that  vicinity  also,  but  it 
was  too  small  to  oppose  the  British  troops.  Several  frigates  and 
forty-four  vessels,  altogether,  shared  the  fate  of  the  stores. 

The  seventh  day  of  May,  1778,  was  not  entirely  a  day  of  gloom  for 
the  American  army,  then  encamped  at  Valley  Forge.  The  breath  of 
spring  quickened  nature,  and  the  forest  began  to  stir  and  bud  for  its 
next  campaign. 

So  the  breath  of  Heaven  bore  a  French  frigate,  La  Sensible,  36 
guns,  to  Falmouth  Harbor  (Portland)  Maine,  and  there  landed  from 
her  deck  a  herald  of  France,  and  he  proclaimed  an  armed  alliance 
between  his  country  and  the  United  States. 

On  the  seventh  of  May,  at  nine  o'clock,  A.  M.,  the  American  army 
was  on  parade.  Drums  beat  and  cannon  were  fired,  as  if  for  some 
victory.  It  was  a  day  of  jubilee,  a  rare  occurrence  for  the  times  and 
place. 

The  brigades  were  steady,  but  not  brilliant  in  their  formation. 
Uniforms  were  scarce.  Many  feet  were  bare.  Many  had  no  coats. 
Some  wore  coats  made  of  the  remnants  of  their  winter  blankets. 
The  pomp  and  circumstance  of  war  was  wanting.  Strongly  marked 
faces,  good  muscle,  and  vigorous  action  were  to  be  discovered  ;  but 
there  was  no  such  surpassing  display  of  extrinsic  splendor  as  enlivened 
Philadelphia,  only  eleven  days  later. 

There  was  no  review  by  general  officers,  with  a  well  appointed 
staff.  Few  matrons  and  few  maidens  looked  on.  There  stood  before 
each  brigade  its  chaplain.  God's  ambassador  was  made  the  voice  to 
explain  this  occasion  of  their  expenditure  of  greatly  needed  powder 


1778.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELPHIA.  405 

The  Treaty  of  Alliance  was  read,  and  in  solemn  silence  the  American 
army  at  Valley  Forge  united  in  Thanksgiving  to  Almighty  God  that 
he  had  given  them  one  friend  on  earth. 

One  theme  was  universal :  and  it  flutters  yet  in  the  breasts  of 

millions : 

"  Praise  God  from  whom  all  blessings  flow." 

Huzzas  for  the  king  of  France,  for  Washington  and  the  Republic, 
with  caps  tossed  high  in  air,  and  a  rattling  fire  through  the  whole 
line,  terminated  the  humble  pageant. 

With  the  opening  spring  General  Howe  found  himself  constrained 
to  send  detachments  for  supplies  and  forage,  which  became  scarce 
in  proportion  as  Washington's  army  infested  the  country.  Colonel 
Mawhood  and  Major  Simcoe  engaged  a  militia  force  under  Colonel 
Holmes,  at  Quinton's  Bridge  near  Salem,  New  Jersey,  on  the 
eighteenth  of  March,  with  little  credit  and  little  plunder.  On 
the  twenty-first  of  March  another  expedition,  under  Major  Simcoe, 
accompanied  by  Colonel  Mawhood,  engaged  the  militia  at  Han 
cock's  Bridge,  five  miles  south  of  Salem,  and  the  incidents,  as 
recorded  in  Simcoe's  own  Journal,  are  not  to  his  credit.  On  the  first 
of  May  Lieutenant-colonel  Abercrombie,  with  Major  Simcoe,  engaged 
militia  under  General  Lacey,  at  the  Crooked  Billet,  in  Montgomery, 
Pennsylvania,  inflicting  some  loss,  but  gathering  neither  food  nor 
forage. 

To  cut  off  and  restrict  these  detachments,  Washington,  on  the 
eighteenth  of  May,  advanced  General  La  Fayette,  with  twenty-one 
hundred  chosen  troops  and  five  pieces  of  artillery  to  Barren  Hill,  about 
half  the  distance  toward  Philadelphia.  His  orders  gave  him  com 
mand  over  all  outposts  and  skirmishing  detachments,  contemplated  the 
contingency  of  an  early  evacuation  of  Philadelphia  by  the  British  army, 
and  with  caution  as  to  prudence  in  taking  his  positions  and  risking 
doubtful  movements,  conferred  large  authority  and  discretion  in  the 
execution  of  his  instructions. 

It  was  practically  a  corps  of  observation,  and  it  was  the  first  really 
independent  command  of  La  Fayette,  as  a  Major-general.  The 
execution  of  his  trust  illustrates  those  peculiar  traits  of  his  character 
which  had  early  attracted  the  favor  of  Washington,  won  his  respect, 
and  gradually  deepened  into  an  attachment  almost  paternal  in  its 
depth  and  endurance.  The  American  Commander-in-chief,  however 
reticent  of  his  opinions,  rarely  failed  to  read  men.  He  read  La  Fay 
ette.  With  singular  enthusiasm,  great  purity  of  character  and  pur- 


406  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1778. 

pose,  unswerving  fidelity  to  obligation,  and  thorough  contempt  for 
the  mean  or  dishonorable,  this  young  French  gentleman,  now  Major- 
general,  combined  a  quick  sagacity,  sound  judgment  and  quick  execu 
tion. 

Reference  is  made  to  map  "  La  Fayette  at  Barren  Hill."  '  The 
site  for  his  camp  was  well  selected.  A  steep,  rocky  ledge  was  on  the 
right  toward  the  Schuylkill  as  well  as  to  the  front  where  his  guns  were 
placed.  Captain- McLean's  light  troops  and  fifty  Indian  scouts  were 
just  below,  near  the  Ridge  road,  and  pickets  were  still  further  advanced 
on  the  road  and  in  the  woods.  To  the  left  was  a  dense  forest,  and 
just  on  its  edge  there  were  several  stone  houses  well  capable  of  defense. 
Six  hundred  Pennsylvania  militia  under  General  Potter  were  posted 
on  the  Whitemarsh  road.  The  sudden  retreat  of  this  body  without 
notice  or  reporting  their  action,  very  nearly  involved  his  command  in 
a  conflict  with  more  than  double  its  force.  At  the  forks  of  the  two 
roads  there  was  a  stone  church  in  a  burying  ground  which  was 
inclosed  by  a  stone  fence  ;  and  La  Fayette  established  his  headquar 
ters  close  by. 

General  Clinton  had  already  relieved  General  Howe  from  the 
command  at  Philadelphia.  Five  thousand  British  troops  were  ordered 
to  surprise  the  American  camp  at  Barren  Hill,  and  Generals  Grant 
and  Erskine  were  associated  in  the  attempt.  This  command  marched 
early  on  the  morning  of  May  nineteenth  by  the  Lime-kiln  and  old 
York  roads,  and  very  early  the  next  morning  passed  Whitemarsh,  where 
it  changed  direction  to  the  left  toward  Barren  Hill,  with  the  design 
of  cutting  off  La  Fayette's  retreat  by  Swede's  Ford.  General  Grey 
with  two  thousand  men  crossed  the  Schuylkill  and  marched  along  its 
west  bank  to  a  point  about  three  miles  below  Barren  Hill  to  be  in 
readiness  to  act  in  concert  with  the  other  detachments.  General 
Clinton  with  a  third  division  marched  by  Chestnut  Hill,  and  up  the 
Manatawny  road  to  make  enclosure  of  La  Fayette's  command  within 
their  enveloping  forces  the  more  secure.  The  plan  was  skillfully 
conceived.  While  General  La  Fayette,  as  he  states,  was  conversing 
with  a  young  lady  then  on  her  way  to  Philadelphia,  (ostensibly  to 
visit  friends,  but  really  to  obtain  information)  he  was  notified  that 
red  uniforms  had  been  seen  in  the  woods,  near  the  road  from  White- 
marsh  to  Swede's  Ford,  in  his  rear.  One  hundred  dragoons  had  been 
ordered  to  join  him.  They  had  scarlet  uniforms  and  his  first  impres 
sion  was  that  they  were  close  at  hand.  To  assure  himself,  he  imme 
diately  sent  scouts  into  the  woods  and  learned  the  real  facts.  He 


:773.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA. 

changed  front  immediately,  occupied  the  church,  burying  ground  and 
all  strong  points,  and  then  "  made  a  display  of  false  heads  of  columns," 
as  if  preparing  to  advance  promptly  upon  the  enemy.  General  Grant 
halted  his  advance  guard  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  whole  division, 
before  engaging  with  the  American  troops.  The  British  column  then 
on  the  Ridge  road,  also  halted,  and  waited  for  assurance  that  the 
right  had  really  reached  La  Fayette's  rear  ;  and  this  was  to  be  deter 
mined  by  an  actual  attack. 

A  country  road  ran  from  the  church  directly  under  Barren  Hill  to 
Matson's  Ford,  which  was  very  little  further  from  Valley  Forge  than 
Swede's  Ford.  This  road  was  entirely  hidden  from  view  by  the  hill. 
The  British  right  rested  at  the  crossing  of  the  two  principal  roads  to 
both  fords  ;  and  as  will  appear  from  the  map,  they  were  nearer  to 
Matson's  Ford  than  La  Fayette  was;  but  supposed  that  they  con 
trolled  all  approaches. 

General  Poor  was  ordered  to  lead  the  retreat,  and  La  Fayette 
brought  up  the  rear.  The  troops  retired  in  order  and  so  promptly 
that  the  main  body  crossed  the  ford  and  occupied  high  and  com 
manding  ground  as  tne  British  vanguard  learned  of  the  movement, 
and  pressed  on  in  pursuit.  As  the  last  troops  crossed,  a  brisk  skirmish 
ensued  over  the  guns,  which  were  the  last  to  follow  ;  but  the  retreat 
was  perfected  and  the  guns  were  saved. 

General  Washington  had  a  distinct  view  of  the  British  movement 
as  it  advanced,  and  fired  alarm  guns  to  warn  La  Fayette  ;  but  the  wis 
dom,  coolness,  and  promptness  of  that  officer  saved  his  command. 
The  American  loss  was  nine,  and  that  of  the  British  was  reported  as 
three. 

La  Fayette  relates  the  fact,  that  "  fifty  Indian  scouts  were  sud 
denly  confronted  by  an  equal  number  of  British  dragoons,"  and  that 
"  the  mutual  surprise  was  so  great  that  both  fled,  with  equal  speed." 

The  congratulations  of  Washington  were  as  cordial  on  the  return 
of  La  Fayette  as  the  greeting  of  the  British  troops  on  their  return 
was  cool  and  impassioned.  No  doubt  had  been  entertained  that  the 
French  Marquis  would  become  the  guest  of  the  garrison  that  evening, 
and  this  was  one  of  the  minor  disappointments  of  this  fruitless 
expedition. 

General  Howe  closed  his  official  connection  with  the  British  service 
on  the  eleventh  of  May,  but  remained  in  Philadelphia  until  after  the 
march  to  Barren  Hill. 

Extraordinary  fetes,  parades,  salutes,  and  scenic  displays,  formed 


408  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1778. 

part  of  a  demonstration  in  his  honor  before  his  departure.  A  regatta 
on  the  Delaware,  a  tournament  on  land,  triumphal  arches,  decorated 
pavilions,  mounted  maidens  in  Turkish  costumes,  slaves  in  fancy  habits, 
knights,  esquires,  heralds,  and  every  brilliant  device,  made  the  eigh 
teenth  day  of  May  memorable,  from  daybreak  until  dark.  Balls, 
illuminations,  fire-works,  wax  lights,  flowers  and  fantastic  drapery 
cheered  the  night  hours,  exhibiting,  as  described  by  Major  Andre,  "  a 
coup  de  cetl,  beyond  description,  magnificent."  "Among  the  fairest 
of  the  ladies  was  Miss  Shippen,  the  subsequent  second  wife  of  Arnold." 
At  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  nineteenth,  the  twenty-four 
hours  of  hilarity,  adulation  and  extravagance  closed,  and  the  army 
hastened  to  Barren  Hill  to  capture  La  Fayette. 

On  the  nineteenth,  General  Mifflin  reported  at  Valley  Forge  for 
duty. 

In  a  letter  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  dated  May  eighteenth,  General 
Washington  expresses  his  "  surprise  to  find  a  certain  gentleman,  who 
some  time  ago,  when  a  heavy  cloud  of  darkness  hung  over  us  and  our 
affairs  looked  gloomy,  was  desirous  of  resigning,  to  be  now  stepping 
forward  in  the  line  of  the  army,"  adding,  "  If  he  can  reconcile  such 
conduct  to  his  own  feelings  as  an  officer,  and  a  man  of  honor,  and 
Congress  have  no  objection  to  his  leaving  his  seat  in  another  depart 
ment,  I  have  nothing  personally  to  oppose  to  it.  Yet  I  must  think 
that  gentleman's  stepping  in  and  out,  as  the  sun  happens  to  beam 
forth  or  become  obscure,  is  not  quite  the  thing,  nor  quite  just,  with 
respect  to  those  officers  who  take  the  bitter  with  the  sweet." 

Washington  was  already  advised  that  the  British  army  was  about 
to  evacuate  Philadelphia.  Repeated  discussions  occurred  as  to  the 
future  action  of  the  two  armies.  The  American  army  began  to  feel 
the  throb  of  hope  as  they  realized  that  the  pressure  of  a  superior 
force  was  to  be  withdrawn  ;  and  the  toil,  self-sacrifice  and  anguish  of 
a  wretched  winter  was  relieved  a  little  by  the  prospect  of  entering  the 
capital,  as  they  entered  it  in  the  autumn  of  1777. 

On  the  following  day  a  council  of  war  was  held,  at  which  Major- 
generals  Gates,  Greene,  Stirling,  Mifflin,  La  Fayette,  De  Kalb,  Arm 
strong  and  Steuben,  and  Brigadier-general  Knox  were  present,  to  hear 
a  statement  of  the  condition  of  the  two  armies. 

Washington  under-estimated  the  British  forces,  as  will  be  seen  by 
Note.  He  estimated  the  British  effective  force  at  Philadelphia  as  ten 
thousand  ;  that  at  New  York  as  four  thousand  ;  that  at  Newport  as 
two  thousand. 


Mfftpitea  anaJ/rawx  tyfsot  Carrvrfftsx. 


408* 


1778.]  OPERATIONS  NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  409 

The  Continental  force  at  Valley  Forge,  including  the  sick  and 
those  on  command  subject  to  call  on  emergency,  he  reported  as  eleven 
thousand  eight  hundred  ;  at  Wilmington,  fourteen  hundred  ;  and  on 
the  Hudson,  at  eighteen  hundred. 

The  opinion  was  unanimous  that  the  army  should  remain  on  the 
defensive,  and  await  the  action  of  the  British  commander. 

On  the  twentieth  of  May,  General  Charles  Lee  joined  the  camp, 
having  been  exchanged  on  the  twenty-first  of  April  for  Major-general 
Prescott,  who  had  been  very  adroitly  captured  at  his  headquarters 
five  miles  above  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  on  the  night  of  the  twenti 
eth  of  July,  17/7,  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Barton  of  Providence. 
General  Lee  had  been  placed  on  parole  as  early  as  the  twenty-fifth  of 
March,  and  visited  Philadelphia.  His  parole  was  extended  so  that 
he  visited  Valley  Forge  on  the  fifth  of  April,  and  York,  where 
Congress  was  in  session,  on  the  ninth. 

It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  on  the  fifteenth  of  June,  while  at  Val 
ley  Forge,  when  there  was  still  a  doubt  as  to  the  ultimate  plans  of 
General  Clinton  after  the  evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  General  Lee 
addressed  a  note  to  General  Washington  giving  his  "  opinion  that 
the  enemy  would  either  go  to  Newcastle,  to  draw  the  American  army 
out  and  fight  it  to  advantage,  or  go  to  Maryland  or  Delaware  or  some 
other  independent  field  where  they  could  control  water  communica 
tions,  and  act  in  harmony  with  frontier  Indian  aggressions." 

A  ship  of  war  reached  Philadelphia  on  the  seventh  with  commis 
sioners  to  represent  Lord  'North's  Conciliatory  Bills,  and  this  delayed 
Clinton's  movement ;  but  Lee's  letter  to  Washington  could  not  have 
been  more  skillfully  designed  to  mislead,  if  he  had  at  heart  the  execu 
tion  by  General  Howe  of  the  plan  he  had  himself  hypothefeically  sug 
gested  while  a  prisoner  of  war  at  New  York. 

His  letter  to  Washington  was  in  harmony  with  his  advice  to  Gen 
eral  Howe  ;  but  the  well  known  French  alliance  which  ripened  in 
January,  1778,  made  that  movement  impossible  of  execution  by  the 
British  troops,  and  Lee  sought  by  all  means  in  his  power  to  prevent 
a  pursuit  of  their  retiring  army. 

A  brief  retrospect  will  explain  Lee's  position. 

During  the  month  of  February,  1777,  he  obtained  permission  from 
General  Howe  to  send  letters  to  Congress  urging  that  commissioners 
be  sent  "  to  confer  with  him  about  confidential  matters  of  vast  interest 
to  the  national  cause."  On  the  twenty-first  of  February  of  the  same 
year,  Congress  declined  to  send  such  commissioners  "  as  altogether 


410  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  [1778 

improper,"  and  "  they  could  not  perceive  how  a  compliance  with  his 
request  would  tend  to  his  advantage  or  the  interest  of  the  public." 
On  the  nineteenth  of  March,  Lee  wrote  again.  This  letter  was  re 
ceived  on  the  twenty-eighth  ;  and  on  the  following  day  Congress 
again  declined  the  proposition. 

On  the  fifth  of  April,  1777,  Lee  wrote  to  Washington,  "  It  is  a 
most  unfortunate  circumstance  for  myself,  and  I  think  not  less  so  for 
the  public,  that  the  Congress  have  not  thought  proper  to  comply  with 
my  request.  It  could  not  possibly  have  been  attended  with  any  ill 
consequences,  and  might  have  been  with  good  ones.  At  least  it  was 
an  indulgence  which  I  thought  my  situation  entitled  me  to.  But  I 
am  unfortunate  in  everything,  and  this  stroke  is  the  severest  I  have 
ever  experienced.  God  send  you  a  different  fate." 

There  were  not  wanting  officers  at  that  time,  General  Greene 
included,  who  supposed  that  the  visit  of  commissioners  could  do  no 
harm,  but  the  people  at  large  approved  the  action  of  Congress.  The 
time  had  passed  for  compromise. 

On  the  twenty-ninth,  the  day  that  Lee's  second  application  was 
acted  upon  by  Congress,  that  officer  submitted  a  paper  to  the  British 
commissioners  which  indicated  his  opinions,  wishes  and  purpose.  The 
original  document  was  brought  to  light  by  George  H.  Moore,  an  emi 
nent  historical  scholar,  and  librarian  of  the  New  York  Historical  Soci 
ety,  in  connection  with  an  address  before  that  Society  in  18/0,  and 
was  officially  endorsed  by  the  British  commission  as  "  Mr.  Lees  plan, 
2gth  March,  1777." 

A  few  paragraphs  are  cited  in  this  connection  :  "  It  appears  to  me 
that  by  the  continuance  of  the  war,  America  has  no  chance  of  obtain 
ing  its  ends."  "  As  I  am  not  only  persuaded  from  the  high  opinion 
I  have  of  the  humanity  and  good  sense  of  Lord  and  General  Howe, 
that  the  terms  of  accommodation  will  be  as  moderate  as  their  powers 
will  admit ;  but  that  their  powers  are  more  ample  than  their  succes 
sor  would  be  tasked  with,  I  think  myself  not  only  justifiable,  but 
bound  in  conscience  in  furnishing  all  the  light  I  can,  to  enable  'em  to 
bring  matters  to  a  conclusion  in  the  most  commodious  manner." 

"  I  know  the  most  generous  use  will  be  made  of  it  in  all  respects  ; 
their  humanity  will  encline  'em  to  have  consideration  for  individuals 
who  have  acted  from  principle."  Then  followed  hypothetical  data  as 
to  the  number  of  troops  required,  and  these  sentences :  "  If  the 
Province  of  Maryland,  or  the  greater  part  of  it,  is  reduced  or  submits, 
and  the  people  of  Virginia  are  prevented  or  intimidated  from  march- 


1778.]  OPERATIONS   NEAR   PHILADELPHIA.  411 

ing  aid  to  the  Pennsylvania  army,  the  whole  machine  is  divided,  and  a 
period  put  to  the  war  ;  and  if  it  is  adopted  in  full,"  ("  Lee's  plan,")  "  I 
am  so  confident  of  success  that  I  would  stake  my  life  on  the  issue." 
"  Apprehensions  from  General  Carleton's  army  will,  I  am  confident, 
keep  the  New  Englanders  at  home,  or  at  least  confine  'em  to  the  east 
side  of  the  river.  I  would  advise  that  four  thousand  men  be  imme 
diately  embarked  in  transports,  one-half  of  which  should  proceed  up 
the  Potomac,  and  take  post  at  Alexandria,  the  other  half  up  Chesa 
peake  Bay,  and  possess  themselves  of  Annapolis."  The  relations  of 
various  posts  to  the  proposed  movement,— the  character  of  the  "  Ger 
man  population  who  would  be  apprehensive  of  injury  to  their  fine 
farms,"  were  also  urged  in  favor  of  "  his  plan  "  for  terminating  the 
war  on  terms  "of  moderate  accommodation." 

Washington  answered  the  letter  of  General  Lee,  on  the  day  it  was 
received,  written  only  three  days  before  the  evacuation  of  Philadel 
phia  ;  and  its  contents  indicate  that  he  fully  appreciated  the  manner 
in  which  that  officer  attempted  to  influence  other  officers  in  the  regu 
lation  of  army  movements. 

"  I  have  received  your  letter  of  this  date  and  thank  you,  as  I  shall 
any  officer  over  whom  I  shall  have  the  honor  to  be  placed,  for  their 
opinions  and  advice  in  matters  of  importance,  especially  when  they 
proceed  from  the  fountain  of  candor,  and  not  from  a  captious  spirit, 
or  an  itch  for  criticism,  .  .  .  and  here  let  me  again  assure  you 
that  I  shall  be  always  happy  in  a  free  communication  of  your  senti 
ments  upon  any  important  subject  relative  to  the  service,  and  only 
beg  that  they  may  come  directly  to  myself.  The  custom  which  many 
officers  have  of  speaking  freely  of  things,  and  reprobating  measures, 
which  upon  investigation  may  be  found  to  be  unavoidable,  is  never 
productive  of  good,  but  often  of  very  mischievous  consequences." 

The  encampment  at  Valley  Forge  was  about  to  be  deserted. 
Washington  and  Lee  were  ready  for  the  march  to  Monmouth. 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 

NOTE. — From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."  Date,  March  26th, 
1778. 

PHILADELPHIA  NEW  YORK  RHODE  ISLAND 

British 13078  3486   1610 

German 5202   3689  2116 

Provincial 1250 3281   44 

Total  19,530  10,456  3,770 


CHAPTER   LIV. 

FROM  PHILADELPHIA  TO  MONMOUTH.    MONMOUTH  AND  VICINITY, 

1778. 

THE  abandonment  of  Philadelphia  by  the  British  army  had 
become  a  military  necessity,  because  too  remote  from  the  sea 
coast,  unless  the  Army  of  Occupation  could  be  so  reinforced  as  to  be 
independent  of  support  from  New  York.  The  detail  of  troops  required 
by  General  Howe  had  not  been  made.  The  recommendation  of  Gen 
eral  Amherst,  military  adviser  of  the  king,  "  that  forty  thousand  men 
be  sent  to  America  immediately,"  had  been  disapproved. 

It  was  of  vital  importance  under  such  circumstances,  that  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  should  reach  New  York  with  the  least  delay  and  the 
least  possible  embarrassment  from  fighting  on  the  march. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  proposed  evacuation  was  in  Washington  s 
favor.  The  purpose  of  the  English  Cabinet  to  transfer  all  active  opera 
tions  to  the  Southern  States  had  not  been  made  public  ;  and  when 
the  British  army  took  its  departure  with  twelve  miles  of  baggage 
train,  thoroughly  cumulative  of  all  army  supplies  that  could  be  loaded 
on  wagons,  it  made  a  deep  impression  upon  the  people. 

It  indicated  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  was  no  temporary 
diversion,  in  order  to  entice  Washington  from  his  stronghold  to  a 
combat  in  the  field  ;  but  it  was  a  surrender  of  the  field  itself  to  his 
control.  It  announced  that  the  royalists  would  be  left  to  their  own 
resources,  and  that  the  British  army  had  not  the  strength  to  meet  the 
contingencies  of  active  operations,  either  in  Pennsylvania  or  New 
Jersey.  The  embarkation  of  nearly  three  thousand  citizens,  with 
their  merchandise  and  personal  effects,  to  accompany  the  naval  squad 
rons,  was  equally  suggestive. 

The  cooperation  of  France  in  the  resistance  of  the  Colonies  to 
British  authority  had  been  publicly  announced  by  Congress,  and  the 
impending  arrival  of  a  French  fleet  hastened  the  movement.  As  a 


I773.J  FROM   PHILADELPHIA   TO    MONMOUTH.  413 

matter  of  fact,  that  fleet  appeared  at  the  entrance  of  Delaware  Bay 
almost  immediately  after  Admiral  Howe  turned  Cape  May,  for  New 
York. 

The  evacuation  of  Philadelphia  began  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morn 
ing,  June  eighteenth,  and  the  entire  army  was  on  the  New  Jersey 
shore  by  ten  o'clock. 

This  movement  had  not  been  made  so  secretly  that  General  Wash 
ington  had  neglected  to  anticipate  its  execution.  General  Maxwell's 
brigade  and  the  New  Jersey  militia  had  been  ordered  to  destroy 
bridges,  to  fell  trees  across  the  roads,  and  to  so  interrupt  the  march  as 
to  give  time  for  his  own  army  to  place  itself  in  a  favorable  position 
for  offensive  action.  A  detachment  under  General  Arnold,  whose 
wound  still  detained  him  from  field  service,  entered  Philadelphia  just 
as  the  British  rear-guard  left. 

Reference  is  made  to  maps,  "  Operations  in  New  Jersey "  and 
"  Operations  near  Philadelphia." 

General  Clinton  advanced  to  Haddonfield  the  same  day.  At  this 
point  the  militia  under  General  Maxwell  made  a  short  resistance  and 
retired  to  Mount  Holly  Pass.  This  place  was  also  abandoned  as  the 
strong  British  vanguard  arrived  ;  but  the  destruction  of  bridges  and 
other  obstructions,  combined  with  the  excessive  summer  heat,  made 
the  march  of  the  British  army  peculiarly  painful  and  exhausting. 
Clinton,  with  his  usual  promptness,  crowded  so  closely  upon  the 
Americans  that  they  did  not  complete  the  destruction  of  the  bridge 
at  Crosswicks,  and  the  British  army  passed  the  creek  on  the  morning 
of  the  twenty-fourth. 

The  column  of  Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen,  with  the  provis 
ion  train  and  heavy  artillery,  went  into  camp  at  Imlays'  Town,  while 
that  of  Cornwallis  occupied  Allentown,  and  thereby  covered  the 
other  division  from  surprise  from  the  north. 

According  to  General  Clinton's  report,  dated  at  New  York,  July 
5th,  17/8,  "the  column  of  General  Knyphausen  consisted  of  the 
Seventeenth  light  dragoons ;  Second  battalion  of  light  infantry ; 
Hessian  Yagers  ;  First  and  Second  British  brigades  ;  Stirn'sand  Loo's 
brigades  of  Hessians  ;  Pennsylvania  Loyalists  ;  West  Jersey  Volun 
teers  and  Maryland  Loyalists.  The  second  division  consisted  of  the 
Sixteenth  light  dragoons ;  First  and  Second  battalions  of  British 
grenadiers,  the  Guards,  and  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  British  brigades." 

Upon  receiving  advices  that  Washington  had  already  crossed  the 
Delaware  and  that  General  Gates  with  the  northern  army  was  ex- 


41 4  FROM   PHILADELPHIA  TO   MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

pected  to  unite  with  Washington,  thus  rendering  a  direct  march  to 
New  York  more  hazardous,  General  Clinton  threw  all  his  baggage 
under  the  escort  of  General  Knyphausen,  placed  it  in  advance,  and 
occupied  the  rear  with  the  second  division,  in  light  marching  order, 
under  his  own  immediate  command ;  and  took  the  Monmouth  route 
to  the  sea. 

Washington  was  notified  of  the  movement  and  took  definite  action, 
in  pursuit.  He  had  crossed  the  Delaware,  at  Cpryell's  Ferry,  nearly 
forty  miles  above  Philadelphia,  without  assurance  of  the  real  purpose 
of  his  adversary.  Having  detached  Colonel  Morgan  with  a  select 
corps  of  six  hundred  men  to  reinforce  Maxwell,  he  marched  to  Prince 
ton  with  the  main  army,  and  thence  to  Hopewell  township,  five  miles 
distant,  where  he  remained  until  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth. 
On  the  previous  day,  however,  he  had  sent  a  second  detachment  of 
fifteen  hundred  chosen  troops  under  Brigadier-general  Scott,  to  rein 
force  those  already  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  and  more  effectually 
Minoy  and  retard  their  march. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  the  army  moved  to  Kingston  ,  and  having 
mtelligence  that  the  enemy  had  been  seen  moving  toward  Monmouth 
Court-House,  Washington  dispatched  a  third  detachment  of  one 
thousand  men  under  General  Wayne,  together  with  the  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette,  who  was  assigned  to  take  command  of  the  entire 
Advanced  corps,  including  Maxwell's  brigade  and  ^Morgan's  light  in 
fantry.  Orders  were  given  to  La  Fayette,  to  "  take  the  first  fair 
opportunity  to  attack  the  rear  of  the  enemy." 

That  officer  wrote  from  "  Robin's  Tavern,  half  past  four,  June  26th," 
"I  have  consulted  the  general  officers  of  the  detachment;  and  the 
general  opinion  seems  to  be  that  I  should  march  in  the  night  near 
them,  so  as  to  attack  the  rear-guard  on  the  march.  Your  excellency 
knows  that  by  the  direct  road  you  are  only  three  miles  further  from 
Monmouth  than  we  are  in  this  place.  Some  prisoners  have  been 
made,  and  deserters  come  in  amazing  fast."  "  I  believe  a  happy 
blow  would  have  the  happiest  effect."  Again.  "At  five  o'clock," 
"  General  Forman  is  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  we  may  overtake  the 
enemy.  It  is  highly  pleasant  to  be  followed  and  countenanced  by 
the  army  ;  that,  if  we  stop  the  enemy,  and  meet  with  some  advan 
tage,  they  may  push  it  with  vigor.  I  have  no  doubt  but  if  we  over 
take  them  we  possess  a  very  happy  chance." 

Again:  "  Ice  Town,  26th  June,  1778,  at  a  quarter  after  seven." 
"  When  I  got  there,  "  referring  to  previously  expressed  purpose  to  go 


1778]  FROM   PHILADELPHIA  TO   MONMOUTH.  415 

to  Ice  Town  for  provisions,  "  I  was  sorry  to  hear  that  Mr.  Hamil 
ton,  who  had  been  riding  all  the  night,  had  not  been  able  to  find  any 
body  who  could  give  him  certain  intelligence  ;  but  by  a  party  who 
came  back,  I  hear  the  enemy  are  in  motion,  and  their  rear  about 
one  mile  off  the  place  they  had  occupied  last  night,  which  is  seven  or 
eight  miles  from  here.  I  immediately  put  Generals  Maxwell's  and 
Wayne's  brigades  in  motion,  and  I  will  fall  lower  down  with  General 
Scott's  and  Jackson's  regiment,  and  some  militia.  I  should  be  very 
happy  if  we  could  attack  them  before  they  halt."  "  If  I  can  not  over 
take  them,  we  could  lay  at  some  distance  and  attack  them  to-morrow 
morning.  .  .  .  If  we  are  at  a  convenient  distance  from  you,  I  have 
nothing  to  fear  in  striking  a  blow,  if  opportunity  is  offered."  "  If  you 
believe  it,  or  if  it  is  believed  necessary  or  useful  to  the  good  of  the  service 
and  the  honor  of  General  Lee,  to  send  him  down  with  a  couple  of  thou 
sand  men,  or  any  greater  force,  I  will  cheerfully  obey  and  serve  him,  not 
only  out  of  duty,  but  out  of  what  I  owe  to  that  gentleman  s  character." 
The  Italics  are  not  so  indicated  in  the  original. 

The  following  appeal  had  been  made  to  General  La  Fayette  by 
General  Lee,  when  he  found  that  the  army  was  earnestly  pressing 
upon  the  enemy:  "  It  is  «my  fortune  and  my  honor  that  I  place  in 
your  hands  :  you  are  too  generous  to  cause  the  loss  of  either."  La 
Fayette  says  in  his  memoirs,  "  This  tone  succeeded  better,"  referring 
to  Lee's  change  of  opinion,  and  claim  to  the  command ;  and  the  let 
ter,  above  cited,  contains  the  generous  response. 

At  evening  of  the  twenty-sixth  the  whole  army  advanced  from 
Kingston,  leaving  their  baggage  so  as  to  be  able  to  support  the 
advance  corps  with  promptness,  and  reached  Cranbury  early  in  the 
morning.  On  the  twenty-seventh  a  heavy  rain  and  intense  heat  sus 
pended  the  march  for  a  few  hours.  Finding  that  the  advance  corps 
was  bearing  too  far  to  the  right  to  be  assured  of  prompt  support  from 
the  main  body,  orders  were  sent  to  La  Fayette  to  take  ground  to  the 
left,  toward  Englishtown.  This  movement  was  also  executed  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh. 

The  advance  corps  was  at  once  strengthened  by  two  additional 
brigades,  as  suggested  by  General  La  Fayette,  and  General  Lee  took 
command.  The  whole  force  thus  detailed  was  about  five  thousand 
men. 

The  main  army  advanced  to  within  three  miles  of  Englishtown, 
and  within  five  miles  of  the  British  army.  The  official  reports  of 
General  Washington  show  that  General  Lee  positively  declined  the 


416  FROM   PHILADELPHIA   TO    MONMOUTH. 

command  of  this  advance  corps,  until  its  large  increase  rendered  it 
certain  that  it  held  the  post  of  honor,  and  would  be  pushed  upon  the 
enemy.  La  Fayette  was  first  assigned  to  the  command  after  a  hot 
debate  in  council  as  to  the  propriety  of  attacking  Clinton's  army  at 
all ;  and  General  Lee  used  the  following  language  when  that  assign 
ment  was  made  with  his  concurrence  ;  that  he  "  was  well  pleased  to 
be  freed  from  all  responsibility  for  a  plan  which  he  was  sure  would 
fail."  This  statement  is  made  important  by  subsequent  events. 

Morgan's  command  was  now  on  the  British  right  flank,  and  Gen 
eral  Dickinson  with  between  seven  and  eight  hundred  men,  threat 
ened  their  left.  During  the  subsequent  action,  Morgan  lay  with  his 
corps  three  miles  south  of  Monmouth  at  Richmond's  Mills  (Shuman's) 
awaiting  orders ;  only  kept  from  participation  in  the  battle  by  failure 
to  receive  timely  instructions  as  to  his  duty  in  view  of  the  general 
movement  of  the  army  to  the  front.  It  will  be  seen  that  he  sent  for 
instructions  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  sound  of  battle. 

This  battle  of  Monmouth  has  less  clearness  of  definition  than  any 
other  action  of  the  Revolution.  The  country  had  not  been  recon- 
noitered,  and  very  loose  reports  were  made,  even  by  officers  who  were 
on  the  ground,  and  who  afterwards  testified  before  the  general  court- 
martial  which  tried  General  Lee. 

On  the  part  of  the  British  army  it  was  a  bold  and  successful  return 
of  the  offensive,  at  the  very  moment  when  any  other  policy  would 
have  threatened  it  with  ruin.  The  pursuit  of  Clinton  by  Washington 
was  fully  equal  to  the  opportunity.  The  limitation  of  its  success  was 
largely  due  to  the  conduct  of  General  Charles  Lee.  Washington  as  a 
matter  of  fact  made  no  rash  venture,  as  if  in  chase  of  a  disappointed 
adversary. 

He  neither  underrated  nor  despised  his  enemy ;  but  giving  credit 
for  courage  and  wisdom  equal  to  his  own,  measured  the  forces  that 
were  to  meet  in  conflict,  and  as  usual,  struck,  or  struck  back  as  best 
he  could. 

The  American  army  was  fully  equal  to  that  of  the  enemy  in  num 
bers  ;  and  although  fresh  from  Valley  Forge,  was  not  wanting  in 
energy  and  nerve.  The  supply  of  provisions  was  scanty,  but  the  army 
was  eager  in  the  pursuit.  It  felt  the  onward  spur,  when  the  force 
which  had  so  long  kept  it  on  the  defensive,  crossed  the  Delaware,  in 
full  retreat  from  the  old  theater  of  conflict. 

The  military  issue  between  Clinton  and  Washington  was  in  some 
elements  quite  unequal.  Clinton  must  regain  New  York.  He  had 


1778.]  FROM   PHILADELPHIA   TO   MONMOUTH.  417 

nothing  to  hope  from  a  battle,  more  than  a  clear  path  to  Sandy  Hook. 
His  heavy  baggage  train  restricted  his  operations  to  the  repulse  of 
an  attack,  and  rendered  any  protracted  pursuit,  even  of  broken  columns, 
a  fruitless  strain  upon  his  command. 

But  for  Washington  to  have  shrunk  back  from  that  retreating 
army,  which  he  had  been  prompt  to  meet  upon  reasonable  terms, 
would  have  accredited  the  British  army  with  that  invincibility  which 
Lee  affirmed  of  it ;  would  have  sacrificed  the  impetus  which  the 
offensive  imparted  to  his  command,  and  would  have  made  every  sub 
sequent  issue  of  the  war  more  hopeless  or  uncertain.  It  would  have 
canceled  the  memory  of  Trenton.  It  would  have  stultified  the  move 
ment  which  made  Germantown  a  pledge  that  the  American  Com 
mander-in-chief  was  ready  at  all  times  to  seize  opportunity  and  do 
real  fighting.  Every  attempted  vindication  of  the  conduct  of  Gen 
eral  Charles  Lee  has  one  fatal  defect.  He  knew  that  he  could  impair 
the  standing  of  Washington  only  by  such  a  limitation  of  his  success  as 
would  place  himself  in  the  foreground  as  a  wise  counselor  and  com 
mander.  He  had  only  to  act  upon  his  avowed  opinion  that  American 
troops  could  not  cope  with  British  troops,  and  withdraw  the  former 
from  a  test  of  their  mettle.  La  Fayette  dissented  from  this  assump 
tion  ;  but  Lee  was  in  command. 

While  all  narratives  agree  that  the  advance  of  subordinate  com 
manders  was  prompt  and  orderly,  however  blindly  conducted,  and  in  a 
direction  favorable  to  success,  it  is  equally  clear  that  General  Lee 
made  no  adequate  effort  to  concentrate  his  divisions,  promulged  no 
definite  orders: — and  in  the  conduct  of  his  own  movements  and  the 
precipitate  retreat,  absolutely  failed  to  control  his  army  and  keep  it 
in  hand.  His  presence  inspired  none,  discouraged  many,  and  abso 
lutely  left  the  divisions  to  work  their  own  way  out  of  confusion,  as  if 
there  were  no  officer  in  general  command. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  facts  seems  to  exclude  the  idea  that 
Lee  was  guilty  of  any  overt  act  of  treason ;  while  it  is  equally  true, 
that  upon  the  basis  of  his  antecedent  opinion,  and  his  expectation  of 
failure,  he  did  not  make  the  proper  effort  to  render  that  failure  the  least 
disastrous  possible,  and  thus  fulfill  the  obligations  of  high  command. 

The  division  which  General  Lee  commanded  on  the  twenty-eighth 
of  June,  1778,  according  to  the  evidence  of  General  Wayne,  consisted 
of  the  following  troops,  besides  the  flanking  detachments  of  Dickin 
son  and  Morgan.  "  In  front,  Colonel  Butler  with  two  hundred  men  ; 
Colonel  Jackson  with  an  equal  number ;  Scott's  own  brigade  with  a 
27 


41 8  FROM   PHILADELPHIA  TO   MONMOUTH.  [1778 

part  of  Woodford's,  six  hundred,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  ;  General 
Varnum  appeared,  about  the  same  number,  with  two  pieces  of 
artillery  :  My  own  detachment  was  about  one  thousand,  with  two 
pieces  of  artillery ;  General  Scott's  detachment  fourteen  hundred 
with  two  pieces  of  artillery ;  General  Maxwell's  was  one  thousand  and 
two  pieces  of  artillery,  in  all  five  thousand,  with  twelve  pieces  of 
artillery,  exclusive  of  the  militia."  General  Lee  claimed  that  this 
force,  so  loosely  stated  by  General  Wayne,  did  not  exceed  four  thou 
sand  one  hundred  men  ;  but  the  force  which  Grayson  took  to  the 
front  was  nearly  eight  hundred  men,  and  although  temporarily 
detached  from  Scott's  and  Varnum's  brigades,  it  must  enter  the 
aggregate  and  be  counted  as  if  not  detached.  The  entire  force  which 
Lee  had  at  his  disposal  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-seventh,  con 
siderably  exceeded  five  thousand  men,  although  he  took  no  steps  to 
communicate  with  Morgan  and  Dickinson  until  especially  aroused  by 
Washington  to  action.  General  La  Fayette  accompanied  General 
Lee,  with  his  consent,  as  a  volunteer. 

Position  of  the  Armies.  On  the  evening  of  June  twenty-seventh, 
1778,  the  British  army  encamped  in  a  strong  position,  with  their 
"  right  extending  about  a  mile  and  a  half  beyond  the  Monmouth 
Court  House,  in  the  parting  of  the  roads  leading  to  Shrewsbury  and 
Middletown,  and  their  left  along  the  road  from  Allentown  to  Mon 
mouth,  about  three  miles  west  of  the  Court  House."  This  position, 
well  protected  on  the  right  and  left,  and  partially  in  front,  by  marshy 
ground  and  woods,  was  regarded  by  Washington  as  "  too  strong  to  be 
assailed  with  any  prospect  of  success." 

The  general  direction  of  the  British  line  while  thus  encamped  and 
when  its  march  commenced,  was  south-easterly,  exposing  their  left 
and  centre  to  an  attack  from  the  American  troops,  whose  offensive 
advance  was  from  the  north-west.  It  therefore  became  important  for 
General  Clinton  to  change  his  position  and  gain  the  Middletown  road 
to  the  sea  as  quickly  as  possible,  especially  as  a  march  of  only  ten  or 
twelve  miles  would  place  him  upon  strong  defensive  ground  beyond 
danger  of  successful  pursuit.  Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen  was 
under  orders  to  move  at  daylight  of  the  following  day.  The  single 
road  which  was  available  for  the  proposed  march,  passed  almost  im 
mediately  into  a  series  of  bluffs  where  the  baggage  train  would  be 
greatly  exposed  to  attack  from  skirmishing  parties,  and  General  Clin 
ton  undertook  the  protection  of  its  rear  by  his  own  division  of 
selected  troops. 


I778.J  FROM   PHILADELPHIA  TO   MONMOUTH.  419 

The  American  army  was  nearly  three  miles  behind  Englishtown, 
and  only  five  miles  from  the  British  camp  ;  while  the  skirmishing  de 
tachments  of  Morgan  and  Dickinson  were  already  on  the  alert  for 
strokes  at  the  British  flanks,  as  the  army  should  break  camp. 

Monmouth  and  Vicinity.  The  reports  of  Generals  Washington, 
Clinton,  and  of  many  other  officers  who  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Mon 
mouth,  are  so  defective  as  to  localities,  that  some  explanation  is  neces 
sary  to  an  appreciation  of  the  narrative.  The  distinctions  of  "  right  " 
and  "  left  "  are  greatly  confused,  through  the  changing  positions  of  the 
troops  ;  especially  as  the  right  and  left  of  Clinton  were  reversed  when 
he  returned  the  offensive  ;  and  the  statement  of  officers  that  u  Morgan 
was  on  the  left  "  did  not  become  true  until  they  commenced  their 
retreat.  Thus,  although  Dickinson  threatened  the  British  left  flank 
on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh,  his  demonstration  was  upon 
their  right  during  their  advance,  later  in  the  forenoon. 

The  Ravines.  The  terms  "  ravine,"  "  morass,"  "  first  stand,"  and 
"  last  stand,"  "  behind  the  morass,"  and  "before  the  morass,"  are 
painfully  disheartening  to  one  who  takes  up  this  battle  record,  and 
they  will  receive  notice.  Three  ravines,  or  morasses,  as  they  are 
indiscriminately  named,  are  mentioned  by  American  officers.  Clinton 
mentions  only  the  two  which  intervened  between  his  advance  from  the 
Court  House  and  Washington's  main  army.  The  ravine  or  morass 
behind  which  Washington  formed  the  divisions  of  Greene  and  Stirling 
to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  fugitive  brigades,  is  about  half  a  mile  south 
easterly  from  the  old  Meeting  House,  and  about  two  and  a  half  miles 
from  Englishtown. 

The  early  skirmish  which  led  General  Dickinson  to  believe  that  the 
British  army  had  not  left  Monmouth,  but  was  advancing  in  force 
toward  the  hill,  was  on  high  ground  just  east  of  this  morass,  this  west 
ravine,  and  was  simply  the  demonstration  of  light  troops  to  throw  off 
the  American  militia,  and  conceal  the  withdrawal  of  their  main  army. 
It  was  on  this  hill  that  the  hedge-fence,  the  parsonage,  and  the 
orchard,  near  which  the  chief  fight  took  place,  were  located.  A  sec 
ond  ravine  or  morass,  which  will  be  called  the  middle  ravine,  crossed 
the  road  not  quite  a  mile  to  the  east  ;  and  on  the  east  side  of  this,  the 
British  camp  rested  for  a  few  hours  after  the  battle.  This  high 
ground  extended  still  farther  eastward,  and  blended  with  the  so-called 
"  heights  of  Monmouth,"  and  then  dipped  toward  the  low  plain,  one 
mile  wide,  and  about  three  miles  long,  just  east  of  the  Amboy  road, 
which  ran  from  the  Court  House  nearly  due  north.  This  narrow 


420  FROM   PHILADELPHIA  TO    MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

plain  or  valley  where  Clinton  formed  his  line  of  attack  was  also  marshy 
near  a  small  pond,  and  along  a  small  creek;  the  latter  extending  from 
near  the  Court  House  north-easterly,  past  Briar  Hill;  and  this  east 
ravine  is  that  which  Wayne,  Varnum,  Jackson,  Scott,  Grayson,  and 
Oswald's  artillery  crossed  and  recrossed,  and  behind  which  they 
retired  when  the  British  line  advanced  in  force.  Just  west  of  the 
Amboy  road,  and  nearly  parallel  with  it,  "  so  as  to  cover  both  roads," 
is  the  high  wooded  ground  where  Lee  proposed  to  re-form  his  line, 
and  from  which,  in  fact,  the  divisions  had  advanced  into  the  plain 
without  definite  orders,  or  due  regard  to  their  mutual  dependence  and 
relations. 

Water  Courses.  Wenrock  Brook,  as  indicated  upon  the  State  Geo 
logical  Survey  of  New  Jersey,  and  recent  township  surveys,  has  been 
erroneously  located  by  most  authors.  It  unites  with  Geblard's  Branch 
just  beyond  Englishtown  as  indicated  on  map  "  Operations  in  New 
Jersey,"  and  map  "  Battle  of  Monmouth,"  and  flows  in  the  opposite 
course  of  that  indicated  by  Irving,  Sparks,  and  some  others.  At  the 
head  of  the  Manisquan,  near  Monmouth  Court  House,  there  was 
formerly  marshy  ground,  where  its  small  tributaries  gathered  their 
waters  ;  and  on  the  north  side  of  Monmouth,  Geblard's  Branch  was 
bordered  by  marshy  ground.  The  small  stream,  or  drainage,  west  of 
Briar  Hill,  sometimes  called  Briar  Creek,  is  not,  as  sometimes  indicated, 
a  branch  of  Charles  River,  emptying  in  to  Raritan  Bay,  but  local,  and 
was  crossed  at  the  time  of  the  battle  by  a  causeway  or  bridge.  A 
small  fork  of  the  Manalapan  brook  flowed  north-easterly  from  the 
Allentown  road,  and  furnished  the  swampy  ground  which  protected 
the  left  of  the  British  camp  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-seventh. 

General  Features.  The  low  plain  below  the  slope  from  the  Court 
House  and  the  Amboy  road,  was  quite  open  for  at  least  a  quarter  of 
a  mile,  with  woods  well  distributed  beyond  this  narrow  belt  as  far  north 
as  Briar  Hill,  to  the  Middletown  road,  on  the  edge  of  which  Colonel 
Grayson  halted  his  command,  nearly  parallel  with  the  road  upon 
which  the  British  "  column  was  marching.'5  The  summit  between  the 
Amboy  road  and  the  middle  ravine  was  mostly  in  woods,  with  open 
ground  near  and  just  north-west  of  the  Court  House,  where  Butler 
drove  back  the  Queen's  Rangers.  To  the  left  of  the  British  line,  after 
it  faced  west  to  return  the  offensive,  was  another  piece  of  woods  out 
of  which  the  dragoons  advanced  and  from  which  a  strong  column 
emerged  for  an  advance  toward  the  Court  House,  to  turn  the  Ameri 
can  right  and  cut  off  Grayson,  Scott,  Jackson,  Maxwell,  and  Oswald, 


1778]  FROM   PHILADELPHIA  TO    MONMOUTH.  421 

when  they  retired  behind  the  east  ravine  and  reached  the  summit. 
The  causeway  and  bridges  are  indicated  on  the  map  ;  and  as  late  as 
January,  1876,  the  middle  ravine  was  still  characterized  by  tangled 
underbrush  and  briars,  as  reported  by  officers  after  the  battle.  The 
present  road  from  Englishtown  runs  considerably  north  of  the  old  road, 
and  there  is  no  trace  of  two  old  paths  referred  to  by  witnesses  on  the 
trial.  The  fact  that  all  the  commanders  refer  to  the  west  ravine, 
clearly  indicates  that  they  made  common  crossing  at  its  bridge  :  and 
although  one  division  marched  to  the  left  from  the  Meeting  House, 
while  other  troops  took  the  sharp  turn  to  the  right  at  the  forks,  the  two 
divisions  finally  took  two  routes,  for  the  double  purpose  of  extending 
their  front  to  prevent  flank  attacks  in  a  general  advance,  and  to  gain 
room  for  the  movement. 

There  was  difficulty  in  obtaining  guides,  and  repeated  halts  ensued 
on  that  account.  General  Maxwell  says  that  he  advanced  along  a 
morass  from  the  Meeting  House,  but  crossed  the  hill  finally  occupied 
by  General  Stirling.  The  small  creek  emptying  into  Lules  pond 
fulfills  the  conditions  of  his  statement.  He  was  informed  that  there 
was  a  second  road  to  the  north  leading  to  Englishtown  by  Craig's 
Mill,  and  fears  were  expressed  that  the  British  troops  would  seek 
thereby  to  gain  the  American  rear,  but  it  was  not  attempted,  and  the 
entire  retreat  was  finally  made  over  the  causeways  at  the  middle  aud 
west  ravines. 


CHAPTER   LV. 

PREPARATIONS   FOR  THE   BATTLE   OF  MONMOUTH,  1778. 

GENERAL  WASHINGTON,  the  American  Commander-in- 
chief  was  in  earnest  pursuit  of  the  British  army  under  Lieuten 
ant-general  Clinton,  as  it  marched  from  Philadelphia,  en  route  for 
New  York.  The  character  of  the  American  people  and  their  reluc 
tance  to  accept  the  restraints  of  strict  authority  had  their  effect  upon 
the  leader  of  their  armies  ;  and  his  orders  were  sometimes  so  cour 
teous,  in  form,  that  the  element — "  do  this!'  was  almost  merged  in  a 
courteous  request. 

But  Charles  Lee  was  a  professional  soldier,  and  knew  what  Wash 
ington  meant.  He  knew  Washington  better,  when  he  took  his  final 
orders,  on  the  twenty-eighth  day  of  June,  1778,  on  the  hill  by  Wen- 
rock  Creek,  about  two  miles  east  of  Monmouth  Court  House.  He 
had  been  in  command  of  nearly  one-half  of  the  American  army  during 
that  day,  and  for  the  thirty-six  hours  preceding.  It  was  his  first  active 
command  after  his  exchange  as  a  prisoner  of  war;  and  both  at  Valley 
Forge  and  at  Kingston  he  had  opportunity  to  learn  the  temper  and 
purposes  of  his  commanding  officer.  He  was  not  left  without  more 
definite  instructions  after  he  solicited  the  command  which  closed  his 
military  career. 

Washington  s  Instructions.  The  following  is  a  statement  of  his 
instructions,  as  understood  by  those,  (other  than  General  Lee),  who 
were  charged  with  their  execution,  and  it  is  taken  from  the  record 
of  "  Proceedings  of  a  general  Court  Martial  which  convened  at 
Brunswick,  July  fourth,  1778,  for  the  trial  of  Major-general  Lee." 
Soon  after  noon,  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  June,  1778,  Washington 
assembled  the  senior  general  officers  who  belonged  to  the  column, 
then  under  marching  orders. 

GENERAL  SCOTT  v<  heard  General  Washington  say,  in  the  presence 


1778.]  PREPARATIONS   FOR   THE  BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  423 

ol  General  Lee,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  General  Maxwell  and  him 
self,  that  he  intended  to  have  the  enemy  attacked,  the  next  morn 
ing,  or  words  to  that  effect ;  and  Washington  desired  General  Lee  to 
call  his  general  officers  together  that  afternoon,  to  concert  some  mode 
of  attack.  General  Lee  appointed  the  time,  at  half  past  five ;  but 
before  the  officers  met,  General  Lee  had  rode  out : — fell  in  with  Gen 
eral  Lee  that  evening  and  told  him,  that  I  had  waited  on  him,  and 
asked  him  if  he  had  any  orders."  "  He  said  he  had  none;  but  we 
should  not  be  disputing  about  rank,  or  what  part  of  the  line  we  should 
march  in."  "  On  cross-examination"  "  understood  that  Lee  was  to 
proceed  on,  and  whenever  he  met  the  enemy,  to  take  the  earliest 
opportunity  to  attack  them." 

General  Wayne  says  ; — "  General  Washington  called  upon  General 
Scott,  General  Maxwell  and  myself,  the  twenty-seventh  of  June,  to 
come  forward  to  the  place  he  and  General  Lee  were  talking,  and  there 
recommended  us  to  fall  upon  some  proper  mode  of  attacking  the 
enemy,  next  morning," — "  did  not  hear  General  Washington  give  any 
particular  orders  for  the  attack  ;  but  he  recommended  that  there 
should  be  no  dispute  in  regard  to  rank,  in  case  of  an  attack ;  that  as 
General  Maxwell  was  the  oldest,  he  of  right  should  have  the  prefer 
ence;  but  as  the  troops  that  were  under  his  command  were  mostly 
new  levies,  and  therefore  not  the  troops  to  bring  on  the  attack,  he 
therefore  wished  that  the  attack  might  be  commenced  by  one  of  the 
picked  corps,  as  it  would  probably  give  a  very  happy  impression." 
"  General  Lee  appointed  the  generals,  who  were  there,  to  meet  at  his 
quarters  about  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  which  I  understood  was 
for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  plan  of  attack  on  the  enemy,  agreeable 
to  the  recommendation  of  General  Washington."  "  At  the  hour 
appointed  met  with  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  and  General  Max 
well  at  General  Lee's  quarters."  "  He  said  he  had  nothing  further  to 
recommend,  than  that  there  should  be  no  dispute  with  regard  to 
rank,  in  case  of  an  attack,  for  he  might  order  on,  either  the  right  or 
the  left  wing,  and  he  expected  they  would  obey,  and  if  they  consid 
ered  themselves  aggrieved,  to  complain  afterwards ;  that  he  had 
nothing  more  to  say  on  the  subject,  but  that  the  troops  were  to  be 
held  in  readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  warning."  On  cross- 
examination  : — "  Lee  said  the  position  of  the  army  might  render  any 
previous  plan  invalid,  or  words  to  that  effect."  "  I  understood  that 
we  were  to  attack  the  enemy  on  their  march,  at  all  events  ;  and  that 
General  Washington  would  be  near  us  to  support  us  with  the  main 


424  PREPARATIONS   FOR  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

army ; — which,  in  its  consequence,  must,  if  we  were  pushed,  inevi 
tably  have  brought  on  a  general  action." 

General  Maxwell,  "  understood  by  what  General  Washington 
said  to  General  Lee,  that  General  Lee  was  to  attack  the  rear  of  the 
British  army  as  soon  as  he  had  information  that  the  "  front  was  in 
motion,  or  marched  off,"  and  he  further  mentioned  that  something 
might  be  done  by  giving  them  a  very  brisk  charge,  by  some  of  the 
best  troops.  "  General  Washington  mentioned  something  about  my 
troops — that  some  of  them  were  new,  and  in  want  of  cartouch-boxes, 
and  seemed  to  intimate  that  there  were  some  troops  fitter  to  make  a 
charge  than  them."  "  He  further  recommended  that  we  should  go 
to  General  Lee's  quarters,  at  six  o'clock."  "  The  orders  I  got  there, 
were  to  keep  in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  warning  in  case  the 
enemy  should  march  off,"  "  that  there  should  be  no  differences  respect 
ing  rank,  or  which  should  be  called  to  the  front,  right  or  left." 

General  Lee,  in  his  defense  says,  "  General  Washington  recom 
mended  to  me  a  conference  with  those  gentlemen,  relative  to  any 
plan  of  operations  to  adopt  ;  but  as  he  only  recommended  the  con 
ference,  I  of  course  thought  myself  at  full  liberty  on  this  head."  It 
is  to  be  noticed  in  this  connection  that  General  Lee  knew  the  bold 
purpose  of  La  Fayette,  and  that  Wayne,  Duportail  and  others  had 
strongly  urged  the  offensive,  before  the  council  of  war  held  at  Kings 
ton.  In  his  defense  he  does  not  state  that  he  was  under  any  obliga 
tion  to  adopt  the  plans  of  General  La  Fayette,  or  prosecute  his  policy; 
nor  does  he  refer  to  Washington's  instructions  of  the  twenty-sixth. 

In  Washington's  immediate  answer  to  the  letter  written  by  La 
Fayette  from  Icetown,  he  says,  "  General  Lee's  uneasiness  on  account 
of  yesterday's  transaction,  rather  increasing  than  abating,  and  your 
politeness  in  wishing  to  ease  him  of  it,  have  induced  me  to  detach 
him  from  this  army,  with  a  part  of  it,  to  reinforce  or  at  least  cover 
the  several  detachments  at  present  under  your  command.  At  the 
same  time  that  I  feel  for  General  Lee's  distress  of  mind,  I  have  an  eye 
to  your  wishes  and  the  delicacy  of  your  situation  ;  and  have  therefore 
obtained  a  promise  from  him,  that  when  he  gives  you  notice  of  his 
approach  and  command,  he  will  request  you  to  prosecute  any  plan  you 
may  have  already  concerted  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  or  otherwise 
annoying  the  enemy ;  this  is  the  only  expedient  I  could  think  of  to 
answer  the  views  of  both.  General  Lee  seemed  satisfied  with  the 
measure."  Washington  wrote  to  the  President  of  Congress  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-eighth  :  "  I  am  here  (Englishtown)  pressing 


I778.J  PREPARATIONS    FOR  THE  BATTLE   OF  MONMOUTH.  425 

hard  to  come  up  with  the  enemy.  We  have  a  strong  and  select 
detachment  more  forward,  under  command  of  Major-general  Lee,  with 
orders  to  attack  their  rear  if  possible." 

The  question  involved  is  this  :  Did  General  Lee  have  no  knowl 
edge  of  the  purpose  of  Washington  in  sending  more  than  five  thousand 
men  to  the  front,  with  the  entire  army  in  light  marching  order,  under 
pledge  to  support  the  advance? 

Doctor  Griffiths  stated  upon  the  trial  of  General  Lee,  that  "  about 
one  hour  and  a  half  after  the  action  began,"  General  Lee  stated,  that 
all  was  going  as  he  expected ;  that  his  advice  had  ever  been  contrary 
to  a  general  action  ;  that  it  had  been  determined  upon  in  a  council  of 
officers  not  to  risk  anything  by  an  attack,  notwithstanding  that  he  had 
that  morning  received  positive  orders  from  Washington  to  attack. 

Summary  of  Events.  General  Lee  advanced  to  Englishtown,  but 
remained  inactive  until  Washington  pressed  him  forward. 

General  La  Fayette  called  during  the  evening  of  the  twenty- 
seventh  to  know  if  any  disposition  of  the  troops  had  been  made  for 
the  next  day.  "  Lee  thought  it  would  be  better  to  act  according  to 
circumstances,  and  had  no  plans."  "  Between  one  and  two  o'clock," 
as  stated  by  General  Lee's  aids,  "  Washington  sent  an  order  direct 
ing  that  six  or  eight  hundred  men  from  Scott's  and  Varnum's  com 
mands  should  be  at  once  sent  forward  to  lie  very  near  the  enemy  as  a 
party  of  observation,  in  case  of  their  moving  off,  to  give  the  earliest 
intelligence  of  it ;  to  skirmish  with  them,  so  as  to  produce  delay  and 
give  time  for  the  rest  of  the  troops  to  come  up  ;  and  directing  him  to 
write  to  Morgan  to  make  a  similar  attack."  This  order  was  received 
as  stated,  before  two  o'clock  A.  M.  Dickinson  received  his  notice, 
and  General  Lee's  aid-de-camp  states  that  he  sent  a  messenger  to 
Morgan,  but  that  officer  did  not  actually  receive  any  instructions  until 
those  given  by  Wayne  during  the  battle  to  a  messenger  sent  for 
orders. 

"At  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth,"  says  La 
Fayette,  "  I  went  to  Lee's  quarters  to  know  if  there  was  anything 
new  ;  the  answer  I  received  was  that  one  brigade  was  already  march 
ing.  As  I  considered  myself  a  volunteer,  I  asked  General  Lee  what 
part  of  the  troops  I  was  to  be  with  ;  General  Lee  said,  if  it  was  con 
venient  for  me,  to  be  with  the  selected  troops.  I  put  myself  with 
them,  in  full  expectation  that  these  troops  would  act  and  be  opposed 
to  the  British  grenadiers." 

At  five  o'clock,  Dickinson  reported  to  Generals  Lee  and  Washing- 


426  PREPARATIONS  FOR   THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

ton  that  the  enemy  had  commenced  their  march.  Washington  imme 
diately  sent  orders  to  General  Lee  to  "  move  forward  and  attack  the 
enemy,  unless  very  powerful  reasons  prevented,"  and  advised  General 
Lee  that  "  the  entire  army  had  thrown  aside  their  packs  and  was 
advancing  to  his  support." 

The  following  remarkable  statement  taken  from  Lee's  defense,  is 
cited  in  this  connection  without  comment.  "  I  had  no  idea  that  his 
excellency  was  to  move  from  Englishtown,  where  I  was  informed  he 
was  posted  ;  and  that  situation  appeared  to  me  the  best  calculated  to 
support  my  corps,  of  any  I  knew  of  in  that  country."  In  another  con 
nection,  he  says,  that  on  the  march  he  noticed  the  hill  where  the  final 
stand  was  made  to  be  an  excellent  position.  The  movement  of  the 
troops  was  very  loosely  made  ;  was  simply  putting  them  on  the  march, 
and  General  Lee  did  not  in  person  superintend  that  movement. 

Colonel  Grayson  "  received  orders  about  three  o'clock,  to  put  Scott's  and  Var- 
num's  brigades  in  readiness  to  march  and  to  give  notice  when  they  were  ready." 
"  Upon  reporting  to  General  Lee  at  Englishtown ; — was  ordered  to  advance  and 
halt  three  miles  from  the  enemy,  and  send  repeated  intelligence  of  their  movements. 
At  the  same  time  a  written  paper  from  General  Washington  to  General  Lee  was 
placo'l  in  his  hands  directing  General  Lee  to  send  out  six  or  eight  hundred  men  as 
a  corps  of  observation,  to  give  frequent  information  of  the  enemy's  movements  and 
to  attack  them  incase  they  began  their  march." 

"  At  a  distance  of  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Englishtown,  was  ordered  to  march 
slow ;  shortly  after,  to  advance."  This  brought  Grayson  to  the  bridge  over  the  west 
ravine;  where  fat  first  skirmish,  hereafter  mentioned,  took  place. 

General  Scott  "  had  orders  about  five  o'clock  to  follow  Maxwell's  brigade  ; — 
passed  Englishtown  ;  was  ordered  to  halt  ;  received  an  order  from  one  of  General 
Lee's  aids  to  march  in  the  rear  of  General  Wayne's  detachment.  About  this  time 
there  was  a  halt  of  an  hour  ;  marched  to  the  Meeting-house,  where  there  was  a 
second  halt ;  advanced  a  mile  and  then  halted,  when  several  pieces  of  cannon  were 
fired,  and  some  small  arms,  in  front  of  the  column. 

This  brought  Scott  to  the  west  ravine  :  He  continues, — "  Soon  after  I  was  ordered 
on,  and  soon  took  a  road  to  the  left  and  then  an  old  road  to  the  right  which  brought 
us  into  a  field  to  the  left  of  some  of  our  troops  that  were  formed  where  there  was  a 
pretty  brisk  firing  of  cannon  on  both  sides."  This  was  the  location  ofthe//z/;W 
skirmish  hereafter  mentioned. 

General  Maxwell;  "received  orders  after  five  o'clock,  to  put  my  brigade  in 
readiness  to  march  immediately.  Ordered  the  brigade  to  be  ready  to  march  ;  went 
and  waited  on  General  Lee.  He  seemed  surprised  I  was  not  marched,  and  that  I 
must  stay  until  the  last,  and  fall  in  the  rear.  I  ordered  my  brigade  to  the  ground  I 
understood  I  was  to  march  by,  and  found  myself  to  be  before  General  Wayne  and 
General  Scott,  and  halted  my  brigade  to  fall  in  the  rear." 

(A  temporary  diversion  made  by  this  brigade  under  General  Lee's 


1778.]          PREPARATIONS.  FOR    THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  427 

order,  under  apprehension  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  by  Craig's 
Mills,  far  to  the  north,  was  countermanded  by  one  of  Washington's 

aids.) 

"  Came  back  to  my  former  position,  waited  a  considerable  time  before  General 
Wayne  and  General  Scott  got  past  me  ;  then  I  marched  in  the  rear.  There  were 
three  pretty  large  halts  before  I  got  up  within  a  mile  of  the  Court  House.  The 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette  informed  me  that  it  was  General  Lee's  wish  that  we  should 
keep  to  the  woods  as  much  as  possible  ;  that  as  I  had  a  small  party  of  militia  horse, 
he  desired  I  should  keep  these  horse  pretty  well  out  upon  my  right."  This  light 
horse,  La  Fayette  handled,  as  hereafter  appears.  "  It  was  thereabouts  that  I  heard 
some  firing  of  cannon  and  small  arms." 

This  refers  to  the  third  skirmish. 

"  The  march  was  pretty  rapid  from  that  place,  and  I  followed  up  General  Scott 
until  I  got  the  front  of  my  brigade  in  the  clear  ground.  General  Scott  was  about 
one  hundred  yards  in  my  front."  (See  map.)  "  I  did  expect  that  General  Scott  would 
have  moved  to  the  right,  as  there  was  a  vacancy  between  him  and  the  other  troops, 
.but  while  I  was  riding  up  to  him,  I  saw  his  troops  turn  about,  and  form  in  column,  and 
General  Scott  coming  to  meet  me.  He  told  me  our  troops  were  retreating  on  the 
right  and  we  must  get  out  of  that  place  ;  that  he  desired  his  cannon  to  go  along 
with  me  as  there  was  only  one  place  to  get  over  that  morass  (the  east  morass)  and 
he  would  get  out  of  that  if  he  could.  I  ordered  my  brigade  to  march  back." 

General  Wayne:  "received  orders  to  prepare  and  march.  Having  marched 
about  a  mile  with  a  detachment,  there  was  a  halt  made  in  front.  Half  an  hour  after 
received  a  message  by  one  of  General  Lee's  aids,  to  leave  my  detachment  and  come 
to  the  front  and  take  command  of  the  troops  in  front,  that  it  was  a  post  of  honor. 
When  I  arrived  there  I  found  about  six  hundred  rank  and  file,  with  two  pieces  of 
artillery  from  Scott's  and  Woodford's  brigades,  and  General  Varnum's  brigade  drawn 
up."  "  Scott's  advanced  up  a  morass,  the  other  in  rear  of  it."  This  was  just  at  the 
close  of  theyfr^/  skirmish  at  the  west  ravine. 

"  Upon  notice  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  from  the  Court  House,  General 
Lee  directed  that  the  troops  might  be  formed  so  as  to  cover  two  roads  that  were  in 
the  woods  where  the  troops  had  advanced  and  formed." 

"  Colonel  Butler  with  his  detachment,  and  Colonel  Jackson  with  his  detachment, 
were  ordered  to  the  front.  Colonel  Butler  formed  the  advance  guard  and  marched 
on.  The  troops  took  up  again  the  line  of  march  and  followed  him.  When  we 
arrived  near  the  edge  of  some  open  ground  in  view  of  the  Court  House,  we  observed 
a  body  of  the  enemy's  horse  drawn  up  on  the  north-west  side,  between  us  and  the 
Court  House.  General  Lee  ordered  the  troops  to  halt,  and  by  wheeling  them  to  the 
right  they  were  reduced  to  a  proper  front  to  the  enemy's  horse,  though  then  under 
cover  of  the  woods.  General  Lee  and  myself  were  advancing  to  reconnoiter  the 
enemy.  In  advancing  a  piece  forward,  General  Lee  received  some  message  which 
stopped  him.  I  went  on  to  a  place  where  I  had  a  fair  prospect  from  my  glass  of  the 
2nemy.  Their  horse  seemed  so  much  advanced  from  the  foot  that  I  could  hardly 
perceive  the  movement  of  the  foot,  which  induced  me  to  send  for  Colonel  Butler's 
detachment,  and  Colonel  Jackson's  detachment,  in  order  to  drive  their  horse  back. 


428  PREPARATIONS   FOR   THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.          [1778. 

I  then  detached  part  of  Butler's  people  who  drove  the  horse  into  the  village.  This 
was  the  second  skirmish  hereafter  noticed. 

"  I  could  perceive  the  enemy  were  moving  from  us  in  very  great  disorder  and 
confusion.  In  about  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  the  enemy  made  a  halt,  and  appeared  to 
be  forming  in  some  order.  This  intelligence  I  sent  by  one  of  my  volunteer  aids  to 
General  Lee,  and  requested  that  the  troops  might  be  pushed  on.  It  was  General 
Lee's  orders  that  I  should  advance  with  Colonel  Butler's  detachment  and  Colonel 
Jackson's  detachment.  Upon  advancing,  the  enemy  took  up  their  line  of  march  and 
began  to  move  on.  I  crossed  the  (east)  morass,  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  east 
of  the  Court  House,  (north-east)  near  to  the  edge  of  a  road  leading  to  Middletown, 
near  the  road  where  the  enemy  were  marching  upon. 

"  The  whole  of  the  enemy  then  in  view  halted.  I  advanced  a  piece  (a  short  dis 
tance)  in  front  of  the  troops,  upon  a  little  eminence,  to  have  a  view  of  the  position 
and  of  their  movements.  Our  troops  were  advancing  and  had  arrived  at  the  edge 
of  a  morass  rather  east  of  the  Court  House.  The  enemy  then  advanced  their  horse, 
about  three  hundred,  and  about  two  hundred  foot  to  cover  them.  The  horse  then 
made  a  full  charge  on  Colonel  Butler's  detachment,  and  seemed  determined  upon 
gaining  their  right  flank,  in  order  to  throw  themselves  in  between  us  and  our  main 
body  which  had  halted  at  the  morass.  He  broke  their  horse  by  a  well  directed  tire, 
which  ran  "  the  horse  "  among  their  foot,  broke  them  and  carried  them  off  likewise. 
(This  was  the  third  skirmish.)  We  had  not  advanced  above  two  hundred  yards, 
before  they  began  to  open  three  or  four  pieces  of  artillery  upon  us.  They  inclined 
first  to  our  right,  in  order  to  gain  a  piece  of  high  ground  to  the  right  of  where  I  lay, 
nearly  in  front  of  the  Court  House.  I  sent  off  Major  Biles  to  desire  our  troops  that 
were  in  view  and  in  front  of  the  morass  to  advance.  Our  artillery  began  to  answer 
theirs  from  about  a  half  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  Butler's  detachment,  when  Major  Biles 
returned,  and  informed  me  that  the  troops  were  ordered  to  repass  the  morass,  and 
they  were  then  retiring  over  it.  I  galloped  up  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  who 
was  in  the  rear  of  Livingston's  or  Stewart's  regiment,  who  said  he  was  ordered  to 
recross  the  morass,  and  form  near  the  Court  House,  from  that  to  the  woods.  I  again 
sent  to  General  Lee,  asking  that  troops  might  be  brought  up.  Major  Biles  or  Major 
Fishbourne  returned,  and  informed  me  that  the  troops  had  been  ordered  to  retire 
from  the  Court  House,  and  that  they  were  then  retiring.  About  the  same  time  one 
of  General  Lee's  aids  told  me  that  it  was  not  General  Lee's  intention  to  attack  them 
in  front,  but  he  intended  to  take  them,  and  was  preparing  a  detachment  to  throw 
upon  their  left.  I  then  crossed  the  ravine  myself,  and  went  with  General  Scott  to 
the  Court  House,"  but  "after  viewing  the  ground  about  the  Court  House,  sent  off  one 
of  my  aids  to  General  Lee  to  request  him  that  the  troops  might  again  be  returned  to 
the  place  they  had  left.  At  this  time  the  enemy  did  not  appear  to  be  above  two 
thousand,  about  a  mile  distant  in  front,  moving  on  to  gain  the  hill  before  mentioned. 
A  fire  was  kept  up  of  cannon  between  us  and  the  enemy  at  this  time.  Major  Fish- 
bourne  returned  and  informed  me  that  the  troops  were  still  retreating,  and  that 
General  Lee  would  see  me  himself.  Afterwards  I  perceived  the  enemy  begin  to 
more  rapidly  in  a  column  toward  the  Court  House.  I  again  sent  Major  Lenox  and 
Major  Fishbourne  to  General  Lee,  requesting  him  at  least  to  halt  the  troops  to  cover 
General  Scott,  and  that  the  enemy  were  advancing,  and  also  sent  to  order  Colonel 
Butler  to  fall  back,  as  he  was  in  danger  of  being  surrounded  and  taken." 


1778.]  PREPARATIONS   FOR  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  429 

"  General  Lee  did  not  again  goto  the  front,  but  fell  back  with  the 
retreating  troops,  then  a  mile  in  the  rear." 

Colonel  Jackson  "  received  orders  from  Colonel  Brooks,  acting  Adjutant-general 
of  Lee's  Division,  to  fall  in  the  rear  of  Maxwell's  brigade.  There  was  some  mis 
understanding  between  General  Scott's  detachment  and  General  Maxwell's  brigade, 
by  both  coming  into  the  road  at  the  same  time,  and  I  fell  in  the  rear  of  General 
Scott's  detachment.  While  I  was  there  I  received  orders  to  join  the  advance  guard 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  Butler.  We  marched  four  or  five  miles  "  (from 
Englishtown)  "  when  we  discovered  the  enemy  by  Monmouth  Court  House,  a  party  of 
horse  and  a  party  of  infantry.  Colonel  Butler  was  ordered  off,  and  I  imagine  (cor 
rectly)  to  fall  in  between  that  party  at  the  Court  House  and  their  main  body.  At 
this  time  the  division  under  General  Lee  halted.  Then  came  orders  from  General 
Wayne,  for  my  detachment  to  immediately  join  Colonel  Butler.  Before  that  I  had 
orders  from  General  Lee  to  support  Colonel  Oswald  with  his  artillery.  Upon  these 
orders  coming  from  General  Wayne,  General  Lee  ordered  me  off  immediately  to 
join  Colonel  Butler."  Colonel  Jackson  finally  gained  a  position  upon  the  left  (see 
map)  and  thus  describes  it.  "  I  did  not  like  my  position  at  all,  as  there  was  a  morass 
in  my  rear,  and  a  height  that  commanded  the  morass.  I  asked  Lieutenant-colonel 
Smith  if  he  did  not  think  it  best  for  me  to  cross  the  morass  and  post  myself  on  the 
height  that  crowned  it.  He  asked  if  I  had  any  orders,  I  answered  no.  He  made 
reply,  "  for  God's  sake,  don't  move  without  you  have  orders.  I  desired  him,  or  he 
offered,  to  go,  and  see  if  there  was  any  person  to  give  me  orders  ;  returned  in  a  few 
minutes  and  told  me  there  was  no  person  there.  I  told  him,  I'll  risk  it  and  cross  the 
rnorass." 

General  Forman,  "  rode  forward  to  discover  the  number  and  situation  of  the 
enemy,  shortly  after  the  enemy's  horse  had  charged  Colonel  Butler's  detach 
ment;  then  rode  in  quest  of  General  Lee,  and  offered  to  take  a  detachment, 
and  by  taking  a  road  upon  our  left,  to  double  their  right  flank.  General  Lee's 
answer  was, — I  know  my  business.  A  few  minutes  afterwards  I  saw  the  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette  direct  Colonel  Livingston's  and  Colonel  Stewart's  regiments  to  inarch 
toward  the  enemy's  left,  and  I  was  informed  by  the  Marquis,  that  he  was  directed  by 
General  Lee  to  gain  the  enemy's  left  flank.  In  this  time  there  was  a  cannonading 
from  both  parties,  but  principally  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  The  Marquis  did  not 
gain  the  enemy's  left  flank  :  as  I  supposed,  it  was  occasioned  by  a  retreat  that  had 
been  ordered  to  the  village,  I  presume  by  General  Lee,  as  he  was  present  and  did 
not  contradict  it." 

This  movement,  which  detached  the  regiments  of  Stewart  and 
Livingston  from  Wayne's  brigade  was  that  which  is  hereafter  referred 
to,  under  notice  of  third  skirmish,  which  induced  the  retreat  of  the 
entire  American  left. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Oswald,  "joined  Scott's  and  Varnum's  brigades  with  four 
pieces  of  artillery,  June  sixteenth  ;  at  half  an  hour  after  one  in  the  morning  of  the 
twenty-eighth,  we  were  assembled  in  the  rear  of  Englishtown, — marched  into 
Englishtown  where  we  were  detained  for  a  guide.  The  two  brigades  under  the 


430  PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  BATTLE  OF  MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

command  of  Colonel  Grayson,  advanced  toward  Monmouth  Court  House.  When 
\ve  reached  the  first  morass,  just  in  front  of  the  position  afterwards  taken  by  Lord 
Stirling,  we  then  received  intelligence  that  the  enemy  were  very  near  us.  Colonel 
Grayson  and  myself  rode  up  in  front  upon  the  hill  where  we  found  General  Dickin 
son  with  a  few  militia.  Colonel  Grayson  then  advanced  with  his  regiment  where 
the  militia  were  engaged  and  I  followed  with  one  piece  of  artillery.  When  we  got 
in  front  of  the  hedge-row  "  (afterwards  a  point  of  resistance)  "  we  saw  no  enemy, 
General  Lee,  General  Wayne  and  some  others  rode  off  to  reconnoiter  the  enemy. 
I  received  orders,  as  I  supposed  from  General  Lee,  to  join  Scott  and  Varnum's 
brigades  upon  the  hill.  At  this  bridge,  (the  west  ravine)  we  had  crossed  and  re- 
crossed  two  or  three  times,  in  consequence  of  the  intelligence  we  had  received 
being  vague  and  uncertain.  Colonels  Butler's  and  Jackson's  regiments  came  up 
and  were  advanced  in  our  front,  in  the  road,  Scott's  and  Varnum's  brigades  following 
them." 

The  subsequent  movements  of  Colonel   Oswald  are  embodied  in 
the  outline  of  the  third  skirmish,  after  he  crossed  the  east  morass. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Brooks,  acting  Adjutant-general,  "  received  the  order  from 
General  Washington  to  make  the  detail,"  already  noticed,  "  about  one  o'clock  in  the 
morning;  they  began  their  march  about  six;  about  seven,  Wayne's  and  Scott's 
detachments,  Maxwell's  brigade  and  Jackson's  corps  followed.  I  rode  forward  and 
found  General  Lee  at  the  Meeting  House  of  Freehold.  Intelligence  of  the  most 
contradictory  nature  was  momently  brought  General  Lee.  This  occasioned  Var 
num's  brigade  and  a  part  of  Scott's  to  pass  and  repass  the  bridge  "  (west  ravine)  " 
several  times.  General  Lee  now  said  he  would  pay  no  farther  regard  to  intelligence, 
but  would  march-  the  whole  command  and  endeavor  to  find  the  enemy,  and  know 
their  condition  for  himself.  For  this  purpose  Jackson's  detachment  was  ordered 
from  the  rear  to  join  the  advance  corps,  the  command  of  which  was  about  this  time 
given  to  General  Wayne.  Within  view  of  Monmouth  Court  House,  there  was  a  halt 
for  an  hour,  in  which  interval  General  Lee  reconnoitered  the  enemy,  who  put  on 
the  appearance  of  retiring  from  the  Court  House  somewhat  precipitately,  and  in  dis 
order.  When  they  had  retreated  about  a  mile,  on  the  Middletown  road,  they  halted 
and  formed  on  high  ground.  General  Lee  observed,  that  if  the  body  now  in  view 
were  all,  or  near  all,  that  were  left  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  main  body,  instead  of 
pushing  their  rear,  he  would  have  them  all  prisoners  ;  he  marched  his  main  body  to 
gain  the  enemy's  rear,  leaving  General  Wayne  with  two  or  three  pieces  of  artillery 
to  amuse  the  enemy  in  front,  but  not  to  push  them,  lest  his  project  should  be  frus 
trated.  After  coming  into  the  plain,  about  a  mile  below  the  Court  House,  I  observed 
the  head  of  General  Lee's  column  filing  to  the  right,  toward  the  Court  House.  A 
cannonading  had  now  taken  place  between  us  and  the  enemy.  When  I  came  in 
the  rear  of  Scott's  detachment  I  perceived  a  very  great  interval  between  that  and  the 
front  of  Maxwell's  brigade.  Upon  General  Maxwell  seeing  me  he  asked  if  I  had  any 
orders  from  General  Lee.  I  told  him  I  had  not.  .  .  General  Scott  came  up  about 
this  time  and  observed  that  our  troops  were  going  off  the  field  toward  the  Court 
House.  He  asked  me  whether  it  was  the  case.  I  told  him  I  knew  nothing  of  it,  if  it 
was  so.  During  this  time  all  the  columns  except  Maxwell's  were  moving  to  the 


1778.]  PREPARATIONS   FOR   THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  431 

right.  After  having  seen  several  battalions  pass  "  (repass)  "  the  ravine  I  returned  to 
the  point  where  General  Maxwell  was  and  found  Generals  Scott  and  Maxwell 
standing  together.  General  Maxwell  again  asked  me  if  I  had  any  orders.  I  told  him 
I  had  not," — "  I  rode  toward  the  ravine  to  find  General  Lee,  but  finding  the  enemy 
were  pushing  that  way,  thought  best  to  return  and  came  round  the  ravine  and  found 
General  Lee  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  this  side  "  (west)  "  of  the  Court  House.  He 
said,  you  see  our  situation ;  but  I  am  determined  to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  bargain. 
The  troops,  in  a  very  easy,  moderate  and  regular  way  continued  their  march  until 
they  had  passed  the  ravine,"  (middle  ravine)  "in  front  of  Carr's  House.  Upon 
asking  several  officers  who  appeared  to  command  the  battalions  why  they  left  the 
ground,  they  said  it  was  by  General  Lee's  and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette's  orders." 

Immediately  after,  the  battle  of  Monmouth   took  place ;  General 
Washington  in  person  commanding. 

Captain  Stewart,  of  the  artillery,  "  was  on  command  with  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette.  On  the  road  to  the  left  of  Monmouth  Court  House,  about  a  mile,  and  about 
half  after  ten  o'clock  in  the  day,  I  heard  the  discharge  of  several  pieces  of  cannon 
and  some  musketry  in  front.  I  immediately  unlimbered  my  pieces.  .  .  .  Gen 
eral  Lee  came  up  and  ordered  me  to  limber,  and  be  ready  to  inarch  on  immediately 
toward  the  enemy,  toward  Monmouth  Court  House  ;  at  the  same  time,  General  Var- 
num's  brigade  and  the  Marquis's  detachment  obliqued  to  the  right,  leaving  General 
Scott's  brigade  and  Colonel  Jackson's  corps  more  on  the  left." 

Colonel  Stewart  of  Wayne's  brigade  asked  General  Lee  "  where  he  should  take 
his  men,"  after  the  retreat  began,  and  he  answered,  "  take  them  to  any  place  to  save 
their  lives,  pointing  to  an  orchard  in  front." 

Captain  Mercer,  aid-de-camp  of  General  Lee,  says,  "  1  was  sent  by  General  Lee 
with  an  order  to  General  Dickinson,  to  inform  him  that  he  intended  to  attack  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  he  was  certain  of  their  march  for  Middletown.  About  one  o'clock 
in  the  morning  we  were  waked  up  by  a  letter  from  General  Washington,  signed  by 
Colonel  Hamilton."  ..."  After  Colonel  Grayson  had  marched,  I  was  ordered 
by  General  Lee  to  write  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  that  he  might  immediately  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  Wayne's  and  Scott's  detachments.  I  don't  conceive  that  the 
troops  were  ready  before  eight  o'clock  or  half-past  eight,  at  which  time  General  Lee 
set  out  from  his  quarters."  ..."  Subsequently,"  as  stated  in  report  of  third 
skirmish,  "  the  three  regiments  in  General  Wayne's  detachment,  Colonel  Wesson's, 
Stewart's  and  Livingston's  were  ordered  to  the  right."  "  The  enemy  were  then 
marching  back  again  to  the  Court  House.  General  Lee  said  he  believed  he  was  mis 
taken  in  their  strength,  but  as  they  were  returning  to  the  Court  House,  there  would 
be  no  occasion  to  push  that  column  further  to  the  left,  as  they  were  in  the  rear 
already."  At  this  point,  the  retreat  of  Grayson,  Scott,  and  Jackson  had  become  a 
necessity.  "  He  then  ordered  me  to  Scott,  with  orders  for  him  to  halt  his  column  in 
the  wood,  and  continue  there  until  further  orders.  I  asked  him  where  I  should  find 
General  Scott,  as  I  had  not  been  there  when  the  front  of  the  troops  filed  off.  He 
pointed  to  the  wood  over  the  ravine,  and  told  me  I  should  find  them  there."  I  made 
what  speed  I  could  to  the  ravine,  but  my  horse  being  very  tired  I  was  some  time  a 
going.  I  found  great  difficulty  in  passing  it  as  it  was  very  deep  and  miry.  When  I 


432 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  BATTLE  OF   MONMOUTH. 


got  over  to  the  other  side,  I  found  Colonel  Jackson's  regiment  retiring  over  the 
ravine  again.  I  took  a  transient  enfilade  view  of  the  enemy  ;  the  party  nearest  us 
seemed  to  be  a  brigade  of  artillery  ;  a  column  of  the  enemy  appeared  at  a  great  dis 
tance,  marching  toward  the  Court  House  on  the  right.  I  supposed  they  might  be 
about,  not  quite,  three  thousand  men  ;  their  horse,  very  considerable,  in  my  idea." 

This  officer's  testimony  is  immaterial  except  as  it  shows  the  want, 
of  system  with  which  the  army  was  handled.  The  testimony  of  La 
Fayette,  Knox,  and  twenty-seven  officers  not  cited,  simply  indicates 
one  fact ;  that  the  division  was  never  concentrated,  received  no  defi 
nite  orders,  and  handled  itself.  The  apology  for  these  facts  will  be 
found  in  the  record  of  the  battle. 


CHAPTER   LVI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MONMOUTH,  1778. 

THE  Battle  of  Monmouth  was  fought  during  the  afternoon  of 
June  twenty-eighth  1778,  at  Wenrock  Creek  in  Monmouth 
County,  New  Jersey ;  General  Washington  and  General  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  in  person  respectively  commanding  the  American  and  British 
armies.  The  original  purpose  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief 
has  been  already  stated.  The  division  of  General  Lee  advanced  too 
late  in  the  morning  to  realize  that  purpose,  and  the  mismanagement 
of  the  troops  after  they  marched,  as  certainly  imperiled  the  whole 
army. 

The  criticisms  of  the  battle  of  Monmouth  do  not  appreciate  that 
relation  of  the  two  columns  which  gave  to  five  thousand  American 
troops  an  immense  advantage,  by  striking  just  where  General  Wash 
ington  expected  the  blow  to  fall,  viz.,  upon  the  flank,  or  rear  of  a 
marching  column,  covering  at  least  four  miles  of  heavy  road. 

The  preliminary  movements  already  adverted  to  in  the  evidence 
cited,  will  be  again  noticed  for  a  more  definite  appreciation  of  the 
battle  itself. 

The  first  skirmish,  was  that  of  Dickinson's  reconnoitering  party, 
on  the  hill  just  east  of  the  west  ravine,  between  seven  and  eight 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  Colonel  Grayson  had  advanced  with  his 
select  detachment,  beyond  the  Freehold  Meeting  House,  half  a  mile. 
General  Dickinson  sent  a  messenger  to  Washington  and  Lee  with 
notice  of  the  British  retreat,  as  early  as  five  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

When  Colonel  Grayson  approached  the  first  ravine,  he  "  saw  firing, 
and  a  party  of  militia  retreating  from  the  enemy." 

General  Dickinson  was  then  engaged  with  a  small  flanking  party 

which  had  been  detached  from  the  British  left  wing,  and  which  he 

erroneously  supposed  to  be  the  advance  guard  of  their  returning  army. 

He  sent  for  aid.     Colonel  Grayson  crossed  the  bridge  with  one  regi- 

28 


434  THE   BATTLE    OF  MONMOUTH.  [1778 

ment  and  one  of  Oswald's  guns,  and  just  as  he  ascended  the  hill,  the 
British  retired.  General  Lee  arrived  soon  after.  At  this  time  there 
was  thorough  confusion  of  opinions  as  to  the  position  and  movements 
of  the  enemy.  General  Dickinson  claimed  that  the  British  were 
returning  from  the  Court  House.  Other  informants  stated  that  they 
were  retreating  towards  Middletown.  There  was  some  reason  for  the 
persistency  with  which  each,  "  with  some  heat "  pressed  their  views, 
as  there  had  been  no  reconnoissance,  in  force.  General  Lee,  however, 
insisted  that  the  British  army  had  retreated. 

General  Clinton  states  that  "  Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen 
marched  at  daylight ;  and  that  he  descended  into  the  plain  at  eight 
o'clock."  The  statements  that  the  British  had  left,  and  that  they  had 
not  left,  were  consistent  with  the  facts  as  known  to  the  different 
messengers,  since  General  Dickinson  referred  to  the  early  movement ; 
and  the  presence  of  Clinton's  division  near  the  Court  House  and  of 
the  flankers  with  whom  he  engaged,  induced  the  mistaken  opinion 
that  the  army  itself  had  returned  to  take  the  offensive.  As  the  result 
of  this  confusion,  the  brigades  of  Scott  and  Varnum  and  Colonel 
Durgee's  regiment  crossed  and  recrossed  the  west  ravine  several 
times,  as  stated  by  those  officers. 

The  presence  of  some  controlling  mind  was  needed :  Troops  were 
rapidly  concentrating  and  halting,  until  at  last  General  Lee  pushed 
Colonels  Butler  and  Jackson  forward,  each  with  two  hundred  men, 
and  then  went  in  person,  to  reconnoiter  the  position.  As  soon  as  Gen- 
eral  La  Fayette  arrived,  the  whole  division  crossed  the  ravine  and 
advanced  toward  the  Court  House.  It  had  been  discovered,  by  this 
time,  after  nine  o'clock,  that  the  British  left  wing  had  entirely  left  the 
Allentown  road  and  was  marching  toward  Middletown.  The  oppor 
tunity  for  striking  it  on  the  left  flank,  while  so  greatly  extended,  had 
been  lost. 

The  second  skirmish,  was  with  a  small  rear  guard,  north-west  of 
the  Court  House,  when  Butler,  then  in  advance,  acting  under  the 
orders  of  General  Wayne  drove  back  the  Queen's  rangers.  La  Fayette 
with  a  few  light  horse  from  Maxwell's  brigade,  passed  beyond  the  Court 
House  into  the  plain,  to  reconnoiter,  and  the  rear  guard  of  the  British 
aimy  was  then  "a  mile  in  advance."  Wayne  had  taken  a  position  on 
the  left  of  the  road  leading  to  the  Court  House  "  having  been  assigned 
to  the  post  of  honor,"  as  stated  by  General  Lee,  with  orders  to  press 
lightly  upon  the  British  rear  guard,  and  to  hold  it  until  a  movement 
could  be  made  to  cut  it  off  from  the  main  column.  As  soon  as  the 


1778.]  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  435 

Queen's  rangers  were  driven  through  the  village,  General  Wayne 
hastened  Colonel  Butler  across  the  east  ravine,  and  placed  his  detach 
ment,  with  two  guns,  upon  a  small  eminence  in  the  plain,  while  the 
other  brigades  were  following  the  general  lead  of  those  in  advance, 
until  they  formed  an  irregular  line  as  far  as  Briar  Hill. 

The  third  skirmish  took  place  just  after  Butler  reached  the  posi 
tion  last  referred  to,  and  while  the  troops  were  moving  from  the  woods 
near  the  Amboy  road,  to  the  plain  beyond  the  east  ravine,  under  the 
general  direction  of  General  Wayne.  The  British  light  dragoons 
made  a  charge  upon  Colonel  Butler  which  was  successfully  repulsed. 
Colonel  Grayson  was  in  advance  with  an  orchard  to  his  left ;  Jackson 
about  a  hundred  yards  in  his  rear;  then  Scott  somewhat  detached, 
and  Maxwell  on  the  edge  of  the  morass.  Grayson  was  informed  by  a 
messenger  from  General  Wayne,  that  he  must  hold  his  ground,  as  the 
enemy  was  retiring.  He  "  hallooed  to  Jackson  to  come  and  form 
upon  the  hill,  (Briar  Hill)  upon  his  left."  This  movement  was  one 
which  threatened  Knyphausen's  column,  just  when  it  was  buried  in  a 
long  defile,  and  Clinton  was  at  once  aroused  to  activity  to  save  the 
baggage  train  which  he  supposed  the  Americans  were  attempting  to 
attack.  Colonel  Jackson  disregarded  the  request  of  Colonel  Grayson, 
because  he  had  no  artillery.  Scott  was  then  a  little  to  the  rear  and 
right  of  Jackson.  Maxwell  expected  Scott  to  move  to  the  right,  to 
join  on  Wayne,  close  the  gap,  and  let  him  into  the  line.  Wayne 
meanwhile  held  the  regiments  of  Wesson,  Stewart,  and  Livingston  to 
the  left  of  Varnum,  to  cover  Butler  with  whom  he  advanced  still  fur 
ther  into  the  plain,  and  also  to  cover  Oswald's  artillery,  which  had 
drawn  two  additional  guns  from  Varnum's  brigade,  and  was  exchang 
ing  shots  with  the  artillery  of  the  enemy.  Major  Mercer  of  General 
Lee's  staff  told  Grayson  that  his  place  was  in  the  rear  of  Wayne,  who 
had  no  right  to  order  him  to  the  position  he  held  on  the  left.  Gen 
eral  Lee  states  that  "  he  sent  Major  Mercer,  and  then  a  second  officer, 
with  express  orders  to  General  Scott  to  hold  his  position."  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Grayson  had  part  of  Scott's  command,  and  both  were 
so  associated  with  Wayne,  that  when  he  moved  toward  the  Court 
House,  as  subsequently  ordered,  they  followed  his  movements,  and 
received  no  intimation  that  they  should  have  done  otherwise  until  the 
movement  was  actually  made,  and  the  whole  army  was  retreating,  by 
detachments,  before  the  advance  of  the  British  army.  The  American 
troops  had  deployed  quite  at  their  own  discretion.  Oswald  main 
tained  his  guns  in  position  until  his  ammunition  was  exhausted,  and 


THE   BATTLE  OF   MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

then  retired  behind  the  morass.  There  he  met  General  Lee,  who 
ordered  him,  upon  obtaining  ammunition,  to  continue  firing,  and  this 
was  done  over  the  heads  of  Butler's  advance  detachment,  and  with 
great  danger,  according  to  the  evidence,  of  doing  injury  to  those  troops. 
At  this  stage  of  the  conflict,  General  Lee  sent  orders  to  General 
Wayne  to  move  toward  the  right,  nearer  the  Court  House,  where  the 
enemy  were  threatening  a  movement.  The  regiments  of  Livingston 
and  Stewart  began  the  movement.  This,  for  want  of  orders  to  the 
contrary,  was  considered  by  Grayson  and  Scott  as  a  general  retreat, 
and  that  opinion  was  confirmed  by  the  evident  pressure  of  the  British 
left  toward  the  Court  House,  while  their  centre  and  right  emerged 
from  the  woods  into  the  plain,  thus  threatening  to  sever  the  American 
line,  already  weakened  in  the  centre,  and  cut  off  the  regiments  which 
were  on  the  left  toward  Briar  Hill.  The  artillery  had  not  returned, 
and  was  playing  from  time  to  time  in  the  rear  of  the  morass.  Gray- 
son,  Scott,  Jackson,  and  Varnum  recrossed  the  morass,  and  with  Max 
well  entered  the  wood  upon  the  hill  west  of  the  Amboy  road.  It  was 
not  until  then,  that  the  messengers  from  General  Lee  intimated  to 
General  Scott  that  he  was  to  remain  steady  on  the  left.  They  com 
municated  orders  to  re-form  the  line  in  the  woods  on  the  high  ground, 
the  right  resting  on  the  village.  General  Lee  states  that  he  supposed 
the  houses  were  of  stone,  but  when  he  found  that  the  village  was 
open,  and  the  houses  were  of  wood,  he  fell  back  before  the  British 
advance.  General  Lee  says  "  the  retreat  in  the  first  instance  was  con 
trary  to  my  intentions,  contrary  to  my  orders,  contrary  to  my  wishes." 

But  the  entire  division  was  in  fact  retreating,  quickened  at  this 
time  by  his  orders  ;  and  the  left  wing  only  saved  its  connection  with 
the  main  body  by  a  march  through  the  woods,  leaving  their  guns  to 
the  charge  of  Colonel  Oswald,  who,  with  his  few  men,  brought  off  ten 
pieces,  after  taking  but  two  into  action  at  first.  It  was  at  this  period 
that  a  messenger  from  General  Morgan,  "  having  in  vain  sought  for 
General  Lee,"  applied  to  General  Wayne  for  instructions,  and  was 
informed  that  "  he  could  see  the  condition  of  things  for  himself,  and 
report  the  facts  to  General  Morgan." 

Thus,  before  eleven  o'clock  or  half-past  eleven,  the  British  column, 
which  had  been  retreating  by  the  Middletown  road,  had  formed  an 
oblique  front  to  the  rear,  extending,  according  to  the  evidence  of 
General  Knox  and  Colonel  Hamilton,  who  saw  "  no  signs  of  any  plan 
for  the  cooperation  of  the  different  American  brigades  in  resistance  to 
the  movement!'  from  Briar  Hill  to  the  marsh  east  of  and  near  the  Court 


I778.J  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  437 

House.  The  British  troops  appeared  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  hardly 
a  mile  distant,  and  were  variously  estimated  at  from  fifteen  hundred 
to  twenty-five  hundred  men.  The  force  of  Lee  then  disposable  for 
attack  or  resistance,  if  properly  in  hand,  was  not  less  than  three  thou 
sand  men,  besides  Grayson's  detachment.  Wayne,  during  the  hour 
and  a  half  while  he  was  in  the  plain,  sent  three  times  to  urge  General 
Lee  to  advance  with  the  troops,  and  as  he  states,  refrained  from 
pressing  the  attack  too  strongly  under  instructions,  and  constantly 
expecting  that  General  Lee  would  carry  the  left  wing  around  the 
right  of  the  British  line  to  cut  it  off  from  the  main  body. 

General  Lee's  purpose,  as  understood  by  General  Wayne,  and  as 
stated  by  Lee  himself  was  to  so  swing  his  left  about  the  British  right 
as  to  take  them,  and  he  also  states  that  when  he  notified  General 
Washington,  who  sent  to  learn  the  progress  of  the  army,  that  he  was 
confident  of  success,  he  supposed  the  British  rear-guard  not  to  exceed 
fifteen  hundred  men.  His  estimate  was  correct,  at  the  time,  as  his 
whole  division  was  then  pressing  to  the  front,  eager  to  engage  the 
enemy  ;  but  at  noon  the  British  army  had  realized  the  weakness  of 
the  pursuit,  and  gained  time  to  turn  it  into  a  failure.  General  Lee, 
in  his  defense,  ridicules  the  application  of  General  Wayne  for  support  ; 
but  not  in  connection  with  his  statement  that  he  placed  him  at  the 
post  of  honor,  nearest  the  enemy,  and  with  the  largest  control  which 
any  subordinate  officer  had  over  the  movements  of  the  picked  troops 
then  in  front.  General  Lee  admits  that  he  sent  no  messenger  to 
Washington  to  advise  him  of  the  retreat,  and  in  his  appeal  to  the 
Court  Martial,  states  that  he  could  appreciate  the  feelings  of  Wash 
ington  when  the  column  rolled  back  upon  him  without  previous  notice 
of  disaster  ;  but  that  when  he  met  Washington  and  exchanged  words 
with  him,  he  did  not  know  that  the  men  had  thus  disorderly  fallen 
back  upon  the  main  body. 

The  retreat.  The  British  army  emerged  from  the  woods,  and 
pressed  toward  the  Court  House.  General  La  Fayette  first  reported 
to  General  Lee  that  the  right  was  threatened,  having  previously  been 
checked  in  his  advance  of  the  American  extreme  right,  by  General 
Lee's  personal  direction.  General  La  Fayette  then  consulted  Gen 
eral  Wayne,  and  placed  the  regiments  of  Livingston  and  Stewart  in 
position  to  resist  the  British  advance,  which  was  steady,  solid,  and  in 
good  order. 

The  details  of  the  retreat  of  different  brigades  and  regiments  are 
not  to  be  considered.  An  entirely  erroneous  opinion  prevails  as  to 


43$  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

their  behavior.  It  is  true  that  there  was  some  confusion,  through 
want  of  some  authoritative  direction  of  their  movements;  but  it  is  to 
be  noticed  that  there  was  nothing  of  the  nature  of  a  panic.  No  com 
mander  knew  why  he  retreated,  only  that  such  were  understood  to  be 
the  orders,  and  that  others  retreated,  and  no  troops  could  have  rallic  1 
more  promptly  than  they  did,  when  they  felt  the  presence  of  Wash 
ington.  General  Lee  deserves  credit  for  self-possession,  and  a  real 
purpose  to  bring  the  men  away  in  safety,  when  he  found  he  could  not 
handle  the  division.  The  troops  had  marched  and  countermarched 
under  blind  guidance,  during  a  day  of  extreme  heat,  were  falling  by 
the  wayside,  fainting  with  thirst,  and  worn  out,  with  no  stimulus  of 
hope  to  hold  them  up,  and  the  retreat  of  Monmouth  was  the  victory 
of  manhood  over  every  possible  discouragement  that  could  befall  an 
earnest  army  in  pursuit  of  a  retiring  adversary.  Regiment  after  regi 
ment,  brigade  after  brigade  hastened  to  cross  the  west  ravine,  and,  to 
his  credit,  Lee  came  with  the  last  column.  At  this  point  the  broken 
detachments  found  the  main  army.  Some  went  to  its  rear  to  rest  and 
rally  for  a  fresh  advance  in  the  evening.  Some  turned  about  and 
fought  until  their  pursuers  retired  from  the  field.  Colonel  Ogden  says, 
he  begged  General  Maxwell  to  halt  his  regiment  and  face  the  enemy, 
and  he  did  so  without  difficulty.  The  division  of  General  Lee  was 
saved  by  the  self-possession  of  its  officers,  and  the  wonderful  endur 
ance  of  the  rank  and  file. 

The  ordeal  of  Valley  Forge  saved  the  army.  The  arrival  of  Wash 
ington  restored  it. 

The  Fourth  Skirmish,  developed  the  BATTLE  OF  MONMOUTH.  It 
was  as  conspicuous  for  the  promptness  of  the  American  troops  to  respond 
to  intelligible  orders,  and  for  rigidity  in  position  under  fire,  as  their  first 
exposure  to  the  enemy  had  been  ungoverned  and  loosely  presented. 

The  cannonading  before  noon  aroused  Washington  to  his  full 
fighting  capacity.  The  return  of  his  aid-de-camp  with  the  assurance 
that  General  Lee  had  overtaken  the  British  army,  and  expected  to 
cut  off  their  rear-guard,  was  received  as  a  vindication  of  his  previous 
judgment  and  as  an  omen  of  success.  The  troops  dropped  every  in- 
cumbrance  and  forced  the  march.  Greene  took  the  right  at  the 
Meeting  House,  and  Stirling  led  the  left  directly  toward  the  hill  where 
he  subsequently  took  his  strong  position.  The  vanguard  under  WTash- 
ington  approached  the  bridge  at  the  west  ravine,  when  repeated  inter 
ruptions  of  his  progress  began  to  warn  him  that  the  battle  waited  for 
the  presence  of  the  Commander-in-chief. 


I77S.J  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  439 

First,  a  mounted  countryman,  then  a  frightened  fugitive  fifer,  told 
his  story.  "  After  a  few  paces,  two  or  three  more  persons  said,  that 
the  continentals  were  retreating."  The  whole  career  of  Charles  Lee 
was  quickly  brought  to  view.  Vague  and  painful  suspicions  and  more 
painful  apprehensions  aroused  Washington  to  duty.  Harrison  and 
Fitzgerald  were  dispatched  to  find  out  what  was  the  matter.  They 
met  Major  Ogden.  His  explanation,  strongly  expletive,  was  simply, 
"  They  are  flying  from  a  shadow."  Officer  after  officer,  detachment 
after  detachment,  came  over  the  bridge,  all  alike  ambiguous  in  their 
replies,  or  ignorant  of  the  cause  of  their  retreat.  Colonels  and  gen 
erals  came  with  broken  commands,  all  knowing  that  they  were  retreat 
ing,  but  no  one  able  to  say  more  than  that  such  were  the  orders,  and 
that  "  the  whole  British  army  was  just  behind."  Washington  hastened 
toward  the  bridge  and  met  Ramsey  and  Stewart,  Wayne  and  Varnum, 
Oswald  and  Livingston.  Upon  them  he  threw  the  burden  of  meeting 
the  British  columns,  and,  leading  the  way,  he  placed  them  on  the  hill. 
On  the  left,  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  he  established  Ramsey  and 
Stewart  with  two  guns,  with  the  solemn  assurance  that  he  depended 
upon  them  to  stop  pursuit.  On  the  right,  back  of  an  orchard,  and 
covered  by  a  thick  hedge  fence,  he  placed  Wayne  and  Varnum,  and 
Livingston  ;  and  Knox  and  Oswald  established  four  guns  there. 
Maxwell  and  other  generals  as  they  arrived  were  ordered  to  the  rear 
to  re-form  their  columns,  and  La  Fayette  was  intrusted  with  the  form 
ation  of  the  second  line,  until  he  could  give  the  halted  troops  a  posi 
tion  which  they  might  hold  while  he  should  bring  up  the  main  army 
to  their  support.  It  was  such  an  hour  as  tests  great  captains  and 
proves  soldiers. 

Already,  with  the  last  retreating  column,  General  Lee  had  appeared, 
and  finding  the  troops  in  line,  he  addressed  himself  to  a  change  of 
their  positions  and  such  an  arrangement  as  he  deemed  best  under  the 
circumstances.  It  had  been  his  purpose,  as  he  states,  after  he  passed 
Carr's  House  and  after  consultation  with  Wickoff,  who  knew  the  coun 
try,  to  place  artillery  on  Comb's  Hill,  which  attracted  his  attention. 
Mr.  Wickoff  showed  him  that  he  could  take  fence  rails  and  make  a 
crossing  of  the  morass  and  that  the  British  army  could  not  attack  him 
without  making  a  circuit  of  three  or  four  miles  to  the  south  ;  but  he 
said  there  was  no  time  for  that,  and  continued  his  retreat.  While 
demanding  the  reason  for  the  existing  disposition  of  the  troops  on 
the  hill  near  the  west  ravine  he  was  informed  that  Washington  had 
located  the  troops  himself.  Regarding  this  as  virtually  superseding 


440  THE   BATTLE   OF   MOM  MOUTH. 

him  in  command,  he  reported  to  General  Washington  for  orders,  and 
was  met  by  the  peremptory  demand  for  "  an  explanation  of  the  retreat." 
General  Lee  seemed  to  have  been  overwhelmed  by  Washington's 
sternness  of  manner  and  replied,  "  Sir — sir."  Upon  repetition  of  the 
inquiry,  he  stated  that  "  the  contradictory  reports  as  to  the  enemy's 
movements  brought  about  a  confusion  he  could  not  control,"  and 
reminded  Washington  that  "  the  thing  was  done  contrary  to  his 
opinion,  that  he  was  averse  to  an  attack,  or  general  engagement,  and 
was  against  it  in  council, — that  while  the  enemy  were  so  superior  in 
cavalry  we  could  not  oppose  them."  Washington  then  replied  that 
he  "  should  not  have  undertaken  it  unless  prepared  to  carry  it 
through,"  that,  "whatever  his  opinion  might  have  been,  he  expected 
his  orders  would  have  been  obeyed."  General  Lee  in  explanation 
of  this  interview,  says,  "some  expressions  let  fall  by  the  General, 
conveyed  the  idea  that  he  had  adopted  some  new  sentiments,  and 
that  it  was  his  wish  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  This  idea 
drew  forth  some  sentences  such  as  related  by  Colonel  Tilghman  " 
above  quoted  : — "  that  when  he  set  out  in  the  morning  it  was  with 
the  conviction  that  it  was  never  his  intention  to  hazard  or  court  a 
general  engagement.  What  his  excellency  meant  by  saying  that 
I  should  not  have  undertaken  what  I  had  no  intention  of  going 
through  with,  I  confess  I  did  not  then,  nor  do  I  this  day,  (August, 
1778)  understand.  The  several  councils  of  war  held,  on  the  subject 
of  the  operations  in  the  Jerseys,  reprobated  the  idea  of  risking  a  gen 
eral  engagement,  as  a  measure  highly  absurd  in  the  then  circumstances 
of  America  (for  since  the  time  those  councils  were  held,  circumstances 
are  much  altered) "  and  adds,  "  But  whatever  may  have  been  the 
good  sense  of  those  councils,  I  shall  readily  allow  that  they  ought  to 
have  little  or  no  weight  with  an  officer,  if  subsequent  orders  from  the 
Commander-in-chief,  or  even  a  hint  communicated,  had  been  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  give  reason  to  think  that  the  idea  had  been 
discarded,  and  that  the  General  had  adopted  a  plan  repugnant  to 
those  councils."  "  No  letter  I  received,  no  conversation  I  ever  held 
with  him,  indicated  an  intention,  or  wish,  to  court  a  general  engage 
ment  ;  if  he  had  I  protest  solemnly  that  whatever  I  might  have 
thought  of  the  wisdom  of  the  plan,  I  should  have  turned  my  thoughts 
solely  to  its  execution."  General  Washington  closed  the  interview  by 
asking  General  Lee  if  he  would  take  command,  while  he  could  form 
the  army  in  the  rear.  Lee  says,  "  When  Washington  asked  me 
whether  I  would  remain  in  front  and  retain  the  command  or  he  should 


I7?8. 1  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  441 

take  it,  I  answered,  that  I  undoubtedly  would,  and  that  he  should 
see  that  I  myself  should  be  one  of  the  last  to  leave  the  field.  Colonel 
Hamilton  flourishing  his  sword,  immediately  exclaimed,  "  That's  right, 
my  dear  General,  and  I  will  stay  and  we  will  all  die  here,  on  the  spot." 
Lee  says  : — "  the  position  was  not  one  to  risk  anything  further  than 
the  troops  which  then  halted  on  it,"  and  ridicules  what  he  styles 
Colonel  Hamilton's  "  flustrated  manner  and  phrenzy  of  valor,"  and 
adds  "  I  answered,  I  am  responsible  to  the  General  and  to  the  conti 
nent,  for  the  troops  I  have  been  entrusted  with.  When  I  have  taken 
proper  measures  to  get  the  main  body  in  a  good  position,  I  will  die 
with  you,  on  the  spot,  if  you  please." 

It  is  worthy  of  record  that  no  witness  on  the  trial  of  General  Lee 
puts  profane  words  in  Washington's  mouth,  neither  does  General  La 
Fayette  in  his  memoirs,  but  all  accounts  concur,  that  his  personal 
bearing,  manner  and  tone  of  voice  were  expressive  of  that  sublime 
wrath  which  followed  his  conviction  that  the  country  and  the  army 
were  willfully  imperiled  by  the  disobedience  of  Charles  Lee. 

Washington  placed  his  army  in  position  ;  Greene  on  the  right  ; 
Stirling  on  the  left,  where  an  admirable  disposition  of  artillery  pre 
pared  him  to  withstand  the  British  column,  and  La  Fayette  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  second  line.  General  Greene  sent  five  guns 
to  Combs'  Hill,  where  they  would  have  enfilading  fire  upon  the  British 
columns  as  they  advanced  against  Wayne's  line,  and  the  battle  of 
Monmouth  began. 

General  Clinton  "  marched  at  eight  o'clock  A.  M.  Soon  after, 
some  reconnoitering  parties  appeared  on  the  left  flank"  (Dickinson's 
skirmish).  "  The  Queen's  Rangers  fell  in  with,  and  dispersed  some 
detachments  among  the  woods,  in  the  same  quarter  "  (Butler's  skir 
mish).  **  The  rear-guard  having  descended  from  the  heights  above 
Freehold,  into  a  plain,  about  three  miles  in  length  and  about  one  in 
breadth,  several  columns  of  the  enemy  appeared  likewise  descending 
into  the  plain,  and  about  ten  o'clock  they  began  cannonading  our  rear. 
Intelligence  was  at  this  instant  brought  me,  that  the  enemy  were 
discovered  marching  in  force  on  both  our  flanks.  I  was  convinced 
that  our  baggage  was  their  object ;  but  it  being  at  this  juncture 
engaged  in  defiles,  which  continued  for  some  miles,  no  means  occurred 
of  parrying  the  blow,  but  attacking  the  corps  which  harassed  our 
rear,  and  pressing  it  so  hard  as  to  oblige  the  detachments  to  return 
from  our  flanks  to  its  assistance.  I  had  good  information  that 
Washington  was  up  with  his  whole  army,  estimated  at  about  twenty 


442  THE   BATTLE   OF  MONMOUTH.  [1778 

thousand ;  but  as  I  knew  there  were  two  defiles  between  him  and  the 
corps  at  which  I  meant  to  strike,  I  judged  that  he  could  not  have 
passed  them  with  a  greater  force  than  what  Lord  Cornwallis'  division 
was  well  able  to  engage.  The  enemy's  cavalry,  commanded  it  is  said 
by  M.  La  Fayette,  having  approached  within  our  reach,  they  were 
charged  with  great  spirit  by  the  Queen's  light  dragoons.  They  did 
not  wait  the  shock,  but  fell  back  in  confusion  upon  their  own  infantry. 
Thinking  it  possible  that  the  event  might  draw  to  a  general  action,  I 
sent  for  a  brigade  of  British  and  the  Seventeenth  light  dragoons  from 
Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen's  division,  and  having  directed  them 
on  the  march,  to  take  a  position  effectually  covering  our  right  flank, 
of  which  I  was  most  jealous,  I  made  a  disposition  of  attack  upon  the 
plain  ;  but  before  I  could  advance,  the  enemy  fell  back  and  took  a 
strong  position  on  the  heights  above  Freehold  Court  House.  .  .  . 
The  British  grenadiers,  with  their  left  to  the  village  of  Freehold,  began 
the  attack  with  so  much  spirit  that  the  enemy  gave  way  immediately. 
The  second  line  of  the  enemy,  on  the  hill  east  of  the  west  ravine, 
stood  the  attack  with  great  obstinacy  but  were  likewise  completely 
routed.  They  then  took  a  third  position,  with  a  marshy  hollow  in 
front,  over  which  it  would  have  been  scarcely  possible  to  have 
attacked  them.  However,  part  of  the  second  line  made  a  movement 
to  the  front,  occupied  some  ground  on  the  enemy's  left  flank  and  the 
light  infantry  and  Queen's  rangers  turned  their  left.  By  this  time  our 
men  were  so  overpowered  by  fatigue  that  I  could  press  the  affair  no 
farther,  especially  as  I  was  confident  the  end  was  gained  for  which 
the  attack  had  been  made.  I  ordered  the  light  infantry  to  join  me  ; 
but  a  strong  detachment  of  the  enemy"  (Wayne)  "  having  possessed 
themselves  of  a  post  which  would  have  annoyed  them  in  their  retreat, 
the  Thirty-third  regiment  made  a  movement  toward  the  enemy, 
which  with  a  similar  one  made  by  the  First  grenadiers,  immediately 
dispersed  them.  I  took  the  position  from  whence  the  enemy  had 
been  first  driven  after  they  had  quitted  the  plain,  and  having  reposed 
the  troops  till  ten  at  night  to  avoid  the  excessive  heat  of  the  day,  I 
took  advantage  of  the  moonlight*  to  rejoin  Lieutenant-general  Knyp- 
hausen,  who  had  advanced  to  Nut  swamp  near  Middletown." 

The  attack  which  was  "  withstood  "  with  great  obstinacy,  was  at 
the  hedge-row  where  the  Second  battalion  of  British  grenadiers  suf 
fered  extremely,  losing  their  gallant  commander  Lieutenant-colonel 
Monckton,  whose  body  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Americans.  Adol- 

*  No  moon,  after  ten  o'clock 


I7?8.]  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  443 

phus  states  that  "  relays  of  grenadiers  buried  his  body,  taking  turns 
during  the  battle,  and  using  bayonets  for  shovels,  mingling  tears  with 
the  earth  they  cast  upon  his  body."  The  grenadiers  fell  back  after 
the  third  assault  without  rescuing  the  body  of  their  leader,  and  the 
Americans  withdrew  behind  the  ravine.  The  attempt  of  General 
Clinton  to  cross  in  force,  and  turn  the  American  left  and  right,  in  turn, 
was  met  by  Generals  Stirling  and  Greene  with  promptness ;  and 
General  Wayne's  command,  which  was  directly  in  front  of  the  bridge, 
maintained  such  a  galling  fire  that  the  regiments  referred  to  by 
General  Clinton  were  promptly  withdrawn. 

Upon  the  retreat  of  the  British  army  behind  the  middle  ravine, 
messengers  were  sent  to  Englishtown  to  bring  a  portion  of  the  trooos 
which  had  been  sent  there  for  re-formation,  under  the  direction  of 
General  Steuben,  at  the  time  of  the  first  retreat.  When  the  troops 
retired  from  the  hedge-row,  General  Lee  reported  to  General  Wash 
ington,  and  "requested  his  excellency's  pleasure,  how  he  should  dis 
pose  of  the  troops,  whether  to  form  in  front,  along  with  the  main  body, 
or  draw  them  up  in  the  rear."  He  "  was  ordered  to  arrange  them  in 
the  rear  of  Englishtown  at  three  miles  distance."  General  Steuben 
says,  u  I  joined  General  Lee  on  horseback  before  a  house,  who  said  he 
was  very  glad  of  my  having  taken  that  charge  upon  me,  for  he  was 
tired  out."  "  General  Maxwell's  brigade,  a  part  of  General  Scott's 
detachment,  were  formed  behind  the  creek  at  Englishtown  ;  then  three 
brigades  of  the  line  which  arrived  with  General  Patterson,  and  the 
second  brigade  of  General  Smallwood.  The  cannonading  continued 
more  or  less  briskly  until  past  five  o'clock.  Half  an  hour  after  it 
ceased,  Colonel  Gimat  arrived  and  brought  me  the  order  from  the 
Commander-in-chief,  that  the  enemy  were  retreating  in  confusion,  and 
that  I  should  bring  him  a  reinforcement.  I  ordered  General  Maxwell 
to  take  the  command  of  the  troops  I  had  placed  behind  the  creek,  and 
to  remain  there  till  further  orders.  I  then  marched  off  with  the  three 
brigades  of  the  second  line.  As  I  passed  through  Englishtown,  7 
again  met  General  Lee,  who  asked  me  '  where  I  was  going ;  '  I 
imparted  to  him  the  order  I  had  received  from  the  Commander-in- 
chief,  which  I  delivered  in  the  very  expressions  of  Colonel  Gimat, 
that  the  enemy  were  retreating  in  confusion.  Upon  that  word 
confusion,  he  took  me  up,  and  said  they  were  only  resting  themselves  ; 
but  said  he  afterwards,  '  I  am  sure  there  is  some  misunderstanding  in 
your  being  to  advance  with  these  troops.'  It  was  not  until  General 
Muhlenberg,  who  led  the  column,  halted,  and  the  precise  orders  of 


444  THE   BATTLE   OF   MONMOUTH.  [1778. 

General  Washington  were  repeated,  that  General  Lee  could  understand 
that  the  cessation  of  firing  was  actually  occasioned  by  the  retreat  of 
the  British  army,  and  not  by  the  defeat  of  the  army  of  Washington. 
'  Then/  said  he,  '  you  are  to  march,'  and  General  Steuben  marched 
with  the  troops." 

During  the  evening  General  Woodford's  brigade  was  advanced  on 
the  right,  and  General  Poor's  on  the  left,  for  the  purpose  of  an  early 
attack  upon  the  British  army  the  following  morning.  General  Clinton 
having  realized  every  possible  benefit  from  his  return  of  the  offensive, 
skillfully  withdrew  his  army,  and  the  oppressive  hot  weather  pre 
vented  pursuit. 

The  British  casualties  as  reported  by  General  Clinton  were  as  fol 
lows  :  Lieutenant-colonel  Monckton,  Captain  Gore,  Lieutenants 
Vaughan  and  Kennedy,  four  sergeants,  and  fifty-seven  rank  and  file 
killed ;  three  sergeants  and  fifty-six  rank  and  file  died  from  fatigue  ; 
Colonel  Trelawney,  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe,  Major  Gardner,  Cap 
tains  Cathcart,  Bereton,  Willis,  Leighton,  Powell,  Bellue  and  Ditmasy 
and  Lieutenants  Kelley,  Paumier,  Goroffe,  Desborough  and  Gilchrist, 
seven  sergeants,  one  hundred  and  forty-eight  rank  and  file  wounded, 
and  sixty-one  rank  and  file  missing. 

General  Washington  reported  the  American  casualties  as  follows  . 
Lieutenant-colonel  Bonner,  Major  Dickinson,  three  captains,  three 
lieutenants,  one  sergeant,  eight  artillery  men,  and  fifty-two  rank  and 
file  killed ;  two  colonels,  nine  captains,  six  lieutenants,  one  ensign, 
one  adjutant,  nine  sergeants,  eleven  artillery  men,  and  one  hundred 
and  twenty-two  rank  and  file  wounded  \  five  sergeants,  one  artillery 
man,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-six  rank  and  file  missing^  many 
of  whom  who  had  been  overcome  by  the  heat,  afterwards  came  up." 

The  two  reports  indicate  nearly  equal  casualties  in  the  two  armies. 
General  Washington  states  that  four  British  officers,  and  forty 
privates  whose  wounds  were  too  dangerous  to  permit  their  removal, 
were  left  on  the  field  by  General  Clinton,  and  that  the  parties  having 
in  charge  the  burial  of  the  dead,  reported  the  British  dead  at  four 
officers,  including  Lieutenant-colonel  Monckton,  and  two  hundred 
and  forty-two  privates.  With  due  allowance  for  the  usual  errors  in 
reports  of  burying  parties,  it  is  evident  that  the  detail  of  General  Clin 
ton's  report  is  defective,  as  it  leaves  many  men  unaccounted  for,  who 
were  dropped  from  his  subsequent  report  of  the  strength  of  his  army. 

Lord  Mahon  says,  "  On  the  whole  it  was  a  pitched  battle." 

Adolphus  says,  "  The  affair  ought  to  have  terminated  when  Lee 


1773.]  THE  BATTLE  OF   MONMOUTH.  445 

was  first  compelled  to  retire.  There  was  no  hope  of  making  an 
advantageous  assault  on  the  enemy  protected  by  defiles  and  marshes.'* 

Lamb  says,  "  The  conduct  of  Washington  was  highly  creditable  to 
his  military  skill." 

Stedman  states  that  "  It  was  impossible  to  attack  Washington's 
front  with  any  prospect  of  success,  that  the  judicious  position  which 
he  took  probably  saved  his  advanced  corps  from  total  ruin." 

Gordon  says,  "  Washington  animated  his  forces  by  his  gallant 
example,  and  by  exposing  his  person  to  every  danger  common  to  the 
meanest  soldier,"  and  that  "  the  behavior  of  the  American  troops  in 
general,  after  recovering  from  the  first  surprise  occasioned  by  the 
retreat,  was  mentioned  as  what  could  not  be  surpassed." 

A  General  Court  Martial,  Major-general  Stirling  presiding,  found 
General  Lee  "  guilty  of  disobedience  of  orders  in  not  attacking  the 
enemy  on  the  28th  of  June,  agreeable  to  repeated  instructions,  of 
misbehavior  before  the  enemy,  by  making  an  unnecessary,  and  in 
some  few  instances  a  disorderly  retreat  ;  and  of  disrespect  to  the 
Commander-in-chief,  in  two  letters  dated  the  1st  of  July  (2Qth  June), 
and  the  28th  of  June  (3Oth  June),  and  sentenced  him  to  be  suspended 
from  command  for  the  term  of  twelve  months." 

(The  error  in  the  date  of  the  first  letter  was  corrected  by  General 
Lee  on  the  3Oth,  when  he  made  another  misdate,  as  above  corrected). 

The  finding  of  the  Court  Martial  was  sustained  by  Congress,  by 
fifteen  affirming  and  seven  dissenting  votes.  General  Lee  was  not 
known  then  as  he  subsequently  made  himself  known,  and  he  had 
strong  partisan  advocates  of  his  cause.  If  he  had  been  in  sympathy 
with  Washington,  he  would  have  received  no  censure.  If  he  had 
exercised  reasonable  self-control  at  the  close  of  the  action,  he  would 
have  saved  his  commission.  He  contended  indeed  with  many  diffi 
culties.  He  "  knew  few  of  the  officers,"  the  country  was  unknown, 
the  guides  were  few,  and  his  staff  seem  to  have  been  inefficient,  even 
in  executing  his  restricted  orders  ;  but  he  had  earnestly  solicited  the 
command,  and  thus  fatally  closed  his  military  career  at  Monmouth. 

His  subsequent  death  was  marked  by  an  atrocious  contempt  of  his 
Maker,  and  of  religion,  so  that  even  in  his  will  he  perpetuated  that 
hatred  of  moral  responsibility  and  true  duty  which  rendered  his  suc 
cess  while  living  absolutely  impossible.  It  is  but  justice  to  the  reader 
of  history,  that  this  element  of  Charles  Lee's  character  should  be  per 
petuated  ;  not  only  for  its  painful  lesson,  but  as  affording  an  additional 
key  to  the  motives  and  conduct  of  his  restless  career 


CHAPTER  LVII. 

FROM  MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.    SIEGE   OF   NEWPORT. 
CONCURRENT  EVENTS. 

GENERAL  Sir  Henry  Clinton  reached  New  York  the  last  ot 
June  without  further  detention.  At  that  date  the  only  con 
siderable  posts  in  the  Northern  States  which  remained  under  his 
control,  were  those  of  New  York,  Staten  Island,  and  Newport,  Rhode 
Island.  Sir  Augustine  Prevost  was  in  command  at  St.  Augustine, 
Florida.  The  British  Cabinet  resolved  to  renew  operations  in  the 
Southern  States  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  that  General  Carleton 
should  again  occupy  the  posts  on  Lake  Champlain.  This  was  con 
sistent  with  the  plan  suggested  by  General  Lee,  who  expressed  the 
opinion,  in  a  letter  to  General  Washington,  immediately  after  the 
battle  of  Monmouth,  claiming  immediate  trial  before  a  general  Court 
Martial,  that  "  the  campaign  would  close  the  war." 

General  Clinton  was  hardly  settled  in  his  headquarters,  when  the 
post  at  Newport  was  threatened  by  a  large  American  force,  acting  in 
concert  with  a  French  fleet.  General  Washington '  marched  from 
Monmouth  to  Brunswick,  where  he  rested  his  troops ;  thence 
to  Paramus  and  Haverstraw  Bay,  on  the  Hudson,  and  finally  re 
established  his  headquarters  at  White  Plains  on  the  twenty-second 
of  July. 

On  the  eighth  the  Count  D'Estaing  made  the  Delaware  Capes  with 
the  following  squadron  of  twelve  ships,  and  four  frigates,  viz.,  Lan- 
guedoc,  90  ;  Tonnant,  80  ;  Caesar,  74  ;  Guerriere,  74  ;  Protecteur,  74 ; 
Provence,  64;  Valliant,  64;  Saggitaire,  54;  Chiniere,  30;  L'En- 
geante,  26  ;  L'Alemence,  26  ;  L'Arimable,  26.  The  Chiniere  was  sent 
to  Philadelphia  with  Silas  Deane,  one  of  the  American  commissioners 
just  returned  from  Paris,  and  Monsieur  Conrad  A.  Gerard,  the  first 
French  Ambassador  to  the  United  States. 


446* 


1778.]  FROM   MONMOUTH   TO  NEW   YORK.  447 

The  remainder  of  the  squadron  having  nearly  four  thousand  troops 
on  board,  sailed  for  Sandy  Hook  as  soon  as  advised  of  the  evacuation 
of  Philadelphia. 

The  French  fleet  sailed  from  Toulon  on  the  thirteenth  of  April, 
but  on  account  of  contrary  winds,  did  not  pass  Gibraltar  until  the 
fifteenth  of  May. 

An  ordinary  voyage  would  have  anticipated  the  departure  of 
Admiral  Howe  from  the  Delaware  and  have  imperiled  both  his  fleet 
and  the  army  of  General  Clinton.  The  British  fleet,  then  at  New 
York,  was  greatly  inferior  to  that  of  the  French  and  consisted  of  only 
six  sixty-fours,  three  fiftys,  two  fortys  and  a  few  small  frigates. 
Other  ships  were  hastily  armed,  and  extraordinary  measures  were 
taken  for  extreme  resistance ;  but  the  draught  of  water  on  the  lower 
bar  would  not  allow  the  heaviest  of  the  French  ships  to  enter  the  har 
bor,  and  the  chief  benefits  from  the  presence  of  that  squadron 
were  derived  from  the  capture  of  vessels  which  approached  New  York 
without  knowledge  of  their  arrival.  A  fact  in  this  connection  illus 
trates  the  uncertainty  of  naval  movements. 

The  British  government  ordered  an  additional  squadron  for 
America  as  soon  as  advised  that  France  designed  to  cooperate  actively 
with  the  United  States  in  war  with  Great  Britain.  The  fleet  sailed 
from  Portsmouth  on  the  twentieth  of  May,  but  upon  a  report  that 
the  fleet  of  Count  D'Estaing  was  bound  for  the  West  Indies  the 
order  was  suspended ;  so  that  Admiral  Byron,  who  was  sent  with 
twenty-two  ships  to  relieve  Lord  Howe,  recalled  at  his  own  request, 
went  into  Plymouth  and  did  not  sail  again  until  the  fifth  of  June. 
This  fleet  was  greatly  scattered  by  storms.  Four  ships  reached 
Sandy  Hook,  separately,  soon  after  the  departure  of  Count  D'Estaing, 
and  thereby  escaped  capture. 

The  Americans  criticised  the  failure  of  the  Count  D'Estaing  to 
•engage  the  British  fleet,  but  without  cause.  Even  Stedman  intimates 
that  he  "  did  not  seriously  intend  to  make  an  attempt  against  the 
harbor  of  New  York !  "  A  letter  to  the  President  of  Congress  dated 
the  twenty-sixth  of  August,  1778,  contains  the  following  conclusive 
statement. 

"  The  pilots  procured  by  Colonels  Laurens  and  Hamilton  "  (of 
Washington's  staff)  "  destroyed  all  illusion." 

"  These  experienced  persons  unanimously  declared,  that  it  was 
impossible  to  carry  us  in.  I  offered,  in  vain,  a  reward  of  fifty  thou 
sand  crowns  to  any  one  who  would  promise  success.  All  refused. 


44§  FROM  MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.  [i7?8. 

and  the  particular  soundings,  which  I  caused  to  be  taken,  myself,  too 
well  demonstrated  that  they  were  right." 

Washington  determined  to  make  the  capture  of  Newport  the 
immediate  objective  of  the  campaign,  while  the  French  fleet  remained 
in  American  waters. 

The  condition  of  the  British  garrison  at  New  York  was  such  that, 
early  as  the  ninth  of  July,  General  Clinton  wrote  to  Lord  Germaine 
that  he  "  might  be  compelled  to  evacuate  the  city  and  return  to 
Halifax."  On  that  day.  the  Count  D'Estaing  anchored  near  Point 
Judith,  Long  Island  Sound,  within  five  miles  of  Newport. 

Washington  directed  General  Sullivan,  then  stationed  at  Provi 
dence,  to  call  in  the  New  England  militia  for  a  combined  movement 
against  Newport  and  its  defenses ;  assigned  Generals  Greene  and  La 
Fayette  to  command  divisions,  and  ordered  the  brigades  of  Varnum 
and  Glover  to  join  La  Fayette's  division.  These  officers  served  with 
Greene  before  Boston,  and  Varnum  was  in  the  original  company 
which  marched  with  Greene,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  pro 
posed  cooperation  of  French  troops  made  the  assignment  of  La  Fa 
yette  equally  judicious. 

The  American  force  which  assembled  at  Providence  was  about 
ten  thousand  men.  Reference  is  made  to  map,  "  Siege  of  Newport." 

The  British  garrison  consisted  of  six  thousand  men  under  Major- 
general  Pigott,  and  embraced  the  following  troops ; — the  Twenty- 
second,  Forty-third,  Fifty-fourth  and  Sixty-third  British  regiments ; 
Fanning's  and  Brown's  Provincials ;  the  following  regiments  of 
Hessian  chasseurs,  viz.,  Huyn,  Banau,  Ditforth,  Landgrave,  Seaboth 
and  Voit.  Two  Hessian  regiments  and  Brown's  Provincials  were 
stationed  on  Connanicut  Island  ;  but  were  withdrawn  to  a  strongly 
intrenched  camp  in  front  of  Newport,  when  the  French  fleet 
entered  the  harbor.  On  the  fifth  of  August,  two  French  ships 
entered  the  Narraganset  passage,  and  two  frigates  passed  in  through 
the  eastern,  or  Seaconnet  Channel. 

The  British  frigates  which  had  secured  the  garrison  from  attack 
up  to  that  time,  were  destroyed,  to  prevent  their  capture.  The 
Juno,  32  ;  Lark,  32  ;  Orpheus,  32  ;  Cerberus  32  ;  and  the  King-Fisher, 
1 6,  were  burned  ;  and  the  Flora,  32,  and  the  Falcon,  18,  were  sunk. 

It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  General  Sullivan  unwisely  detained 
the  French  fleet  in  the  offing,  and  neglected  military  courtesies  which 
were  no  less  deserved  than  proper,  while  he  was  maturing  his  plans 
for  operations  by  land.  The  French  troops  had  been  nearly  five 


1778.]  FROM    MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.  449 

months  on  ship-board,  and  their  prompt  landing  would  have  averted 
subsequent  disaster. 

The  tenth  of  August  was  designated  for  the  attack.  The  Ameri 
can  troops  were  to  cross  from  Tiverton  to  Rhode  Island  at  Rowland's 
Ferry,  and  the  French  troops  were  to  land  on  the  west  side,  nearly 
opposite  Byer's  Island.  On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth,  without 
giving  notice  to  the  French  commander,  General  Sullivan  crossed  from 
Tiverton,  and  occupied  the  north  end  of  Rhode  Island.  The  French 
had  forced  the  middle  and  eastern  passages  on  the  eighth,  in  readi 
ness  to  land  on  the  tenth.  General  Sullivan  had  previously  notified 
Count  D'Estaing  that  he  could  not  move  earlier  than  the  tenth, 
because  of  the  non-arrival  of  militia  and  other  troops  daily  expected 
in  camp.  Count  D'Estaing  was  a  Lieutenant-general  of  the  French 
army,  while  General  Sullivan  was  only  a  Major-general ;  but  the 
French  officer  gracefully  declined  a  command,  and  as  gracefully  pro 
posed  to  attach  the  French  troops  to  the  division  of  General  La 
Fayette.  The  precipitate  landing  of  the  American  troops  discon 
certed  the  plan  of  attack,  but  did  not  engender  a  conflict  between 
the  American  and  French  commanders,  as  so  often  stated  at  that 
period,  and  currently  believed. 

General  Sullivan  notified  Count  D'Estaing  that  "  in  consequence 
of  the  abandonment  of  the  north  end  of  Rhode  Island  by  the  British 
troops,  when  the  French  ships  forced  a  passage  into  the  harbor,  he 
had  occupied  the  position,"  and  "  had  made  a  descent  upon  the  island 
without  waiting  for  the  day  appointed."  Count  D'Estaing  "  had  been 
assured  that  morning,  that  not  more  than  two  thousand  men  had 
landed,"  and  "  believing  that  his  (Sullivan's)  situation  required  prompt 
succor,"  made  a  personal  visit  to  General  Sullivan.  His  own  state 
ment  of  the  matter  is  highly  honorable  to  his  judgment  and  candor. 
In  a  report  to  the  President  of  Congress,  he  says,  "  Knowing  that 
there  are  moments  which  must  be  eagerly  seized  in  war,  I  was  cautious 
of  blaming  any  overthrow  of  plans,  which  nevertheless  astonished  me, 
and  which  in  fact  merits  in  my  own  opinion  only  praise,  although  accu 
mulated  circumstances  might  have  rendered  the  consequences  very 
unfortunate." 

The  Count  D'Estaing  visited  General  Sullivan  without  information 
that  the  British  fleet  at  New  York  had  been  reinforced,  and  was  on 
its  way  to  Newport. 

On  the  eighth,  General  Washington  wrote,  that  he  "  had  received 
a  letter  from  General  Maxwell,  dated  at  nine  o'clock  the  previous 
29 


450  FROM   MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.  [1778. 

morning,  near  Staten  Island,  stating  that  Lord  Howe  had  sailed  from 
the  Hook  with  his  fleet,"  adding,  with  peculiar  forecast  of  the  future, 
"  unless  the  fleet  may  have  received  advices  of  a  reinforcement  on  the 
coast,  ...  it  can  only  be  accounted  for  on  the  principle  of  des 
peration,  stimulated  by  a  hope  of  finding  you  divided  in  your  opera 
tions  against  Rhode  Island."  The  Count  D'Estaing  visited  General 
Sullivan  with  no  apprehension  that  his  fleet  was  in  danger.  "  Two 
of  the  French  ships  were  out  of  the  port  in  the  Sound  ;  two  others 
were  at  the  north  end  of  the  west  channel ;  three  frigates  were  in  the 
east  channel,  and  the  eight  ships  which  forced  the  middle  passage 
were  between  Rhode  Island,  thickly  set  with  batteries,  and  Connani- 
cut  Island.  A  large  number  of  his  sailors,  who  were  suffering  with 
the  scurvy  were  on  that  island  ;  and  when  he  visited  General  Sullivan, 
he  left  orders  for  the  troops  who  were  to  join  in  the  expedition  to 
follow."  The  dissipation  of  the  morning  fog  discovered  Lord  Howe's 
fleet  approaching  the  entrance  to  the  port.  He  "  counted  fourteen 
vessels  with  two  tiers  of  guns,  and  many  frigates,  thirty-six  in  all." 

It  appears  that  General  Pigot  promptly  notified  General  Clinton 
of  the  arrival  of  the  French  squadron,  and  the  timely  arrival  of  a 
portion  of  Admiral  Byron's  fleet  enabled  Admiral  Howe  to  leave  New 
York  on  the  sixth  of  August  with  eight  line-of-battle  ships,  five  fifty  s, 
two  forty-fours,  several  light  frigates,  three  fire  ships,  two  bombs,  and 
some  smaller  vessels.  Unfavorable  winds  delayed  their  passage. 

The  scattered  fleet  of  the  Count  D'Estaing  was  in  peril  of  being 
cut  off  by  detachments.  The  wind  was  from  the  north-east,  insuring  to 
him  the  weather  gauge  ;  and  with  due  promptness  he  gathered  his 
ships  and  passed  the  channels  to  be  ready  for  his  adversary.  For 
two  days  the  wind  remained  in  the  same  quarter.  As  he  retained  the 
weather  gauge,  Admiral  Howe  wisely  declined  to  press  up  to  the 
shore  against  such  an  advantage  in  favor  of  the  French  fleet. 

A  storm  of  unusual  severity  separated  and  dispersed  both  fleets, 
just  as  a  partial  change  of  wind  had  brought  them  upon  nearly  equal 
terms  of  conflict.  Stedman  styles  that  storm  "  tremendous."  Gordon 
says,  "  a  strong  gale  increased  to  a  violent  tempest."  Marshall  says, 
"  a  furious  storm  of  wind  and  rain  came  up  from  the  north-east,  which 
blew  down  and  almost  irreparably  ruined  all  the  tents  ;  rendered  the 
arms  unfit  for  immediate  use,  and  damaged  the  ammunition,  of  which 
fifty  rounds  had  just  been  issued.  The  soldiers  suffered  extremely, 
and  several  perished  in  the  storm,  which  continued  for  three  days." 

Both  fleets  were  seriously  damaged,  and  during  their  dispersion 


1775.]  FROM   MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.  451 

over  fifty  miles  and  more  of  ocean,  there  were  frequent  collisions  from 
the  meeting  of  lost  ships  and  detachments.  On  the  thirteenth,  the 
Renown,  54,  (British)  Captain  Dawson,  fell  in  with  the  Languedoc, 
84,  (flag  ship)  quite  dismantled  ;  but  the  vicinity  of  six  other  French 
ships  prevented  attack.  During  the  same  evening,  the  Tonnant,  80, 
lost  her  mainmast,  and  would  have  been  attacked  by  the  Preston,  50, 
Commodore  Hotham,  but  for  the  presence  of  other  French  vessels. 
On  the  sixteenth  the  Isis,  50,  (British)  Captain  Rayner,  was  nearly 
stripped,  in  action  with  the  Caesar,  74,  but  the  latter  vessel  was  severely 
handled  and  drew  off  to  refit.  Admiral  Howe  himself  ran  the  gaunt 
let  of  a  portion  of  the  French  fleet  and  barely  made  New  York.  The 
British  squadron  returned  to  that  city,  and  the  French  returned  to 
Newport. 

The  American  army,  meanwhile,  had  made  such  advances  toward 
Newport  as  the  unpropitious  circumstances  permitted.  The  move 
ment  began  on  the  fifteenth.  Colonel  Henry  B.  Livingston,  with  a 
detail  of  fifty  men  from  each  brigade,  and  certain  independent  com 
panies  which  had  reported  for  duty  during  the  attempt  to  regain 
Rhode  Island,  formed  the  advance  column.  General  Sullivan  took 
position  about  five  miles  in  advance  of  the  town,  at  Gibb's  Farm  ; 
General  Greene  at  Middletown,  on  the  farm  afterwards  known  as 
Randolph's;  and  General  La  Fayette  at  the  Boiler  Garden.  John 
Hancock,  of  Massachusetts,  came  forward  as  a  general  officer  and 
commanded  the  second  line.  Colonel  West  commanded  the  reserve. 
General  Pigott  had  industriously  perfected  the  defenses  during  the 
delay  which  occurred  after  the  first  arrival  of  the  French  fleet.  The 
neck  of  land  from  Coddington's  Cove  across  to  Easton's  Bay  and  the 
pond  just  above  it,  was  protected  by  interior  and  exterior  lines,  each 
suitably  broken  by  redoubts. 

The  interior  lines  extended,  as  will  appear  by  reference  to  the 
map,  and  as  stated  in  General  Sullivan's  report,  from  the  sea  to  the 
north  end  of  the  island,  having  a  strong  redoubt  at  the  head  of  the 
pass  between  Easton's  Bay  and  Pond.  A  second  redoubt  twenty 
rods  north  of  the  first,  had  a  good  sweep  of  fire  toward  the  hill  east 
of  the  pond.  The  first  line,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  advance  of  this, 
also  presented  a  strong  redoubt  eastward  ;  and  from  that  direction  the 
American  approaches  were  made.  Well  arranged  abatis  crossed  the 
neck  from  Irish's  redoubt,  commanding  the  fork  of  the  east  and  west 
roads  which  extended  from  that  point  to  the  north  end  of  the  island. 
The  distance  from  Castle  Hill  near  the  main  entrance  of  the  harbor 


452  FROM    MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.  [1778. 

to  Butt's  Hill,  where  the  Americans  made  their  last  resistance,  was 
nearly  fifteen  miles.  Between  the  fifteenth  and  the  twentieth  the 
Americans  had  established  several  batteries  and  the  British  were  com 
pelled  to  strengthen  their  works  by  redoubts  in  the  manner  already 
stated.  On  the  twenty-third  the  American  army  was  reported  by 
General  Sullivan  in  a  published  circular  as  follows  : 

"  The  numbers  of  our  army  amount  to  eight  thousand  one  hundred 
and  seventy-four,  rank  and  file,  exclusive  of  eight  hundred  artillery 
men,  the  whole  exceedingly  well  officered,  and  a  reinforcement  of 
three  thousand  men  will  probably  be  here  in  a  few  days." 

On  the  twentieth  the  Count  D'Estaing  returned  to  port.  His 
fleet  was  badly  crippled  by  the  storm,  and  some  of  the  ships  were  cut 
up  by  the  casualties  of  action.  Generals  Greene  and  La  Fayette 
waited  upon  him  to  urge  the  resumption  of  the  original  plan  of  attack1 
upon  the  British  works  ;  but  he  had  already  decided  to  sail  for  Bos 
ton,  to  refit.  The  instructions  of  his  sovereign  were  explicit,  for  any 
case  of  severe  injury  by  tempest  or  in  action  ;  viz.,  to  make  the  port 
of  Boston.  The  manifest  propriety  of  these  instructions  was  over 
looked  by  the  American  officers.  He  was  upon  a  distant  foreign 
coast,  and  liable  at  any  time  to  meet  a  British  fleet.  It  was  a  vital 
matter  that  his  ships  should  be  kept  in  fighting  trim.  The  Americans 
urged,  that  "  he  could  refit  at  Newport."  It  is  evident  that  with  the 
siege  of  Newport  on  his  hands,  Newport  was  wholly  unsuited  to  that 
purpose.  His  officers  were  nearly  or  quite  unanimous  in  favor  of 
literal  compliance  with  his  instructions,  and  he  sailed  for  Boston  on 
the  twenty-second  of  August,  just  a  month  from  his  departure  from 
Sandy  Hook.  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  action  of  his  officers 
originated  from  jealousy  of  his  assignment  to  naval  command,  while 
a  general  officer  of  the  army.  There  is  no  occasion  for  that  criticism. 
The  French  naval  officers  were  fully  appreciative  of  any  prospect  of 
success  against  the  British  troops ;  but  no  less  assured,  that  their 
whole  future  depended  upon  the  condition  of  their  ships. 

The  Count  D'Estaing,  in  a  letter  to  General  Sullivan  on  the 
morning  of  his  return,  says,  "  I  should  be  culpable  in  my  duty  to 
America  herself  if  I  could  for  a  moment  think  of  not  preserving  a 
squadron  destined  for  her  defense.  I  regretted  to  Colonel  Fleury, 
that  you  should  have  landed  on  the  island  a  day  before  the  time 
agreed  upon  between  us,  and  I  should  be  greatly  afflicted  to  know 
that  you  are  in  danger.  To  decide  upon  your  motives  is  a  wrong 
which  I  have  not  committed.  I  have  refrained  from  censure  ;  and  the 


I778.J  FROM   MONMOUTH   TO   NEW  YORK.  453 

twelve  thousand  men  now  under  your  command  will  probably  prove 
the  correctness  of  the  step,  by  a  success  which  I  desire  as  a  citizen, 
and  as  an  admirer  of  your  bravery  and  talents." 

A  protest  was  sent  to  him  August  twenty-seventh,  after  he  had 
sailed,  signed  by  John  Sullivan,  N.  Greene,  John  Hancock,  J.  Glover, 
Ezek  Cornell,  Wm.  Whipple,  John  Tyler,  Solomon  Lovell,  and  John 
Fitzconnel,  which  overtook  and  annoyed  him,  but  did  not  change  his 
purpose ;  although  he  gave  earnest  assurance  that  he  would  return  as 
soon  as  he  could  do  so  in  fighting  condition. 

General  Sullivan  issued  an  intemperate  general  order,  which  he 
modified  two  days  afterwards ;  but  the  following  sentence  had  gone 
before  the  people.  "  The  General  yet  hopes  the  event  will  prove 
America  able  to  procure  that  by  her  own  arms,  which  her  allies  refuse 
to  assist  in  obtaining." 

The  departure  of  the  fleet  depressed  the  American  army.  They 
dropped  from  enthusiasm  to  its  opposite  extreme,  and  the  militia 
returned  home  in  large  numbers.  The  public  indignation  was  very 
bitterly  expressed. 

At  this  period  of  doubt  in  the  American  camp,  a  courier  arrived 
from  General  Washington  with  the  information  that  Sir  Henry  Clin 
ton  had  left  New  York  with  four  thousand  troops  to  reinforce  the 
garrison  of  Newport,  and  strongly  intimated  the  importance  of  secur 
ing  a  timely  retreat  from  Rhode  Island.  Head  winds  delayed  the 
transports  so  that  General  Sullivan  had  timely  notice  of  the  move 
ment.  On  the  twenty-sixth,  the  heavy  baggage  and  superfluous  ord 
nance  were  removed  in  safety.  On  the  twenty-eighth,  a  council  of 
war  decided  that  the  army  should  fall  back  to  the  north  end  of  the 
island  and  fortify  the  position,  until  a  messenger  could  be  sent  to 
Boston  to  learn  if  Count  D'Estaing  was  ready  to  return  to  Newport. 
General  La  Fayette  made  this  trip  with  remarkable  expedition,  but 
failed  to  move  the  French  General  to  expose  his  fleet  until  it  could  be 
thoroughly  overhauled.  It  is  certain  that  if  he  had  responded  to  the 
appeal,  he  would  have  encountered  a  superior  British  force  and  almost 
certain  destruction.  As  an  index  of  the  spirit  in  which  he  received 
the  application,  it  is  only  necessary  to  say,  that  he  offered  "  to  lead 
his  troops  in  person  to  Newport,  and  place  himself  under  General 
Sullivan's  orders."  He  says,  "  I  was  anxious  to  demonstrate,  that  my 
countrymen  could  not  be  offended  by  a  sudden  expression  of  feeling, 
and  that  he  who  had  the  honor  of  commanding  them  in  America,  was 


454  FROM  MONMOUTH  TO  NEW  YORK.  [177*. 

and  would  be  at  all  times,  one  of  the  most  devoted  and  zealous  ser 
vants  of  the  United  States." 

It  must  be  the  judgment  of  history  that  he  did  his  duty  to  France, 
America,  and  himself;  and  under  the  exasperating  character  of  the 
abuse  which  was  heaped  upon  him,  he  vindicated  the  confidence  of 
his  sovereign  in  his  capacity  and  wisdom. 

By  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth,  the  American 
army  occupied  Quaker  Hill  and  Turkey  Hill  with  their  advance 
guard,  and  held  strong  intrenchments  across  the  north  end  of  Rhode 
Island,  and  a  commanding  position  on  Butt's  Hill. 

Colonel  Henry  B.  Livingston  was  pushed  forward  by  the  east  road, 
and  Colonel  John  Laurens  by  the  west  road,  to  meet  the  advance. 
At  a  council  of  war  which  was  held  before  morning,  General  Greene 
urged  an  attack  in  force  upon  the  British,  so  as  to  cut  their  detach 
ments  off  by  superior  numbers,  but  his  opinion  was  overruled.  The 
British  soon  drove  the  Americans  from  Turkey  and  Quaker  Hills,  but 
not  without  loss,  and  the  Americans  retired  within  their  lines.  Gen 
eral  Pigott  states  that  he  "  did  not  know  of  the  retreat  until  the 
morning,  when  he  made  the  following  disposition  of  troops  :  Gen 
eral  Prescott  and  a  part  of  Brown's  corps  occupied  the  old  works 
eastward,  and  moved  up  the  east  shore  of  the  island ;  Brigadier-gen 
eral  Smith  marched  the  Twenty-second  and  Forty-third  regiments,  and 
the  flank  companies  of  the  Thirty-eighth  and  Fifty-fourth  by  the  east 
road.  Major-general  Losberg  marched  with  the  Hessian  chasseurs, 
and  the  Anspach  regiments  of  Voit  and  Seaboth  by  the  west  road. 
As  soon  as  General  Smith  reported  the  Americans  to  be  in  force  on 
Quaker  Hill,  the  Fifty-fourth  British,  the  Hessian  regiment  of  Huger, 
and  the  residue  of  Brown's  Provincial  corps  were  sent  to  his  support. 
Colonel  Fanning's  corps  of  Provincials  were  sent  by  the  west  road  to 
support  General  Losberg,  who  encountered  a  stubborn  resistance  at 
Turkey  Hill."  At  Quaker  Hill  General  Glover  distinguished  himself 
by  a  valiant  defense,  as  did  Colonels  Livingston  and  Laurens.  The 
American  casualties  were  thirty  killed,  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven 
wounded  and  forty-four  missing.  The  British  casualties  were  thirty- 
eight  killed,  two  hundred  and  ten  wounded,  and  a  few  missing.  Just 
at  evening  the  Americans  made  an  attempt  to  cut  off  some  chasseurs 
who  were  advancing  on  their  right ;  but  General  Pigott  states  that 
"  the  regiments  of  Fanning  and  Huger  were  ordered  up  to  their  sup 
port,  and  after  a  smart  engagement,  obliged  them  to  retreat  to  their 
main  body  on  Windmill  Hill." 


I778.J  PROM    MONMOUTH   TO   NEW   YORK.  455 

The  Americans  pitched  a  number  of  tents  in  front  of  their  lines, 
and  appeared  to  be  diligently  at  work  upon  the  defenses.  A  retreat 
by  both  Bristol  and  Rowland  ferries  had  been  determined  upon.  The 
experience  and  good  judgment  of  General  Glover  was  conspicuous  on 
this  occasion,  as  during  the  retreat  from  Long  Island  in  1776.  Gen 
eral  La  Fayette  returned  from  Boston  at  eleven  o'clock,  and  devoted 
himself,  as  at  Brandy  wine,  Barren  Hill,  and  Monmouth,  to  the  care 
of  the  rear  guard,  and  "  before  twelve  o'clock,"  says  General  Sullivan, 
"  the  main  army  had  crossed  with  the  stores  and  baggage:  La  Fay 
ette  brought  off  the  pickets  and  other  parties  which  covered  the 
retreat  in  excellent  order;  not  a  man  was  left  behind,  nor  the  smallest 
article  left." 

On  the  morning  of  the  thirtieth,  one  hundred  sail  of  British  vessels 
appeared  in  sight,  bringing  General  Clinton's  army  to  the  rescue  of 
the  garrison.  He  returned  promptly  to  New  York,  however,  only 
deterred  from  a  descent  upon  New  London,  by  contrary  winds,  which 
prevented  the  fleet  from  entering  the  harbor.  General  Grey  sailed 
from  Newport,  with  the  transports,  to  Acushnet  river ;  landed  at 
evening,  and  within  twenty-four  hours  destroyed  seventy  vessels. 
Bedford,  Fairhaven  and  Martha's  Vineyard  were  also  visited.  These 
posts  were  famous  for  their  outfit  of  privateers,  and  six  armed  vessels 
of  from  fourteen  to  sixteen  guns,  besides  warehouses  and  public  stores, 
were  destroyed,  and  a  successful  levy  was  made  upon  the  inhabitants 
for  ten  thousand  sheep  and  three  hundred  oxen.  Admiral  Howe 
sailed  for  Boston,  where  he  arrived  September  first ;  but  being  unable 
to  draw  the  Count  D'Estaing  into  an  engagement,  returned  to  New- 
York. 

The  popular  clamor  against  the  French  general  had  not  subsided. 
On  the  fifteenth  of  September,  the  Chevalier  de  Saint  Sauveur  was 
killed  at  Boston,  while  attempting  to  quiet  an  affray  between  the 
French  and  disorderly  parties  at  the  French  bakery.  The  Massachu 
setts  General  Assembly,  on  the  day  following,  ordered  a  monument  to 
be  erected  to  his  memory,  and  the  judgment  of  good  citizens  was 
fully  alive  to  the  disgrace  which  such  disorder  and  recrimination 
inflicted  on  the  national  cause. 

The  Count  D'Estaing  remained  at  Boston  until  November  third, 
when  he  sailed  for  the  West  Indies.  On  the  first  of  November,  how 
ever,  Admiral  Byron  appeared  off  the  harbor  with  a  large  naval  force, 
but  was  immediately  driven  off  by  a  severe  storm,  which  so  disabled 
his  fleet  that  he  was  compelled  to  go  to  Newport  to  refit.  This 


456  FROM   MONMOUTH   TO   NEW  YORK.  11778. 

officer  fought  the  Ocean  during  1778.  The  passage  of  his  fleet  from 
England  was  disastrous ;  for  after  the  dispersion  of  his  ships  on  that 
voyage,  he  was  himself,  compelled  to  make  Halifax,  before  he  reached 
New  York. 

The  first  active  cooperation  of  the  French  navy  in  support  of  the 
United  States  had  resulted  in  no  victories  ;  but  it  precipitated  the 
evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  restricted  the  garrison  of  New  York  to 
operations  within  reach  of  the  British  navy,  and  was  a  pledge  of  prac 
tical  sympathy  in  the  struggle.  To  the  nations  of  Europe  it  was  the 
emphatic  declaration  that  France  was  ready  to  maintain,  as  well  a^ 
acknowledge,  American  Independence. 


•40(5* 


CHAPTER    LVIII. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1778.    JULY  TO  DECEMBER. 

AFTER  the  failure  of  operations  against  Newport,  General 
Sullivan  resumed  his  post  at  Providence  ;  General  La  Fayette 
occupied  Bristol,  and  afterwards  withdrew  behind  Warren,  out  of 
reach  of  the  British  shipping,  and  General  Greene,  who  was  still 
Quartermaster-general,  went  to  Boston  to  superintend  the  purchase 
of  supplies  for  the  French  squadron. 

Washington  retained  his  headquarters  at  White  Plains,  until  the 
latter  part  of  September.  Upon  his  first  return  to  this  post,  after  two 
years'  absence,  he  took  occasion  to  contrast  the  two  periods,  thus 
writing, — "  The  hand  of  Providence  has  been  so  conspicuous,  that  he 
must  be  worse  than  an  infidel  that  lacks  faith  ;  and  more  than  wicked, 
that  has  not  gratitude  enough  to  acknowledge  his  obligation."  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief,  that  his 
wonderful  self-control  over  a  passionate  natural  temper,  and  his 
equanimity  under  exasperating  ordeals,  owe  much  of  their  strength  to 
the  sentiment  just  quoted,  so  that  he  could  devote  his  faculties 
entirely  to  duty,  unhampered  by  such  personal  issues  as  annoyed 
many  of  his  associates.  From  White  Plains  he  removed  to  Fishkill, 
and  on  the  tenth  to  Fredericksburg.  On  the  twenty-seventh  he 
announced  the  disposition  of  the  army  for  the  approaching  period  of 
winter-quarters. 

It  indicates  his  judgment  of  the  relative  value  and  exposure  of 
different  localities  and  posts.  "  Nine  brigades  on  the  west  side  of 
the  Hudson  River,  exclusive  of  the  garrison  at  West  Point ;  one  of 
which,  the  North  Carolina  brigade,  will  be  near  Smith's  Clove  for  the 
security  of  that  pass,  and  as  a  reinforcement  to  West  Point  in  case  of 
necessity  ;  another,  the  Jersey  brigade,  will  be  at  Elizabethtown,  to 
cover  the  lower  part  of  New  Jersey ;  and  the  other  seven,  consisting 


45 8  CAMPAIGN. — JULY   TO   DECEMBER.  [1778. 

of  the  Virginia,  Maryland,  Delaware,  and  Pennsylvania  troops,  will  be 
at  Middlebrook  ;  six  brigades  will  be  left  on  the  east  side  of  the  river, 
and  at  West  Point ;  three  of  which  (of  the  Massachusetts  troops)  will 
be  stationed  for  the  immediate  defense  of  the  Highlands  ;  one  at 
West  Point,  in  addition  to  the  garrison  already  there  ;  and  the  other 
two  at  Fishkill  and  Continental  village.  The  remaining  three  brigades, 
composed  of  the  New  Hampshire  and  Connecticut  troops  and  Hazen's 
regiment,  will  be  posted  in  the  vicinity  of  Danbury,  for  the  protec 
tion  of  the  country  lying  along  the  Sound,  to  cover  our  magazines 
lying  on  Connecticut  river,  and  to  aid  the  Highlands  on  any  serious 
movement  of  the  enemy  that  way.  The  park  of  artillery  will  be 
at  Pluckemin  ;  the  cavalry  will  be  disposed  of  thus  :  Eland's  regiment 
at  Winchester,  Virginia  ;  Baylis  at  Frederic,  or  Hagerstown,  Mary 
land  ;  and  Sheldon's  at  Durham,  Connecticut ;  Lee's  corps  (Colonel 
Harry  Lee)  will  be  with  that  part  of  the  army  which  is  in  the  Jerseys, 
acting  on  the  advanced  posts." 

General  Putnam  was  assigned  to  command  at  Danbury  ;  General 
McDougall  in  the  Highlands,  and  general  headquarters  were  to  be 
near  Middlebrook. 

The  British  army.  No  extensive  field  operations  took  place  in  the 
Northern  States  after  the  battle  of  Monmouth.  The  time  was  draw 
ing  near  when  the  comparative  rest  which  the  Southern  States  realized 
after  the  defense  of  Fort  Moultrie  was  to  be  replaced  by  the  pervasive 
activities  of  war,  and  the  issues  of  pitched  battles.  The  army  of  Gen 
eral  Clinton  was  largely  depleted  by  order  of  the  British  Cabinet. 
Five  thousand  men  were  ordered  to  the  West  Indies,  and  three  thou 
sand  men  to  Florida.  Sir  Henry  Clinton  says  in  a  letter  of  October 
eighth,  addressed  to  Lord  Germaine,  "  With  an  army  so  much  dimin 
ished  at  New  York,  nothing  important  can  be  done  ;  especially  as  it 
is  also  weakened  by  sending  seven  hundred  men  to  Halifax,  and  three 
hundred  to  Bermuda." 

The  retreat  from  Monmouth  involved  nearly  eight  hundred  deser 
tions,  as  authentically  verified,  and  the  killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing,  and  the  contingent  casualties  of  all  kinds  from  the  time  the  evac 
uation  of  Philadelphia  began,  were  little  less  than  two  thousand  men. 
Many  died  from  exposure  to  heat,  and  the  waste  was  not  promptly 
replaced  from  England.  Several  restricted  incursions  were  made 
which  kept  the  American  Commander-in-chief  on  the  watch  for  the 
Highland  posts  ;  but  these  became  less  frequent,  and  the  year  1778 
drew  near  its  close  with  a  material  loss  of  prestige  to  the  British  cause, 


I778.j  CAMPAIGN.— JULY   TO   DECEMBER.  459 

and  much  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  in  final 
success. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  September,  General  Grey  surprised 
Colonel  Baylor's  light  horse  at  Tappan,  as  completely  as  he  did  Gen 
eral  Wayne's  command  at  Paoli  ;  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell, 
accompanied  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe,  confirmed  their  ante 
cedent  custom  of  warfare  by  forays  which  brought  little  plunder  and 
less  intrinsic  credit. 

General  Cornwallis,  with  five  thousand  men,  made  an  incursion 
into  New  Jersey,  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Hackensack,  and  Gen 
eral  Knyphausen,  with  three  thousand  men,  operated  in  Westchester 
county,  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Bronx,  but  with  little  acquisi 
tion  of  provisions  or  other  supplies. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  October,  Captain  Ferguson  of  the  Seventieth 
British  regiment,  with  three  thousand  regulars  and  the  Third  New 
Jersey  Volunteers,  made  a  descent  upon  Little  Neck,  New  Jersey, 
where  many  privateers  were  equipped,  surprised  a  detachment  of 
Count  Pulaski's  brigade  at  night,  and  inflicted  a  "  loss  of  fifty  killed, 
none  wounded"  including  Lieutenant-colonel  the  Baron  de  Bose,  and 
Lieutenant  de  la  Borderie.  Ferguson  says  in  his  official  report,  "  It 
being  a  night  attack,  little  quarter  could  of  course  be  given  ;  so  that 
there  are  only  five  prisoners."  Colonel  Pulaski  vigorously  pursued 
the  party,  inflicting  some  loss. 

The  Indian  massacres  in  the  Wyoming  Valley,  from  July  first  to 
the  fourth,  which  were  to  be  subsequently  avenged,  were  followed  by 
that  of  Cherry  Valley,  November  eleventh.  These  were  frontier 
enterprises,  beyond  the  range  of  the  general  campaign  ;  but  they 
made  impressions  upon  the  nation,  and  multiplied  the  embarrass 
ments  of  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  November,  Commodore  Hyde  Parker 
convoyed  a  fleet  of  transports  to  Savannah,  which  carried  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Campbell,  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  two  battalions  of  Hes 
sians,  four  battalions  of  Provincial  troops,  and  a  detachment  of  the 
Royal  artillery,  making  a  total  force  of  about  three  thousand  five 
hundred  men.  The  troops  landed  at  Tybee  Island,  about  fifteen 
miles  from  Savannah,  and  captured  the  city  on  the  twenty-ninth  of 
December.  The  American  force,  under  command  of  General  Robert 
Howe,  consisted  of  about  eight  hundred  men,  and  with  militia  did 
not  exceed  twelve  hundred.  (Stedman  estimates  it  at  fifteen  hundred). 
Colonel  Huger's  and  Thompson's  South  Carolina  regiments,  Colonel 


460  CAMPAIGN.— JULY  TO   DECEMBER.  Li7/S. 

George  Walton's  Georgia  riflemen,  one  hundred  men,  and  Colonel 
Elbert's  Georgia  militia  fought  well  at  an  advanced  position  near 
Tatnal's  and  Wright's  plantations,  until  resistance  was  hopeless. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  he 
was  guided  by  a  negro,  through  a  hidden  path  across  a  swamp,  upon 
the  American  right.  This  movement  in  force,  while  only  demonstrat 
ing  in  front,  insured  his  success.  His  report  states  the  capture  of 
thirty-eight  officers,  four  hundred  and  fifteen  non-commissioned 
officers  and  privates,  and  forty-eight  pieces  of  cannon,  twenty-three 
mortars,  and  ninety-four  barrels  of  powder,  besides  the  shipping  in 
the  harbor,  and  a  large  quantity  of  provisions.  His  loss  is  given  as 
one  officer  Captain  Peter  Campbell,  of  Skinner's  light  infantry,  two 
privates  killed,  and  one  sergeant,  and  nine  privates  wounded,  and 
states  that  eighty-three  American  dead  and  eleven  wounded  were 
found  on  the  field. 

Thus  the  Southern  campaign  of  1779  was  inaugurated  with  the 
closing  days  of  1778. 

Notwithstanding  this,  the  condition  of  General  Clinton  at  New 
York  had  become  critical.  The  position  of  the  American  army 
restricted  his  supplies,  and  compelled  him  to  depend  largely  upon 
England  ;  and  on  the  second  day  of  December,  he  again  wrote 
despondently  to  the  British  Secretary  of  State  : — "  I  do  not  complain, 
but,  my  lord,  do  not  let  any  thing  be  expected  of  one  circumstanced 
as  I  am." 

The  Northern  Frontier.  The  British  garrison  at  Detroit  had 
taken  little  part  in  active  service  after  its  detachment  retired  from 
"the  Cedars  "  in  1776,  but  the  early  western  settlers  were  constantly 
exposed  to  Indian  incursions  ;  and  the  defense  of  Boonesborough, 
Harrodsburg,  and  Fort  Logan  were  conspicuous  for  their  valor. 
Daniel  Boone  with  thirty-seven  men  had  been  captured  at  last  by 
Indians,  was  taken  to  Chillicothe,  Ohio,  and  thence  to  Detroit.  He 
was  taken  back  to  Chillicothe  and  adopted  by  the  Shawnee  nation. 
On  the  sixteenth  of  June,  1778,  he  escaped  and  reached  Boones 
borough,  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles,  as  he  states  in  his  narrative, 
on  the  twentieth.  Captain  Duquesne  and  eleven  other  French 
Canadians  from  Detroit,  acting  in  the  name  of  Governor  Hamilton, 
and  four  hundred  and  fifty  Indians,  unexpectedly  attacked  the  fort  on 
the  twentieth  of  August  but  were  repulsed. 

A  small  British  garrison  had  been  placed  at  Kaskaskia  (Randolph 
county,  Illinois),  but  this  force  had  been  withdrawn  to  Detroit  upon 


1778.]  CAMPAIGN. — JULY  TO   DECEMBER.  461 

the  American  invasion  of  Canada  in  1775,  and  the  command  of  the 
post  was  intrusted  to  a  Frenchman  by  the  name  of  Rocheblave. 

Under  the  patronage  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  George  Mason  and 
George  Wythe,  of  Virginia,  Colonel  George  Rogers  Clarke  leftWilliams- 
burg,  Virginia,  on  the  fourth  of  January,  1778,  and  on  the  fourth  of 
July  captured  Kaskaskia.  While  descending  the  Ohio  he  heard  of 
the  alliance  with  France  and  from  Kaskaskia  he  moved  toward  the 
French  settlement  at  Vincennes  (Knox  county,  Indiana)  and  there 
established  himself,  with  the  declared  purpose  of  conquering  the  north 
west.  Lieutenant  Governor  Hamilton  left  Detroit  on  the  seventh  of 
October  and  recovered  Vincennes  on  the  seventeenth  of  December, 
postponing  operations  to  recover  Illinois  until  spring.  Thus  the 
extreme  west  began  to  engage  in  the  general  war. 

Miscellaneous  Events.  The  French  alliance  had  been  an  impres 
sive  sign  of  the  American  progress  toward  recognition  among  the 
nations.  All  efforts  to  compromise  still  failed,  and  the  military  opin 
ions  of  General  Amherst  received  no  attention. 

On  the  nineteenth  of  March  the  constitution  had  been  adopted, 
to  take  effect  the  twenty-ninth  of  November. 

Another  expedition  to  conquer  Canada  was  proposed,  to  be  under 
the  command  of  La  Fayette,  associated  with  the  Count  D'Estaing. 
Detroit,  Niagara,  Oswego,  Montreal  and  Halifax  were  to  be  sepa 
rate  objectives  of  one  grand  movement ;  but  the  wisdom  of  Washing 
ton  postponed,  and  afterwards  induced  Congress  to  reject  the  scheme. 

The  year  1778  closed  ;  but  the  American  Congress  had  no  money, 
and  the  loose  union  of  the  States  was  constantly  evoking  sectional 
jealousies.  The  Commander-in-chief  declared  that  "  the  States 
separately  were  too  much  engaged  in  their  local  concerns,  when  the 
great  business  of  a  nation,  the  momentous  concerns  of  an  empire, 
were  at  stake." 

Bancroft  thus  embodies  his  sentiment.  "  He  who  in  the  beginning 
of  the  revolution  used  to  call  Virginia  his  country,  from  this  time 
never  ceased  his  efforts,  by  conversation  and  correspondence,  to  train 
the  statesmen  of  America,  especially  of  his  beloved  native  common 
wealth,  to  the  work  of  consolidating  the  Union." 

Upon  visiting  Philadelphia  at  the  close  of  the  year,  he  addressed 
a  letter  to  Colonel  Harrison,  Speaker  of  the  Virginia  House  of  Dele 
gates,  which  solemnly  declared  his  apprehensions  for  the  future.  He 
urged  Virginia  to"  send  the  best  and  ablest  of  her  men  to  Congress," 
and  thus  continues  :  "  They  must  not  slumber  nor  sleep  at  home  in 


462  CAMPAIGN.— JULY   TO  DECEMBER.  [1778. 

such  a  time  of  pressing  danger ; — content  with  the  enjoyment  of 
places  of  honor  or  profit  in  their  own  States  while  the  common  inter 
ests  of  America  are  mouldering  and  sinking  into  inevitable  ruin." 
.  .  .  "  If  I  were  to  draw  a  picture  of  the  times  and  men,  from 
what  I  have  seen,  heard,  and  in  part  know,  I  should  in  one  word  say 
that  idleness,  dissipation  and  extravagance  seem  to  have  laid  fast  hold 
of  most  of  them  ;  that  speculation,  peculation  and  an  insatiable  thirst 
for  riches  seem  to  have  got  the  better  of  every  other  consideration 
and  almost  of  every  order  of  men  ;  that  party  disputes  and  personal 
quarrels  are  the  great  business  of  the  day  ;  .  while  a  great  and 

accumulating  debt,  ruined  finances,  depreciated  money,  and  want  of 
credit,  which  in  its  consequences  is  the  want  of  every  thing,  are  but 
secondary  considerations,  if  our  affairs  wore  the  most  promising 
aspect ;  .  .  .  An  assembly,  a  concert,  a  dinner,  a  supper,  will  not 
only  take  men  off  from  acting  in  this  business,  but  even  from  think 
ing  of  it ;  while  a  great  part  of  the  officers  of  our  army,  from  absolute 
necessity,  are  quitting  the  service,  and  the  more  virtuous  few,  rather 
than  do  this,  are  sinking  by  sure  degrees  into  beggary  and  want." 

His  convictions  were  embodied  in  one  sentence.  "  Our  affairs  are 
in  a  more  distressed,  ruinous  and  deplorable  condition  than  they  have 
been  since  the  commencement  of  the  war." 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 
NOTE.     From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."    Date  August  I5th,  1778 

New  York 15,886  Long  Island 8117 

Staten  Island 3,244  Rhode  Island 5189 

Paulus  Hook 456  With  Lord  Howe's  Fleet 512 

19,586  13,818 

Total  33,404 

This  force  reduced  by  detachments  sent  to  the  West  Indies  and  Halifax,  was  taken  up 
November,  i,  1778,  as  follows  : 

New  York 95°8  Paulus  Hook  4*9 

Long  Island 5630  Providence  Island 225 

Statenlsland 972  Rhode  Island 57dc 

16,110 

Total,  22,484 


CHAPTER   LIX. 

JANUARY  TO  JULY,    1779.     POSITION   OF  THE   ARMIES.     INCIDENTS 
OF  THE   GENERAL   CAMPAIGN. 

r  I  ^HE  year  1779  opened  without  offensive  actions  on  the  part  of 
JL  either  of  the  armies  in  the  Northern  States.  The  garrison  of 
New  York  made  no  demonstration  of  importance  in  any  direction  ; 
and  Washington  spent  the  greater  part  of  January  in  urging  Congress 
to  take  active  measures  to  recruit  the  army.  It  was  not  until  the 
ninth  of  March  that  eighty  regular  battalions  were  authorized,  and  it 
was  found  almost  impossible  to  obtain  funds,  by  loan  or  taxation,  to 
maintain  the  troops  already  on  duty. 

The  garrison  of  Philadelphia  was  passing  through  an  idle  experi 
ence,  similar  to  that  of  the  British  garrison  of  the  previous  year. 
Congress  itself  seemed  enervated  by  the  temporary  suspension  of 
active  hostilities.  While  General  Clinton  was  inactive  at  New  York, 
General  Washington  resolved  to  employ  a  portion  of  the  army  in 
punishing  the  Indians  who  had  devastated  Wyoming  and  Cherry 
Valleys  the  previous  year.  New  Jersey  troops  were  assigned  to  this 
duty,  but  refused  to  march  until  provision  was  made  for  the  support 
of  their  families.  The  State  legislature  provided  money  to  pay  the 
officers  and  men,  and  order  was  restored.  The  immediate  elements 
of  the  Southern  campaign  postponed  the  expedition  to  Wyoming 
Valley  ;  but  Colonel  Schaick,  Lieutenant-colonel  Willett,  and  Major 
Cochran,  surprised  the  towns  of  the  Onondagas,  in  New  York,  and  on 
the  nineteenth  of  April  destroyed  the  whole  settlement  without  loss. 
The  Confederate  money  soon  depreciated  so  as  to  be  worth  but 
three  or  four  cents  on  the  dollar,  and  Washington  was  constrained 
to  offer  his  own  estate  for  sale  to  meet  his  actual  necessities.  Before 
fall  the  issue  of  two  hundred  millions  of  paper  money  was  authorized, 
and  measures  were  taken  to  obtain  a  loan  in  Europe. 

Major-general  Benjamin  Lincoln  had  arrived  at  Charleston  on  the 


464  JANUARY   TO  JULY.  [1779. 

first  of  December  preceding,  superseding  Brigadier-general  Robert 
Howe,  in  command  of  the  American  troops.  During  January,  Gen 
eral  Prevost  captured  Sunbury,  and  Colonel  Campbell  occupied 
Augusta. 

General  Lincoln's  command  consisted  of  one  thousand  one  hundred 
and  twenty-one  regular  troops,  and  a  force  of  raw  militia  which  made  the 
aggregate  three  thousand  six  hundred  and  thirty-nine.  He  advanced 
to  Perrysburg  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Savannah  a  few  miles  north 
of  that  city,  to  prevent  the  crossing  into  South  Carolina  of  General 
Prevost's  army,  then  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  three  thousand  strong, 
besides  Georgia  Provincials.  Neither  army  was  inclined  to  force  a 
passage,  but  two  companies  of  the  Sixtieth,  and  one  company  of  the 
Sixteenth  British  regiments  made  a  diversion  toward  Beaufort,  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  a  footing  upon  Port  Royal,  a  large  island  seventy- 
five  miles  south-west  of  Charleston. 

Colonel  William  Moultrie  was  sent  to  the  rescue.  He  crossed  to 
the  island  with  a  force  of  three  hundred  militia,  one  small  gun,  and 
nine  regulars,  including  Captain  De  Trevills,  and  after  a  spirited 
skirmish  repulsed  the  attack. 

On  the  fourteenth,  Colonel  Andrew  Pickens,  of  South  Carolina, 
and  Colonel  Dooley,  of  Georgia,  with  three  hundred  men,  surprised 
Colonel  Boyd's  Provincials  on  the  north  side  of  Kettle  Creek,  in 
Wilkes  county,  Georgia. 

On  the  third  of  March,  General  Lincoln  sent  General  Williamson 
with  twelve  hundred  men  up  the  river  to  take  position  opposite 
Augusta  ;  General  Rutherford  with  nearly  eight  hundred  men  to  the 
Black  Swamp ;  and  General  Ashe  with  fifteen  hundred  North  Carolina 
militia  and  some  Georgia  Continental  troops,  was  sent,  with  orders  to 
cross  the  river  at  Augusta  (which  the  British  had  abandoned),  and  to 
move  down  the  west  side  of  the  river.  This  detachment  went  into 
camp  in  the  angle  of  Briar  creek  and  the  Savannah,  thirteen  miles 
above  the  British  army.  The  American  position  was  very  strong  by 
nature,  as  Briar  creek  was  deep  and  broad  ;  but  the  right  flank  was 
left  entirely  exposed.  General  Prevost's  report  to  Lord  Germaine 
states  that  "  while  dispositions  were  made  to  keep  Mr.  (General) 
Lincoln  in  check,  Major  McPherson,  with  the  first  battalion  of  the 
Seventy-first,  and  some  irregulars,  with  two  field  pieces,  was  directed 
to  advance  toward  Briar  creek  bridge  ;  while  Lieutenant-colonel  Pre 
vost  with  the  second  battalion  of  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  a  corps 
of  light  infantry  commanded  by  Sir  James  Baird,  and  three  companies 


I779-]  JANUARY   TO   JULY.  465 

of  grenadiers,  made  a  long  circuit  of  fifty  miles,  surprised  the  Ameri 
can  army  and  routed  it  thoroughly." 

Seven  cannon  and  a  thousand  arms  were  captured,  as  well  as  Gen 
eral  Elbert,  Colonel  Mclntosh,  several  other  officers,  and  nearly  two 
hundred  men.  Nearly  an  equal  number  were  supposed  to  have  been 
lost  in  the  action,  or  in  flight  through  the  swamps  and  the  residue, 
with  the  exception  of  four  or  five  hundred  men,  retired  to  their  homes, 
and  did  not  rejoin  General  Lincoln  at  Charleston.  Governor  Rut- 
ledge  had  been  re-elected  governor,  and  the  people  assembled  at 
Orangeburg,  with  a  spirit  similar  to  that  which  had  been  aroused 
during  1776. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  April,  General  Lincoln  again  crossed  the 
Savannah  river,  but  after  fruitless  marching,  the  American  army 
again  retreated  to  Charleston.  General  Prevost  promptly  advanced 
and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  city.  General  Pulaski  gained 
credit  in  skirmishing  before  the  town,  and  the  vigorous  action  of 
Rutledge,  Moultrie,  Laurens  and  others,  overcame  the  fears  of  many 
citizens  who  were  ready  to  submit. 

On  the  thirteenth  the  British  withdrew  ;  and  on  the  twentieth  a 
vigorous  attack  was  made  upon  a  post  retained  by  them  at  Stono 
Ferry,  which  failed  for  want  of  full  concert  in  the  attack,  and  prompt 
support.  The  British  troops  retired  to  Savannah,  after  establishing  a 
post  at  Port  Royal. 

Congress  seemed  incapable  of  realizing  the  impending  desolation 
which  must  follow  a  strong  invasion  of  the  Southern  States,  and 
Washington  was  powerless  to  furnish  the  aid  required,  so  long  as 
General  Clinton  occupied  New  York. 

General  Greene  asked  permission  to  go  to  the  Southern  States, 
but  his  assignment  was  not  authorized  by  Congress,  although  approved 
by  the  Commander-in-chief.  The  utmost  that  could  be  done  was  to 
authorize  a  portion  of  the  regular  troops,  which  belonged  to  the 
Southern  Department,  to  return  to  that  section  for  service. 

La  Fayette,  finding  that  active  duty  was  not  contemplated,  sailed 
for  France  in  the  American  frigate  Alliance,  with  the  best  wishes  of 
the  people  he  had  served  so  intelligently  and  so  well. 

At  the  extreme  west,  the  American  forces  at  Kaskaskia  resolved 
to  anticipate  the  threats  of  Lieutenant-governor  Hamilton,  who  was 
still  at  Vincennes,  and  had  announced  his  purpose  to  reduce  the 
Illinois  country  to  submission.  Colonel  Clark,  after  great  trials  and 
an  extraordinary  march,  captured  Vincennes  on  the  twenty-fourth  of 
30 


466  JANUARY  TO  JULY. 

February ;  and  shortly  after,  sixty  of  his  men  ascended  the  Wabash 
river,  with  armed  boats,  and  captured  a  large  supply  of  goods  en  route 
from  Detroit.  A  thousand  troops  were  raised  by  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia  to  strengthen  the  frontier,  and  under  the  wise  support  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  then  Governor  of  Virginia,  that  region  was  placed 
in  a  condition  for  defense. 

The  Middle  States  were  not  without  their  experience  in  that 
class  of  warfare  which  characterized  the  greater  part  of  the  campaign 
of  1779. 

General  Matthews  left  New  York  with  two  thousand  troops  and 
five  hundred  marines,  late  in  April,  anchored  in  Hampton  Roads 
on  the  ninth  of  May,  laid  waste  Portsmouth  and  Norfork,  destroyed 
over  a  hundred  vessels,  and  returned  to  New  York  within  the  month, 
having  taken  seventeen  prizes,  and  at  least  three  thousand  hogsheads 
of  tobacco. 

The  first  six  months  of  1779  was  a  severe  test  of  the  endurance 
of  the  bankrupt  Republic,  and  an  equally  severe  test  of  the  patriotism 
of  the  Southern  States,  which  began  to  feel  the  pressure  from  rapidly 
augmenting  hostile  forces,  while  the  general  government  was  power 
less  to  render  them  adequate  aid  for  defense.  Thus  far  the  campaign 
had  been  exhaustive,  without  many  critical  issues  to  arouse  the 
people  to  a  passionate  resistance. 

One  single  demonstration  was  made  by  General  Clinton,  which 
seemed  to  have  in  view  the  reduction  of  the  Highland  posts,  and  this 
confirmed  the  policy  of  Washington  in  retaining  his  army  in  such  a 
position  that  he  could  quickly  reach  the  Hudson  river.  On  the 
thirteenth  of  May  General  Clinton  ascended  the  river,  accompanied  by 
General  Vaughan,  under  convoy  of  the  fleet  of  Sir  George  Collier,  and 
took  possession  of  Verplanck's  Point  and  Stony  Point.  The  latter  post 
was  being  fortified,  but  by  a  very  small  force,  entirely  inadequate  to 
resist  a  naval  attack.  It  really  had  little  defensive  value  ;  but  the 
two  posts  taken  together  formed  the  lower  passage  to  the  Highlands, 
and  their  occupation  by  the  British  troops  would  be  a  standing  menace 
to  West  Point.  The  Seventeenth  British  regiment,  the  grenadier 
companies  of  the  Seventy-first,  and  artillery,  under  Lieutenant-colonel 
Webster,  were  placed  at  Stony  Point ;  a  garrison  of  equal  strength 
was  left  at  Verplanck's,  each  covered  by  the  presence  of  several  small 
frigates  and  sloops  of  war,  and  General  Clinton  retired  with  the  main 
body  to  Yonkers, 

The  American   army  was  removed   from  Middlebrook  to  Smith's 


1 779-1  JANUARY  TO  JULY.  467 

Clove  early  in  the  month.  On  the  twenty-third,  Washington  removed 
his  headquarters  to  New  Windsor,  leaving  General  Putnam  in  com 
mand.  General  Heath  was  ordered  from  Boston,  and  General  Wayne 
was  stationed  between  the  Clove  and  Fort  Montgomery,  near  Dunder- 
berg  mountain. 

Such  were  the  modified  positions  of  the  two  armies  of  the  northern 

zone,  at  the  close  of  June,  1779. 

•>' 
BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 

NOTE.     From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."    Date,  Feb.  isth,  1779. 

New  York 9100  Nova  Scotia 3011 

Long  Island 5714  Georgia 4330 

Staten  Island 1619  Bermuda 240 

Paulus  Hook 387  Providence  Island 240 

Rhode  Island 5642  

7821 
22,462 

Total,  30,283. 
SAME,  May  1st,  1779. 

New  York 9123                Halifax 3677 

Long  Island 6056                Georgia 4794 

Staten  Island 1344                West  Florida 1703 

Paulus  Hook 383  Bermuda  and  Providence  Island. . .     470 

Hoboken 264                                                                             

Rhode  Island 5644  10,644 

Total,  33,  45!. 


CHAPTER  LX. 

JULY  TO  DECEMBER,  1779.    DESOLATING   INCURSIONS.    MINOR 

MENTION. 

AS  the  first  of  July  perfected  the  lodgment  of  British  troops  at 
the  entrance  to  the  Highlands  ;  so  it  witnessed  renewed  activ 
ity  of  their  northern  army,  by  detachments.  On  the  second,  at  eleven 
o'clock  at  night,  Lieutenant-colonel  Banastre  Tarleton,  from  his  camp 
on  the  river  Bronx,  made  report  of  his  operations  during  the  previous 
twenty-four  hours.  With  seventy  of  the  Seventeenth  light  dragoons, 
a  part  of  the  Legion  infantry  and  cavalry,  (Tarleton's)  Queen's  Rangers, 
Hessians,  and  some  mounted  Yagers,  two  hundred  men,  he  passed 
North  Castle  Meeting  House,  and  through  Bedford  to  Pound-Ridge, 
to  surprise  Colonel  Sheldon,  who  commanded  a  force  of  about  ninety 
cavalry  at  that  point.  The  British  troops  pursued  the  partially  sur 
prised  Americans  nearly  to  Salem ;  burned  the  Presbyterian  Meet 
ing  House  and  some  dwellings,  captured  Sheldon's  colors  which  had 
been  accidentally  left  in  their  quarters, — some  baggage  of  the  officers, 
and  a  few  arms ;  but  inflicted  and  received  small  loss.  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Tarleton  says,  "  I  proposed  to  the  militia  terms  ;  that  if  they 
would  not  fire  from  buildings,  I  would  not  burn.  They  persisted  in 
firing,  till  the  torch  stopped  their  progress."  The  retreat  was  fol 
lowed  up  by  the  militia,  availing  themselves  of  fences  and  other 
obstructions  which  shortened  the  expedition  and  made  it  unprofitable. 
On  the  third  of  July  General  Tryon  left  New  York  with  two 
thousand  six  hundred  men,  under  convoy  of  the  fleet  of  Sir  George 
Collier,  to  invade  Connecticut.  In  the  report  of  the  latter  officer  to 
Mr.  Stephens,  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty;  he  states,  that  he  "  first 
sent  the  Renown,  Thames,  Otter,  and  two  armed  vessels,  to  block  up 
New  London  harbor  and  the  east  entrance  to  the  Sound,  and  pro 
ceeded  from  New  York,  via  Hell  Gate,  with  his  Majesty's  ships 
Camilla,  Scorpion,  Halifax  (brig)  and  Hussar  (galley)  together  with 


r779-J  JULY   TO   DECEMBER.  469 

the  transports,  and  on  the  fifth  landed  the  army,  in  two  divisions,  at 
New  Haven. 

On  Sunday,  July  4th,  the  day  before  General  Tryon  landed,  he 
issued  a  proclamation  which  foreshadowed  his  purposes.  A  single 
extract  is  given,  to  illustrate  its  character:  "The  ungenerous  and 
wanton  insurrections  against  the  sovereignty  of  Great  Britain,  into 
which  this  colony  had  been  deluded  by  the  artifices  of  designing  men, 
for  private  purposes,  might  well  justify  in  you  every  fear  which  con 
scious  guilt  could  form,  respecting  the  intentions  of  the  present  arma 
ment.  The  existence  of  a  single  habitation  on  your  defenseless  coast 
ought  to  be  a  subject  of  constant  reproof  to  your  ingratitude."  The 
people  to  whom  this  was  addressed,  were  preparing,  so  soon  as  the 
Sabbath  should  pass,  to  honor  the  day  upon  which  his  proclamation 
was  dated.  General  Tryon  reports,  that  "  the  first  division,  consisting 
of  the  Guards,  Fusileers,  Fifty-fourth  regiment,  and  a  detachment  of 
Yagers,  with  four  field  pieces,  under  Brigadier-general  Garth,  landed 
about  five  o'clock  (A.  M.)  a  mile  south  of  West  Haven,  and  began 
their  march,  making  a  circuit  of  upwards  of  seven  miles,  to  head  off  a 
creek  on  the  western  side  of  the  town.  Before  noon,  after  the  return 
of  the  boats,  General  Tryon,  in  person,  disembarked  with  the  Hes 
sians,  Landgraves  and  "  King's  American  "  regiments  and  two  pieces 
of  cannon,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  harbor,  and  instantly  began  the 
march  of  three  miles,  to  the  ferry  from  New  Haven,  east  to  Brentford, 
"  (Branford)."  The  Rock  battery  (Fort  Hale)  was  then  occupied, 
and  the  armed  vessels  entered  the  Bay.  "  General  Garth  got  into 
the  town,  not  without  opposition,  loss  and  fatigue,  and  reported  at 
half-past  one,  that  he  should  begin  the  conflagration  which  he  thought 
it  wanted.  In  the  morning,  the  first  division  embarked  at  the  south 
east  part  of  the  town,  crossed  the  ferry,  and  joined  the  other  on  the 
East  Haven  side.  In  their  progress  on  the  preceding  day  from  West 
Haven  they  were  under  continual  fire  ;  but  the  rebels  were  every  where 
repulsed.  The  next  morning,  as  there  was  not  a  shot  fired  to  molest 
the  retreat,  General  Garth  changed  his  design  and  destroyed  only 
the  public  stores,  some  vessels  and  ordnance,  excepting  six  field- 
pieces  and  an  armed  privateer  which  were  brought  off.  The  troops 
reembarked  at  Rock-Fort  and  anchored  on  the  morning  of  the 
eighth  off  the  village  of  Fairfield." 

The  landing  of  General  Garth  was  at  Savin  Rock.  At  the  "  West 
Haven  Green,"  Captain  James  Hillhouse,  with  a  party  of  students 
from  Yale  College  and  other  young  men  of  the  city,  made  a  courageous 


470  JU^V    TO   DECEMBER.  Li77y. 

resistance;  throwing  the  British  light  troops  back  upon  the  main 
body.  The  plank  had  been  taken  from  the  bridge  where  the  Milford 
turnpike  crossed  West  River,  and  at  this  point  Adjutant  Campbell  of 
the  guards  was  killed,  and  Rev.  Naphtalie  Daggett,  afterwards  Presi 
dent  of  Yale  College,  was  made  a  prisoner,  and  suffered  much  per 
sonal  violence.  The  British  troops  fell  back,  passed  up  the  western 
bank  of  the  river,  crossed  at  Thompson's  bridge  and  entered  the  town 
on  the  old  Derby  road  by  the  way  of  Hotchkissville,  coming  into 
Chapel  street  from  the  west,  a  little  before  two  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon.  General  Tryon  landed  at  Light  House  Point.  After  General 
Garth  joined  General  Tryon  in  the  evening,  the  troops  found  that  it 
was  impossible  to  obtain  control  of  the  Neck-bridge,  and  his  division 
remained  north  of  the  town  without  crossing ;  while  General  Tryon 
remained  on  the  East  Haven  Heights.  The  American  loss  is  stated 
in  the  Connecticut  Journal  of  July  1 7th,  17/9,  at  twenty-two  killed, 
and  seventeen  wounded.  General  Tryon  states  his  own  loss  at  two 
officers  and  seven  men  killed  ;  three  officers  and  thirty-seven  men 
wounded  and  twenty-five  missing. 

The  pecuniary  damage  was  stated  by  a  committee  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  Connecticut,  appointed  in  October,  1779,  to  have  been 
of  the  cash  value  of  twenty-four  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety- 
three  pounds,  seven  shillings  and  six  pence,  besides  Continental  money 
which  was  destroyed.  Several  prominent  citizens  were  taken  away 
by  the  fleet. 

On  the  eighth  and  ninth  of  July,  Fairfield  was  burned,  including 
two  meeting-houses,  eighty-three  dwelling  houses  and  shops,  two 
school-houses,  the  jail,  and  the  county  house  ;  of  "  the  total  estimated 
cash  value  of  ^34,559  $s.  and  6d.  The  estimates  were  based  upon 
the  money  value  of  17/4." 

The  British  loss  is  reported  by  General  Tryon,  as  nine  killed,  thirty 
wounded,  and  five  missing.  General  Tryon  says  in  his  report,  "  I 
regret  the  loss  of  two  places  of  public  worship  at  Fairfield,  which  took 
fire  unintentionally  from  the  flakes  from  the  buildings,  and  I  gave 
strict  orders  for  the  preservation  of  that  of  Norwalk."  Lord  Ger- 
maine  wrote  to  General  Clinton,  November  fourth,  "  You  will  acquaint 
General  Tryon  and  the  officers  that  were  under  his  care  that  their 
conduct  has  met  with  his  majesty's  approbation ;  but  I  can  not  help 
lamenting  with  you,  that  the  behavior  of  the  rebels  in  firing  from 
their  houses  upon  the  troops,  rendered  it  necessary  to  make  use  of 
severities  that  are  ever  painful  to  British  soldiers  to  inflict ;  but  were 


I779.]  JULY  TO   DECEMBER.  47 l 

such  as  are  justified  by  the  general  practices  of  all  nations  upon  such 
occasions." 

Lord  Germaine's  statement  simply  indicates  how  utterly  incapable 
he  was  of  appreciating  the  character  of  the  war,  and  of  distinguishing 
a  contest  between  armies,  from  marauding  expeditions  against  the 
homes  of  a  civilized  people.  Green  Farms,  near  by,  suffered  the  loss 
of  the  meeting-house,  fourteen  dwellings,  thirteen  barns,  and  a  store, 
"  valued  in  all  at  £3904  I  fs." 

The  fleet  crossed  the  Sound  to  Huntington,  Long  Island,  for  sup 
plies,  and  on  the  eleventh  returned  to  the  Connecticut  shore,  and 
anchored  five  miles  from  the  bay  of  Norwalk.  A  landing  was  effected 
that  night  by  General  Eraser  at  the  Cow  Pasture,  u  a  peninsula  on  the 
east  side  of  the  harbor,  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  bridge  which 
formed  the  communication  between  the  east  and  west  parts  of  the  vil 
lage,  nearly  equally  divided  by  a  salt  creek." 

The  second  division  under  General  Garth  landed  at  the  "  old  well," 
on  the  west  side  of  the  harbor.  Sir  George  Collier  sums  up  the 
operations  briefly :  "  For  the  treacherous  conduct  of  the  rebels  in 
murdering  the  troops  from  windows  of  houses  after  safe-guards  were 
granted  them,  the  town  of  Norwalk  was  destroyed,  with  five  large 
vessels,  two  privateer  brigs  on  the  stocks,  two  saw  mills,  considerable 
salt  works,  several  warehouses  of  stores,  merchandise,  etc.  The  small 
town  of  Greenfield  suffered  the  same  chastisement." 

"  The  rebels  firing  from  the  windows  and  the  tops  of  houses,  occa 
sioned  the  band  of  royal  refugees  to  set  several  of  these  on  fire,  which 
communicating  to  others,  burned  the  whole  town,  and  also  several 
whale  boats." 

General  Parsons  arrived  with  two  thousand  troops,  but  too  late  to 
prevent  the  destruction  of  the  town. 

On  the  thirteenth  the  expedition  returned  to  New  York.  Gen 
eral  Washington  was  engaged  on  the  sixth  in  inspecting  out-posts, 
and  on  the  seventh  first  learned  that  troops  had  been  sent  toward 
Connecticut.  An  express  was  sent  to  Governor  Trumbull.  Glover's 
brigade,  then  at  Providence,  was  ordered  to  cooperate  with  the  militia, 
in  case  the  enemy  should  make  a  descent ;  but  the  expedition  had 
accomplished  its  mission  before  the  orders  were  received. 

This  incursion  has  been  thus  referred  to,  in  order  to  illustrate  the 
character  of  that  warfare  which  only  incites  resistance,  embitters  the 
struggle,  and  makes  submission  possible,  only  through  extermination 
and  ruin. 


472  JULY   TO   DECEMBER.  [1779. 

The  British  army  was  not  furnished  with  the  necessary  reinforce 
ments  to  contend  in  the  field ;  and  its  activities  were  expended  in 
forays  which  barbarized  the  soldiers  and  made  subsequent  small 
reinforcements  useless. 

The  discussions  embraced  under  "  Statesmanship  in  War,"  and 
"  Civil  Wars,"  afford  the  key  to  this  mode  of  warfare.  The  atrocities 
committed  on  either  side,  originated  almost  entirely  in  the  employ 
ment  of  European  mercenaries,  Provincials,  Royal  refugees,  and 
Indians.  The  Legionary  troops  and  American  partisan  corps  invari 
ably  took  large  liberties,  reciprocated  personal  violence,  and  disre 
garded  those  principles  of  war  between  civilized  nations,  which  as  a 
general  rule,  were  honorably  regarded  by  the  British  and  American 
regular  troops. 

The  invasion  of  Connecticut  was  immediately  followed  by  a  strictly 
military  expedition  of  characteristic  boldness  and  distinguished  suc 
cess.  As  early  as  the  tenth,  Washington  organized  an  expedition 
against  Stony  Point,  the  execution  of  which  was  intrusted  to  General 
Wayne.  The  plans  finally  adopted  were  substantially  those  of  the 
Commander-in-chief.  The  details  laid  down  by  him  were  carefully 
executed  by  General  Wayne. 

The  British  garrison  had  been  supplied  with  heavy  guns,  and 
strong  defenses  had  been  well  advanced  during  the  preceding  six 
weeks  of  British  occupation.  Breastworks  and  batteries  were  built  in 
advance  of  the  fort,  and  two  rows  of  abatis  crossed  the  slope  to  the 
rear.  The  American  right  consisted  of  Colonel  Febiger's  regiment  in 
front,  followed  by  Colonel  Webb's  (Lieutenant-colonel  Meigs  com 
manding),  and  a  detachment  from  West  Point  under  Major  Hull. 

Colonel  Butler's  regiment,  and  two  companies  of  North  Carolina 
troops  under  Major  Murphy,  formed  the  left  wing.  Colonel  Lee's 
light  horse  formed  the  reserve,  and  the  brigade  of  General  Muhlen- 
berg,  three  hundred  strong,  which  had  been  so  manceuvered  as  not  to 
lead  vagrants  or  spies  to  anticipate  its  ultimate  destination,  formed  the 
covering  party,  and  took  post  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  swamp. 

The  troops  left  Sandy  Beach  at  midnight  of  the  fifteenth  and 
marched  by  single  files,  over  mountains,  through  deep  morasses  and 
difficult  defiles.  At  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  sixteenth, 
the  troops  were  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  fort ;  and  the  columns 
of  attack  were  rapidly  formed,  as  previously  designated  in  orders.  A 
reconnoissance  was  made  by  Wayne,  in  person,  and  at  half-past  eleven 
the  advance  was  ordered.  One  hundred  and  fifty  volunteers,  with 


I779-]  JULY   TO   DECEMBER.  473 

fixed  bayonets  and  unloaded  muskets,  under  Lieutenant-colonel 
Fleury,  led  by  a  forlorn  hope  of  twenty  men  under  Lieutenant  Gib 
bon  of  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania,  formed  the  extreme  right ;  and  one 
hundred  volunteers  under  Lieutenant  Knox  of  Ninth  Pennsylvania, 
led  by  a  similar  party  of  twenty,  formed  the  extreme  left. 

To  avoid  the  possibility  of  any  deserter  giving  warning  to  the 
garrison,  the  previous  purpose  of  the  expedition  was  not  disclosed 
until  the  final  formation  for  the  attack.  The  following  order  had 
been  given,  "  If  any  soldier  presume  to  take  his  musket  from  his 
shoulder, — attempt  to  fire,  or  begin  the  battle,  till  ordered  by  his 
proper  officer,  he  shall  be  instantly  put  to  death  by  the  officer  next 
him." 

The  full  tide  made  the  morass  more  difficult  of  passage,  and  the 
advance  of  Major  Murphy,  in  the  centre,  was  somewhat  delayed. 
The  right  column  fell  in  with  an  outpost  which  gave  the  alarm.  Major 
Murphy's  column  advanced  immediately,  as  if  it  were  the  only  attack 
ing  party,  and  received  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  grape  shot. 
Each  officer  and  soldier,  at  the  suggestion  of  Washington,  had  been 
directed  to  fix  a  piece  of  white  paper  to  his  cap,  to  distinguish  him 
from  an  en^my,  and  a  watchword  "the  fort  is  ours  "  had  been  given 
for  each  detachment  to  shout  aloud,  as  they  gained  the  positions  they 
were  ordered  to  attack  "  thus  to  prevent  confusion  and  mistakes." 
The  troops  had  been  carefully  drafted  by  Washington  himself.  A 
reward  of  five  hundred  dollars  and  immediate  promotion,  was  offered 
the  first  man  who  entered  the  works  ;  and  one  hundred  dollars  to 
each  of  the  four,  next  in  turn." 

General  Wayne,  in  person,  led  Febiger's  solid  column,  half  platoon 
front,  followed  by  the  other  troops  of  the  right  wing ;  and  Colonel 
Butler  advanced,  on  his  left,  with  the  second  division.  The  abatis 
were  wrenched  away  by  the  pioneer  corps.  Every  detachment  moved 
on  its  course  as  if  crowded  by  some  resistless,  unseen  power,  and  the 
two  assaulting  columns  met  in  the  centre  of  the  works,  about  the 
same  moment. 

General  Wayne  fell,  while  passing  the  abatis,  wounded  in  the  head, 
but  not  dangerously,  by  a  musket  ball  ;  and  the  total  American  loss 
was  only  fifteen  killed  and  eighty-three  wounded. 

The  British  casualties  were  one  officer  and  nineteen  men  killed, 
six  officers  and  sixty-eight  men  wounded,  two  officers  and  fifty-six 
men  missing  ;  twenty-five  officers  and  four  hundred  and  forty-seven 
men  taken  prisoners.  The  stores,  valued  at  158,640  dollars,  were 


474  JULY  TO   DECEMBER.  [1779. 

divided  among  the  troops,  in  proportion  to  the  pay  of  the  officers 
and  men. 

The  extraordinary  and  literal  success  of  this  movement,  as  planned, 
is  due  to  Washington's  mature  preparation,  and  the  no  less  remark 
able  faithfulness  and  skill  of  Wayne  and  his  entire  force.  It  was  dis 
tinguished  by  a  courtesy  to  prisoners  and  an  entire  absence  of  vio 
lence,  after  the  surrender,  which  received  high  praise  from  British 
officials. 

General  Clinton  moved  up  the  river  to  cover  Verplanck's  Point 
from  threatened  attack,  and  General  Sterling  was  detailed  to  attempt 
the  recapture  of  the  post ;  but  it  was  abandoned  by  the  Americans, 
as  untenable,  after  removal  of  the  stores,  and  the  British  troops 
resumed  possession. 

A  second  expedition,  undertaken  in  July,  without  the  sanction 
of  Washington,  was  less  fortunate.  General  McLean  of  the  British 
army  commanding  at  Halifax,  established  a  post  of  six  hundred  men, 
on  the  site  of  the  present  town  of  Castine,  Maine,  on  Penobscot  Bay. 
The  State  of  Massachusetts  organized  an  expedition  to  reduce  the 
post.  Nineteen  armed  vessels  carrying  three  hundred  guns,  and 
twenty-four  transports  carrying  about  a  thousand  men,  entered  that 
bay  July  twenty-fifth,  and  landed  on  the  twenty-eighth.  It  was  a 
failure  from  that  moment.  The  troops  were  too  few  to  storm  the 
works;  the  armed  ships  were  too  ignorantly  handled  by  an  officer  of 
militia,  to  make  an  impression,  and  the  subsequent  arrival  of  Sir  George 
Collier  with  a  sixty-four  gun  ship  and  five  frigates,  insured  the  disper 
sion  of  the  American  troops. 

Twenty-four  transports  and  the  following  armed  vessels  were 
burned.  Brigs:  Active,  16  ;  Defence,  16;  Hazard,  16  ;  Diligence, 
14; — The  Providence  (sloop)  14;  was  blown  up.  The  Nancy,  16  ; 
and  Rover,  10,  (sloops)  were  captured  ;  and  the  Spring-Bird,  10,  (sloop) 
was  burned. 

d)n  the  twenty-second  of  July,  Joseph  Brant  led  a  party  of  Indians 
and  disguised  royalists  into  Orange  County,  New  York,  laying  waste 
and  destroying  as  they  went,  and  at  Minisink,  ten  miles  west  of 
Goshen,  on  the  Neversink  river,  burned  the  church,  houses  and  other 
property.  Count  Pulaski  had  quartered  in  the  vicinity  during  the 
previous  winter ;  but  when  he  was  ordered  south,  no  troops  were 
ordered  to  take  his  place.  Application  was  made  to  Colonels  Hathorn, 
Tuston,  and  Major  Meeker  of  the  militia  for  aid.  An  ill-managed 
pursuit,  an  ambuscade,  and  a  massacre  followed.  Forty-four  were 


C779-J  JULY  TO   DECEMBER.  475 

killed  in  the   field  ;  and  of  one  hundred  and   forty-nine  who  engaged 
in  the  enterprise,  only  thirty  returned  to  tell  their  story. 

In  contrast  with  this  expedition,  and  more  like  Wayne's  assault 
of  Stony  Point,  was  Major  Henry  Lee's  capture  of  Paulus  Hook, 
directly  opposite  New  York,  where  Jersey  City  now  stands.  The 
Hook,  so  called,  was  an  island  at  high  water,  and  here  the  British 
authorities  had  established  an  outpost  of  New  York.  A  detachment 
from  the  Sixty-fourth  British  regiment,  and  a  few  Hessians  occupied 
it.  The  Americans,  four  hundred  in  number,  crossed  the  Hackensack, 
marched  down  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson,  and  stormed  the  works, 
using  the  bayonet  only,  not  a  shot  having  been  fired.  The  assault 
was  made  at  half  past  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  August  nine 
teenth.  The  American  loss  was  twenty,  and  that  of  the  British  fifty, 
and  one  hundred  and  fifty-eight  prisoners.  The  retreat  was  accom 
plished  with  difficulty,  but  safely  ;  the  march  having  been  at  least 
thirty  miles,  over  mountains,  through  morasses  and  defiles,  with  their 
rear  threatened  by  a  considerable  force. 

A  single  additional  expedition  is  mentioned,  that  of  General  Sul 
livan  against  the  Seneca  Indians.  The  command  was  tendered  to 
General  Gates  on  the  sixth  of  March,  when  the  expedition  was  first 
authorized  by  Congress.  An  enclosed  letter  tendered  the  command 
to  General  Sullivan,  if  General  Gates  declined  the  command,  in  which 
event  he  was  to  relieve  General  Sullivan,  then  at  Providence.  Gen 
eral  Gates,  then  at  Boston,  wrote  under  date  of  March  i6th  :  "  Last 
night  I  had  the  honor  of  your  excellency's  letter.  The  man  who 
undertakes  the  Indian  service  should  enjoy  youth  and  strength, 
requisites  I  do  not  possess.  It  therefore  grieves  me,  that  your  excel 
lency  should  offer  me  command  to  which  I  am  entirely  unequal.  In 
obedience  to  your  command,  I  have  forwarded  your  letter  to  General 
Sullivan,  and  that  he  may  not  be  one  moment  detained,  I  have 
desired  him  to  leave  the  command  with  General  Glover,  until  I  arrive 
in  Providence.'' 

General  Sullivan  marched  from  Easton,  Pennsylvania,  to  Wyoming, 
reaching  the  valley  on  the  last  of  July,  and  Tioga  Point,  New  York, 
August  eighth.  General  James  Clinton  commanded  the  northern 
division,  and  joined  General  Sullivan  on  the  twenty-second  of  August. 
The  additional  brigades  of  Generals  Hand,  Poor,  and  Maxwell,  Major 
Parr's  rifle  corps,  and  Proctor's  artillery  were  attached  to  the  com 
mand,  making  a  total  force  of  five  thousand  men.  On  the  twenty- 
ninth,  the  battle  of  Chemung  was  fought,  near  the  present  site  o* 


JULY  TO  DECEMBER.  [1779. 

Elmira.  The  American  loss  was  seven  killed ;  that  of  the  enemy, 
unknown.  The  towns  of  the  "  Six  Nations"  were  laid  waste.  Or 
chards,  gardens,  houses,  cabins,  clothing,  provisions,  and  life,  suffered 
indiscriminately,  and  the  expedition,  which  returned  in  September, 
failed  to  put  an  end  to  Indian  aggression,  and  equally  failed  to  recom 
mend  Christian  civilization  by  any  contrast  of  its  warfare  with  that  of 
the  enemies  it  was  sent  to  punish. 

The  numerous  minor  operations  of  the  year  1779,  thus  briefly 
outlined,  have  been  illustrative  of  the  war  which  centered  in  the 
movements  of  large  armies;  and  as  they  fill  the  gap  between  pitched 
battles,  are  used  to  illustrate  the  extent  of  the  war,  and  the  characters 
whose  military  record  is  made  up  of  the  minor,  as  well  as  more  prom 
inent,  events  of  the  campaigns. 

The  year  did  not  close  however,  without  one  conspicuous  action, 
and  that  entailed  upon  the  Southern  States  a  series  of  struggles  which 
lasted  until  the  close  of  the  war. 

Admiral  Arbuthnot  arrived  at  New  York,  August  twenty-fifth, 
with  reinforcements,  not  greatly  exceeding  three  thousand  men,  and 
relieved  Sir  George  Collier.  Sir  Andrew  Hammond  arrived  with  an 
additional  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men  from  Cork,  on  the  twenty- 
first  of  September.  The  French  squadron  of  Count  D'Estaing  having 
captured  St.  Vincents  and  Granada,  suddenly  appeared  on  the  coast 
of  Georgia. 

Spain  had  joined  France  in  war  against  Great  Britain,  and  the 
whole  line  of  British  posts,  from  Halifax  to  St.  Augustine,  was  exposed 
to  such  naval  attacks  as  these  two  powers  might  attempt,  to  divert 
attention  from  their  more  direct  operations  against  her  West  India 
possessions.  These  small  British  reinforcements  did  not  warrant  any 
attempt  upon  West  Point,  which  Washington  was  strengthening  with 
great  industry ;  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  rightly  apprehended  an  attack 
upon  New  York  itself,  by  a  cooperation  of  the  French  fleet  with  the 
American  army. 

General  Clinton  abandoned  Newport,  October  twenty-fifth,  then 
Stony  Point  and  Verplanck's  Point,  so  that  New  England  and  the 
Hudson  river  were  free  from  British  restraint. 

The  military  operations  for  the  season  terminated  with  the  siege 
of  Savannah  and  the  departure  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  from  New  York, 
to  again  attempt  the  capture  of  Charleston. 


CHAPTER   LXI. 

SIEGE   OF   SAVANNAH.    GENERAL  CLINTON   SAILS  FOR 
CHARLESTON,  1779. 

GOVERNOR  RUTLEDGE,  of  South  Carolina,  and  General 
Lincoln,  then  stationed  at  Charleston,  were  alike  convinced 
that  the  recovery  of  Savannah  was  the  best  method  of  protecting 
South  Carolina  and  rescuing  the  State  of  Georgia  from  British  con 
trol.  As  early  as  July  twentieth,  Governor  Wright  had  returned 
from  England  and  resumed  office  at  once.  The  season  was  approach 
ing  when  the  West  India  harbors  were  liable  to  hurricanes  or  sudden 
tempest,  and  the  suspension  of  naval  operations  in  those  waters,  after 
the  French  capture  of  Granada,  afforded  a  plausible  opportunity  for  an 
appeal  to  Count  D'Estaing  to  employ  his  fleet  against  Savannah. 
Monsieur  Plombard,  the  French  Consul  at  Charleston,  concurred  in 
the  feasibility  of  the  movement,  and  messengers  were  at  once  sent  to 
the  French  commander  to  urge  his  cooperation.  He  thoroughly 
approved  the  plan,  and  sailed  immediately  for  the  American  coast. 
A  division  of  two  ships  and  three  frigates  was  sent  to  Charleston  to 
perfect  the  details  of  operations,  and  the  remainder  of  his  squadron, 
consisting  of  twenty  ships  of  the  line, 'two  fiftys  and  eleven  frigates, 
with  six  thousand  troops,  appeared  off  Tybee  Island  near  Savannah, 
on  the  eighth  of  September,  and  on  the  ninth,  anchored  off  the  bar. 
The  Experiment,  50,  (British)  Sir  James  Wallace  commanding,  and 
two  store  ships  were  captured  near  the  harbor  entrance,  and  the 
Ariel,  24,  which  had  been  cruising  off  Charleston  bar,  shared  the 
same  fate. 

Reference  is  made  to  map  "  Siege  of  Savannah  "  which  is  chiefly 
copied  from  the  survey  of  a  British  officer  of  the  garrison,  and  was 
engraved  for  Stedman  in  1794. 

Several  of  the  ships  had  been  seen  off  the  coast  as  early  as  the 
fourth,  and  the  detachment  which  sailed  for  Charleston  had  given 


SIEGE  OF  SAVANNAH.  [1779. 

still  earlier  warning,  so  that  a  dispatch-vessel  had  been  sent  to  General 
Clinton  to  give  notice  of  their  presence  on  the  coast.  It  does  not 
appear,  from  the  report  of  General  Prevost,  then  in  command  at 
Savannah,  that  he  was  confident  of  their  purpose  to  attack  Savannah, 
until  about  the  eighth ;  but  from  the  first  intimation  of  the  appear 
ance  of  French  ships,  he  industriously  applied  himself  to  strengthen 
ing  his  defenses.  The  smaller  armed  vessels  then  in  port  were  moved 
up  the  river,  and  their  guns  and  seamen  were  transferred  to  the  city. 
A  horse-shoe  battery  was  at  once  built  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
town  and  entrusted  to  the  care  of  sailors.  The  Fowey,  Rose,  Keppel 
and  Germaine  were  kept  in  service  and  were  so  stationed  as  to  defend 
the  harbor  passage  from  a  landing  by  boats,  or  to  retire  up  the  river, 
as  might  be  deemed  necessary.  Captain  Henry's  dispatch  to  the  Ad 
miralty,  of  November  eighth,  states  that  every  exertion  was  then 
being  made  to  increase  the  fortifications  of  the  town.  The  buoys 
were  removed  from  the  harbor  entrance,  a  large  number  of  negroes 
were  impressed  and  put  at  work  ;  new  redoubts  of  palmetto  logs, 
inter-filled  with  sand,  were  erected  ;  a  strong  line  of  palisades  was 
completed,  and  an  inner  line  of  detached,  but  mutually  supporting 
earth-works,  were  added  to  the  lines.  Reliefs  of  troops  and  negroes 
were  assigned  to  duty,  so  that  the  labor  was  incessant,  by  night  as 
well  as  by  day.  Captain  MoncriefT,  a  distinguished  engineer,  had 
charge  of  the  preparations ;  and  every  hour  of  protracted  delay  in 
making  the  investment  was  earnestly  improved  by  the  garrison  in 
preparation  to  resist  an  attack. 

As  the  purpose  of  the  enemy  unfolded,  the  guns  were  removed 
from  the  "  Rose,"  already  unseaworthy,  and  it  was  sunken  with  the 
Savannah  and  other  vessels,  in  the  channel.  The  Germaine  retained 
her  armament  and  was  stationed  off  the  horse-shoe  redoubt,  to  flank 
the  lines  on  the  right  of  the  town. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Cruger  was  then  at  Sunbury  with  a  small 
detachment,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Maitland  was  at  Beaufort  with  a 
force  of  eight  hundred  excellent  troops.  Both  officers  were  ordered 
to  report  at  Savannah,  with  their  commands. 

The  American  authorities  at  Charleston  took  hold  of  the  enter 
prise  with  great  zeal,  and  sent  galleys  with  other  small  vessels  to  assist 
the  French  in  landing.  This  fleet  of  small  craft  promptly  took  on 
board  three  thousand  five  hundred  and  twenty-four  French  troops 
and  passed  up  Ossabaw  inlet  to  Beaulien,  about  twelve  miles  from 
Savannah,  where  they  were  landed  under  cover  of  four  armed  galleys. 


I779-J  SIEGE   OF   SAVANNAH.  479 

The  command  marched  immediately  to  Savannah,  and  on  the  six 
teenth  the  Count  D'Estaing  summoned  the  garrison  "to  surrender 
to  the  arms  of  the  King  of  France."  .  .  .  General  Prevost  had 
declined  an  unconditional  surrender  and  invited  terms.  A  truce  of 
twenty-four  hours  was  granted  by  Count  D'Estaing  ;  and  during  that 
period  Lieutenant-colonel  Maitland  skillfully  conducted  his  com 
mand  through  "  Walls  Cut,"  behind  the  islands,  and  joined  the  garri 
son.  The  surrender  was  then  peremptorily  declined.  The  object 
of  the  truce  had  been  realized. 

At  Charleston  all  was  active.  The  legislature  adjourned  : — militia 
took  the  place  of  the  regulars  in  the  forts,  and  on  the  eighth,  after 
four  days'  notice  of  the  proposed  movement,  a  considerable  force 
marched  for  Savannah.  General  Lincoln  left  the  city  on  the 
twelfth. 

General  Prescott  had  not  neglected  the  land  approaches  to  Savan 
nah,  while  especially  watching  the  river  front;  but  had  destroyed 
bridges,  and  otherwise  obstructed  the  roads,  so  that  the  Americans 
did  not  join  the  French  army  until  the  sixteenth. 

A  council  of  war  was  held  ;  the  demand  made  upon  the  garrison 
by  the  Count  D'Estaing,  prior  to  the  arrival  of  General  Lincoln,  was 
satisfactorily  explained,  and  on  the  twenty-third  the  trenches  were 
commenced.  The  difficulty  of  procuring  animals  of  draught  for 
hauling  the  heavy  guns  a  distance  of  five  miles,  occasioned  a  delay 
which  still  further  enured  to  the  benefit  of  the  British  troops. 

On  the  twenty-fourth,  Major  Graham  made  a  sally  from  the  in- 
trenchments  without  valuable  results.  On  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
seventh,  Major  McArthur  made  such  a  bold  and  skillful  demonstration 
toward  the  centre  of  the  allied  forces  as  to  occasion  a  firing  between 
the  French  and  American  camps.  On  the  fifth  of  October,  at  an  early 
hour,  fire  was  opened  from  a  battery  of  nine  mortars,  and  thirty-three 
pieces  of  heavy  artillery,  from  the  land  side,  and  sixteen  guns  from  the 
river,  and  was  maintained  without  interruption  until  the  eighth.  The 
works  were  strengthened  and  advanced,  additional  guns  were  placed 
in  position,  and  the  effect  was  soon  visible  in  the  burning  of  houses 
and  general  damage  to  the  town  of  Savannah,  without  serious  injury 
to  the  defensive  works.  On  the  eighth,  Major  L' Enfant,  with  five 
men  advanced  under  fire,  screened  themselves  behind  the  abatis,  and 
kindled  the  timber ;  but  the  green  wood  failed  to  burn,  and  the 
attempt,  however  daring,  was  a  failure. 

General  Prevost  sent  out  a  flag  requesting  permission  to  send  the 


SIEGE   OF   SAVANNAH.  [1779. 

women  and  children  out  of  the  city.  This  was  refused  by  both  Gen 
eral  Lincoln  and  Count  D'Estaing,  and  the  cannonading  continued. 

The  French  fleet  had  been  more  than  a  month  on  the  coast.  On 
his  arrival,  the  Count  D'Estaing  stated  that  his  time  was  very  limited, 
and  the  opinion  prevailed  among  the  American  officers  that  his  delay 
before  Savannah  would  not  necessarily  exceed  from  ten  to  sixteen 
days.  Upon  this  understanding  he  landed  his  troops.  The  French 
West  India  Islands  had  been  left  suddenly  without  naval  support ; 
and  the  time  already  wasted  had  been  sufficient  for  the  British  fleet 
at  New  York  to  be  advised  of  the  siege,  and  make  the  voyage  to 
relieve  the  garrison.  Many  seamen  and  gunners  from  the  French 
ships  were  in  the  trenches,  and  the  fleet  itself  was  seriously  exposed. 
These  facts,  in  connection  with  the  lateness  of  the  season,  were  urgent 
reasons  for  pressing  the  siege.  The  French  commander,  as  at  New 
port,  shrank  from  no  conflict,  but  held  that  his  fleet  was  his  first  care, 
and  that  his  support  of  America  must  be  consistent  with  his  allegiance 
to  France.  The  engineers  reported  that  it  would  require  ten  days 
more  to  complete  the  trenches.  It  had  therefore  become  impracti 
cable  for  him  to  await  the  slow  process  of  a  regular  siege,  by  system 
atic  approaches,  and  a  council  of  war  resolved  to  assault  the  British 
works  without  delay.  The  only  alternative  was  to  raise  the  siege. 

The  force  detailed  for  the  direct  assault  consisted  of  three  thou 
sand  five  hundred  French  troops,  six  hundred  American  regulars, 
including  Pulaski's  corps,  and  two  hundred  and  fifty  Charleston  militia, 
the  whole  force  divided  into  two  columns.  General  Dillon,  of  the  Irish 
brigade  in  the  French  service,  was  to  take  the  extreme  left,  and  pass 
under  and  past  Spring  Hill,  with  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  British 
extreme  right  near  the  horse-shoe  or  sailors'  battery. 

The  Count  D'Estaing  and  General  Lincoln  were  to  move  with  the 
second  division,  which  was  to  attack  the  Spring  Hill  redoubt  itself 
and  its  flanking  defenses,  while  the  Count  Pulaski  was  ordered  to 
storm  the  redoubt  still  farther  to  the  north  on  their  left. 

General  Huger,  of  South  Carolina,  with  five  hundred  men  of  the 
First  and  Second  brigades  of  militia,  General  Williams'  brigade,  and 
the  Second  battalion  of  militia,  were  to  make /<?z«/  attacks  upon  the 
south  and  east  sides  of  the  town,  with  orders  to  improve  any  fair 
opportunity  to  push  on  and  take  the  garrison  in  the  rear ;  and  the 
trenches  and  batteries  were  to  be  occupied  by  American  militia,  as  if 
the  usual  cannonading  was  to  be  continued. 

On  the  evening  of  the  eighth,  General  Lincoln  ordered  the  troops 


I779.J  SIEGE  OF  SAVANNAH.  481 

to  place  white  paper  on  their  hats  for  distinction  from  the  enemy,  and 
to  be  ready  to  make  the  assault  at  four  o'clock  the  next  morning,  the 
ninth,  which  had  been  designated  for  the  movement. 

The  march  was  so  delayed  that  it  was  daylight  when  Count 
D'Estaing,  supported  by  General  Lincoln,  Colonels  Laurens  and 
Mclntosh,  reached  the  foot  of  Spring  Hill  and  commenced  the  attack. 
Under  a  wasting  fire  the  French  troops  and  the  American  light 
infantry  pressed  on,  heedless  of  the  fall  of  men  by  the  score  at  every 
step.  The  picked  troops  of  the  garrison  had  been  concentrated  to 
meet  the  assault.  General  Dillon  pressed  so  far  into  the  marsh,  be 
yond  the  main  column,  as  to  lose  his  way,  so  that  he  was  not  disen 
tangled  until  the  battle  was  over ;  and  the  column  of  General  Huger 
which  waded  through  rice  fields  was  unable  to  make  any  practical 
advance,  and  retired  after  a  loss  of  twenty-eight  men.  The  Sergeant- 
major  of  the  Charleston  grenadiers  had  deserted  during  the  night,  after 
the  order  had  been  promulgated  to  the  troops,  and  the  garrison  adapted 
their  defense  to  the  well  understood  onset  which  they  were  to  resist. 

Count  Pulaski  promptly  took  his  position,  and  by  the  impetus  of 
his  attack  was  carried  into  the  face  of  superior  numbers  where  he 
fought  without  yielding,  until  he  was  mortally  wounded.  The  head 
of  the  main  column  not  only  forced  the  entrance  to  the  Spring  Hill 
redoubt,  but  climbed  the  palisades,  and  at  one  moment  Lieutenants 
Bush  and  Homes,  of  the  Second  South  Carolina,  had  planted  the 
South  Carolina  colors  by  the  side  of  the  French  standard,  within  the 
redoubt.  Both  officers  fell,  and  Lieutenant  Grey  raised  the  colors 
only  to  receive  a  mortal  wound.  Sergeant  Jasper  raised  one  of  them 
a  third  time,  but  received  his  death  wound  also.  He  lived  to  bring 
away  the  colors  in  safety.  For  fifty-five  minutes  the  assailing  column, 
crowded  within  a  narrow  space,  was  exposed  to  a  constant  fire  from 
troops  well  under  cover,  as  well  as  from  the  British  grenadiers  and 
Major  Glazier's  marines  who  met  them  in  front. 

General  Moultrie  says,  "  Our  troops  were  so  crowded  in  the  ditch 
and  upon  the  beam,  that  they  could  hardly  raise  an  arm,  and  while 
they  were  in  this  situation,  huddled  up  together,  the  British  loaded 
and  fired  deliberately,  without  any  danger  to  themselves. 

At  this  time  the  Germaine  and  several  galleys  maintained  a  deadly 
enfilading  fire  across  the  slope  of  the  hill,  until,  overwhelmed  with  the 
severity  of  the  storm,  the  troops  withdrew  to  their  encampments. 

With  perhaps  the  exception  of  Bunker  Hill,  there  was  no  action 
of  the  war  where  so  great  a  loss  was  received  in  so  brief  a  period. 
31 


482  SIEGE   OF   SAVANNAH.  [1779- 

The  British  casualties  were  as  follows :  Captain  Tawes,  who  com 
manded  the  Spring  Hill  redoubt  with  great  gallantry,  Captain  Simp 
son,  Lieutenant  McPherson,  Ensign  Pollard,  and  thirty-six  non-corn- 
missioned  officers  and  privates  were  killed.  The  wounded  and  missing, 
including  two  captains  and  two  lieutenants,  numbered  sixty-three, 
and  the  deserters  and  missing  fifty-two. 

The  American  casualties  included  among  the  killed,  Majors  Mott, 
Wise,  and  Jones,  Captains  Beraud,  Shepherd,  and  Donnom,  and  Lieu 
tenants  Hume,  Bush,  Wickham,  and  Bailey  ;  among  the  wounded  and 
missing,  General  Pulaski  (mortally),  nine  captains  and  eleven  lieuten 
ants  ;  non-commissioned  officers,  and  privates  killed  and  wounded, 
according  to  General  Lincoln's  statement,  one  hundred  and  seventy. 
General  Moultrie,  in  his  Memoirs,  puts  the  American  casualties  at 
four  hundred  and  fifty-seven,  which  is  undoubtedly  the  correct 
number. 

General  D'Estaing  was  twice  wounded,  and  the  French  casualties 
amounted  to  fifteen  officers  and  one  hundred  and  sixty-eight  sub 
alterns  and  soldiers  killed,  and  forty-three  officers  and  four  hundred 
and  eleven  subalterns  and  soldiers  wounded. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Maitland,  of  the  British  army,  Major  Moncrief, 
chief  engineer,  and  Captain  Henry,  who  had  charge  of  the  naval 
forces,  distinguished  themselves  ;  and  Colonel  Laurens  was  equally 
conspicuous  for  gallantry  at  the  head  of  the  American  light  infantry. 
The  French  withdrew  their  artillery,  and  sailed  on  the  twenty-ninth, 
and  the  American  army  retired  to  Charleston. 

General  Moultrie  says  in  his  Memoirs,  "  There  can  not  be  any 
doubt,  but  if  the  French  and  Americans  had  marched  into  Savannah 
when  they  arrived  on  the  seventeenth,  they  would  have  carried  the 
town  very  easily,  because  at  that  time  they  had  only  the  Spring  bat 
tery  completed,  and  no  abatis  round  the  town,"  and  then  adds,  "  after 
this  repulse  we  were  in  a  much  worse  situation  than  before.  The 
Count  D'Estaing  departed  ;  the  unfortunate  militia  of  Georgia,  who 
had  taken  the  British  protection  could  not  go  back  to  them  again,  but 
were  obliged  to  seek  shelter  in  a  strange  country,  or  live  in  the  back 
woods  of  their  own.  It  depressed  our  spirits,  we  began  to  be  appre 
hensive  for  the  safety  of  these  two  Southern  States  ;  it  also  depre 
ciated  our  money  so  low  that  it  was  scarcely  worth  anything." 

The  result  of  the  siege  of  Savannah  determined  the  movements  of 
both  the  northern  armies.  The  French  fleet  was  dispersed  by  a  storm 
soon  after  it  left  the  American  coast,  and  four  frigates  fell  into  the 


C79-]  SIEGE  OF  SAVANNAH.  483 

hands  of  the  British.  A  portion  of  the  fleet  returned  to  the  West 
Indies,  and  the  Count  D'Estaing  returned  to  France. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  December,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  left  New 
York  to  the  command  of  Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen,  and  em 
barked  with  seven  thousand  five  hundred  men  for  Charleston  under 
convoy  of  five  ships  of  the  line  and  several  frigates,  Admiral  Arbuth- 
not  commanding  the  squadron.  Washington  had  assembled  a  large 
force  of  New  York  and  Massachusetts  militia  for  the  purpose  of  mak 
ing  an  attack  upon  New  York,  but  these  were  at  once  disbanded. 

Learning  that  Sir  Henry  Clinton  was  embarking  a  large  force 
upon  transports,  and  believing  that  their  destination  was  either 
Georgia  or  South  Carolina,  he  ordered  the  North  Carolina  brigade  to 
march  to  Charleston  in  November,  the  Virginia  line  to  march  in 
December,  and  the  remainder  of  the  army  was  placed  in  winter 
quarters. 

One  division  under  General  Heath  was  stationed  in  the  Highlands, 
the  cavalrymen  were  sent  to  Connecticut,  and  Washington  with  the 
main  army  established  his  headquarters,  for  the  second  time,  at 
Morristown,  New  Jersey. 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 
NOTE.     From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."     Date,  December  1st, 

1779- 

(  British 13,848 

New  York  and  its  Dependencies •<  German 10,836 

(  Provincial 4,072 


Halifax  and  Penobscot 3,460 


Georgia  ....................................................................   3,930 

West  Florida  ..............................................................    1,787 

Bermuda  and  Providence  Island  ............................................        636 


Total,  38,569. 


CHAPTER   LXII. 

JANUARY  TO  JULY,  1780.     CONDITION  OF  THE  ARMIES. 

WHILE  General  Clinton  was  once  more  on  the  ocean,  to  again 
attempt  the  capture  of  Charleston,  the  American  army  was 
in  huts,  surrounded  by  snow  to  the  even  depth  of  two  feet,  badly 
drifted  in  all  defiles  and  undergoing  a  physical  ordeal  hardly  less  try 
ing  than  that  of  Valley  Forge.  In  order  to  induce  Congress  to  make 
still  more  urgent  efforts  to  bring  the  army  up  to  a  fair  service-stand 
ard,  Washington  prepared  a  statement  of  his  force  as  it  appeared  on 
the  muster  rolls  of  the  army.  That  statement  included  the  total 
nominal  force,  (except  from  South  Carolina  and  Georgia)  with  all 
independent  organizations  ;  and  upon  the  impossible  assumption  that 
every  man  on  the  original  rolls  was  still  living  and  in  the  service,  the 
aggregate  was  only  twenty-seven  thousand  and  ninety-nine  men  ;  this 
included  invalids,  drummers,  fifers,  in  fact,  the  entire  army. 

Two  thousand  and  fifty-one  enlistments  were  to  expire  December 
thirty-first.  Six  thousand  four  hundred  and  twenty-six  would  expire 
March  thirty-first.  By  the  last  of  April,  the  total  reduction  by  ex 
piration  of  term  of  service  would  reach  eight  thousand  one  hundred 
and  eighty-one;  by  the  last  of  June,  ten  thousand  one  hundred  and 
fifty-eight ;  by  the  last  of  September,  ten  thousand  seven  hundred 
and  nine,  and  during  the  year,  twelve  thousand  one  hundred  and 
fifty-seven. 

The  total  force,  enlisted  for  the  war,  was  but  fourteen  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  ninety-eight  ;  and  from  the  numbers  already 
given,  there  was  to  be  made  the  necessary  allowance  for  artificers, 
armorers,  wagoners,  quartermasters,  employees  and  all  the  subordinate 
details  which  lessen  the  fighting  force  of  an  army  ;  as  well  as  the 
casualties  since  the  original  muster.  The  several  States  furnished 
their  quota  for  different  periods  and  at  different  times ,  so  that  there 
was  a  constant  addition  of  raw  levies,  and  the  army  had  no  opportu- 


8 

-  *  s.teS* 


i;8o.]  JANUARY   TO   JULY.  485 

nity  to  become  alike  disciplined  and  drilled,  in  all  its  parts.  Such 
was  the  condition  of  the  army  of  the  United  States  when  the  second 
campaign  in  the  Southern  States  began. 

At  the  time  this  statement  was  made,  shortly  before  General 
Clinton  sailed,  the  British  force  at  New  York  and  its  dependencies 
consisted  of  twenty-eight  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty-six 
effectives. 

Three  thousand  nine  hundred  and  thirty  men  were  in  Georgia; 
one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-seven  in  Florida  ;  and  at 
Penobscot,  Maine,  and  Halifax,  subject  to  call,  there  was  an  addi 
tional  British  force  of  three  thousand  four  hundred  and  sixty  men, 
making  a  total  force  of  nearly  thirty-eight  thousand  men. 

General  Clinton  sailed  with  seven  thousand  five  hundred  and  fifty 
men  ;  thus  increasing  the  British  force  in  the  Southern  Department 
to  thirteen  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-seven  men,  and  leaving 
twenty-one  thousand  and  six  in  and  near  New  York.  Even  this 
garrison  was  not  without  apprehensions  of  an  attack  from  Washing 
ton's  army.  Unprecedented  cold  froze  the  bay  so  that  teams  and 
artillery  could  cross  upon  the  ice. 

The  British  army  in  New  York  was  almost  in  a  starving  and  frozen 
condition.  Transports  were  broken  up  for  fuel  and  almost  all  country 
supplies  were  cut  off  by  the  extremely  cold  weather  and  the  difficulty 
of  sending  out  expeditions  to  hunt  for  food  or  wood. 

Notwithstanding  the  severe  cold,  Lord  Stirling  crossed  to  Staten 
Island  with  a  force  of  twenty-five  hundred  men,  but  failed  to  sur 
prise  the  posts,  and  a  channel,  which  opened  quite  suddenly  through 
the  ice,  put  the  garrison  in  speedy  communication  with  the  city. 

A  few  prisoners  were  taken,  but  the  men  suffered  severely.  On 
the  twenty-fifth  of  the  same  month,  Lieutenant-general  Knyphau- 
sen  sent  a  small  command  across  the  ice,  at  Paulus  Hook,  which  cap 
tured  a  company  at  Newark;  while  Lieutenant-colonel  Buskirk 
crossed  from  Staten  Island  to  the  main  land  and  captured  the  picket 
guard  at  Elizabethtown,  with  two  majors,  two  captains  and  forty-two 
privates,  In  the  first  instance  the  academy  was  burned,  and  in  the 
other,  the  town  house  and  the  church  of  Rev.  James  Caldwell,  then 
Chaplain  in  Colonel  Elias  Dayton's  regiment. 

On  the  second  of  February,  Lieutenant-colonel  Norton  with  four 
companies  of  guards,  two  of  Hessians  and  one  of  Yagers,  with  some 
cavalry,  and  two  small  guns,  made  a  march,  using  sleighs  for  the  men, 
against  a  small  American  post  near  White  Plains,  in  Westchester 


486  JANUARY  TO  JULY.  [1780. 

county  ;  burned  the  house  of  a  man  by  the  name  of  Young,  which 
was  the  post  headquarters,  and  captured  ninety  prisoners,  incurring  a 
loss  of  two  killed  and  twenty-three  wounded.  Such  random  incur 
sions  comprised  the  whole  active  operations  of  the  garrison  of  New 
York  until  spring. 

The  American  army  at  Morristown  fought  cold,  nakedness  and  fam 
ine.  During  the  "  great  freeze"  of  January,  1780,  the  suffering  became 
intense.  Washington  found  that  even  military  constraint  was  unable 
to  collect  food  from  a  region  almost  depleted  of  supplies.  His  trans 
portation  was  so  limited  that  it  was  with  difficulty  that  fuel  could  be 
hauled  for  camp  fires,  and  the  troops  were  repeatedly  without  meat 
for  two  or  three  days.  It  was  at  such  a  time  that  the  people  of  New 
Jersey,  whose  soil  was  a  constant  battle-field  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  of  the  war,  exhibited  their  confidence  in  Washington  and 
their  sympathy  with  his  troops.  .The  patriotism  of  the  citizens  was 
of  the  same  temper  as  that  of  the  people  of  South  Carolina.  In  each 
State  the  royalist  element  was  bold  and  active.  As  the  capture  of 
Charleston  subsequently  developed  that  element  and  gave  it  organi 
zation  and  boldness,  so  the  presence  of  General  Clinton's  army  in 
New  York  encouraged  the  belief  that  British  supremacy  wrould  ulti 
mately  be  restored.  The  American  royalists  therefore  considered  the 
property  of  the  patriots  to  be  legitimate  plunder  ;  and  the  American 
soldier  who  found  an  enemy  in  an  old  neighbor,  and  regarded  him,  at 
best,  as  only  a  spy,  was  quickened  to  acts  of  violence  which  he  would 
not  have  committed  against  a  British  regular. 

Quite  a  large  number  of  those  who  were  disaffected  to  the  new 
government  had  joined  the  British  Provincial  battalions,  and  with 
those  of  New  York  of  this  class,  there  was  carried  into  General 
Clinton's  returns  for  December,  1779,  a  force  of  four  thousand 
and  sixty-four  men.  Thus  organized,  and  knowing  the  country 
thoroughly,  they  made  successful  irritating  forays,  and  the  State  was 
treated  as  a  free  granary  for  both  armies.  In  Washington's  hour  of 
trial,  the  self-sacrifice  of  heads  of  families,  past  the  age  of  military  ser 
vice,  and  of  the  women,  was  practically  extended  to  his  relief.  Im 
pressive  instances  are  numerous,  and  they  illustrate  one  of  the  redeem 
ing  elements  of  a  war  of  revolution,  when  surpassing  trials  develop 
transcendent  virtues. 

The  Rev.  Dr.  Joseph  F.  Tuttle,  afterwards  President  of  Wabash 
College,  a  son  of  New  Jersey,  and  for  a  long  time  a  resident  of  Morris 
Bounty,  devoted  many  years  to  the  study  of  the  Revolutionary  his- 


i73o.]  JANUARY  TO  JULY.  487 

tory  of  that  State,  and  by  personal  visits  to  survivors  of  the  war,  at 
their  own  homes,  accumulated  a  store  of  memorial  facts  which  greatly 
redound  to  the  credit  of  that  people.  Both  Mr.  Irving  and  Mr.  Ban 
croft  have  acknowledged  their  indebtedness  to  his  valuable  manu 
scripts,  and  the  author  cites  a  few  facts  kindly  furnished,  to  illustrate 
the  condition  of  affairs  at  Morristown,  the  spirit  of  the  people,  and 
the  state  of  the  army  at  the  beginning  of  1780. 

The  camp.  "  The  paths  at  the  camp  near  Morristown  were  marked 
with  blood  from  the  bare-footed  soldiers." 

Its  approaches.  "  The  enemy  never  passed  Short  Hills.  The  alarm 
gun,  the  beacon  fires,  the  express  riders,  were  always  ready.  The 
light  kindled  at  Short  Hills,  could  be  seen  at  Pompton  and  Basking- 
ridge  ;  and  this  was  answered  from  Kimball  mountain,  Rockaway 
Heights,  and  Vernon,  in  Sussex."  "  The  pass  through  to  Chatham 
was  as  a  closed  gate  and  secure." 

Devotion  of  women.  "  Mrs.  Uzal  Kitchell,  daughter  of  Daniel 
Tuttle,  with  husband,  father,  and  four  brothers  in  the  service,  declined 
a  British  protection,  saying,  "  If  the  God  of  battles  will  not  protect 
us  we  will  fare  with  the  rest."  "  As  many  as  twelve  soldiers  at  a  time 
were  repeatedly  billeted  at  her  house,  and  as  with  many  others  of 
like  spirit,  they  contributed  from  slender  means  for  army  uses,  without 
asking  for  vouchers  for  the  articles  furnished." 

Hunger  appeased.  "  On  one  occasion  her  sister,  Mrs.  Keturah 
Flatt,  filled  a  large  kettle  with  meat,  placed  it  over  the  fire,  and 
started  to  sift  some  meal  for  a  hungry  party.  They  eagerly 
snatched  the  uncooked  food  in  her  absence,  and  preferred  the  un 
sifted  meal,  because  there  was  more  of  it,  and  it  was  good  enough 
as  it  was." 

Clothing.  "  Stockings,  mittens,  leggins,  blankets,  and  all  kinds  of 
domestic  fabric  employed  these  earnest  women." 

"The  Kitchells,  Smiths  and  Greens  of  Hanover;  the  Jacksons, 
Beeches  and  Winds  of  Rockaway  and  Pequannock  ;  the  Condits, 
Fords,  Johns,  and  Hathaways  of  Morristown ;  the  Carters,  Pier- 
sons,  Sayers,  Millers,  Thompsons  and  Browns  of  Chatham  ;  the 
Thompsons,  Drakes  and  Carys  of  Windham,  were  only  a  few,  who 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  counted  all  things  as  loss  unless 
independence  was  won  ;  and  the  army  was  made  recipients  of  their 
bounty." 

All  this  was  in  keeping  with  that  spirit  which  comforted  the  army 
about  Boston  in  1776,  which  saved  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas,  which 


488  JANUARY  TO  JULY.  [17*0- 

worked  mightily  by  firesides,  like  unseen  leaven,  to  maintain  the 
struggle  which  Congress  well  nigh  despaired  of,  and  the  army  seemed 
too  feeble  to  sustain. 

Washington  says  of  New  Jersey  at  that  period,  that  "  his  requisi 
tions  were  punctually  complied  with,  and  in  many  counties  exceeded." 

Irving  says  :  "  Exhausted  as  the  State  was  by  repeated  drains, 
yet,  when  deep  snows  cut  off  all  distant  supplies,  Washington's  army 
subsisted  by  it." 

Bancroft  says:  "Generally  throughout  the  war,  the  women  of 
America  never  grew  weary  of  yielding  up  articles  necessary  for  the 
comfort  of  their  own  households,  to  relieve  the  distresses  of  the  soldiers. 
The  women  of  Philadelphia  rallying  round  the  amiable  Esther  Reed, 
wife  of  the  President  of  Pennsylvania,  now  made  a  more  earnest  effort ; 
they  brought  together  large  donations  of  clothing,  and  invited  the 
ladies  of  other  States  to  adopt  a  like  plan.  They  thus  assisted  to  keep 
alive  the  spirit  of  patriotism  in  the  army,  but  their  gifts  could  not 
meet  its  ever-recurring  wants." 

On  the  eleventh  of  January,  Quartermaster-general  Greene  wrote, 
"  Such  weather  never  did  I  feel.  For  six  or  eight  days  it  has  been  so 
cold  that  there  has  been  no  living  abroad  ;  the  snow  is  also  very  deep, 
and  much  drifted.  We  drive  over  the  tops  offences.  We  have  been 
alternately  out  of  meat  and  bread  for  eight  or  nine  days  past,  and 
without  either  for  three  or  four." 

With  all  this  destitution  of  the  army  and  local  waste  through  New 
Jersey,  the  New  England  States  and  Pennsylvania  were  once  more 
without  British  garrisons  ;  and  the  active  anxieties  of  impending 
danger  gave  way  to  a  lethargy  which  seemed  almost  to  ignore  like 
dangers  which  had  only  been  transferred  to  other  portions  of  one 
common  country.  There  was  scarcity  of  money.  Practically,  there 
was  no  money.  The  soldiers  had  not  been  paid  for  five  months ; 
their  families  were  suffering ;  recruiting  was  almost  suspended  ;  and 
the  burden  of  the  war  seemed  to  rest  more  depressingly  on  the  North 
ern  States  which  had  respite  from  its  active  operations,  than  upon  the 
Southern  States,  which,  left  mostly  to  themselves,  were  called  to 
endure  afflictions  such  as  New  Jersey  had  experienced  during  previous 
campaigns.  The  comparative  independence  of  the  separate  States 
weakened  their  essential  union,  and  the  jealousy  which  Congress, 
representing  the  States,  entertained  of  central  authority,  prevented 
that  prompt  confidence  in  the  counsels  of  the  Commander-in-chief 
which  had  been  so  reliable  after  the  battle  of  Trenton,  and  which  was 


78o.]  JANUARY   TO   JULY.  489 

indispensable  to  general  success.  These  elements  had  memorable 
expressions  which  illustrate  this  crisis  of  the  war. 

Washington  thus  states  the  first  difficulty  :  "  Certain  I  am,  unless 
Congress  are  vested  with  powers,  by  the  separate  States,  competent 
to  the  great  purposes  of  war,  or  assume  them  as  a  matter  of  right, 
and  they  and  the  States  act  with  more  energy  than  they  have  hitherto 
done,  our  cause  is  lost.  We  can  no  longer  drudge  along  in  the  old 
way.  By  ill-timing  in  the  adoption  of  measures  ;  by  delays  in  the 
execution  of  them,  or  by  unwarrantable  jealousies,  we  incur  enormous 
expenses  and  derive  no  benefit  from  them.  One  state  will  comply 
with  a  requisition  of  Congress;  another  neglects  to  do  it  :  a  third 
executes  it  by  halves  :  and  all  differ  in  the  manner,  the  matter,  or 
so  much  in  point  of  time,  that  we  are  always  working  up  hill.  While 
such  a  system  as  the  present  one,  or  rather  want  of  one  prevails,  we 
shall  ever  be  unable  to  apply  our  strength  or  resources  to  any  advan 
tage.  ...  I  see  one  head  gradually  changing  into  thirteen.  I 
see  one  army  branching  into  thirteen,  which  instead  of  looking  up  to 
Congress  as  the  supreme  controlling  power  of  the  United  States,  are 
considering  themselves  as  dependent  upon  their  respective  States. 
Congress  have  already  scarcely  a  power  left  but  such  as 
concerns  foreign  transactions  ;  for  as  to  the  army,  they  are  at  present 
little  more  than  the  medium  through  which  its  wants  are  conveyed  to 
the  States.  This  body  never  had,  or  at  least  in  few  instances,  ever 
exercised  powers  adequate  to  the  purposes  of  war.  .  .  .  In  a  word, 
I  see  the  powers  of  Congress  declining  too  fast  for  the  consideration 
and  respect  which  are  due  to  them  as  the  great  representative  body 
of  America,  and  I  am  fearful  of  the  consequences." 

Unequal  pay  and  bounties  continued  to  aggravate  these  difficulties, 
until  Washington  wrote  to  the  President  of  Congress  on  the  third  of 
April,  so  plainly  and  unequivocally  of  the  mutinous  spirit,  intense 
disgust  and  absolute  desperation  of  his  small,  famished  and  depleted 
command,  that  a  committee  of  three  was  appointed,  after  a  hot  debate, 
to  consult  with  him  as  to  measures  of  relief.  Even  this  advisory 
committee  was  reluctantly  conceded.  M.  de  La  Vergne  wrote  on 
the  seventeenth  of  April  to  Count  Vergennes :  "It  was  said  that 
this  appointment  of  a  committee,  would  be  putting  too  much  power 
in  a  few  hands  and  especially  in  those  of  the  Commander-in-chief; — 
that  his  influence  was  already  too  great  ;  that  even  his  virtues  afforded 
motives  for  alarm  ;  that  the  enthusiasm  of  the  army,  joined  to  the 
kind  of  dictatorship  already  confided  to  him,  put  Congress  and  the 


490  JANUARY   TO  JULY.  [1780. 

United  States  at  his  mercy  ;  that  it  was  not  expedient  to  expose  a  man 
of  the  highest  virtues  to  such  temptations."  General  Schuyler,  then 
in  Congress,  John  Matthews  and  Nathaniel  Peabody  were  appointed 
the  committee. 

In  a  letter  to  James  Duane,  dated  May  fourteenth,  Washington 
says  of  the  appointment  of  General  Schuyler  upon  this  committee, 
that  "  no  man  could  be  more  useful,  from  his  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  resources  of  the  country,  the  activity  of  his  temper,  his  fruitful- 
ness  of  expedients  and  his  sound  military  sense." 

As  a  result  of  this  conference  and  the  persistent  pressure  which 
the  Commander-in-chief  brought  to  bear  upon  Congress,  it  was 
determined  that  the  soldiers'  pay  should  be  equalized  and  more  sys 
tematic  efforts  be  made  to  recruit  and  maintain  the  army. 

The  first  six  months  of  the  year  were  peculiarly  trying  because 
the  main  army  was  unable  to  take  part  in  the  active  operations  of 
the  Southern  campaign,  during  the  occupation  of  New  York  by  a 
superior  force,  supported  by  an  adequate  fleet.  The  capture  of 
Charleston,  and  another  invasion  of  New  Jersey,  for  the  purpose  of 
capturing  the  Morristown  fastness,  were  the  chief  military  events,  but 
there  were  other  incidents  which  require  notice  before  those  actions 
receive  attention. 

On  the  twelfth  of  February,  Congress  affirmed  the  action  of  a 
General  Court  Martial  which  sentenced  Arnold,  then  commanding  at 
Philadelphia,  to  be  reprimanded  for  giving  passes  to  disaffected 
citizens  and  using  public  transportation  for  private  uses.  The  repri 
mand  was  mildly  administered,  but  Arnold  was  angry.  His  life  of 
ostentatious  display,  wild  extravagance  and  loose  views  of  moral  obli 
gation  had  aroused  public  indignation  ;  and  the  charges  which  would 
have  been  comparatively  unnoticed  if  he  had  observed  Republican 
simplicity,  were  pressed  somewhat  sternly,  because  of  suspicions  that 
he  had  repeatedly  used  his  official  position  for  private  emolument. 

General  La  Fayette  returned  from  France,  reached  Morristown 
on  the  twelfth  of  May,  was  received  with  enthusiasm,  and  brought  the 
welcome  news  that  France  had  detailed  the  Count  de  Rochambeau 
with  a  large  army  to  aid  the  United  States,  and  the  first  division  was 
already  on  its  passage.  The  extraordinary  tact  of  this  officer,  not  a 
little  aided  by  the  efforts  of  the  beautiful  and  enthusiastic  Marie 
Antoinette,  had  achieved  this  result ;  and  with  wise  appreciation  of 
the  difficulty  of  real  harmony  between  French  and  Anglo-American 
troops,  he  succeeded  in  securing  such  instructions  from  Louis  XVI. 


JANUARY  TO  JULY.  49! 

that  a  jar  of  interest  or  duty  between  the  allies  seemed  improbable. 
"  The  troops  were  to  obey  Washington ;  to  admit  the  precedence  of 
American  officers  of  equal  rank  ;  on  all  formal  occasions  to  yield  the 
right  to  the  American  army,  and  bear  in  mind  that  the  whole  pur 
pose  was  heartily  and  efficiently  to  execute  the  will  of  the  American 
Commander-in-chief."  The  only  drawback  was  found  in  the  entirely 
unprepared  condition  of  the  United  States  to  provide  for  their  sup 
port,  and  to  furnish  an  equivalent  army  force,  so  as  to  make  the  joint 
operations  more  immediately  effective. 

Long  before  their  arrival  the  American  army  had  lost  in  numbers 
even  more  than  anticipated  by  Washington,  in  his  report  already  cited. 
While  the  call  from  South  Carolina  for  aid  became  more  and  more  im 
perative  he  was  compelled  to  groan  in  spirit  and  send  only  words  of 
sympathy,  instead  of  men  to  fight.  On  the  second  of  April  his  whole 
force,  on  both  sides  of  the  Hudson  river,  consisted  of  only  ten  thousand 
four  hundred  rank  and  file  and  of  these  two  thousand  eight  hundred 
had  but  four  weeks  to  serve.  Lord  Rawdon  took  two  thousand  five 
hundred  British  and  Hessians  to  reinforce  General  Clinton,  but  nearly 
twelve  thousand  remained  behind  ;  and  while  this  warning  of  the 
purpose  of  the  British  commander  to  strike  with  decisive  effort  at 
Charleston,  aroused  the  alarm  of  Washington  for  the  fate  of  the  South 
ern  campaign,  he  could  not  leave  the  Northern  States  to  render  sub 
stantial  aid.  The  Maryland  division,  however,  the  Delaware  regi 
ment  and  the  First  artillery,  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  were 
ordered  South  ;  and  the  Baron  De  Kalb  was  instructed  to  lead  the 
troops  to  Charleston.  It  is  just  here  that  one  fact  in  the  struggle  for 
American  Independence  should  have  specific  notice.  From  I//6, 
before  Boston,  and  through  the  entire  war,  the  states  of  Maryland 
and  Delaware  were  represented  on  nearly  every  battle-field.  Although 
their  troops  were  few  in  numbers  they  were  distinguished  for  valor, 
so  that  their  failure  in  an  emergency  was  a  sign  of  great  peril,  or  of 
some  over-mastering  superiority,  or  panic. 

But  it  was  not  on  battle  fields,  north  or  south,  that  the  entire 
interest  of  the  period  concentrated.  The  southern  army  was  numeri 
cally  weak,  and  the  northern  army  was  hungry.  On  the  twenty-fifth 
of  May  two  Connecticut  regiments  mutinied,  declaring  that  they 
would  march  home,  "  or  at  least  gain  subsistence  by  the  point  of  the 
bayonet."  Handbills  printed  in  New  York  were  secretly  circulated, 
urging  the  soldiers  to  desert.  "  This  mutiny,"  says  Washington, 
qnite  impressively,  "  has  given  infinite  concern.  There  was  no 


492  JANUARY  TO  JULY. 

money  but  continental  paper,  and  adds,  "  it  is  evidently  impracticable, 
from  the  immense  quantity  it  would  require,  to  pay  them  as  much  as 
would  make  up  the  depreciation."  "  This  is  a  decisive  moment,  one 
of  the  most ;  I  will  go  farther  and  say  the  most  important  America 
has  seen.  The  court  of  France  has  made  a  glorious  effort  for  our 
deliverance,  and  if  we  disappoint  its  intentions  by  our  supineness,  we 
must  become  contemptible  in  the  eyes  of  all  mankind;  nor  can  we 
after  venture  to  confide  that  our  allies  will  persist  in  an  attempt  to 
establish  what,  it  will  appear,  we  want  inclination  or  ability  to  assist 
them  in." 

General  Greene,  then  Quartermaster-general,  thus  addressed  the 
Colonel  of  the  Morristown  militia :  "  There  are  no  more  provisions 
than  to  serve  one  regiment  in  the  magazine.  The  late  terrible  storm, 
the  depth  of  the  snow,  and  the  drifts  in  the  roads  prevent  the  little 
stock  from  coming  forward  which  is  in  distant  magazines.  The  roads 
must  be  kept  open  by  the  inhabitants,  or  the  army  can  not  be  sub 
sisted.  Unless  the  good  people  lend  their  assistance  to  forward  sup 
plies,  the  army  must  disband.  The  army  is  stripped  naked  of  teams 
as  possible,  to  lessen  the  consumption  of  forage.  Call  to  your  aid  the 
overseers  of  highways  and  every  other  order  of  men  who  can  give 
dispatch  to  this  business." 

"  P.  S.     Give  no  copies  of  this  for  fear  it  should  get  to  the  enemy." 

General  Greene  resigned  his  place  as  Quartermaster-general,  but 
continued  to  act  until  August,  when  Colonel  Pickering  assumed  its 
duties.  He  desired  to  join  the  southern  army. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  June,  Congress,  without  consulting  Washing 
ton,  appointed  General  Gates  to  the  command  of  the  Southern  Depart 
ment.  He  had  spent  the  winter  at  his  home  in  Virginia,  but  eagerly 
accepted  this  high  command.  His  old  confidant  and  companion 
in  arms,  Charles  Lee,  sententiously  forewarned  him  on  his  departure  ; 
"  Take  care  that  you  do  not  exchange  northern  laurels  for  southern 
willows." 


CHAPTER   LXIII. 

SOUTH   CAROLINA   AND  NEW  JERSEY   INVADED.     SIEGE  OF 
CHARLESTON.    BATTLE  OF  SPRINGFIELD.     1780. 

GENERAL  CLINTON  left  New  York  December  twenty-sixth, 
1779.  Under  fair  promise,  he  had  a  voyage  of  only  ten  days 
before  him.  He  cleared  the  ice  of  the  harbor  without  difficulty,  and 
the  whole  fleet  got  under  way.  For  a  few  days  the  weather  proved 
favorable;  the  admiral  led  the  van,  and  kept  in  shore,  but  this  gleam 
of  fortune  was  not  sufficiently  permanent  to  give  a  fortunate  termina 
tion  to  the  voyage.  A  succession  of  storms  dispersed  the  fleet.  Few 
ships  arrived  at  Tybee,  in  Georgia,  before  the  end  of  January.  Some 
were  taken,  others  separated,  one  ordnance  vessel  foundered,  most  of 
the  artillery,  and  all  the  cavalry  horses  perished.  Such  is  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Tarleton's  brief  record  of  the  voyage.  In  his  "  History  of  the 
Campaigns  of  1780  and  1781,"  he  says,  "  The  richness  of  the  country, 
its  vicinity  to  Georgia,  and  its  distance  from  General  Washington, 
pointed  out  the  advantages  and  facility  of  its  conquest.  While  it 
would  be  an  unspeakable  loss  to  the  Americans,  the  possession  of  it 
would  tend  to  secure  to  the  crown  the  southern  part  of  the  continent 
which  stretches  beyond  it." 

The  British  troops  made  Tybee  Island,  near  Savannah,  their  first 
rendezvous,  but  were  unable  to  leave  for  South  Carolina  until  the 
tenth  of  February,  landing  on  St.  John's  Island,  thirty  miles  below 
Charleston,  on  the  following  day. 

The  troops  which  accompanied  General  Clinton  consisted  of  the 
following  commands,  and  were  reported  at  the  time,  at  London,  to  be 
of  the  strength  now  indicated.  The  statement  is  given  ;  but  so  many 
round  numbers  indicate  error. 

Light  Infantry 800        Queen's  Rangers 200 

Grenadiers 900        Guides  and  Pioneers 1 50 

Seventh  Regiment      ....     400        Fanning's  Corps 100 


494  SOUTH    CAROLINA  AND   NEW  JERSEY   INVADED.  [1780. 

Twenty-third  Regiment      .     .  400        Hessian  Grenadiers 1000 

Thirty-third          "  ...  450        Ferguson's  Corps 300 

Forty-second        "           ...  700  Second  Hessian  Regiment  .     .     .     800 

Sixty-third  "          ...  400        Yagers 200 

Sixty-fourth          "  ...  350        British  Artillery 200 

British  Legion 200 

Total 7550. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  states  that  transportation  was  pro 
vided  for  eight  thousand  five  hundred  men  ;  and  that  is  the  number 
generally  reported  as  connected  with  the  expedition  prior  to  rein 
forcements  received  from  Savannah  and  New  York. 

Admiral  Arbuthnot  furnished  the  convoy,  consisting  of  the  Europe, 
64  ;  Russel,  74  ;  Robuste,  74 ;  Defiance,  64 ;  Raisonable,  64  ;  Renown, 
50  ;  Romulus,  44 ;  Roebuck,  44  ;  Blonde,  32  ;  Perseus,  32  ;  Camilla, 
20  :  Raleigh,  28  ;  Richmond,  32  ;  Virginia,  28. 

The  British  troops  were  promptly  transferred  to  James  Island, 
then  crossed  Stono  and  Ashley  rivers,  and  took  position  across  the 
narrow  neck  between  the  Ashley  and  Cooper  rivers,  where  they 
established  themselves  on  the  twelfth  of  March.  It  will  be  noticed 
by  reference  to  map,  "  Siege  of  Charleston,"  that  the  possession  of 
Wappoo  Creek  enabled  the  British  troops  to  use  small  boats  for 
transferring  troops  to  the  Ashley  river,  without  entering  the  harbor 
from  the  sea.  Meanwhile,  the  British  fleet  had  been  ordered  to  silence 
Fort  Moultrie,  and  force  an  entrance  to  the  inner  bay. 

The  garrison  of  the  city  did  not  exceed  two  thousand  two  hundred 
regulars  and  one  thousand  militia,  when  General  Clinton  crossed  the 
Ashley ;  but  he  delayed  his  advance  upon  the  city  for  two  weeks,  so 
that  the  troops  under  General  Patterson,  who  had  been  ordered  to 
join  him  from  Savannah,  could  arrive  and  make  his  force  equal  to  any 
contingency  of  stubborn  resistance  by  the  American  troops.  Gov 
ernor  Rutledge  had  reached  Charleston,  having  discretionary  author 
ity  from  the  State  to  act  according  to  his  own  will  in  all  matters  of 
essential  concern  ;  and  General  Lincoln  was  in  command  of  the  gar 
rison.  It  appears,  from  documentary  data,  that  the  retention  of  the 
city  was  principally  owing  to  the  demand  of  the  inhabitants,  since  the 
neglect  to  anticipate  an  attack  from  the  land  side  had  prevented  the 
completion  of  thoroughly  defensive  works  ;  and  it  was  clearly  an  error 
to  retain  the  town  with  inadequate  forces.  Commodore  Whipple  of 
the  American  navy  felt  strong  confidence,  not  shared  by  Washington, 
that  he  could  prevent  the  British  ships  from  crossing  the  bar  ;  and 


i ySo.]  SOUTH   CAROLINA  AND   NEW   JERSEY   INVADED.  495 

too  much  confidence  was  reposed  in  the  capacity  of  Fort  Moultrie  to 
maintain  its  good  record,  although  it  had  been  allowed  to  become 
almost  worthless  from  neglect.  The  few  vessels  at  his  (Whipple's) 
command,  consisted  of  the  Briscole,  nominally  44,  but  mounting  only 
26  guns  ;  the  Providence  and  Boston,  each  32  guns  ;  the  Queen  of 
France,  28  ;  L'Aventure  and  Truite,  each  26  guns ;  the  Ranger  and 
General  Lincoln,  each  20  guns,  and  the  Notre  Dame  of  14  guns. 
These  were  moored  between  Sullivan's  Island  and  the  middle  ground, 
previously  noticed.  On  the  twentieth  of  March  the  British  squadron 
safely  crossed  the  bar,  and  the  American  fleet  retired.  With  the 
exception  of  the  Ranger,  20,  the  American  ships  were  sunk  in  Cooper 
River,  between  the  city  and  Shutes  Folly  ;  and  the  guns,  stores  and 
men  were  transferred  to  the  city  defenses.  The  Ranger  and  two 
galleys  were  placed  in  Hog  Island  channel  to  keep  up  communication* 
with  the  country  north  of  Charleston. 

On  the  seventh  of  April  General  Wood  ford  crossed  Cooper  River, 
and  joined  the  garrison  with  seven  hundred  Virginia  troops,  having 
made  a  forced  march  of  nearly  five  hundred  miles  in  thirty  days.  The 
Americans  still  retained  a  post  at  Monk's  Corner  ;  and  the  garrison 
depended  wholly  upon  that  section  of  the  State  for  supplies,  after  the 
Neck  came  into  the  possession  of  British  troops.  General  Clinton 
thoroughly  understood  his  position,  but  still  awaited  the  arrival  of 
General  Patterson. 

At  one  o'clock  on  the  ninth,  Admiral  Arbuthnot  weighed  anchor, 
leading  with  the  Roebuck,  followed  in  order  by  the  Richmond,  Rom 
ulus,  Blonde,  Virginia,  Raleigh,  Sandwich,  armed  ship,  and  the  Re 
nown,  and  passed  Fort  Moultrie  with  a  loss  of  only  twenty-seven  men, 
without  stopping  for  its  fire,  and  came  to  anchor  off  Fort  Johnson 
which  had  been  abandoned.  "  The  Aretus  ordnance  ship  grounded 
and  was  burned.  The  Richmond's  foretop-mast  was  shot  away  ;  some 
damage  was  done  to  the  masts  and  rigging  of  the  other  vessels,  but 
their  hulls  suffered  but  slightly." 

General  Lincoln  had  confidently  expected  that  the  proclamation 
of  General  Rutledge,  and  the  great  emergency  which  threatened  the 
city,  would  bring  a  larger  force  to  the  defense,  but  he  was  disap 
pointed. 

General  Patterson  marched  for  Charleston  about  the  middle  of 
March  with  twelve  hundred  men.  He  was  joined  by  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Tarleton  near  Port  Royal.  This  officer  had  partially  re 
mounted  his  dragoons,  and  Major  Cochran  with  the  legion  infantry 


496  SOUTH   CAROLINA   AND   NEW  JERSEY   INVADED.  [1780. 

and  Major  Ferguson's  riflemen,  formed  an  additional  force,  to  make 
the  reinforcement  important  to  General  Clinton's  success. 

Several  skirmishes  occurred  as  they  approached  Charleston,  in  one 
of  which  Colonel  William  Washington,  with  Pulaski's  corps,  Eland's 
light  horse,  and  a  detachment  of  regular  cavalry,  gained  decided  credit, 
capturing  Lieutenant-colonel  Hamilton  of  the  North  Carolina  Pro 
vincials  and  some  other  prisoners.  Tarleton  says,  "  the  affair  ended 
with  equal  loss  to  both  parties."  Colonel  Washington  was  then 
attached  to  General  Huger's  command,  which  consisted  of  the  cav 
alry  already  named  and  some  militia,  with  headquarters  at  Monk's 
Corner,  thirty  miles  distant  from  the  city.  Lieutenant-colonel  Web 
ster  with  fourteen  hundred  men,  consisting  of  the  Thirty-third  and 
Sixty-fourth  British  infantry,  accompanied  by  Tarleton's  and  Fergu 
son's  mounted  men,  marched  on  the  thirteenth  of  April,  surprised 
the  post,  and  captured  one  hundred  officers  and  men,  four  hundred 
horses,  and  fifty  wagons  loaded  with  arms,  clothing  and  ammunition. 

On  the  twenty-ninth,  Admiral  Arbuthnot  formed  a  brigade  of  five 
hundred  seamen  and  marines  under  Captains  Hudson,  Order  and 
Gambier,  which  landed  at  daybreak,  at  Mount  Pleasant.  This  com 
pelled  the  Americans  to  abandon  their  position  at  L'Empries  Point, 
with  a  loss  of  nearly  a  hundred  men,  who  were  captured  by  the  guard- 
boats  of  the  fleet,  while  retiring  to  Charleston. 

On  the  fourth  of  May,  Captains  Hudson,  Gambier  and  Knowles 
landed  before  daylight  upon  Sullivan's  Island,  with  two  hundred 
seamen  and  marines,  and  the  garrison  of  Fort  Moultrie  surrendered. 

Ground  had  been  broken  on  the  night  of  the  first  of  April,  at  a 
distance  of  eight  hundred  yards  from  the  American  lines,  and  on  the 
tenth  a  summons  was  sent  to  General  Lincoln,  demanding  the  sur 
render  of  the  city.  This  was  promptly  refused,  and  by  the  nineteenth 
the  second  parallel  was  opened  at  a  distance  of  only  four  hundred 
and  fifty  yards.  The  American  detachment  at  Biggins'  bridge,  over 
the  Cooper  River  a  few  miles  above  Charleston,  was  also  dispersed, 
and  upon  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from  New  York,  April  the 
eighteenth,  Lieutenant-general  Cornwallis  took  command  upon  the 
north  bank  of  that  river  and  closed  all  communication  between  the 
city  and  the  country  adjacent. 

On  the  sixth  of  May  the  third  parallel  was  occupied  and  prepara 
tions  were  made  for  an  assault. 

By  reference  to  marginal  notes  upon  the  map,  the  relative  posi 
tions  of  the  American  batteries  will  be  understood.  Two  rows  of 


iTSo.J  SOUTH   CAROLINA  AND   NEW  JERSEY    INVADED.  497 

abatis,  a  double  picketed  ditch  and  several  redoubts  crossed  before  the 
town,  connecting  the  swamps  that  skirted  the  city  on  both  rivers,  and 
a  canal  was  still  further  advanced  before  these,  making  a  wet  ditch. 
The  third  British  parallel  tapped  this  ditch  and  it  was  at  once  con 
verted  into  a  sure  cover  for  pressing  more  closely  upon  the  lines  of 
abatis. 

There  was  no  longer  any  hope  of  successful  resistance.  The  guns 
were  dismounted,  the  works  were  in  ruins,  and  on  the  twelfth  of  May 
Major-general  Leslie  took  possession  of  the  city,  under  honorable 
terms  of  surrender. 

The  British  casualties,  as  reported  by  General  Clinton,  May  thir 
teenth,  were  seventy-six  killed  and  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine 
wounded.  The  American  casualties  were  nearly  the  same.  The 
schedule  of  prisoners  reported  by  Deputy  Adjutant-general  John 
Andre  made  an  aggregate  of  five  thousand  six  hundred  and  eighteen 
men,  which  in  fact  included  all  male  citizens,  as  the  Continental 
troops,  including  five  hundred  in  hospital,  did  not  exceed  two  thou 
sand  men. 

The  citizens,  as  well  as  the  militia,  were  treated  as  prisoners 
on  parole,  and  were  allowed  to  return  home,  while  the  Continental 
troops  and  seamen  were  retained  as  prisoners  of  war,  including  the 
Lieutenant  Governor  and  five  of  the  council.  Four  hundred  and  five 
pieces  of  ordnance,  large  and  small,  were  among  the  acquisitions  of 
the  capture. 

At  this  time  Colonel  Buford  with  three  hundred  and  eighty  Vir 
ginia  regulars  and  two  field  pieces  was  en  route  for  Charleston,  but 
upon  hearing  of  its  capture  he  fell  back  towards  North  Carolina, 
joined  by  Colonel  Washington  and  the  few  of  his  cavalry  who  had 
escaped  from  the  affair  at  Monk's  Corner.  Immediately  after  the 
surrender,  General  Clinton  sent  Lieut-Col.  Cruger  up  the  Saluda  to 
Ninety-six  (see  map  of  "  Operations  in  Southern  States  ")  and  Lieu 
tenant-colonel  Tarleton  with  one  hundred  and  seventy  dragoons,  one 
hundred  mounted  infantry  and  a  three  pounder  gun,  to  pursue  Colo 
nel  Buford.  In  a  forced  march  of  twenty-four  hours  he  reached 
Rugely's  Mills,  beyond  Camden,  and  by  three  o'clock  of  the  afternoon 
overtook  the  Americans  on  the  bank  of  the  Waxhaw.  A  messenger 
was  sent  in  advance,  exaggerating  the  pursuing  force,  and  demanding 
a  surrender,  which  was  declined ;  and  Tarleton  pressed  on  so  rapidly 
that  he  fell  upon  the  American  troops  before  they  were  prepared  for 
action,  threw  them  into  disorder  and  committed  great  havoc.  His 
32 


498  SOUTH   CAROLINA  AND   NEW  JERSEY   INVADED.  [1780 

report  gives  the  American  casualties  as  one  hundred  and  thirteen  killed, 
one  hundred  and  fifty  wounded,  unable  to  travel,  and  fifty-three  prison 
ers.  General  Clinton's  report  states  the  number  of  killed,  at  one 
hundred  and  seventy-two.  The  British  casualties  were  two  officers 
and  three  privates  killed,  one  officer  and  fourteen  privates  wounded, 
eleven  horses  killed,  and  nineteen  wounded.  Colonel  Tarleton 
says,  "  a  report  among  the  cavalry  that  they  had  lost  their  command 
ing  officer  (when  his  horse  was  shot)  stimulated  the  soldiers  to  a  vin 
dictive  asperity,  not  easily  restrained ;  but  the  wounded  of  both 
parties  were  collected  with  all  possible  dispatch,  were  treated  with 
equal  humanity,  were  placed  at  the  neighboring  plantations  and  a 
meeting-house,  and  surgeons  were  sent  for  from  Charleston  and  Cam- 
den  to  assist  them." 

The  inauguration  of  a  bitter  partisan  warfare  at  once  began  ;  and 
on  the  twentieth  of  June  at  Ramsour's  Mills,  in  Lincoln  County, 
North  Carolina,  a  party  of  Whigs,  distinguished  by  white  paper  on 
their  hats,  and  a  party  of  Tories  wearing  twigs  of  pine,  had  a  deadly 
encounter,  where  acquaintances  and  old  neighbors  fought  until  nearly 
three  hundred  were  killed  or  wounded. 

On  the  third  of  June,  two  days  before  his  departure,  General 
Clinton  issued  a  proclamation,  "  requiring  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Province  of  South  Carolina,  including  prisoners  on  parole,  to  return 
to  their  allegiance,  or  be  treated  as  rebels  to  the  government 
of  the  king."  It  was  based  on  the  assumption  of  restored  suprem 
acy  ;  it  ignored  the  terms  of  honorable  surrender  ;  it  set  at  naught 
all  sound  military  policy,  and  quickened  the  energies  of  the 
people  to  fresh  assertion  of  independence.  Its  key  is  found  in  the 
hasty  and  enthusiastic  communication  of  General  Clinton  to  Lord 
Germaine,  which  says,  "  The  inhabitants  from  every  quarter  declare 
their  allegiance  to  the  king,  and  offer  their  services  in  arms.  There 
are  few  men  in  South  Carolina  who  are  not  either  our  prisoners,  or 
in  arms  with  us." 

In  following  General  Clinton  to  New  York,  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  the  mutinous  spirit  which  had  been  evoked  in  the  American 
army  through  actual  famine,  had  been  misinterpreted  by  the  British 
officers  at  New  York,  and  that  on  the  sixth  of  June,  General  Knyp- 
hausen  with  Generals  Mathews,  Tryon,  and  Sterling,  with  five  thou 
sand  troops,  crossed  from  Staten  Island  to  Elizabethtown  Point,  for 
the  purpose  of  cooperating  with  any  movement  which  might  favor 
the  restoration  of  British  supremacy,  or  afford  a  prospect  of  a  sue- 


I750.J  SOUTH   CAROLINA  AND   NEW  JERSEY   INVADED  499 

cessful  attack  upon  Morristown  itself.  General  Stirling  advanced 
before  daylight  toward  Elizabethtown,  but  found  that  the  militia 
were  on  the  alert.  An  American  sentry  fired  into  the  advancing  col 
umn  while  it  was  only  dimly  distinguishable  before  daylight,  and 
General  Stirling  received  the  shot  in  his  thigh,  which  ultimately 
proved  fatal.  He  was  carried  to  the  rear,  and  General  Knyphausen 
took  his  place  at  the  front.  By  this  time  the  sun  had  risen,  and 
the  regiment  of  Colonel  Elias  Dayton  began  to  assemble,  falling 
back  slowly  however  before  the  advancing  British  troops.  A  squad 
ron  of  Simcoe's  Queen's  Rangers  followed,  leading  the  British 
and  Hessian  infantry.  As  by  magic,  the  militia  appeared.  Fences, 
thickets,  orchards,  houses,  and  trees  were  made  available  for  single 
riflemen,  and  the  column  suffered  constant  loss.  Stedman  says, 
"  a  mutinous  spirit  had  certainly  discovered  itself  among  the 
soldiers  of  the  American  army,  but  arose  from  distress,  and  not 
from  disaffection.  The  British  commander  experienced  a  grievous 
disappointment.  Instead  of  being  received  in  the  Jerseys  as  friendly, 
the  militia  very  gallantly  turned  out  to  oppose  them.  During 
the  march  from  Elizabethtown  to  Connecticut  Farms,  a  distance 
of  only  seven  miles,  they  were  annoyed  by  parties  of  militia  the  whole 
way.  When  the  British  troops  approached  Springfield,  a  detachment 
from  that  army  which  was  represented  to  be  mutinous,  was  seen 
drawn  up  in  force  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  to  dispute  their  pas 
sage."  As  Colonel  Dayton  fell  back,  he  found  that  General  Max 
well's  brigade  was  ready  to  support  him,  and  a  vigorous  skirmish  was 
maintained  until  the  enemy  brought  artillery  to  the  front  as  well  as 
additional  troops.  The  village  of  Connecticut  Farms  was  burned, 
including  the  church  and  parsonage,  and  the  wife  of  Chaplain  Cald- 
well  was  killed  by  a  bullet.  Irving  says,  "  The  tragical  fate  of  Mrs. 
Caldwell  produced  almost  as  much  excitement  throughout  the  country 
as  that  which  had  been  caused  in  a  preceding  year  by  the  massacre 
of  Miss  McCrea."  Like  that  event,  however  sad,  it  could  not  be 
charged  to  the  account  of  the  British  commander. 

General  Knyphausen  advanced  within  half  a  mile  of  Springfield, 
and  halted,  to  determine  the  wisest  plan  of  action.  The  whole  coun 
try  seemed  aroused.  General  Maxwell  was  on  the  bank  of  the  Rah- 
way.  On  the  short  hills  in  the  rear,  Washington  was  posted  in  force. 
The  smoke  of  beacon  fires  spread  the  progress  of  the  alarm  and 
throughout  the  country.  When  night  came  on,  dark  and.  rainy  as  it 
was.  the  fires  still  blazed  with  increasing  numbers,  and  the  deep  boom 


500  SOUTH    CAROLINA  AND   NEW  JERSEY  INVADED.  [1780. 

of  the  alarm  guns  on  the  mountains  warned  the  people  far  and  wide 
that  every  man  who  had  a  gun  was  wanted  at  once.  Before  morning 
the  Hessian  general  attempted  to  regain  Staten  Island  ;  but  the  tide 
was  out,  and  the  whole  shore  was  covered  with  deep  mud,  which  the 
cavalry  could  not  cross.  Stedman  says,  that  "  It  was  determined  for 
the  credit  of  the  British  arms  to  remain  some  days  longer  in  New 
Jersey,  lest  their  precipitate  retreat  should  be  represented  as  a  flight.'* 
Such  considerations  could  hardly  have  controlled  the  actions  of  a 
veteran  soldier  like  Lieutenant-general  Knyphausen.  As  early  as  the 
first  of  June  he  had  learned  of  the  capture  of  Charleston,  and  that 
General  Clinton  was  to  return  to  New  York,  which  was  a  good  base 
for  an  advance  upon  Morristown.  He  therefore  strengthened  his 
position  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  his  superior  officer. 

Washington  wrote  on  the  tenth  that  "  their  movements  were 
mysterious,  and  the  design  of  the  movement  not  easily  penetrated." 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  few  movements  during  the  war  which 
bore  so  directly  upon  the  safety  of  the  American  army  and  the  gen 
eral  cause,  as  the  operations  of  the  British  army  before  Springfield 
during  June,  1780;  and  the  conduct  of  both  sides  indicated  some  ap 
preciation  of  its  importance. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  reached  Staten  Island  on  the  seventeenth,  and 
a  plan  was  at  once  matured  to  strike  the  camp  and  magazines  of 
Washington  at  Morristown.  Troops  were  embarked  upon  transports, 
and  all  suitable  demonstrations  were  made  as  if  an  expedition  against 
West  Point  was  intended.  Washington  deliberately,  but  actively, 
put  his  army  in  motion,  and  advanced  eleven  miles  toward  Pompton, 
on  the  twenty-second,  en  route  to  the  Hudson,  when  he  discovered 
the  purpose  of  his  adversary. 

General  Greene  had  been  left  in  command  near  Springfield  on  the 
twenty-first  of  June,  with  Maxwell's  and  Stark's  brigades,  Lee's  cavalry 
corps,  and  the  militia. 

The  British  advance  was  made  in  two  columns,  at  five  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  June  twenty-third  ;  one  by  the  Vauxhall,  and  the  other 
by  the  Springfield  road,  the  whole  force  consisting  of  five  thousand 
infantry,  besides  cavalry  and  eighteen  pieces  of  artillery.  The  British 
pressure  was  quite  deliberate,  but  earnest,  upon  the  left,  on  the  Spring 
field  road,  as  if  it  were  the  main  attack.  The  column  formed  near 
the  Matthews  house,  on  a  small  eminence  where  artillery  could  gain 
a  commanding  position,  because  just  at  the  left  of  the  bridge,  Colonel 
Angell's  Rhode  Island  regiment  with  one  gun,  was  holding  an  orchard 


I7$o.]  SOUTH   CAROLINA  AND   NEW  JERSEY   INVADED.  501 

which  commanded  the  bridge  over  the  Rahway  and  afforded  some 
cover.  The  British  guns  were  aimed  too  high  at  first,  and  did  little 
execution  ;  but  by  fording  the  stream,  not  more  than  twelve  yards 
wide,  the  command  turned  the  American  position,  and  crowded  Colonel 
Angell  back  to  the  second  bridge,  over  a  branch  of  the  Rahway,  where 
Colonel  Shreve  resisted  with  equal  obstinacy.  Colonel  Angell  lost  one- 
fourth  of  his  men  and  was  compelled  to  fall  back  with  Colonel  Shreve 
upon  the  brigades  of  Maxwell  and  Stark. 

Colonel  Dayton's  regiment  contributed  to  their  resistance,  and 
"  none,"  says  Irving,  "  showed  more  ardor  in  the  fight  than  Caldwell 
the  chaplain,  who  distributed  Watts'  psalms  and  hymn  books  among 
the  soldiers  when  they  were  in  want  of  wadding,  with  the  shout 
'  put  Watts  into  them,  boys.' ' 

The  other  British  column  had  a  still  more  important  objective  in 
view,  being  no  other  than  to  gain  the  pass  leading  to  Chatham  and 
Morristown.  Major  Lee's  cavalry  and  a  picket  under  Captain  Walker 
were  posted  at  Little's  Bridge,  on  the  Vauxhall  road,  and  Colonel 
Ogden's  regiment  covered  them.  General  Greene  soon  found  that  he 
could  not  afford  to  hold  so  extended  a  front,  and  concentrated  his 
force  at  other  positions  eminently  strong  and  capable  of  defense. 
Reference  is  made  to  map  "  Battle  of  Springfield."  The  remainder 
of  General  Maxwell's  and  Stark's  brigades  took  high  ground  by  the 
mill,  with  the  militia  force  of  General  Dickinson  on  the  flanks.  The 
Vauxhall  bridge  was  contested  as  hotly  as  that  at  Springfield.  Gen 
eral  Greene  ultimately  took  post  on  the  first  range  of  hills,  in  the  rear 
of  Byram's  tavern,  where  the  roads  were  brought  so  near  that  succor 
might  be  readily  given  from  one  to  the  other,  i4  and  he  was  thus 
enabled  to  detach  Colonel  Webb's  regiment,  Lieutenant-colonel 
Huntington  commanding,  and  Colonel  Jackson's  regiment  with  one 
piece  of  artillery,  which  entirely  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
on  the  American  left,  and  secured  that  pass."  Reference  is  also  made 
to  map — "  Operations  in  New  Jersey."  The  map  previously  referred 
to  designates  the  various  British  and  Hessian  corps  engaged  in  the 
action. 

General  Clinton's  army  withdrew,  after  burning  Springfield,  and 
at  midnight  crossed  to  Staten  Island,  removing  their  bridge  of  boats 
after  the  passage. 

The  American  casualties  were  one  officer  and  twelve  non-commis 
sioned  officers  and  privates  killed,  Captain  Davis'  detachment  and 
the  militia  not  reporting,  five  officers  and  fifty-six  privates  wounded 


502  SOUTH   CAROLINA  AND   NEW   JERSEY   INVADED.  [1780. 

and  nine  privates  missing.  The  British  loss  was  not  officially  stated 
but  was  estimated  by  contemporary  journalists  as  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty.  General  Clinton  says,  "  I  could  not  think  of  keeping  the 
field  in  New  Jersey,"  and  wished  "  to  land  the  troops  and  give  a  camp 
of  rest  to  an  army  of  which  many  corps  had  had  an  uninterrupted 
campaign  of  fourteen  months."  It  appears  from  this  report  that 
General  Clinton  had  no  immediate  designs  upon  the  Hudson  River 
posts,  but  his  operations  were  so  conducted  as  to  keep  the  American 
army  on  constant  duty. 

New  Jersey  had  been  a  scene  of  constant  warfare  for  five  years ; 
and  it  was  at  last  relieved  from  the  pressure. 

Washington  was  still  imploring  the  States  to  fill  their  quota  under 
new  assignments,  and  the  first  six  months  of  1780  closed  their  battle 
record. 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 

NOTE. — From  "Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."     Date  May  ist,  1780. 
NEW  YORK  SOUTH  CAROLINA  NOVA  SCOTIA  EAST  FLORIDA 

British 7711   7041   2298   536 

German 7451   3018   572 

Provincials..   2162   2788   638 


17,324  12,847  3,508 

WEST  FLORIDA  GEORGIA  BERMUDAS  PROVIDENCE  ISLAND 

British 590 

German 547  862 

Provincials...  316 1016 326 130 

1453  1878 

Total,  38,002. 


CHAPTER   LXIV. 

FRENCH  AUXILIARIES.     ARNOLD'S  TREASON.    SOUTHERN  SKIR 
MISHES,    1780. 

LIEUTENANT-general  the  Count  de  Rochambeau,  arrived  at 
Newport,  Rhode  Island,  July  tenth,  l/8o,  with  nearly  six  thou 
sand  French  troops,  constituting  the  first  division  of  a  corps  of  twelve 
thousand  men,  which  Louis  XVI.  had  designated  as  aid  to  the  United 
States  in  their  war  for  national  independence.  Major-general  the 
Marquis  de  Chastellux,  a  relative  of  La  Fayette,  accompanied  the 
command.  The  Chevalier  de  Ternay  commanded  the  convoy,  which 
consisted  of  seven  heavy  ships,  viz.,  two  8os,  one  74,  four  643,  two 
403,  a  cutter,  20 ;  hospital  ship,  pierced  for  64  guns,  a  bomb  ship  and 
thirty-two  transports. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  Washington  to  make  the  capture  of  New 
York  his  immediate  objective  ;  and  a  plan  of  operations  was  submitted 
to  the  French  commander  soon  after  his  arrival  at  Newport ;  but  on 
the  thirteenth  of  July,  Admiral  Graves  arrived  at  New  York  with  six 
ships  of  the  line,  which  gave  the  British  naval  forces  a  superiority  of 
ships  and  metal ;  and  the  enterprise  was  postponed  until  the  French 
second  division  should  arrive. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton,  in  turn,  proposed  an  expedition  to  Rhode 
Island,  and  eight  thousand  troops  were  advanced  as  far  as  Hunting- 
ton,  Long  Island,  but  a  prompt  movement  of  Washington  with  his 
army,  and  advices  of  the  strength  and  position  of  Rochambeau,  gave 
such  assurance  that  he  would  meet  a  superior  force,  that  the  project 
was  converted  into  a  simple  naval  demonstration,  with  the  double 
purpose  of  blockading  the  French  squadron  and  cutting  off  the  ex 
pected  second  French  division  when  it  should  enter  the  American 
waters. 

The  Count  de  Rochambeau,  with  a  soldier's  exactness,  at  once 
comprehended  the  situation,  and  in  his  dispatch  of  July  sixteenth, 


5O4  FRENCH  AUXILIARIES.  [1780. 

to  Count  de  Vergennes,  thus  epitomizes  the  condition  of  American 
affairs : 

"  Upon  our  arrival  here,  the  country  was  in  consternation,  the 
paper  money  had  fallen  to  sixty  for  one.  .  .  I  spoke  to  the  prin 
cipal  persons  of  the  place,  and  told  them,  as  I  write  to  General  Wash 
ington,  that  this  was  merely  the  advanced  guard  of  a  greater  force, 
and  that  the  king  was  determined  to  support  them  with  his  whole 
power.  In  twenty-four  hours  their  spirits  rose,  and  last  night  all  the 
streets,  houses  and  steeples  were  illuminated,  in  the  midst  of  fire-works 
and  the  greatest  rejoicings.  .  .  You  see,  sir,  how  important  it  is 
to  act  with  vigor.  .  .  Send  us  troops,  ships  and  money ;  but  do  not 
depend  upon  these  people,  nor  upon  their  means ;  they  have  neither 
money  nor  credit ;  their  means  of  resistance  are  only  momentary,  and 
called  forth  when  they  are  attacked  in  their  homes.  They  then 
assemble  for  the  moment  of  immediate  danger  and  defend  themselves. 
Washington  commands  sometimes  fifteen  thousand,  sometimes  three 
thousand  men." 

The  above  letter  would  fairly  represent  a  condensed  statement 
of  Washington's  experience  during  the  greater  part  of  the  entire  war. 
The  entire  campaign  of  1780,  is  interwoven  with  reports  of  deficiency 
in  men,  food,  clothing  and  money ;  and  the  numerous  entreaties,  pro 
tests  and  demands,  heretofore  cited,  are  but  feeble  expressions  of  the 
patience  as  well  as  agony  of  spirit  which  characterized  both  the  official 
and  unofficial  correspondence  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief. 

The  last  six  months  of  1780  was  without  active  field  operations 
in  the  Northern  States.  The  French  fleet  was  blockaded  at  Newport 
by  a  superior  British  naval  force,  and  repeated  consultations  between 
General  Washington  and  the  Count  de  Rochambeau,  resulted  in  the 
postponement  of  a  proposed  attack  upon  New  York. 

A  proclamation  was  published  over  the  signature  of  La  Fayette, 
with  the  sanction  of  Washington,  announcing  to  the  Canadians  that 
the  French  troops  would  assist  in  expelling  the  British  from  Canada. 
The  object  of  this  paper  was  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  garrison  of 
New  York  from  the  proposed  attack  upon  that  city.  General  Clin 
ton,  under  date  of  August  thirty-first,  forwarded  a  copy  to  Lord  Ger- 
maine,  calling  his  attention  to  its  purport ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
expedition  was  never  seriously  proposed.  During  the  discussion  of 
the  project  to  attack  New  York,  General  Arnold  was  advised  by 
Washington  that  he  would  be  tendered  a  command.  Still  pleading 
his  old  wounds  as  an  excuse  from  active  service,  he  expressed  a  prefer- 


1780.]  FRENCH   AUXILIARIES.  505 

ence  for  a  post-command,  and  after  repeated  solicitations  of  himself 
and  friends,  he  was  granted  his  choice,  and  on  the  third  of  August, 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  "  West  Point  and  its  dependencies,  in 
which  all  are  included,  from  Fishkill  to  King's  Ferry." 

A  protracted  clandestine  and  confidential  correspondence  had  long 
been  carried  on  between  himself  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  through  Major 
Andre,  under  the  assumed  names  of  Gustavus  and  John  Anderson, 
and  this  was  so  disguised  by  commercial  forms  as  to  be  intelligible 
only  to  the  parties  holding  the  secret.  By  this  means  General  Clin 
ton  was  frequently  advised  of  the  condition,  movements  and  resources 
of  the  American  army,  and  was  undoubtedly  greatly  restrained  in  his 
military  movements  by  the  possession  of  the  secret  and  a  correspond 
ing  dependence  upon  Arnold  to  instruct  him  as  to  times  and  modes 
of  action.  Arnold's  pretended  preference  for  post  duty  was  deliber 
ately  treasonable  and  base. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  of  August,  General  Clinton  wrote  to  Lord 
Germaine  officially  as  follows  :  "  At  this  new  epoch  of  the  war,  when  a 
foreign  force  has  already  landed,  and  an  addition  to  it  is  expected, 
I  owe  it  to  my  country,  and  I  must  in  justice  say  to  my  own  fame,  to 
declare  to  your  lordship  that  I  become  every  day  more  sensible  of  the 
utter  impossibility  of  prosecuting  the  war  in  this  country  without 
reinforcements.  .  .  .  We  are,  by  some  thousands,  too  weak  to 
subdue  this  rebellion." 

Lord  George  Germaine  wrote  in  reply,  under  date  of  September 
twenty-seventh  :  "  Next  to  the  destruction  of  Washington's  army, 
the  gaining  over  officers  of  influence  and  reputation  among  the  troops 
would  be  the  speediest  means  of  subduing  the  rebellion  and  restoring 
the  tranquillity  of  America.  Your  commission  authorizes  you  to  avail 
yourself  of  such  opportunities,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
expenses  will  be  cheerfully  submitted  to." 

It  is  impossible  to  determine  how  far  Lord  Germaine's  confidence 
in  the  ability  of  Arnold  to  execute  his  plan  dissuaded  him  from  send 
ing  troops  to  the  United  States ;  and  yet  such  would  be  the  natural 
effect  of  substituting  the  use  of  gold  for  the  force  of  arms  in  the  pro 
secution  of  a  costly  and  protracted  war.  The  archives,  then  secret, 
show  that  he  was  kept  advised  of  the  entire  scheme. 

On  the  thirtieth  of  August,  Arnold  solicited  an  interview  with 
some  responsible  party  in  order  definitely  to  settle  upon  the  price  of  his 
honor.  On  the  eighteenth  of  September  he  wrote,  advising  that 
Andre  be  sent  up  the  river  to  the  Vulture,  sloop  of  war,  then  at 


506  FRENCH   AUXILIARIES.  Li78o. 

anchor  in  Haverstraw  Bay,  promising  "  to  send  a  person  on  board  with 
a  boat  and  a  flag  of  truce.  General  Clinton  received  the  letter  the 
following  day  ;  troops  were  embarked  under  the  pretense  of  an  expe 
dition  into  the  Chesapeake,  and  Andre  reached  the  Vulture  on  the 
twentieth. 

On  the  twenty-first,  about  midnight,  Andre  landed,  met  Arnold, 
and  accompanied  him  first  to  the  Clove,  and  then  to  the  house  of 
Joshua  Hett  Smith,  see  map  "  Highlands  of  the  Hudson."  Subse 
quent  examinations  failed  to  convict  Smith  of  any  knowledge  of  the 
details  of  the  conspiracy.  His  antecedents  were  favorable  to  sympa 
thy  with  the  British  army ;  but  the  secret  was  too  valuable  to  be 
intrusted  to  a  convenient  tool.  The  terms  of  purchase  were  soc-n 
settled,  simply  "^p/dTand  a  brigadier-general's  commission." 

Andre  crossed  the  Hudson,  to  return  to  New  York  by  land,  was 
captured  on  the  twenty-third,  and  on  the  second  of  October  was 
executed  as  a  spy. 

America  grieved  over  this  painful  necessity,  but  there  was  no 
alternative  except  an  exchange  for  Arnold,  who  escaped  by  taking 
refuge  on  the  Vulture,  the  twenty-fourth,  and  this  exchange  was 
declined  by  General  Clinton. 

General  Clinton  wrote  to  Lord  Germaine,  "  Thus  ended  this  pro 
posed  plan,  from  which  I  had  conceived  such  great  hopes  and 
imagined  such  great  consequences." 

General  Greene  was  at  once  assigned  to  the  command  made  vacant 
by  the  treason  of  Arnold.  The  garrison  was  changed  ;  the  works 
were  modified  and  strengthened,  and  Washington  took  post  with  his 
main  army  at  Prakeness,  near  Passaic  Falls,  in  Ne\v  Jersey.  (See 
map,  "  Operations  in  New  Jersey.") 

During  these  months  of  uncertain  plans,  depreciated  credit,  and 
exposed  treason  at  the  north,  the  south  was  the  theatre  of  active  war. 
For  a  short  time  there  had  been  a  superficial  peace  in  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia,  and  Lord  Cornwallis,  then  at  Charleston,  undertook  to 
reduce  North  Carolina  to  submission.  Lord  Rawdon  was  placed  in 
command  at  Camden.  A  considerable  royalist  militia  force  was 
enrolled,  but  the  effort  to  force  paroled  citizens  and  prisoners  to 
render  service  to  the  crown,  gradually  destroyed  all  confidence  in 
official  pledges,  and  developed  a  partisan  warfare  of  most  persistent 
daring  and  bitterness.  The  cane-brakes,  rice  swamps,  and  evergreen 
forests  were  hiding  places  and  natural  strongholds  which  an  army 
could  not  penetrate  without  guides,  and  to  which  small  detachments, 


i78o.J  FRENCH   AUXILIARIES.  507 

unable  to  take  the  field  against  regular  troops,  could  retreat  when 
closely  pressed,  with  little  danger  from  pursuit. 

A  few  of  the  principal  skirmishes  are  briefly  stated,  in  order  to 
illustrate  the  style  of  warfare  which  the  Southern  campaign  evoked, 
and  which  properly  enter  into  the  minor  operations  of  war. 

On  the  twelfth  of  July,  Captain  Christian  Houk,  who,  with 
thirty-five  dragoons,  twenty  New  York  volunteers,  and  sixty  royalist 
militia,  was  detached  from  the  garrison  at  Rocky  Mountain,  "  to  col 
lect  the  royal  militia  and  push  the  rebels  as  far  as  he  deemed  conve 
nient,"  "  was  surprised  and  destroyed,"  as  Colonel  Tarleton  states, 
through  placing  his  party  carelessly,  without  pickets,  or  sending  out 
patrols  at  Williamson's  Plantation.  "This,"  says  Justice  Johnson, 
"  was  the  first  check  the  British  regular  troops  had  received  from  the 
militia  since  the  fall  of  Charleston."  Among  the  Americans  who  par 
ticipated  were  the  brothers  Adair,  one  of  them  the  subsequently  well 
known  General  John  Adair.  This  expedition  first  went  to  the  house 
of  a  Mrs.  McClure,  found  her  sons  James  and  Edward  in  the  act  of 
converting  her  tea-pots  into  bullets,  and  took  them  off,  as  they  said,  to 
hang  them.  The  plantations  of  Colonel  Bratton  and  James  William 
son,  who  afterwards  took  part  in  the  skirmish,  were  ravaged.  Mrs. 
McClure  reported  the  facts  at  Sumter's  camp,  where  Colonel  Bratton, 
Captain  McClure  and  five  of  the  Williamsons  were  on  duty.  With 
seventy-five  ment  they  stole  upon  Houk's  party,  separated  them 
from  the  picketed  horses  and  then  punished  them.  Captain  Houk 
was  among  the  killed.  These  facts  illustrate  the  character  of  many 
skirmishes  which  the  passing  weeks  developed. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  July,  Sumter  made  an  unsuccessful  attack 
upon  the  British  post  at  Rocky  Mount,  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Catawba,  thirty  miles  northwest  from  Camden,  and  eleven  miles  from 
Hanging  Rock,  then  commanded  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Turnbull. 
This  post  consisted  of  two  log-houses,  perforated  for  small  arms,  and 
a  small  redoubt  surrounded  by  a  ditch  and  abatis.  Three  assaults 
were  made  and  repulsed.  The  American  casualties  included  Colonel 
Reed  and  thirteen  men  killed  or  wounded.  Tarleton  gives  the  British 
casualties  at  one  officer  killed,  one  wounded,  and  about  ten  men  killed 
or  wounded,  and  says  u  at  the  last  assault,  the  Americans  penetrated 
the  abatis,  but  were  finally  repulsed." 

On  the  first  of  August,  Colonel  Elijah  Clark,  of  Wilkes  County, 
Georgia,  was  followed  by  a  Mrs.  Dillard,  who  had  just  fed  his  com 
mand,  and  informed  that  Major  Ferguson  was  in  close  pursuit.  She 


508  FRENCH   AUXILIARIES. 

was  just  in  time  to  prevent  a  surprise,  and  in  the  two  skirmishes  that 
followed  nearly  sixty  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  the  dragoons  leav 
ing  twenty-eight  dead  on  the  field,  and  the  Americans  losing  Major 
Smith,  and  four  men  killed,  and  Colonels  Clark  and  Robinson,  Major 
Clark  and  twenty-three  others  wounded. 

The  character  of  the  warfare,  coupled  with  the  ill-advised  policy 
of  General  Clinton,  produced  absolute  disregard  of  the  formal  obliga 
tions  of  surrender  and  parole. 

On  the  sixth  of  August,  Colonel  Tarleton  reported  to  General 
Cornwallis,  "  that  Lieutenant-colonel  Lisle,  who  had  been  paroled,  and 
had  exchanged  his  parole  for  a  certificate  of  a  good  subject,  carried 
off  a  whole  battalion  of  men  which  he  raised  in  the  districts  of  the 
Ennoree  and  Tyger,  as  soon  as  they  received  arms  and  ammunition,  to 
join  Colonel  Sumter,"  adding  "  This  treachery  ruined  all  confidence 
between  the  regulars  and  militia'' 

"  This  reinforcement,"  says  Colonel  Tarleton,  "  added  to  his  former 
numbers,  inspired  Colonel  Sumter  with  a  desire  of  signalizing  him 
self  by  attacking  some  of  the  British  posts  upon  the  frontier."  On 
the  sixth  of  August,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  he  approached 
the  flank  of  the  post  "  of  Hanging  Rock,"  which  was  entrusted  to 
the  North  Carolina  refugees,  under  the  orders  of  Colonel  Bryan. 
They  fled.  "  The  legion  charged  twice  with  fixed  bayonets  to  save 
their  three  pounder."  "  Colonel  Sumter  still  persevered  in  his  attack, 
and  very  probably  would  have  succeeded,  if  a  stratagem  employed  by 
Captains  Stewart  and  McDonald  of  the  British  Legion  had  not  dis 
concerted  his  operations."  This  was  the  simple  detachment  of  a 
small  force  of  buglers  to  the  flanks,  who  gave  such  signals  as  to  indi 
cate  the  approach  of  additional  troops.  It  was  repeatedly  practiced 
during  the  war.  Colonel  Tarleton  omits  to  state  that  the  American 
success  at  one  time  was  so  promising,  that,  as  at  Bennington,  they 
allowed  themselves  to  fall  into  disorder  by  plunder  of  commissary  and 
other  supplies,  and  thus  greatly  imperiled  the  success  achieved  at 
the  first  onset.  The  conditions  of  the  battle,  for  it  was  more  than  a 
skirmish,  changed  repeatedly  during  nearly  four  hours  of  conflict. 
Gordon  says,  "  The  Prince  of  Wales  regiment  which  defended  the 
place  was  nearly  annihilated,  and  the  arms  and  ammunition  taken 
from  the  British  who  fell  in  the  beginning,  were  turned  against 
their  associates  ;  that  Colonel  Sumter's  party  had  not  more  than  ten 
bullets  to  a  man  when  the  action  commenced."  The  British  loss  was 
two  hundicxi  and  sixty-nine,  killed,  wounded  and  taken  prisoners. 


I73o.]  FRENCH  AUXILIARIES.  $0$ 

The  American  loss  was  severe,  but  not  officially  reported.  Colonel 
Tarleton  states  that  "  about  one  hundred  dead  and  wounded  Ameri 
cans  were  left  on  the  field  of  battle,  adding  significantly,  "  The  re 
pulses  he  (Colonel  Sumter)  received,  did  not  discourage  him,  or 
injure  his  cause.  The  loss  of  men  was  easily  supplied,  and  his  reputa 
tion  for  activity  and  courage  was  fully  sustained  by  his  late  enterpris 
ing  conduct."  Irving  says — "  among  the  partisans  who  were  present 
in  this  fight,  an  orphan  boy  of  Scotch-Irish  descent,  was  Andrew  Jack 
son."  That  boy  became  a  successor  of  Washington,  as  President  of 
the  United  States. 

During  these  desultory  operations,  of  which  a  few  only  are  stated, 
the  condition  of  the  American  army  proper  is  to  be  noticed.  On  the 
sixth  of  July,  the  Baron  De  Kalb  was  at  Buffalo  Ford  and  Deep  River. 
He  left  Morristown,  New  Jersey,  on  the  sixteenth  of  April,  with  nearly 
fourteen  hundred  men,  embarked  at  the  head  of  Elk  river  on  the  third 
day  of  May,  reached  Petersburg  early  in  June,  entered  North  Carolina 
on  the  twentieth  of  June,  halted  at  Hillsborough  to  rest  his  troops 
and  secure  supplies,  and  then  advanced.  General  Gates  reached  De 
Kalb's  camp  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  July.  He  had  previously  written 
to  General  De  Kalb,  from  Hillsborough,  "  Enough  has  already  been 
lost  in  a  vain  defense  of  Charleston  ;  if  more  is  sacrificed,  the  Southern 
States  are  undone  ;  and  this  may  go  nearly  to  undo  the  rest." 

General  Caswell's  North  Carolina  militia  had  already  crossed  the 
Pedee  on  the  route  for  Camden  in  defiance  of  the  wishes  and  orders 
of  General  De  Kalb.  There  was  some  jealousy  of  foreign  officers, 
and  General  Caswell  made  a  mistake  in  not  reporting  directly  to  Gen 
eral  De  Kalb.  That  officer  felt  the  slight,  and  wrote  on  the  seventh 
of  July  to  his  wife,  "  Officers  of  European  experience  alone,  do  not 
know  what  it  is  to  contend  against  difficulties  and  vexations.  My 
present  condition  makes  me  doubly  anxious  to  return  to  you."  It 
had  been  his  purpose  to  advance  by  Salisbury  and  Charlotte,  through 
a  fertile  country  where  supplies  would  be  ready  at  hand.  Adjutant- 
general  Williams  urged  the  movement  ;  but  General  Gates  decided 
differently,  upon  his  arrival,  and  to  the  amazement  of  his  officers 
ordered  the  troops  to  be  ready  to  start  at  a  moment's  warning,  and 
"on  the  twenty-seventh,"  says  Irving,  "put  what  he  called  the 
Grand  Army  on  its  march,  by  the  shortest  route  to  Camden,  through 
a  barren  country  which  could  offer  no  food  but  lean  cattle,  fruit  and 
unripe  maize."  Marion  was  detached  and  sent  to  the  interior  of  South 
Carolina  to  watch  the  British  troops  and  make  a  report. 


5IO  FRENCH  AUXILIARIES.  [1780 

On  the  third  of  August,  the  army  crossed  the  Pedee  and  united 
with  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Porterfield,  who  had  been 
dispatched  to  the  relief  of  Charleston,  but  who  with  superior  enter 
prise  and  judgment  had  operated  on  the  border,  after  hearing  of  the 
capture  of  that  city.  Neither  prisoners  nor  medicines  could  be  had. 
The  army  ate  peaches  for  bread.  Dysentery  broke  out  in  the  camp ; 
many  could  hardly  walk.  "  On  the  fourth  of  August,  General  Gates 
issued  a  proclamation."  A  portion  is  copied  from  Colonel  Tarleton's 
official  reports,  with  Italics,  as  given  by  that  officer,  "  inviting  the 
patriotic  citizens  of  Carolina  to  assemble  iinder  his  auspices,  to  vindicate 
the  rights  of  America ;  holding  out  an  amnesty  to  all  who  had  sub 
scribed  paroles  imposed  upon  them  by  the  ruffian  band  of  conquest  ; 
and  excepting  only  those  who  in  tlie  hour  of  devastation,  had  exercised 
acts  of  barbarism  and  depredation  upon  the  persons  and  property  of  their 
fellow-citizens. ' ' 

Colonel  Tarleton's  troubles  with  American  militia  had  not  ended 
with  the  desertion  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Lisle.  As  General  Gates 
moved  toward  Camden,  Major  McArthur  collected  boats  on  the 
Pedee,  upon  which  he  placed  one  hundred  sick,  many  of  whom  were 
from  the  Seventy-first  British  regulars,  which  had  suffered  greatly 
from  the  climate.  "  Colonel  Mills,  who  commanded  the  militia  of 
the  Cheraw  district,  though  a  very  good  man,"  says  Tarleton,  in  his 
report  of  August  sixth,  "  had  not  complied  with  my  instructions  in 
forming  his  corps,  and  attended  more  to  oaths  and  professions,  and 
attended  less  to  the  former  conduct  of  those  whom  he  admitted. 
The  instant  that  the  militia  found  that  Major  McArthur  had  left 
his  post,  and  were  assured  that  Gates  would  come  there  the  next 
day,  they  seized  their  own  officers,  and  the  hundred  sick,  and 
carried  them  all  prisoners  into  North  Carolina."  Colonel  Mills 
escaped. 

On  the  seventh,  Gates  effected  a  union  with  Caswell's  North  Caro 
lina  militia,  and  the  half-famished  army  advanced  to  Lynch's  Creek. 
The  British  withdrew  their  post  from  Cheraw's  Hill,  and  fell  back  to 
Camden.  If  the  American  column  had  marched  by  the  route  sug 
gested  and  urged  by  Baron  De  Kalb,  it  would  have  reached  Camden  in 
the  rear  of  Cheraw  Hill  before  Lord  Rawdon  could  have  gained  that 
post,  and  would  have  secured  ample  supplies. 

Colonel  Tarleton  says,  "  The  American  commander  had  not  suffi 
cient  penetration  to  conceive  that  by  a  forced  march  up  the  creek,  he 
could  have  pushed  Lord  Rawdon's  flank,  and  reached  Camden 


I78o.j  FRENCH  AUXILIARIES. 

which  would  have  been  an  easy  conquest,  and  a  fatal  blow  to  the 
British."  This  was  a  fact  which  may  have  given  to  Cornwallis  more 
confidence  in  his  subsequent  attack  upon  Gates  at  Sander's  Creek. 
He  was  too  good  a  soldier  not  to  notice  such  mistakes  and  profit 
by  them. 

General  Gates  halted  two  days,  and  on  the  thirteenth  encamped 
at  Rugely's  Mills,  twelve  miles  above  Camden.  On  the  fourteenth, 
General  Stevens  joined  the  army  with  seven  hundred  Virginia 
militia. 

"  On  the  night  between  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth,"  Lord  Corn 
wallis  reached  Camden,  having  left  Charleston  on  the  tenth.  The 
Twenty-third,  Thirty-third,  and  Seventy-first  British  regiments,  the  Vol 
unteers  of  Ireland,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Hamilton's  corps  had  also 
been  collected  at  that  post.  Four  companies  of  light  infantry  from 
Ninety-six  joined  the  same  day.  Colonel  Tarleton  himself  having  just 
recovered  from  a  fever,  crossed  the  Santee  River  on  the  sixth,  then 
Black  River,  joined  Lord  Rawdon  on  the  tenth,  and  with  him,  fell  back 
to  Camden. 

Meanwhile  a  train  of  clothing,  ammunition,  and  other  supplies  had 
left  Charleston  for  the  use  of  the  British  troops.  Colonel  Sumter 
made  application  to  General  Gates  on  the  fourteenth  for  a  detachment 
of  four  hundred  regulars  and  volunteers  to  join  his  command  of  an 
equal  number,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  that  train.  A  detail  was 
made  by  General  Gates  upon  hastily  formed  impressions  that  his  own 
force  vvas  seven  thousand  men,  and  consisted  of  one  hundred  Maryland 
regulars,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Woodford,  three  hundred  North 
Carolina  militia,  some  artillerymen,  and  two  brass  guns. 

Colonel  Sumter  met  the  train  as  it  slowly  traveled  up  the  west 
bank  of  the  Wateree,  and  was  about  to  cross  the  river  within  a  mile 
of  Camden.  The  surprise  was  complete,  but  the  roar  of  cannon  soon 
advised  him  that  there  was  severe  fighting  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river.  During  the  next  day  he  was  informed  by  a  messenger  from 
Major  Davis  of  the  defeat  of  Gates  at  Sander's  Creek,  and  at  once 
hastened  toward  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  as  ordered. 

On  the  night  of  the  seventeenth,  his  command,  oppressed  by  the 
heat,  worn  out  by  marching,  and  encumbered  by  more  than  one 
hundred  prisoners,  went  into  camp  on  the  north  side  of  Fishing  creek, 
about  two  miles  above  its  junction  with  the  Catawba. 

Colonel  Tarleton  had  already  crossed  the  Catawba  in  pursuit,  and 
was  resting  his  men  at  Fishing  creek.  On  the  morning  of  the  eigh- 


512  FRENCH   AUXILIARIES. 

teenth,  he  dashed  in  upon  the  surprised  Americans,  cutting  them  off 
from  their  color  line  where  the  arms  were  stacked,  inflicted  a  loss  of 
one  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded,  captured  three  hundred  prisoners, 
besides  the  rescue  of  his  own  men,  and  the  train  they  had  lost,  took 
one  thousand  stand  of  arms  and  two  cannon,  and  dispersed  the  entire 
command  as  with  the  suddenness  and  success  of  a  whirlwind. 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 
NOTE. — From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."    Date,  August  1st,  1780. 

REGULAR  TROOPS  ONLY. 

New  York 19,115  West  Florida 1,261 

South  Carolina 6,589  Nova  Scotia 3,524 

Georgia 1,756  Bermuda 204 

East  Florida 453  Providence  Island 118 

27,9I3  5,107 

Total,  33,020. 

December,  1st  1780. 

.NewYork 17,729  West  Florida 1,261 

On  an  Expedition 2274  Nova  Scotia 3,167 

South  Carolina 7384  Bermuda 387 

Georgia 968  Providence  Island 143 

East  Florida. 453 

4,958 
28,808 

Total,  33,766. 
Provincial  forces  at  close  of  year 8,954 


512* 


CHAPTER   LXV. 

BATTLE   OF   CAMDEN.     KING'S   MOUNTAIN.     POSITION  OF 
SOUTHERN   ARMIES. 

THE  battle  of  Camden,  or  Sander's  Creek,  was  one  of  the  most 
suggestive  of  the  war.  The  force  of  discipline,  exact  apprecia 
tion  of  the  adversary,  quick  seizure  of  opportunity,  and  the  delivery 
of  incessant  blows  upon  every  exposed  point  in  turn,  were  illustrated 
in  the  conduct  of  Lord  Cornwallis.  Webster,  Rawdon  and  Tarleton 
recognized  the  controlling  will  of  the  general  commanding,  and  obeyed 
orders  implicitly,  confidently,  and  at  all  hazards.  The  British  regulars 
only  did  their  duty  as  usual.  It  was  characteristic  of  their  general 
conduct  during  the  whole  war. 

Lord  Cornwallis  hesitated,  as  he  states,  whether  to  risk  an  action 
against  the  American  army,  or  to  retire  to  Charleston.  His  scouts 
were  constantly  on  the  alert,  and  he  formed  so  correct  an  estimate  of 
the  character  of  General  Gates,  and  the  composition  and  disposition 
of  the  American  army,  as  to  risk  an  attack,  although  he  knew  that  it 
was  superior  in  numbers  to  his  own,  and  occupying  a  good  position 
at  Rugely's  Mills.  General  Gates  was  thoroughly  "  sure  of  victory, 
and  of  the  dispersion  of  the  British  army."  It  has  been  seen  that  he 
participated  actively  in  no  part  of  the  operations  near  Saratoga  until 
the  morning  of  August  eleventh,  1777.  Confiding  in  numbers,  and 
neglecting  reconnoissance,  he  then  imperiled  his  army  by  forcing 
several  brigades  across  Fishkill  creek,  while  remaining  in  the  rear 
himself. 

He  brought  his  worn-out,  sick  and  hungry  army  to  Rugely's  Mills 
despite  of  advice  and  prudence,  and  intended  at  once  to  attack  a 
strong  post  and  veteran  troops,  as  if  the  prestige  of  the  Burgoyne 
campaign  was  a  formidable  part  of  his  aggressive  force,  instead  of  an 
element  to  incite  Cornwallis  to  a  more  determined  resistance.  He 
33 


514  BATTLE   OF  CAMDEN.  11780. 

had  about  fourteen  hundred  good  troops  well  officered.  The  re 
mainder  were  raw  militia  just  collected,  many  of  whom  had  never 
been  in  action,  and  had  only  just  received  bayonets,  without  instruc 
tion  in  their  use.  They  had  no  idea  of  tactical  formations  and  move 
ments,  and  no  provision  was  made  for  a  rallying  point  in  case  of  dis 
aster.  General  Gates  seems  to  have  been  limited  in  capacity  to  the 
simple  issue  of  an  order,  and  to  take  the  consequences  of  its  mode  of 
execution  as  <;  one  of  the  uncertainties  of  war."  He  did  not  know  that 
Cornwallis  had  reached  Camden  when  he  advanced,  nor  the  weakness 
of  his  own  force  until  he  ordered  the  battle ;  then  assumed  that  a 
general  should  never  retreat  under  whatever  circumstances,  and 
lacked  the  wisdom  to  consult  with  other  officers  when  uncertain  as  to 
the  proper  line  of  duty. 

General  Gates  placed  in  the  hands  of  Adjutant-general  Williams 
an  elaborate  general  order,  dated  "  Camp  Clermont,  I5th  of  August," 
directing  the  "  Grand  army  to  march  promptly  at  ten  o'clock  that 
night."  It  was  evident  from  its  tenor  that  the  general  commanding 
did  not  even  know  the  strength  of  the  force  that  was  to  be  handled. 
Adjutant-general  Williams  at  once  called  upon  the  general  officers, 
of  whom  thirteen  were  with  the  army,  for  exact  returns  of  their  com 
mands.  The  abstract  was  placed  before  General  Gates,  "as  he  came 
from  a  council  of  officers."  It  showed  that  the  total,  nominal  strength, 
was  only  three  thousand  and  fifty-two  men.  Turning  to  his  chief  of 
staff,  he  simply  said,  "  Sir,  the  numbers  are  certainly  below  the  esti 
mate  made  this  morning.  There  was  no  dissenting  voice  in  the 
council  where  the  orders  have  just  been  read  ;  there  are  enough  for 
our  purpose."  The  orders  were  then  published  in  the  army,  without 
deliberation  or  consultation  with  anybody. 

Through  the  coincidence  of  each  army  attempting  to  surprise  the 
other,  they  left  their  respective  camps  at  the  same  hour,  ten  o'clock, 
so  as  to  gain  time  to  strike  the  adversary  before  daylight  on  the 
following  morning. 

Colonel  Armand  with  his  cavalry,  only  sixty  men,  led  the  advance, 
although  he  remonstrated  at  the  detail  of  mounted  men  as  a  pioneer 
corps  for  night  service,  since  the  profoundest  silence  was  enjoined  in 
orders.  Colonel  Porterfield's  light  infantry  were  ordered  to  march 
upon  his  right  flank  and  Major  Armstrong  on  the  left  flank,  each  in 
single  file,  two  hundred  yards  from  the  road. 

Colonel  Armand's  orders  were,  "  being  thus  supported,  in  case  of 
an  attack  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  in  front,  not  only  to  support  the 


i7So.J  BATTLE   OF   CAMDEN.  515 

shock  of  the  enemy's  horse,  but  to  rout  them  ;  and  to  consider  the 
order,  to  stand  the  attacks  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  be  their  numbers 
what  they  may,  as  positive."  Between  two  and  three  o'clock  in  the 
morning  the  advance  guard  of  the  British  army,  consisting  of  twenty 
Legion  cavalry  and  as  many  mounted  infantry,  confronted,  hotly 
attacked  and  routed  Armand's  detachment.  Colonel  Porterfield 
faithfully  executed  his  orders  and  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  skir 
mish  ;  but  the  prompt  arrival  of  the  light  infantry,  the  Twenty-third 
and  Thirty-third  British  regiments  in  support  of  their  advance  guard, 
compelled  him  to  retire.  The  retreat  of  Armand's  cavalry  threw  the 
First  Maryland  brigade  into  confusion  ;  and  both  armies,  well  satisfied 
with  their  experience  of  a  night  attack,  awaited  the  morning  and 
formed  their  lines  for  action.  It  was  still  within  the  power  of  Gen 
eral  Gates  to  fall  back  to  a  strong  position  ;  but  he  lacked  nerve  and 
decision  for  such  an  hour.  A  prisoner  who  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Americans  reported  the  British  force  to  be  three  thousand  strong, 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Lord  Cornwallis.  This  fact  was 
reported  to  General  Gates.  Adjutant-general  Williams  says,  "  Gen 
eral  Gates  called  the  general  officers  together  in  the  rear,  asking — 
"  what  is  to  be  done.  "  All  were  mute  for  a  few  moments,  when  the 
gallant  Stevens  exclaimed,"  "  Gentlemen,  is  it  not  too  late  now  to  do 
anything  but  fight."  "When  the  Adjutant-general  went  to  call  the 
Baron  De  Kalb  to  council,  he  said,  "  and  has  the  General  given  you 
orders  to  retreat  the  army,"  thus  indicating  his  opinion  of  the  proper 
action  required.  "  The  Baron  did  not  however  oppose  the  sugges 
tion  of  General  Stevens  ;  and  every  measure  that  ensued  was  prepara 
tory  for  action."  Adjutant-general  Williams  says  "  that  the  General 
seemed  disposed  to  await  events — he  gave  no  orders.^  "  Upon  his 
suggesting  a  brisk  attack  by  Stevens'  brigade  upon  the  British  right, 
he  answered,  "  Sir,  that's  right ;  let  it  be  done."  "  This  was  the  last 
order  the  deputy  Adjutant-general  received."  Reference  is  made  to 
map  "  Battle  of  Camden."  This  battle,  as  far  as  it  was  a  battle,  on 
the  part  of  the  Americans,  and  not  a  rout,  was  confined  to  the  right 
wing  where  the  gallant  De  Kalb  fought  his  small  command  admirably. 
He  did  not  know  that  the  rest  of  the  army  had  fled,  until,  surrounded 
by  overwhelming  numbers,  he  learned  the  fate  of  the  day. 

The  British  army  had  passed  Sander's  creek  and  entered  upon  a 
narrow  belt  of  solid  land,  bordered  on  each  side  by  an  impassable 
swamp.  The  American  army  was  flanked  by  the  same  swamps  ;  but 
the  interval  rapidly  widened  in  the  direction  of  Rugely's  Mills,  so 


516  BATTLE   OF  CAMDEN. 

that  their  flanks,  the  left  especially,  became  exposed  in  case  the 
engagement  was  pressed  and  they  failed  to  hold  their  original  ground. 
The  artillery  was  then  placed  in  the  centre  of  the  front  line  ;  and 
Major  Armstrong's  light  infantry,  which  had  retreated  at  the  first 
encounter,  was  ordered  to  cover  a  small  interval  between  the  left  wing 
and  the  swamp  in  that  quarter.  Frequent  skirmishes  during  the 
night  disclosed  the  relative  positions  of  the  armies  ;  and  the  British 
army  advanced  at  dawn  of  day. 

"  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  commanded  the  right  wing,  con 
sisting  of  three  companies  of  light  infantry,  the  Twenty-third  and 
Thirty-third  British  regiments.  Lord  Rawdon  commanded  the  left, 
consisting  of  the  volunteers  of  Ireland,  the  Legion  Infantry,  Hamil 
ton's  corps  and  Bryan's  refugees.  Two  six  pounders  and  two  three 
pounders,  were  to  the  left  of  the  road,  under  Lieutenant  McLeod. 
The  two  battalions  of  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  with  two  six  pound 
ers,  formed  the  second  line.  The  Legion  cavalry  remained  in  column, 
on  account  of  the  thickness  of  the  woods  to  the  right  of  the  main 
road,  close  to  the  first  battalion  of  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  with 
orders  to  act  as  opportunity  offered,  or  necessity  required." 

The  Second  Maryland  brigade,  General  Gist  commanding,  with 
the  Delaware  troops  under  Baron  De  Kalb,  formed  the  American 
right  ;  the  North  Carolina  militia  formed  the  centre,  under  General 
Caswell ;  and  the  equally  untried  Virginia  militia,  under  Stevens, 
were  on  the  left.  The  First  Maryland  brigade  formed  the  second  line, 
and  the  artillery  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Singleton,  was  so 
posted  as  to  command  the  road. 

The  morning  was  calm  and  hazy ;  and  the  smoke  settled  so  near 
the  earth,  that  "  it  was  difficult,"  says  Cornwallis,  "  to  see  the  effect 
of  a  very  heavy  and  well  supported  fire  on  both  sides."  He  says, 
"  Observing  a  movement  on  the  American  left  which  I  supposed  to 
be  with  an  intention  to  make  some  alterations  in  their  order,  I 
directed  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  to  begin  the  attack."  The 
movement  referred  to,  was  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Adjutant-general 
Williams  to  force  the  brigade  of  Stevens  to  charge  upon  the  British 
right  wing  before  it  could  fully  deploy ;  and  to  give  time  for  their 
advance,  he  threw  a  small  party  of  skirmishers  forward,  with  orders 
"  to  take  to  single  trees  and  thus  annoy  the  enemy  as  much  as  possi 
ble."  The  British  right  wing  however  was  too  quick  and  spirited  for 
this  movement  of  untried  militia,  who  did  not  know  how  to  use  the 


1780.]  BATTLE   OF   CAMDEN.  517 

bayonet  just  received.  They  came  on  with  a  steady  front  and  loud 
cheers,  instantly  carrying  everything  before  them. 

The  Virginia  militia  threw  down  their  loaded  arms  and  fled.     The 

o 

North  Carolina  militia,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  detachment 
under  General  Gregory  who  made  a  short  pause,  and  of  a  part  of 
Dixon's  regiment  who  were  next  in  line  to  the  second  Maryland 
brigade,  fled  also.  The  power  of  example  is  illustrated  by  Dixon's 
conduct  in  view  of  his  position.  "  At  least  two-thirds  of  the  army," 
according  to  Adjutant-general  Williams,  "  fled  without  firing  a  shot." 
The  First  Maryland  brigade  two  hundred  yards  in  the  rear,  repeatedly 
resisted  the  attack  upon  their  left,  until  the  British  right  wing  over 
whelmed  them  by  numbers  and  forced  them  to  retire.  It  was  just 
then  that  the  British  legion,  which  had  pursued  the  militia  until  they 
were  started  to  the  rear,  joined  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster,  and  made 
the  decisive  charge  upon  the  First  Maryland  brigade.  The  Second 
Maryland  brigade  did  not  flinch  ;  but  after  repulsing  Lord  Rawdon 
twice,  charged  bayonet  under  Baron  De  Kalb,  broke  through  the 
British  left,  wheeled  upon  its  centre,  and  fought  alone  until  the  whole 
British  army  enveloped  them  in  fire.  Baron  De  Kalb  fell,  wounded  in 
eleven  places,  and  could  hardly  be  convinced  that  the  Americans  were 
not  the  victors,  so  faithfully  had  he  executed  his  orders,  in  the  assur 
ance  of  equal  good  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  other  divisions.  The 
rout  was  utter.  General  Gates  was  carried  away  with  the  militia,  which 
he  calls  "  a  torrent,"  and  knew  nothing  of  the  resistance  so  stubbornly 
maintained  by  the  right  wing  of  his  army. 

Adjutant-general  Williams  says,  "  If  in  this  affair  the  militia  fled 
too  soon,  the  regulars  may  be  thought  as  blamable  for  remaining  too 
long  on  the  field  ;  especially  after  all  hope  of  victory  must  have  been 
despaired  of."  General  Gates  hurried  with  General  Caswell  to 
Charlotte,  sixty  miles  from  the  field  of  battle,  and  by  the  twentieth 
safely  reached  Hillsborough,  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles  from 
Camden,  without  gathering  a  sufficient  force  of  the  fugitives  to  form 
even  an  escort. 

The  North  Carolina  militia  fled  to  their  homes,  or  wherever  they 
could  find  refuge.  General  Stevens  followed  the  Virginians  to  Hills- 
borough,  and  back  over  the  route  they  came,  to  attempt  to  rally  them, 
but  their  term  of  service  was  short  and  he  soon  discharged  them. 

General  Cornwallis  reports  his  force  at  two  thousand  two  hundred 
and  thirty-nine  men,  and  his  casualties  sixty-eight  killed ;  two  hundred 
and  fifty-six  wounded  and  missing.  General  Gates  subsequently 


$18  BATTLE   OF  CAMDEN.  [i78a 

reported  the  loss  of  General  De  Kalb  and  five  officers  killed,  and  thirty- 
four  officers  wounded,  including  Lieutenant-colonels  Woodford, 
Vaughan,  Porterfield,  and  Du  Buson,  most  of  whom  had  been  taken 
prisoners  ;  and  that  by  the  twenty-ninth  seven  hundred  non-com 
missioned  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Maryland  division  had  rejoined 
the  army.  This  is  a  remarkable  statement,  greatly  to  the  credit  of 
those  troops.  The  Delaware  regiment  had  been  almost  literally 
destroyed.  The  Maryland  troops  lost  between  three  and  four  hundred 
in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners,  and  the  original  force  was  hardly 
fourteen  hundred  strong. 

General  Gates  undoubtedly,  as  stated  by  him,  made  all  the  effort 
within  his  power  to  check  the  flight ;  but  he  had  no  power  in  action, 
and  there  is  not  a  redeeming  fact  during  his  connection  with  the 
Southern  army  to  show  his  fitness  to  command  troops.  Generals 
Smallwood  and  Gist  secured  their  escape,  as  did  the  greater  portion 
of  Armand's  cavalry.  The  British  came  into  the  possession  of  seven 
pieces  of  artillery,  two  thousand  muskets,  the  entire  baggage  train,  and 
prisoners  to  the  number  of  nearly  one  thousand,  according  to  the  report 
of  Cornwallis,  including  Generals  De  Kalb,  Gregory,  and  Rutherford. 

Congress  had  assigned  General  Gates  to  the  command  of  the 
Southern  Department  at  a  time  when  the  Commander-in-chief  had 
selected  General  Greene  for  the  detail  ;  and  the  battle  of  Camden  was 
an  impressive  commentary  upon  their  action.  It  is  not  to  be  lost 
sight  of  that  the  expedition  of  Colonel  Sumter  took  four  hundred  men 
from  the  army  at  a  critical  hour,  and  that  a  reasonable  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  militia  who  were  clumsily  posted  in  the  most  exposed 
part  of  the  field  would  have  given  increased  value  to  the  good  conduct 
of  the  American  right. 

On  the  day  of  Sumter's  misfortunes  at  Fishing  creek,  a  skirmish 
occurred  at  Musgrove's  Mills,  South  Carolina,  on  the  Ennoree  River, 
in  which  the  Americans  successfully  surprised  Colonel  Ennis,  who  was 
in  command  of  a  mixed  force  of  regulars  and  royalists. 

On  the  twenty-first  a  skirmish  occurred  at  Wahab's  plantation. 
The  house  was  burned,  but  the  Americans  under  Colonel  Davis 
secured  ninety-six  horses,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  stand  of  arms, 
inflicted  a  loss  upon  the  legion,  who  quartered  there,  of  sixty  men, 
losing  about  thirty. 

Early  in  September,  Brigadier-general  Patterson  retired  from 
Charleston  on  sick  leave,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Balfour  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  that  post. 


I73o.]  BATTLE   OF  CAMDEN.  519 

Lieutenant-colonel  Brown  was  stationed  at  Augusta,  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Cruger  at  Ninety-six,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Turnbull  at 
Camden.  General  Cornwallis  advanced  on  the  twenty-second  with 
the  Seventh,  Twenty-third,  Thirty-third  and  Seventy-first  regiments 
of  infantry,  the  Volunteers  of  Ireland,  Hamilton's  corps,  Bryan's 
Refugees,  four  pieces  of  cannon,  and  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  toward 
Charlotte,  via  Hanging  Rock.  In  a  skirmish  near  the  Court  House 
on  the  twenty-sixth,  while  entering  the  town,  the  British  advance  was 
actively  resisted,  being  fired  upon  from  behind  stone  fences  and  build 
ings.  Colonel  Tarleton  reports  "  about  thirty  of  the  enemy  were 
killed  and  taken  ;  the  king's  troops  did  not  come  out  of  this  skirmish 
unhurt.  Major  Huger  and  Captains  Campbell  and  McDonald  were 
wounded,  and  twelve  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  were  killed 
and  wounded.  The  American  report  states  their  loss  as  "  Colonel 
Francis  Locke,  (who  fought  at  Ramsour's  Mills)  killed,  Major  Graham 
and  twelve  men  wounded." 

It  was  now  the  purpose  of  General  Cornwallis  to  take  active 
measures  for  the  invasion  of  North  Carolina  ;  but  the  whole  region, 
drained  by  the  Pacoiet,  Tyger,  Ennoree,  and  Saluda  Rivers  was  a 
troublesome  one  to  leave  in  his  rear.  Of  the  people  of  Mecklenburg 
County,  around  Charlotte,  Colonel  Tarleton  thus  gives  his  opinion, 
"  It  was  evident  that  the  counties  of  Mecklenburg  and  Rowan  were 
more  hostile  to  England  than  any  others  in  America.  The  vigilance 
and  animosity  of  these  districts  checked  the  exertions  of  the  well- 
affected,  and  totally  destroyed  all  communications  between  the  king's 
troops  and  the  loyalists  in  the  other  parts  of  the  province.  No  Brit 
ish  commander  could  obtain  any  information  ;  the  foraging  parties 
were  every  day  harassed  by  the  inhabitants,  who  did  not  remain  at 
home  to  receive  payment  for  the  products  of  their  plantations,  but 
generally  fired  from  covert  places  to  annoy  the  British  detachments. 
Individuals,  with  expresses,  were  frequently  murdered.  Notwith 
standing  their  checks  and  losses,  they  continued  their  hostilities  with 
unwearied  perseverance,  and  the  British  troops  were  so  effectually 
blockaded,  that  very  few  out  of  a  great  number  of  messengers  could 
reach  Charlotte,  in  the  beginning  of  October,  to  give  intelligence  of 
Ferguson's  situation."  These  statements  clearly  indicate  the  fact  that 
the  British  policy  was  developing  an  increased  antagonism  among 
the  people,  and  that  the  conquest  did  not  extend  beyond  garrison 
limits.  This  irregular  warfare  was  bearing  fruit. 

Colonel  Clark  threatened  Augusta,  and  in  two  days  inflicted  con- 


520  BATTLE   OF  CAMDEN.  [1780. 

siderable  loss  upon  the  garrison,  but  was  repulsed,  Lieutenant-colonel 
Brown,  the  post  commander,  being  wounded,  and  Captain  Johnson 
killed.  Colonel  Tarleton  says  that  the  British  loss  fell  principally 
upon  their  Indian  auxiliaries.  General  Cornwallis  states  that  ihe 
Indians  pursued  and  scalped  many  of  the  Americans. 

On  the  eighth  of  October  the  battle  of  King's  Mountain  entered 
into  the  operations  of  the  campaign  and  did  very  much  to  offset  the 
British  victory  at  Camden.  Tarleton  and  Ferguson  operated  along 
parallel  belts  separated  by  the  Catawba  and  Broad  Rivers  as  circum 
stances  of  pursuit  or  scouting  determined,  and  the  latter  officer  who 
had  hoped  to  cut  off  Colonel  Clark's  detachment  and  other  border 
partisan  corps,  before  winter,  found  himself  compelled  to  take  refuge 
on  King's  Mountain  on  the  sixth  of  October,  closely  pursued  by  a 
superior  force.  Colonel  Isaac  Shelby  with  a  force  from  Sullivan 
County  (now  in  Tennessee) ;  Colonel  William  Campbell,  with  men  from 
Washington  County,  Virginia ;  Colonel  Benjamin  Cleveland  with 
men  from  Wilkes  and  Surrey  Counties  ;  Colonel  Charles  McDowell, 
with  men  from  Wilkes  and  Rutherford  Counties,  North  Carolina ; 
Colonel  John  Sevier  with  men  from  Sullivan,  reached  the  Cowpens, 
on  Broad  River  on  the  sixth  of  October,  and  were  joined  the  same 
evening  by  Colonel  James  Williams  of  South  Carolina  with  a  small 
force,  the  total  command  numbering  nearly  or  quite  sixteen  hundred 
men,  who  had  been  selected  for  the  purpose.  It  was  an  impromptu, 
unpaid  army  of  volunteers,  hastily  combined  for  the  purpose  of  ridding 
the  country  of  Ferguson's  corps. 

King's  Mountain,  about  a  mile  long  and  about  a  hundred  feet 
above  the  surrounding  country,  is  one  of  a  series  of  rocky  summits 
extending  from  the  south-east  to  the  north-west,  and  is  just  within 
the  boundary  line  of  North  Carolina,  as  indicated  on  the  map  "  Opera 
tions  in  Southern  States." 

Nine  hundred  men  were  selected  to  storm  the  hill  in  front  and  on 
the  flanks.  The  detachment  of  the  Seventy-first  British  regulars, 
fought  with  such  spirit  that  in  three  bayonet  charges  they  crowded 
their  assailants  to  the  foot  of  the  hill.  Major  Ferguson  was  killed  and 
the  command  devolved  upon  Captain  Abraham  De  Peyster,  of  the 
King's  American  regiment.  After  an  hour  of  desperate  struggle  the 
command  surrendered. 

The  American  casualties  were  Colonel  Williams,  Major  Chronicle, 
Captain  Mattocks,  two  lieutenants,  four  ensigns,  and  nineteen  men 


I780.J  BATTLE   OF  CAMDEN.  521 

killed  ;  one  major,  three  captains,  three  lieutenants  and  fifty-three 
privates  wounded. 

The  British  casualties  are  characterized  by  a  report  which  is  so 
similar  to  those  of  Tarleton  respecting  "  the  wounded  unable  to 
march,"  that  it  confirms  the  generally  accepted  opinion  that  a  delib 
erate  slaughter  was  made  of  the  so-called  Tory  troops.  The  casualties 
are  reported  as,  "Two  colonels,  three  captains  and  two  hundred  and 
one  privates  killed,  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  privates  wounded, 
and  being  unable  to  march,  left  on  the  field  ;  one  colonel,  twelve  captains 
and  with  other  officers  and  men,  six  hundred  and  forty-eight  prisoners. 
The  regulars  lost,  besides  Major  Ferguson,  one  captain,  two  lieutenants 
and  fifteen  privates  killed  ;  thirty-five  wounded  but  unable  to  march  and 
left  on  the  ground  ;  two  captains  and  sixty-eight  taken  prisoners." 

Fifteen  hundred  muskets  and  other  arms,  with  the  baggage,  were 
captured.  Tarleton  thus  briefly  sums  up  his  statement :  "  The  action 
was  disputed  with  great  bravery  near  an  hour,  when  the  death  of  the 
gallant  Ferguson  threw  his  whole  corps  into  total  confusion.  No 
effort  was  made  after  this  event,  to  resist  the  enemy's  barbarity  or 
revenge  the  fall  of  their  leader." 

Lossing  and  Dawson  justly  regard  this  action  as  one  of  the  most 
obstinate  of  the  war,  and  the  associated  skirmishes  already  briefly 
noticed,  are  but  indicative  of  the  intensely  personal  and  destructive 
character  of  the  campaign. 

"  It  was  now  evident,"  says  Tarleton,  "  beyond  contradiction,  that 
the  British  general  had  not  adopted  the  most  eligible  plan  for  the 
invasion  of  North  Carolina.  Winnsborough  was  selected  for  the 
winter  quarters  of  the  army,  and  the  sick  were  placed  at  Camden, 
where  u  redoubts  were  built,  to  make  up  for  the  badness  of  the  posi 
tion."  Works  were  also  erected  at  Nelson's  Ferry,  to  secure  the 
communications  with  Charleston,  and  also  at  Ninety-six. 

"  The  success  of  the  Americans  at  King's  Mountain,"  says  Tarle 
ton,  "  and  the  distance  of  Cornwallis's  army,  prompted  many  of  the 
disaffected  inhabitants  of  South  Carolina  to  break  their  parole,  and  to 
unite  under  a  leader,  *  Marion,'  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  province." 
Sumter  still  operated  on  the  banks  of  Broad  River,  cutting  off  forag 
ing  parties,  and  endangering  the  post  at  Ninety-six.  Major  Wemyss 
of  the  Sixty-third  British  regiment,  and  some  cavalry  of  the  legion, 
attempted  to  surprise  him  at  Fish  Dam  Ford,  on  the  ninth  of  Novem 
ber,  lost  twenty-five  men  as  prisoners,  and  failed  in  the  attempt. 
Later  in  the  month,  Colonel  Sumter,  strongly  reinforced  by  Colonels 


522  BATTLE    OF   CAMUEN.  [1780. 

Thomas  and  Bratton,  and  Majors  McCall  and  Hammond,  of  South 
Carolina,  marched  toward  Ninety-six  to  attempt  its  capture,  but  was 
pursued  by  Colonel  Tarleton,  and  a  skirmish  ensued,  November 
twentieth,  at  Blackstock's  plantations,  on  the  Tiger  River,  which  left 
Colonel  Sumter  in  possession  of  the  field. 

The  skirmish  is  given  in  order  to  indicate  the  extraordinary  con 
flict  in  reports  of  this  partisan  warfare.  American  statement  of  their 
own  loss,  three  killed,  four  wounded,  among  the  latter  General  Sumter  ; 
of  the  enemy,  ninety-two  killed  and  one  hundred  wounded.  Tarle- 
ton's  statement,  Americans  killed  and  wounded, upwards  of  one  hun 
dred,  and  fifty  made  prisoners.  British  loss,  Lieutenants  Gibson  and 
Cope  killed,  four  officers  and  forty-five  non-commissioned  officers  and 
men  killed  and  wounded. 

Stedman  "  takes  the  whole  account  of  the  action  from  Mackenzie's 
strictures  on  Tarleton's  campaign,"  very  justly  reviewing  inconsist 
encies  in  Tarleton's  report, which  disprove  his  statement  of  casualties, 
and  adds,  "  The  wounded  of  the  British  detachment  were  left  to  the 
mercy  of  the  enemy  ;  and  it  is  but  justice  to  General  Sumter  to  declare 
that  the  strictest  humanity  took  place  upon  the  present  occasion  ; 
they  were  supplied  with  every  comfort  in  his  power.  Although  Tarle 
ton  was  repulsed  at  Blackstock's  Hill,  the  immediate  effects  were 
nearly  the  same  as  a  victory.  General  Sumter  being  disabled  by  his 
wound  from  keeping  the  field,  his  followers  dispersed,  after  conveying 
him  to  a  place  of  safety." 

The  summer  and  fall  campaign  in  the  Southern  States  had  been 
one  of  constant  activity,  and  as  the  year  1780  drew  to  its  close  there 
was  no  cessation  of  demands  upon  the  vigilance  of  either  army.  The 
remnants  of  General  Gates'  army  were  being  reorganized  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  and  before  the  departure  of  that  officer  to  answer  before  a 
Court  of  Inquiry  ordered  by  Congress,  as  to  the  disaster  at  Camden, 
he  had  collected  a  nominal  force  of  two  thousand  three  hundred  and 
seven  men,  more  than  half  of  whom  were  militia,  and  as  afterwards 
stated  by  General  Greene,  "  but  eight  hundred  in  the  whole  force 
were  properly  clothed  and  equipped." 

The  post  commander  at  Charleston,  Lieutenant-colonel  Balfour, 
was  taking  extreme  measures  to  terrify  and  intimidate  the  people ; 
Marion  had  increased  his  partisan  detachment  to  the  strength  of  an 
efficient  corps,  and  with  no  severity  of  climate  such  as  impaired  opera 
tions  at  the  north,  the  campaign  of  1781  practically  began  when 
General  Nathaniel  Greene  arrived  to  take  command  of  the  Southern 
Department  on  the  third  of  December,  1780. 


ejc/exctw  fro/n 

arrcfed  £ntisftJjefiJV7x(f 
from  roattto  eaefiteranut. 
Second  Position. 


522* 


CHAPTER   LXVI. 

MINOR  MENTION,    1780.    EUROPEAN  COALITION  AGAINST 
ENGLAND.     GENERAL   GREENE   AT   THE   SOUTH. 

THE  year  1780  closed  with  the  promise  of  still  more  active  opera 
tions  in  the  Southern  Department  ;  but  there  were  many 
hindrances  to  prevent  prompt  support  from  the  North.  The  defeat 
of  the  American  army  at  Camden  was  not  known  by  General  Wash 
ington  until  September,  and  it  was  impossible  to  spare  from  the 
Northern  army  a  sufficient  force  to  cope  with  that  of  Lord  Cornwallis. 

The  second  division  of  French  troops,  so  long  looked  for,  and 
reported  as  blockaded  in  the  port  of  Brest,  did  not  arrive.  The 
blockade  of  Newport  compelled  the  French  army  to  remain  almost 
idle,  as  a  support  to  the  fleet,  and  the  American  army  rapidly  dimin 
ished  in  numbers  as  winter  drew  near. 

Occasional  demonstrations  were  made  as  if  to  attack  New  York, 
but  chiefly  to  prevent  the  detachment  of  any  portion  of  its  garrison  to 
the  South.  A  serious  attack  upon  the  city  was  impracticable, 'until 
reinforcements  should  arrive  from  France. 

During  the  month  of  October,  however,  La  Fayette  elaborated  a 
plan,  which  was  so  far  advanced  that  boats  were  built  and  placed 
upon  wagons,  thereby  to  unite  the  advantages  of  attack  both  by 
land  and  water.  This  plan  included  Fort  Washington,  the  city  of 
New  York  and  Staten  Island,  as  objectives  of  simultaneous  attack, 
and  proposed  to  make  the  blow  as  sudden  as  that  upon  Trenton  in 
1776.  It  was  abandoned  for  want  of  boats.  There  were  few  periods 
during  the  war  when  more  diverse  and  widely  separated  interests 
required  the  attention  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief. 

Major  Carleton,  with  a  force  of  eight  hundred  troops,  regulars, 
Canadians  and  Indians,  captured  Forts  George  and  Ann  in  October. 
Fort  Edward  was  saved  through  the  sagacity  of  Colonel  Livingston, 


524  MINOR   MENTION. 

who  having  a  garrison  of  only  seventy-nine  men,  averted  attack,  by 
sending  a  letter  to  the  commanding  officer  of  Fort  George  (to  be 
intercepted  by  the  enemy)  exaggerating  his  own  strength  and  declar 
ing  his  purpose  to  go  to  the  rescue  of  that  post.  The  British  troops 
however,  actually  advanced  to  the  vicinity  of  Saratoga,  burned  some 
houses,  and  then  returned  to  Lake  Champlain. 

An  incursion  from  Fort  Niagara  into  the  Mohawk  Valley  brought 
another  brief  struggle  with  Sir  John  Johnson,  Joseph  Brant  and 
the  Indians.  The  Oneidas,  friendly  to  the  United  States,  were 
expelled  from  their  homes,  the  Schoharie  region  was  desolated,  and 
much  wheat  was  destroyed. 

On  the  sixth  of  November,  General  Washington  confided  to  Gen 
eral  Schuylerthe  fact,  that  some  leaders  in  Vermont  were  correspond 
ing  with  British  officials  in  Canada,  and  directed  him  to  concert 
measures  with  General  Clinton  to  detect  and  thwart  their  plans. 
The  prompt  response  of  General  Schuyler  was  characteristic  of  his 
entire  career  during  the  war  :  and  it  is  but  justice  to  say.  that  garbled 
documents, and  sneers  at  his  high  social  position  and  culture,have  in 
some  instances  usurped  the  place  of  history  and  dishonored  records 
otherwise  reputable  for  general  accuracy  of  statement.  These  move 
ments  required  three  additional  regiments  to  be  sent  to  Albany,  and 
constant  uneasiness  prevailed  along  the  whole  northern  and  north 
western  frontiers. 

On  the  seventh  of  November  it  was  known  to  Washington  that 
the  American  army  was  "  experiencing  almost  daily  want ;  "  while 
the  "  British  army  in  New  York  was  deriving  ample  supplies  from  a 
trade  with  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Connecticut,  which  had,  by 
degrees,  become  so  common  that  it  was  hardly  thought  a  crime." 

General  Sullivan  having  left  the  army,  took  his  seat  in  Congress, 
September  eleventh.  In  a  letter  of  November  twentieth,  Washing 
ton  uses  the  following  urgent  and  laconic  terms,  in  writing  to  him : 
"  Congress  will  deceive  themselves,  if  they  imagine  that  the  army,  or 
a  State  that  is  the  theater  of  war,  can  rub  through  a  second  cam 
paign,  as  the  last.  It  would  be  as  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
because  a  man  had  rolled  a  snowball  till  it  had  acquired  the  size  of  a 
horse,  he  might  do  it  until  it  was  the  size  of  a  house.  Matters  may 
be  pushed  to  a  certain  point,  beyond  which  we  can  not  move  them. 
Ten  months'  pay  is  now  due  to  the  army.  Every  department  of  it  is 
so  much  indebted  that  we  have  not  credit  for  a  single  expense,  and 
some  of  the  States  are  harassed  and  oppressed  to  a  degree  beyond 


lySo.j  MINOR   MENTION.  525 

bearing.  .  .  To  depend,  under  these  circumstances,  upon  the 
resources  of  the  country,  unassisted  by  foreign  bravery,  will,  I  am 
confident,  be  to  lean  upon  a  broken  reed." 

General  Sullivan  had  advised  that  the  French  fleet  should  force 
its  way  from  Newport  to  Boston,  and  the  French  army  report  at 
headquarters.  This  proposition  had  been  urged  at  a  conference  held 
with  the  Count  de  Rochambeau,  at  Hartford,  Connecticut,  but  it  was 
not  adopted.  As  early  as  October  sixteenth,  General  Leslie  left 
New  York  with  nearly  three  thousand  troops  and  landed  at  Ports 
mouth,  Virginia  ;  but  afterwards  re-embarked,  and  landed  at  Charles 
ton,  late  in  December.  Colonel  Rochambeau,  son  of  Count  de 
Rochambeau,  left  Newport  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  October,  ran  the 
gauntlet  of  the  British  fleet  during  a  gale,  and  safely  reached  France, 
with  a  formal  application  for  additional  aid  of  men,  arms  and  money 
The  Chevalier  de  Ternay  died  at  Newport,  on  the  fifteenth  of 
December,  and  was  succeeded  in  command  of  the  fleet,  by  Chevalier 
Destouches.  Some  ineffectual  negotiations  took  place  looking  to  a 
union  of  Spanish  and  French  ships  in  a  common  movement  on  the 
American  coast ;  but  no  practical  results  were  realized,  more  than  to 
hold  the  British  ships  fast  before  Newport,  and  thus  prevent  their 
operations  down  the  Atlantic  coast.  Colonel  Fleury,  who  had  been 
distinguished  at  Fort  Mifflin  and  Stony  Point,  joined  the  French 
army  under  Rochambeau. 

On  the  twentieth  of  December,  General  Washington  wrote  to 
Benjamin  Franklin,  Minister  at  the  Court  of  Versailles,  stating  that 
"  the  campaign  had  been  thus  inactive,  after  a  flattering  prospect  at 
the  opening  of  it  and  vigorous  struggles  to  make  it  a  decisive  one, 
through  failure  of  the  expected  naval  superiority  which  was  the  pivot 
upon  which  everything  turned,"  and  added  :  "  The  movements  of 
Lord  Cornwallis  during  the  past  month  or  two  have  been  retrograde. 
What  turn  the  late  reinforcements,  which  have  been  sent  to  him,  may 
give  to  his  affairs,  remains  to  be  known.  I  have  reinforced  our 
Southern  army,  principally  with  horse  ;  but  the  length  of  the  march 
is  so  much  opposed  to  the  measure  that  every  corps  is  in  a  greater 
or  less  degree  ruined.  I  am  happy,  however,  in  assuring  you  that  a 
better  disposition  never  prevailed  in  the  legislatures  of  the  several 
States,  than  at  this  time.  The  folly  of  temporary  expedients  is  seen 
into  and  exploded,  and  vigorous  efforts  will  be  used  to  obtain  a  per 
manent  army  and  carry  on  the  war  systematically,  if  the  obstinacy 
of  Great  Britain  shall  compel  us  to  continue  it.  We  want  nothing 


526  MINOR   MENTION.  [i78a 

but  the  aid  of  a  loan  to  enable  us  to  put  our  finances  into  a  tolerable 
train.  The  country  does  not  want  resources,  but  we  want  the  means 
of  drawing  them  forth." 

It  appears  from  this  letter  that  Washington  had  reached  a  point 
where  he  felt  that  ultimate  success  was  not  far  distant.  The  recon 
struction  of  the  army  to  which  he  refers,  was  a  plan  then  pending  for 
the  consolidation  of  battalions,  reducing  their  numbers  and  thereby 
settling  upon  something  like  a  permanent  army  establishment. 

The  new  army  was  to  consist  of  fifty  regiments  of  foot,  including 
Hazen's,  specially  reserved — four  regiments  of  artillery,  and  one  of  arti 
ficers,  with  the  two  partisan  corps  under  Armand  and  Lee,  and  four 
other  legionary  corps,  two-thirds  horse  and  one-third  foot.  All  new 
enlistments  were  to  be  for  the  war.  The  total  force  upon  the  rees 
tablished  company  basis  would  amount  to  thirty-six  thousand  men. 
Not  more  than  half  that  number  were  ever  in  the  field  at  the  same 
time,  and  the  full  complement  was  never  recruited.  Hazen's  regiment, 
and  the  corps  of  Armand  and  Lee  were  recruited  at  large.  The  other 
regiments  were  assigned  as  follows :  to  Massachusetts  and  Virginia, 
eleven  regiments  each  ;  Pennsylvania,  nine  ;  Connecticut,  six  ;  Mary 
land,  five  ;  North  Carolina,  four  ;  New  York,  three  ;  New  Hampshire, 
New  Jersey  and  South  Carolina,  two  each  ;  Rhode  Island,  Delaware 
and  Georgia,  one  each. 

This  reorganization  was  attended  with  difficulties.  There  were 
many  who  had  taken  commissions  with  the  purpose  of  devoting  their 
life  to  military  attainment.  Their  entire  life,  (as  a  soldier  would 
understand  the  expression)  was  involved  in  their  military  service. 
The  consolidation  involved  sacrifices,  and  there  was  a  strong  party  in 
Congress,  "  led  by  Samuel  Adams,"  which  as  Hildreth  concisely  states 
the  fact,  "was  very  jealous  of  military  power,  and  of  everything  which 
tended  to  give  a  permanent  character  to  the  army."  The  retirement 
of  officers  on  partial  pay  was  bitterly  opposed  by  this  party;  and  the 
jealousy  of  a  regular  army,  the  value  of  which  was  in  Washington's 
estimation,  and  in  fact,  one  of  the  great  lessons  of  the  war,  was  the 
perpetual  cause  of  waste,  disaster,  and  the  postponement  of  success. 

Colonel  Robert  H.  Harrison,  former  secretary  to  the  Commander- 
in-chief  had  become  Chief  Justice  of  Maryland,  and  was  succeeded  in 
the  staff  by  Jonathan  Trumbull,  Jr.  Hand  was  appointed  Adjutant- 
general,  vice  Scammel  resigned.  Smallwood  succeeded  to  command 
of  a  division,  vice  De  Kalb,  killed  in  battle.  Morgan  was  promoted  as 
Brigadier-general,  and  sent  to  the  Southern  Department,  together 


I78o,]  MINOR    MENTION. 

with  General  Steuben  and  Lee's  corps,  three  hundred  and  fifty  strong, 
together  with  Kosciusko  as  engineer,  vice  Du  Portail  captured  at 
Charleston. 

A  specie  tax  of  six  millions  was  imposed,  and  in  spite  of  countless 
minor  embarrassments  the  sixth  annual  campaign  of  the  war  drew 
near  its  close. 

On  the  twenty-eighth  of  November,  Washington  designated  the 
winter  quarters  for  the  army,  his  own  being  established  at  New 
Windsor.  The  Pennsylvania  line  were  established  near  Morristown  ; 
the  Jersey  line  at  Pompton  ;  the  Maryland  regiment  of  horse  at  Lan 
caster,  Pennsylvania  ;  and  Sheldon's  horse  at  Colchester,  Connecticut ; 
one  New  York  regiment  at  Fort  Schuyler,  one  at  Saratoga,  and  the 
remainder  of  the  line  at  Albany,  Schenectady,  and  other  exposed 
posts. 

In  the  location  of  troops  in  southern  New  England,  where  the 
French  army  was  quartered,  there  was  much  local  apprehension  lest 
forage  would  be  inadequate  to  the  demand  ;  and  some  local  feeling 
was  aroused  in  Connecticut  against  the  assignments  made.  In  a 
letter  to  Governor  Trumbull,  of  December  seventeenth,  Washington 
plainly  asserted  his  prerogative  as  Commander-in-chief  to  direct  the 
movements  of  the  army,  asserting  that  any  local  interference  intrenched 
upon  his  prerogative  and  endangered  the  national  cause.  Governor 
Trumbull,  as  always,  fully  supported  Washington. 

The  condition  of  Great  Britain  at  this  period  of  the  struggle  was 
one  of  supreme  trial.  Her  insular  position  was  suggestive  of  inde 
pendence  ;  but  her  maritime  superiority  was  a  source  of  universal 
jealousy  and  envy.  Whatever  may  have  been  her  errors  of  policy  or 
her  failure  to  compromise  issues  with  foreign  states,  the  close  of  1780 
found  her  in  practical  conflict  with  Europe,  and  under  apprehensions 
of  invasion  from  France.  Spain  and  France  were  united  in  open  war, 
and  their  combined  fleets  threatened  her  West  India  possessions. 
Spain  was  pressing  the  siege  of  Gibraltar.  Denmark  and  Sweden 
had  already  united  with  Catharine  of  Russia  to  adopt  the  famous 
system  of  "  Armed  Neutrality,"  declaring  that  "  free  ships  make  free 
goods,"  and  that  neutrals  might  carry  any  goods  or  supplies  wherever 
they  pleased  with  complete  immunity  from  search  or  capture.  This 
was  a  blow  at  British  commerce.  Even  in  the  East  Indies  her  crown 
was  one  of  thorns.  Hyder  Ali  swept  through  the  province  of  Madras, 
and  Warren  Hastings  was  contending,  as  for  life,  to  save  British 
supremacy  from  overthrow. 


528  MINOR   MENTION.  [1780. 

France  sent  aid  to  Hyder  AH  as  well  as  to  America,  and  thereby 
was  limited  in  her  contributions  to  the  army  of  Washington. 

Early  in  September  a  correspondence  had  been  well  advanced 
between  the  United  States  and  Holland,  looking  to  a  commercial 
treaty  between  the  two  nations.  Laurens  was  sent  as  a  commissioner 
to  Holland,  was  taken  prisoner,  carried  to  England,  and  confined  in  the 
Tower  on  a  charge  of  high  treason.  His  papers  were  captured,  and 
as  the  result  of  a  brief  correspondence  between  the  British  Cabinet 
and  the  States-General  of  Holland,  the  British  government  declared 
war  against  that  state  on  the  second  day  of  December.  Instructions 
had  been  previously  sent  to  her  fleets,  and  immediate  blows  were 
struck  at  the  Dutch  colonies  and  Dutch  commerce. 

Domestic  excitements  added  their  burden  to  the  great  external 
pressure  which  seemed  to  threaten  the  Island  Empire.  Eighty  thou 
sand  volunteers  had  been  enrolled  in  Ireland,  in  view  of  apprehended 
invasion  from  France.  The  agitations  for  parliamentary  reform 
became  earnest,  and  the  independence  of  the  Irish  Parliament  was 
said  to  be  in  peril.  Meanwhile  the  British  advocates  of  "  peace  with 
America  at  the  price  of  recognized  independence  "  became  more 
earnest,  and  the  crisis  rendered  the  detachment  of  any  considerable 
body  of  troops  to  increase  the  armies  at  New  York  and  Charleston, 
absolutely  impossible.  The  period  was  one  which  vindicated  the 
claim  of  Great  Britain  to  the  admiration  of  the  world  for  her  wonder 
ful  capacity  to  withstand  external  force,  and  no  less  emphatically  dis 
closed  the  equally  wonderful  resources  at  her  control.  It  was  in  exact 
keeping  with  the  struggle  which  made  the  American  Colonies  uncon 
querable  by  force  of  arms.  Thus  England  and  France  alike  were 
restrained  from  strengthening  the  contending  armies  of  the  New 
World. 

General  Greene  accepted  the  southern  command  with  eagerness, 
supported  by  the  confidence  of  Washington.  General  La  Fayette 
desired  to  accompany  him  ;  but  in  view  of  his  intimate  relations  to 
the  French  alliance,  his  services  were  deemed  essential  to  successful 
operations  at  the  north. 

General  Greene  started  for  the  south.  There  was  breadth  of  terri 
tory  sufficient  to  satisfy  any  reasonable  ambition ;  but  he  needed 
an  army.  He  resolved  to  develop  an  army,  in  accordance  with  the 
peculiar  kind  of  service  which  would  be  required,  and  his  suggestion 
was  approved  by  Washington  when  he  first  submitted  his  plan  on  the 
eighth  of  November,  1780.  He  would  have  that  army  a  "flying 


1780.]  MINOR   MENTION.  S29 

army,"  lightly  equipped,  mobile,  and  as  familiar  as  possible  with  the 
country  in  which  operations  were  to  be  prosecuted.  The  Commander- 
in-chief  addressed  letters  to  Governor  Thomas  S.  Lee  of  Maryland, 
to  Governor  Abner  Nash  of  North  Carolina,  and  to  Governor  Thomas 
Jefferson  of  Virginia,  invoking  their  cordial  cooperation  in  the  work 
of  the  new  Department  commander. 

The  southern  army,  as  Greene  wrote  to  General  Knox,  "  is  shadow 
rather  than  substance,  having  only  an  imaginary  existence."  Con 
gress  could  not  supply  troops  ;  but  by  the  adding  of  Maryland  and 
Delaware  to  his  department,  he  secured  the  control  of  militia,addi- 
tional  to  that  which  he  was  to  draw  from  the  actual  field  of  opera 
tions.  He  was  also  clothed  with  the  same  powers  which  General 
Gates  had  been  empowered  to  exercise,  such  as  authority  to  draw 
upon  the  Southern  States  for  troops  or  money  and  to  impress  subsis 
tence  or  transportation,  whenever  unavoidable  necessity  should 
require  it. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  November  he  began  his  journey,  attended 
by  General  the  Baron  Steuben  and  his  aids  Colonel  Morris  and  Major 
Burnet.  At  each  State  capital  he  urged  the  necessity  of  immediate 
action.  To  Governor  Rodney  of  Delaware,  he  wrote  : — "  Do  not  suffer 
those  States,  now  struggling  with  the  enemy,  to  sink  under  their 
oppression,  for  want  of  a  reasonable  support."  To  Governor  Lee,  of 
Maryland: — "Unless  they  are  soon  succored  and  countenanced  by 
a  good  regular  force,  their  distresses  will  inevitably  break  their  spirits, 
and  they  will  be  compelled  to  reconcile  themselves  to  their  misfor 
tunes.  There  is  no  alternative  but  base  submission,  or  an  effectual 
prosecution  of  the  war."  Generals  Gist  and  Smallwood  were  at  once 
employed  by  these  two  States,  upon  recruiting  service.  General 
Greene's  order  of  November  twentieth,  thus  gives  clearness  to  his 
will, — "  You  will  please  to  make  all  your  applications  in  writing,  that 
they  may  appear  hereafter  for  our  justification  ;  that  we  left  nothing 
unessayed  to  promote  the  public  service.  Let  your  applications  be 
as  pressing  as  our  necessities  are  urgent;  after  which,  if  the  northern 
States  are  lost,  we  shall  stand  justified.  The  greatest  consequences 
depend  upon  your  activity  and  zeal  in  the  business." 

Upon  reaching  Virginia,  he  found  that  the  State  was  necessarily 
absorbed  in  its  own  defense.  General  Leslie  had  taken  possession 
of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth,  and  fortified  both.  Generals  Muhlen- 
berg  and  Weedon,  had  been  sent  by  Washington  to  organize  the 
militia,  and  upon  General  Greene's  arrival  they  were  organizing  their 
34 


53°  MINOR   MENTION.  [1780. 

forces  to  oppose  any  advance  of  General  Leslie  beyond  the  immedi 
ate  limits  of  the  two  posts  which  his  army  garrisoned.  The  consoli 
dation  of  regiments  and  the  reduction  of  their  number,  left  several 
valuable  officers  out  of  service  ;  but  nearly  all  of  these,  as  well  as 
Generals  Muhlenberg  and  Weedon,  had  served  under  General  Greene 
at  the  north.  Among  the  officers  thus  left  without  commands  was 
Colonel  Edward  Carrington.  The  first  thing  General  Greene  deter 
mined  upon  was  "  to  select  depots,  and  laboratories, — posts  of  rest  and 
communication,  and  to  provide  transportation  for  hospital  and  other 
army  stores." 

Justice  Johnson  states  that  "he  fixed  his  eye  upon  Colonel  Car 
rington  as  eminently  qualified  to  undertake  the  task  of  combining 
and  conducting  the  means  at  the  Quartermaster-general's  depart 
ment  ;  that  he  obeyed  the  call  to  the  office  and  discharged  it  with 
unequaled  zeal  and  fidelity."  Chief-justice  Marshall  confirms  the 
statement.  The  principal  depot  of  stores  and  arms  was  established 
at  Prince  Edward  Court  House,  and  General  the  Baron  Steuben  was 
charged  with  maintaining  the  supply  of  powder  from  the  manufac 
tories,  and  of  lead  from  the  mines  in  Fincastle  County.  He  was  also 
placed  in  command  of  the  District  of  Virginia,  with  a  special  charge 
"  to  collect,  organize,  discipline  and  expedite  the  recruits  for  the 
Southern  army." 

Before  his  departure  for  the  field  General  Greene  wrote  to  Gover 
nor  Jefferson,  urging  the  immediate  completion  of  the  regiments, 
under  the  reduced  standard,  to  their  maximum  ;  and  makes  the  fol 
lowing  points  emphatic:  "It  is  perfectly  consistent,  in  all  cases,  to 
carry  on  war  abroad,  rather  than  at  home,  as  well  in  matters  of  expense, 
as  in  humanity  to  the  inhabitants.  But  this  policy  is  rendered  doubly 
necessary  to  Virginia,  from  the  ease  with  which  the  enemy  can  pene 
trate  through  North  Carolina  and  possess  themselves  of  all  the  low 
country  of  Virginia.  .  .  It  must  be  the -extreme  of  folly  to  hazard 
our  liberties  upon  so  precarious  a  dependence,"  referring  to  the 
militia.  "They  are  the  bulwark  of  civil  liberty  if  they  are  not 
depended  upon,  as  a  principal,  but  employed  as  an  auxiliary." 
"  Officers  are  the  very  soul  of  an  army,  and  you  may  as  well  attempt 
to  animate  a  dead  body  into  action,  as  to  expect  to  employ  an  army 
to  advantage,  when  the  officers  are  not  perfectly  easy  in  their  circum 
stances,  and  happy  in  the  service." 

In  the  sphere  of  Logistics  which  so  materially  affects  all  military 
operations,  General  Greene  had  peculiar  experience,  and  he  evinced 


I78o.j  MINOR  MENTION.  531 

great  discrimination  and  practical  judgment.  In  this  letter  to  Gov 
ernor  Jefferson,  he  says  :  "  The  late  distressing  accounts  from  the 
Southern  army  claim  the  immediate  attention  of  government,  both 
with  respect  to  provisions  and  clothing.  It  is  impossible  for  men  to 
remain  long  in  the  field  unless  they  are  well  furnished  with  both 
these  articles;  and  to  expose  them  to  the  want  of  either, will  soon 
transfer  them  from  the  field  to  the  hospital,  or  lay  them  under  the 
necessity  of  deserting."  ..."  Great  pains  should  be  taken  to  fix 
upon  some  place  for  feeding  the  army  with  live  stock,  and  I  think  of 
none  unless  it  be  putting  up  a  large  quantity  of  beeves  to  stall-feed." 
.  .  .  "  The  distress  and  suffering  of  the  people  of  North  and  South 
Carolina  deserve  the  most  speedy  support  to  keep  alive  that  spirit  of 
enterprise  which  has  prevailed  among  them  lately,  so  much  to  their 
honor.  It  is  much  easier  to  oppose  the  enemy  while  the  tide  of 
sentiment  runs  in  our  favor,  than  it  will  be  to  secure  Virginia  after 
they  are  overrun." 

Orders  were  issued  to  Colonel  Carrington  "  to  explore  the  Dan, 
Yadkin  and  Catawba,  and  make  himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
the  streams  into  which  they  discharged  themselves."  This  order  was 
executed  with  great  exactness,  and  the  casual  reader  of  general  history 
who  has  regarded  the  subsequent  movements  of  General  Greene  as 
accidental,  will  see  that  a  previous  knowledge  of  the  country  in  which 
he  was  to  operate  was  one  element  of  his  military  success.  Colonel 
Carrington  accompanied  General  Greene  to  Richmond  after  the 
organization  of  his  department.  General  Stevens  executed  the  sur 
vey  of  the  Yadkin.  Kosciusko,  Greene's  engineer-in-chief,  examined 
the  Catawba,  and  other  officers  visited  the  Dan.  The  result  of  this 
forethought  materially  affected  the  subsequent  campaign. 

On  the  second  of  December,  General  Greene  reached  Charlotte, 
and  immediately  relieved  General  Gates  of  the  command,  under  cir 
cumstances  which  redounded  to  the  credit  of  both  officers.  Mutual 
courtesies  were  exchanged,  and  General  Gates  went  to  his  farm.  The 
condition  of  his  army  was  General  Greene's  first  care.  He  found  that 
everything  was  needed,  and  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Jefferson,  states 
quite  clearly  the  facts.  A  few  paragraphs  are  given :  "  I  find  the 
troops  in  a  most  wretched  condition,  destitute  of  everything  necessary 
either  for  comfort  or  convenience,  and  may  literally  be  said  to  be 
naked."  "  It  will  answer  no  good  purpose  to  send  men  here  in  such 
a  condition."  "  There  must  be  either  pride,  or  principle,  to  make  a 
soldier.  No  man  will  think  himself  bound  to  fiorht  the  battles  of  a 


532  MINOR   MENTION.  [..1780 

state  that  leaves  him  to  perish  for  want  of  clothing,  nor  can  you  inspire 
a  soldier  with  the  sentiment  of  pride  while  his  situation  renders  him 
more  an  object  of  pity  than  of  envy.  The  life  of  a  soldier  in  the  best 
estate, is  liable  to  innumerable  hardships  ;  but  where  these  are  aggra 
vated  by  the  want  of  provisions  and  clothing,  his  condition  becomes 
intolerable ;  nor  can  men  long  contend  with  such  complicated  diffi 
culties  and  distress.  Death,  desertion,  and  the  hospital  must  soon 
swallow  up  an  army  under  such  circumstances,  and  if  it  were  possible 
for  men  to  maintain  such  a  wretched  existence,  they  would  have  no 
spirit  to  face  their  enemies,  and  would  inevitably  disgrace  themselves 
and  their  commander.  It  is  impossible  to  presume  discipline  when 
troops  are  in  want  of  everything  ;  to  attempt  severity  will  only  thin 
the  ranks  by  a  more  hasty  desertion." 

For  two  months  General  Greene  remained  in  camp.  He  antici 
pated  the  necessity  for  axes,  and  even  nails,  and  fabricated  cheap 
substitutes  for  articles  that  could  not  be  readily  secured  otherwise. 

On  the  twentieth  of  December,  having  been  delayed  four  days  by 
rains,  the  huts  at  Charlotte  were  abandoned,  the  main  army  reaching 
Hicks  creek,  a  branch  of  the  Peedee,near  Cheraw  Hill,  on  the  twenty- 
sixth.  General  Morgan  was  detached,  however,  on  the  sixteenth, 
with  three  hundred  and  twenty  from  the  Maryland  line,  two  hundred 
Virginia  militia,  and  Colonel  Washington's  horse,  less  than  a  hundred 
strong,  to  cross  the  Catawba,  and  "  take  command  in  that  quarter,  to 
act  offensively  or  defensively,  to  protect  the  country,  spirit  up  the  peo 
ple,  annoy  the  enemy,  collect  provisions  and  forage,  form  magazines, 
prevent  plundering,  etc." 

Marion  at  once  placed  himself  in  communication  with  General 
Greene.  In  a  letter  to  that  officer,  responsive  to  one  addressed  to 
General  Gates,  he  says,  "  Your  letter  of  the  22d  last  month  to  Gen 
eral  Gates  is  before  me.  I  am  fully  sensible  your  service  is  hard  and 
sufferings  great ;  but  how  great  the  prize  for  which  we  contend.  I 
like  your  plan  of  frequently  shifting  your  ground.  It  frequently  pre 
vents  a  surprise,  and  perhaps  the  total  loss  of  your  party.  Until  a 
more  permanent  army  can  be  collected  than  is  in  the  field  at  present, 
we  must  endeavor  to  keep  up  a  partisan  war,  and  preserve  the  tide  of 
sentiment  among  the  people  in  our  favor  as  much  as  possible.  Spies 
are  the  eyes  of  an  army,  and  without  them  a  general  is  always  groping 
in  the  dark." 

Marion  was  then  on  Black  River,  but  soon  returned  to  his  camp 
in  the  forks  of  Pedee  and  Lynch  Rivers,  and  on  the  twenty-seventh  of 


ijSo.J  MINOR   MENTION.  533 

December  reported  to  General  Greene  the  arrival  of  General  Leslie  at 
Charleston,  his  march  to  Camden,  and  the  establishment  of  Colonel 
Watson  at  Nelson's  Ferry  with  two  hundred  men.  From  that  time 
forward  the  campaign  was  fairly  in  motion.  With  Morgan  on  the 
west  and  Marion  in  the  eastern  districts,  the  new  commanding  officer 
had  carefully  prepared  his  way  to  contend  with  the  British  forces  in  a 
manner  of  warfare  which  should  suit  itself  to  the  character  of  his 
troops,  and  the  country  in  which  the  war  was  to  be  carried  on.  It  is 
very  clear  from  the  unofficial  letters  of  General  Greene  to  La  Fayette 
and  other  officers,  that  he  realized  the  grave  responsibilities  of  his 
position  and  endeavored  to  anticipate  the  contingencies  of  the  cam 
paign.  A  reference  to  chapter  thirty-six  will  show  that  at  that  early 
period  of  the  war,  he  understood  the  importance  of  preparing  in 
advance  for  an  army  movement;  and  as  already  indicated,  much  of 
his  success  at  the  south  was  secured  by  the  tedious  system  of  recon 
noitring  which  he  inaugurated  before  he  marched  from  Virginia. 

Other  troops  followed  slowly.  The  patience  of  Baron  Steuben  was 
severely  tasked.  On  the  fifteenth  of  December  Colonel  Lee  marched 
with  his  corps,  three  hundred  strong,  and  Colonel  Christopher  Greene 
accompanied  him  with  four  hundred  men,  but  they  did  not  reach  the 
Pedee  until  the  twelfth  of  January. 

The  closing  active  campaign  of  the  war  for  American  Independence 
thus  opened,  and  its  principal  military  events  will  be  considered  in 
detail. 


CHAPTER   LXVII. 

CONDITION  OF  SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  MUTINY  AT  THE  NORTH. 
OPERATIONS  OF  GENERALS  GREENE  AND  CORNWALLIS. 
BATTLE  OF  COWPENS,  1781. 

THE  campaign  of  1781  was  the  last  of  the  American  war,  but  in 
some  respects  it  was  less  earnestly  supported  than  were  those 
of  previous  years.  The  American  army  could  not  be  recruited  up  to 
the  new  standard,  and  the  British  received  no  considerable  reinforce 
ments  from  abroad.  The  American  people  seemed  to  consider  the 
presence  of  the  French  troops  as  equivalent,  rather  than  as  an  en 
couragement,  to  extra  exertion  ;  and  a  corresponding  impression  of 
the  English  crown  that  the  south  was  almost  conquered  and  would 
quite  generally  rally  to  the  royal  standard,  had  its  tendency,  equally 
to  quiet  the  English  authorities  and  prevent  the  shipment  of  troops. 

The  addition  of  Holland  to  the  enemies  of  England  had  its  effect 
also,  since  it  compelled  England  to  leave  American  affairs  almost 
entirely  to  the  care  of  officers  then  on  duty  in  the  United  States  ; 
and  on  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  could  not  fail  to  see  that  any 
large  addition  to  the  British  army,  from  abroad, was  impossible.  In 
addition  to  these  considerations,  there  was  a  sense  of  fatigue  which 
affected  the  people  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  as  if  there  had  been 
sufficient  fighting  over  an  issue  which  could  have  but  one  possible 
result,  separation.  The  English  whigs  remonstrated  against  its  con 
tinuance,  and  the  Cabinet  itself  began  to  realize  the  fact  that  the  war 
was  crippling  all  efforts  in  other  directions  ;  while  the  Americans 
themselves,  outside  of  the  Southern  States,  largely  entertained  the 
conviction  that  the  war  would  soon  end,  and  therefore  failed  to  make 
the  necessary  exertions  to  end  it  summarily,  by  supplying  the  neces 
sary  force,  at  once.  Money,  food  and  clothing,  were  as  scarce  as  at 
any  previous  period,  and  protracted  sacrifice,  uncompensated  labor 
and  unpaid  services,  began  to  wear  out  both  soldiers  and  people, 


534* 


1 78i.]  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  535 

Hostilities  were  too  inactive  to  arouse  the  north  to  united  action  : 
and  the  English  forces  at  the  south  were  too  superior  in  numbers  to 
encourage  the  southern  people  to  combine  for  resistance,  unaided  by 
regular  troops.  It  was  just  the  time  when  the  British  Cabinet  could 
have  made  a  strong  reinforcement  very  impressive  ;  provided  it  could 
command  English  sympathy  ;  and  it  was  just  the  time  that  the 
American  people  needed  the  pressure  of  some  permanent  danger  to 
arouse  them  to  the  offensive. 

The  French  army  in  America  sustained  an  important  relation  to 
this  period.  It  prevented  General  Clinton  from  risking  the  offensive, 
and  to  the  same  extent  lessened  the  zeal  of  the  New  England  people 
in  the  preparations  for  troops  for  the  new  campaign,  because  the 
urgency  of  their  employment  did  not  appear  immediate  and  absolute. 

The  active  operations  of  the  year  eventually  transferred  La  Fay- 
ette,  and  then  Washington  and  Rochambeau,  to  the  Southern  depart 
ment,  where  Greene  had  been  established  in  December,  1780. 

On  the  part  of  the  British  army,  Cornwallis  held  the  chief  place 
of  responsible  command.  Phillips  and  Arnold  made  a  diversion  into 
Virginia  to  strengthen  his  second  invasion  of  North  Carolina,  and 
Arnold  ultimately  made  an  incursion  into  Connecticut  to  suspend  the 
transfer  of  northern  American  troops  to  the  south.  This  latter  in 
cursion,  however,  was  entirely  ignored  by  Washington,  who  had  a 
fixed  objective  of  pursuit,  and  that  was,  to  capture  New  Yorker  to 
capture  Cornwallis. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  General  Clinton  was  out  of  favor  with 
the  Crown  and  that  on  the  contrary  Cornwallis  was  a  favorite  ;  that 
he  obtained  reinforcements  which  were  refused  to  Clinton.  A  profit 
less  controversy  subsequently  took  place  between  those  officers,  and 
the  general  facts  will  appear  in  their  proper  connection.  A  single 
statement  will  do  much  to  explain  the  positions  of  these  officers  and 
dispose  of  frivolous  accusations  to  their  discredit. 

The  attitude  of  the  British  Cabinet  was  based  upon  the  invinci 
bility  and  sufficiency  of  the  forces  sent  to  suppress  the  revolution. 
Allusion  has  been  twice  made  to  the  neglect  of  the  military  counsels 
of  General  Amherst.  Demands  for  reinforcements,  strong  assuran 
ces  that  the  forces  were  insufficient,  repeated  unsuccessful  campaigns, 
each  expected  to  close  the  war,  the  French  intervention,  and  the 
accumulating  enemies  who  were  determined  to  cripple  the  British 
empire,  compelled  the  Cabinet,  by  natural  logic,  to  trust  those  who 
were  mostly  in  harmony  with  its  opinions  and  policy. 


CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  [1781. 

The  positive  assurances  of  General  Clinton  and  of  Cornwallis,  which 
were  continued  until  after  the  battle  at  Guilford  Court  House, — that 
British  supremacy  in  the  Southern  States  had  been  restored,  and  that 
the  people  were  in  arms  for  the  Crown,  were  enough  to  check  rein 
forcements  and  contrast  the  condition  of  General  Clinton,  at  New 
York,  who  was  in  fear  of  losing  that  post,  and  had  no  confidence  in 
ultimate  success,unless  largely  strengthened  both  in  army  and  fleet. 

The  entire  history  of  the  war,  and  therefore  the  career  of  the 
British  commanders,  is  to  be  interpreted  by  similar  considerations, 
which  controlled  their  action,  shaped  issues,  and  determined  cam 
paigns.  It  is  sufficient  for  the  present  purpose  to  state  the  matter 
thus  briefly. 

The  campaign  of  1781  will  be  taken  up  in  detail,  in  order  that  its 
military  value  and  relations  may  be  more  distinctly  separated  from 
general  history.  It  was  the  culminating  campaign  of  a  long  war,  a 
campaign  where  the  forces  on  both  sides  were  inferior  to  the  forces 
previously  engaged,  and  where  the  success  of  either  party,  analyzed 
separately,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  seemed  impossible ;  and 
yet  a  campaign,  where  the  success  of  either  party  seemed  positively 
certain,  in  case  of  a  thorough,  concentrated  effort. 

This  campaign  will  be  considered  as  follows : 

I.  Mutiny  of  the  American  Army.     Its  history  and  effects. 

II.  The  operations  of  General  Greene  at  the  South. 

III.  Arnold's  operations  in  Virginia. 

IV.  La  Fayette's  operations  in  Virginia. 

V.  Arnold's  raid  into  Connecticut. 

VI.  Washington  on  the  Offensive. 

These  operations  substantially  ended  hostilities,  and  include  the 
battles  of  Cowpens,  Guilford,  and  Hobkirk's  Hill  (near  Camden),  the 
sieges  of  Ninety-six  and  Augusta,  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  arid 
the  siege  of  Yorktown,  as  well  as  the  minor  operations  before  James 
town,  Petersburg,  Richmond,  and  New  London. 

I.  Mutiny  of  the  American  Army. 

The  war  which  now  entered  upon  its  seventh  year,  was  a  different 
war  from  that  which  Great  Britain  or  the  American  people  anticipated 
when  the  struggle  began.  The  contract  which  George  III.  made  with 
soldiers  was  considered  a  favor  to  the  enlisted  men,  and  the  terms, 
"  three  years  or  during  the  war"  were  regarded  as  better  than  a 
regular  enlistment  for  five,  seven,  or  more  years.  The  term  of  three 
years,  according  to  military  usage,  was  a  short  term. 


I78i.]  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  537 

A  similar  enlistment  of  American  troops  was  made  under  the  sup 
position  that  the  three  years  was  the  maximum,  and  that  the  term 
"  during  the  war"  was  simply  an  assurance  of  earlier  discharge,  and 
they  hoped  the  war  would  not  last  for  the  full  three  years. 

As  the  year  1781  opened  and  the  prospect  of  a  new  year  of  struggle 
became  certain,  and  the  invasion  of  the  Southern  States  began  to  indi 
cate  the  prospect  of  a  southern  campaign,  which  was  at  all  times  un 
popular  with  northern  troops,  a  disaffection  was  developed  which  at 
last  broke  forth  in  open  mutiny,  and  a  peremptory  demand  for  dis 
charge.  This  irritation  was  aggravated  by  hunger,  cold,  and  poverty. 

Marshall  says :  "  The  winter  brought  not  much  relaxation  from 
toil,  and  none  from  suffering.  The  soldiers  were  perpetually  on  the 
point  of  starvation,  were  often  entirely  without  food,  were  exposed 
without  proper  clothing,  to  the  rigors  of  winter ;  and  had  now  served 
almost  twelve  months  without  pay." 

"  This  situation  was  common  to  the  whole  army  ;  and  had  been  of 
such  long  continuance,  that  scarcely  the  hope  of  a  change  could  be 
realized."  "  It  was  not  easy  to  persuade  the  military  that  their  breth 
ren  in  civil  life  were  unable  to  make  greater  exertions  in  support  of 
the  war,  or  that  its  burdens  ought  not  to  be  more  equally  borne." 

On  the  first  of  January  the  Pennsylvania  line  revolted  ;  Captain 
Billings  was  killed  in  an  attempt  to  suppress  the  mutiny  ;  General 
Wayne  was  powerless  to  restore  order,  and  thirteen  hundred  men, 
with  six  guns,  started  to  Princeton,  with  the  declared  purpose  to  march 
to  Philadelphia,  and  obtain  redress.  They  demanded  clothing,  the 
residue  of  their  bounty,  and  full  arrears  of  pay.  A  committee  from 
Congress  and  the  State  authorities  of  Pennsylvania,  at  once  entered 
into  negotiations  with  the  troops  for  terms  of  compromise. 

The  American  Commander-in-chief  was  then  at  New  Windsor. 
A  messenger  from  General  Wayne  informed  him  on  the  third  of  Janu 
ary  of  the  revolt,  and  the  terms  demanded.  It  appears  from  Wash 
ington's  letters  that  it  was  his  impulse,  at  the  first  intimation  of  the 
trouble,  to  go  in  person  and  attempt  its  control.  His  second  impres 
sion  was  to  reserve  his  influence  and  authority  until  all  other  means 
were  exhausted.  The  complaint  of  the  mutineers  was  but  a  statement 
of  the  condition  of  all  the  army,  so  far  as  the  soldiers  had  served  three 
years;  and  the  suffering  and  failure  to  receive  pay  were  absolutely 
universal.  Leaving  the  preliminary  discussion  with  the  civil  authori 
ties  who  were  responsible  for  much  of  the  trouble,  the  Commander-in- 
chief  appealed  to  the  Governors  of  the  northern  States,  for  a  force  of 


538  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  [1781. 

militia  to  meet  any  attacks  from  New  York,  and  declined  to  interfere 
until  he  found  that  the  passion  had  passed  and  he  could  find  troops 
who  would  at  all  hazards  execute  his  will.  It  was  one  of  the  most 
difficult  passages  in  the  war,  and  was  so  handled  that  the  Commander- 
in-chief  retained  his  prestige  and  regained  control  of  the  army. 

There  was  a  double  phase  to  this  mutiny,  and  General  Clinton 
watched  its  development  with  interest.  Eager  to  avail  himself  of  the 
disaffection  which  communicated  itself  to  the  Jersey  troops,  and  to 
invade  New  Jersey  itself,  he  seems  to  have  remembered  the  unfortu 
nate  march  to  Springfield  in  1780,  and  remained  in  New  York,  watch 
ing  the  conduct  of  Washington. 

In  a  letter  to  Lord  Germaine  he  says,  "  General  Washington  has 
not  moved  a  man  from  his  army,  (near  West  Point)  as  yet ;  and  as  it 
is  probable  their  demands  are  nearly  the  same  with  the  Pennsylvania 
line,  it  is  not  thought  likely  he  will.  I  am,  however,  in  a  situation  to 
avail  myself  of  favorable  events,  but  to  stir  before  they  offer  might 
mar  all." 

General  Clinton  received  information  of  the  revolt  as  early  as 
Washington,  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-third,  and  sent  messengers 
to  the  American  army  with  propositions,  looking  to  their  return  to 
British  allegiance.  He  entirely  misconceived  the  nature  of  the  dis 
affection,  and  his  agents  were  retained  in  custody. 

It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  a  portion  of  the  troops  were  discharged 
without  critical  examination  of  their  enlistments,  on  their  own  oath ; 
that  many  promptly  reenlisted,  that  as  soon  as  Washington  found  that 
he  had  troops  who  did  not  share  in  the  open  mutiny,  he  used  force 
and  suppressed  the  disaffection,  and  that  the  soldiers  themselves  hung 
several  agents  who  brought  propositions  from  General  Clinton  which 
invited  them  to  abandon  their  flag  and  join  his  command.  The 
mutiny  of  the  American  army  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1781, 
was  a  natural  outbreak  which  human  nature  could  not  resist,  and 
whatever  of  discredit  may  attach  to  the  revolt,  it  will  never  be  unas- 
sociated  with  the  fact  that  while  the  emergency  was  one  that  over 
whelmed  every  military  obligation  by  its  pressure,  it  did  not  affect 
the  fealty  of  the  soldiers  to  the  cause  for  which  they  took  up  arms. 
It  impaired  discipline,  and  disregarded  authority  ;  but  it  also  had  in 
its  manifestations,  many  of  the  elements  of  lawful  revolution,  the 
state  itself  having  failed  in  duty  to  its  defenders. 

La  Fayette  thus  wrote  to  his  wife,  "  Human  patience  has  its 
limits.  No  European  army  would  suffer  the  tenth  part  of  what  the 


i78i.J  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  539 

Americans  suffer.  It  takes  citizens  to  support  hunger,  nakedness, 
toil,  and  the  total  want  of  pay,  which  constitute  the  condition  of  our 
soldiers,  the  hardiest  and  most  patient  that  are  to  be  found  in  the  world." 

An  appeal  was  at  once  made  to  the  Northern  States  for  money, 
and  enough  was  secured  to  bring  up  three  months  of  the  arrears  of 
pay.  The  States  of  Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire  also  gave 
twenty-four  dollars  extra,  in  specie,  to  each  soldier  enlisted  from  the 
respective  States.  Colonel  Laurens  was  appointed  as  special  agent  to 
visit  France  and  secure  a  loan,  which  during  the  year  was  increased 
by  two  other  loans,  as  hereafter  noticed.  This  dependence  upon 
France,  however,  was  calculated  to  lessen  a  sense  of  responsibility  at 
home;  and  Count  de  Vergennes,  under  date  of  February  fifteenth, 
when  advised  of  the  mission  of  Colonel  Laurens,  used  the  following 
language  :  "  Congress  relies  too  much  on  France  for  subsidies  to  main 
tain  their  army.  They  must  absolutely  refrain  from  such  exorbitant 
demands.  The  great  expenses  of  the  war  render  it  impossible  for 
-France  to  meet  these  demands  if  persisted  in." 

The  chief  difficulty,  however,  grew  out  of  the  individuality  of  the 
States,  and  the  fact  that  Congress  was  rather  advisory  than  authori 
tative  in  its  jurisdiction.  A  partial  relief  came  with  the  adoption  of 
Articles  of  Confederation,  which  took  effect  on  the  second  of  March, 
1781,  when  Congress  assembled  under  the  new  powers  conceded  by 
that  instrument.  Maryland  yielded  her  assent  on  the  preceding  day, 
and  the  long  period  of  four  years  and  four  months  had  transpired  from 
their  first  adoption  by  Congress  and  their  submission  to  the  States  for 
acceptance. 

During  these  events  which  were  threatening  the  very  existence  of 
the  American  army,  the  blockade  of  the  French  fleet  was  still  main 
tained  with  vigor.  The  British  squadron  occupied  Gardiner's  Bay, 
Long  Island,  for  winter  anchorage,  and  was  thus  enabled  to  keep  a 
close  watch  upon  all  vessels  entering  or  departing  from  the  Sound. 

During  the  latter  part  of  January,  it  temporarily  lost  its  numerical 
superiority  through  a  violent  storm  which  sunk  the  Culloden,  74,  dis 
masted  the  Bedford,  and  drove  the  America  out  to  sea.  The  interval 
was  improved  to  dispatch  several  ships  to  the  Chesapeake,  to  coop 
erate  with  an  expedition  against  Arnold,  which  will  be  noticed  in  its 
connection. 

The  American  army  had  become  so  reduced  as  hardly  to  exceed 
five  thousand  men  for  duty,  and  the  French  troops  were  not  dispos 
able  for  general  service,  so  long  as  the  fleet  was  confined  to  port. 


540  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN   AFFAIRS.  [1781 

Under  these  discouraging  circumstances,  the  European  States  did 
not  lose  their  confidence  in  the  ability  and  resources  of  the  American 
Commander-in-chief.  It  would  not  be  an  unwarrantable  assertion  to 
say  that  this  confidence  grew  out  of  their  habitual  recognition  of  per 
sonal  governments  at  home,  and  that  they  quite  naturally  gave  him 
a  corresponding  credit  for  powers  which  were  beyond  his  prerogative 
and  the  jurisdiction  of  Congress  itself.  His  reputation  as  a  wise  com 
mander  was  well  established. 

Mrs.  Bache,  daughter  of  Franklin,  thus  cites  a  letter  from  her 
father,  which  is  suggestive  of  the  estimation  in  which  he  was  held  in 
France  :  "  My  father  says,  if  you  see  General  Washington,  assure  him 
of  my  very  great  and  sincere  respect,  and  tell  him  that  all  the  old 
generals  here  amuse  themselves  in  studying  the  accounts  of  his  operations, 
and  approve  highly  of  his  conduct"  It  is  equally  certain  that  no  ex 
travagant  estimate  can  be  placed  upon  the  services  of  General  La 
Fayette,  whose  letters  urged  the  supply  of  men  and  money,  with  the 
most  pointed  assurance  that  the  American  States  would  realize  suc 
cess,  and  be  amply  able  to  refund  all  advances  which  might  be  made 
by  the  King. 

The  influence  of  Adams,  Franklin  and  Jay  at  Holland,  France 
and  Spain  was  strongly  marked,  and  characteristic  of  the  American 
temper. 

The  single  intimation  of  Colonel  Laurens,  upon  his  arrival  at  Paris, 
that  money  was  indispensable,  and  that  France  would  do  well  to 
hold  the  American  nation  up,  rather  than  have  it  left  to  join  its  re 
sources  with  England  against  France,  was  another  incident  of  the 
opening  year  which  strongly  persuaded  the  French  minister  to  render 
pecuniary  aid  to  meet  the  emergency.  This  cursory  reference  to  the 
condition  of  the  United  States,  during  the  early  part  of  1781,  will 
indicate  the  circumstances  under  which  the  mutiny  at  the  north  took 
place  and  the  campaign  at  the  south  opened. 

General  Greene  s  Southern  Campaign.  Reference  is  made  to  map 
"  Operations  in  Southern  States." 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  General  Greene  sent  Morgan  to 
the  Catawba  district,  with  three  hundred  and  ninety  continental 
troops  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard,  Colonel  Washington's 
horse,  and  two  companies  of  Virginia  militia.  These  companies,  com 
manded  by  Captains  Triplett  and  Tate  were  not  ordinary  militia  ; 
but  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  old  soldiers  who  had  served  their 
terms  and  reenlisted  as  substitutes  for  other  militia.  Upon  reaching 


178I.J  CONDITION   OF  SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  541 

Broad  River,  General  Morgan  was  joined  by  General  Davidson  and 
Colonel  Pickens,  and  Majors  McDowell  and  Cunningham,  with  nearly 
seven  hundred  volunteers  and  militia  from  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas. 
General  Greene's  immediate  command  was  not  far  from  two  thou 
sand  men,  mostly  militia ;  and  his  station  was  nearly  seventy  miles 
east,  a  little  north,  from  Winnsborough,  then  the  headquarters  of 
Cornwallis.  Morgan  was  on  the  Pacolet,  a  branch  of  Broad  River, 
about  fifty  miles  north-west  of  Winnsborough,  having  established  his 
camp  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  December,  1780.  His  position  threat 
ened  not  only  Ninety-six,  but  the  entire  line  of  small  posts  in  the  rear 
of  the  British  army. 

A  British  invasion  of  North  Carolina  was  clearly  inadmissible 
while  the  American  troops  were  thus  on  both  flanks  ;  and  Lord  Corn 
wallis  determined  to  strike  Morgan  and  Greene,  in  turn,  before  their 
forces  should  be  further  increased  from  the  militia,  or  the  north. 
Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  was  detached  on  the  first  of  January, 
with  the  Legion  and  a  portion  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Seventy- 
first  British  regiment,  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  with  orders  to  pur 
sue  Morgan  and  drive  him  across  Broad  River. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  December,  General  Greene  detached 
Washington's  cavalry  and  McCall's  mounted  militia,  in  all  two  hun 
dred  and  fifty  men,  to  surprise  a  party  of  loyalists  twenty  miles  south 
of  his  camp.  They  were  pursued,  overtaken  and  for  the  most  part 
killed.  Justice  Johnson  says,  "  the  killed  and  wounded  were  reported 
at  one  hundred  and  fifty,  and  the  prisoners  at  forty,"  and  adds,  "  such 
were  the  bloody  sacrifices  at  that  time  offered  up  at  the  shrine  of 
civil  discord."  A  detachment  was  also  sent  to  surprise  Williams, 
(see  map),  a  small  stockade  fort  ;  but  the  garrison  retired  without 
resistance. 

Lord  Cornwallis  marched  up  the  west  bank  of  the  Catawba,  leav 
ing  orders  to  General  Leslie,  then  on  the  march  from  Charleston,  to 
follow.  Heavy  rains  delayed  the  march  of  the  main  army,  encumbered 
as  it  was  with  a  considerable  baggage  train,  while  Tarleton,  not 
apprehensive  that  it  would  fail  to  support  his  advance,  pushed  for 
ward  rapidly,  crowded  Morgan  over  the  Pacolet,  and  by  crossing  at 
an  upper  ford  drove  him  still  further  back  to  the  Cowpens,  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  Broad  River  itself. 

Colonel  Tarleton  states  that  he  originally  "  started  with  the 
Legion,  five  hundred  and  fifty  men,  (Cornwallis  puts  the  number  at 
six  hundred,)  the  first  battalion  of  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  con- 


542  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS. 

sisting  of  two  hundred  men,  and  two  three-pounders ;  but  had  not 
proceeded  above  twenty  miles  from  Brierly  Ferry,  before  he  had 
undoubted  proof  that  the  report  which  occasioned  the  order  for  the 
light  troops  to  march  was  erroneous,  and  that  Ninety-six  was  secure." 
Upon  application  to  Cornwallis,  his  baggage  was  forwarded  under  the 
escort  of  two  hundred  men  from  the  Seventh  British  regiment,  and 
fifty  dragoons,  designed  as  a  reinforcement  for  Ninety-six.  These 
troops  were  added  to  Tarleton's  command,  making  the  whole  detach 
ment  one  thousand  strong,  besides  a  few  loyalists.  He"  commenced 
his  advance  on  the  twelfth.  The  Ennoree  and  Tiger  were  crossed 
on  the  fourteenth,  and  advices  from  Cornwallis  indicated  that  he 
would  move  up  the  east  bank  of  Broad  River  so  as  to  cut  off  Morgan's 
retreat.  Cornwallis  reached  Turkey  Creek,  (see  map)  on  the  evening 
of  the  sixteenth,  and  there  waited  for  General  Leslie,  whose  force 
consisted  of  thirteen  hundred  and  fifty  men. 

That  officer  marched  from  Charleston  directly  for  Camden,  and 
was  so  delayed  by  swamps,  high  water,  and  other  difficulties  of  the 
way,  that  the  success  of  the  whole  movement  devolved  upon  the 
action  of  Tarleton  alone.  Cornwallis  himself  was  nearly  twenty-five 
miles  from  Tarleton  when  the  battle  of  Cowpens  was  fought,  and 
according  to  Tarleton,  had  plenty  of  time  to  have  reached  Ramsour's 
Mills,  which  would  have  effectually  cut  off  Morgan's  retreat.  The 
delay  of  General  Leslie  at  Camden,  according  to  Lord  Cornwallis' 
statement,  was,  "  that  General  Greene  might  be  kept  in  suspense  as 
long  as  possible  as  to  the  proposed  movements." 

The  battle  of  Cowpens  was  fought  near  Broad  River,  about  two 
miles  south  of  the  North  Carolina  boundary  line,  on  ground  used 
especially  for  pasture,  which  gave  name  to  the  locality. 

The  field  of  battle  itself  was  open  woodland,  sloping  to  the  front, 
and  well  adapted  for  skirmishing,  while  sufficiently  clear  of  under 
growth  for  the  movements  of  mounted  men.  Tarleton  says,  "  there 
could  be  no  better."  "  Broad  River  wound  around  Morgan's  left 
within  six  miles,  and  ran  parallel  with  his  rear,  so  that  there  was 
no  possibility  of  escape,  in  case  of  defeat."  Morgan  occupied  the 
summit,  which  was  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  level  ground, 
and  formed  his  regular  troops  at  the  highest  point.  The  Maryland 
battalion,  nearly  three  hundred  strong,  were  on  the  left,  and  the 
companies  of  Virginia  militia  under  Triplett  and  Tate  were  next  in 
order,  with  Beaties'  Georgians,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  on 
the  extreme  right.  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard  commanded  this 


1781.]  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN   AFFAIRS.  543 

line.  See  map  "  Battle  of  Cowpens."  One  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
to  the  front,  a  force  of  two  hundred  and  seventy  militia  were  posted 
under  Colonel  Pickens,  in  open  order.  Major  Cunningham,  of 
Georgia,  and  Major  McDowell,  of  South  Carolina,  with  one  hundred 
and  fifty  picked  men,  were  stationed  still  further  in  advance,  about  an 
equal  distance,  as  skirmishers,  with  orders  to  take  to  trees — not  to  fire 
until  the  enemy  were  within  fifty  yards  ;  and  then  to  fall  back,  firing 
at  will,  as  they  could  find  cover. 

Colonel  Pickens  had  orders  in  like  manner  to  reserve  fire  until  the 
enemy  came  within  fifty  yards,  and  after  two  volleys  to  retire  to  the 
left  of  the  regulars ;  but  if  charged  by  cavalry,  only  one  man  in  three 
was  to  fire,  while  the  others  must  withhold  fire  until  a  charge  was 
made,  or  the  troopers  should  turn  back.  The  regulars  were  advised 
of  these  instructions  and  cautioned,  in  case  of  being  forced  from  their 
own  position,  to  retire  in  good  order  to  the  next  hill,  and  be  prepared 
at  any  time  to  face  about  and  attack.  In  the  rear  of  the  high  ground 
was  a  second  small  elevation  behind  which  Washington's  cavalry  and 
Colonel  McCall's  mounted  men  were  out  of  cannon  range,  and  in 
reserve  for  timely  use.  Morgan  has  thus  apologized  for  his  choice  of 
ground  :  "  I  would  not  have  had  a  swamp  in  view  of  my  militia  on 
any  consideration ;  they  would  have  made  for  it,  and  nothing  could 
have  detained  them  from  it.  And  as  to  covering  my  wings,  I  knew 
my  adversary,  and  was  perfectly  sure  I  should  have  nothing  but 
downright  fighting.  As  to  retreat,  it  was  the  very  thing  I  wished  to 
cut  off  all  hope  of.  I  would  have  thanked  Tarleton  had  he  surrounded 
me  with  his  cavalry.  It  would  have  been  better  than  placing  my  own 
men  in  the  rear  to  shoot  down  those  who  broke  from  the  ranks. 
When  men  are  forced  to  fight,  they  will  sell  their  lives  dearly ;  and 
I  knew  that  the  dread  of  Tarleton's  cavalry  would  give  due  weight 
to  the  protection  of  my  bayonets,  and  keep  my  troops  from  breaking 
as  Buford's  regiment  did.  Had  I  crossed  the  river,  one-half  of  the 
militia  would  immediately  have  abandoned  me." 

The  British  advance  was  made  as  early  as  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  January  seventh.  The  troops  had  marched  from  early  dawn 
and  were  well  worn  down  ;  but  Tarleton  had  intimations  that  addi 
tional  militia  were  on  the  march  to  join  Morgan,  and  he  prepared  to 
risk  the  action  with  equal  numbers,  trusting  to  the  discipline  and 
superiority  of  his  troops  for  the  decision  of  the  battle.  His  formation 
is  detailed  upon  the  map.  His  advance  was  prompt  and  spirited. 
The  American  skirmishers  fired  effectively,  and  fell  back  into  the  first 


544  CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS. 

line,  and  the  militia  after  one  steady,  deadly  fire,  fell  back  also  and 
began  to  move  across  the  front  of  the  second  line  to  take  position  on 
their  left  as  ordered. 

The  British  troops  taking  the  whole  movement  as  assurance  of 
easy  victory  advanced  rapidly,  with  shouts,  only  to  find  themselves 
confronted  by  the  main  body,  which  received  them  without  flinching. 
The  British  guns  were  then  moved  to  the  front,  and  fifty  dragoons 
from  each  British  extremity  followed  the  retreating  militia  when  the 
first  line  broke.  But  upon  the  resistance  of  the  main  body,  the 
Seventy-first  British  regiment,  which  had  been  in  reserve,  and  Tarle- 
ton,  with  two  hundred  dragoons  advanced  to  the  charge.  As  the 
British  left  ascended  the  hill  to  turn  the  American  right,  the  militia 
there  stationed  were  ordered  by  Morgan  to  swing  back,  thus  making 
a  crotchet  to  the  rear,  and  to  hold  the  position  until  Colonel  Pickens 
could  bring  up  the  militia  who  were  already  forming  for  that  purpose, 
while  the  American  cavalry  spurred  around  the  left  of  the  regulars 
and  attacked  the  British  right  which  had  thus  far  followed  the  retreat 
ing  militia.  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard  mistaking  this  change  of  posi 
tion  in  his  right  for  the  contingent  movement  to  the  rear,  ordered  the 
regulars  also  to  retreat.  The  British  had  lost  many  officers  and  they 
pressed  on  in  some  disorder.  The  issue  of  the  day  was  at  its  crisis  ; 
when  Morgan  ordered  the  troops  to  face  about,  deliver  fire  and  charge 
with  the  bayonet.  The  British  were  within  thirty  yards.  The  effect 
was  immediate  and  conclusive  at  that  part  of  the  field.  Washington 
was  just  then  engaged  with  the  artillery  endeavoring  to  capture  the 
guns,  and  the  British  infantry  and  cavalry  fled  or  surrendered. 
Nearly  every  gunner  was  killed  or  wounded  while  faithfully  fighting 
by  his  gun.  The  Seventy-first  regiment  with  Tarleton's  horse  were 
still  on  the  American  right  wing,  until  Pickens'  militia  came  up  vig 
orously  attacking  their  flank.  Being  now  under  cross  fire  they  also 
threw  down  their  arms  and  surrendered.  Tarleton  escaped  with  forty 
horse ;  after  a  vain  dash  to  save  the  guns  and  restore  order.  Tarleton 
and  Washington  here  met  face  to  face,  the  former  received  a  cut  on 
his  hand  and  the  latter  a  pistol  shot  in  his  knee. 

He  thus  states  the  facts.  "  The  militia,  after  a  short  contest 
were  dislodged,  and  the  British  approached  the  continentals.  The 
fire  on  both  sides  was  well  supported  and  produced  much  slaughter. 
The  cavalry  on  the  right  charged  the  enemy's  left  with  great  gallan 
try  but  were  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  reserve  and  by  a  charge 
of  Colonel  Washington's  cavalry.  As  the  contest  in  the  front  line 


I78i.|  CONDITION   OF  SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  545 

seemed  equally  balanced,  he  thought  the  advance  of  the  Seventy-first 
into  line  and  a  movement  of  the  cavalry  in  reserve,  to  threaten  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  would  put  a  victorious  period  to  the  action.  No  time 
was  lost.  The  cavalry  were  ordered  to  incline  to  the  left  and  to  form 
a  line  which  would  embrace  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  right  flank. 
Upon  the  advance  of  the  Seventy-first,  all  the  infantry  again  moved 
on.  The  continentals  and  backwoodsmen  gave  ground.  The  British 
rushed  forward.  An  order  was  given  to  the  cavalry  to  charge.  An 
unexpected  fire  from  the  Americans  who  came  about  as  they  were 
retreating,  stopped  the  British  and  threw  them  into  confusion.  Exer 
tions  to  make  them  advance  were  useless.  The  cavalry  which  had 
not  been  engaged  fell  into  disorder  and  an  unaccountable  panic  ex 
tended  itself  along  the  whole  line.  Neither  promises  nor  threats 
could  avail." 

The  British  casualties  were  stated  by  General  Cornwallis  at  ten 
officers  and  ninety  men  killed,  twenty-nine  officers  and  five  hundred 
men  captured.  He  omits  the  number  wounded.  Morgan  accounts 
for  six  hundred  prisoners  turned  over  to  the  commissary  officer.  The 
British  army  returns  of  February  first,  reports  diminution  from  last 
return,  January  fifteenth,  as  seven  hundred  and  eighty-four  men ; 
which  closely  approximates  the  total  loss.  The  American  casualties 
were  twelve  killed,  and  sixty  wounded. 

Two  standards,  thirty-five  wagons,  one  hundred  horses,  eight  hun 
dred  muskets  and  two  cannon  were  among  the  trophies  of  the  victory. 
Lossing  states  that  these  guns  alternately  changed  owners,  at  Sara 
toga,  Camden,  Cowpens,  -and  Guilford. 

Tarleton  severely  criticises  Lord  Cornwallis  for  neglect  to  advise 
him  as  to  his  movements,  and  says,  with  some  bitterness,  that  "  as 
Ferguson's  disaster  made  the  first  invasion  of  North  Carolina,  so  the 
battle  of  Cowpens  would  probably  make  the  second  equally  dis 
astrous." 

He  rejoined  the  army  on  the  following  day,  and  insists  that  a 
prompt  movement  made  at  that  time,  might  have  rescued  the  prison 
~ers.  General  Morgan  carried  out  his  plan  of  battle  with  almost  entire 
success.  Leaving  his  severely  wounded  under  a  flag  of  truce,  and 
his  cavalry  to  cover  his  retreat,  he  crossed  Broad  River  that  night 
with  his  infantry  and  prisoners,  and  forded  the  Catawba  on  the 
twenty-fourth.  On  the  same  night  Cornwallis  reached  Ramsour's 
Mills,  at  the  junction  of  the  road  from  Cowpens  with  that  upon 
which  his  army  marched.  Here  he  halted  two  days  to  burn  surplus 
35 


546  CONDITION   OF  SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS.  [1781 

baggage  and  wagons,  and  by  this  delay  lost  his  opportunity  to  over 
take  Morgan.  The  American  command  was  only  twenty  miles  in 
advance,  and  the  Catawba  was  fordable  until  heavy  rains  on  the 
twenty-seventh  and  twenty-eighth  raised  the  waters,  and  on  the 
twenty-ninth,  when  Cornwallis  reached  its  bank,  it  could  not  be 
crossed.  Morgan  started  his  prisoners  for  Virginia  on  the  twenty- 
fifth,  and  made  every  possible  effort  to  rally  militia  and  cover  his 
retreat  until  General  Greene  could  come  to  his  assistance.  It  has 
been  generally  stated  that  Cornwallis  pursued  so  closely  upon  Morgan 
that  a  sudden  flood  alone  saved  the  latter.  Morgan's  letter  to  Greene 
dated  the  twenty-fifth,  at  his  camp  on  the  east  side  of  the  Catawba, 
settles  the  question  of  the  date  of  his  crossing  the  river. 

As  General  Leslie  joined  Cornwallis  on  the  eighteenth  and  nine 
teenth,  there  was  ample  time  to  have  redeemed  Cowpens  ;  but  a 
somewhat  characteristic  hesitation  at  a  critical  hour,  and  indecision 
under  pressure,  lost  him  the  precious  opportunity. 

General  Morgan  remained  but  a  few  weeks  in  the  service.  Severe 
rheumatism  settled  in  his  limbs,  and  his  active  days  soon  ended. 
From  Bunker  Hill  to  Quebec,  through  Burgoyne's  campaign,  and 
wherever  he  was  entrusted  with  command,  he  had  proved  his  courage 
and  his  fertility  in  resources  during  periods  of  great  danger ;  and 
Congress  vied  with  States  and  citizens,  in  honorable  testimonials  to 
his  valor,  as  the  victor  at  Cowpens. 


~ 


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£       JT 

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546* 


CHAPTER   LXVIII. 

FROM  COWPENS  TO  GUILFORD  COURT  HOUSE.     MANCEUVERS 
OF  THE  ARMIES.     1781. 

A  MESSENGER  from  General  Morgan  reached  General  Greene, 
at  his  camp  on  Hick's  Creek,  a  fork  of  the  Great  Republic, 
January  twenty-fifth,  1781,  and  informed  him  of  the  battle  of  Cow- 
pens,  that  a  large  number  of  prisoners  were  to  be  provided  for,  and 
that  the  army  of  Cornwallis  was  in  pursuit.  The  completeness  of 
the  success  reported  made  the  contrast  of  his  inability  to  improve 
it,  very  tantalizing  and  painful. 

The  army,  including  Morgan's  corps,  numbered  only  one  thousand 
four  hundred  and  twenty-six  infantry,  forty-seven  artillerists  and  two 
hundred  and  thirty  cavalry.  The  militia  numbered  four  hundred. 
These  numbers  fluctuated  greatly,  since  the  Southern  militia  were 
quite  like  the  minute  men  of  1775-6,  who  volunteered  for  pressing 
duty,  and  then  returned  to  the  ordinary  pursuits  of  life.  There  was 
no  money,  little  clothing,  and  constant  hardship.  A  single  extract 
from  a  letter  written  by  General  Greene  to  General  Sumter,  two 
days  before  the  battle  of  Cowpens,  contains  this  paragraph :  "  More 
than  half  our  members  are  in  a  manner  naked  ;  so  much  so  that  we 
can  not  put  them  on  the  least  kind  of  duty.  Indeed  there  is  a  great 
number  that  have  not  a  rag  of  clothes  on  them  except  a  little  piece 
of  blanket,  in  the  Indian  form,  around  their  waists." 

It  was  under  such  circumstances  that  this  commander  was  sum 
moned  to  save  the  fruits  of  Morgan's  victory,  to  expel  the  British 
army  from  the  Carolinas,  and  to  vindicate  the  supremacy  and  power  of 
the  United  States.  For  three  days  he  devoted  his  time  to  putting 
this  nominal  army  in  preparation  for  taking  the  field  ;  and  on  the 
twenty-eighth,  accompanied  by  one  aid,  a  guide  and  a  sergeant's  party 
of  cavalry,  he  started  for  Morgan's  command.  On  the  night  of  the 
thirtieth,  after  a  ride  of  over  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles,  he 


548  FROM   COWPENS   TO   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  [1781. 

was  with  Morgan.  His  letters  to  Varnum,  then  in  Congress,  to  Gist, 
Srnallwood,  Rutledge,  Washington  and  others,  are  full  of  urgent 
appeals  for  at  least  five  thousand  infantry  and  six  or  eight  hundred 
horse. 

It  was  an  extraordinary  state  of  affairs,  when  a  victory  seemed  but 
the  first  step  toward  disaster,  and  when  even  the  Commander-in-chief 
was  constrained  to  write,  u  I  wish  I  had  it  in  my  power  to  congratu 
late  you  on  the  brilliant  and  important  victory  of  General  Morgan, 
without  the  alloy  which  the  distresses  of  the  department  you  com 
mand,  and  apprehensions  of  posterior  events,  intermix.  I  lament  that 
you  will  find  it  so  difficult  to  avoid  a  general  action  ;  for  our  misfor 
tunes  can  only  be  completed  by  the  dispersion  of  your  little  army, 
which  will  be  the  most  probable  consequence  of  such  an  event." 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Arnold  landed  in  Virginia  on  the 
fourth  day  of  January, with  sixteen  hundred  regular  troops,  so  that 
General  Steuben's  local  responsibilities  were  as  pressing  as  when  Gen 
eral  Greene  passed  through  Virginia  on  his  way  to  the  Southern 
Department. 

A  brief  diversion  from  the  immediate  narrative  is  necessary,  in 
order  to  indicate  the  exact  circumstances  which  controlled  both 
Generals  Greene  and  Cornwallis,  in  their  subsequent  movements,  and 
to  correct  the  impression  that  the  campaign  consisted  simply  of  a 
swift  pursuit  and  successful  retreat,  and, one  where  ravines  and  floods 
alone  determined  the  result.  The  spring  campaign  of  1781  was  one  of 
operations,  and  there  was  no  retreat  of  General  Greene  which  did 
not  constitute  a  manceuver,  having  in  view  an  ultimate  engagement, 
with  the  recovery  of  the  South  as  the  chief  objective. 

A  statement  of  Arnold's  position  and  operations  up  to  the  first  of 
February,  is  an  essential  element  to  be  taken  into  view.  He  left 
New  York  on  the  nineteenth  of  December,  1780,  with  sixteen  hundred 
men.  It  appears  from  General  Clinton's  letters  that  he  did  not  rely 
upon  that  officer's  discretion,  and  attached  Lieutenant-colonels  Simcoe 
and  Dundas  to  the  command,  "  two  officers  of  tried  ability  and  experi 
ence,  and  possessing  the  entire  confidence  of  their  commander."  The 
Queen's  Rangers,  and  the  Eighteenth  British  regiment  (Scotch),  re 
spectively  commanded  by  the  officers  named,  formed  the  larger  portion 
of  Arnold's  division.  The  characteristic  accompaniment  of  the  naval 
movements  of  the  period,  a  gale,  separated  the  fleet  on  the  twenty- 
sixth  and  twenty-seventh  of  December ;  but  on  the  thirty-first,  with 
out  waiting  for  other  transports  still  at  sea,  twelve  hundred  men  were 


I78i.]  FROM   COWPENS   TO   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  549 

transferred  to  small  vessels  and  moved  up  the  James  River.  On  the 
night  of  January  third,  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe  landed  at  Hood's 
Point  with  one  hundred  and  thirty  of  the  Queen's  Rangers  and  the 
light  infantry  and  grenadiers  of  the  Eighteenth  regiment,  spiked  the 
guns  of  a  battery,  which  was  abandoned  by  the  small  detachment  of 
fifty  men  who  occupied  it,  and  on  the  fourth  the  expedition  landed 
at  Westover,  nearly  twenty-five  miles  below  Richmond,  and  marched 
immediately  to  that  city.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  fifth,  Arnold 
entered  Richmond.  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe  quickly  dislodged  a 
force  of  two  hundred  irregulars,  militia  which  Colonel  John  Nichols 
had  assembled  on  Richmond  Hill,  and  a  few  mounted  men  who  were 
on  Shrove  Hill  also  retired  as  the  British  troops  advanced.  The 
Rangers,  light  infantry  and  grenadiers,  proceeded  promptly  to  West- 
ham,  nearly  seven  miles  above  Richmond,  and  destroyed  a  foundry, 
laboratory  and  some  shops,  as  well  as  the  auditor's  records  which  had 
been  withdrawn  from  Richmond  for  safety,  and  returned  to  the  city 
in  the  evening.  Arnold  sent  to  Governor  Jefferson  a  proposal  to 
compromise  the  terms  of  his  incursion,  and  to  save  the  buildings  if 
vessels  might  come  up  the  river  and  remove  tobacco  and  other 
plunder.  Upon  its  rejection,  he  burned  so  much  of  the  city  as  time 
permitted,  and  returned  to  Westover  on  the  sixth,  without  loss  to  his 
command.  The  expedition  was  a  surprise,  but  the  loss,  except  to 
private  property  and  the  capture  of  the  books  and  papers  of  the  coun 
cil,  was  very  inconsiderable.  Five  brass  guns,  three  hundred  stand 
of  arms,  found  in  the  loft  of  the  capitol  and  in  a  wagon,  and  some 
quartermaster  stores,  constituted  the  chief  articles  captured.  Even 
the  workshops  and  warehouses  were  not  wholly  consumed.  Reference 
is  had  to  maps  "Operations  in  Southern  States,"  and  "Arnold  at 
Richmond." 

On  the  eighth,  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe  visited  Charles  City 
Court  House,  and,  according  to  Tarleton's  narrative,  killed  or  wounded 
twenty  militia,  with  a  loss  of  one  man  killed  and  three  wounded. 

General  Steuben  had  in  vain  attempted  to  equip  a  sufficient  force 
to  anticipate  the  movement.  Of  six  hundred  men  at  Chesterfield 
Court  House,  he  had  clothing  for  only  one  hundred  and  fifty.  The 
appearance  of  some  militia  at  Manchester,  however,  and  information 
that  General  Steuben  was  at  Petersburg,  led  Arnold  to  hasten  back 
to  save  his  line  of  retreat,  and  he  proceeded  at  once  to  Portsmouth 
to  put  it  in  a  defensive  condition. 

At  this  time  General  Leslie  also  received  advices    that  General 


550  FROM   COWPENS   TO   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  [1781. 

Phillips  was  preparing  to  leave  New  York  with  additional  troops  for 
Virginia,  so  that  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  receiving  reinforcements 
from  the  north  increased  daily,  and  the  whole  Southern  army  was  in 
pursuit  of  Morgan. 

As  the  mind  reverts  to  the  contentions  for  high  command  which 
characterized  the  first  years  of  the  war,  and  one  officer  after  another, 
then  so  ambitious,  disappears  from  battle  record,  it  looks  as  if  the 
man  who  sat  by  Morgan  on  the  banks  of  the  Catawba  on  the  thirtieth 
of  January,  1781,  must  have  felt  as  if  a  new  generation  had  taken  the 
place  of  old  comrades,  and  that  he  was  only  waiting  to  pass  away  also. 

The  hazard  of  delay  aroused  him  to  action.  Lee  was  ordered  to 
hasten  back  and  join  Morgan  without  delay.  The  commissary  of 
supplies  was  ordered  to  remove  everything  from  the  sea  coast  to  the 
interior.  The  commissaries  at  Hillsborough  and  Salisbury  were 
placed  in  readiness  to  move  the  prisoners  into  the  upper  counties  of 
Virginia.  Colonel  Carrington,  Quartermaster-general,  was  ordered  to 
collect  magazines  on  the  Roanoke.  Letters  were  written  to  General 
Steuben  to  hasten  on  his  recruits  ;  to  the  governors  of  North  Carolina 
and  Virginia,  to  fill  up  their  quotas  of  regulars  and  to  call  into  the  field 
all  the  militia  they  could  arm ;  to  Shelby,  Campbell  and  the  other 
participants  in  the  battle  of  King's  Mountain,  to  bid  them  come  out 
once  more,  to  repel  the  threatened  invasion  ;  to  General  Huger,  "  to 
march  to  Guilford  Court  House  direct  instead  of  to  Salisbury,"  adding, 
"from  Cornwallis'  pressing  disposition  and  the  contempt  he  has  for 
our  army,  we  may  precipitate  him  into  some  capital  misfortune." 

Just  then,  the  tidings  came  that  a  garrison  had  been  landed  at 
Wilmington,  almost  in  the  rear  of  the  small  army  which  he  left  at 
Hick's  Creek.  The  terms  of  service  of  the  Virginia  militia  brigade 
was  about  expiring  and  according  to  precedent  they  were  to  be  dis 
charged  at  the  place  where  they  organized.  Availing  himself  of  this 
opportunity  he  placed  General  Stevens  in  command,  consigned  to 
him  the  escort  of  the  prisoners  then  in  depot  at  Hillsborough  and 
thereby  saved  a  detail  from  his  other  troops.  General  Stevens  dis 
charged  the  duty  and  reported  back  promptly  to  meet  the  responsi 
bilities  of  the  campaign. 

The  condition  of  Cornwallis  requires  passing  notice.  He  af 
firms  that  "  his  second  invasion  of  North  Carolina  was  approved 
by  General  Clinton  :  "  "  that  the  defense  of  the  frontier  of  South 
Carolina,  even  against  an  inferior  army,  would  be,  from  its  extent, 
the  nature  of  the  climate  and  the  disposition  of  the  inhabitants, 


i78i.]  FROM   COWPENS   TO   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  551 

utterly  impracticable,  while  the  enemy  could  draw  supplies  from 
North  Carolina  and  Virginia."  Of  the  affair  at  Cowpens  he  says, 
"  the  disaster  of  the  seventeenth  of  January  can  not  be  imputed  to 
any  defect  in  my  conduct,  as  the  detachment  sent,  was  certainly 
superior  to  the  force  against  which  it  was  sent,  and,  put  under  the 
command  of  an  officer  of  experience  and  tried  abilities."  "The  pub 
lic  faith  was  pledged  to  our  friends  in  North  Carolina,  and  I  believed 
my  remaining  force  to  be  superior  to  that  under  the  command  of 
General  Greene,"  but,  "  our  hopes  of  success  were  not  founded  only 
upon  the  efforts  of  the  corps  under  my  immediate  command,  which 
did  not  much  exceed  three  thousand  men ;  but  principally  upon  the 
most  positive  assurances,  given  by  apparently  credible  deputies  and 
emissaries,  that  upon  the  approach  of  a  British  army  in  North  Carolina, 
a  great  body  of  the  inhabitants  were  ready  to  join  and  to  cooperate 
with  it,  in  endeavoring  to  restore  his  Majesty's  government."  "  All 
inducements  in  my  power  were  made  use  of  without  material  effect ; 
and  every  man  in  the  army  must  have  been  convinced  that  the 
accounts  of  our  emissaries  had  greatly  exaggerated  the  number  of 
those  who  professed  friendship  for  us : — a  very  inconsiderable  num 
ber  could  be  prevailed  upon  to  remain  with  us,  or  to  exert  themselves 
in  any  form  whatever." 

It  will  hereafter  appear  that  Cornwallis'  movement  lost  sight  of  a 
possible  dependence  upon  support  from  the  British  army  in  Virginia, 
and  that  his  selection  of  the  Salisbury  route,  for  his  invasion,  contem 
plated  the  control  of  the  river  sources, so  as  to  force  Greene  eastward 
and  make  his  destruction  or  capture  more  certain. 

When  Greene  took  command  on  the  Catawba,on  the  thirty-first 
of  January,  the  army  of  Cornwallis  was  only  eighteen  miles  below, 
unable  to  cross  the  river  by  reason  of  high  water.  Greene  summoned 
the  neighboring  militia  to  turn  out  and  guard  the  fords  as  the  water 
fell.  Beatie's  Ford,  where  the  army  encamped,  is  about  six  miles 
above  McCowan's  Ford  and  nearer  to  Salisbury.  On  the  evening  of 
January  thirty-first,  Morgan  was  sent  forward  toward  Salisbury  while 
General  Greene  remained  to  bring  off  the  militia.  The  river  fell 
rapidly  and  Colonels  Webster  and  Tarleton  crossed  at  Beatie's  Ford 
shortly  after  it  was  abandoned.  General  Davidson,  with  three  hun 
dred  men,  met  the  division  of  Cornwallis  toward  morning,  February 
first,  and  while  resisting  their  crossing  at  McCowan's  Ford,  was  killed, 
and  his  men  were  scattered.  A  few  rendezvoused  at  Tarrant's  Farm 
ten  miles  on  the  road  to  Salisbury,  but  were  there  attacked  and  cut  to 


552  FROM   COWPENS   TO   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  [1751. 

pieces  by  Tarleton.  By  the  third,  Morgan  had  crossed  the  Yadkin. 
Cornwallis  burned  most  of  his  remaining  baggage  and  wagons, 
doubled  teams,  mounted  a  portion  of  his  infantry  and  sent  a  strong 
corps  under  General  O'Hara  in  pursuit.  It  rained  all  day  on  the 
first  of  February.  Greene  knew  that  within  two  days  the  water 
from  the  mountains  would  fill  the  Yadkin.  As  yet  it  was  not  so  deep 
but  that  his  cavalry  crossed  safely,  and  his  forethought  in  having 
boats  provided,  enabled  him  to  secure  all  his  command.  Many  in 
habitants  followed  the  army,  retiring  in  dread  of  Tarleton,  and  the 
vanguard  of  the  British  force  only  captured  the  rearmost  wagons. 
A  useless  cannonade  was  maintained  during  the  day.  Cornwallis 
remained  at  Salisbury  four  days,  and  passed  the  Yadkin  on  the  eighth. 
Greene  marched  on  the  fourth,  after  one  day's  halt,  and  united  his 
command  at  Guilford  Court  House. 

A  council  of  war  was  held  which  advised  not  to  offer  battle.  The 
re-united  army  only  numbered  two  thousand  and  thirty-six  men,  includ 
ing  fourteen  hundred  and  twenty-six  regulars.  Some  course  of  action 
was  to  be  immediately  decided  upon.  Colonel  Carrington  joined  the 
command,  with  the  report, that  boats  had  been  secured,  and  secreted 
along  the  Dan,  so  as  to  be  collected  on  a  few  hours'  warning.  The 
British  army  was  at  Salem,  only  twenty-five  miles  from  Guilford. 
This  was  on  the  tenth  of  February.  Preparatory  to  the  march, 
General  Greene  organized  a  light  corps  of  seven  hundred  picked 
troops  under  Colonels  Williams,  Carrington,  Howard,  Washington 
and  Lee,  to  cover  his  rear. 

Kosciusko  had  joined  Greene,  and  was  sent  forward  to  throw  up 
a  breastwork  to  cover  the  landing  of  the  boats,  and  the  army  com 
menced  its  march. 

Cornwallis  bore  to  the  left  to  cross  above  Greene.  He  had  no 
idea  that  Greene  could  effect  a  crossing  at  the  few  ferries  which  lay 
below  the  possible  fording  places,  while  by  cutting  him  off  from  the 
fords  above,  he  could  follow  down  the  river  and  strike  his  small  com 
mand  as  well  as  the  army  marching  from  the  camp  on  the  Peedee. 
But  that  army  had  already  joined  Greene.  In  a  letter  to  Lord  Ger- 
maine,  of  March  nineteenth,  he  says,  "  I  was  informed  that  the 
American  commander  could  not  collect  many  flats  at  any  of  the 
ferries  on  the  River  Dan."  Colonel  Carrington,  however,  had  been 
specially  charged  with  this  duty  by  General  Greene,  with  the  aid  of 
Captain  Smith,  of  the  Maryland  line ;  had  anticipated  almost  any 
contingency  which  should  require  the  passage  of  the  river ;  and  so 


I78i.]  FROM   COWPENS   TO   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  553 

provided  boats  at  Boyd's  and  Irwin's  ferries,  which  were  neighboring 
ferries,  that  on  the  fourteenth  of  February  the  whole  division  safely 
crossed  the  river,  secured  their  boats,  and  were  beyond  reach  of  the 
enemy.  Tarleton  thus  reports  this  affair :  "  The  light  army  (Williams) 
which  was  the  last  in  crossing,  was  so  closely  pursued,  that  scarcely 
had  its  rear  landed  when  the  British  advance  appeared  on  the  oppo 
site  bank ;  and  in  the  last  twenty-four  hours  it  is  said  to  have  marched 
forty  miles.  The  hardships  suffered  by  the  British  troops  for  want 
of  their  tents  and  usual  baggage,  in  this  long  and  rapid  pursuit 
through  a  wild  and  unsettled  country,  were  uncommonly  great ;  yet 
such  was  their  ardor  in  the  service  that  they  submitted  to  them,  with 
out  a  blow, to  the  American  army, before  it  crossed  the  Roanoke."  l 
Tarleton  adds,  "  That  the  American  army  escaped  without  suffering 
any  material  injury,  seems  more  owing  to  a  train  of  fortunate  inci 
dents,  judiciously  improved  by  their  commander,  than  to  any  want  of 
enterprise  or  activity  in  the  army  that  pursued.  Yet  the  operations 
of  Lord  Cornwallis,  during  the  pursuit,  would  probably  have  been 
more  efficacious,  had  not  the  unfortunate  affair  at  the  Cowpens  de 
prived  him  of  almost  the  whole  of  his  light  troops." 

Lord  Cornwallis  returned  to  Hillsborough  and  issued  a  proclama 
tion,  "  but,"  says  Tarleton,  "  the  misfortunes  consequent  on  premature 
risings  had  considerably  thinned  out  the  loyalists,  originally  more 
numerous  in  North  Carolina  than  in  any  of  the  other  colonies.  Their 
spirits  may  be  said  to  have  been  broken  by  repeated  persecutions. 
Still,  the  zeal  of  some  was  not  repressed  ;  and  considerable  numbers 
were  preparing  to  assemble,  when  General  Greene,  reinforced  with  six 
hundred  Virginia  militia  under  General  Stevens,  took  the  resolution 
of  again  crossing  the  Dan,  and  re-entering  North  Carolina."  Lieuten 
ant-colonel  Lee,  with  his  legion,  was  detached  across  the  river  on  the 
twenty-first  of  February,  and  the  next  day  General  Greene  passed  it 
with  the  rest  of  the  army. 

Meanwhile  General  Greene  posted  a  portion  of  his  army  at  Hali 
fax  Court  House,  and  made  every  exertion  to  prepare  an  offensive 
return.  On  the  seventeenth,  his  whole  force  in  camp  consisted  of 
one  thousand  and  seventy-eight  regular  infantry — sixty-four  artillery, 
and  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  cavalry,  with  one  hundred  and 
twelve  legionary  infantry,  so  many  troops  had  been  detached  in 

1  "  The  upper  Roanoke  is  known  as  the  Dan  ;  the  upper  Pedee  as  the  Yadkin  ;  the 
upper  west  branch  of  the  Santee,  first  as  the  Congaree,  and  then  as  Broad  ;  the  upper  east 
branch,  first  as  the  Wateree,  and  then  as  Catawba." 


554  FROM   COWPENS  TO   GUILFORD  COURT   HOUSE.  [1781. 

charge  of  prisoners,  the  baggage,  and  the  sick.  The  Delaware 
troops  under  Kirkwood,  so  terribly  cut  up  at  Camden,  did  not 
exceed  eighty  men  for  duty.  On  the  nineteenth,  Stevens  was 
ordered  by  Greene  to  engage  volunteers  for  the  service,  and  he 
joined  within  three  days,  with  nearly  eight  hundred  men. 

By  the  twenty-third  the  whole  army  was  demonstrating  towards 
Guilford,  and  Lee  and  Pickens  hovered  near  the  outposts  of  Cornwallis. 

At  this  time  the  loyalists  were  organizing  a  corps  under  Colonel 
Pyle  upon  the  marshes  of  the  Haw,  and  Tarleton  was  sent  to  assist 
and  protect  them.  More  than  four  hundred  had  collected  a  little 
north  of  the  old  Hillsborough  and  Salisbury  road,  two  miles  from  the 
Allamance  River,  in  Orange  County,  Virginia.  Lee  and  Pickens  fell  in 
with  this  party,  having  been  advised  of  their  movements  by  two  men 
whom  they  picked  up  while  hunting  for  Tarleton.  Tarleton  says, 
"  the  loyalists  were  proceeding  to  Tarleton's  encampment,  unappre 
hensive  of  danger,  when  they  were  met  in  a  lane,  by  Lee  with  his  legion. 
Unfortunately,  mistaking  the  American  cavalry  for  Tarleton's  dra 
goons  they  allowed  themselves  to  be  surrounded  ;  no  quarter  was 
granted ;  between  two  and  three  hundred  were  inhumanly  butchered. 
Humanity  shudders  at  the  recital,  but  cold  and  unfeeling  policy 
aroused  it,  as  the  most  effective  means  of  intimidating  the  friends  of 
royal  government/' 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  loyalists  commenced  the  firing  as  soon 
as  they  recognized  the  Maryland  troops  in  the  rear  of  Lee,  and  that 
Lee  himself  had  hoped  to  pass  and  strike  at  Tarleton  hirrself;  but 
after  the  firing  began,  it  was  continued,  until  the  whole  party  were 
killed,  wounded,  or  driven  into  the  woods. 

Cornwallis  withdrew  from  Hillsborough  on  the  following  day,  even 
before  the  expiration  of  the  time  designated  in  his  proclamation  for 
the  people  to  report  to  him  for  duty.  Stedman,  then  his  commissary, 
intimates  that  the  army  could  not  be  supported  at  that  point.  On 
the  twenty-seventh  he  crossed  the  Haw  and  fixed  his  camp  near 
Allamance  Creek,  one  of  its  tributaries.  Greene  adopted  a  line  of 
march  nearly  parallel  to  that  of  his  adversary,  and  advanced  to  the 
heights  between  Reedy  Fork  and  Troublesome  Creek,  having  his 
divided  headquarters  near  the  Speedwell  iron  works  and  Boyd's 
Mill,  on  two  streams.  Greene  had  gained  the  choice  of  position  en 
tirely,  reversing  the  old  relations  of  the  armies.  He  could  give  battle, 
retire  as  he  advanced,  or  move  into  Virginia  by  the  upper  fords  which 
Cornwallis  had  so  eagerly  controlled  a  few  weeks  before.  It  will  be 


I78I.J  FROM   COWPENS  TO   GUILFORD   COURT  HOUSE.  555 

noticed  that  the  camp  of  Cornwallis,  between  the  Haw  and  Deep 
rivers,  was  where  the  roads  from  Salisbury,  Guilford  and  Hillsborough 
unite,  and  thus  controlled  the  direct  road  to  Wilmington,  his  depot 
of  clothing  and  supplies,  of  which  his  army  was  already  in  great  need. 
The  light  troops  of  both  armies  were  actively  employed,  daily,  and  on 
the  sixth  of  March,  a  skirmish  at  Wetzell's  Mills,  which  was  skillfully 
anticipated  and  supported  by  the  whole  British  army,  put  in  peril  the 
whole  column  of  Williams  and  Lee. 

On  the  eighth,  commissioners  finally  settled  upon  a  plan  of  ex 
change  of  prisoners,  the  British  having  exacted  paroles  of  the  militia 
wherever  they  went,  while  charging  them  to  the  account  as  if  captured 
in  battle.  Colonel  Carrington  and  Frederick  Cornwallis  made  an 
adjustment  so  that  General  Greene  obtained  some  officers  who  would 
have  otherwise  been  idle  during  the  campaign,  but  the  arrangement 
had  no  immediate  value  as  to  private  soldiers  and  militia. 

In  the  midst  of  these  anxieties  troops  began  to  arrive,  and  on  the 
twelfth  Greene  determined  to  offer  battle.  On  the  thirteenth  orders 
were  issued  for  all  detachments  to  report  at  Guilford  Court  House, 
and  on  the  fourteenth  of  March,  General  Greene  was  in  readiness  for 
the  struggle. 


CHAPTER   LXIX. 

BATTLE  OF  GUILFORD  COURT  HOUSE.     1781. 

THE  American  army  which  was  formed  for  battle  near  Guilford 
Court  House,  March  fifteenth,  1781,  consisted  of  four  thousand 
four  hundred  and  four  men  ;  including  one  thousand  four  hundred 
and  ninety  regular  infantry,  and  one  hundred  and  sixty-one  cavalry. 
Lieutenant-colonels  Lee  and  Campbell  were  sent,  early  in  the  morning, 
to  feel  the  enemy  and  skirmish  with  its  advance  column. 

Cornwallis  accepted  the  challenge,  sent  his  baggage  back  to  Bell's 
Mill,  on  Deep  River,  and  marched  toward  Guilford.  The  cavalry, 
the  light  infantry  of  the  guards,  and  the  Yagers,  composed  his  ad 
vance  guard.  "A  sharp  conflict,"  says  Tarleton,  "  ensued  between 
the  advanced  parties  of  the  two  armies.  In  the  onset,  the  fire  of  the 
Americans  was  heavy,  and  the  charge  of  their  cavalry  was  spirited. 
Notwithstanding  their  numbers  and  opposition,  the  gallantry  of  the 
light  infantry  of  the  guards,  assisted  by  the  legion,  made  impression 
upon  their  centre  before  the  Twenty-third  regiment  arrived  to  give 
support  to  the  advanced  troops.  Captain  Goodricks,  of  the  guards, 
fell  in  this  contest ;  and  between  twenty  and  thirty  of  the  guards, 
dragoons,  and  Yagers  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  king's  troops 
moved  on  until  they  arrived  in  sight  of  the  American  army."  Refer 
ence  is  made  to  map  "  Battle  of  Guilford ;  "  and  the  narrative  will 
follow  the  movements  of  the  attacking  force.  The  American  first 
line  was  formed  in  the  edge  of  woods, behind  open  ground,  and  under 
cover  of  fences.  From  this  point  the  surface  gradually  ascended  to 
the  Court  House,  and  was  quite  thickly  wooded.  Other  hills  were  on 
either  side,  and  the  Court  House  itself  stood  upon  a  still  more  abrupt 
ascent.  The  first  line  consisted  of  North  Carolina  militia  under  Gen 
erals  Butler  and  Eaton,  one  thousand  and  sixty  men,  besides  officers. 
Captain  Singleton  occupied  the  road,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery. 
The  riorht  was  covered  bv  Lvnch's  riflemen,  two  hundred  men  ;  Kirk- 


BATTLE   OF    GUILFORD   COURT  HOUSE.  557 

wood' s  Delawares,  not  exceeding  eighty  men,  and  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  under  Colonel  Washington.  The  left  was  covered  by  Camp 
bell's  riflemen  and  the  legion  infantry,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  and  Lee's  horse. 

The  American  second  line,  about  three  hundred  yards  in  the  rear, 
consisted  of  the  Virginia  militia  under  Generals  Stevens  and  Lawson, 
eleven  hundred  and  twenty-three  men,  rank  and  file,  posted  in  woods 
and  on  both  sides  of  the  road.  Behind  this  line  Stevens  had  placed  a 
few  veterans  to  keep  the  militia  up  to  duty.  The  American  third  line 
was  more  than  three  hundred  yards  further  in  the  rear,  upon  high 
ground,  with  the  left  slightly  refused ;  and  was  composed  entirely 
of  regulars.  Kirkwood  had  been  detached  from  the  right,  as  already 
noticed,  to  take  a  position  on  the  corresponding  flank  of  the  first  line. 
General  Huger  was  in  command  of  the  right  wing,  consisting  of  Vir 
ginia  troops,  and  Colonel  Williams  commanded  the  left  wing,  com 
posed  of  Maryland  troops.  As  this  division  of  regulars  would  very 
naturally  be  regarded  as  a  veteran  corps,  it  is  but  proper  to  state 
that  the  Second  Maryland  regiment,  Lieutenant-colonel  Ford  com 
manding,  consisted  of  the  new  levies,  most  of  whom  had  never  been 
in  action  or  under  fire  at  all ;  and  that  fully  one-half  of  the  Virginia 
brigade  was  made  up  of  similar  troops.  Colonel  Gunby's  command, 
which  had  been  handled  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard  at  Cowpens, 
was  the  only  regular  infantry  which  could  be  called  veteran.  A  por 
tion  of  the  North  Carolina  militia  had  been  forced  into  the  service, 
under  suspicion  of  disloyalty,  as  a  punishment,  and  with  here  and 
there  a  few  substitutes,  and  with  good  officers,  it  was  a  feeble  force 
to  resist  any  persistent  attack  of  British  troops.  Its  flanks  were  so 
well  covered,  however,  that  General  Greene  must  have  had  faith  in 
their  ability  to  make  some  resistance,  when  thus  well  supported  and 
so  admirably  disposed.  General  Stevens  posted  some  of  his  old 
soldiers  in  the  rear  of  his  line  to  anticipate  any  disorder,  as  many  of 
the  Virginia  militia  also,  were  raw  troops,  then  for  the  first  time 
brought  to  the  field.  In  thus  carefully  stating  the  battle  formation 
of  the  American  army,  it  is  proper  to  notice  a  characteristic  letter 
from  General  Morgan  to  General  Greene,  under  date  of  February 
twentieth,  which  seems  to  have  suggested  to  General  Greene  his 
plan  of  battle.  "  I  expect  Lord  Cornwallis  will  push  you  until  you 
are  obliged  to  fight  him,  on  which  much  will  depend.  You'll  have, 
from  what  I  see,  a  great  number  of  militia.  If  they  fight,  you'll  beat 
Cornwallis ;  if  not,  he  will  beat  you,  and  perhaps  cut  your  regulars 


558  BATTLE   OF   GU1LFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  [1781. 

to  pieces.  I  am  informed  that  among  the  militia  will  be  a  number 
of  old  soldiers.  I  think  it  would  be  advisable  to  select  them  from 
the  militia,  and  put  them  in  the  midst  of  the  regulars.  Select  the 
riflemen  also  and  fight  them  on  the  flanks,  under  enterprising  officers 
who  are  acquainted  with  that  kind  of  fighting,  and  put  the  remain 
der  of  the  militia  in  the  centre  with  some  picked  troops  in  their  rear, 
with  orders  to  shoot  down  the  first  man  that  runs.  If  anything  will 
succeed,  a  disposition  of  this  kind  will.  I  hope  you  will  not  look 
upon  this,  as  dictating ;  but  as  my  opinion,  in  a  matter  that  1  am 
much  concerned  in." 

It  is  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  at  least  six  hundred  of  the  mili 
tia  were  enrolled  for  six  weeks  only,  including  the  march  to  the  field 
and  the  return  march  for  discharge,  so  that  General  Greene  had  little 
time  to  lose.  The  formation  of  the  army  for  battle  has  been  severely 
criticised,  on  the  ground  that  the  regulars  were  so  far  in  the  rear  ; 
but  the  flanking  bodies  in  the  first  line  were  fully  equal  in  number  to 
the  small  veteran  corps  of  the  reserve,  and  they  were  men  who  had 
tested  their  mettle  thoroughly  on  other  fields.  The  disposition  of  the 
troops  seems  to  have  so  equalized  the  commands  as  to  impart  strength 
to  all  parts,  and  to  leave  the  militia  alone,  at  no  point.  If  Kirkwood's 
command  had  covered  Singleton's  guns  in  the  centre,  possibly  it 
would  have  strengthened  the  line  ;  but  might  have  sacrificed  him,  with 
the  militia  ;  and  the  supports  were  near  enough,  if  there  had  been 
any  resistance  at  all. 

The  British  right  wing  consisted  of  the  regiment  of  Bose  (Hes 
sian)  and  the  Seventy -first  British.  General  Leslie  commanding,  with 
the  First  battalion  of  guards  in  reserve,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Nor 
ton  ;  and  the  left  wing  consisted  of  the  Twenty-third  and  Thirty-third 
British,  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  commanding,  with  the  grena 
diers  and  Second  battalion  of  the  guards  in  reserve,  under  General 
O'Hara.  The  light  infantry  and  Yagers  were  to  the  left  and  rear  of 
the  artillery,  which  occupied  the  road  and  exchanged  fire  with  Single* 
ton's  guns  while  the  British  line  was  forming.  The  American  line,  it 
will  be  observed,  considerably  overlapped  the  British,  thereby  endan 
gering  its  flanks  in  case  of  a  direct  advance.  The  British  army  had 
marched  through  a  defile,  to  their  position,  and  had  not  sufficient 
room  for  deployment  until  they  passed  beyond  a  small  creek  which, 
crossed  the  Salisbury  road.  It  will  be  at  once  seen  that  the  Ameri 
can  first  line,  with  Stevens  and  Lawson  behind  its  immediate  centre, 
was  a  strong  line,  when  it  is  considered  that  the  entire  British  force 


i78i.J  BATTLE   OF   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  559 

was  but  little  if  any  over  two  thousand  strong,  after  deduction  of  the 
baggage  guard  sent  to  Bell's  Mills.  The  tabular  statement  at  close  of 
this  chapter  indicates  the  condition  of  the  army  of  General  Cornwallis 
at  different  dates. 

Tarleton's  dragoons  were  kept  in  column,  on  the  road,  in  the  rear, 
to  act  as  opportunity  should  be  furnished  by  the  events  of  the  day, 
and  to  cover  the  artillery  which  could  advance  only  by  the  road.  It 
will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  map,  that  Lord  Cornwallis  appreciated 
the  danger  that  threatened  his  flanks,  upon  a  simple  advance  against 
the  centre,  and  as  soon  as  the  militia  gave  way,  so  that  he  felt  the 
sharp  fire  of  the  flanking  parties,  the  Twenty-third  and  Thirty-third 
regiments  changed  direction  to  the  left,  to  let  in  their  reserves  on 
the  right,  while  the  light  infantry  and  Yagers  marched  obliquely  to 
the  very  left  extreme.  The  right  wing  also  took  up  its  reserves,  so 
that  the  combined  line  became  co-extensive  with  the  entire  American 
front.  Lieutenant  O'Hara  was  killed  at  his  guns, during  the  artillery 
firing  which  was  maintained  quite  steadily  during  the  last  twenty 
minutes,  before  the  British  army  entered  the  open  ground  to  charge 
the  militia.  The  advance  was  steady  and  in  good  order.  When 
within  about  one  hundred  and  forty  yards  of  the  fence  the  North 
Carolina  militia  delivered  a  partial  volley  and  fled,  abandoning  every 
thing.  Singleton's  guns  necessarily  retreated  up  the  road  as  soon  as 
left  without  support.  A  considerable  portion  of  Eaton's  brigade 
dashed  behind  Campbell's  riflemen  and  took  refuge  in  thick  woods, 
on  a  hill  (see  map)  and  the  remainder  of  the  division  fell  back  upon 
the  second  line,  which  opened  its  files  for  them  to  pass  through, and 
promptly  resumed  a  steady  front  toward  the  enemy.  The  British 
left  wing  was  severely  galled  by  the  fire  of  Kirkwood,  Lynch  and 
Washington ;  but  finally  forced  them  back  to  a  corresponding  posi 
tion  on  the  right  of  the  second  line.  The  British  right  wing  was 
equally  annoyed  by  the  riflemen  of  Campbell,  the  legionary  infan 
try  and  Lee.  The  British  centre  had  swept  on  at  a  bayonet  charge 
against  the  second  line,  and  the  first  battalion  of  guards,  with  the  regi 
ment  of  Bose,  wheeled  to  the  right,to  clear  their  flanks  of  these  assail 
ants.  The  woods  were  so  thick,  and  so  filled  with  underbrush  that 
their  bayonets  were  of  little  practical  value.  As  the  riflemen  fell 
back  the  pursuit  was  continued  up  the  hill  so  far,  that  these  regiments 
were  absolutely  detached  from  the  army  and  engaged  in  a  separate 
battle  until  the  principal  action  was  practically  ended.  While  the 
British  army  lost  numbers  by  their  absence,  it  is  not  probable  that 


560  BATTLE   OF   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE. 

Campbell  and  Lee,  after  their  gallant  conduct  in  the  morning,  would 
have  let  slip  an  opportunity  to  attack  the  British  in  the  rear,  if  the 
guards  and  Hessians  had  adhered  to  the  originial  order  of  battle. 
The  manner  in  which  this  flanking  detachment  sustained  itself  will 
be  hereafter  noticed. 

Meanwhile  the  British  centre  and  left  wing  moved  directly  upon 
the  Virginia  militia,  which  resisted  for  awhile  with  great  spirit,  but 
was  finally  compelled  to  give  way  and  seek  coyer  behind  the  conti 
nental  troops,  or  in  the  woods.  Kirkwood  and  Washington  hastened 
to  their  original  positions  on  the  right  of  the  reserve  line  as  soon  as 
the  second  line  gave  way. 

The  British  centre  was  embarrassed  by  the  woods,  and  its  advance 
became  unequal.  The  Seventy-first  dropped  behind,  greatly  impeded 
by  ravines,  and,  possibly  and  very  naturally,  to  be  ready,  if  needed  to 
support  the  two  regiments  which  had  broken  off  from  its  right,  and 
were  actively  engaged  at  the  time.  Cornwallis  says,  "  they  advanced 
upon  hearing  active  firing  upon  their  left  and  front." 

The  Thirty-third,  the  light  infantry,  and  Yagers  pressed  after 
Kirkwood  and  Lynch  whom  they  had  opposed  from  the  beginning  of 
the  action,  dropping  the  Twenty-third  behind,  and  this  regiment,  like 
the  Seventy-first  of  the  right  wing  was  again  dropped,  when  the 
Second  battalion  of  the  guards  and  the  grenadiers  advanced  toward 
the  American  third  line. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  advanced  directly  upon  the  American 
regulars,  and  made  two  successive  charges,  which  were  repulsed. 
Colonel  Gunby  with  the  First  Maryland  regiment,  supported  by  the 
left  wing  of  General  Huger's  command,  delivered  a  well  directed  fire, 
resorted  to  the  bayonet  and  compelled  the  assailing  column  to  cross 
a  deep  ravine  and  take  refuge  upon  a  hill  to  its  rear.  Tarleton  says, 
"  At  this  period  the  event  of  the  action  was  doubtful,  and  victory 
alternately  presided  over  either  army.  Webster,  however,  gained  an 
excellent  position  till  he  could  hear  of  the  progress  of  the  king's  troops 
on  his  right." 

The  Americans  had  thus  repulsed  and  detached  the  British  left, 
and  the  extreme  British  right  was  engaged  with  Campbell  and  Lee  at 
a  disadvantage,  more  than  a  mile  to  the  right  and  rear.  The  Second 
battalion  of  the  guards  and  the  grenadiers  were  continuing  their 
march,  and  without  waiting  for  support,  made  an  impetuous  attack 
upon  the  left  of  the  American  reserve  near  the  Court  House.  The 
Second  Maryland  regiment  gave  way  almost  instantly,  losing  the  guns 


rySi.]  BATTLE   OF  GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  561 

which  had  been  withdrawn  to  this  line.  The  advance  of  the  guards 
had  not  been  perceived  by  Colonel  Williams  on  account  of  an  inter 
vening  clump  of  trees  (see  map)  until  they  made  their  charge.  Its 
effect  was  to  threaten  the  entire  line,  take  it  in  the  rear,  and  force  it 
towards  Webster.  The  First  Maryland  wheeled  to  the  left  and  used 
the  bayonet.  Colonel  Gunby  was  almost  immediately  dismounted, 
and  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard  took  command.  Tarleton  and  Corn- 
wallis  confirm  the  statement  of  the  gallant  conduct  of  this  regiment. 
Tarleton  says,  "  The  Maryland  brigade,  followed  by  Washington's 
cavalry,  moving  upon  them  before  they  could  receive  assistance,  retook 
the  cannon  and  repulsed  the  guards  with  great  slaughter,  the  ground 
being  open.  Colonel  Washington's  dragoons  killed  Colonel  Stewart 
and  several  of  his  men,  and  pursued  the  remainder  into  the  woods. 
General  O'Hara,  though  wounded,  rallied  the  remainder  of  the  Second 
battalion  of  the  guards  to  the  Twenty-third  and  Seventy-first,  who  had 
inclined  from  the  right  and  left,  and  were  now  approaching  open 
ground." 

To  cover  their  advance,  Lieutenant  McLeod  was  placed  with  two 
guns  upon  a  small  knoll  near  the  road,  which  should  have  been  held 
by  Singleton,  and  checked  the  American  advance, until  the  arrival  of 
the  two  British  regiments  last  referred  to  exposed  the  Maryland  regi 
ment  to  the  attack  of  a  largely  superior  force.  The  American  onset 
was  so  persistent  and  the  moment  was  so  critical  that  General  Corn- 
wallis  cpmmenced  this  artillery  fire  before  the  guards  were  disengaged, 
and  while  they  were  actually  exposed  to  its  effect.  When  the  First 
Maryland  regiment  wheeled  upon  the  guards,  it  uncovered  the  Vir 
ginia  line,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  availed  himself  of  the 
opportunity  to  recross  the  ravine  and  join  the  main  body.  Tarleton's 
dragoons  had  just  returned  from  the  support  of  the  regiment  of  Bose, 
and  was  immediately  followed  by  the  First  battalion  of  the  guards. 
The  force  now  concentrated  near  the  Court  House  could  not  be 
resisted,  and  General  Greene  ordered  a  retreat.  This  retreat  was 
made  under  cover  of  Colonel  Greene's  regiment,  which  from  its  situa 
tion  had  been  held  fast  to  watch  the  movements  of  Webster  after 
he  occupied  the  hill  nearly  opposite,  and  had  taken  no  active  part 
in  the  operations  to  its  left. 

The  Twenty-third   and   Seventy-first  regiments  followed  a  short 
distance   in   pursuit ;  but  Tarleton    says,    "  Earl  Cornwallis  did    not 
think  it  advisable  for  the  British  cavalry  to  charge  the  enemy,  who 
were  retreating  in  good  order." 
36 


502  BATTLE  OF  GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  [1781 

The  contest  between  Campbell  and  the  Legion  light  infantry,  sup- 
ported  by  a  few  militia  who  rallied  in  the  woods,  had  in  the  meantime 
been  so  spirited,  that  the  British  regiments  "  found  men  behind  trees 
on  all  sides  of  them,"  and  Tarleton  says,  that  "  when  he  made  his 
charge, he  found  officers  and  men  of  both  corps  in  the  possession  of 
the  enemy."  He  had  been  sent  in  that  direction  on  account  of  the 
continuous  firing  which  had  been  noticed  by  Cornwallis  ;  and  at  the 
time  he  was  so  detached,  there  was  no  opportunity  to  handle  his  cav 
alry  to  advantage  at  the  centre.  The  American  riflemen  had  their 
choice  of  ground,  and  their  mode  of  fighting  was  destructive  to  the 
guards  and  Hessians,  with  little  loss  to  themselves.  His  arrival  was 
opportune,  and  the  Americans  retreated  to  the  woods.  Fortunately 
for  Tarleton,  Colonel  Lee  had  abandoned  the  hope  of  resistance,  more 
than  to  check  pursuit,  and  had  made  a  detour  for  the  purpose  of  join 
ing  the  main  army  at  the  Court  House  before  that  officer  appeared. 

He  lost  a  great  opportunity,  and  in  fact  failed  to  reach  the  main 
army  until  the  next  morning.  He  states  that  if  General  Greene  had 
known  the  condition  of  the  British  army,  a  retreat  would  have  been 
unnecessary,  and  the  victory  certain.  He  did  not  reach  Greene,  how 
ever,  and  did  not  so  advise  him.  His  arrival  at  that  moment  would 
have  settled  the  issue. 

Tarleton  gives  it  as  his  opinion  that  "  if  the  American  artillery  had 
pre-occupied  the  small  hill  by  the  road-side,  the  Twenty-third  and 
Seventy-first  regiments  could  not  have  united  with  the  guards  ;  and 
the  result  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  army  of  Cornwallis."  He 
says,  that  "one-third  of  the  British  army  was  killed  or  wounded  dur 
ing  the  two  hours  of  battle."  The  casualties  are  stated  as  given  in 
the  official  Returns,  made  up  immediately  after  the  battle,  and  the 
numerous  conjectures  which  have  exaggerated  the  losses  on  both 
sides,  are  of  little  value,  when  the  acknowledged  facts  and  the  admit 
ted  valor  of  the  troops,  who  did  any  fighting,  on  either  side,  suffi 
ciently  indicate  the  desperate  character  of  the  action. 

British  casualties — Royal  Artillery,  Lieutenant  O'Hara,  and  one 
man  killed  ;  four  wounded.  Guards — Lieutenant-colonel  Stewart, 
eight  sergeants,  twenty-eight  rank  and  file  killed  ;  Captains  Schmultz, 
Maynard,  and  Goodrick  died  of  wounds ;  Captains  Lord  Douglas, 
Smeaton,  and  Maitland,  Ensign  Stewart,  Adjutant  Colquhoun,  two 
sergeants,  and  one  hundred  and  forty  three  rank  and  file  wounded, 
and  twenty-two  missing.  Twenty-third  regiment :  Lieutenant  Robin 
son  and  twelve  men  killed ;  Captain  Peter,  one  sergeant,  and  forty- 


i78i.]  BATTLE   OF  GUILFORD  COURT   HOUSE.  563 

three  wounded.  Thirty-third  regiment :  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster 
died  of  wounds  ;  Ensign  Talbot,  and  ten  men  killed  ;  Lieutenants 
Salvin  and  Wyngand,  Ensigns  Kelly,  Gore,  and  Hughes,  Adjutant 
Fox,  and  fifty-six  men,  wounded;  Seventy-first:  Ensign  Grant  and 
twelve  men  killed,  fifty-six  men  wounded.  Regiment  of  Bose  :  Cap 
tain  Wilmousky  and  Ensign  De  Trott,  died  of  wounds ;  ten  men 
killed  ;  Lieutenants  Schncener  and  Graise,  and  sixty-two  men  killed  ; 
three  missing.  British  Legion  —  Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  and 
thirteen  men  wounded  ;  three  men  killed.  Total  casualties  reported: 
Five  hundred  and  forty-four.  General  Howard  who  volunteered  to 
accompany  Cornwallis,  was  also  wounded. 

Sergeant  Lamb  relates  that  he  saw  Lord  Cornwallis  crossing  clear 
ground,  where  the  guards  suffered  so  severely,  riding  upon  a  dragoon 
horse,  (his  own  having  been  shot,)  and  that  he  was  carried  directly 
toward  the  Americans.  The  trooper's  saddle-bags  were  underneath 
the  horse,  embarrassing  his  control  of  the  creature.  Lamb  "  seized 
the  bridle,  turned  the  horse's  head,  and  ran  by  the  side  until  the 
Twenty-third  regiment  was  gained."  Cornwallis  and  Leslie  were 
the  only  general  officers  of  the  British  army  who  were  not  wounded. 

American  Casualties.  Virginia  Regulars — One  captain,  two  sub 
alterns,  and  twenty-six  men  killed  ;  four  sergeants  and  thirty-five 
men  wounded,  and  thirty-nine  men  missing.  Mary  land  Regulars :  One 
major,  one  subaltern,  and  thirteen  killed  ;  five  captains,  one  sergeant, 
and  thirty-six  men  wounded  ;  ninety-seven  missing.  Delaware  Battalion 
—seven  killed  ;  thirteen  wounded,  fifteen  missing.  Washington  s  de 
tachment  of  First  and  Third  cavalry,  three  killed  ;  two  captains,  two 
subalterns,  and  four  wounded  (prisoners,)  three  missing.  Lee's  Corps, 
three  killed  ;  one  captain,  eight  men  wounded  (prisoners)  ;  seven 
missing.  Total  casualties  of  regulars,  three  hundred  and  twenty- 
nine.  General  Huger  was  also  wounded.  Stevens  Brigade — Two 
captains  and  nine  men  killed.  Brigadier-general  Stevens,  one  cap 
tain,  four  subalterns,  and  thirty  men  wounded.  One  major,  three 
subalterns,  and  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  men  missing.  Lawsons 
Brigade — One  killed.  One  major,  two  subalterns,  and  thirteen  men 
wounded.  One  subaltern,  eighty-six  men  missing.  Campbell's  and 
LyncJi  s  Rifle  Regiments — Two  captains  and  one  man  killed  ;  one  cap 
tain,  one  subaltern,  and  fourteen  men  wounded  ;  one  captain,  seven 
subalterns,  and  eighty-six  missing.  Total  casualties  of  Virginia 
militia,  four  hundred  and  eight.  North  Carolina  militia,  six  killed  ; 
one  captain,  one  subaltern,  and  three  men  wounded;  two  captains, 


564  BATTLE   OF   GUILFORD   COURT   HOUSE.  [1781, 

nine  subalterns,  and  five  hundred  and  fifty-two  missing.  Total 
casualties  of  brigade,  five  hundred  and  seventy-four.  Total  Ameri 
can  casualties,  thirteen  hundred  and  eleven.  The  large  number  of 
missing  are  accounted  for  by  both  British  and  American  authorities, 
as  having  fled  to  their  homes.  Two  days  afterward  the  returns  of 
the  Virginia  Regulars  showed  seven  hundred  and  fifty-two  men 
present,  and  of  the  Maryland  Brigade,  five  hundred  and  fifty,  which 
reduced  their  loss,  reported  on  the  seventeenth  as  two  hundred  and 
sixty-one  men,  to  one  hundred  and  eighty-eight. 

General  Greene  retreated  nearly  twelve  miles  to  the  iron  works  on 
Troublesome  Creek.  Although  the  American  army  had  thus  fallen 
back  to  the  rendezvous  which  had  been  selected  in  case  of  defeat,  it  was 
not  disheartened.  On  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  preparations 
were  made  for  battle,  on  the  conviction  that  Cornwallis  would  pur 
sue.  The  resistance  which  had  been  made,  aroused  the  remnants  of 
the  militia  to  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  previous  failure  ;  and  the 
example  of  the  First  Maryland  encouraged  them  to  seek  an  oppor 
tunity  to  redeem  their  credit.  Surgeons  were  sent  to  Guilford,  where 
they  found  that  all  possible  care  had  been  taken  of  their  wounded  by 
the  British  officers. 

Greene,  writing  on  the  same  day,  says,  "  the  enemy  gained  his 
cause,  but  is  ruined  by  the  success  of  it."  Tarleton  regarded  "  the 
victory  as  the  pledge  of  ultimate  defeat."  "  The  British  had  the 
name ;  the  Americans  the  good  consequences  of  victory,"  wrote 
Ramsey. 

"Another  such  victory  would  ruin  the  British  army,"  said  Fox  in 
the  House  of  Commons. 

Pitt  and  other  political  leaders  in  Great  Britain,  regarded  it  as  the 
"  precursor  of  ruin  to  British  supremacy  in  the  south  "  ;  and  the  cor 
respondence  of  Cornwallis,  official  and  unofficial,  breathes  but  one 
sentiment  as  to  the  repugnance  of  the  southern  people  at  large  to 
respect  British  authority. 

After  providing  for  the  badly  wounded  to  the  best  of  his  ability, 
and  leaving  those  who  could  not  march  to  the  protection  of  a  flag  of 
truce,  he  issued  a  formal  proclamation  of  victory  and  a  rallying  call 
to  the  people,  and  immediately  crossed  Deep  River,  as  if  on  the  march 
to  Salisbury.  Recrossing  it  lower  down,  he  moved  to  Ramsour's  Mills. 
General  Greene  gathered  such  troops  as  had  a  reasonable  time  of  ser 
vice  before  them,  and  marched  to  Buffalo  Ford,  when  he  ordered  an 
inspection  of  his  command  with  view  to  a  spirited  pursuit  and  the 


BATTLE   OF  GU1LFORD   COURT  HOUSE. 


565 


contingency  of  another  battle.  It  became  necessary  to  send  back  to 
his  train  for  additional  ammunition,  lead  and  bullet  moulds,  so  that 
he  did  not  reach  Ramsour's  Mills  until  the  twenty-eighth,  one  day 
after  Cornwallis  had  bridged  the  river  and  moved  on  toward  Cross 
Creek  (Fayetteville)  on  the  direct  Wilmington  road. 

The  British  army  was  almost  destitute  of  clothing  and  other  needed 
supplies.  The  destruction  of  their  train  during  the  winter  had  been 
a  constant  source  of  trouble,  and  the  loss  had  not  been  compensated 
by  results.  Messengers  were  sent  to  Lord  Rawdon,  then  at  Camden, 
warning  him  that  Greene  would  probably  invade  South  Carolina,  and 
the  army,  reduced  to  "  not  quite  fifteen  hundred  men  (1435)  through 
sickness,  desertion,  and  losses  in  battle,"  marched  to  Wilmington, 
reaching  that  town  on  the  seventh  of  April.  The  messengers  failed 
to  reach  Lord  Rawdon,  and  General  Greene  entered  upon  his  South 
Carolina  campaign. 

NOTE. — State  of  the  troops  that  inarched  with  the  army  under  the  command  of  Lieuten- 
ant-General  Earl  Cornwallis.     (Official.) 

RANK  AND  FILE  PRESENT  AND  FIT  FOR  DUTY. 


British. 

German. 

Provincials. 

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January  15,1781. 

690 

167 

41 

286 

328 

249 

237 

60 

347 

103 

451 

256 

3224 

February  i,  1781  . 

690 

279 

334 

234 

345 

97 

174 

287 

2440 

March  I,  1781.  .  . 

605 

258 

322 

212 

313 

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April  I,  1781.  ... 

411 

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182 

229 

161 

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1723 

The  force  ultimately  able  to  march  to  Virginia,  has  already  been  stated  at  1455  men. 


CHAPTER   LXX. 

SOUTHERN  CAMPAIGN.     BATTLE  OF  HOBKIRK'S  HILL.     PARTISAN 

WARFARE. 


ENERAL  GREENE  resolved  to  move  directly  against  the  mili- 
tary  posts  of  South  Carolina,  irrespective  of  the  action  of  Lord 
Cornwallis.  He  did  not  believe  that  pursuit  would  be  attempted. 
Even  in  that  case,  he  would  at  least  relieve  North  Carolina  from 
danger,  and  would  occupy  such  a  position  as  to  be  able  to  attack 
either  Rawdon,  or  Cornwallis,  without  their  possible  cooperation 
against  him.  He  moved  so  rapidly  that  he  reached  Rugely's  Mills 
before  Cornwallis  knew  that  he  had  left  Deep  River  ;  and  it  was  then 
too  late  to  intercept  his  march  to  the  south.  That  officer  had  already 
determined  that  the  most  hopeful  method  of  reducing  the  Southern 
States,  was  by  occupation  of  Virginia,  and  by  control  of  Chesapeake 
Bay  and  its  contributory  water  courses.  This  plan  involved  a  separa 
tion  of  the  south  from  the  north,  so  that  neither  could  aid  the  other. 
He  resolved  to  march  to  Virginia,  by  the  shortest  route,  and  to  effect 
a  junction  with  General  Phillips,  who  arrived  in  Chesapeake  Bay  on 
the  twenty-sixth  of  March,  with  two  thousand  troops  from  New  York, 
and  with  instructions  to  report  to  Lord  Cornwallis  and  act  under  his 
orders. 

The  narrative  would  be  incomplete  without  some  further  reference 
to  this  sudden  abandonment  of  a  campaign  which  had  been  so  en 
tangled  and  eventful,  especially  as  the  military  policy  of  the  British 
Cabinet  and  of  General  Clinton  are  involved  in  the  movement. 

General  Cornwallis,  in  his  answer  to  General  Clinton's  "  Narra 
tive."  thus  states  the  case:  "I  could  not  remain  at  Wilmington, 
lest  General  Greene  should  succeed  against  Lord  Rawdon,  and,  by 
returning  to  North  Carolina,  have  it  in  his  power  to  cut  off  every 
means  of  saving  my  small  corps,  except  that  disgraceful  one  of  an 
embarkation,  with  the  loss  of  the  cavalry,  and  every  horse  in  the 


SecondBntishLine:  Center  andliefk 
advance  upon  VirginiaMilitia . 


AmericanFirslLine. 
British  AdvancctMes  iqrwURt, 

^ 


Compiled  and  Drawn  'byM£arringlon. 


5GG* 


I78i.]  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  $67 

army."  .  .  "  I  was  most  firmly  persuaded,  that  until  Virginia  was 
reduced,  we  could  not  hold  the  more  southern  provinces;  and  that,' 
after  its  reduction,  they  would  fall,  without  much  difficulty."  On 
the  eighteenth  of  April  he  advised  Lord  Germaine,  that  "  the  great 
reinforcements  sent  by  Virginia  to  General  Greene,  whilst  General 
Arnold  was  in  the  Chesapeake,  are  convincing  proofs  that  small  expe 
ditions  do  not  frighten  that  powerful  province." 

General  Cornwallis  wrote  to  General  Clinton  on  the  tenth  of 
April: — "I  can  not  help  expressing  my  wishes  that  the  Chesapeake 
may  become  the  seat  of  war,  even  (if  necessary)  at  the  expense  of 
abandoning  New  York.  Until  Virginia  is  in  a  measure  subdued,  our 
hold  of  the  Carolinas  must  be  difficult,  if  not  precarious."  The  fol 
lowing  appreciation  of  the  theatre  of  operations  is  included  in  the 
same  letter.  "  The  rivers  of  Virginia  are  advantageous  to  an  invad 
ing  army ;  but  North  Carolina  is,  of  all  the  provinces  in  America,  the 
most  difficult  to  attack,  (unless  material  assistance  could  be  got  from 
the  inhabitants,  the  contrary  of  which  I  have  sufficiently  experienced) 
on  account  of  its  great  extent,  of  the  numberless  rivers  and  creeks, 
and  the  total  want  of  interior  navigation."  In  reply,  General  Clinton, 
under  date  of  May  twenty-ninth,  says,  "  Had  it  been  possible  for  your 
Lordship,  in  your  letter  to  me  of  the  loth  ult.,  to  have  intimated  the 
probability  of  your  intention  to  form  a  junction  with  General  Phillips, 
I  should  certainly  have  endeavored  to  have  stopped  you,  as  I  did 
then,  and  do  now,  consider  such  a  move  as  likely  to  be  dangerous  to 
our  interests  in  the  southern  colonies."  In  a  dispatch  to  General 
Phillips,  of  April  thirteenth,  marked  "secret  and  most  private"  and 
which  Lord  Cornwallis  found  at  Petersburg  after  the  death  of  Gen 
eral  Phillips,  General  Clinton  says,  "  His  Lordship  tells  me  he  wants 
reinforcements.  I  would  ask — how  can  that  be  possible  ?  And,  if  it 
is,  what  hopes  can  I  have,  of  a  force  sufficient  to  undertake  any  solid 
operation  ?  As  my  invitation  to  Lord  Cornwallis  to  come  to  the 
Chesapeake,  was  upon  a  supposition  that  everything  would  be  settled 
in  the  Carolinas,  I  do  not  think  he  will  come."  .  .  .  "If  Lord 
Cornwallis  proposes  anything  necessary  for  his  operations,  you  of 
course  must  adopt  it,  if  you  can  ;  letting  me  know  your  thought* 
thereon" 

A  dispatch  which  he  received  from  Whitehall  Palace  says,  "  Lord 
George  Germaine  strongly  recommends  to  General  Clinton,  either  to 
remain  in  good  humor,  in  full  confidence  to  be  supported  as  much  as 
the  nature  of  the  service  will  admit  of,  or  avail  himself  of  the  leave 


568  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  [1781. 

of  coming  home,  as  no  good  can  arise,  if  there  is  not  full  confidence 
*  between  the  general  and  the  minister,"  and,  on  the  sixth  of  June, 
Lord  Germaine  wrote  to  General  Clinton,  "  Lord  Cornwallis'  opinion 
entirely  coincides  with  mine,  of  the  great  importance  of  pushing  the 
war  on  the  side  of  Virginia,  with  all  the  force  that  can  be  spared." 

It  is  impracticable  more  than  to  notice  these  leading  facts,  in  the 
examination  of  voluminous  correspondence  and  dispatches,  which 
illustrate  the  relations  of  these  officers,  and  the  policy  of  the  crown. 
General  Clinton  had  suggested  to  General  Phillips,  a  movement  up 
the  Delaware,  with  the  contingency  of  an  attack  upon  Philadelphia, 
to  be  supported  by  a  movement  on  his  part,  from  New  York ;  and  he 
was  at  the  same  time  having  difficulty  with  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  of 
whom  he  said :  "  He  is  more  impracticable  than  ever,  swearing  to  me 
(Clinton)  that  he  knows  nothing  of  his  recall ;  to  others,  he  says  he 
is  going  home  immediately."  Rumors  of  a  French  naval  reinforce 
ment  prevailed,  and  the  situation  of  General  Clinton  was  doubly  em 
barrassing,  by  the  contrast  of  the  condition  of  the  South  with  that 
which  he  guaranteed  when  Charleston  was  captured  and  Cornwallis 
was  left  in  command.  He  very  properly  declared  "  a  naval  suprem 
acy  to  be  the  first  essential  element  to  success  in  Virginia,"  and  at 
the  same  time  realized  the  uncertainty  of  securing  that  supremacy, 
so  long  as  the  fleets  of  Spain  and  France  were  operating  in  the  West 
Indies,  within  striking  distance  of  the  American  coast.  Differences 
of  opinion  between  the  naval,  as  well  as  the  military  commanders, 
ultimately  proved  fatal  to  the  campaign ;  and  at  this  time,  the  Cabi 
net  was  almost  equally  divided  between  an  assurance  of  easy  victory 
at  the  South,  and  apprehensions  of  the  possible  fruits  of  the  European 
coalition  against  Great  Britain. 

General  Cornwallis  wrote  to  General  Clinton,  April  twenty-third, 
"  My  present  undertaking  sits  heavy  on  my  mind.  I  have  experi 
enced  the  distresses  and  dangers  of  marching  some  hundreds  of 
miles,  in  a  country  chiefly  hostile,  without  one  active  or  useful  friend 
—without  intelligence  and  without  communication  with  any  part  of 
the  country.  The  situation  in  which  I  leave  South  Carolina,  adds 
much  to  my  anxiety  ;  yet  I  am  under  the  necessity  of  adopting  this 
hazardous  enterprise,  hastily,  and  with  the  appearance  of  precipita 
tion,  as  I  find  there  is  no  prospect  of  speedy  reinforcements  from 
Europe ;  and  that  the  return  of  General  Greene  to  North  Carolina, 
either  with  or  without  success,  would  put  a  junction  with  General 
Phillips  out  of  my  power." 


7881. 1  SOUTHERN  CAMPAIGN.  569 

Lord  Cornwallis  began  his  march  from  Wilmington  on  the 
twenty-fifth  of  April,  having  "  remained  eighteen  days  at  that  post, 
to  refresh  and  refit  his  army."  He  sent  orders  to  General  Phillips  to 
march  and  meet  him  at  Petersburg,  then  took  a  direct  route,  via 
Smithfield,  Lewisburg,  and  Halifax  Court  House,  as  indicated  on 
map  "  Outline  of  Atlantic  Coast,"  and  reached  the  designated  ren 
dezvous  without  serious  interruption,  on  the  twentieth  of  May. 
Meanwhile,  General  Phillips  reached  Petersburg  on  the  eighth,  died  of 
sudden  illness  on  the  thirteenth,  and  was  succeeded  in  command  by 
General  Arnold,  pending  the  arrival  of  Lord  Cornwallis.  The  opera 
tions  of  the  Middle  Department  will  be  considered  in  connection 
with  General  La  Fayette's  Virginia  campaign. 

The  movements  of  General  Greene  will  be  first  followed  to  the 
close  of  active  operations  at  the  South. 

During  the  march  to  Rugely's  Mills,  on  the  sixth  of  April,  he  had 
detached  Colonel  Lee  with  orders  to  join  Marion,  and  break  Lord 
Rawdon's  communications  with  Charleston.  Sumter,  already  recov 
ered  from  his  wound  and  restored  to  duty,  was  located  between 
Camclen  and  Ninety-six  ;  and  General  Pickens,  with  militia,  was  in 
structed  to  operate  between  Ninety-six  and  Augusta. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  April,  Lee  and  Marion  captured  Fort 
Watson,  a  post  on  the  Santee  River,  on  the  Charleston  road,  directly 
in  the  rear  of  Camden.  This  capture  was  attended  by  incidents 
which  illustrate  the  minor  operations  of  war.  The  fort  was  a  simple 
stockade,  upon  an  Indian  mound  forty  feet  high,  near  the  Santee, 
and  at  the  upper  end  of  Scott's  Lake.  The  garrison  consisted  of 
eighty  regulars  and  forty  royalists.  The  stockade  was  surrounded  by 
fallen  trees,  doing  service  as  abatis,  but  not  firmly  embedded  in  the 
ground.  The  supply  of  water  for  the  garrison  was  from  the  lake. 
This  was  cut  off.  Then  a  trench  was  dug  to  the  level  of  the  river 
bed,  and  the  garrison  became  independent  of  lake  and  river.  The 
assailants  had  no  artillery,  and  the  range  of  fire  was  over  the  heads 
of  the  garrison.  To  meet  this  emergency  the  ingenious  device  of  a 
log  crib,  filled  with  sand,  was  resorted  to.  From  its  summit,  the 
skilled  riflemen  picked  off  the  garrison,  and  the  fort  surrendered. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Watson,  and  the  immediate  seizure  of  the  passes 
through  the  hills,  cut  off  Lord  Rawdon's  supply-route  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Santee.  Colonel  Watson,  then  en  route  to  Camden  with 
five  hundred  men  to  reinforce  its  garrison,  was  compelled  to  retrace 
his  steps  and  march  up  the  west  bank 


57O  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  [1781. 

The  advance  of  Lee  and  Marion  against  Fort  Watson  had  been 
made  as  early  as  the  fifteenth ;  and  application  was  made  to  General 
Greene  for  one  piece  of  artillery.  The  guns  lost  atGuilford  had  been 
partly  replaced  by  two  which  were  brought  down  from  Oliphant's 
Mills,  at  the  head  of  the  Catawba,  and  Colonel  Harrison  was  then  on 
his  march  with  two  other  pieces  from  the  general  depot  at  Prince 
Edward  Court  House.  A  gun  could  not  be  sent  directly  to  Marion 
without  passing  through  Camden,  and  there  was  no  wagon  road  across 
Pine  Tree  Creek.  Upon  a  report  that  Colonel  Webster  was  approach 
ing  Camden,  Colonel  Carrington  was  ordered  to  take  the  artillery 
and  baggage  back  to  Rugely's  Mills,  and  Captain  Findley  was  to  start 
from  that  point  down  the  Black  River  road  to  join  Marion  with  one 
gun,  so  that  he  might  meet  Watson  in  the  field,  if  he  found  opportu 
nity  to  do  so.  Greene  sent  his  cavalry  to  the  east  bank  of  Pine  Tree 
Creek,  to  anticipate  any  movement  to  cut  off  the  escort  which  accom 
panied  the  gun,  and  advanced  on  the  nineteenth  to  Log  Town,  within 
half  a  mile  of  Camden,  where  he  made  demonstrations  to  the  east 
and  south-east  of  the  town,  but  failed  to  draw  Lord  Rawdon  from  the 
post.  His  own  force  was  too  weak  to  venture  an  assault.  On  the 
twenty-fourth  General  Greene  withdrew  to  Hobkirk  Hill,  and  sent 
orders  to  Colonel  Carrington  to  return  with  the  artillery  and  supplies 
for  the  troops.  That  officer  had  moved  the  guns  and  baggage  to 
Lynch's  Creek,  nearly  eight  miles  beyond  Rugely's  Mills,  so  that  he 
was  unable  to  execute  the  order  of  recall  until  after  nine  o'clock  of 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth.  Rations  were  at  once  distributed 
and  the  troops  were  at  breakfast,  when  the  subsequent  attack  was 
made  upon  their  position  by  Lord  Rawdon.  These  facts  are  given  as 
explanation  of  the  reported  negligence  and  surprise  of  the  American 
camp.  On  the  previous  day  the  following  order  had  been  issued  : 

"CAMP  BEFORE  CAMDEN,  NORTH  QUARTER,    Tuesday,  April  24tA. 

"  The  general  orders  respecting  passes  are  punctually  to  be  observed. 
None  are  to  be  granted  but  by  commandants  of  corps.  The  rolls  are  to 
be  called  at  least  three  times  a  day,  and  all  absentees  reported  and 
punished.  Officers  of  every  rank  are  to  confine  themselves  to  their  re 
spective  duties.  And  every  part  of  the  army  must  be  in  readiness  to 
stand  at  arms  at  a  moment's  warning" 

The  battle  of  Hobkirk's  Hill,  sometimes  and  quite  correctly  called 
the  battle  of  Camden,  occurred  on  the  following  day.  General  Greene 
had  sent  orders  to  Marion  to  join  him  as  soon  as  he  should  reduce 


I78i.j  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  5/1 

Fort  Watson,  and  that  officer  started  for  the  main  army  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  twenty-third.  Lord  Rawdon  was  advised  of  this  movement, 
and  resolved  to  attack  his  adversary  before  he  could  be  thus  reinforced. 
He  had  also  learned  from  a  deserter  that  Colonel  Carrington  had  been 
sent  to  Rugely's  Mills  with  the  artillery,  but  had  not  been  advised  of 
his  return.  Reference  is  made  to  maps,  "  Battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill," 
and  "  Operations  in  Southern  States." 

Hobkirk's  Hill  is  described  as  a  narrow  sand  ridge  of  very  little 
elevation,  which  separates  the  head  springs  of  two  small  branches,  the 
one  running  into  the  Wateree,  the  other  into  Pine  Tree  Creek.  It 
was  quite  thickly  wooded,  quite  abrupt  toward  Camden,  sloping  more 
gradually,  eastward,  and  protected  from  approach  on  the  east  and 
north-east  by  impassable  swamps. 

The  country  between  the  hill  and  Log  Town  was  also  covered  by 
trees  and  thick  shrubbery  ;  from  Log  Town  to  Camden  the  woods  had 
been  cut  down,  to  prevent  their  being  used  to  cover  an  advancing 
enemy.  When  Lord  Rawdon  understood  General  Greene's  position, 
he  placed  the  post  in  charge  of  convalescents  from  the  general  hos 
pital,  and  by  a  detour  to  the  east,  attempted  to  surprise  the  American 
camp.  Lord  Rawdon  had  already  been  advised  by  Colonel  Balfour, 
that  the  Commander-in-chief  had  directed  the  abandonment  of  Cam 
den  ;  but  the  operations  of  Greene,  Marion,  Lee  and  Sumter,  had 
rendered  such  a  movement  impracticable.  On  that  account  he  had 
directed  Colonel  Watson  to  join  him.  His  protracted  delay,  through 
the  movements  of  the  American  partisan  corps,  left  the  post  greatly 
exposed.  Several  skirmishes  had  already  taken  place  near  Camden, 
and  Tarleton  states  that  "  Lord  Rawdon  had  learned  from  prisoners, 
that  "  Greene's  army  was  not  by  any  means  so  numerous  as  he  had 
apprehended,  but  that  considerable  reinforcements  were  expected. 
To  balance  this  he  received  the  unfavorable  intelligence  that  Marion 
had  already  taken  such  a  position  as  rendered  it  impracticable  for 
Colonel  Watson  to  join  him." 

The  command,  consisting  of  about  nine  hundred  men,  with  fifty 
dragoons,  marched  at  ten  o'clock,  and  by  filing  close  to  the  swamp 
on  their  right,  gained  the  woods  unperceived.  This  route  of  march 
also  carried  the  British  column  to  the  left  of  the  American  front, 
which  had  less  natural  strength,  and  brought  on  an  immediate  skir 
mish  with  the  pickets,  nearly  a  mile  from  the  camp.  These  were 
commanded  by  Captains  Benson  and  Morgan,  of  Virginia,  besides 
Kirkwood's  small  detachment  of  Delaware  troops.  The  resistance  was 


572  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  [1781. 

so  efficient  as  to  delay  the  advance  until  the  American  line  was 
formed. 

The  Sixty-third  British  regiment  formed  the  right,  the  New  York 
volunteers  the  centre,  and  the  king's  Americans  the  left,  of  the  first 
line.  The  Volunteers  of  Ireland  on  the  right,  and  Captain  Robert 
son's  detachment,  formed  a  supporting  line  ;  and  the  South  Carolina 
regiment  and  the  dragoons  were  still  in  reserve.  The  front  was  too 
narrow,  and  the  plan  of  General  Greene  was  well  designed  to  envelop 
and  crush  it.  The  secondary  diagram  on  the  map  indicates  that 
plan.  The  American  right  wing  consisted  of  General  Huger's  bri 
gade,  with  the  regiments  of  Lieutenant-colonels  Campbell  and  Hawes  ; 
and  the  left  wing,  under  Colonel  Gunby  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Ford, 
Colonel  Williams  commanding.  It  was  quite  similar  to  the  formation 
of  the  reserve  line  at  the  battle  of  Guilford.  The  North  Carolina 
militia,  consisting  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  under  Colonel 
Reade,  formed  the  reserve,  but  took  no  part  in  the  action.  The  artil 
lery,  three  guns,  under  Colonel  Harrison,  just  arrived,  was  masked  in 
the  centre,  and  orders  were  given  for  the  regiments  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  guns  to  open  for  their  fire ;  and  then  to  "  charge  the  enemy 
with  the  bayonet,  withholding  their  own  fire  until  the  British  line  was 
broken."  The  regiments  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  line,  were  to 
left  and  right  oblique,  upon  the  respective  flanks  of  the  advancing 
enemy.  Much  confidence  was  felt  in  the  assurance  that  Lord  Raw- 
don  was  unadvised  of  the  return  of  the  artillery,  and  implicit  reliance 
was  placed  upon  the  regiments  at  the  centre.  Colonel  Washington 
was  sent  to  double  the  right  flank  and  take  them  in  the  rear." 

Lord  Rawdon  quickly  perceived  that  his  front  was  too  contracted, 
and  as  at  Guilford,  the  reserves  were  brought  up  to  equal  the  front 
of  the  enemy.  Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell  with  the  Sixty-third 
British  regiment  and  the  king's  Americans  pressed  on  firmly,  notwith 
standing  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  while  Campbell  on  the  right,  and 
Ford  on  the  left  of  the  American  line,  were  descending  the  hill  with 
spirit,  in  accordance  with  the  plan  of  battle.  Both  of  the  British 
wings,  brought  up  so  hurriedly  to  the  support  of  the  original  column, 
began  to  give  way  under  pressure.  Ford  fell,  severely  wounded, 
and  his  men  hesitated  in  their  advance.  Captain  Beatty  on  the  right 
of  Colonel  Gunby's  regiment,  was  mortally  wounded.  His  own  com 
pany  on  the  right  of  the  regiment,  began  a  hasty  firing,  and  almost 
immediately  after,  fell  back  in  disorder.  It  was  the  critical  moment 
of  the  battle.  The  interval  thus  made,  was  filled  by  the  British  ad- 


178I.J  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  573 

vance,  and  Colonel  Gunby  made  the  grand  mistake  of  retiring  the 
other  companies,  to  re-form  the  regiment.  This  movement,  says 
Greene,  "gave  the  whole  regiment  an  idea  of  a  retreat,  which  soon 
spread  through  the  Second  regiment,  which  fell  back  accordingly. 
They  both  rallied  afterwards,  but  it  was  too  late.  The  enemy  had 
gained  the  eminence,  silenced  the  artillery,  and  obliged  us  to  haul 
it  off." 

Greene  himself  pulled  at  the  drag  ropes  to  encourage  his  men, 
and,  "  the  guns  were  simply  hauled  into  the  bushes  at  the  rear 
of  the  hill ;  and  overlooked  by  the  British  troops  in  their  brief 
pursuit." 

Tarleton  says,  "  They  pursued  three  miles  ;  but  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  being  superior  to  the  British,  their  dragoons  could  not  risk  much  ; 
and  Lord  Rawdon  would  not  suffer  the  infantry  to  break  their  order 
for  any  benefit  that  might  be  expected  from  a  pursuit  of  the 
fugitives." 

Meanwhile  Colonel  Washington  had  made  a  complete  circuit  as 
far  as  Log  Town,  capturing  or  parolling  as  he  went;  but  the  defeat 
of  the  American  centre  spoiled  General  Greene's  well  arranged  plan 
of  battle.  Tarleton  says,  "  a  part  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  under 
Colonel  Washington,  either  by  design,  or  through  ignorance  of  the 
state  of  the  action,  came  round  to  the  rear,  and  exacted  paroles  from 
some  of  the  British  officers  who  lay  wounded  in  the  field  ;  they  like 
wise  carried  off  several  wounded  men."  The  design  of  General 
Greene  was  based  upon  confidence  in  his  best  troops. 

Great  discrepancies  occur  in  the  statements  as  to  General  Greene's 
force.  These  statements  seem  to  have  a  simple  solution.  The  returns 
of  April  twenty-sixth,  the  day  after  the  action,  show  present  for  duty, 
eleven  hundred  and  eighty-four  men  ;  but  contain  no  column  of  total 
numbers.  The  addition  of  the  casualties  makes  that  total  fourteen 
hundred  and  forty-six  men,  which  is  very  near  Lossing's  figures. 
Chief-Justice  Marshall  states  the  number  of  Continental  troops  en 
gaged  in  -the  action  to  have  rather  exceeded  twelve  hundred.  Ram 
sey  and  Gordon,  and  those  who  adopted  their  figures,  omit  the  cas 
ualties  of  the  day. 

The  American  loss  included  Captain  Beatty,  one  sergeant  and 
eighteen  men  killed^  Lieutenant-colonels  Ford  and  Campbell,  Cap 
tain  J.  Smith,  1st  Maryland,  Captain  Dunholm,  Virginia,  Captain 
(Lieutenant)  Bruff,  Maryland,  Lieutenant  Galloway,  Maryland,  Lieu 
tenant  Ball,  Virginia,  and  one  hundred  and  eight  men,  wounded,  three- 


574  SOUTHERN  CAMPAIGN.  [1781, 

sergeants  and  one  hundred  and  thirty-three  men  missing.  Of  the 
last  number,  some  were  killed,  and  forty-seven  were  known  to  be 
wounded,  and  prisoners.  Total  casualties,  two  hundred  and  seventy- 
one. 

The  British  loss  was  one  officer  and  thirty-eight  men  killed, 
twelve  officers  and  two  hundred  and  seven  men  wounded  and  miss 
ing.  Total  casualties,  two  hundred  and  fifty-eight. 

General  Greene  retired  to  Rugely's  Mills,  and  Lord  Rawdon  fell 
back  to  Camden. 

"  The  victory  at  Hobkirk's  Hill,"  says  Stedman,  "  like  that  at 
Guilford  Court  House  ....  produced  no  consequence  beneficial 
to  the  British  interest."  "Even  in  Charleston  itself,  many  of  the 
inhabitants,  although  awed  and  restrained  by  the  presence  of  the 
garrison,  gave  signs  of  evident  dissatisfaction.  Sumter  on  the  north 
west  frontier,  and  Marion  on  the  north-east,  had  kept  alive  the 
embers  of  revolt ;  but  they  now  burst  forth  in  a  flame,  as  soon 
as  intelligence  was  received  that  General  Greene  had  entered  the 
province." 

On  the  seventh  of  May,  Colonel  Watson  joined  Lord  Rawdon, 
and  General  Greene  declined  to  be  drawn  into  battle. 

On  the  ninth  of  May,  such  stores  as  could  not  be  removed  were 
destroyed,  and  on  the  tenth,  Lord  Rawdon  evacuated  Camden  and 
retired  to  Monk's  Corner. 

Fort  Mott  surrendered  to  Lee  and  Marion  on  the  twelfth.  This 
fort  was  a  stockade  defense,  built  around  a  private  mansion.  Mrs. 
Rebecca  Mott,  the  owner,  furnished  General  Marion  with  an  East 
India  bow  and  arrows,  with  which  combustible  missiles  were  shot  upon 
the  roof,  to  fire  the  building. 

On  the  eleventh  of  May,  General  Sumter  occupied  Orangeburg. 

On  the  fifteenth,  Lee  reduced  Granby. 

On  the  fifth  of  June,  Augusta  surrendered,  having  been  under 
observation,  and  practically  under  siege,  from  the  sixteenth  of  April, 
when  the  Georgia  militia  under  Colonels  Williams,  Baker  and  Ham 
mond  first  established  their  camp  within  gun-shot  of  the  defenses. 
Pickens,  Lee  and  Clark  afterward  participated  in  the  siege.  As  in 
the  case  of  Fort  Watson  a  log  crib,  filled  with  sand,  called  "  a  May- 
ham  tower,"  from  Lieutenant-colonel  Mayham  who  devised  it,  in  the 
first  instance,  during  the  siege  of  Fort  Watson,  was  a  prominent 
element  in  securing  command  of  the  defenses.  The  garrison  was 
largely  made  up  of  Indian  auxiliaries 


I78i.J  SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  575 

General  Greene  was  before  Ninety-six,  as  early  as  the  twenty-first 
of  May.  Kosciusko  planned  the  approaches. 

On  the  seventh  of  June,  Lord  Rawdon  left  Charleston  with  the 
flank  companies  of  three  regiments  which  had  just  arrived,  and  on  the 
twenty-first  the  siege  was  raised,  after  the  condition  of  the  garrison 
had  become  critical.  General  Greene  retired  northward,  was  followed 
by  Lord  Rawdon  as  far  as  the  Ennoree,  and  eventually  retired  behind 
the  Tyger  and  Broad  Rivers.  Upon  learning  that  Lord  Rawdon  had 
abandoned  Ninety-six  and  divided  his  forces,  to  cover  the  outposts 
of  Charleston,  General  Greene  ordered  his  hospital  and  baggage, 
then  at  Winnsborough  to  be  transferred  to  Camden,  and  marched 
his  army  to  the  High  Hills  of  Santee,  for  rest,  during  the  extreme 
summer  heat.  While  operations  at  the  extreme  south  were  gradually 
losing  magnitude  and  the  operations  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  the 
movements  of  armies,  the  partisan  skirmishes  were  constant,  and  bit 
terly  conducted. 

At  Quinby  Bridge,  July  seventeenth,  at  Monk's  Corner,  at  Dor 
chester  on  Cooper  River,  almost  to  the  Charleston  picket  lines,  and 
through  the  entire  region  so  recently  occupied  by  the  British  troops, 
the  activities  and  antagonisms  of  local  warfare  were  uninterrupted  by 
the  summer's  heat,  and  the  short  repose  of  the  main  armies. 

Little  quarter  was  given  in  contests  between  Americans,  and  the 
adventures  of  Sumter,  Lee,  Marion,  and  Wade  Hampton,  Horry, 
and  royalist  partisan  leaders,  would  fill  volumes.  They  definitely 
illustrate  the  misguided  policy  which  attended  the  prosecution  of  the 
war.  The  British  army  was  numerically  unequal  to  the  demands 
upon  its  service  ;  and  the  substitution  of  proclamations,  confiscations, 
and  hanging,  only  multiplied  enemies,  without  securing  respect  or 
obedience.  Colonel  Balfour,  the  post  commander  at  Charleston,  was 
an  energetic  commander;  but  the  lawless  execution  of  Colonel 
Haynes  without  a  trial,  and  other  deeds  of  extreme  severity,  tarnished 
his  name,  and  the  acquiescence  of  Lord  Rawdon  in  his  action  in  that 
single  case,  called  forth  from  the  Duke  of  Richmond  and  other  leading 
statesmen  unqualified  reprobation. 

The  British  army  could  not  protect.  The  American  army  could 
not  rescue.  The  frightful  elements  of  civil  war  penetrated  all  neigh 
borhoods.  There  was  no  such  place  as  home.  Too  often  in  the 
extremity  of  the  struggle  there  was  no  such  thing  as  family.  The 
bitterest  foes  were  those  within  the  household.  The  waste  of  war 
was  slowly  wearing  out  the  war  itself. 


SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN.  [1781 


BRITISH   EFFECTIVE   FORCE   IN   AMERICA. 

NOTE.     From  "Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office.     Date  May  1st,  1781. 

New  York 12,257         East  Florida 438 

On  an  Expedition 1,782         West  Florida 1,185 

under  General  Leslie 2,278         Nova  Scotia  3,130 

"         Arnold....  1,553         Bermuda 366 

"         Phillips....  2,116         Providence  Island 128 

South  Carolina 7,254         Georgia. 887 

27,240  6,134 
33,374- 


t 


m«^apj-^s  .*  *>^^* 


^  ^°r  *-  -"-"  ^~ «  4  ^"^T"  ^ 
-  v  ^AmencanPilkct-.-'^  ~t  « 

A?i-"-A  -1-^1.  •—  - 


<o»yirfsd  and tfram  fyfbf.  (arrzngton 

576 


CHAPTER   LXXI. 

BATTLE   OF  EUTAW  SPRINGS.    CLOSING  EVENTS  OF  THE 
CAMPAIGN.     1781. 

LORD  RAWDON  sailed  homeward  to  recruit  his  health,  but 
was  taken  prisoner  by  Count  de  Grasse,  and  carried  to  Chesa 
peake  Bay,  where  Cornwallis  soon  shared  his  fortunes.  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Stewart  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  British  army  in  the 
Southern  Department,  with  headquarters  at  Orangeburg,  South 
Carolina.  General  Greene,  who  had  been  resting  his  army  at  the 
High  Hills  of  the  Santee,  had  been  reinforced  by  seven  hundred  con 
tinental  troops  from  North  Carolina  under  General  Jethro  Sumner, 
and  marched  with  very  nearly  two  thousand  six  hundred  men,  on  the 
twenty-second  of  August,  to  engage  the  British  army.  Orders  had 
been  sent  to  Lee,  Marion,  and  Pickens  to  join  his  command.  Colonel 
Stewart  fell  back  forty  miles,  and  established  his  camp  at  Eutaw 
Springs.  See  map  "  Battle  of  Eutaw  Springs."  This  movement  was 
not  made  under  fear  of  attack,  but  to  secure  supplies  for  his  army. 
He  states  the  matter  squarely,  in  his  official  report  to  Earl  Cornwallis, 
as  follows,  "The  army  under  my  command  being  much  in  want  of 
necessaries,  and  there  being  at  the  same  time  a  convoy  of  provisions 
on  the  march  from  Charleston,  which  would  have  necessarily  obliged 
me  to  make  a  detachment  of  at  least  four  hundred  men  (which  at  the 
time  I  could  ill  afford,  the  army  being  much  weakened  by  sickness)  to 
meet  the  convoy  at  Martin's,  fifty-six  miles  from  camp,  I  therefore 
thought  it  advisable  to  retire  by  slow  marches  to  the  Eutaws,  where 
I  might  have  an  opportunity  of  receiving  my  supplies,  and  disen 
cumber  myself  from  the  sick,  without  risking  my  escorts,  or  suffer 
myself  to  be  attacked  to  disadvantage,  should  the  enemy  have  crossed 
the  Congaree." 

On  the  seventh  of  September,  General  Greene  encamped  at  Bui- 
dell's  plantation,  on  the  Santee  River,  seven  miles  from  Eutaw  Springs. 
37 


5/8  BATTLE  OF  EUTAW   SPRINGS.  [1781 

On  the  eighth  of  September,  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  was 
fought.  It  was  the  last  battle  of  the  last  Southern  campaign  of  the 
war,  and  its  conditions  and  results  are  therefore  material  elements  to 
complete  this  narrative.  Colonel  Stewart  learned  of  the  position  of 
General  Greene's  camp,  as  he  states  in  his  official  report,  from  two 
deserters,  about  six  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

Stedman  says,  "  Unfortunately,  their  report  was  neither  credited 
nor  inquired  into ;  but  they  themselves  were  sent  to  prison."  Sted 
man  was  not  present,  and  Colonel  Stewart's  report  credits  the  desert 
ers  with  information  upon  which,  in  part,  he  acted.  Major  Coffin  had, 
however,  been  previously  dispatched  with  one  hundred  and  forty 
infantry  and  fifty  cavalry,  in  order  to  gain  intelligence  of  the  enemy ; 
and  he  reported  that  they  appeared  in  force  in  front,  then  about  four 
miles  from  camp.  Colonel  Stewart  adds,  "  Finding  the  enemy  in 
force  so  near  me,  I  determined  to  fight  them  ;  as,  from  their  numer 
ous  cavalry,  it  seemed  to  be  attended  with  dangerous  consequences, 
I  immediately  formed  the  line  of  battle,  with  the  right  of  the  army 
to  Eutaw  Branch,  and  its  left  crossing  the  road  leading  to  Roche's 
plantation,  leaving  a  corps  on  a  commanding  situation  to  cover  the 
Charleston  road,  and  to  act  as  a  reserve." 

The  line  was  in  the  woods,  in  advance  of  the  camp,  and  the  tents 
were  left  standing.  Major  Majoribanks  was  on  the  extreme  right,  in 
a  close  thicket,  nearly  covered  from  sight.  The  Third  British,  known 
as  the  "  Irish  Buffs,"  which  landed  on  the  third  of  June,  constituted 
the  right  wing  proper,  with  the  American  Royalists  under  Lieuten 
ant-colonel  Cruger  at  the  centre ;  and  the  Sixty-third  and  Sixty- 
fourth  British  took  position  on  the  left.  A  small  reserve  of  infantry 
with  Captain  Coffin's  detachment,  constituted  the  remainder  of  the 
British  force,  which  did  not  exceed  two  thousand  men,  all  told. 
"  Major  Sheridan  with  a  detachment  of  New  York  volunteers  took 
post  in  a  house,  to  check  the  enemy  should  they  attempt  to  pass  it." 
This  brick  house  and  its  garden  fence,  (palisaded,)  proved  as  efficient 
a  point  of  resistance,  as  did  the  Chew  house,  at  the  battle  of  Brandy- 
wine. 

General  Greene  advanced  early  in  the  morning,  leaving  his  camp  a 
little  after  four  o'clock  of  the  eighth  of  September.  "  The  front  was 
composed,"  according  to  his  official  report,  "  of  four  small  battalions 
of  militia,  two  of  North,  and  two  of  South  Carolina."  General  Marion 
commanded  the  right  wing,  and  General  Pickens  the  left  wing.  Colo 
nel  Malmady  commanded  the  centre,  which  was  composed  of  North 


1781.]  BATTLE   OF   EUTAW   SPRINGS,  579 

Carolina  militia,  with  a  small  artillery  detachment  under  Lieutenant 
Gaines,  and  two  three-pounders,  which  rested  on  the  road.  "  The 
second  line  consisted  of  three  small  brigades  of  continental  troops, 
one  of  North  Carolina,  one  of  Virginia,  and  one  of  Maryland," — 
respectively  under  the  command  of  General  Sumner,  Colonel  Camp 
bell,  and  Colonel  Williams.  Two  six-pounders  under  Captain  Brown 
were  on  the  road.  Lieutenant-colonel  Washington,  with  his  cavalry, 
and  the  Delaware  troops  (Kirkwood's)  formed  the  body  of  the  reserve. 
Lieutenant-colonel  Lee  with  his  legion  covered  the  right  flank,  and 
Lieutenant-colonel  Henderson,  with  the  State  troops,  the  left.  The 
American  force  slightly  exceeded  twenty-three  hundred  men.  Such 
were  the  relative  tactical  positions  of  the  armies ;  but  the  fighting  was 
less  systematic  than  the  artificial  formations.  Some  matter-of-fact 
elements,  much  less  formal,  preceded  the  struggle.  A  portion  of  the 
British  army  had  been  sent  out  to  dig  sweet  potatoes,  which  were 
just  ripe,  and  were  much  liked  by  the  soldiers.  Colonel  Stewart  says, 
nearly  at  the  close  of  his  report,  "  I  omitted  to  inform  your  lordship, 
in  its  proper  place,  of  the  armies  having  for  some  time  been  much  in 
want  of  bread,  there  being  no  old  corn,  or  mills,  near  me.  I  was, 
therefore,  under  the  necessity  of  sending  out  rooting  parties,  from 
each  corps,  under  an  officer,  to  collect  potatoes  every  morning  at  day 
break  ;  and  unfortunately,  that  of  the  flank  battalions  and  "  Buffs  " 
having  gone  too  far,  in  front,  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  before  the 
action  began,  which  not  only  weakened  my  line,  but  increased  their 
number  of  prisoners." 

The  rooting  party  thus  found  the  vanguard  of  General  Greene's 
army,  which  they  were  not  seeking,  and  left  the  sweet  potatoes  which 
they  were  seeking,  with  all  possible  energy ;  and  the  pursuit  of  the 
rooting  party,  unarmed  as  they  were,  imparted  vigor  to  the  American 
advance,  and  increased  the  number  of  prisoners  afterwards  reported. 
Captain  Coffin,  who  had  been  sent  to  the  front,  also  had  a  short  skir 
mish  three  miles  before  the  British  camp ;  and  left  forty  of  his  men 
in  the  hands  of  the  Americans.  Some  of  his  party  were  killed. 

As  nearly  all  critical  events  in  human  history  have  their  minor 
determining  issues,  so  this  final  battle  of  the  Southern  campaign  of 
the  war  under  notice,  is  easily  brought  to  plain  solution. 

The  American  army  was  superior  in  numbers,  and  was  well-offi 
cered.  The  preliminary  skirmish  with  Coffin,  and  the  surprise  of  the 
rooting  party,  imparted  zest  to  their  advance.  It  was  nearly  nine 
o'clock  when  the  opposing  forces  met  in  battle,  and  the  artillery  fire 


580  BATTLE  OF  EUTAW   SPRINGS.  [1781. 

on  either  side,  was  limited  to  the  range  of  the  road.  The  "  distribu 
tion  of  the  British  artillery  through  their  line,"  referred  to  by  several 
historians,  was  simply  the  location  of  three  guns  in  the  centre  of  a 
small  front  of  a  few  hundred  yards  ;  and  both  armies  fought  under 
the  shade  of  forest  trees,  where  the  American  army  had  every  advan 
tage  of  position,  and  where  individual  merit  had  its  best  opportunity. 

This  battle  illustrates  the  fair  average  of  military  transactions, 
when  stripped  of  the  poetical  adornments  which  deceive  youthful 
aspirants  for  glory,  and  enthuse  the  people  with  frenzied  excitement 
over  victories  won. 

Fighting  is  hard  work.  The  beautiful  formation  of  parade  van 
ishes  in  the  field.  The  word  "steady"  means  just  that;  but  the 
idea  of  perfect  self-possession,  so  that  depleted  regiments  unite  again 
as  fast  as  men  fall,  and  the  aggregate  loss  is  simply  a  diminution  of  a 
promptly  closed-up  front,  is  theoretical  and  impossible.  The  morale, 
or  inertia  of  an  army,  gives  it  physical  power  ;  and  this  is  made  up 
of  elements  which  must  come  out  of  fixed  conditions.  These  condi 
tions  are,  either  an  exact  and  patient  training,  or  the  impulsion  which 
comes  from  some  overwhelming  passion.  Concord,  Lexington,  and 
Bunker  Hill  illustrate  the  latter  ;  and  both  the  British  and  Hessian 
troops  almost  invariably  demonstrated  the  value  of  the  first  condition. 
The  American  continental  army,  so  far  as  permanent,  acquired  like 
discipline,  and  their  battalions  suffer  very  little  discount,  when  en 
gaged  under  equal  circumstances  with  their  opponents. 

The  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  was  well  fought,  until  the  battle,  like 
that  of  Bennington,  promised  a  short  march  to  easy  victory,  and  then 
license  supplanted  discipline,  and  vanquished  victory. 

The  action  began  between  the  artillery  detachments,  and  their  fire 
was  maintained  with  much  vigor,  until  one  of  the  British  and  two  of 
the  American  pieces  were  dismounted.  The  British  left  wing,  "  by 
an  unknown  mistake,"  says  Colonel  Stewart,  "  advanced  and  drove 
the  militia  and  North  Carolinians  before  them  ;  but  unexpectedly 
finding  the  Virginia  and  Maryland  line  ready  formed,  and  at  the 
same  time  receiving  a  heavy  fire,  occasioned  some  confusion."  The 
North  Carolina  militia,  however,  fired  seventeen  rounds  before  their 
retreat,  and  Sumner  so  promptly  pushed  the  battalions  of  Ashe,  Arm 
strong  and  Blount  into  the  gap,  that  the  first  line  was  restored,  and 
the  British  in  turn  retreated.  The  reserve  then  came  to  their  sup 
port.  The  American  second  line  was  promptly  brought  up,  at  a 
bayonet  charge,  and  the  British  left  wing  in  turn  gave  way. 


1781.]  BATTLE   OF   EUTAW   SPRINGS.  58! 

Colonel  Henderson  was  wounded  early  in  the  action,  and  Lieuten 
ant-colonel  Wade  Hampton  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  cavalry 
on  the  left  flank.  Washington,  with  Kirkwood,  advanced  toward  the 
position  occupied  by  Majoribanks,  and  Lee  threatened  the  British 
left.  The  bayonet  charge  led  by  Colonel  Williams  shattered  the 
British  left  wing.  The  troops  broke  into  disorder  and  fled  through 
their  camp  to  the  cover  of  the  house  already  occupied  by  Major 
Sheridan.  While  the  British  officers  were  rallying  their  men  and 
forming  the  line  anew,  and  obliquely  to  the  left,  across  the  open 
ground  behind  their  camp,  a  portion  of  the  American  troops  were 
plundering  the  tents,  drinking  rum,  and  sacrificing  the  partial  success 
already  attained. 

The  position  of  Major  Majoribanks  was  such  as  to  endanger  the 
American  left  wing.  Colonel  Washington  attempting  in  vain  to  dis 
lodge  him,  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  together  with  nearly 
forty  of  his  men.  The  thicket  was  too  dense  for  the  movement  of 
cavalry,  and  the  men  were  taken,  one  by  one,  without  opportunity  to 
resist.  Kirkwood  and  Hampton  made  a  similar  attempt  with  persis 
tent  valor,  but  Majoribanks  only  retired  to  a  still  stronger  position, 
and  eventually  behind  the  palisades  of  the  garden. 

General  Greene  made  every  possible  effort  to  restore  his  line,  but 
no  troops  could  withstand  the  hot  fire  to  which  they  were  exposed. 
The  artillerymen  were  in  open  ground,  and  nearly  every  one  fell  upon 
the  field.  The  house  which  Sheridan  occupied,  had  windows  in  the 
roof,  and  was  practically,  as  General  Greene  reports  it,  a  three  story 
house.  Finding  its  capture  impossible,  and  that  his  men  were  exposed 
to  absolute  slaughter,  he  abandoned  the  guns  and  retired  to  Burdell's 
plantation.  The  battle  was  one  of  great  activity  on  both  sides.  The 
unarmed  rooting  party  of  course  carried  back  with  them  an  element 
of  disorder.  The  British  left,  made  up  of  the  veteran  Sixty-third  and 
Sixty-fourth,  had  served  during  the  war  from  their  landing  on  Staten 
Island  in  1779  (see  page  200).  They  made  an  unauthorized  plunge 
upon  the  American  centre  to  capture  its  guns,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
fight,  and  lost  confidence  by  the  repulse  which  attended  the  advance 
of  Sumner.  The  bayonet  charge  of  Williams  and  Campbell  which 
followed,  was  efficient  and  determining.  The  conduct  of  Majoribanks 
was  equally  opportune,  on  the  British  right.  The  occupation  of  the 
brick  house  and  garden,  and  the  plunder  of  the  British  camp,  taken 
together,  saved  Colonel  Stewart's  army. 

The  American    casualties  are    given  by  General  Greene,  as  one 


582  BATTLE   OF  EUTAW   SPRINGS.  [1781, 

lieutenant-colonel,  six  captains,  five  subalterns,  four  sergeants,  and 
ninety-eight  rank  and  file,  killed  ;  two  lieutenant-colonels,  seven  cap 
tains,  twenty  lieutenants,  twenty-four  sergeants,  and  two  hundred 
and  nine  rank  and  file  wounded.  Total  casualties  four  hundred  and 
eight. 

The  British  casualties  are  given  by  Colonel  Stewart  as  three  com 
missioned  officers,  six  sergeants,  and  seventy-six  men,  killed  ;  sixteen 
commissioned  officers,  twenty  sergeants,  and  two  hundred  and  thirty- 
two  men  missing.  Total  casualties,  six  hundred  and  ninety-three. 

On  the  night  of  the  ninth,  Colonel  Stewart  retired  to  Monk's 
Corner,  having  broken  up  and  abandoned  one  thousand  stand  of  arms 
which  he  threw  into  the  river,  and  left  seventy  wounded  men  to  the 
care  of  the  Americans. 

Stedman  says,  "  both  armies  had  suffered  so  much  that  for  some 
time  afterwards  neither  of  them  was  in  a  situation  to  undertake  any 
thing  against  the  other,"  and  adds,  "  Indeed  this  was  the  last  action 
of  any  consequence  that  happened  in  South  Carolina  between  the 
king's  troops  and  the  Americans.  The  former,  from  this  time  chiefly 
confined  themselves  to  Charleston  Neck  and  some  posts  in  its  neigh 
borhood,  the  security  of  the  town  appearing  to  be  their  principal 
object ;  and  General  Greene,  either  was  not  or  did  not  think  himself 
in  sufficient  force  to  attempt  to  reduce  it." 

Tarleton  says,  "  It  is  impossible  to  do  justice  to  the  spirit,  patience 
and  invincible  fortitude  displayed  by  the  commanders,  officers  and 
soldiers  during  these  dreadful  campaigns  in  the  two  Carolinas.  They 
had  not  only  to  contend  with  men,  and  these  by  no  means  deficient 
in  bravery  and  enterprise,  but  they  encountered  and  surmounted 
difficulties  and  fatigues  from  the  climate  and  the  country,  which 
would  appear  insuperable  in  theory,  and  almost  incredible  in  the 
relations."  .  .  .  "  During  the  greater  part  of  the  time  they  were 
totally  destitute  of  bread,  and  the  country  afforded  no  vegetables  for 
a  substitute.  Salt  at  length  failed,  and  their  only  resources  were 
water  and  the  wild  cattle  which  they  found  in  the  woods.  In  the  last 
expedition  fifty  men  perished  through  mere  fatigue."  .  .  "  We 
must  not,  however,  confine  the  praise  entirely  to  the  British  troops  ; 
as  a  detachment  of  Hessians  which  had  been  lent  upon  the  occasion 
by  General  De  Bose,  deservedly  came  in  for  their  proper  share.  The 
same  justice  requires  that  the  Americans  should  not  be  deprived  of 
their  share  of  this  fatal  glory.  They  had  the  same  difficulties  to  en 
counter,  joined  to  a  fortune  on  the  field  generally  adverse  ;  yet  on 


l?8i.J  BATTLE  OF  EUTAW   SPRINGS.  $83 

the  whole  the  campaign  terminated  in  their  favor,  General  Greene 
having  recovered  the  far  greater  part  of  Georgia  and  the  two 
Carolinas." 

On  the  twelfth,  General  Greene  crossed  the  Santee  at  Nelson's 
Ferry,  and  on  the  fifteenth  was  at  his  old  camp  at  the  High  Hills. 
Pickens,  Marion  and  Hampton  resumed  their  partisan  operations,  and 
Greene's  army  was  soon  reduced  to  less  than  a  thousand  effective 
men,  with  nearly  six  hundred  wounded  men  from  the  two  armies  in 
his  charge. 

One  Hector  O'Neal  with  a  party  of  royalists  captured  Hillsborough, 
and  made  Governor  Burke  and  the  council  prisoners,  but  was  killed, 
during  his  retreat  to  Wilmington,  by  a  party  of  militia. 

On  the  ninth  of  November,  General  Greene's  camp  was  enlivened 
by  official  information  of  the  surrender  of  CornwalHs. 

On  the  eighteenth  the  High  Hills  were  again  abandoned,  and 
numerous  minor  operations  concluded  the  Southern  campaign  of  1781. 

It  was  a  constant  struggle  to  secure  troops,  food,  medicines  and 
ammunition,  while  the  garrison  of  Charleston  had  been  increased  to  an 
effective  force  of  nearly  six  thousand  men  ;  but  the  armies  did  not 
again  meet  in  the  field. 


CHAPTER   LXXII. 

LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.     CONDITION  OF  THE  TWO 

ARMIES. 

ON  the  twentieth  of  February,  1781,  Congress  resolved  that  a 
portion  of  the  Pennsylvania  line,  then  near  Lancaster,  and 
which  had  been  engaged  in  the  previous  mutiny,  should  be  ordered 
to  the  south,  to  constitute  a  part  of  the  southern  army.  This  was 
predicated  upon  the  landing  of  a  British  force  at  Wilmington,  on  the 
Cape  Fear  River.  That  force,  however,  had  been  magnified  beyond  its 
real  importance  ;  and  the  ultimate  increase  of  the  British  army  in  Vir 
ginia  gradually  modified  the  disposition  of  the  detachment  referred  to. 
On  the  same  day,  General  La  Fayette  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  troops  then  assembled  at  Peekskill,  having,  as  his  specific 
objective  of  operations,  a  rapid  march  to  Virginia,  to  capture  Bene 
dict  Arnold.  Owing  to  the  temporary  reduction  of  the  British  fleet 
at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  by  the  storm  of  January  twenty-second, 
before  noticed,  M.  Destouches,  then  commanding,  vice  Admiral  Ter- 
nay,  deceased,  agreed  to  send  one  ship  of  the  line  and  two  frigates  to 
Chesapeake  Bay,  to  prevent  Arnold's  escape.  The  letters  of  Count  de 
Rochambeau  show  that  he  consented  to  send  a  detachment  of  French 
troops  also  ;  but  this  he  states,  "  was  thought  to  be  unnecessary  and 
inexpedient  as  the  movement  was  intended  to  be  rapid  ; — it  being 
presumed  that  the  continental  troops  and  militia,  in  Virginia,  were 
sufficient  to  operate  against  Arnold  by  land."  This  small  naval 
detachment,  commanded  by  M.  De  Tully,  sailed  from  Newport  on 
the  ninth  of  February,  and  captured  the  British  frigate  Romulus, 
44,  in  Lynn  Haven  Bay,  as  well  as  two  privateers,  and  eight  other 
prizes  ;  but  the  L'Eveille,  64,  drew  too  much  water  to  ascend  the 
Elizabeth  River  where  Arnold  had  withdrawn  his  few  light  frigates : — 
the  Surveillante  grounded,  and  the  vessels  returned  to  Newport,  on 
the  twenty-fourth.  It  appears  that  the  entire  French  fleet  would 


i78i.]  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  585 

have  joined  the  movement,  with  a  land  force  added,  if  Count  de 
Rochambeau  had  received  letters  from  General  Washington  in  time  ; 
but  M.  De  Tully  had  sailed  when  the  proposition  reached  the  French 
headquarters. 

The  division  of  La  Fayette  consisted  of  twelve  hundred  light 
infantry,  made  up  of  New  England  and  New  Jersey  troops.  He 
started  immediately  for  his  new  command,  reaching  Pompton  on  the 
twenty-third  of  February,  Philadelphia  on  the  second,  and  Head  of 
Elk  on  the  third  of  March.  The  troops  went  to  Annapolis  by  water. 
La  Fayette  first  went  in  an  open  canoe  to  Elizabethtown,  to  accelerate 
preparations  for  the  attack  upon  Arnold.  During  this  preliminary 
examination  he  visited  Baron  Steuben,  then  at  Yorktown,  who  enter 
tained  the  idea  that  he  would  rally  at  least  five  thousand  militia,  and 
then  visited  General  Muhlenberg,  at  Suffolk,  and  actually  made  a 
reconnoissance  of  Arnold's  defenses  at  Portsmouth.  The  return  of 
the  French  ships  to  Newport  compelled  him  to  return  to  Annapolis 
and  await  further  instructions  from  Washington. 

The  expedition  was  immediately  reorganized.  General  Wash 
ington  visited  Newport  on  the  sixth,  and  held  a  conference  with  Count 
de  Rochambeau,  on  the  Admiral's  ship.  Pursuant  to  previous  cor 
respondence  with  Count  de  Rochambeau,  he  found  that  eleven  hun 
dred  and  forty  men,  under  Baron  de  Viomeriil,  had  already  embarked, 
but  a  delay  in  the  repair  of  one  frigate  had  prevented  earlier  sailing. 
The  squadron,  consisting  of  eight  ships  of  the  line  and  four  frigates, 
sailed  on  the  eighth.  On  the  tenth,  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  then  at 
Gardiner's  Bay,  on  the  north  side  and  east  end  of  Long  Island,  wrote 
to  General  Clinton  to  warn  Arnold  of  the  expedition,  and  at  once 
sailed  with  an  equal  force,  in  pursuit  of  the  French  ships.  On  the 
sixteenth  a  short  naval  engagement  occurred  between  the  two  fleets, 
off  Chesapeake  Bay,  with  well  balanced  results  ;  but  the  object  of  the 
expedition  having  been  thwarted  by  the  presence  of  the  British 
squadron,  M.  Destouches  returned  to  Newport  on  the  twenty-sixth, 
after  an  absence  of  only  eighteen  days. 

A  material  modification  of  the  plan  of  campaign  was  involved  in 
these  failures  of  the  French  fleet  to  control  the  Chesapeake.  Under 
the  original  order,  La  Fayette  was  instructed  "  to  return  to  the  main 
army,  in  case  Arnold  quitted  Virginia,  or  the  French  lost  superiority 
of  naval  force."  Washington  wrote  to  La  Fayette  on  the  fifth  of 
April,  as  follows :  "  While  we  lament  the  miscarriage  of  an  enterprise 
which  bid  so  fair  for  success,  we  must  console  ourselves  in  the  thought 


586  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  [1781 

of  having  done  everything  practicable  to  accomplish  it.  I  am  certain 
that  the  Chevalier  Destouches  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  gain 
the  Chesapeake.  The  point  upon  which  the  whole  turned,  the  action 
with  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  reflects  honor  upon  the  chevalier  and  upon 
the  marine  of  France.  As  matters  have  turned  out,  it  is  to  be  wished 
that  you  had  not  gone  out  of  the  Elk ;  but  I  never  judge  of  the  pro 
priety  of  measures  by  after  events."  La  Fayette  was  also  instructed 
to  return  to  Philadelphia.  On  the  sixth,  he  was  ordered  to  join  Gen 
eral  Greene  ;  but  when  Washington  learned  of  the  landing  of  General 
Phillips  in  Virginia,  with  reinforcements  to  the  British  army,  he  coun 
termanded  the  order  and  assigned  La  Fayette  to  command  in  Vir 
ginia  under  General  Greene,  to  whom,  as  well  as  to  Washington,  he 
made  his  reports.  General  Greene  thus  expressed  his  views  of  this 
detail  of  General  La  Fayette,  in  a  letter  written  "  Ten  miles  from 
Guilford  Court  House,  March  eighteenth"  :  "  I  am  happy  to  hear  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette  is  coming  to  Virginia,  though  I  am  afraid  from 
a  hint  in -one  of  Baron  Steuben's  letters,  that  he  will  think  himself  in 
jured  in  being  superseded  in  the  command.  Could  the  Marquis  join 
us  at  this  moment,  we  should  have  a  most  glorious  campaign.  It 
would  put  Lord  Cornwallis  and  his  whole  army  into  our  hands."  The 
Baron  Steuben  as  usual,  accepted  Washington's  orders  as  final;  and 
by  a  different  plan  than  anticipated  by  General  Greene,  the  Virginia 
operations  of  La  Fayette  directly  led  to  the  final  environment  and 
capture  of  Lord  Cornwallis. 

Many  embarrassments  attended  the  opening  of  this  campaign. 
The  troops  themselves  disliked  their  transfer  to  a  warmer  climate, 
especially  when  they  were  ordered  to  march  to  the  extreme  south  ; 
and  some  dissatisfaction  was  expressed  at  the  assignment  of  Colonel 
Gimat  and  Major  Galvan,  both  excellent  officers,  to  commands  in  the 
corps.  Desertions  were  frequent  and  the  spirit  of  the  army  was  almost 
mutinous.  One  deserter  was  hung,  and  then  La  Fayette  changed  his 
policy,  and  forgave  and  dismissed  the  second  offender.  An  order  was 
issued  declaring  that  "  lie  was  setting  out  for  a  difficult  and  dangerous 
expedition ;  but  that  he  hoped  the  soldiers  would  not  abandon  Jiiin  ; 
but  that  whoever  wished  to  go  away  might  do  so  instantly"  "  From 
that  hour,"  he  states  in  his  memoirs,  "  all  desertions  ceased,  and  not 
one  man  would  leave."  It  has  already  been  seen  that  Washington 
could  send  no  adequate  reinforcements  to  General  Greene,  and  it  is 
well  to  notice  the  condition  of  the  northern  army  from  which  La 
Fayette  had  withdrawn  twelve  hundred  men. 


7«i.j  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  587 

Condition  of  the  American  army.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the 
new  army  establishment  was  fixed  at  thirty-seven  thousand  men,  and 
the  purpose  was  to  realize  this  force  by  the  first  of  January,  1781. 
The  requisitions  had  been  delayed.  Marshall  says,  "  The  regular  force 
drawn  from  Pennsylvania  to  Georgia  inclusive,  at  no  time  during  this 
active  and  interesting  campaign,  amounted  to  three  thousand  effective 
men.  Of  the  northern  troops,  twelve  hundred  had  been  detached 
under  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  to  the  aid  of  Virginia.  Including 
these  in  the  estimate,  the  States  from  New  Jersey  to  New  Hampshire 
inclusive,  so  late  as  the  ninth  of  April,  had  furnished  only  five  thou 
sand  effectives.  The  cavalry  and  artillery  at  no  time  exceeded  one 
thousand."  "  During  May,  the  total  force  reached  seven  thousand 
men,  of  whom  rather  more  than  four  thousand  might  have  been 
relied  on  for  action  ;  but  even  these  had  been  brought  into  camp  too 
late  to  acquire  that  discipline  which  is  so  essential  to  military  service." 

Washington  thus  embodies  the  gloomy  condition  of  affairs  in  his 
diary,  commencing  the  first  of  May:  "Instead  of  having  magazines 
filled  with  provisions,  we  have  a  scanty  pittance  scattered  here  and 
there  in  the  different  States.  Instead  of  having  our  arsenals  well 
supplied  with  military  stores,  they  are  poorly  provided,  and  the  work 
men  are  leaving  them.  Instead  of  having  the  various  articles  of  field 
equipage  in  readiness  to  deliver,  the  quartermaster-general  is  but  even 
now  applying  to  the  States  (as  the  dernier  resort)  to  provide  these 
things  for  their  troops  respectively.  Instead  of  having  a  regular  system 
of  transportation  upon  credit,  or  funds  in  the  quartermaster's  hands 
to  defray  the  contingent  expenses,  we  have  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other ;  and  in  all  that  business,  or  a  great  part  of  it,  being  done  by 
military  impressment,  we  are  daily  and  hourly  oppressing  the  people, 
souring  their  tempers  and  alienating  their  affections.  Instead  of  hav 
ing  the  regiments  completed  under  the  new  establishment,  and  which 
ought  to  have  been  so  by  the of agreeable  to  the  requi 
sitions  of  Congress,  scarce  any  State  in  the  service  has  at  this  time  an 
eighth  part  of  its  quota  in  the  field  ;  and  there  is  little  prospect  that 
I  can  see  of  ever  getting  more  than  half.  In  a  word,  instead  of  having 
everything  in  readiness  to  take  the  field,  we  have  nothing.  And 
instead  of  having  the  prospect  of  a  glorious  offensive  campaign  before 
us,  we  have  a  bewildered  and  gloomy  prospect  of  a  defensive  one  ; 
unless  we  should  receive  a  powerful  aid  of  ships,  land  troops  and 
money  from  our  generous  allies,  and  these  at  present  are  too  contin 
gent  to  build  upon."  "  Chimney-corner  patriots,"  abounded,  and  it 


588  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  [1781, 

would  be  difficult  to  find  a  period  of  modern  history  where  "  venality,' 
"corruption,"  "prostitution  of  office  for  selfish  ends,"  "abuse  of 
trust,"  "  perversion  of  funds  from  a  national  to  a  personal  use,"  and 
"  speculations  upon  the  necessities  of  the  times,"  had  been  more  wide 
spread  and  offensive  than  as  described  in  unequivocal  terms  by  Wash 
ington  during  the  war  under  notice.  Every  battle  and  every  cam 
paign  was  affected  by  such  elements,  and  the  diffusion  of  political 
responsibility  still  made  the  United  States  only  a  loose  partnership  of 
scattered  and  differently  related  partners. 

On  the  twentieth  of  February,  when  the  Virginia  campaign  was 
initiated,  General  Washington  urged  General  Schuyler  to  accept  the 
head  of  the  War  Department,  using  these  words,  "  Our  affairs  are 
brought  to  an  awful  crisis.  Nothing  will  recover  them  but  the  vigor 
ous  exertion  of  men  of  abilities  who  know  our  wants,  and  the  best 
means  of  supplying  them.  These  qualifications,  sir,  without  a  com 
pliment,  I  think  you  possess.  Why  then,  the  department  being 
necessary,  should  you  shrink  from  the  duties  of  it  ?  The  greater  the 
rhaos,  the  greater  will  be  your  merit  in  bringing  forth  order."  Gen 
eral  Schuyler  replied  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  February,  and  declared 
his  intention  never  to  hold  any  office  under  Congress  unless  accom 
panied  with  a  restoration  of  military  rank,  and  that  "  such  inconveni 
ences  would  result  to  themselves  (Congress)  from  such  a  restoration,  as 
would  necessarily  give  umbrage  to  many  officers." 

Generals  Greene,  Gates  and  Sullivan  were  considered  candidates, 
but  the  matter  was  dropped,  until  General  Lincoln  received  the 
appointment,  October  twenty-fifth,  1781.  Robert  Morris,  whose 
wealth  and  energies  during  the  entire  war  were  devoted  to  the  cause, 
so  that  he  commanded  credit  when  Congress  had  none,  took  charge 
of  the  Financial  Bureau,  and  General  McDougall  was  elected  Secre 
tary  of  Marine. 

The  foregoing  considerations  have  value  in  the  present  connec 
tion  ;  and  further  reference  to  the  condition  of  the  American  north- 
ern  army  will  be  deferred  to  its  association  with  operations  against 
Yorktown  and  New  York,  after  General  Washington  assumed  per 
sonal  command  of  all  the  armies  in  the  field. 

Situation  of  the  British  army.  On  the  fifth  of  April,  after  La 
Fayette  had  reached  Head  of  Elk,  General  Clinton  thus  wrote  to 
Lord  Germaine  :  "  I  am  preparing  for  every  exertion  within  the  com 
pass  of  my  very  reduced  force,  which  after  the  several  large  detach 
ments  sent  to  the  southward,  amounts  to  no  more  than  6275  auxiliary 


£78i.]  LA  JAYETTE  S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  589 

troops,  4527  British  and  906  Provincials  ready  for  the  field.'  (Refer 
ence  is  made  to  note  at  end  of  chapter.)  A  letter  of  General  Corn- 
wallis  to  General  Clinton  dated  April  tenth,  was  noticed  in  chapter 
LXX.  On  the  eleventh  of  April,  General  Clinton  wrote  to  General 
Phillips  :  "The  security  of  the  Carolinas  is  of  the  greatest  moment; 
but  the  best  consequences  maybe  expected  from  an  operation  up  the 
Chesapeake.  Let  the  same  experiment  be  tried  there  which  has 
been  so  unsuccessful  in  the  south."  (Italics  not  in  the  original,  but 
suggestive  of  General  Clinton's  anxiety,  and  doubt  as  to  the  general 
campaign.)  He  continues, — "Virginia  has  been  looked  upon  as  uni 
versally  hostile,  Maryland  less  so,  but  has  not  been  tried ;  but  in 
Pennsylvania,  on  both  sides  of  the  Susquehanna,  and  between  the 
Chesapeake  and  Delaware,  the  friends  of  the  king's  interests  are  said 
to  be  numerous.  Support  should  be  rendered  to  them,  and  means 
of  proving  their  fidelity  put  into  their  hands.  If  Lord  Cornwallis 
can  spare  such  part  of  his  forces  as  to  effect  this  movement,  it  is 
greatly  to  be  desired."  It  will  be  seen  that  the  war  was  taking  the 
direction  which  General  Charles  Lee  had  recommended  to  the  Brit 
ish  commissioners  at  an  early  period,  and  that  the  views  of  Lord 
Cornwallis,  based  upon  the  inadequacy  of  the  army  to  the  conquest 
of  the  South,  so  long  as  Virginia  was  unsubdued,  were  beginning  to 
affect  General  Clinton  himself. 

The  official  report  of  British  troops  for  duty,  in  Virginia,  made  up 
on  the  first  of  May,  1781,  gives:  under  Arnold,  fifteen  hundred  and 
fifty-three  men,  and  under  Phillips,  two  thousand  one  hundred  and 
sixteen  men.  The  army  of  Lord  Cornwallis  increased  this  force  to  a 
little  over  five  thousand  men,  on  the  twentieth  of  May.  Colonel 
Tarleton  had  received  some  recruits  and  mounted  the  legion  upon 
blooded  horses,  which  were  quite  uniformly  kept  by  gentlemen  in  that 
part  of  Virginia.  Colonel  Hamilton's  North  Carolina  Royalists  also 
joined  the  command.  In  the  meantime  General  Phillips  had  com 
pleted  the  fortifications  which  Arnold  began  at  Portsmouth ;  and  on 
the  eighteenth  of  April  he  embarked  his  troops,  sailed  up  the  James 
River  as  far  as  Burwell's  Ferry,  and  marched  to  Williamsburg.  The 
militia  fled.  Colonel  Simcoe  pursued,  and  it  was  proposed  to  occupy 
Yorktown  ;  but  the  plan  was  abandoned  for  want  of  the  necessary 
force,  both  to  hold  the  post  and  to  meet  La  Fayette,  who  was  advanc 
ing  toward  Richmond.  "  A  small  party  passed  up  the  Chickahominy 
in  boats,  and  destroyed,"  according  to  Arnold's  official  report,  "  sev 
eral  armed  ships,  the  State  ship-yards,  warehouses,  etc.,  etc.  "  "  On 


5QO  LA   FAYETTE'S   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  [1781, 

the  twenty-fourth,  the  army  sailed  to  City  Point,  and  on  the  twenty- 
fifth  marched  for  Petersburg,  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning."  See 
map  "  Arnold  at  Petersburg."  Generals  Steuben  and  Muhlenberg 
were  then  at  that  post  with  about  one  thousand  militia.  A  strong 
position  was  taken  up  on  a  hill  east  of  Brandon,  on  the  Appomatox 
River,  which  compelled  the  British  army  to  make  a  long  detour,  with 
view  of  intercepting  the  American  retreat.  Baron  Steuben  promptly 
foiled  this  intention  by  falling  back  to  Brandon,  and  finally  re-crossed 
the  river  with  a  loss  of  but  twenty  in'  killed  and  wounded.  A  judi 
cious  disposition  of  his  artillery  on  Baker's  Hill  covered  his  retreat, 
Arnold  says,  "  the  enemy  were  soon  obliged  to  retire  on  the  bridge, 
with  the  loss  of  one  hundred  men  killed  and  wounded  as  we  have 
since  been  informed  ;  our  loss  was  only  one  killed,  and  ten  wounded. 
The  enemy  took  up  the  bridge,  which  prevented  our  pursuing  them." 
He  says,  "  four  thousand  hogsheads  of  tobacco,  one  ship,  and  a  num 
ber  of  small  vessels  on  the  stocks  and  in  the  river  were  destroyed." 

On  the  twenty-seventh,  "  General  Phillips  inarched  to  Chesterfield 
Court  House,  burned  barracks  for  two  thousand  men,  three  hundred 
barrels  of  flour,  etc."  On  the  same  day  Arnold  marched  to  Osborne's, 
thirteen  miles  from  Richmond,  and  "  destroyed,"  says  La  Fayette  in  his 
report  to  General  Greene,  "  some  vessels  that  had  been  collected  there." 
These  vessels  had  been  prepared  for  an  expedition  against  Portsmouth. 
General  La  Fayette  was  then  at  Hanover  Court  House.  Arnold's 
report  states  that  "  two  ships,  five  brigantines,  five  sloops  and  one 
schooner,  loaded  with  tobacco,  cordage,  flour,  etc.,  fell  into  our  hands ; 
four  ships,  five  brigantines,  and  a  number  of  small  vessels  were  sunk 
and  burnt.  On  board  of  the  whole  fleet  (none  of  which  escaped) 
were  taken  and  destroyed  about  two  thousand  hogsheads  of  tobacco,'' 
"  want  of  boats  and  the  wind  blowing  hard  prevented  our  capturing 
many  of  the  seamen,  who  took  to  their  boats  and  escaped  to  shore. 
On  the  thirtieth  the  British  army  marched  to  Manchester  and 
destroyed  twelve  hundred  hogsheads  of  tobacco.  The  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette  having  arrived  with  his  army  at  Richmond,  opposite  to 
Manchester,  the  day  before,  and  being  joined  by  the  militia  drove 
from  Petersburg  and  Williamsburg;  they  were  spectators  of  the  confla 
gration,  without  attempting  to  molest  us."  General  La  Fayette  says, 
''Our  regular  force  consisted  of  nine  hundred  men,  rank  and  file; 
that  of  the  enemy  of  twenty-three  hundred  at  the  lowest  estimate. 
The  command  of  the  water,  and  such  a  superiority  of  regular  troops 
gave  them  possession  of  our  shore.  There  was  no  crossing  for  us  but 


1781.]  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  591 

under  a  circuit  of  fifteen  miles,  and  from  the  number  and  size  of  their 
boats,  their  passage  over  the  river  was  six  times  quicker  than  ours. 
Richmond  being  their  main  object,  I  determined  to  defend  this  capi 
tal,  where  a  quantity  of  public  stores  and  tobacco  was  contained." 
(At  this  time  Generals  Steuben  and  Muhlenberg  were  further  up  the 
river,  not  having  effected  a  crossing.)  "  Six  hundred  men  ventured 
on  this  side,  but  were  timely  recalled,  and  being  charged  by  a  few 
dragoons  of  Major  Nelson,  flew  into  the  boats  with  precipitation. 
The  enemy  have  lost  some  men,  killed,  prisoners,  and  deserters. 
Since  the  British  army  landed  at  City  Point  (some  flour  excepted  at 
the  Court  House)  no  public  property  has  been  destroyed."  The 
foregoing  is  from  a  letter  addressed  to  General  Greene,  dated,  "  camp 
on  Pamunky  River,  May  3d,  1781." 

On  the  first  of  May  the  British  troops  marched  to  Osborne's,  em 
barked  on  the  second,  reached  Westover  on  the  third,  and  on  the 
seventh,  when  near  Hog  Island,  received  instructions  from  Lord 
Cornwallis  to  meet  him  at  Petersburg,  and  reached  that  place  on  the 
ninth.  Several  American  officers  were  captured  by  their  sudden 
return. 

Movements  of  La  Fayette.  It  has  been  seen  that  he  reached 
Head  of  Elk  on  the  third  of  March.  "  The  shortest  calculation  was 
for  the  sixth."  No  operation  of  the  war  more  clearly  demonstrates 
the  value  of  good  logistics,  and  the  facts  demand  notice  in  connection 
with  this  Virginia  campaign.  Messengers  were  sent  in  advance  to 
arouse  the  people,  and  the  citizens  of  New  Jersey  cheerfully  aided  the 
progress  of  his  army. 

"  Notwithstanding  the  depth  of  the  mud  and  the  extreme  bad 
ness  of  the  roads,  this  march,"  says  La  Fayette,  writing  to  Wash 
ington,  March  2d,  1781,  "  which  I  call  rapid,  (as  for  example  they 
came  in  two  days  from  Morristown  to  Princeton)  has  been  performed 
with  such  ardor  and  alacrity,  that  agreeably  to  the  report,  only  two 
men  have  been  left  behind  ;  and  yet  these  two  men  have  embarked 
at  Trenton  with  some  remains  of  baggage.  At  every  place  where 
the  detachment  have  halted,  they  have  found  covering  and  wood 
ready  for  them,  and  there  has  not  been  the  least  complaint  made  to 
me  by  the  inhabitants.  Every  third  day  they  have  drawn  their  pro 
visions  ;  the  clothing  has  also  been  distributed,  and  having  embarked 
yesterday  at  Trenton,  they  passed  this  city  (Philadelphia)  about  two 
o'clock  with  a  wind  which  was  extremely  favorable.  The  artillery 
consisted  of  one  24,  six  i8s,  two  brass  I2s,  one  eight-inch  how- 


592  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  [1781. 

Uzer,  two  eight-inch  mortars,  in  all,  twelve  heavy  pieces ;  four  six- 
pounders,  and  two  small  howitzers,  with  a  sufficient  quantity  of  am 
munition  will  be  at  the  head  of  the  Elk  this  day  and  to-morrow,  so 
that  by  the  4th  I  hope  we  shall  be  ready  to  sail.  A  quantity  of 
medicines  and  instruments,  and  fifteen  hundred  pairs  of  shoes  will  be 
at  the  head  of  Elk  before  we  embark."  "  I  am  also  assured  that  we 
will  have  a  sufficient  quantity  of  boats  to  land  the  detachment,  and 
two  heavy  ones  will  be  added  for  the  artillery,  and  some  of  the 
private  armed  vessels  in  the  bay  have  been  ordered  to  the  head  of  the 
Elk.  Two  dispatch  boats  are  there,  and  four  more  have  been  asked 
for.  As  a  further  security  to  our  subsistence,  I  have  got  the  Minis 
ter's  permission  to  dispose  of  the  French  flour  and  salt  meat  along 
the  bay  in  case  of  necessity."  The  troops  were  promptly  forwarded 
to  Annapolis  ;  and  at  Baltimore,  besides  an  advance  by  the  merchants 
of  two  thousand  guineas,  the  ladies  undertook  the  work  of  furnishing 

o  t> 

his  command  with  suitable  clothing  for  summer  wear.  The  disap 
pointments  incident  to  the  failure  of  the  French  naval  forces  to  con 
voy  and  cover  his  division  compelled  his  return  to  the  Elk,  and  by 
the  time  the  order  came  to  move  to  the  extreme  south,  the  dissatis 
faction  of  his  troops  already  adverted  to  had  taken  place,  and  had 
been  substantially  settled.  He  had  also  armed  several  vessels,  and 
proposed  to  make  a  miniature  fleet  for  his  own  convoy,  but  "  some 
vessels  were  run  off  to  avoid  him,"  and  the  adventure  against  Ports 
mouth  to  capture  Arnold  came  to  an  end.  He  "  visited  the  Hermi- 
one  frigate,  however,  and  obtained  a  pledge  from  M.  Delatouch,  that 
on  his  return  to  Newport,  M.  Destouches  would  make  an  offer  of  the 
ship  URveille  and  the  four  frigates,  to  convoy  twelve  hundred  men 
to  any  part  of  the  continent  which  Washington  might  think  proper." 
In  this  connection  he  adds,  "  These  ships  are  too  strong  to  be  afraid 
of  frigates,  and  too  fast  to  be  in  the  least  concerned  by  the  fear  of  a 
squadron." 

The  plan  of  La  Fayette  after  the  failure  of  the  design  upon  Ports 
mouth  was,  "  to  take  these  fast  vessels  and  go  by  sea  to  Wilmington 
or  Georgetown,  and  take  Cornwallis  in  his  rear,  or  in  the  neighborhood 
of  General  Greene."  The  plan  was  eminently  practicable  and  wise. 
La  Fayette  also  confidentially  advised  General  Washington  that  "  two 
.millions  and  a  half  had  been  given  to  Franklin,"  adding,  "  Marquis  de 
Castries  and  Count  de  Vergennes  are  trying  to  obtain  a  sum  more 
adequate  to  our  wants  ;  this,  however,  the  minister  of  finance  has 
requested  me  not  to  mention,  as  it  was  as  yet  an  uncertainty,  and 


i78i.j  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  593 

would  perhaps  give  ill-grounded  hopes'  destructive  of  the  internal 
efforts  we  ought  to  make."  On  the  thirteenth  of  April,  having  re 
ceived  notice  from  General  Greene  that  "  he  expected  that  Cornwallis 
would  fall  back  to  Wilmington,  and  that  his  own  project  was  to  carry 
the  war  into  South  Carolina,"  La  Fayette  renewed  the  suggestion 
"  that  a  corps  of  light  infantry  be  embarked  at  Philadelphia,  on  board 
of  a  light  squadron,  which  might  have  been  upon  the  seat  of  war  in  a 
very  short  passage."  On  the  twenty-eighth  of  April,  he  wrote  from 
Hanover  Court  House  to  General  Greene  :  "  Having  received  intel 
ligence  that  General  Phillips'  army  were  preparing  for  offensive  opera 
tions,  I  left  at  Baltimore  everything  that  would  impede  our  march — 
to  follow  us  under  a  proper  escort,  and  with  about  a  thousand  men, 
officers  included,  hastened  toward  Richmond,  two  hundred  miles, 
which  I  apprehended  would  be  a  principal  object  with  the  enemy." 
This  outline  brings  La  Fayette  up  to  the  date  when  he  reported  his 
arrival  near  Richmond  and  the  retreat  of  Generals  Phillips  and 
Arnold  the  day  following. 

La  Fayette  had  marched  with  great  celerity,  leaving  his  artillery 
behind,  which  he  said  "  might  appear  a  strange  whim  ;  but  it  saved 
Richmond,"  and  adds,  "  General  Phillips  had  given  the  signal  for 
attack  when  he  learned  of  his  (La  Fayette's)  unexpected  arrival." 
A  chain  of  expresses  was  at  once  established  to  Point  Comfort.  A 
detachment  was  sent  to  Williamsburg  to  annoy  the  enemy,  and  if 
possible  prevent  their  establishing  a  permanent  post.  On  the  eighth 
of  May  he  writes:  "  There  is  no  fighting  here  unless  you  have  a  naval 
superiority,  or  an  army  mounted  on  race  horses.  Phillips'  plan  against 
Richmond  has  been  defeated.  He  was  going  toward  Portsmouth ; 
now  it  appears  I  have  business  to  transact  with  two  armies,  and  this 
is  rather  too  much."  La  Fayette  had  just  learned  of  the  march  of 
Lord  Cornwallis  northward,  and  was  making  an  effort  to  reach  Hali 
fax  and  cut  him  off  from  union,  with  Phillips.  The  sudden  return  of 
General  Phillips  to  Brandon  on  the  eighth,  defeated  that  enterprise ; 
but  did  not  divert  him  from  his  recognition  of  the  claims  of  General 
Greene  to  be  supported.  He  says,  "  Each  of  these  armies  is  more 
than  double  the  superior  of  me.  We  have  no  boats,  few  militia,  and 
less  arms.  I  will  try  to  do  for  the  best.  Nothing  can  attract  my 
sight  from  the  supplies  and  reinforcements  destined  to  General 
Greene's  army.  While  I  am  going  (marching)  to  get  beaten  by 
both  armies  (Phillips'  and  Cornwallis')  or  each  of  them  separately, 
the  Baron  remains  at  Richmond,  where  he  hurries  the  collection 
38 


594  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  [1781 

of  recruits  and  every  other  requisite.  I  have  forbidden  every  depart 
ment  to  give  me  anything  that  may  be  thought  useful  to  General 
Greene,  and  should  a  battle  be  expected  (an  event  which  I  will  try 
to  keep  off,)  no  consideration  will  prevent  our  sending  to  Carolina 
eight  hundred  recruits,  who  I  hope  may  be  equipped  in  a  fortnight. 
When  General  Greene  becomes  equal  to  offensive  operations,  this 
quarter  will  be  relieved.  I  have  written  to  Wayne  to  hasten  his 
march  ;  but  unless  I  am  very  hard  pushed,  shall  request  him  to  pro 
ceed  to  the  southward.  General  Greene  was  on  the  twenty-sixth 
before  Camden,  but  did  not  think  himself  equal  to  the  storming  the 
works."  General  Washington  thus  replied  :  "Your  determination  to 
avoid  an  engagement  with  your  present  force,  is  certainly  judicious.  I 
hope  the  Pennsylvanians  have  begun  their  march  before  this 
General  Wayne  has  been  pressed  both  by  Congress  and  the  Board  of 
War  to  make  as  much  expedition  as  possible,  and  extraordinary 
powers  are  given  him  to  enable  him  to  procure  provisions." 

On  the  eighteenth  of  May  orders  were  received  from  General 
Greene,  directing  General  La  Fayette  to  take  command  in  Virginia 
and  to  send  all  reports  to  the  Commander-in-chief.  It  is  worthy  of 
record,  that  while  General  Greene  was  almost  the  only  one  of  the 
general  officers  of  1776,  who  served  actively  through  the  war,  under 
the  direct  orders  of  the  Commander-in-chief,  both  of  them,  alike,  and 
without  disappointment  reposed  entire  confidence  in  General  La  Fay 
ette.  The  foregoing  extracts  from  his  papers,  indicate  the  occasion 
for  that  confidence. 

When  La  Fayette  assumed  command,  May  eighteenth,  he  "  took 
a  position,  between  the  Pamunky  and  Chickahominy  Rivers,  which 
equally  covered  Richmond  and  other  interesting  points  of  the  State, 
and  sent  General  Nelson  with  militia  toward  Williamsburg." 

Upon  the  return  of  General  Phillips  to  Petersburg,  May  ninth,  he 
took  position  at  Wilton,  ten  miles  below  Richmond.  Upon  applica 
tion  from  North  Carolina  for  ammunition,  General  Muhlenberg  was 
sent  with  five  hundred  men,  to  escort  twenty  thousand  cartridges  over 
the  Appomatox  ;  and  to  divert  the  enemy's  attention,  Colonel  Gimat, 
with  his  battalion  and  four  pieces  of  artillery,  assumed  their  position 
so  that  the  absence  of  the  troops  was  not  discovered.  To  Colonel 
Hamilton  he  wrote,  on  the  twenty-third,  thus  laconically :  "  Both 
armies  have  formed  their  junction.  Their  infantry  is  near  five  to  one, 
their  cavalry  ten  to  one.  We  have  no  continentals.  Is  it  not  strange 
that  General  Wayne's  detachment "  (the  seven  hundred  Pennsyl- 


i78i.]  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  595 

vanians)  "  can  not  be  heard  of?  They  are  to  go  to  Carolina ;  but 
should  I  have  them  for  a  few  days,  I  am  at  liberty  to  keep  them. 
This  permission  I  will  improve,  so  far  as  to  receive  one  blow ;  that 
being  beat,  I  may  be  beat  with  some  decency.  The  command  of  the 
waters,  the  superiority  in  cavalry  and  the  great  disproportion  of  our 
force  gave  the  enemy  such  advantages  that  I  durst  not  venture  out 
and  listen  to  my  fondness  for  enterprise  ;  to  speak  truth,  I  was  afraid 
of  myself,  as  much  as  of  the  enemy.  Independence  has  rendered  me 
the  more  cautious,  as  I  know  my  own  warmth ;  but  if  the  Pennsyl- 
vanians  come,  Lord  Cornwallis  shall  pay  something  for  his  victory." 

From  this  time,  forward,  the  operations  of  the  two  armies  were 
characterized  by  constant  activity,  each  officer  sustaining  his  repu 
tation  ;  and  the  wearisome  marchings  and  counter-marchings  ended 
as  unfortunately  for  Lord  Cornwallis,  as  did  his  pursuit  of  General 
Greene,  without  detracting  from  his  skill  as  a  soldier. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  May  Lord  Cornwallis  acknowledged  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements  under  General  Leslie,  this  force  being  carried 
into  official  returns,  as  two  thousand  two  hundred  and  seventy-eight 
men,  and  informed  General  Clinton,  that  he  "  should  proceed  to  dis 
lodge  La  Fayette  from  Richmond."  On  the  same  day  he  wrote  a 
second  letter,  as  follows,  "  I  have  consented  to  the  request  of  Briga 
dier-general  Arnold,  to  go  to  New  York;  he  conceives  that  your 
excellency  wishes  him  to  attend  you,  and  his  present  indisposition 
renders  him  unequal  to  the  fatigue  of  service.  He  will  represent  the 
horrid  enormities  which  are  committed  by  our  privateers  in  Chesa 
peake  Bay  ;  and  I  must  join  my  earnest  wish  that  some  remedy  may 
be  applied  to  an  evil  which  is  so  very  prejudicial  to  his  Majesty's 
service." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  operations  of  Arnold  while  in  Virginia, 
db  elsewhere,  consisted  of  raids  upon  property,  and  involved  no 
collision  with  Americans  in  force.  It  was  known  to  General  Clin 
ton  and  publicly,  that  Washington's  instructions  to  La  Fayette 
expressly  forbade  any  terms  with  Arnold  which  should  exempt  him 
from  punishment  for  desertion  and  treason.  Anxiety  for  the  safety 
of  Arnold  is  referred  to  by  General  Clinton  in  several  dispatches,  but 
on  April  nth  he  apologetically  explained  that  the  words  used  during 
the  pendency  of  the  French  attack,  meant  "  the  security  of  him, 
(Arnold)  the  troops  under  his  orders  and  the  posts  on  the  Elizabeth 
river,  as  the  principal  objects  of  your  (Phillips')  expedition,  and  no 
more  than  relieving  them  of  their  supposed  danger."  This  dispatch 


596  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  1.1781. 

was  opened  by  Lord  Cornwallis  after  the  death  of  General  Phillips. 
A  letter  of  March  twenty-fourth  closed  thus :  "  P.  S.  Pray  send 
Brigadier-general  Arnold  here  by  the  first  opportunity,  if  you  should 
not  have  particular  occasion  for  his  services."  This  was  received  by 
Lord  Cornwallis  May  twentieth.  The  position  of  Generals  Phillips 
and  Arnold,  in  view  of  the  relations  of  the  two  officers  during  the 
Saratoga  campaign,  had  been  such  as  forbade  friendship ;  but  the 
obligation  of  General  Clinton  to  protect  Arnold  was  peremptory. 

Upon  the  death  of  Phillips,  Arnold  wrote  to  General  La  Fayette, 
who  declined  personal  correspondence  with  him.  Arnold  threatened 
to  send  his  prisoners  of  war  to  the  West  Indies,  but  as  already  indi 
cated,  his  retirement  to  New  York  followed  the  arrival  of  General 
Cornwallis. 

On  the  thirty-first  of  May,  General  Washington  wrote  to  La 
Fayette,  "Your  conduct  upon  every  occasion  meets  my  approbation, 
but  in  none  more  than  in  your  refusing  to  hold  a  correspondence  with 
Arnold." 

It  appears  that  an  attempt  had  been  made  at  first  to  conceal  from 
La  Fayette  the  fact  of  General  Phillips'  decease;  and  some  direct  cor 
respondence  of  Arnold  with  London  officials  had  disturbed  General 
Clinton.  When  General  Cornwallis  reached  Petersburg,  he  found 
that  General  Clinton  had  conceived  plans  for  a  broader  range  of 
operations  than  the  mere  conquest  of  Virginia,  and  thus  wrote  :  "In 
regard  to  taking  possession  of  Philadelphia,  (proposed  by  General 
Clinton)  by  an  incursion  (even  if  practicable)  without  an  intention  of 
keeping  or  burning  it,  (neither  of  which  appear  to  be  practicable)  I 
should  apprehend  it  would  do  more  harm  than  good  to  the  cause  of 
Britain.  If  offensive  war  is  intended,  Virginia  appears  to  me  to  be 
the  only  province  in  which"  there  is  a  stake.  But  to  reduce  this  pro 
vince  and  keep  possession  of  the  country,  a  considerable  army  would 
be  necessary,  for  with  a  small  force,  the  business  would  probably  ter 
minate  unfavorably,  though  the  beginning  might  be  successful.  In 
case  it  is  thought  expedient  and  a  proper  army  for  the  attempt  can 
be  found,  I  hope  your  Excellency  will  do  me  the  justice  to  believe 
that  I  neither  wish  nor  expect  to  have  the  command  of  it,  leaving  you 
at  New  York  on  the  defensive.  Such  sentiments  are  so  far  from  my 
heart  that  I  can  with  great  truth  assure  you  that  few  things  could 
give  me  greater  pleasure  than  being  relieved  by  your  presence  from  a 
situation  of  so  much  anxiety  and  responsibility." 

(Italics  not  in  original  manuscript,  but  so  placed  in  justice  to  Lord 


596* 


I78i.1  LA  FAYETTE'S  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  597 

Cornwallis,  as  indicating  an  error  on  the  part  of  General  Clinton,  who 
afterwards  declared  that  "  Lord  Cornwallis  tried  to  dupe  him  into  a 
resignation  of  the  general  command.") 

Upon  the  departure  of  Arnold  the  Virginia  campaign  became  the 
theatre  of  more  active  operations  between  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
and  Earl  Cornwallis. 


CHAPTER   LXXIII. 

LA  FAYETTE  AND  CORNWALLIS  IN  VIRGINIA. 

EARL  CORNWALLIS,  still  further  reinforced  from  New  York, 
commanded  seven  thousand  efficient  British  troops,  and  began 
his  campaign  in  Virginia  with  hope  and  vigor.  He  controlled  the 
water-courses  and  inlets  which  exposed  Virginia  to  naval  attack,  and 
his  adversary  lay  within  a  day's  march,  with  an  army  of  less  than 
twenty-eight  hundred  infantry,  including  militia,  and  with  less  than 
one  hundred  disciplined  cavalry.  The  topographical  features  of  the 
country  peculiarly  embarrassed  the  operations  of  the  American  troops 
as  well  as  hindered  the  concentration  of  State  militia.  Many  navi 
gable  rivers  ran  so  nearly  parallel  that  a  small  naval  force  could  quickly 
shift  an  assailing  army  from  section  to  section,  and  the  local  militia 
wherever  concentrated,  could  not  be  transferred  with  equal  celerity 
to  resist  incursions  or  meet  organized  troops. 

General  Cornwallis  appreciated  his  position,  and  endeavored  to  so 
avail  himself  of  his  superior  force,  as  to  strike  other  organized  forces 
at  advantage,  and  at  the  same  time  annihilate  depots  and  prevent 
the  accumulation  of  supplies,  which  were  vital  to  General  Greene's 
army  at  the  south,  as  well  as  to  successful  operations  against  the 
British  army  in  Virginia  itself.  The  State  authorities  were  not  want 
ing  in  vigor,  but  the  pressure  was  as  universal  as  the  exposure. 

The  time  was  at  hand  when  the  war  determined  toward  one  field 
of  operations,  and  that  was  occupied  by  La  Fayette  and  Cornwallis. 
A  British  ascendency  there  would  make  the  severance  of  the  south 
from  the  north  complete ;  and  would  leave  to  General  Greene  a  barren 
triumph  in  the  Carolinas.  The  time  was  at  hand  when  one  exhaustive 
effort  was  called  for  on  the  part  of  the  American  Congress  and  the 
Commander-in-chief  of  its  armies.  The  statesmen  of  Virginia  realized 
the  emergency,  and  all  alike  looked  to  Washington  for  relief;  but 
while  Richard  Henry  Lee  and  other  earnest  men  urged  that  dicta- 


I78I.J  LA   FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN  VIRGINIA.  599 

torial  powers  should  be  granted  to  the  Commander-in-chief,  as  after 
the  battle  of  Trenton,  Governor  Jefferson  and  another  class,  equally 
earnest,  deprecated  any  concentration  of  authority  which  would  as 
similate  the  ruling  element  to  the  royal  prerogative  of  European 
princes.  All  classes  urged  Washington  to  animate  the  struggle  by 
his  personal  presence.  Congress  was  destitute  of  authority  and 
resources  equal  to  the  issue ;  but  when  that  issue  finally  ripened, 
Washington  seized  the  opportunity  and  achieved  its  mastery. 

General  history  is  full  of  the  civil  measures,  so  feeble  and  uncer 
tain,  which  wrought  in  vain  for  an  adequate  increase  of  the  army; 
and  the  long  war  was  hastening  to  its  end,  through  the  earnest  alliance 
of  France  and  the  wise  military  conduct  of  Washington  on  the  one 
hand,  and  a  marvellous  want  of  concentrated  effort  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain. 

Washington  knew  how  and  when  to  disregard  all  exposed  locali 
ties  and  seize  determining  opportunity  in  view  of  the  whole  theatre 
of  war.  Clinton  failed  on  the  other  hand,  in  strategy,  while  self- 
possessed  and  brave  in  battle,  and  was  confused  by  the  extent  of 
operations  requiring  attention.  The  British  Cabinet  did  not  appre 
ciate  the  real  danger  which  threatened  the  royal  cause  in  America ; 
and  the  protection  of  their  numerous  colonies  as  well  as  the  vindica 
tion  of  their  honor  at  sea,  had  become  matters  of  superior  moment. 

La  Fayette  and  Cornwallis  realized  the  magnitude  of  the  campaign 
which  they  had  undertaken ;  and  its  details  redound  to  their  honor. 
Finding  that  he  could  not  hold  Richmond,  General  La  Fayette  re 
moved  the  most  valuable  stores,  and  marched  northward  toward  the 
Rappahannock  to  secure  the  speediest  union  with  the  Pennsylvania 
line  under  General  Wayne,  and  then  sought  by  all  possible  means  to 
avoid  a  general  engagement,  while  daily  harassing  the  right  flank  and 
the  rear  of  the  British  forces.  The  assembly  of  Virginia,  quickened 
to  fresh  activity  by  the  urgency  of  the  peril,  retired  to  Charlottesville, 
May  twenty-fourth,  and  put  forth  all  the  proper  energy  within  its 
power. 

Fifteen  millions  of  Bills  of  Credit,  realizing  a  nominal  value  of  one 
dollar  to  forty,  the  declaration  of  martial  law  within  twenty  miles  of 
an  army  headquarters,  and  appeals  to  the  militia,  were  resorted  to  as 
extraordinary  measures  ;  but  this  interposition  of  paper  appeals  and 
resolutions  could  not  stop  Cornwallis.  Charlottesville  had  been  the 
depot  for  the  prisoners  captured  at  Saratoga,  and  their  rescue  had 
been  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  occupation  of  the  upper  Dan  bv 


600  LA   FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS    IN   VIRGINIA  [1781. 

that  officer  in  the  previous  year ;  thwarted  indeed  by  General  Greene's 
well-considered  movement  down  the  Roanoke  or  lower  Dan.  These 
prisoners  were  now  passed  over  the  mountains  to  Winchester. 

Meanwhile,  and  by  the  twenty-fifth  of  May,  General  Cornwallis 
was  on  the  march.  The  James  River  was  crossed  at  Westover  and 
his  headquarters  were  established  at  Bird's  plantation.  By  the  use 
of  boats,  previously  constructed  by  Arnold,  and  by  "  swimming  all 
the  horses  but  the  best,  the  entire  army,  infantry,  cavalry  and  artil 
lery,  completed  the  passage,"  as  Tarleton  states,  "  in  less  than  three 
days." 

On  the  twenty-seventh  the  army  encamped  near  White  Oak 
Swamp.  At  this  point  information  was  obtained  that  General  La 
Fayette  had  abandoned  Richmond  and  crossed  the  Chickahominy. 
The  army  moved  toward  Bottom  Bridge  on  that  river,  and  the  Ameri 
cans  crossed  the  Pamunky  River.  "  A  few  days  afterwards,"  says 
Tarleton,  "  an  American  patrol  was  captured  and  among  other  papers 
from  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  to  General  Greene,  Steuben,  etc., 
one  letter,  addressed  to  Mr.  Jefferson,  the  Governor  of  Virginia,  was 
particularly  striking.  After  exhorting  that  gentleman  to  turn  out 
the  militia,  he  prophetically  declared  that  the  British  success  in  Vir 
ginia  resembled  the  French  invasion  and  possession  of  Hanover  in  the 
preceding  war,  and  was  likely  to  have  similar  consequences,  if  the 
government  and  the  country  would  exert  themselves  at  the  present 
juncture."  Tarleton  himself  was  never  more  thoroughly  in  his  favor 
ite  element.  His  legion  was  splendidly  mounted  with  the  best  stock 
of  the  country;  at  the  simple  cost  of  bridles  and  saddles,  when  others 
were  not  found  in  gentlemen's  stables.  With  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  all  but  seventy  his  own  dragoons,  he  was  dispatched  in  the  be 
ginning  of  June  toward  Charlottesville.  Governor  Jefferson  and  the 
Virginia  Assembly  were  the  objectives  of  pursuit.  Lieutenant-colo 
nel  Simcoe,  with  the  Yagers,  and  the  infantry  and  hussars  of  the 
Rangers,  was  at  the  same  time  sent  to  Point  of  Fork,  where  Baron 
Steuben  was  then  stationed  in  charge  of  the  arsenal  and  laboratory 
previously  established  at  that  place.  See  map,  "  La  Fayette  in  Vir 
ginia." 

Tarleton  marched  between  the  South  Anna  and  North  Anna 
rivers  at  high  speed,  notwithstanding  the  summer  heat,  "  halted  at 
noon,'*  on  the  third,  "just  long  enough  to  refresh  men  and  horses, 
pressed  forward  again  in  the  afternoon,  halted  at  eleven,  near  Louisa 
Court  House,  and  remained  on  a  plentiful  plantation  till  two  o'clock 


1781.]  LA   FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA.  6oi 

in  the  morning,  at  which  time  he  again  resumed  his  march."  "  Before 
dawn,  he  fell  in  with  twelve  wagons  that  were  on  their  journey,  under 
a  small  guard,  from  the  upper  parts  of  Virginia  and  Maryland,  with 
arms  and  clothing  for  the  continental  troops  in  South  Carolina." 
These  were  burned,  "  to  save  time  and  avoid  a  detail  for  their  escort." 
Several  captures  were  made  at  private  mansions,  including  Colonel 
John  Simms,  (a  member  of  the  Assembly)  and  two  brothers  of  Gen 
eral  Nelson,  and  after  a  short  halt  near  the  residence  of  Dr.  Walker, 
the  march  was  resumed.  Tarleton  says  he  "  imagined  that  a  march 
of  seventy  miles  in  twenty-four  hours,  with  the  caution  he  had  used, 
might  perhaps  give  him  the  advantage  of  a  surprise.  He  therefore 
approached  the  Rivianna,  which  river  lies  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  on 
which  the  town  is  situated,  with  all  possible  expedition.  The  cavalry 
charged  through  the  water  with  very  little  loss  and  routed  the  detach 
ment  posted  at  that  place."  Seven  members  of  the  Legislature 
were  secured.  Brigadier-general  Scott  and  a  few  other  officers  were 
captured.  The  casualties  were  trifling.  "  One  thousand  arms  were 
broken  up,  four  hundred  barrels  of  powder  and  several  hogsheads  of 
tobacco  were  destroyed." 

A  detachment  of  dragoons  under  Captain  McLeod  visited  Monti- 
cello,  the  country  seat  of  Jefferson,  three  miles  from  Charlottesville, 
but  their  approach  was  discovered  and  the  Governor  escaped.  The 
speaker  of  the  Assembly  also  escaped  and  that  body  at  once  assem 
bled  at  Staunton,  beyond  the  mountains.  The  books,  papers  and 
furniture  of  Governor  Jefferson  were,  not  disturbed  ;  but  his  wines 
were  freely  used,  or  wasted,  without  the  authority  of  the  command 
ing  officer. 

On  the  twelfth  of  June,  General  Nelson  was  elected  Governor, 
vice  Mr.  Jefferson,  who  had  declined  re-election  in  order  that  the 
executive  office  should  be  held  by  a  man  of  military  knowledge  and 
experience. 

On  the  day  of  his  arrival,  toward  evening,  Tarleton  started  down 
the  Rivianna  toward  Point  of  Fork,  to  cooperate  with  Simcoe's  expe 
dition.  This  expedition  was  quite  differently  conducted  from  that  of 
Tarleton.  Colonel  Simcoe  is  often  underrated,  because  of  frequent 
ferocity  in  shortening  fights.  He  killed  an  enemy  as  fast  as  he  could, 
up  to  the  last  point  of  resistance ;  but  he  was  shrewd  and  cool,  and 
managed  his  operations  with  much  deliberation,  even  when  heated  by 
the  ardor  of  battle.  He  approached  the  Baron  Steuben's  position  so 
as  to  make  the  most  plausible  display  of  his  forces,  and  made  the 


602  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN  VIRGINIA. 

impression,  as  Cornwallis  designed,  that  the  main  army  was  near 
General  Steuben,  having  advices  of  his  approach,  removed  a  portion 
of  the  public  stores,  although,  as  the  river  was  deep,  he  might  have 
held  the  defensive  with  success  if  he  had  known  the  strength 
opposed.  He  retired  from  his  position,  however,  and  all  public  prop 
erty  that  remained  at  the  depot  was  destroyed  or  disposed  of.-  The 
small  arms  were  old  and  undergoing  repair  ;  but  some  valuable  stores 
besides  cannon  and  mortars  were  among  the  spoils. 

The  position  of  the  armies,  thus  early  in  June,  1781,  is  a  material 
fact  in  the  consideration  of  the  future  operations  of  the  war. 

So  far  as  related  to  the  British  army  in  Virginia,  Cornwallis  was 
equal  to  the  position.  He  had  the  support  of  his  government  and  an 
adequate  force  in  hand.  He  shaped  his  plans  upon  the  presumption 
that  army  headquarters  at  New  York  would  hold  its  own,  and  would 
occupy  the  attention  of  the  army  of  Washington  and  Rochambeau, 
which,  combined  as  it  was,  did  not  equal  the  troops  at  General  Clin 
ton's  disposal. 

It  is  not  out  of  place  to  again  refer  to  the  military  principles 
already  defined,  which  compel  wise  commanders  to  regard  the  destruc 
tion  of  opposing  armies  as  more  important  than  any  ordinary  guard 
duty  over  towns  and  cities. 

Cornwallis  based  his  movements,  therefore,  upon  the  assurance 
that  his  army  was  at  his  own  disposal  for  the  conquest  of  Virginia. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  of  this.  He  followed  Tarleton  and  Simcoe 
to  Elk  Hill,  a  plantation  of  Jefferson,  near  Byrd  Creek,  in  the  heart 
of  Virginia,  and  thus  re-united  his  forces. 

His  march  had  not  been  made  regardless  of  the  operations  of  La 
Fayette,  but  a  detachment  had  been  sent  toward  Raccoon  Ford  as  if 
his  own  purpose  was  to  follow  in  force.  It  was  still  his  plan  to  em 
ploy  cavalry  to  break  up  depots  of  supplies,  by  rapid  movements,  and 
to  march  with  the  main  army  against  organized  troops.  As  an  indi 
cation  of  his  discreet  military  policy,  an  order  issued  to  Colonel  Tarle 
ton  on  the  ninth  of  June,  dated  "camp  at  Jefferson's,"  is  quoted — • 
"  destroy  all  the  enemy's  stores  and  tobacco,  between  James  River 
and  the  Dan  ;  and  if  there  should  be  a  quantity  of  provisions  or  corn 
collected  at  a  private  house,  I  would  have  you  destroy  it,  even 
although  there  should  be  no  proof  of  its  being  intended  for  the 
public  service,  leaving  enough  for  the  support  of  the  family ;  as  thert 
is  the  greatest  reason  to  apprehend  that  such  provisions  will  be  ulti 
mately  appropriated  by  the  enemy  to  the  use  of  General  Greene  s  army, 


1781.]  LA   FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA.  603 

which  from  the  present  state  of  the  Carolinas,  must  depend  on  tJiis 
province  for  supplies''1  (Italics  not  in  original  order,  but  so  indicated 
as  to  place  these  instructions  in  association  with  those  of  Washing 
ton  to  General  Greene,  fully  as  stern,  on  page  243.) 

Before  further  notice  of  this  campaign,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  far  away  at  Wethersfield,  Connecticut,  on  the  twenty-first  of 
May,  the  day  after  the  arrival  of  Cornwallis  at  Petersburg,  Washing 
ton  and  Rochambeau  were  in  conference  ;  and  that  they  deliberately 
discussed  the  propriety  of  an  attack  upon  New  York.  This  fact  must 
be  kept  in  mind,  in  order  to  appreciate  the  resulting  embarrassments 
which  followed  the  operations  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  under  the  demands 
of  Clinton  for  help  at  headquarters. 

During  the  march  of  Lord  Cornwallis  to  Byrd  Creek,  La  Fayette 
effected  a  junction  with  General  Wayne,  near  Raccoon  Ford  on  the 
Rapidan.  This  was  on  the  seventh.  By  reference  to  the  map  it 
will  be  seen  that  La  Fayette  was  nearly  north  from  the  camp  of 
Cornwallis.  By  a  prompt  march  to  Charlottesviile  he  could  effect  a 
union  with  Baron  Steuben,  who  was  not  far  distant  southward,  and 
then  move  eastward  toward  the  British  army,  reserving  to  himself  a 
retreat  at  will,  while  still  threatening  their  rear.  Tarleton  thus  states 
the  movement :  "  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  who  had  previously 
practiced  defensive  manceuvers  with  skill  and  security,  being  now 
reinforced  by  General  Wayne  and  about  eight  hundred  continentals, 
and  some  detachments  of  militia,  followed  the  British  as  they  pro 
ceeded  down  James  River.  This  design  being  judiciously  arranged 
and  executed  with  extreme  caution,  allowed  opportunity  for  the  junc 
tion  of  Baron  Steuben,  confined  the  small  detachments  of  the  king's 
troops,  and  both  saved  the  property  and  animated  the  drooping 
spirits  of  the  Virginians." 

On  the  thirteenth,  Tarleton  reported  to  Cornwallis  his  own  move 
ments.  This  letter  was  intercepted  by  La  Fayette's  scouts,  and  as 
promptly  published  for  warning  to  the  people.  On  the  fourteenth, 
Cornwalli?  notified  Tarleton  that  he  proposed  to  move  the  next  day 
to  Westham,  near  Richmond.  Tarleton  says :  "  While  the  royal 
army  marched,  the  rear  and  left  flank  were  covered  by  the  British 
Legion  and  the  Seventy-sixth  regiment  on  horseback ;  and  on  its 
arrival  at  Richmond,  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe  with  his  corps  was 
posted  at  Westham,  and  his  own  (Tarleton's)  corps  at  Meadow 
Bridge.  During  these  operations  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  con 
tinued  to  advance  his  light  troops  to  harass  the  patrols.  On  the 


604  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA. 

eighteenth,  he  (Tarleton)  made  a  forced  march  to  intercept  General 
Muhlenberg's  detachment,  who  evaded  the  blow  by  an  early  retreat, 
and  the  British  Legion  returned  to  the  royal  army." 

La  Fayette  thus  reports  this  occurrence  to  General  Greene,  from 
"  Mr.  Tyre's  plantation,  twenty  miles  from  Williamsburg,  June  twenty- 
seventh,  1781  :  "  "  On  the  eighteenth,  the  British  army  moved  toward 
us  with  a  design,  as  I  apprehend,  to  strike  at  a  detached  corps  com 
manded  by  General  Muhlenberg.  Upon  this,  the  light  infantry  and 
Pennsylvanians  marched,  under  General  Wayne,  when  the  enemy 
returned  into  town.  The  day  following  I  was  joined  by  General 
Steuben's  corps,  and  on  the  night  of  the  twentieth,  Richmond  was 
evacuated."  Cornwallis  thus  left  Richmond  on  the  twentieth,  and 
directed  his  course  by  Bottom  Bridge  and  New  Kent  Court  House 
for  Williamsburg.  "  At  the  time  the  royal  army  quitted  New  Kent, 
the  main  body  of  the  Americans  approached  within  twelve  miles  of 
that  place,"  says  Tarleton,  "  which  circumstance  nearly  occasioned 
Earl  Cornwallis  to  countermarch  ;  but.  upon  reflection,  he  pursued 
his  design  of  moving  to  Williamsburg,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
fifteenth  of  June." 

Within  six  miles  of  Williamsburg  the  next  morning,  a  sharp  skir 
mish  ensued.  The  Queen's  Rangers  (Simcoe)  had  marched  down  the 
Chickahominy,  guarding  the  British  rear  and  right  flank.  They  were 
closely  pressed  by  the  American  advance  guard  under  Colonel  Butler, 
supported  by  Wayne.  La  Fayette  says,  "  the  whole  British  army 
came  out  to  save  Simcoe."  Tarleton  had  marched  to  Burwell's 
Ferry  on  the  James  River,  and  says,  "  Before  the  horses  were  un 
bridled,  the  sound  of  musketry  and  cannon  announced  the  commence 
ment  of  an  action  at  the  outpost,  and  Lord  Chewton  soon  afterwards 
delivered  Earl  Cornwallis'  orders  for  the  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry 
to  repair  with  expedition  to  the  army,  who  were  already  moving  to 
the  relief  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Simcoe.  The  loss  in  this  affair  was 
nearly  equal,  upwards  of  thirty  being  killed  and  wounded  on  each 
side.  The  Americans  retreated  to  their  army  at  Tyre's  plantation, 
and  the  king's  troops  returned  in  the  evening  to  Williamsburg,  where 
they  found  some  recruits  for  the  guards  who  had  arrived  during  their 
absence."  This  last  paragraph  shows  that  La  Fayette  correctly  sup 
posed  that  the  main  army  turned  to  meet  his  attack,  and  he  thus 
closes  his  report :  "  The  post  they  now  occupy  is  strong,  under  the 
protection  of  their  shipping,  but  upwards  of  one  hundred  miles  from 
the  Point  of  York."  Under  date  of  June  soth,  Lord  Cornwallis  re- 


lySi.J  LA   FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN  VIRGINIA.  60$ 

ports  his  loss  at  three  officers  and  thirty  privates  killed  and  wounded, 
and  that  "  three  American  officers  and  twenty-eight  privates  were 
taken  prisoners.''  But  a  new  element  had  entered  into  the  campaign. 
On  the  twenty-sixth,  Ensign  Amiel  placed  in  his  hands  dispatches 
from  General  Clinton,  the  first  dated  June  nth,  already  fifteen  days 
old.  Besides  an  estimate  that  "  the  continentals  under  La  Fayette 
could  not  exceed  one  thousand,  and  that  the  Pennsylvania  line  under 
Wayne  were  so  disconcerted  that  their  officers  were  afraid  to  trust 
them  with  ammunition,"  (this  however  may  have  since  altered),  he 
says,  "  The  detachments  I  have  made  from  this  army  into  the  Chesa 
peake,  since  General  Leslie's  expedition  in  October  last,  inclusive,  have 
amounted  to  seven  thousand  seven  hundred  and  seventy-four  effect 
ives  ;  and  at  the  time  your  lordship  made  the  junction  with  the  corps 
there  were  under  Major-general  Phillips'  orders  five  thousand  three 
hundred  and  four;  a  force  I  should  have  hoped  would  be  sufficient  of 
itself  to  have  carried  on  operations  in  any  of  the  southern  provinces 
of  America  ;  where,  as  appears  from  intercepted  letters  of  Washington 
and  La  Fayette,  they  are  in  no  situation  to  stand  even  against  a 
division  of  that  army.  ...  By  the  intercepted  letters  enclosed  to 
your  lordship,  you  will  observe  that  I  am  threatened  with  a  siege  of 
this  post.  My  present  effective  force  is  only  ten  thousand  nine  hundred 
and  thirty-one.  It  is  probable  that  the  enemy  may  collect  for  such 
an  object,  at  least  twenty  thousand,  besides  reinforcements  to  the 
French,  (which  from  pretty  good  authority  I  have  reason  to  expect), 
and  the  numerous  militia  of  the  five  neighboring  provinces.  Thus 
circumstanced,  I  am  persuaded  your  lordship  will  be  of  opinion  that 
the  sooner  I  concentrate  my  forces  the  better." 

The  following  corps  were  therefore  to  be  forwarded  to  New  York 
in  succession  as  they  could"be  spared,  "  two  battalions  of  light  infantry, 
Forty-third  regiment,  Seventy-sixth  or  Eightieth  regiment,  two  bat 
talions  of  Anspach,  Queen's  Rangers,  cavalry  and  infantry,  the 
remains  of  the  Seventeenth  light  dragoons,  and  such  proportion  of 
the  artillery  as  could  be  spared,  particularly  men."  A  second  dis 
patch  by  the  same  messenger,  dated  June  I5th,  says,  "  I  request  you 
will  immediately  embark  a  part  of  the  troops  stated  in  the  letter 
inclosed,  beginning  with  the  light  infantry,  and  send  them  to  me  with 
all  possible  dispatch.  ...  I  do  not  think  it  advisable  to  leave 
more  troops  in  that  unhealthy  climate  at  this  season  of  the  year  than 
what  are  absolutely  wanted  for  at  defensive,  and  desultory  watei 
excursions." 


600  LA,FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA. 

Lord  Cornwallis  was  thus  assured  that  cooperation  from  New  York, 
via  Philadelphia,  as  previously  proposed,  or  otherwise,  was  improbable, 
and  with  the  proposed  reduction  of  his  army  the  conquest  of  Virginia 
became  impossible.  The  question  of  retaining  any  army  at  all  in 
Virginia  was  at  once  a  practical  one.  On  the  thirtieth,  he  replied 
from  Williamsburg,  "  Your  excellency  being  charged  with  the  weight 
of  the  whole  American  war,  your  opinions  of  course  are  less  partial, 
and  are  directed  to  all  parts  ;  upon  viewing  York,  I  was  clearly  of 
opinion  that  it  far  exceeds  our  power,  consistent  with  your  plans,  to 
make  safe  defensive  posts  there  and  at  Gloucester,  both  of  which 
would  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  shipping.  ...  As  mag 
azines,  etc.,  may  be  destroyed  by  occasional  expeditions  from  New 
York,  and  there  is  little  chance  of  establishing  a  post  capable  of  giving 
effectual  protection  to  ships  of  war,  I  submit  to  your  excellency's 
consideration,  whether  it  is  worth  while  to  hold  a  sickly  defensive 
post  (Portsmouth)  in  this  Bay,  which  will  always  be  exposed  to  a 
sudden  French  attack,  and  which  experience  makes  no  diversion  in 
favor  of  the  southern  army."  While  these  dispatches  were  being 
exchanged,  a  cipher  dispatch  from  General  Clinton  of  June  twenty- 
eighth,  received  by  Lord  Cornwallis  July  eighth,  again  avowed  a  pur 
pose  of  making  a  rapid  movement  to  seize  the  stores,  etc.,  collected 
at  Philadelphia,  and  afterward  to  use  the  force  so  employed  to  rein 
force  New  York,  urging  embarkation  of  the  troops  before  mentioned, 
and  offering  to  "  return  whatever  may  have  been  too  great  a  propor 
tion  of,  the  moment  the  expedition  is  over."  On  the  date  of  receipt, 
Lord  Cornwallis  replied,  that  "  the  troops  were  ready  to  embark,  and 
deprecated  the  detention  of  defensive  posts  in  the  country,  which  can 
not  have  the  slightest  influence  on  the  war  in  Carolina,  and  which 
gives  us  some  acres  of  an  unhealthy  swamp,  and  forever  liable  to 
become  a  prey  to  a  foreign  enemy  with  a  temporary  superiority  at 
sea.  .  .  .  Desultory  expeditions  in  the  Chesapeake  may  be 
undertaken  from  New  York  with  as  much  ease  and  more  safety, 
whenever  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  our  naval  force  is  likely  to 
be  superior  for  two  or  three  months."  The  letter  cited,  also  describes 
the  attack  of  La  Fayette  at  Jamestown  which  will  be  noticed. 

The  position  assumed  by  Cornwallis  in  his  correspondence  was 
verified  by  his  ultimate  capture.  He  desired  to  have  the  Virginia 
army  equal  to  a  conquest  of  the  State,  and  able  to  support  itself,  or 
as  the  alternative,  to  abandon  the  passive  occupation  of  posts  which 
could  draw  no  adequate  resources  from  the  country  around,  and 


1781.]  LA   FAYETTE   AND    CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA.  607 

could  be  assured  of  no  security  by  sea.  Sufficient  has  been  said  to 
indicate  the  uncertainty  of  his  future  operations  and  the  embarrass 
ments  which  followed  them.  These  continued  until  reinforcements, 
three  thousand  men,  although  not  one-third  of  the  number  expected, 
arrived  at  New  York  and  General  Clinton  as  late  as  July  eleventh,  (not 
received  until  the  twentieth,)  "  authorized  him  to  disembark  the  troops 
then  at  Portsmouth  and  ready  to  sail  for  New  York."  Meanwhile  the 
condition  of  things  changed.  He  had  been  compelled  to  act  upon 
the  supposition  that  the  depletion  of  his  command  would  end  the 
Virginia  campaign.  The  embarkation  of  troops  was  to  be  made 
from  Portsmouth. 

During  this  time  the  American  army  had  followed  closely  upon 
the  retiring  army  of  Lord  Cornwallis. 

La  Fayette  thus  wrote  to  Washington  on  the  twenty-eighth  of 
June  :  "  The  enemy  have  been  so  kind  as  to  retire  before  us.  Twice 
I  gave  them  a  chance  of  fighting  (taking  care  not  to  engage  them 
farther  than  I  pleased)  but  they  continued  their  retrograde  motions. 
Our  numbers  are,  I  think,  exaggerated  to  them,  and  our  seeming 
boldness  confirms  the  opinion.  I  thought  at  first,  Lord  Cornwallis 
wanted  to  get  me  as  low  down  as  possible,  and  use  his  cavalry  to 
advantage.  His  lordship  had  (exclusive  of  the  reinforcements  from 
Portsmouth,  said  to  be  six  hundred)  four  thousand  men,  eight  hun 
dred  of  whom  were  dragoons,  or  mounted  "infantry."  Our  force  is 
almost  his,  but  only  one  thousand  five  hundred  regulars,  and  fifty 
dragoons.  One  little  action  more  particularly  marks  the  retreat  of 
the  enemy.  From  the  place  whence  he  first  began  to  retire  to  Wil- 
liamsburg,  is  upwards  of  one  hundred  miles.  The  old  arms  at  the 
Point  of  Fork  have  been  taken  out  of  the  water.  The  cannon  was 
thrown  into  the  river  undamaged,  when  they  marched  back  to  Rich 
mond  ;  so  that  his  lordship  did  us  no  harm,  of  consequence,  but  lost 
an  immense  part  of  his  former  conquests  and  did  not  make  any  in 
this  State.  General  Greene  only  demanded  of  me,  to  hold  my  ground 
in  Virginia.  I  don't  know  but  what  we  shall,  in  our  turn,  become  the 
pursuing  enemy." 

The  movement  of  Lord  Cornwallis  to  Portsmouth,  nominally 
begun  on  the  fourth  of  July,  was  delayed  until  the  ninth,  the  fourth 
and  fifth  being  occupied  in  the  removal  of  the  heavy  baggage.  Gen 
eral  La  Fayette  advanced  to  Green  Spring,  within  a  few  miles  of  James 
town,  and  sent  light  parties  in  advance,  to  attack  the  British  rear 
guard.  The  Queen's  Rangers  crossed  James  River  on  the  fourth, 


608  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS  IN  VIRGINIA.  [1781. 

but  the  main  army  still  remained  on  the  north  side.  The  British 
position  had  natural  strength.  The  right  was  covered  by  ponds  and 
swamps,  and  before  the  centre  and  left,  the  ground  was  so  low  and 
miry,  that  it  could  be  crossed  only  by  narrow  causeways.  Tarleton 
says,  "  he  hired  a  negro  and  a  dragoon,  and  charged  them  to  feign 
desertion,  and  give  false  intelligence,  and  to  represent,  that  the  body 
of  the  king's  troops  had  crossed  James  River  ;  and  he  supposed  it 
"  most  probable  that  La  Fayette  acted  upon  this  false  intelligence, 
rather  than  through  too  great  ardor''  adding,  "for  it  is  the  only  instance 
of  this  officer s committing  himself  during  a  very  difficult  campaign'' 
Tarleton's  opinion  is  correct,  with  this  qualification,  that  in  view 
of  the  narrow  and  difficult  approaches  to  the  British  camp,  the 
American  advance  pressed  on  too  hotly,  while  the  admirable  reti 
cence  of  the  British  troops  induced  the  supporting  parties  also  to 
cross  the  causeways,  only  to  find  themselves  confronted  by  at  least 
thrice  their  numbers.  Some  discredit  has  been  cast  upon  General 
Wayne  for  this  exposure  of  the  American  army,  but  the  force  of  the 
enemy  was  simply  underestimated.  His  self-possession  and  daring 
were  never  more  conspicuous,  and  the  Pennsylvania  troops  under  his 
command  fought  on  equal  terms  with  the  best  troops  of  Cornwallis. 
The  American  army,  except  the  militia  under  Baron  Steuben,  left 
camp  about  three  o'clock,  and  reached  the  British  front  about  five,  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  sixth.  A  few  dragoons  and  the  rifle  detachments 
of  Majors  Call  and  Willis  crossed  the  causeway  first,  and  took  cover 
in  a  wood  near  the  Williamsburg  road.  Armand's  and  Mercer's  cav 
alry,  with  McPherson  followed.  Captain  Savage  with  two  guns  and 
two  battalions  of  light  infantry  under  Major  Galvan  and  Major  Willis, 
(of  Connecticut,)  came  next,  and  these  troops  were  supported  by 
General  Wayne's  Pennsylvania  brigade.  The  pickets  were  attacked 
vigorously  and  driven  in,  although  promptly  supported  by  the  Yagers. 
The  two  guns  and  the  battalions  of  Willis  and  Galvan  came  to  their 
support.  Lieutenant-colonel  Mercer  and  Major  McPherson,  respect 
ively,  took  command  of  the  riflemen  on  the  right  and  left,  while  the 
cavalry  advanced  upon  the  British  horse  which  formed  in  a  field  to 
the  rear  of  the  picket.  Tarleton,  then  acting  under  the  immediate 
orders  of  Cornwallis,  says,  "  the  British  cavalry  supported  the  pickets 
on  the  left,  in  order  to  contain  the  enemy  within  the  woods  and  to 
prevent  their  seeing  the  main  army.  Upon  the  first  cannon-shot 
from  the  enemy  the  British  army  formed  and  advanced,  when  the 
dragoons  fell  through  the  intervals  made  for  them  by  the  infantry." 


1781.]  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS  IN  VIRGINIA.  609 

The  British  right  consisted  of  the  Twenty-third,  Thirty-third,  and 
Seventy-first  regiments,  (Yorke's  brigade  vice  Webster,  killed  at  Guil- 
ford,)  the  Guards,  Hessians,  two  battalions  of  light  infantry  and  three 
guns,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Yorke,  and  were  opposite 
the  position  of  Major  McPherson.  The  British  left  consisted  of  the 
Forty-third,  Twenty-sixth  and  Eightieth  regiments,  with  light  com 
panies,  supported  for  a  second  line,  by  Tarleton's  legion  and  two  guns, 
all  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Dundas,  and  confronted  Mercer,  whose 
riflemen  were  partially  covered  by  an  opportune  ditch  and  a  rail  fence, 
supported  by  the  two  small  battalions  of  continentals. 

After  brief  opposition  the  first  line  gave  way.  The  American  left 
had  already  retired.  Wayne  anticipated  the  advancing  columns  by  a 
bold  bayonet  charge,  immediately  supported  by  La  Fayette,  who  had 
finally  crossed  the  causeway ;  and  such  was  the  vigor  of  the  conflict 
that  the  American  army  extricated  its  front,  and  retired  unpursued 
to  its  camp.  La  Fayette  had  his  horse  shot  and  was  conspicuous  for 
personal  daring,  in  the  thickest  of  the  fight. 

The  American  casualties  so  far  as  reported,  were  one  hundred  and 
eighteen  men  killed,  wounded  and  missing.  The  British  casualties 
were  seventy-five. 

La  Fayette  withdrew  to  Malvern  Hill  to  rest  his  troops,  and  Corn- 
wallis  hastened  his  departure  for  Suffolk  and  Portsmouth.  Tarleton 
claims  that  Cornwallis  could  have  destroyed  La  Fayette's  army  by  a 
vigorous  pursuit  that  night,  or  the  following  morning ;  but  he  fails  to 
harmonize  such  a  project  with  obedience  to  General  Clinton's  orders, 
and  does  not  strengthen  his  reflection  upon  his  commanding  officer 
by  stating  the  fact  that  the  troops  did  not  go  to  New  York,  at  last. 
Lord  Cornwallis  obeyed  orders  ;  and  could  not  read  the  future  as 
Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  interpreted  the  past. 

The  following  order  received  July  twelfth  by  the  Orpheus  frigate, 
certainly  must  have  convinced  Lord  Cornwallis  that  he  would  have 
committed  a  fatal  error  if  he  had  followed  the  advice  of  Tarleton  : 

"NEW  YORK,  July  ist,  1781. 

"  MY  LORD  :  For  reasons  which  I  think  it  unnecessary  to  mention  to  you  by  this 
opportunity,  I  request  that  whatever  troops,  etc.  your  Lordship  may  have  embarked 
for  this  place,  may  sail  forty-eight  hours  after  the  departure  from  the  Chesapeake 
of  the  frigate  which  carries  this  letter  ;  and  which  has  orders  to  return  whenevei 
your  Lordship  signifies  to  the  captain  of  her,  that  the  troops,  etc.  are  all  on  board 
and  ready  to  proceed  on  the  intended  service. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

"H.  CLINTON." 


6lO  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN  VIRGINIA.  [1781. 

This  order  needs  no  comment. 

On  the  ninth  of  July,  Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  left  Cobham 
with  orders  to  ravage  the  country  as  far  as  New  Haven,  in  Bedford 
county,  to  destroy  a  depot  of  supplies  supposed  to  be  at  Prince 
Edward  Court  House,  to  intercept  any  British  prisoners  or  American 
light  troops,  returning  to  the  northward  from  Greene's  army  ;  and 
then  to  retire  at  his  leisure  to  Suffolk.  This  expedition  was  gone 
fifteen  days,  marched  four  hundred  miles,  and  is  thus  described  by 
Tarleton  :  "  The  stores  destroyed,  either  of  a  public  or  private  nature, 
were  not  in  quantity  or  value,  equivalent  to  the  damage  sustained  in 
the  skirmishes  on  the  route,  and  the  loss  of  men  and  horses  by  the 
excessive  heat  of  the  climate.  The  stores  which  were  the  principal 
object  of  the  expedition  had  been  conveyed  from  Prince  Edward 
Court  House  and  all  that  quarter  of  the  country,  to  Hillsborough 
and  General  Greene's  army,  upwards  of  a  month  before  the  British 
light  troops  began  their  movement."  Reference  is  again  made  to 
map,  which  is  compiled  from  a  recent  military  map  of  Virginia, 
prepared  by  the  United  States  Engineer  Corps,  and  that  which 
accompanies  Tarleton's  narrative. 

During  this  incursion,  Cornwallis,  having  forwarded  to  Portsmouth 
such  troops  as  were  designed  for  New  York,  awaited  the  return  of 
Tarleton  at  Suffolk. 

On  the  twentieth  of  July,  at  one  o'clock  A.  M.,  Brigadier-major 
Bowers  placed  in  the  hands  of  General  Cornwallis  a  dispatch  in  cipher 
from  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  dated  July  nth,  1781.  The  following  is  an 
extract  :  "  If  you  have  not  already  passed  the  James  River,  you  will 
continue  on  the  Williamsburg  neck  until  the  frigate  arrives  with  my 
dispatches  by  Captain  Stapleton.  If  you  have  passed  and  find  it 
expedient  to  recover  that  station  you  will  please  do  it,  and  keep  pos 
session  until  you  hear  from  me.  Whatever  troops  may  have  been 
embarked  by  you  for  this  place  are  likewise  to  remain  until  further 
orders  ;  and  if  they  should  have  been  sailed,  and  within  your  call,  you 
will  be  pleased  to  stop  them."  This  dispatch  is  cited  to  show  author 
ity  for  detention  of  the  troops.  The  entire  files  of  dispatches  between 
Generals  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  support  the  movement  actually  made 
by  Lord  Cornwallis  to  Yorktown,  and  it  was  absolutely  his  only  policy, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  General  Clinton  refused  to  entertain  his  pro 
position  to  abandon  Virginia  wholly,  so  long  as  it  was  not  to  be  held 
in  force  aggressively.  In  justice  to  both,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  in 
homely  phrase  that  each  had  his  hands  full  of  responsibility,  while 


1781.]  LA  FAYETTE   AND   CORNWALLIS  IN  VIRGINIA.  6l  I 

there  was  but  one  hand  full  of  resources  to  meet  the  demand.  New 
York  or  Yorktown,  Clinton  or  Cornwallis  had  to  suffer.  Cornwallis 
the  man  of  field  duty,  exposure  and  trial,  was  the  victim  of  these 
inadequate  resources.  In  this  the  final  disaster,  he  lost  no  honor,  and 
in  his  fate,  England,  then  struggling  with  the  civilized*  world,  lost  no 
glory. 

On  the  first  of  August,  Cornwallis  proceeded  by  water  to  York- 
town,  the  main  body  of  the  army  following,  and  executing  the  move 
ment  by  the  fourth.  On  the  sixth,  Tarleton  sailed  to  Hampton, 
threw  his  horses  into  deep  water  near  shore,  landed  without  loss,  and 
joined  Cornwallis  on  the  seventh.  General  O'Hara's  division 
remained  at  Portsmouth  to  destroy  the  works,  and  on  the  twenty- 
second  the  British  army  was  concentrated  at  Yorktown  and  Glou 
cester  Point,  just  across  the  river. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  August,  General  La  Fayette  established  his 
headquarters  in  the  forks  of  the  Pamunky  and  Mattaponey  rivers, 
from  which  place  he  detached  light  troops  to  the  rear  of  Gloucester 
to  anticipate  any  attempt  of  his  adversary  to  march  north,  and  Gen 
eral  Wayne  was  sent  across  the  James  River,  demonstrating  beyond 
Suffolk  and  near  Portsmouth,  for  the  purpose  of  anticipating  an 
attempt  of  Cornwallis  to  retreat  into  North  Carolina.  He  gives  as 
an  additional  reason  for  this  policy,  the  belief,  that  in  case  the  prom 
ised  fleet  of  Count  de  Grasse  should  arrive,  he  would  thus  be  able  to 
cooperate  more  promptly,  and  if  not,  that  he  would  be  so  situated  as 
to  occupy  Portsmouth,  and  prevent  the  escape  of  Cornwallis  by  sea 
in  case  that  officer  should  attempt  to  return  to  that  post  and  embark 
for  New  York. 

Repeated  skirmishes  took  place.  While  the  British  army  was 
fortifying  the  two  posts,  Simcoe  was  actively  engaged  with  La 
Fayette's  light  troops  in  front  of  Gloucester,  and  Tarleton  made 
repeated  excursions  toward  Williamsburg,  where  the  American 
advance  guard  was  established. 

These  movements  were  made  with  extreme  caution.  On  the 
eighth  of  August.  La  Fayette  wrote  to  Washington,  "  We  shall  act 
agreeably  to  circumstances,  but  avoid  drawing  ourselves  into  a  false 
movement,  which,  if  cavalry  had  the  command  of  the  rivers,  would  give 
the  enemy  the  advantage  of  us.  His  lordship  plays  so  well,  that  no 
blander  can  be  hoped  from  him,  to  recover  a  bad  step  of  ours.  .  .  . 
Should  a  fleet  come  in  at  this  moment  our  affairs  would  take  a  very 
happy  turn." 


6l2  LA   FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA. 

On  the  twenty-first  he  again  wrote,  "  We  have  hitherto  occupied 
the  forks  of  York  River,  thereby  looking  both  ways.  Some  militia 
have  prevented  the  enemy's  parties  from  remaining  any  time  at  or 
near  Williamsburg,  and  false  accounts  have  given  them  some  alarm. 
Another  body  of  militia  under  Colonel  Ennis  has  kept  them  pretty 
close  in  Gloucester  town  and  foraged  in  their  vicinity.  ...  In 
the  present  state  of  affairs,  my  dear  general,  I  hope  you  will  come  your 
self  to  Virginia.  Lord  Cornwallis  must  be  attacked  with  pretty  great 
apparatus  ;  but  when  a  French  fleet  takes  possession  of  the  bay  and 
rivers,  and  we  form  a  land  force  superior  to  his,  that  army  must 
sooner  or  later  be  forced  to  surrender,  as  we  may  get  what  reinforce 
ments  we  please.  I  heartily  thank  you  for  having  ordered  me  to 
remain  in  Virginia ;  it  is  to  your  goodness  that  I  am  indebted  for  the 
most  beautiful  prospect  which  I  may  ever  behold." 

On  the  thirtieth,  the  Count  de  Grasse  arrived  in  Chesapeake  Bay 
with  twenty-six  ships  of  the  line,  besides  frigates  and  transports.  The 
British  frigate  Guadaloupe,  28,  which  had  started  with  dispatches  for 
New  York,  was  forced  to  return  to  Yorktown,  and  the  Loyalist,  20, 
stationed  in  the  bay,  was  captured. 

On  the  third  of  September  the  Count  de  St.  Simon  landed  at  James 
town  Island  with  three  thousand  two  hundred  French  troops  and  was 
joined  by  La  Fayette  at  Green  Spring  on  the  same  day.  On  the 
fifth  the  allies  occupied  Williamsburg,  about  fifteen  miles  from 
Yorktown. 

The  Count  de  Grasse  had  a  limited  period  for  operations  on  the 
American  coast,  and  united  with  Count  de  St.  Simon  in  urging  an  im 
mediate  attack  upon  Yorktown  while  its  defenses  were  incomplete, 
the  latter  waiving  seniority  and  proposing  to  serve  under  La  Fayette. 
This  officer,  writing  to  Washington,  on  the  arrival  of  the  fleet,  which 
had  been  met  by  one  of  his  officers  upon  making  Cape  Henry,  says, 
"  I  am  not  so  hasty  as  the  Count  de  Grasse,  and  think  that  having  so 
sure  a  game  to  play,  it  would  be  madness,  by  the  risk  of  an  attack,  to 
give  anything  to  chance.  Unless  matters  are  very  different  from 
what  I  think  they  are,  my  opinion  is,  that  we  ought  to  be  contented 
with  preventing  the  enemy's  forages,  with  militia,  without  committing 
our  regulars.  Whatever  readiness  the  Marquis  de  St.  Simon  has 
been  pleased  to  express  to  Colonel  Gimat  respecting  his  being  under 
me,  I  shall  do  nothing  without  paying  that  deference  which  is  due  to 
age,  talents  and  experience  ;  but  would  rather  incline  tc  the  cautious 
line  of  conduct  I  have  of  late  adopted."  "  I  hope  you  will  find  we 


1781.]  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN  VIRGINIA.  613 

have  taken  the  best  precautions  to  lessen  his  lordship's  (Cornwallis') 
escape.  I  hardly  believe  he  will  make  the  attempt.  If  he  does,  he 
must  give  up  ships,  artillery,  baggage,  part  of  the  horses,  all  the 
negroes ;  must  be  certain  to  lose  the  third  of  his  army,  and  run  the 
greatest  risk  to  lose  the  whole,  without  gaining  that  glory  which  he 
may  derive  from  a  brilliant  defense."  Again,  "  September  eighth," 
"  If  you  knew  how  slowly  things  go  on  in  this  country  !  !  The  gover 
nor  does  what  he  can  ;  the  wheels  of  government  are  so  rusty  that  no 
governor  whatever  will  be  able  to  set  them  free  again.  Time  will 
prove  that  Mr.  Jefferson  has  been  too  severely  charged."  .  .  .  "We 
will  try,  if  not  dangerous,  upon  a  large  scale,  to  form  a  good  idea  of 
the  works ;  but  unless  I  am  greatly  deceived,  there  will  be  madness 
in  attacking  them  now,  with  our  force.  Marquis  de  St.  Simon,  Count 
de  Grasse  and  General  Du  Portail  agree  with  me  in  opinion ;  but 
should  Lord  Cornwallis  come  out  against  such  a  position  as  we  have, 
everybody  thinks  that  he  can  not  but  repent  of  it ;  and  should  he 
beat  us,  he  must  soon  prepare  for  another  battle." 

During  this  period  Lord  Cornwallis  had  seriously  entertained  a 
purpose  of  attacking  the  allied  army  and  made  a  careful  reconnois- 
sance  to  ascertain  its  position  and  force.  Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton 
in  his  narrative,  more  than  once  intimates  that  Lord  Cornwallis  had 
no  right  to  depend  upon  the  assurances  contained  in  the  dispatches 
of  General  Clinton,  as  being  positive  promises  to  furnish  aid,  and 
says,  "  England  must  lament  the  inactivity  of  the  king's  troops, 
whether  it  proceeded  from  the  noble  Earl's  misconception,  or  from 
the  suggestions  of  confidential  attendants,  who  construed  the  Com 
mander-in-chief  s  letters  into  a  definite  promise  of  relief."  The  dis 
patches  quoted  on  pages  623  and  631  are  the  basis  for  the  opinion 
of  Lord  Cornwallis  and  for  the  intimations  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Tarle 
ton.  He  also  argues  that  "  Lord  Cornwallis  must  have  known  the 
superiority  of  the  French  naval  force,  which  General  Clinton  could 
not  have  known,  when  he  wrote  his  dispatches."  This  position  ignores 
the  fact  that  the  aggregate  British  naval  force  on  the  American  coast 
was  supposed  to  be  superior  to  that  of  France,  although  divided,  and 
unfortunate  circumstances  combined  to  prevent  its  concert  of  action. 
This  was  beyond  the  control  of  both  Generals  Clinton  and  Cornwallis. 
The  letters  of  General  La  Fayette,  already  cited,  show  that  he  was 
conducting  the  campaign  with  reference  to  just  such  a  movement  as 
Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  advised,  and  that  its  promise  of  success 
was  small. 


614  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN  VIRGINIA.  [1781. 

It  is  no  injustice  to  Tarleton  or  Clinton,  to  state,  that  their  entire 
correspondence  and  discussion  upon  the  events  of  the  war,  partakes 
of  the  nature  of  personal  controversy,  and  the  conclusions  are  very 
often  unjust  to  others,  rarely  to  themselves. 

The  time  was  at  hand  for  the  arrival  of  Washington  himself.  Be 
fore  entering  upon  that  portion  of  the  narrative,  a  brief  statement 
of  the  naval  movements  which  involved  such  confusion  of  British 
opinion  and  realized  such  determining  consequences,  is  properly  in 
place. 

Just  after  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  for  General  Clinton,  already 
noticed,  the  Count  de  Barras,  under  date  of  May  eleventh,  informed 
Washington  that  the  Count  de  Grasse,  then  in  the  West  Indies,  ex 
pected  to  leave  Cape  Francois  for  the  Chesapeake,  with  from  twenty- 
five  to  twenty-nine  sail  of  the  line,  and  three  thousand  two  hundred 
soldiers ;  but  that  such  were  his  engagements  with  land  and  naval 
forces  of  Spain,  then  in  the  West  Indies,  that  he  must  return  by  the 
middle  of  October.  These  facts  materially  changed  the  plan  of  cam 
paign.  New  York  had  been  the  objective  of  attack,  according  to  the 
original  purpose  of  General  Washington,  although  not  favored  by 
General  Rochambeau  or  the  French  government.  There  were  too 
many  contingencies  which  rendered  any  permanent  French  naval 
superiority  at  New  York  uncertain,  if  not  impossible. 

Washington  promptly  notified  La  Fayette,  by  letter  of  August 
fifteenth,  of  the  change  of  plan,  and  explained  to  that  officer  the 
importance  of  controlling  all  avenues  of  escape,  so  that  a  concentrated 
movement  could  be  made  against  Lord  Cornwallis.  It  has  been  seen 
that  General  La  Fayette  was  of  full  accord  in  opinion,  and  equal  to 
the  duty.  The  Count  de  Barras,  commanding  the  French  squadron 
at  the  north,  consisting  of  seven  ships  of  the  line,  was  the  senior  of 
Count  de  Grasse,  and  had  discretionary  authority  from  the  Marshal 
de  Castries,  French  Minister  of  Marine,  to  cruise  for  British  ships  off 
the  Banks  of  Newfoundland  ;  but  he  waived  rank  and  independent 
command,  and  by  this  prompt  exposure  of  his  small  fleet  and  a  well- 
planned  voyage,  contributed  greatly  to  the  final  result.  Admiral 
Rodney  commanding  the  British  naval  force  in  the  West  Indies, 
learned  of  the  proposed  movement  of  Count  de  Grasse,  and  detached 
Sir  Samuel  Hood  with  fourteen  ships  of  the  line  to  intercept  him. 
The  French  force  sent  to  the  American  coast  was  greater  than  under 
the  existing  circumstances  he  could  have  anticipated.  Admiral  Rod- 
ney  presented  the  facts  fully,  during  November  and  December,  1781, 


1781.]  LA   FAYETTE   AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA. 

before  the  House  of  Commons,  but  the  discussion  is  immaterial,  al 
though  he  had  Burke  as  his  censor.  The  defense  of  Admiral  Graves, 
who  succeeded  Admiral  Arbuthnot  at  New  York,  equally  discloses 
one  simple  fact,  which  is  the  material  fact,  that  the  French  fleet  was 
equal  to  cope  with  any  which  it  might  meet,  and  Count  de  Grasse 
was  wise  in  thus  increasing  his  squadron.  The  British  fleet,  so  de 
tached  from  the  West  India  squadron,  anticipated  that  it  had  only  to 
supplement  the  New  York  and  Newport  fleets,  and  was  not  equal  to 
the  demand.  Failure  in  concert  of  action  brought  additional  disap 
pointment. 

Admiral  Hood  sailed  for  America,  crossed  the  mouth  of  Chesapeake 
Bay  just  before  the  arrival  of  Count  de  Grasse,  without  entering  it ; 
looked  into  Delaware  Bay  and  sailed  for  New  York,  where  he  arrived 
August  twenty-eighth,  and  reported  to  Admiral  Graves.  That  officer 
had  but  five  ships  of  the  line  ready  for  sea ;  but  upon  advices  that 
Count  de  Barras  had  certainly  started  from  Newport  for  the  Chesa 
peake,  he  took  command  of  the  entire  squadron,  and  promptly  sailed 
with  nineteen  ships  of  the  line,  on  the  last  of  August.  On  the  fifth 
of  September  he  passed  within  the  capes  without  knowledge  of  the 
presence  of  a  superior  adversary  force.  The  French  fleet  was  weak 
ened  by  the  absence  of  seventeen  hundred  seamen  who  were  up 
James  River,  and  upon  first  intimation  that  a  squadron  was  in  the 
offing,  Count  de  Grasse  supposed  it  to  be  the  squadron  of  Count  de 
Barras.  The  right  wing,  however,  moved  promptly  out  of  the  bay 
southward,  followed  from  Lynn  Bay  by  the  remaining  ships  as  they 
could  slip  anchor  and  make  headway.  The  fleets  manoeuvered 
for  five  days  without  coming  to  a  general  action,  but  with  several 
sharp  encounters.  The  French  casualties  were  two  hundred  and 
twenty  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  English  were  three  hundred  and 
thirty-six.  Several  ships  suffered  considerable  damage.  Meanwhile, 
see  map  "  Operations  in  Chesapeake  Bay,"  Admiral  Barras  entered 
the  bay  from  the  north  with  seven  ships  of  the  line,  fourteen  trans 
ports  and  a  supply  of  siege  guns,  which  were  of  vital  importance  to 
the  allied  army.  Admiral  Graves  again  entered  the  bay  ;  but  being 
advised  of  the  arrival  of  Count  de  Barras  and  apprehending  danger 
to  his  fleet  from  the  lateness  of  the  season,  with  no  fair  prospect  of 
an  engagement  on  equal,  or  even  fair  terms,  he  sailed  for  New  York. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  Washington  reached  La 
Fayette's  headquarters.  The  French  fleet  numbered  thirty-five  ships 
of  the  line,  and  no  hostile  squadron  was  in  sight. 


6l6  LA  FAYETTE  AND   CORNWALLIS   IN   VIRGINIA.  [1781 

It  is  a  fact  to  be  noticed,  that  during  the  war  of  1775-1781,  these 
naval  operations  in  Chesapeake  Bay  brought  together  one  of  the 
heaviest  naval  armaments  known  to  maritime  warfare,  the  opposing 
squadrons  numbering  fifty-two  ships  of  the  line  when  Admiral  Graves 
sailed  for  New  York. 

NOTE.  (Fourth  Edition.}  On  the  2ist  of  August,  1781,  Washington,  writing  from 
Head  Quarters,  Kings  Ferry,  to  Governor  Livingston,  informed  him  that  "he  intended 
to  march  in  person  with  the  whole  of  the  French  Army  and  a  detachment  from  the 
American  Army,  with  as  much  dispatch  as  circumstances  would  admit,  into  Virginia, 
believing,  that  with  the  arrival  of  Count  de  Grasse  and  his  fleet  with  a  body  of  French 
troops  on  board,  there  would  be  the  fairest  opportunity  to  reduce  the  whole  British 
force  in  the  South,  and  to  ruin  their  boasted  expectations  in  that  quarter."  This  letter, 
taken  from  the  Livingston  correspondence,  is  published  in  full,  Vol.  IV,  p.  141,  Mag. 
Am.  Hist.  (Feb.,  1880),  and  urges  "continued  effort  to  secure  a  Permanent  Army,  as 
the  great  object  of  the  States,  if  they  regard  sound  Policy,  Prudence  or  Economy  " 


CHAPTER   LXXIV. 

WASHINGTON    AND    ROCHAMBEAU.      ARNOLD    AT   NEW   LONDON. 
FROM  THE   HUDSON  TO  YORKTOWN. 


campaign  of  1781  illustrated  wise  strategy,  prompt  logistics, 
and  successful  tactics,  under  circumstances  of  great  difficulty. 
These  can  be  appreciated  only  by  constant  reference  to  the  whole 
theatre  of  war.  The  extent  of  coast,  and  the  nature  of  the  country 
behind  that  coast,  are  physical  facts  which  enhance  the  value  of  the 
successes  realized,  and  indicate  the  substantial  aid  which  the  United 
States  received  through  the  support  of  France.  The  British  opera 
tions  were  predicated  upon  the  control  of  American  waters.  New 
York  was  still  the  general  base,  and  through  the  movements  made  in 
the  middle  and  southern  zones,  which  were  carried  on  from  Ports 
mouth  and  Charleston,  the  struggle  was  gradually  coming  to  a  sim 
ple  issue  with  Lord  'Cornwallis,  who  had  in  turn  commanded  in  each 
zone.  La  Fayette  and  Greene  held  nominal  relations  of  mutual  sup 
port  ;  but  neither  could  receive  early  information  of  the  movements 
of  the  other,  so  as  to  act  in  full  accord,  and  the  information  which 
was  from  time  to  time  received,  was  so  differently  interpreted,  that  it 
was  for  a  long  time  uncertain  what  were  the  real  fruits  of  Camden, 
Cowpens  and  Guilford.  The  march  of  Lord  Cornwallis  into  Virginia 
was  the  first  emphatic  fact  which  enabled  General  Washington  to 
plan  an  efficient  offensive.  The  repeated  detachment  of  troops  from 
New  York  so  sensibly  lessened  the  capacity  of  its  garrison  for  exten 
sive  field  service  at  the  north,  that  the  American  Commander-in-chief 
determined  to  attack  that  post,  and  as  a  secondary  purpose,  thereby  to 
divert  General  Clinton  from  giving  further  aid  to  troops  in  the  Southern 
States.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  prudent  conduct  of  the  Virginia 
campaign  eventually  rallied  to  the  support  of  General  La  Fayette  an 
army,  including  militia,  nearly  as  large  as  that  of  Washington,  and  the 
nominal  strength  of  the  allied  army  near  Yorktown,  early  in  Septem 
ber  was  nearly  or  quite  as  great  as  that  of  Lord  Cornwallis. 


6l8  WASHINGTON  AND   ROCHAMBEAU.  [1781. 

There  were  other  elements  which,  as  in  previous  campaigns, 
hampered  operations  at  the  north.  The  Indians  were  still  trouble 
some  in  Western  New  York,  and  the  Canadian  frontier  continued  to 
demand  attention.  The  American  navy  had  practically  disappeared. 
The  scarcity  of  money  and  a  powerless  recruiting  service,  increased 
the  difficulties  of  carrying  on  the  war  in  a  manner  that  would  use  to 
the  best  advantage  the  troops  of  France. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  May,  a  military  conference  was  held  at 
Wethersfield,  Connecticut,  four  miles  south  from  Hartford,  at  which 
Generals  Rochambeau  and  Chastellux  on  the  part  of  the  French  army, 
met  Washington  for  the  purpose  of  determining  a  plan  for  the  ensu 
ing  campaign.  As  the  result  of  the  interview,  the  Count  de  Rocham 
beau  wrote  to  Count  de  Grasse,  requesting  him  to  send  his  fleet  to 
act  in  cooperation  with  Count  de  Barras,  and  to  close  the  port  of 
New  York.  It  has  already  been  noticed  that  the  Count  de  Grasse 
indicated  his  purpose  to  sail  for  the  Chesapeake,  but  to  return  to  the 
West  Indies  by  the  middle  of  October,  and  that  the  French  govern 
ment  did  not  deem  a  movement  upon  New  York  as  practicable.  It 
is  to  be  made  prominent  in  this  connection,  as  the  key  to  the  policy 
of  France,  that  her  navy  was  upon  a  foreign  coast,  that  it  was  spared 
with  difficulty  from  the  West  Indies,  and  that  the  burden  of  such  an 
expedition  would  almost  entirely  rest  upon  her  shoulders.  With  the 
exception  of  the  Crimean  war  in  1854,  if  that  indeed  be  an  exception, 
there  is  hardly  to  be  found  in  military  annals  a  more  cordial  coopera 
tion  than  that  which  characterized  the  navy  and  army  of  Louis  XVI. 
in  aid  of  the  United  States  during  the  war  of  1775-1781.  The 
immediate  junction  of  the  two  armies  was  first  determined  upon  at 
Wethersfield,  so  as  to  be  prepared  for  any  good  opportunity  to  begin 
operations.  The  American  army,  which  exhibited  an  effective  strength 
of  less  than  forty-six  hundred  men,  was  ordered  to  Peekskill  on  the 
Hudson.  The  Count  de  Rochambeau  with  the  Duke  de  Lauzun, 
marched  from  Newport,  across  the  State  of  Connecticut  and  took  post 
at  Ridgebury.  This  was  a  small  village  near  Salem,  on  the  road  to 
Danbury,  about  fifteen  miles  back  from  Long  Island  Sound.  The 
first  offensive  design  was  to  attack  Morrisania,  where  Colonel  De- 
lancey's  Refugees  had  their  headquarters.  This  corps,  both  mounted 
and  foot,  was  the  terror  of  the  region,  and  Westchester  County  became 
the  field  of  their  operations,  as  at  its  first  organization  in  1776.  Dur 
ing  one  foray  as  far  as  the  Croton  River,  a  detachment  had  surprised 
a  small  post  commanded  by  Colonel  Christopher  Green,  already 


I78I.J  WASHINGTON  AND   ROCHAMBEAU.  6lQ 

noticed  for  good  conduct  at  Bunker  Hill,  Quebec  and  Red  Bank,  and 
he  had  been  mistreated,  with  a  severity  which  aroused  the  indignation 
of  Washington  and  demanded  punishment. 

A  second  design  to  be  concurrently  attempted,  was  to  seize  the 
British  posts  at  the  north  end  of  New  York  Island.  Sheldon's  dra 
goons  and  some  continental  troops  were  to  cooperate  with  a  French 
division  under  the  Duke  de  Lauzun  in  the  former  enterprise,  while 
General  Lincoln  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  detachment  of 
troops  from  the  American  army  to  prosecute  the  latter.  This  force 
was  to  descend  the  Hudson  by  boats,  and  the  third  of  July  was  de 
signated  for  both  attacks.  Governor  Clinton  of  New  York  was  advised 
of  Washington's  plan,  so  that  he  could  concentrate  the  New  York 
militia  in  case  of  success,  and  signal  guns  and  fires  had  been  pre 
arranged,  to  give  him  notice  of  a  favorable  result.  Washington,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  looked  beyond  the  ostensible  purpose  of  these  orders, 
and  hoped  that  a  surprise  of  these  posts  would  induce  General  Clinton 
to  attempt  their  recapture,  and  thus  bring  on  a  general  action  between 
the  armies.  The  reported  detachment  of  a  considerable  foraging 
force  from  New  York  garrison  into  New  Jersey  also  induced  the 
belief  that  the  English  commander  entertained  no  fears  as  to  the 
safety  of  these  detached  posts,  and  that  they  would  be  but  indiffer 
ently  guarded. 

General  Lincoln  left  Peekskill  with  eight  hundred  men  on  the  first 
of  June,  proceeded  to  Teller's  Point,  then  took  boats,  and  with 
muffled  oars  rowed  down  Tappan  Sea  at  night.  On  the  morning  of 
the  second,  by  hugging  the  eastern  shore,  he  reached  Dobb's  Ferry 
without  being  discovered  by  the  British.  Washington  moved  at 
daylight,  (about  three  o'clock  in  that  latitude)  without  baggage, 
leaving  his  tents  standing,  passed  through  Tarrytown,  and  reached 
Valentine's  Hill,  four  miles  above  Kings'Bridge,  by  sunrise  of  the  third. 
He  was  thus  in  a  good  position  to  support  and  cooperate  with  either 
expedition. 

General  Lincoln  crossed  the  Hudson  in  a  small  boat  and  landed 
at  old  Fort  Lee,  to  reconnoitre  the  country  opposite.  He  at  once 
observed  a  British  ship  of  war  lying  near  the  shore  and  that  a  large 
British  camp  had  been  established  on  the  extreme  north  end  of  New 
York  Island.  A  surprise  of  Fort  Washington,  or  the  outposts  further 
up  the  island,  was  of  course  impossible.  The  troops  previously  sent 
to  New  Jersey  had  returned  and  reoccupied  the  British  advance  lines 
to  the  northward.  General  Lincoln  left  Peekskill  with  alternative 


620  WASHINGTON  AND   ROCHAMBEAU.  [1781 

orders,  expressly  providing  for  this  emergency,  and  he  at  once  recrossed 
the  river,  landed  his  troops  just  above  Spuyten  Duyvel  Creek,  near 
Old  Fort  Independence,  and  then  occupied  high  ground  near  King's 
Bridge,  so  as  to  act  in  concert  with  the  Duke  de  Lauzun,  and  cut  off 
any  detachment  which  might  attempt  to  cross  the  Harlem  to  support 
Delancey.  The  Duke  de  Lauzun  in  the  meanwhile  had  only  reached 
East  Chester.  His  troops  had  been  wearied  by  a  hot  march  over 
rough  country  and  were  several  hours  later  than  the  time  designated 
for  the  attack.  The  troops  of  General  Lincoln  were  discovered  by  a 
foraging  party  of  nearly  fourteen  hundred  men,  and  a  sharp  skirmish 
ensued.  The  Duke  de  Lauzun  heard  the  firing  and  marched  to  its 
relief.  Washington  had  already  marched,  and  upon  his  approach  the 
British  retired  to  New  York  Island.  Washington  reconnoitred  the 
position  during  the  afternoon,  then  fell  back  to  Valentine's  Hill,  and 
on  the  next  day  to  Dobb's  Ferry,  where  Count  de  Rochambeau  joined 
him  on  the  sixth. 

On  the  eighth,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  enclosed  some  intercepted 
letters  of  Washington  to  Cornwallis — stated  that  he  was  "  threatened 
with  a  siege,"  and  asked  for  "  two  thousand  troops,"  adding,  "  the 
sooner  they  come  the  better." 

Meanwhile  the  American  camp  had  been  established  with  its 
right  on  the  Hudson,  covered  by  earthworks,  and  its  left  across  Saw 
Mill  river.  For  locality,  see  map  "  Hudson  River  Highlands."  The 
French  army  occupied  tHe  hills  still  further  eastward,  as  far  as  the 
river  Bronx. 

General  Washington,  Count  de  Rochambeau,  and  Generals  de 
Boville  and  Du  Portail  crossed  to  the  Jersey  Heights,  and  with  a  small 
escort  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  New  Jersey  troops,  made  examination 
of  the  New  York  Island  outposts.  This  was  immediately  followed 
by  a  reconnaissance  in  force,  of  the  entire  British  front,  from  King's 
Bridge  down  the  Hudson  River  and  along  Hell  Gate  channel.  The 
command  consisted  of  five  thousand  men,  in  two  divisions,  respectively 
led  by  the  Count  de  Chastellux  and  General  Lincoln.  The  troops 
marched  during  the  evening  of  July  twenty-first,  reached  King's 
Bridge  at  daylight,  and  formed  on  the  hills  back  of  Fort  Indepen 
dence.  Lauzun's  Lancers  and  Sheldon's  light  infantry  scoured  the 
vicinity  of  Morrisania,  and  Sheldon's  dragoons  went  as  far  as  Frog's 
Neck.  The  Refugees  fled  to  islands,  to  vessels,  and  to  the  woods. 
A  few  were  captured,  but  Delancey  himself  having  succeeded  Major 
Andre"  as  Adjutant-general,  no  longer  remained  at  the  headquarters 


1781.]  WASHINGTON  AND   ROCHAMBEAU.  621 

of  his  old  corps  and  was  not  exposed  to  capture.  Generals  Washing 
ton  and  Rochambeau,  attended  by  a  squadron  of  dragoons,  then  made 
a  careful,  ostentatious  examination  of  all  the  British  advance  works, 
and  the  line  of  the  Harlem,  passing  repeatedly  under  fire  from  ves 
sels  and  pickets.  By  midnight  of  the  twenty-third  they  returned  to 
their  encampment.  Mr.  Irving  says,  "  The  immediate  effect  of  this 
threatening  movement  appears  in  a  letter  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to 
Cornwallis,  dated  July  26th,"  requesting  him  to  order  three  regiments 
to  New  York  from  Carolina,  writing,  "  I  shall  probably  want  them, 
as  well  as  the  troops  you  may  be  able  to  spare  me  from  the  Chesa 
peake,  for  such  offensive  or  defensive  operations  as  may  offer  in  this 
quarter."  Cornwallis  had  already  ordered  two  of  the  European  regi 
ments,  which  could  be  spared  during  the  inactive  summer  months, 
from  Carolina  to  New  York,  and  was  "  requested  to  renew  the  order." 
It  has  been  seen  in  a  previous  chapter  that  Clinton  had  peremptorily 
and  repeatedly  ordered  troops  from  Yorktown  before  the  reconnois- 
sance  above  referred  to.  Clinton's  dispatches  of  June  8th,  nth,  1 3th, 
1 9th  and  28th,  as  well  as  of  July  1st,  are  of  this  general  character. 
In  that  of  the  8th  he  thus  suggestively  limits  the  previous  semi- 
independent  command  of  Cornwallis.  (That  officer  had  directly  con 
sulted  the  Home  War  Office  and  had  been  supported  in  his  sugges 
tions.)  "  As  your  lordship  is  now  so  near,  it  will  be  unnecessary  for 
you  to  send  your  dispatches  immediately  to  the  Minister ;  you  will 
therefore  be  so  good  as  to  send  them  to  me  in  the  future." 

The  position  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief  at  this  time  was 
one  of  peculiar  personal  mortification.  Appeals  to  State  authorities 
failed  to  fill  up  his  army.  Three  thousand  Hessian  reinforcements 
had  landed  at  New  York,  and  the  government  as  well  as  himself 
would  be  compromised  before  the  whole  world,  by  failure  to  meet  the 
just  demands  which  the  French  auxiliaries  had  a  right  to  press  upon 
his  attention.  Relief  came  most  opportunely.  The  frigate  Concorde 
arrived  at  Newport,  and  a  reiteration  of  the  purpose  of  Count  de 
Grasse  to  leave  St.  Domingo  on  the  third  of  August,  for  the  Chesa 
peake  direct,  was  announced  by  a  special  messenger. 

The  possibilities  of  the  future  at  once  quickened  him  to  immediate 
action.  With  a  reticence  so  close,  that  the  army  could  not  fathom  his 
plans,  he  re-organized  his  forces  for  a  false  demonstration  against  New 
York  and  a  real  movement  upon  Yorktown.  The  excellent  Logistics 
of  La  Fayette's  march  in  February,  were  to  be  equaled  by  the  energy 
and  favoring  circumstances  which  attended  the  progress  of  the  allied 


622  WASHINGTON  AND   ROCHAMBEAU.  [1781. 

armies  under  the  personal  direction  of  Washington.  Letters  to  the 
Governors  of  northern  States  called  for  aid  as  if  to  capture  New  York. 
Letters  to  La  Fayette  and  the  Count  de  Grasse  embodied  such  inti 
mations  of  his  plans  as  would  induce  proper  caution  to  prevent  the 
escape  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  and  secure  transportation  at  Head  of  Elk. 
Other  letters  to  authorities  in  New  Jersey  and  Philadelphia,  expressly 
defining  a  plan  of  operations  against  New  York  via  Staten  Island, 
with  the  assurance  of  ample  naval  support,  were  exposed  to  intercep 
tion  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  General  Clinton. 

As  late  as  the  nineteenth,  the  roads  leading  to  King's  Bridge  were 
cleared  of  obstructions,  and  the  army  was  put  in  readiness  to  advance 
against  New  York  Island.  On.  the  same  day  the  New  Jersey  regi 
ment  and  that  of  Colonel  Hazen  crossed  the  Hudson  at  Dobb's  Ferry, 
to  threaten  Staten  Island,  and  ostensibly  to  cover  some  bake-houses 
which  were  being  erected  for  the  purpose  of  giving  color  to  the  show 
of  operations  against  New  York.  The  plan  of  a  large  encampment 
had  been  prepared,  which  embraced  Springfield  and  the  Chatham 
Pass  to  Morristown,  and  this  was  allowed  to  find  its  way  to  Clinton's 
headquarters.  General  Heath  was  assigned  to  command  of  the  Hud 
son-river  posts,  with  two  regiments  from  New  Hampshire,  ten  from 
Massachusetts,  five  from  Connecticut,  the  Third  artillery,  Sheldon's 
dragoons,  the  invalid  corps,  all  local  companies,  and  the  militia. 

The  following  forces  were  selected  to  accompany  the  Commander- 
in-chief,  viz.,  the  light  infantry  under  Colonel  Scammel,  four  light  com 
panies  from  New  York  and  Connecticut,  the  Rhode  Island  regiment, 
under  the  new  army  establishment,  two  New  York  regiments,  that  of 
New  Jersey  and  Hazen's  regiment,  (the  last  two  already  across  the 
Hudson)  and  Lamb's  artillery,  in  all  about  two  thousand  men. 

The  American  troops  crossed  on  the  twenty-first,  at  King's  Ferry, 
and  encamped  near  Haverstraw.  The  French  army  followed,  and 
the  army  was  united  on  the  twenty-fifth.  During  the  delay  in  the 
passage  of  the  troops,  Count  de  Rochambeau  accompanied  General 
Washington  to  a  final  inspection  of  West  Point ;  and  the  headquar 
ters  at  New  Windsor,  between  that  post  and  Newburgh,  were  substan 
tially  abandoned. 

The  American  army  marched  promptly  toward  Springfield  on  the 
Rahway,  and  the  French  army  for  Whippany,  toward  Trenton.  The 
American  train  was  accompanied  by  bateaux  on  wheels,  as  if  to  cross 
more  promptly  to  Staten  Island,  and  Washington  thus  states  his  ob 
ject  :  "  That  much  trouble  was  taken,  and  finesse  used,  to  misguide 


1781.]  WASHINGTON   AND    ROCHAMBEAU.  623 

and  bewilder  Sir  Henry  Clinton  in  regard  to  the  real  object,  by  ficti 
tious  communications  as  well  as  by  making  a  deceptive  provision  of 
ovens,  forage  and  boats  in  his  neighborhood,  is  certain.  Nor  were 
less  pains  taken  to  deceive  our  own  army,  for  I  had  always  conceived 
when  the  imposition  does  not  completely  take  place  at  home,  it  would 
never  sufficiently  succeed  abroad." 

General  Washington  and  suite  reached  Philadelphia  about  noon, 
August  thirtieth.  The  army  had  already  realized  the  fact  that  they 
were  destined  southward.  Some  dissatisfaction  was  manifested  ;  but 
Count  de  Rochambeau  advanced  twenty  thousand  dollars  in  gold 
upon  the  pledge  of  Robert  Morris  that  he  would  refund  the  sum  by 
the  first  of  October,  and  the  effect  upon  the  troops,  who  had  long 
been  without  any  pay,  was  inspiring.  The  arrival  of  Colonel  John 
Laurens  from  France,  (reaching  Boston  on  the  twenty-fifth,)  was  a 
source  of  still  deeper  satisfaction.  He  brought  clothing,  ammunition, 
and  half  a  million  of  dollars  in  cash,  as  a  part  of  six  millions  of  livres, 
$1,1 1 1, 1 1 1,  generously  furnished  by  Louis  XVI.  Additional  sums 
were  pledged.  Dr.  Franklin  had  secured  a  loan  of  four  millions  of 
livres,  $740,740  to  cover  American  drafts,  before  the  arrival  of  Colonel 
Laurens,  and  Count  de  Vergennes  had  agreed  to  guarantee  a  loan  in 
Holland  for  ten  million  livres,  $1,851,851  more. 

On  the  second  of  September  the  American  army  made  its  third 
glad  entry  into  Philadelphia,  and  was  received  with  enthusiasm.  On 
the  next  day  the  French  army,  after  a  brief  halt  to  clean  uniforms 
and  accoutrements,  made  its  brilliant  passage  through  the  American 
capital.  Their  rich  foreign  uniforms  contrasted  with  the  faded  cloth 
ing  of  the  column  that  had  passed  the  day  before.  The  whole  popu 
lation  again  mingled  all  tokens  of  congratulation  and  joy ;  but  there 
was  no  time  for  protracted  honors.  The  plainly  equipped  detachment 
of  Washington's  veterans,  however,  lost  no  credit,  according  to  the 
French  authorities,  in  the  steadiness  of  their  march  and  their  fitness 
for  battle. 

Dispatches  here  received  from  General  La  Fayette,  dated  on  the 
twenty-first  of  August,  informed  General  Washington  that  "  the 
British  troops  were  fortifying  Gloucester" — that  "  a  small  garrison 
still  remained  at  Portsmouth  " — that  he  "  had  written  to  the  Gov 
ernor  to  collect  six  hundred  militia  upon  Blackwater" — "to  General 
Gregory  near  Portsmouth,  that  he  had  an  account  that  the  enemy 
intended  to  push  a  detachment  to  Carolina," — to  General  Wayne'"  to 
move  to  the  southward  and  be  ready  to  cross  the  James  at  West- 


624  ARNOLD   AT  NEW  LONDON.  (1781. 

over,"  and  that  "  the  army  would  soon  assemble  again  upon  the 
waters  of  the  Chickahominy."  This  letter  has  been  previously 
noticed,  for  other  extracts.  He  had  advised  General  Washington 
of  the  occupation  of  Yorktown,  in  a  letter  dated  August  eighth. 
Up  to  this  time  no  further  intelligence  had  been  received  of  the 
movements  of  the  Count  de  Grasse. 

On  the  second  of  September,  while  the  American  army  was 
marching  through  Philadelphia,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  sent  a  courier 
vessel  to  Yorktown,  with  the  following  dispatch  :  (Clinton  to  Corn- 
wallis)  "  September  second,  1781."  (In  cypher.)  Received  fifteenth 
September.  "  Mr.  Washington  is  moving  an  army  to  the  southward 
with  an  appearance  of  haste,  and  gives  out  that  he  expects  the  coop 
eration  of  a  considerable  French  armament.  Your  lordship,  however, 
may  be  assured,  that  if  this  should  be  the  case,  I  shall  either  endeavor 
to  reinforce  the  army  under  your  command  by  all  the  means  within  the 
compass  of  my  power,  or  make  every  possible  diversion  in  your  favor." 

"  P.  S.  Washington,  it  is  said,  was  to  be  at  Trenton  this  day,  and 
means  to  go  in  vessels  to  Christiana  Creek,  and  from  thence,  by  Head 
of  Elk,  down  Chesapeake,  in  vessels  also.  .  .  .  Washington  has 
about  four  thousand  French  and  two  thousand  rebel  troops  with  him." 

On  the  fifth  of  September,  General  Washington  started  for  Head 
of  Elk.  He  had  just  passed  Chester  when  a  courier  met  him  with 
dispatches  which  announced  the  arrival  of  the  Count  de  Grasse.  He 
returned  to  Chester  to  advise  Count  de  Rochambeau  of  the  news,  and 
moved  directly  on,  reaching  Head  of  Elk  the  next  morning.  This 
dispatch  reached  Philadelphia  during  a  banquet  given  by  the  French 
officers  to  the  Chevalier  de  Luzerne,  accompanied  by  the  additional 
announcement  of  the  landing  of  Count  de  St.  Simon,  and  his  junction 
with  La  Fayette.  The  day  had  closed  with  a  review  of  the  French 
army,  which  had  been  attended  by  the  President  of  Congress  ;  and  the 
city  was  thrilled  with  fresh  pride  and  hope,  as  these  successive  excite 
ments  came  in  to  brighten  the  national  life.  On  the  day  that  Wash 
ington  arrived  at  Head  of  Elk,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  sent  the  following 
dispatch  to  Lord  Cornwallis : 

"  Clinton  to  Cornwallis,  Sept.  sixth,  at  noon.  (In  cypher.)  (Re 
ceived  sixteenth  September) : 

"  As  I  find  by  your  letters  that  De  Grasse  has  got  into  the  Chesa 
peake,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  Washington  is  moving  with,  at  least 
six  thousand  French  and  rebel  troops  against  you,  I  think  the  best 
way  to  relieve  you,  is  to  join  you,  as  soon  as  possible,  with  all  the 


I78I.J  ARNOLD  AT  NEW   LONDON.  625 

force  that  can  be  spared  from  here,  which  is  about  four  thousand 
men.  They  are  already  embarked,  (Italics  not  in  the  original),  and 
will  proceed  the  instant  I  receive  information  from  the  admiral  that 
we  may  venture  ;  or  that  from  other  intelligence  the  commodore 
and  I  should  judge  sufficient  to  move  upon.  By  accounts  from 
Europe  we  have  every  reason  to  expect  Admiral  Digby  hourly  on  the 
coast." 

(This  sixth  day  of  September  was  La  Fayette's  twenty-fourth 
birthday.) 

On  the  same  day  a  British  force  from  New  York  landed  in  New 
England. 

As  soon  as  General  Clinton  found  that  Washington  had  moved 
against  Cornwallis,  he  attempted  to  check  his  march  by  an  invasion 
of  Connecticut ;  and  this  was  intrusted  to  the  command  of  General 
Benedict  Arnold.  It  was  his  native  State,  and  he  had  become  an 
object  of  as  intense  hatred  as  he  had  formerly  commanded  homage. 
No  possible  selection  could  have  been  more  injudicious,  as  a  matter 
of  military  policy,  not  excepting  that  of  Tarleton  or  Simcoe  ;  and  no 
man  was  better  prepared  by  his  antecedents  to  move  wherever  he 
could  safely  destroy  life  and  property,  regardless  of  restraint.  The 
man  whom  Phillips  and  Cornwallis  could  not  associate  with,  except 
officially,  and  whom  Clinton  endured  under  the  pressure  of  past  fra 
ternity  in  his  treason,  was  just  the  man  whom  Washington  could  safely 
leave  to  the  care  of  the  citizens  and  militia  of  New  England.  Any 
temporary  success  would  only  insure  his  destruction.  A  wild  animal 
could  commit  ravage,  but  an  aroused  people  would  master  him 
at  last.  So  with  Arnold.  It  was  a  very  grave  error  to  presume 
that  he,  of  all  men,  could  affect  the  movements  of  Washington  and 
Rochambeau.  If  Clinton  had  taken  the  garrison  of  New  York,  or 
half  of  it,  into  the  field,  he  would  have  aided,  possibly  have  saved 
Cornwallis. 

The  expedition  of  Arnold  consisting  of  the  Thirty-eighth,  one  hun 
dred  Yagers,  the  Third  battalion  of  New  Jersey  volunteers,  the  loyal 
Americans,  American  Refugees  and  artillerists,  and  three  six  pound 
ers  and  one  howitzer,  left  New  York  September  fourth,  and  landed  on 
both  sides  of  New  London  harbor  early  on  the  sixth.  Captain  Beas- 
ley's  report  to  the  admiral  states  that  it  was  about  half  past  six  when 
the  vessels  entered  the  harbor;  and  according  to  Arnold's  report  the 
landing  was  effected  about  nine  o'clock.  Reference  is  made  to  map 
"  Benedict  Arnold  at  New  London."  This  expedition  was  for  pur- 
40 


626  ARNOLD   AT  NEW   LONDON.  [1781. 

poses  of  plunder  and  desolation,  without  anticipation  of  battle. 
Arnold  landed  on  the  west  side,  so  as  to  enter  the  town.  "  An  un 
finished  mere  breastwork  or  water  battery,"  as  Hampstead  styles  it, 
called  Fort  Trumbull,  almost  open,  landward,  was  the  only  defensive 
work,  except  a  small  redoubt  on  higher  ground  in  the  rear,  called 
Fort  Folly  or  Fort  Nonsense.  Fort  Trumbull  was  occupied  by  Cap 
tain  Adam  Shopley's  detachment  of  State  troops,  less  than  thirty 
strong,  usually  stated  at  twenty-three  or  four  men  besides  himself. 
Arnold  detached  Captain  Willett  with  four  companies  of  the  Thirty- 
eighth  to  occupy  Fort  Trumbull,  and  advanced  directly  upon  the 
town.  Captain  Willett's  force  was  joined  by  one  hundred  and  twenty 
American  Refugees,  under  Captain  Frink,  who  had  been  sent  by  Lieu 
tenant-colonel  Upham  from  Fort  Franklin,  a  stockade  fort  at  Lloyd's 
Neck,  Simcoe's  old  headquarters  on  Long  Island,  nearly  opposite 
New  London.  "  During  the  previous  year,  1780,  there  had  been 
organized  on  Long  Island  a  Board  of  Associated  Loyalists,  including 
such  persons  as  would  aid  the  king,  but  declined  a  regular  military 
service.  It  provoked  frightful  collisions  with  citizens  of  opposite  sen 
timents,  and  some  of  the  more  barbarous  minor  operations  of  civil 
war.  During  July,  1781,  Admiral  Barras  sent  a  detachment  of  troops 
from  Newport,  with  three  frigates,  to  reduce  Fort  William,  then  gar 
risoned  by  nearly  eight  hundred  Refugees,  but  abandoned  the  enter 
prise  after  the  capture  of  some  British  marines  at  Huntington  Bay. 
Lossing  states  that  the  association  was  dissolved  late  in  1781,  because 
of  the  manifest  mischief  it  was  working  to  the  royal  cause." 

Captain  Shopley's  men  delivered  one  volley,  disabling  four  or  five  of 
the  assailants,  and  abandoned  the  fort,  taking  boats  for  Fort  Griswold. 
One  boat  was  shattered  by  a  nine  pounder  ball,  but  about  twenty 
of  his  men  safely  joined  the  other  garrison.  Arnold  met  with  only  a 
nominal  resistance  from  hastily  armed  citizens,  there  being  no  con 
siderable  military  force  in  the  vicinity. 

The  right  wing,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Eyer,  landed  back  of 
Pine  Island,  and  marched  in  two  divisions,  the  Fifty-fourth  and 
Fortieth  regiments  respectively  leading  each.  The  New  Jersey  Volun 
teers  and  artillery  who  landed  last,  were  in  the  rear,  and  fell  behind, 
while  making  the  circuit  of  some  swampy  ground,  so  that  they  did 
not  reach  the  summit  of  the  hill  upon  which  Fort  Griswold  rested 
until  after  the  storming  party  gained  possession  of  the  rampart.  As 
soon  as  Arnold  secured  possession  of  Fort  Trumbull,  he  noticed  that 
"  the  shipping  in  the  harbor  was  -actively  engaged  in  preparations  to 


I78i.]  ARNOLD  AT   NEW   LONDON.  627 

retire  up  the  Norwich  River  "  (Norwich,  only  thirteen  miles  distant, 
was  Arnold's  birth-place),  and  thus  states  the  case  in  his  report  :  "  I 
found  the  enemy's  ships  would  escape,  unless  we  could  possess  our 
selves  of  Fort  Griswold.  From  information  I  received,  before  and 
after  my  landing,  I  had  reason  to  believe  that  Fort  Griswold,  on 
Groton  side,  was  very  incomplete ;  and  I  was  assured  by  friends  to 
government,  after  my  landing,  that  there  were  only  twenty  or  thirty 
men  in  the  fort,  the  inhabitants  in  general  being  on  board  the  ships 
and  busy  in  saving  their  property.  I  therefore  dispatched  an  officer 
to  Lieutenant-colonel  Eyer,  with  the  intelligence  I  had  received,  and 
requested  him  to  make  an  attack  on  the  fort  as  soon  as  possible ;  at 
which  time  I  expected  the  howitzer  was  up,  and  would  have  been 
made  use  of.  On  my  gaining  a  height  of  ground  in  the  rear  of  New 
London  from  which  I  had  a  good  prospect  of  Fort  Griswold,  I  found  it 
much  more  formidable  than  I  expected,  or  I  had  formed  an  idea  of 
from  the  information  I  had  before  received.  I  observed  at  the  same 
time  that  the  men  who  had  escaped  from  Fort  Trumbull  had  crossed 
in  boats  a'nd  had  thrown  themselves  into  Fort  Griswold,  and  a  favor 
able  wind  springing  up  about  this  time,  the  enemy's  ships  were  escap 
ing  up  the  river,  notwithstanding  the  fire  from  Fort  Trumbull  and  a 
six-pounder  I  had  brought  with  me.  I  immediately  dispatched  a  boat, 
with  an  officer,  to  Lieutenant-colonel  Eyer  to  countermand  my  first 
order;  but  the  officer  arrived  a  few  minutes  too  late.  After  a  most 
obstinate  defense  of  near  forty  minutes,  the  fort  was  carried  by  the 
superior  bravery  and  perseverance  of  the  assailants." 

The  character  of  Arnold's  incursion  is  indicated  by  his  confidence 
that  he  was  to  meet  with  no  serious  opposition  and  courted  none. 
While  he  was  watching  Fort  Griswold,  the  Fortieth  and  Fifty-fourth 
were  storming  its  works.  The  outline  of  this  work,  with  a  small 
advanced  redoubt,  connected  with  a  covered  way,  is  correctly  given 
on  the  map,  and  any  visitor,  as  late  as  1876,  could  trace  the  steep 
parapet,  to  the  south,  the  bastions,  the  deep  ditch,  and  even  examine 
the  old  well,  and  the  triangular  breastwork  which  guarded  the  entrance. 
A  small  knoll  near  by,  Avery's  Hill  or  Ledge,  was  the  rendezvous 
for  the  assailants,  who  did  not  wait  for  their  artillery,  but  with 
eager  confidence,  after  gathering  their  forces,  were  ready  to  ad 
vance  to  the  assault.  The  position  was  strong  ;  but  its  defenders 
were  few.  The  small  reinforcement  from  Fort  Trumbull  did  not 
make  the  garrison  more  than  one  hundred  and  sixty  all  told.  It  was 
a  severe  test  for  the  handful  of  men  who  saw  the  approaching  regu- 


628  ARNOLD  AT  NEW   LONDON.  [1781. 

lars,  who  knew  that  the  opposite  shore  was  already  in  British  pos 
session  and  that  their  lives  were  to  be  imperiled,  seemingly,  for  hon 
or's  sake.  But  a  successful  defense  might  reverse  the  whole  issue. 
New  London  had  then  not  been  fired.  The  only  possible  point  of 
resistance  was  Fort  Griswold.  Success  would  drive  the  British  right 
wing  to  their  ships. 

According  to  Arnold's  report,  when  his  messenger  reached  Lieu 
tenant-colonel  Eyer,  "  he  had  already  sent  Captain  Beckwith  with  a 
flag  to  demand  a  surrender."  Captain  Shopley  received  the  flag, 
according  to  the  statements  contained  in  Lieutenant  Stephen  Ham- 
stead's  narrative  and  the  equally  interesting  work  of  Miss  Caulkins, 
compiled  from  the  statements  of  survivors  of  the  assault.  At  first,  "  a 
council  of  war  unanimously  voted  that  the  garrison  was  unable  to 
defend  themselves  against  so  superior  a  force."  "  Colonel  Nathan 
Gallup  of  the  Groton  militia,  who  was  present,  insisted  however,  that 
he  could  procure  a  reinforcement  of  two  or  three  hundred  militia, 
in  fifteen  minute s,\i  the  garrison  would  holdout;  and  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Ledyard  was  unfortunately  misled  by  these  assurances,  and 
returned,  through  Captain  Shopley,  an  answer,  declining  to  comply 
with  the  order.  Unfortunately  the  Colonel  failed  to  meet  with  that 
success  which  he  expected — his  men  offered  to  meet  the  enemy  in  the 
field,  but  peremptorily  declining  to  enter  the  fort  to  fight  against  such 
great  odds  with  no  chance  to  escape" 

As  a  fair,  unsuccessful  resistance  involved,  ordinarily,  only  a  fair 
surrender,  and  as  only  such  men  as  could  be  readily  rallied  could  par 
ticipate  in  the  defense,  it  is  evident  that  the  quotation  made  can  not 
be  precisely  historical.  Militia  would  have  preferred  the  fort  to  the 
exposure  of  Groton  Hill.  Barber,  in  his  Historical  Collections,  states 
that  "  on  the  advance  of  the  enemy  Colonel  Ledyard,  having  but  one 
hundred  and  fifty  men  with  him  in  the  fort,  sent  out  an  officer  to  get 
assistance,  as  there  were  a  number  of  hundreds  of  people  collected  in 
the  vicinity;  this  officer  by  drinking  too  much,  became  intoxicated, 
and  no  reinforcement  was  obtained." 

The  defense  of  Fort  Griswold  during  the  afternoon  of  September 
sixth,  1781,  was  correctly  characterized  by  Arnold  as  "most  obsti 
nate."  His  officially  reported  loss,  viz.,  "  one  major,  one  captain,  one 
lieutenant,  two  ensigns,  two  sergeants  and  forty  rank  and  file  killed ; 
and  one  lieutenant-colonel,  two  captains,  one  lieutenant,  one  ensign, 
eight  sergeants,  two  drummers  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven 
rank  and  file  wounded,  total  of  casualties  one  hundred  and  sixty- 


1781.]  ARNOLD   AT   NEW    LONDON.  629 

three,"  and  exceeding  the  number  of  the  garrison,  indicates  the  char 
acter  of  the  resistance. 

The  battle  was  short,  and  is  briefly  stated.  The  storming  parties 
on  the  south  and  south-east  were  compelled  to  pass  a  deep  ditch  and 
climb  an  embankment  at  least  twelve  feet  in  height.  The  storming 
party  from  the  east  eventually  pressed  through  three  embrasures  or 
deep  cuts  in  the  rampart  flanking  the  salient  angle,  for  which  there 
were,  so  far  as  known,  no  guns.  The  first  repulse  was  complete  and 
with  great  slaughter.  The  second  assault  crowned  the  parapet,  and 
from  the  moment  the  troops  leaped  into  the  small  area  of  the  parade, 
there  was  indiscriminate  butchery.  All  that  the  American  militia  did 
at  King's  Mountain,  and  all  that  Tarleton  did  to  avenge  his  defeat  at 
Cowpens,  was  summed  up  in  the  punishment  of  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Griswold  for  their  obstinate  defense.  There  is  no  redeeming  feature 
which  history  can  recognize.  The  larger  portion  of  the  British  cas 
ualties  occurred  outside  of  the  fort,  when  they  were  on  the  trying  ad 
vance,  and  they  could  not,  and  no  troops  could,  inflict  great  loss  upon 
active  opponents  firing  from  the  cover  of  short  pickets,  supermounting 
the  parapet.  The  authorities  are  conclusive  that  the  American  loss 
was  insignificant  until  the  British  troops  occupied  the  works  and  the 
garrison  had  practically  yielded  the  contest. 

Arnold  says  "  eighty-five  men  were  found  dead  in  Fort  Griswold, 
and  sixty  wounded,  most  of  them  mortally."  He  adds,  "  I  believe 
we  have  about  seventy  prisoners  besides  the  wounded,  who  are  pa 
roled."  This  included  both  sides  of  the  river.  He  says  "  their  (the 
American)  loss  on  the  other  side  (the  New  London  side)  must  have 
been  considerable  ;  but  can  not  be  ascertained." 

"  Lieutenant-colonel  Eyer  and  three  other  officers  of  the  Fifty- 
fourth  were  wounded.  Major  Montgomery  was  killed  by  a  spear  in 
entering  the  enemy's  works,  and  Major  Broomfield  succeeded  to  the 
command." 

The  gate  of  the  fort  was  opened  by  order  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Ledyard  ;  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Buskirk,  of  the  New  Jersey  Volun 
teers,  arrived  in  time  to  participate  in  the  closing  scene,  so  that  the 
wanton  slaughter  of  Ledyard  after  he  surrendered  his  sword  is  to  be 
charged  to  the  memory  of  an  American  loyalist,  and  not  to  a  British 
regular  officer.  When  once  this  work  began,  the  wounded  were  not 
spared  and  the  tragedy  was  complete. 

Meanwhile  Arnold  was  actively  engaged  in  less  dangerous  work. 
He  says  "  ten  or  twelve  ships  were  burned,  and  one  loaded  with  naval 


630  ARNOLD   AT  NEW   LONDON.  [1781 

stores,  among  the  former,  the  cargo  of  the  Hannah,  Captain  Watson, 
from  London,  lately  captured  by  the  enemy.  The  whole  of  which 
was  burned  with  the  stores,  which  proved  to  contain  a  large  quantity 
of  powder  unknown  to  us.  The  explosion  of  the  powder  and  the 
change  of  wind  soon  after  the  stores  were  fired,  communicated  the 
flames  to  part  of  the  town,  which  was,  notwithstanding  effort  to  pre 
vent  it,  unfortunately  destroyed."  Sixty-five  dwellings,  thirty-one 
stores  and  warehouses,  eighty  ships,  twenty  barns,  a  meeting-house, 
court-house,  jail,  the  market  and  custom-house  were  among  the  tro 
phies  which  ended  the  military  achievements  of  Benedict  Arnold, 
and  passed  him  over  to  the  care  of  universal  history. 

His  daring  spirit  was  indeed  fretted  by  repeated  injustice,  but  his 
ungovernable  temper  almost  invariably  induced  the  occasion  for  his 
many  disappointments.  With  the  vindication  of  his  valor  at  Saratoga, 
there  must  be  as  freely  perpetuated,  the  inevitable  doom  which  awaits 
a  traitor. 

From  this  episode  of  an  important  campaign  the  attention  is  at 
once  diverted  to  operations  which  it  did  not  embarrass. 

While  the  allied  army  was  waiting  for  additional  transportation  at 
Head  of  Elk,  General  Washington,  accompanied  by  Count  de  Rocham- 
beau,  visited  Baltimore,  where  they  were  received  with  illuminations 
and  civil  honors.  On  the  ninth,  accompanied  by  one  staff  officer,  he 
visited,  for  the  first  time  during  six  years,  his  home  at  Mount  Vernon. 
On  the  tenth  his  own  suite  and  Count  de  Rochambeau  and  suite 
became  his  guests.  On  the  eleventh  General  Chastellux  and  aids-de 
camp  were  added  to  the  company.  On  the  twelfth  the  hospitalities 
of  the  mansion  yielded  their  claim  to  the  behests  of  duty,  and  on  the 
fourteenth  day  of  September,  1781,  the  American  Commander-in- 
chief  reached  the  headquarters  of  General  La  Fayette  at  Williamsburg, 


u30* 


CHAPTER    LXXV. 

SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.     SURRENDER   OF   CORNWALLIS.     CLOSE   OF 

CAMPAIGN.     1781. 

GOOD  strategy  before  New  York  isolated  Clinton ;  and  equal 
strategy  in  Virginia  and  the  Chesapeake  isolated  Cornwallis. 
The  former,  outgeneraled,  could  not  overtake  the  American  army  by 
land, — could  not  divert  its  commanding  general  from  the  crowning 
objective  of  his  campaign, — could  not  resolve  to  hazard  something  at 
his  own  post  and  throw  the  bulk  of  his  army  upon  Philadelphia  and 
the  American  rear;  while  to  relieve  Yorktown  by  sea  required  imme 
diate  action  and  the  support  of  an  adequate  fleet.  The  following 
dispatch  indicates  the  position  of  Lord  Cornwallis : 

(Cornwallis  to  Clinton?}  "York,  i6th  September,  1781.  In 
cypher.  Dispatches  of  2d  and  6th  (already  noticed)  acknowledged. 
The  enemy's  fleet  has  returned.  Two  line  of  battle  ships,  and  one 
frigate,  lie  at  the  mouth  of  this  river ;  and  three  or  four  line  of  battle 
ships,  several  frigates  and  transports,  went  up  the  bay  on  I2th  and 
I4th.  I  hear  Washington  arrived  at  Williamsburg  on  the  I4th. 
Some  of  his  troops  embarked  at  Head  of  Elk,  and  the  others  arrived 
at  Baltimore  on  the  I2th.  If  I  had  no  hopes  of  relief,  I  would  rather 
risk  an  action  than  defend  my  half  finished  works ;  but  as  you  say 
Digby  is  hourly  expected,  and  promise  every  exertion  to  assist  me,  I 
do  not  think  myself  justified  in  putting  the  fate  of  the  war  on  so  des 
perate  an  attempt.  By  examining  the  transports  with  care,  and  turn 
ing  out  useless  mouths,  my  provisions  will  last  six  weeks  from  this 
day,  if  we  can  preserve  them  from  accidents.  The  cavalry  must,  I 
fear,  be  all  lost.  I  am  of  opinion,  that  you  can  do  me  no  effectual 
service,  but  by  coming  directly  to  this  place.  Lieutenant  Conway  of 
this  command  is  just  exchanged.  He  assures  me  that  since  the 
Rhode  Island  squadron  has  joined  they  have  thirty-six  sail  of  the 


632  SIEGE   OF   YORKTOWN.  [1781. 

line.     This  place  is  in  no  state  of  defense.     If  you  can  not  relieve  me 
very  soon,  you  must  be  prepared  to  hear  the  worst. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

CORNWALLIS." 

The  following  dispatches  are  cited  in  this  connection  : 
(Clinton  to  Cornwallis.}  "  New  York,  Sept.  24th,  1781.  In  cypher. 
(Received  Sept.  29th,  1781).  Foregoing  dispatch  acknowledged. 
At  a  meeting  of  the  general  and  flag  officers  held  this  day,  it  was 
determined  that  above  five  thousand  men  rank  and  file,  shall  be  em 
barked  on  board  the  king's  ships,  and  the  joint  exertions  of  the  army 
and  navy  made  in  a  few  days  to  relieve  you,  and  afterwards  to  coop 
erate  with  you.  The  fleet  consists  of  twenty-three  sail  of  the  line, 
three  of  which  are  three-deckers.  There  is  every  reason  to  hope  we 
start  from  hence  the  5th  of  October. 

"  P.  S.  Admiral  Digby  is  this  moment  arrived  at  the  Hook,  with 
three  sail  of  the  line.  As  a  venture,  not  knowing  whether  they  can 
be  seen  by  us,  I  request  that  if  all  is  well,  upon  hearing  a  considerable 
firing  towards  the  entrance  of  the  Chesapeake,  three  large  separate 
smokes  may  be  made  parallel  to  it,  and  if  you  possess  the  post  of 
Gloucester,  four,  I  shall  send  another  runner  soon." 

The  following  dispatch  was  sent  in  reply  : 

"York,  10  P.  M.,  Sept.  29th,  1781.  In  cypher.  I  have  ventured 
these  last  two  days  to  look  General  Washington's  whole  force  in  the 
face  in  their  position  on  the  outside  of  my  works,  and  I  have  the 
pleasure  to  assure  your  excellency  that  there  was  but  one  wish 
throughout  the  whole  army,  which  was  that  the  enemy  would 
advance.  I  have  this  evening  received  your  letter  of  the  24th  which 
has  given  me  the  greatest  satisfaction.  I  shall  retire  this  night  within 
the  works,  and  have  no  doubt  if  relief  arrives  in  any  reasonable  time, 
York  and  Gloucester  will  be  both  in  possession  of  His  Majesty's 
troops.  I  believe  your  excellency  must  depend  more  on  the  sound 
of  our  cannon  than  the  signal  of  smokes  for  information  ;  however,  I 
will  attempt  it  on  the  Gloucester  side  ;  medicines  are  wanted." 

(Clinton  to  Cornwallis^)  "  New  York,  Sept.  25th,  1781,  (duplicate) 
in  cypher,  received  October  2d.  My  Lord  : — My  letter  of  yesterday 
will  have  informed  your  lordship  of  the  number  of  ships  and  troops 
we  can  bring  with  us.  It  is  supposed  the  necessary  repairs  of  the 
fleet  will  detain  us  here  to  the  fifth  of  October  and  your  lordship 


i78i.j  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.  633 

must  be  sensible  that  unforeseen  accidents  may  lengthen  it  out  a  day 
or  two  longer  ;  I  therefore  entreat  you  to  lose  no  time  in  letting  me 
know  your  real  situation,  and  your  opinion  how  upon  our  arrival  we 
can  best  act  to  form  a  junction  with  you,  together  with  the  exact 
strength  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  and  what  part  of  the  Chesapeake  the) 
appear  to  be  most  jealous  of.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

H.  CLINTON." 

"  P.  S.  As  your  lordship  must  have  better  intelligence  than  we 
possibly  can  have,  I  request  you  will  send  a  trusty  person  to  each  of 
the  capes  about  the  seventh  of  next  month,  with  every  information 
respecting  the  force  and  situation  of  the  enemy  you  may  judge  neces 
sary,  and  directions  to  continue  there  until  our  arrival,  when  small 
vessels  will  be  sent  to  bring  off  any  person  they  may  find  there." 

The  following  reply  brings  the  correspondence  of  these  officers  up 
to  the  practical  operations  of  the  siege  : 

(Cornwallis  to  Clinton?)  <l  Yorktown,  Virginia,  October  3d,  1781, 
in  cypher.  Sir  : — I  received  your  letter  of  the  twenty-fifth  September, 
last  night.  The  enemy  are  encamped  about  two  miles  from  us.  On 
the  night  of  the  3Oth  of  September  they  broke  ground,  and  made  two 
redoubts  about  eleven  hundred  yards  from  our  works,  which,  with 
some  works  that  had  been  constructed  to  secure  our  exterior  position, 
occupy  a  gorge  between  two  creeks  which  nearly  embrace  this  post. 
They  have  finished  these  redoubts,  and  I  expect  they  will  go  on  with 
their  works  this  night.  From  the  time  that  the  enemy  have  given  us, 
and  the  uncommon  exertions  of  the  troops,  our  works  are  in  a  better 
state  of  defense  than  we  had  reason  to  hope.  I  can  see  no  means  of 
forming  a  junction  with  us  but  by  York  River ;  and  I  do  not  think 
that  any  diversion  would  be  of  any  use  to  us.  Our  accounts  of  the 
strength  of  the  French  fleet  have  in  general  been,  that  they  were 
thirty-five  or  six  sail  of  the  line  ;  they  have  frequently  changed  their 
position  ;  two  ships  of  the  line  and  one  frigate  lie  at  the  mouth  of 
this  river,  and  our  last  accounts  were,  that  the  body  of  the  fleet  lay 
between  the  tail  of  the  Horse-shoe  and  York-spit.  And  it  is  likewise 
said  that  four  line  of  battle  ships  lay  a  few  days  ago  in  Hampton 
Road.  I  see  little  chance  of  my  being  able  to  send  persons  to  wait 
for  you  at  the  capes,  but  I  will  if  possible.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

CORNWALLIS." 

British  Position.  York  or  Yorktown,  ten  miles  up  York  River,  is 
situated  upon  the  south  or  right  bank  (which  was  then  quite  a  bluff,) 


634  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.  [1781. 

between  two  small  creeks,  which  according  to  Cornwallis  "  nearly  em 
braced  the  post."  The  British  right  rested  on  a  swamp  which  bor 
dered  the  creek,  west  of  the  town.  Batteries  one,  two  and  three, 
see  map  "  Siege  of  Yorktown,"  covered  this  approach ;  and  a  large 
redoubt,  completely  fraized  and  fronted  by  abatis,  had  been  built  upon 
the  bluff  beyond  this  creek,  westward,  between  the  Williamsburg  road 
and  the  river.  This  redoubt  was  occupied  by  the  Fusileers ;  and  the 
Guadaloupe,  28,  frigate,  lay  at  anchor  off  the  mouth  of  the  creek. 
The  east  branch  of  this  creek  flowed  through  a  deep  ravine,  or 
"gorge,"  as  Cornwallis  styles  it.  It  will  be  seen  that  any  approach 
to  the  town  from  the  west  or  the  front,  was  hardly  practicable,  and  a 
retreat  of  the  garrison,  by  the  same  route,  would  be  as  difficult.  To 
the  south-east,  following  the  course  of  the  river,  was  a  large  space  of 
solid  surface  cut  into  ravines,  under  cover  of  one  of  which  the  besieg 
ers  ultimately  moved  toward  their  second  parallel,  thus  shortening 
the  zig-zag  approaches.  On  the  high  ground  in  front  of  the  great 
ravine  or  gorge,  the  British  had  located  several  redoubts.  It  has 
been  seen  that  Lord  Cornwallis  abandoned  them  upon  receipt  of 
Clinton's  dispatch  of  the  twenty-fourth.  Tarleton  severely  criticises 
the  movement ;  but  his  opinion  is  to  be  associated  with  his  other 
opinion  which  favored  an  attack  upon  the  American  camp.  He 
entirely  omits  important  considerations.  To  have  retained  the  re 
doubts  until  they  were  assaulted  would  have  demanded  successful 
resistance,  since  their  defenders  could  not  re-cross  that  ravine  under 
pressure.  Cornwallis  saved  the  garrisons  by  abandoning  the  works* 
Their  consequent  occupation  by  the  French  was  of  value  to  the  be 
siegers,  because  it  brought  them  within  easy  range  of  fire,  and  the 
ravine  in  turn  protected  them  from  any  sally  from  the  garrison.  In 
view  of  the  whole  situation,  the  natural  approaches  were  from  the 
north-east,  hence  the  redoubts  five,  six,  seven  and  eight  received 
more  care.  Houses  had  been  leveled,  and  a  second  line  of  trenches 
had  been  placed  in  their  rear,  as  a  last  defense.  Two  redoubts  had 
also  been  advanced  into  the  open  ground  in  front.  The  allied  armies 
made  their  regular  siege  approaches  entirely  upon  this  front. 

Gloucester  Point,  across  the  river,  a  mile  distant,  had  been  first  for 
tified.  With  swamps  flanking  both  the  retiring  shores,  there  was 
solid  surface  in  front,  and  then  for  more  than  a  mile  the  ground  was 
clear  of  woods. 

American  Position.  On  the  day  after  General  Washington's  arri 
val  at  Williamsburg,  he  notified  Count  de  Grasse  that  "  such  of  the 


SIEGE   OF   YORKTOWN.  635 

American  troops  as  found  insufficient  transportation  at  Head  of  Elk, 
were  marching  to  Baltimore,  to  be  put  on  board  of  transports  that 
might  be  collected  there,  and  requested  assistance  in  this  respect. 
In  a  postscript  he  remarks  that  "  his  wishes  had  been  anticipated." 
Admiral  Barras,  who  arrived  on  the  tenth,  had  already  sent  ten  trans 
ports  from  the  squadron,  two  frigates  captured  in  the  recent  naval 
action,  and  some  other  prize  vessels,  to  move  the  troops.  They  em 
barked  at  Annapolis  for  James  River. 

On  the  seventeenth,  General  Washington,  the  Count  de  Rocham- 
beau,  General  Knox,  and  General  Du  Portail  embarked  on  the  Queen 
Charlotte,  and  visited  Count  de  Grasse  on  his  flag-ship,  the  Ville  de 
Paris,  arriving  on  the  eighteenth.  They  were  received  with  appropri 
ate  honors,  and  confirmed  their  plans  for  conducting  the  siege.  By 
reason  of  severe  and  contrary  winds  they  did  not  regain  Williamsburg 
until  the  twenty-second.  The  American  Commander-in-chief  was  at 
once  confronted  with  a  question  which  threatened  to  destroy  his  well- 
laid  plans.  The  arrival  of  Admiral  Digby  at  New  York  with  three 
ships  of  the  line,  reported  at  six,  inclined  Count  de  Grasse  to  re-unite 
his  entire  fleet,  leave  two  vessels  at  the  mouth  of  York,  four  frigates 
and  some  corvettes  in  the  James,  and  then  sail  toward  New  York  to 
intercept  or  engage  the  British  fleet — then  "  to  act  in  concert ;  but 
each  on  his  side."  An  earnest  appeal  by  La  Fayette  in  person,  per 
suaded  the  Count  de  Grasse  to  change  his  purpose  and  accept  the 
judgment  of  the  generals  commanding  the  land  forces.  On  the 
twenty-fifth,  the  remaining  troops  reached  Williamsburg,  making  a 
total  force  of  twelve  thousand  regular  troops,  besides  militia,  which 
exceeded  four  thousand  men. 

On  the  twenty-eighth,  the  entire  army  advanced  and  took  a  posi 
tion  within  about  two  miles  of  the  British  advanced  works,  and  on  the 
twenty-ninth,  after  a  thorough  reconnoissance,  the  movement  began 
for  encircling  the  town  and  closing  in  upon  its  defenders.  On  the 
thirtieth  it  was  found  that  Lord  Cornwallis  had  withdrawn  his  troops 
from  the  front,  and  the  allied  lines  were  established  in  the  general 
form  of  a  semi-circle,  with  each  extreme  resting  on  the  York  River. 
During  the  skirmishing  incident  to  reconnoitering  service  Colonel 
Scammel,  whose  services  had  greatly  endeared  him  to  the  Command 
er-in-chief  and  to  the  army,  was  mortally  wounded,  taken  prisoner, 
and  carried  into  Yorktown.  He  was  removed  to  Williamsburg  by 
consent  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  but  died  on  the  sixth  of  October. 

General  Lincoln  occupied  the  banks  of  Wormley's  Creek,  near 


636  SIEGE   OF  YORKTOWN. 

Moore's  house,  and  the  general  arrangement  of  the  other  troops, 
before  the  active  operations  of  the  siege  began,  is  indicated  on  the 
map. 

On  the  Gloucester  side,  the  Neck  was  occupied  by  the  Duke  de 
Lauzun  with  his  legion  of  cavalry,  and  a  body  of  Virginia  militia  under 
General  Weedon.  Eight  hundred  marines  from  the  squadron  of 
Count  de  Grasse  landed  on  the  first  of  October  to  reinforce  the  de 
tachment.  General  de  Cloisy  was  in  command,  and  although  repeated 
skirmishes  ensued,  no  persistent  efforts  were  made  to  break  through 
the  American  lines,  and  the  offensive  action  of  the  allies  was  limited 
to  the  confinement  of  the  British  troops  to  its  defenses  and  the  area  in 
front  of  the  works.  On  one  occasion,  while  covering  a  foraging  party, 
Colonel  Tarleton  was  unhorsed.  The  British  lost  one  officer  and 
eleven  men  and  the  French  Hussars  lost  two  officers  and  fourteen 
men.  The  contradictory  opinions  expressed  as  to  the  merits  of  this 
skirmish  are  settled  by  Tarleton's  own  report  of  it,  where  he  says : 
"  A  dragoon's  horse  of  the  British  legion,  plunged,  on  being  struck 
with  a  spear,  and  overthrew  Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  and  his 
horse.  This  circumstance  happening  to  occur  so  much  nearer  to  the 
body  of  the  French  than  the  British  cavalry,  excited  an  apprehension 
in  the  latter  for  the  safety  of  their  commanding  officer.  Impelled  by 
this  idea  the  whole  of  the  English  rear  set  out  in  full  speed  from  its 
distant  situation,  and  arrived  in  such  disorder  that  its  charge  was 
unable  to  make  any  impression  upon  the  Duke  de  Lauzun's  Hussars. 
Meanwhile  Tarleton  escaped  the  enemy  and  obtained  another  horse, 
when,  perceiving  the  broken  state  of  his  cavalry,  occasioned  by  their 
anxiety  for  his  safety,  he  ordered  a  retreat,  to  afford  them  an  oppor 
tunity  of  recovering  from  their  confusion." 

Colonel  Tarleton's  closing  adventure  of  the  war,  which  did  not 
lessen  his  reputation  as  a  dashing  cavalry  officer,  failed,  as  did  his 
whole  career,  in  establishing  him  any  fame  as  a  scientific  soldier. 

It  was  not  until  the  sixth  that  the  heavy  guns  were  brought  up, 
and  then  the  utmost  vigor  was  used  to  push  the  siege.  The  Count 
de  Grasse  consented  to  stay  on  the  coast  until  the  first  of  November, 
notwithstanding  the  detention  would  be  greater  than  he  at  first 
anticipated,  since  it  was  well  understood  that  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
would  attempt  to  relieve  the  post  as  soon  as  he  could  procure  a 
squadron  sufficiently  strong  to  risk  a  conflict  with  the  French  fleet. 

Washington  reported  to  the  President  of  Congress,  under  date 
of  October  twelfth,  "  that  the  first  parallel  had  been  opened  on  the 


I78I.J  SIEGE   OF  YORKTOWN.  637 

sixth,  at  night,  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy,  and  under 
the  direction  of  General  Lincoln,  both  French  and  American  troops 
participating  in  the  movement.  One  French  officer  wounded,  and 
sixteen  privates  killed  and  wounded  comprised  the  casualties." 

"  On  the  seventh  and  eighth,  work  was  advanced  upon  this  paral 
lel  ;  several  redoubts  were  established  and  the  French  mounted  heavy 
guns  at  the  redoubts  which  the  British  abandoned  on  the  twenty- 
ninth."  "  On  the  ninth,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  American 
battery  on  the  right  opened  with  six  eighteen  and  twenty-four  pound 
ers,  two  mortars  and  two  howitzers  ;  the  French  having  opened  fire 
on  the  left,  at  three  o'clock,  with  four  twelve  pounders  and  six  howit 
zers.  This  fire  was  directed  against  the  embrasures,  dismounting 
guns,  destroying  the  hastily  constructed  earthworks  and  preparing 
the  way  for  the  next  advance. 

"  On  the  tenth,  two  French  batteries,  one  of  two  eighteen  and 
twenty-four  pounders  and  six  mortars  and  howitzers,  and  the  other 
of  four  eighteen  pounders,  opened  fire,  and  two  American  batteries, 
one  of  four  eighteen  pounders  and  one  of  two  mortars,  joined  in  the 
cannonade. 

"  During  the  evening  a  hot  shot  from  one  of  the  French  batteries 
set  the  frigate  Charon,  44,  on  fire  and  in  the  morning  two  transports 
shared  the  same  fate.  The  Guadaloupe  and  other  vessels  were  trans 
ferred  to  the  Gloucester  shore  to  escape  injury  from  shot  and  shell 
which  passed  over  the  city. 

"  On  the  eleventh,  the  second  parallel  was  established  within  three 
hundred  yards  of  the  British  works,  with  the  loss  of  but  one  man 
killed  and  two  or  three  wounded." 

The  condition  of  affairs  within  these  works  is  very  clearly  indi 
cated  by  the  official  reports  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  and  he,  of  all  men, 
was  better  situated  to  estimate  the  results  thus  far  realized  by  the 
besieging  forces.  On  the  tenth  he  received  a  dispatch  from  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  by  the  hands  of  Major  Cochran,  dated  "  New  York,  September 
3Oth,"  (duplicate),  in  cypher,  which  reads  as  follows,  "  I  am  doing 
everything  in  my  power  to  relieve  you  by  a  direct  move,  and  I  have 
every  reason  to  hope,  from  the  assurance  given  me  this  day  by 
Admiral  Graves,  that  we  may  pass  the  bar  by  the  1 2th  of  October,  if 
the  winds  permit  and  no  unfortunate  accident  happens.  Answer." 

(Cornwallis  to  Clinton^)  "October  nth,  1781,  12  M.  In  cypher. 
Cochran  arrived  yesterday.  I  have  only  to  report  that  nothing  but 
a  direct  move  to  York  River,  which  includes  a  successful  naval  action, 


638  SIEGE   OF  YORKTOWN.  [1781 

can  save  me.  The  enemy  made  their  first  parallel  on  the  night  of  the 
sixth,  at  the  distance  of  six  hundred  yards,  and  have  perfected  it,  and 
constructed  places  of  arms  and  batteries  with  great  regularity  and 
caution.  On  the  evening  of  the  ninth  their  batteries  opened  and 
have  since  continued  firing  without  intermission,  with  about  forty 
cannon,  mostly  heavy,  and  sixteen  mortars,  from  eight  to  sixteen 
inches.  We  have  lost  about  seventy  men,  and  many  of  our  works  are 
considerably  damaged ;  and  in  such  works,  on  disadvantageous 
ground,  against  so  powerful  an  attack,  one  can  not  hope  to  make  a 
very  long  resistance."  "  P.  S.  October  nth,  5  P.M.  Since  my 
letter  was  written  we  have  lost  thirty  men." 

"  October  I2th,  7  P.  M.  Last  night  the  enemy  made  their  second 
parallel  at  the  distance  of  three  hundred  yards.  We  continue  to  lose 
men  very  fast," 

On  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  the  allies  maintained  fire  from 
mortars,  but  occupied  the  time,  chiefly,  in  completing  the  second 
parallel.  The  line  of  redoubts  and  batteries  marked  F.  (French)  had 
been  completed,  but  it  was  essential  to  the  completion  of  this  parallel 
that  the  two  advanced  redoubts  on  the  British  left  should  be  reduced 
and  taken  into  the  lines.  Such  had  been  the  effect  of  the  fire,  so  far 
as  could  be  ascertained,  that  it  was  decided  to  take  those  by  assault, 
and  details  of  troops  were  made  for  the  purpose. 

The  American  light  infantry,  under  the  direction  of  General  La 
Fayette,  were  assigned  to  the  assault  of  the  redoubt  nearest  the 
river,  and  the  force  was  organized  as  follows  : — Colonel  Gimat's  battal 
ion  led  the  van,  followed  by  that  of  Colonel  Hamilton  who  took  com 
mand,  then  Colonel  Laurens  with  eighty  men,  to  take  the  redoubt  in 
flank,  and  Colonel  Barber's  battalion,  as  a  supporting  column. 

The  French  column,  under  the  direction  of  Baron  de  Viomenil, 
was  led  by  the  German  Grenadier  regiment  of  Count  William  Forbach 
de  Deux  Fonts,  supported  by  the  grenadiers  of  the  regiment  of 
Gatinais.  This  regiment  had  been  formed  out  of  that  of  Auvergne, 
once  commanded  by  De  Rochambeau,  and  once  known  as  the 
Regiment  U  Auvergne  sans  tac/ie,  "Auvergne,  without  a  stain."  The 
grenadiers  were  drawn  up  to  receive  their  instructions  and  De  Rocham 
beau,  in  person,  pledged  himself  to  ask  of  Louis  XVI.  the  restoration 
of  their  old  name  if  they  did  their  duty.  (The  king  subsequently  re 
deemed  this  pledge.) 

The  attacks  were  made  simultaneously,  upon  rocket  signals,  accord 
ing  to  agreement.  The  redoubt  nearest  the  river  was  defended  by  a 


l?8i  I  SIEGE   OF   YORKTOWN.  639 

detachment  of  less  than  sixty  men.  Colonel  Hamilton  led  the  men 
rapidly  forward  with  unloaded  muskets,  climbing  over  abatis  as  best 
possible,  and  in  a  very  short  time  he  was  over  the  parapet.  Laurens 
entered  from  the  rear,  and  the  occupation  of  the  work  was  secured  in 
a  few  minutes.  Colonel  Gimat  and  Colonel  Barber  who  came  up  with 
his  reserve  promptly  and  followed  the  advance,  were  both  wounded. 
The  American  loss  was  one  sergeant  and  eight  privates  killed,  seven 
officers  and  twenty-five  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates 
wounded.  The  British  loss  was  but  eight  killed,  (the  resistance  hav 
ing  ceased  as  soon  as  the  American  troops  commanded  the  position) 
and  seventeen  prisoners,  including  Major  Campbell,  who  commanded 
the  redoubt. 

The  redoubt  which  was  assailed  by  the  French  was  defended  by 
more  than  a  hundred  men.  The  French  sappers  removed  the  abatis 
deliberately,  under  fire,  and  when  a  path  was  cleared,  a  steady  vigor 
ous  charge  with  the  bayonet  effected  the  result.  Count  de  Damas, 
the  Chevalier  de  Lameth,  Adjutant-general  of  La  Fayette,  and  the 
Count  de  Deux  Fonts  were  wounded.  Before  the  signal  had  been 
given  some  light  words  passed  between  the  Baron  de  Viomenil  and 
General  La  Fayette,  as  to  the  superiority  of  the  French  grenadiers  for 
these  attacks,  and  as  soon  as  the  Americans  achieved  their  success, 
La  Fayette,  with  prompt  pleasantry,  sent  Major  Barber  to  tender  arty 
needed  assistance.  The  redoubts  were  taken  into  the  second  parallel 
before  morning. 

The  following  dispatch,  in  cypher,  dated  October  I5th,  1781,  is 
the  announcement  which  Lord  Cornwallis  made  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
of  this  disaster : 

"  Sir  :  Last  evening  the  enemy  carried  my  two  advanced  redoubts 
by  storm,  and  during  the  night  have  included  these  in  their  second 
parallel,  which  they  are  at  present  busy  in  perfecting.  My  situation 
has  now  become  very  critical.  We  dare  not  show  a  gun  to  their  old 
batteries,  and  I  expect  that  their  new  ones  will  open  to-morrow 
morning,  so  that  we  shall  soon  be  exposed  to  an  assault  in  ruined 
works,  in  a  bad  position,  and  with  weakened  numbers.  The  safety  of 
the  place  is  therefore  so  precarious  that  I  can  not  recommend  that 
the  fleet  and  army  should  run  great  risk  in  endeavoring  to  save  us." 

The  same  officer  wrote  on  the  twentieth,  giving  an  account  of  a 
sortie  made  from  the  post,  and  of  his  attempt  to  rescue  the  chief  por 
tion  of  his  army  ;  and  the  narrative  will  adopt  his  description  as  more 
personal  and  impressive  than  that  of  the  American  officers. 


640  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.  [1781. 

(Cornwallts  to  Clinton.)  October  2Oth.  "  A  little  before  day 
broke,  on  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth,  I  ordered  a  sortie  of  about 
three  hundred  and  fifty  men  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Abercrombie, 
to  attack  two  batteries  which  appeared  to  be  in  the  greatest  forward 
ness  and  to  spike  the  guns.  A  detachment  of  guards  with  the  eight 
ieth  company  of  grenadiers  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Lake,  attacked  the  one,  and  one  of  light  infantry  under  the  command 
of  Major  Armstrong  commanded  the  other,  and  both  succeeded  in 
forcing  the  redoubts  that  covered  them,  spiking  eleven  guns,  and  kill 
ing  or  wounding  about  one  hundred  French  troops,  which  had  the 
guard  of  that  part  of  the  trenches,  and  with  little  loss  on  our  side. 
This  action  proved  of  little  public  advantage,  for  the  cannon  having 
been  spiked  in  a  hurry,  were  soon  rendered  fit  for  service  again,  and 
before  dark  the  whole  parallel  and  batteries  appeared  to  be  nearly 
complete.  At  this  time  we  knew  that  there  was  no  part  of  the  whole 
front  attacked  on  which  we  could  show  a  single  gun,  and  our  shells 
were  nearly  expended.  I  therefore  had  only  to  choose  between  pre 
paring  to  surrender  next  day,  or  endeavoring  to  get  off  with  the 
greatest  part  of  the  troops,  and  I  determined  to  attempt  the  latter. 
.  .  .  It  might  at  least  delay  the  enemy  in  the  prosecution  of  fur 
ther  enterprises.  Sixteen  large  boats  were  ordered  to  be  in  readiness 
to  receive  troops  precisely  at  ten  o'clock.  With  these  I  hoped  to 
pass  the  infantry  during  the  night,  abandoning  our  baggage,  and  leav 
ing  a  detachment  to  capitulate  for  the  towns-people,  and  the  sick  and 
wounded,  on  which  subject  a  letter  was  ready  to  be  delivered  to  Gen 
eral  Washington.  .  .  .  With  the  utmost  secrecy  the  light  in 
fantry,  greater  part  of  the  guards,  and  part  of  the  Twenty-third  regi 
ment  landed  at  Gloucester  ;  but  at  this  critical  moment,  the  weather, 
from  being  moderate  and  calm,  changed  to  a  most  violent  storm  of 
wind  and  rain,  and  drove  all  of  the  boats,  some  of  which  had  troops 
on  board,  down  the  river.  ...  In  this  situation  with  my  little 
force  divided,  the  enemy's  batteries  opened  at  daybreak  ;  the  passage 
between  this  place  and  Gloucester  was  much  exposed  ;  but  the  boats 
being  now  returned,  they  were  ordered  to  bring  back  the  troops,  and 
they  joined  us  in  the  forenoon  without  much  loss.  Our  works  were 
in  the  meantime  going  to  ruin.  We  at  that  time  could  not  fire  a 
single  gun,  only  one  eight-inch  and  a  little  more  than  one  hundred 
cohorn  shells  remained.  ...  I  therefore  proposed  to  capitulate." 

At  about  ten  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  the  seventeenth  of  October 
and  almost  at  the  hour  when  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  with  a  land  force  of 


1781.3  SIEGE   OF  YORKTOWN.  641 

seven  thousand  choice  troops  under  convoy  of  twenty-five  ships  of 
the  line,  two  fifties  and  eight  frigates  were  sailing  down  the  Bay  of 
New  York  to  go  to  the  relief  of  the  worn-out  garrison,  a  flag  was  sent 
to  the  American  headquarters  with  the  following  note : 

"  Earl  Cornwallis  to  General  Washington. 

"YORK,  i-jfA  October,  1781. 

"  SIR :  I  propose  a  cessation  of  hostilities  for  twenty-four  hours 
and  that  two  officers  be  appointed  by  each  side,  to  meet  at  Mr. 
Moore's  house,  to  settle  terms  for  the  surrender  of  the  posts  of  York 
and  Gloucester. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

"  CORNWALLIS." 

General  Washington  to  Earl  Cornwallis  (Reply) : 

"  MY  LORD :  I  have  had  the  honor  of  receiving  your  lordship's 
letter  of  this  date. 

"An  ardent  desire  to  spare  the  further  effusion  of  blood  will 
readily  incline  me  to  listen  to  such  terms  for  the  surrender  of  your 
posts  of  York  and  Gloucester  as  are  admissible. 

"I  wish,  previously  to  the  meeting  of  commissioners,  that  youi 
lordship's  proposals  in  writing  may  be  sent  to  the  American  lines,  for 
which  purpose  a  suspension  of  hostilities  during  two  hours  from  the 
delivery  of  this  letter,  will  be  granted. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

"  GEORGE  WASHINGTON." 

In  accordance  with  this  condition  Earl  Cornwallis  submitted  a 
proposition  at  half-past  four  in  the  afternoon ;  but  its  terms  being 
too  general,  commissioners  were  appointed  :  the  Viscount  de  Noailles 
and  Lieutenant-colonel  Laurens  on  the  part  of  the  allies,  and  Colonel 
Dundas  and  Major  Ross  on  the  part  of  the  British,  to  define  the 
conditions  more  explicitly.  On  the  eighteenth,  the  articles  were 
completed  ;  on  the  nineteenth  they  were  signed  by  Cornwallis  and 
Thomas  Symonds  at  Yorktown,  and  by  George  Washington,  Le 
Compte  de  Rochambeau  and  Le  Compte  de  Barras,  for  himself 
and  Compte  de  Grasse,  "  in  the  trenches  before  Yorktown,  in  Vir 
ginia." 

At  twelve  o'clock,  the  two  redoubts  on  the  left  flank  of  York  were 
delivered  over,  one  to  American  infantry  and  the  other  to  French 
grenadiers. 

41 


642  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.  Li78i 

At  one  o'clock,  two  works  on  the  Gloucester  side  were  delivered 
respectively  to  French  and  American  troops.  At  two  o'clock,  the 
garrison  of  York  marched  out  to  the  appointed  place  in  front  of  the 
post,  with  shouldered  arms,  colors  cased,  drums  beating  a  British 
march,  grounded  their  arms  and  returned  to  their  encampments  to 
remain  until  dispatched  to  their  several  destinations  in  Virginia, 
Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania.  At  three  o'clock,  the  garrison  of  Glou 
cester  marched  out,  the  cavalry  with  drawn  swords,  trumpets  sound 
ing  and  the  infantry  as  prescribed  for  the  garrison  of  York. 

The  land  forces  became  prisoners  to  the  United  States,  and  the 
marine  forces  to  the  naval  army  of  France. 

The  general  conditions  of  the  surrender  were  the  same  as  those 
observed  when  General  Lincoln  surrendered  Charleston  during  1780. 

The  British  troops  marched  to  the  field  of  ceremony  with  their 
usual  steadiness,  and  the  whole  army  having  received  an  issue  of  new 
clothing,  their  appearance  was  as  soldierly  as  if  on  garrison  parade. 
When  General  O'Hara  approached  General  Washington  and  apolo 
gized  for  the  absence  of  General  Cornwallis,  on  account  of  indisposi 
tion,  he  was  referred  to  General  Lincoln.  That  officer  received,  and 
as  promptly  returned  his  sword,  and  the  troops  having  deposited 
their  arms  returned  to  the  post.  The  absence  of  Earl  Cornwallis  has 
been  often  criticised,  as  if  his  excuse  was  but  a  sham.  He  was  too 
good  a  soldier  to  dodge  disagreeable  duty,  and  the  ungenerous  critics 
might  recall  the  months  of  strain  to  which  he  had  been  subjected,  be 
fore  passing  censure  upon  one  who  had  passed  through  so  severe  an 
ordeal.  The  subsequent  courtesies  which  passed  between  himself  and 
Washington  are  matters  of  history ;  and  the  military  sagacity  of  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  equal  to  his  good  taste,  when,  in  response  to  a  toast 
given  by  General  Washington,  "  The  British  Army;'  Earl  Cornwallis 
turning  to  his  host,  thus  closed — "  And  when  the  illustrious  part  that 
your  Excellency  has  borne  in  this  long  and  laborious  contest  becomes 
matter  of  history,  fame  will  gather  your  brightest  laurels  rather  from 
the  banks  of  the  Delaware  than  from  those  of  the  Chesapeake." 

It  was  on  the  nineteenth  of  October,  while  the  surrender  was  in 
progress,  that  Sir  Henry  Clinton  left  Sandy  Hook.  He  made  the 
Capes  on  the  twenty-fourth,  but  returned  on  the  twenty-ninth,  when 
assured  that  the  fate  of  the  campaign  was  settled. 

"  The  general  return  of  officers  and  privates  surrendered  at  York- 
town,  as  taken  from  the  original  muster  rolls,  is  stated  by  the  com 
missary  of  prisoners  to  have  been  as  follows : — General  and  staff,  79  : 


t78i.J  SIEGE   OF  YORKTOWN.  643 

artillery,  23;  guards,  527;  light  infantry,  671  ;  I7th  regt.,  245  ;  23d 
regt.,  233  ;  33d  regt.,  260  ;  43d  regt.,  359  ;  ?ist  regt.,  300  ;  76th  regt., 
715;  8oth  regt.,  689  ;  two  battalions  of  Anspach,  1077,  (these  two 
battalions  alone  had  colonels  present)  Prince  Hereditary,  484  ;  Regi 
ment  of  de  Bose,  349;  Yagers,  74;  British  legion,  241;  Queen's 
Rangers,  320 ;  North  Carolina  vols.,  142  ;  Pioneers,  44  ;  Engineers,  23  : 
Total,  including  commissary  department  and  80  followers  of  the 
army,  7,247  men  :  Total  of  officers  and  men,  alone,  7,073  ;  seamen  and 
from  shipping,  about  900  officers  and  men."  Other  authorities 
increase  this  number  to  over  8,000.  It  is  evident  from  this  report 
that  the  record  office  return  of  August  1 5th, cited  on  page  462  and  as 
intimated  elsewhere,  over-estimates  the  really  effective  force.  The 
return  of  June  1st,  1782,  for  example,  carries  the  "late  garrison  of 
Yorktown  "  into  the  record  as  8,806  men. 

Seventy-five  brass  guns,  69  iron  guns,  18  German  and  six  British 
regimental  standards,  were  among  the  trophies  captured. 

The  military  chest  contained  .£2,113  6y.  sterling.  The  Guada- 
loupe,  28 ;  the  old  Fowey,  the  Bonetta  (sloop),  24,  and  Vulcan, 
fire  ship,  24 ;  thirty  transports,  fifteen  galleys,  and  many  smaller 
vessels,  with  nearly  nine  hundred  officers  and  seamen,  were  surren 
dered  to  the  French. 

The  Bonetta  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Earl  Cornwallis  as  a 
dispatch  vessel,  to  be  returned,  or  accounted  for  to  the  Count  de 
Grasse. 

The  American  casualties  during  the  siege,  up  to  the  sixteenth,  as 
recorded  in  Washington's  Diary,  were  twenty-three  killed,  sixty-five 
wounded  ;  the  French,  fifty-two  killed,  one  hundred  and  thirty-four 
wounded.  The  British  casualties  were  one  hundred  and  fifty-six 
killed,  three  hundred  and  twenty-six  wounded,  and  seventy  missing. 
Major  Cochran,  acting  aid-de-camp  to  Earl  Cornwallis,  was  the  only 
British  field  officer  who  fell  during  the  siege. 

In  the  letter  of  Earl  Cornwallis  of  the  twentieth  of  October  there 
occurs  the  following  expression  as  to  his  treatment  after  the  surrender. 

"The  treatment,  in  general,  that  we  have  received  from  the 
enemy  since  our  surrender,  has  been  perfectly  good  and  proper  ;  but 
the  kindness  and  attention  that  has  been  shown  us  by  the  French 
officers  in  particular,  their  delicate  sensibility  of  our  situation,  their 
generous  and  pressing  offer  of  money,  both  public  and  private,  to 
any  amount,  has  really  gone  beyond  what  I  can  possibly  describe, 
and  will,  I  hope,  make  an  impression  on  the  breast  of  every  British 


644  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN.  [1781 

officer,  whenever  the  fortune  of  war  should  put  any  of  them  into  our 
power." 

This  testimonial  of  Earl  Cornwallis  is  worthy  of  lasting  mention 
and  is  in  harmony  with  his  own  generous  character  and  conduct. 

It  is  in  this  place  proper  to  place  him  with  Burgoyne,  who,  with 
like  misfortunes,  achieved  a  record  unsurpassed,  if  equaled,  by  any 
other  British  General,  for  untiring,  unselfish  and  skillful  conduct  under 
circumstances  of  protracted  trial  which  no  misfortune  could  tarnish. 

From  Long  Island  to  Yorktown,  even  in  spite  of  the  early  errors 
of  military  policy  which  attach  to  this  kind  of  war  and  which  were 
maintained  by  the  British  Cabinet,  he  showed  himself  the  rival  of 
Howe  in  strategic  skill,  of  Clinton  in  courage,  and  superior  to  both  in 
appreciation  of  the  opportunities  and  demands  of  the  protracted 
struggle.  The  narrative  has  sufficiently  illustrated  the  difficulties  of 
his  service  ;  and  the  criticisms  of  Tarleton  and  Clinton,  after  the  war 
closed,  do  not  disclose  facts  to  show  that  he  had  alternatives  of  action, 
in  the  Southern  or  Virginia  campaigns,  which  afforded  him  any  better 
military  opportunities  than  those  which  he  in  each  case  improved  to 
the  full  extent  of  the  troops  and  resources  at  his  command. 

It  would  be  unjust  to  General  Clinton  to  take  his  own  correspond 
ence  or  even  his  own  defense  as  explanatory  of  his  intercourse  with 
General  Cornwallis  during  the  Carolina  and  Virginia  campaigns.  In 
his  vindication,  which  really  lies  in  circumstances  beyond  his  con 
trol,  he  rests  too  much  upon  the  assumption  that  one  of  the  two 
officers  must  bear  the  responsibility  of  the  failures,  overlooking  too 
often  the  fact,  that  adequate  support  was  not  furnished.  He  had, 
however,  in  his  extreme  assurance  of  success,  encouraged  the  British 
ministry,  in  a  direction  exactly  in  harmony  with  its  bias  and  wishes, 
and  his  repeated  claims  for  more  troops  induced  a  conviction  of  in 
efficiency.  He  was  brave,  as  a  soldier,  but  timid  and  uncertain  in 
policy,  and  his  excellence  lay  in  execution,  when  the  work  was  before 
him  and  action  was  the  only  alternative.  Too  much  was  expected  of 
the  British  Generals,  with  the  resources  at  their  disposal,  and  the 
entire  series  of  paper  controversy  seems  like  so  many  attempts  to  save 
one  at  another's  expense,  because  there  had  to  be  a  scape-goat  for 
every  unexpected  military  disaster. 

On  the  date  last  referred  to,  October  twentieth,  1781,  General 
Washington  closed  an  order  of  congratulation  to  the  allied  army  in 
the  following  words : 

"  Divine  service  is  to  be  performed  to-morrow  in  the  several  brigades 


i78i.J  SIEGE   OF   YORKTOWN.  64  j 

and  divisions.  The  Commander-in-chief  earnestly  recommends  that 
the  troops,  not  on  duty,  should  universally  attend,  with  that  serious 
ness  of  deportment  and  gratitude  of  heart  which  the  recognition  of 
such  reiterated  and  astonishing  interpositions  of  Providence  demand 
of  us." 

In  closing  the  career  of  these  two  men  who  have  filled  prominent 
places  in  the  Battle  narrative,  so  near  its  close,  there  remains  only  to 
add  the  single  statement,  that  the  correspondence  embodied  in  the 
text  is  to  be  accepted  as  written  in  good  faith  by  both  parties,  and 
each  suffered.  The  French  fleet  was  in  their  ivay. 

Washington  paid  his  respects  in  person  to  Count  de  Grasse,  and 
various  enterprises  were  suggested  for  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
advantage  already  gained.  The  most  prominent  was  one  against 
Charleston.  A  second  proposed  the  transportation  of  La  Fayette  to 
Wilmington  with  a  mixed  command  of  French  and  American  troops. 
The  inevitable  delays,  the  lateness  of  the  season,  the  heavy  draught 
of  the  ships,  the  augmentation  of  the  British  naval  forces  on  the 
North  American  Station,  and  the  urgent  demand  for  his  presence  in 
the  WTest  Indies,  were  among  the  causes  which  deterred  the  Count  de 
Grasse  from  such  movements  and  eventually  suspended  further  propo 
sitions.  On  the  fourth  of  November  he  left  the  coast,  having  received 
from  Washington,  Congress,  and  the  American  people,  repeated 
acknowledgments  of  the  services  of  himself  and  his  fleet.  A  stand 
of  colors  and  a  piece  of  ordnance  were  voted  to  himself  and  Count  de 
Rochambeau,  and  it  "  was  decreed,  that  there  should  be  a  marble  mon 
ument  erected  at  Yorktown  to  commemorate  the  alliance  between 
France  and  the  United  States  and  the  victory  achieved  by  their  as 
sociated  arms." 

The  Marquis  de  St.  Simon  embarked  his  troops  October  thirty- 
first,  and  sailed  for  the  West  Indies.  Count  de  Rochambeau  remained 
in  Virginia,  with  headquarters  at  Williamsburg,  for  some  weeks,  hold 
ing  his  command  subject  to  orders  for  any  required  detail.  He 
afterward  returned  through  Philadelphia  to  the  Hudson  ;  thence  to 
New  England  in  the  fall,  and  sailed  from  Boston  for  the  West  Indies 
early  in  December,  1782.  His  army,  whether  in  camp  or  on  the 
march,  was  the  theme  of  general  praise  for  its  admirable  discipline 
and  good  deportment. 

General  Lincoln  conducted  the  main  army  to  winter  quarters  in 
New  Jersey  and  on  the  Hudson,  and  soon  assumed  his  duties  as  Sec 
retary  of  War;  St.  Clair  and  Wayne  went  south  to  the  reinforcement 


646  SIEGE   OF   YORKTOWN.  [1781, 

of  Greene,  and  the  army  was  thus  widely  distributed  at  the  close  of 
this  last  active  campaign.  La  Fayette  seeing  no  prospect  of  active 
service,  returned  to  France,  bearing  with  him  the  affection  of  the 
American  people,  next  to  that  with  which  they  honored  Washing 
ton.  The  usual  relaxation  of  military  obligation  took  place,  increased 
greatly  by  the  conviction  that  peace  was  not  far  distant,  and  the 
usual  routine  of  embarrassment  followed  the  efforts  to  maintain  an  army. 

Sir  Guy  Carleton  succeeded  Sir  Henry  Clinton  early  in  May,  1782, 
and  on  the  seventh,  he  advised  Washington  that  he  had  been  asso 
ciated  with  Admiral  Digby  in  a  commission  to  consider  the  terms  of 
permanent  peace. 

The  moderate  party  in  England  received  fresh  strength ;  the  min 
istry  succumbed  to  the  force  of  the  last  blow.  France  was  as  eager 
as  other  nations  to  stop  the  cost  and  waste  of  war,  and  the  siege  of 
Yorktown  eventually  wrought  out  for  the  people  of  the  United  States 
their  National  Independence. 

BRITISH  EFFECTIVE  FORCE. 

NOTE. — From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."     Date  September  ist, 
1781. 

NEW  YORK  VIRGINIA  SOUTH  CAROLINA 

British 5932  5544   5024 

German 8629  2204  1596 

Provincials 2140 1137 3155 

Total  16,701  8885  9775 

GEORGIA  EAST  FLORIDA  WEST  FLORIDA 

British -     - 546 374 

German 486   558 

Provincials 598   211 

1084  546  1143 

NOVA  SCOTIA  PROVIDENCE  ISLAND  BERMUDAS 

British 1745   135   354 

German 562  

Provincials 1145   

3452                                        135  354 

Total 42,075. 

TROOPS   UNDER   CORNWALLIS   IN    VIRGINIA. 

NOTE.     From  "  Original  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office."     Date  August  ist,  1781. 

British 5541  Provincials 1137 

German 2148  On  Detachments 607 

1744 
Total,  9,433. 


Artificers 
a  Laboratory 
a  Magazine 


048* 


CHAPTER   LXXVL 

CONCLUSION. 

IN  the  consideration  of  the  battles  and  some  of  the  associated 
minor  operations  of  the  war  of  1775-1781,  in  connection  with 
established  principles  which  must  interpret  the  relations  and  value  of 
military  facts  and  military  conduct,  there  are  found  some  incidents 
of  the  history  which  are  very  properly  retouched,  at  the  close  of  the 
narrative.  While  partly  involved  in  the  general  notice  of  the  "  Revo 
lutionary  Epoch  "  and  more  directly  suggested  by  the  discussion  of 
"Wars  between  Nations"  and  "  Military  Principles  Defined,"  they 
are  worthy  of  re-statement,  as  the  legitimate  effects  of  permanent 
causes. 

General  Features  of  the  Struggle.  This  conflict,  in  the  governing 
resistance  of  its  authorized  advocates,  was  Revolutionary  ;  and  neither 
an  Insurrection  nor  a  simple  Rebellion.  It  necessarily  partook  of 
elements  which  characterize  Civil  War  (Chapter  VI),  and  these  elements 
were  multiplied,  exactly  in  proportion  as  the  armies  were  too  small, 
or  too  detached,  to  strike  decisive  blows  in  the  field.  Some  of  the 
partisan  corps,  on  both  sides,  as  with  the  guerilla  parties  during  the 
Peninsula  war  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  the  wars  of  Vendee,  and  at 
certain  stages  of  the  American  civil  war  of  1861-5,  were  numerous, 
active  and  unsparing,  just  as  they  were  at  the  time  beyond  the 
influence  and  control  of  organized  troops.  While  skirmishing  and 
scouting  parties,  which  form  the  light  troops  of  a  regular  army,  are 
called  upon  to  sever  communications,  seize  and  destroy  depots  of 
supplies,  or  otherwise  disable  an  adversary,  thereby  to  reduce  his 
means  of  offensive  action,  it  is  however  no  more  certain  now,  than  it 
was  during  the  period  under  notice,  that  violence  to  non-resisting 
soldiers,  or  citizens,  and  the  infliction  of  suffering  upon  the  defense 
less  people  of  the  country  where  war  prevails,  is  fatal  to  the  best  sue- 


648  CONCLUSION.  [1781. 

cess.  It  is  no  less  a  violation  of  the  rights  and  obligations  of  war 
itself,  and  repugnant  to  the  spirit  of  that  Christianity  which  admits  of 
no  war,  whatever,  unless  to  subserve  righteousness  and  enforce  peace. 

The  causes  which,  from  the  very  inception  of  the  conflict,  seemed 
to  force  a  wrong  "  Military  Policy"  upon  the  British  Cabinet,  were 
considered  in  the  preliminary  discussions  ;  and  the  perpetuation  of  that 
policy  was  interwoven  with  the  progress  of  every  campaign.  The 
adoption  of  the  views  of  the  moderate  party  in  England,  as  late  as 
the  close  of  Burgoyne's  campaign,  even  at  the  cost  of  American 
Independence,  would  have  secured  to  Great  Britain  a  natural  ally,  and 
one  well  located  to  afford  material  aid  to  her  operations  in  the  West 
Indies.  It  might  also  have  averted  the  European  Coalition  which 
drew  inspiration,  if  not  its  existence,  from  the  prolonged  struggle  in 
America.  The  progress  of  all  attempts  at  reconciliation  was  attended 
by  the  assumption,  that  an  unprincipled  and  groundless  rebellion, 
impelled  by  an  original  purpose  to  obtain  national  independence, 
was  the  kind  of  opposition  which  was  to  be  reduced  to  terms.  This 
failure  to  appreciate  the  real  character  of  the  issue  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  Colonies,  involved,  at  the  very  outset,  a  failure  to 
furnish  adequate  means  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war ;  and  the  error 
grew  more  and  more  glaring,  as  the  pressure  from  other  adversaries 
made  it  impossible  to  supplement  the  defect.  This  error  was  recip 
rocated  by  the  American  people.  Their  conduct  of  the  war  during 
each  successive  campaign  is  clearly  indicative  of  a  failure  to  adopt 
an  energetic  Military  Policy,  which  alone  promised  early  success. 
Its  neglect  involved  nearly  seven  years  of  struggle  and  more  than 
eight  years  of  unrest  and  waste.  The  pressure  of  an  emergency 
would  indeed,  now  and  then,  arouse  a  feverish,  popular  response ; 
but  when  the  danger  passed  by,  relaxation  ensued  ;  and  then — a 
series  of  uncertainties,  fluctuations  and  disasters,  just  at  times,  when 
exhaustive  measures  were  vital  to  success.  That  multiplication  of 
miseries,  which  were  often  related  to  mere  hunger,  cold,  or  want  of 
money,  had  its  germ  in  this  lack  of  conscious  obligation  to  devote 
all  available  appliances  to  the  quickest  possible  destruction  of  the  Brit 
ish  army. 

There  were  natural  causes  for  this  state  of  affairs.  The  jealousy 
of  central  authority  which  individualized  states,  extended  its  enfee 
bling  influence  to  communities  even  smaller  than  states.  Local  and 
sectional  prejudices  were  hardly  less  destructive,  through  their  para 
lyzing  force,  than  British  armies  were  in  the  operations  of  the  field. 


J  78 1.]  CONCLUSION.  649 

The  letters  of  General  Greene,  embodied  in  a  statement  of  the  true 
conditions  to  permanent  success,  as  cited  on  page  85,  are  expressive 
of  the  true  military  policy  which  belonged  to  the  colonies  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war. 

It  is  impossible  to  examine  the  narrative,  condensed  as  it  is,  with 
out  the  conviction  that  a  thorough  cooperation  of  the  colonies  in 
the  effort  to  raise  a  national  army,  irrespective  of  local  dangers,  would 
have  lessened  those  dangers  and  would  have  diminished  the  cost  and 
shortened  the  duration  of  the  war.  From  the  many  documents, 
muster-rolls  and  official  statements  which  have  been  cited,  it  appears 
that  there  were  several  occasions  when  the  prompt  support  of  the 
American  army  would  have  achieved  victory ;  and  it  is  equally  true 
that  the  British  army  repeatedly  had  as  good  assurance  of  success, 
but  for  its  over-estimate  of  the  American  forces  in  the  field.  And  yet 
in  proportion  as  the  British  forces  diminished,  or  withheld  the  offen 
sive,  so  did  their  opponents  seem  impatient  of  further  sacrifice ;  and 
the  constant  fluctuations  of  the  American  army,  together  with  great 
scarcity  of  army  supplies,  as  well  as  of  money,  made  the  opening  and 
close  of  every  campaign  to  appear  as  if  a  single  bold  stroke  of  the 
British  troops  must  end  the  struggle. 

Even  when  the  fall  of  Yorktown  drew  near,  the  effective  strength 
of  Washington's  army  at  the  north  was  less  than  that  of  the  combined 
French  armies  of  Rochambeau  and  St.  Simon,  and  was  not  superior 
to  the  army  of  Cornwallis  itself  in  respect  of  numbers. 

The  apprehensions  of  La  Fayette  and  of  the  French  Minister  ot 
Finance,  that  the  Americans  would  depend  too  implicitly  upon  ex 
ternal  aid,  and  would  fail  to  meet  a  corresponding  responsibility,  were 
partially  confirmed ;  and  the  occasional  complaint  that  the  French 
army  and  navy  did  no  more,  was  largely  based  upon  a  consciousness 
of  inadequate  home  effort,  and  the  fatigue  experienced  under  the 
pressure  of  protracted  struggle. 

The  reluctance  of  States  to  waive  leadership  and  recognize  one 
permanent  responsibility,  which  impaired  the  efficiency  of  military 
action  early  in  the  war,  was  followed  by  extreme  jealousy  of  a  well 
organized  and  highly  disciplined  army.  Because  Bunker  Hill  ex 
pressed  the  capacity  of  true  valor  to  resist  efficiently,  under  favoring 
opportunity,  it  did  not  follow  that  the  fresh  regiments  of  Stark, 
Chester,  Prescott,  or  Christopher  Greene  were,  man  for  man,  in  open 
field,  the  fighting  peers  of  the  British  Fifth,  Thirty-eighth,  and  Forty- 
second  regiments  which  withered  under  their  fire.  The  warnings, 


650  CONCLUSION.  [1781. 

appeals  and  protests  of  Washington  were  even  more  earnest  for  dis 
ciplined  men  than  for  food  or  clothing.  He  knew  well  that  money 
and  supplies  would  follow  success  ;  and  he  knew  just  as  well  that  the 
people  would  have  confidence  in  an  army  only  in  the  proportion  that 
strict  discipline,  exact  accountability,  and  fitness  to  sustain  the  strug 
gle  would  give  the  pledge  of  an  earnest  purpose  to  finish  the  war. 
The  patriotism  which  endured  starvation  and  exposure  at  Valley 
Forge  and  Morristown  had  its  strength  in  the  discipline  attained; 
because  a  conscious  fitness  for  duty  inspired  pride  and  courage,  while 
the  true  patriot  was  willing  to  undergo  the  proper  training  which 
would  give  to  his  energies  the  best  capacity  to  achieve. 

With  this  brief  resume,  of  the  errors  and  shortcomings  of  both 
Great  Britain  and  the  American  people  in  the  direction  of  Military 
Policy,  there  is  involved  another  class  of  considerations  which  inspire 
awe,  and  unmistakably  declare  the  true  Philosophy  of  the  American 
struggle  for  National  Independence. 

The  former  regarded  the  effectual  resistance  of  the  colonies  to  be 
just  as  impossible  as  King  Pharaoh  of  Egypt  believed  the  persistent 
demands  of  the  greatest  patriotic  leader  of  ancient  times  to  be  absurd, 
and  innocent  of  danger  to  his  ancestral  rights  and  royal  prerogative. 

The  latter,  in  their  long  protracted  importunity  for  satisfaction, 
equality  and  peace,  besought,  then  resisted,  struggled  on,  and  still 
resisted,  until  the  purpose  to  be  emancipated  became  a  part  of  the 
inner  life.  It  was  at  the  hearth-stone  as  well  as  in  the  skirmish.  It 
was  before  the  domestic  altar,  as  well  as  in  the  tent  or  barracks.  The 
hands  of  women  wrought  in  silence  and  in  tears,  while  their  husbands 
fought  the  battle  amid  tumult  and  carnage.  It  was  with  all  childish 
sports  until  mimic  war  gave  precocious  vigor  to  youth,  and  boys  took 
part  in  a  conflict  with  men.  But  as  from  year  to  year,  deliverance 
ever  beckoned  forward,  only  to  recede,  campaign  after  campaign,  and 
still  there  was  hope,  and  with  it  progress  ;  the  American  people  did 
not  even  then  anticipate  the  great  duration  of  that  wearisome  struggle, 
any  more  than  the  Hebrew  militia  forecast  their  forty  years  of  tire 
some  marchings  in  pursuit  of  independence  and  peace.  It  was  well 
they  did  not.  Great  Britain  was  blind  to  operations  of  the  laws 
which  gave  her  her  liberty.  America  was  blind  to  the  cost  of  rescu 
ing  imperiled  liberty.  The  blindness  of  the  one  withheld  the  force. 
The  blindness  of  the  other  supplied  the  faith. 

The  Chariot  of  the  Ruler  of  the  Universe  rode  through  and  over 
the  theatre  of  war.  These  on  the  one  side  were  stayed,  and  these  on 


I78I.J  CONCLUSION.  651 

the  other  side  were  encouraged.  The  weakness  of  physical  might 
and  power  in  a  moral  struggle,  was  made  to  exalt  the  emotional  and 
the  spiritual,  and  to  vindicate  man,  by  the  interposition  of  his  Maker. 

Bad  Military  Policy,  as  a  matter  of  human  science,  made  the  war 
of  1775-1781  l°n§  a°d  costly.  Infinite  wisdom  ordained  for  both 
parties  an  independent  prosperity,  a  higher  mission  among  the  nations. 

Thus  while  "  Military  Science  is  the  key  to  military  history,"  there 
is  an  inner  realm  of  unseen  cause  which  the  key  of  Providence  alone 
controls,  and  that  nation  which  has  the  sublimer  faith  will  gather  the 
fruit  of  peace,  while  others  languish  in  the  pursuit  through  the  endless 
issues  of  controversy  and  blood. 

There  is  still  another  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  this  narrative, 
and  one  which  the  very  weakness  of  the  American  army  at  that 
period  has  made  impressive  for  all  time,  and  that  is,  the  ultimate 
dependence  of  all  nations  upon  moral  convictions,  for  the  vindication 
of  either  personal  or  national  liberty.  Under  the  "  Apology  for  the 
Art  of  War,"  the  necessity  for  standing  armies  was  made  manifest. 
Under  the  review  of  the  American  Revolution,  the  capacity  of  a  peo 
ple  led  by  a  small  army  has  been  demonstrated.  It  is  a  confirmation 
of  the  general  principles  with  which  the  narrative  opened  ;  and  an 
encouragement  to  all  nations  that  there  is  to  be  a  time  when  the 
administration  of  civil  law  alone  will  require  physical  force  ;  and  when 
the  superior  obligation  of  equal  justice  will  alike  end  armaments  and 
armies. 

With  this  inevitable  side  drift  which  carries  military  policy  into 
all  the  responsibilities  of  a  national  life,  there  is  a  necessary  recurrence 
to  other  elements  of  the  war  under  notice. 

The  Strategy  of  the  war  of  1775-81  is  best  appreciated  by  exam 
ination  and  application  of  the  principles  heretofore  stated.  Their 
repetition  is  not  required.  That  the  location  of  the  American  head 
quarters  in  New  Jersey  and  on  the  Hudson,  admitted  of  all  possible 
strategic  combinations and  contingencies  which  were  involved  in  move- 
merits  of  British  troops  from  Canada,  New  York,  or  by  the  Chesapeake, 
is  evident  from  the  readiness  with  which  such  enterprises  were  met 
and  foiled  ;  and  it  is  equally  evident  that  the  so-called  Fabian  policy 
of  Washington  was  based  upon  the  conviction  that  a  true  strategic 
policy  would  be  adopted  on  the  part  of  the  British  Cabinet,  and  that 
was  to  destroy  his  army,  and  let  cities,  districts,  and  provinces  fall 
through  the  want  of  compact,  sufficient  and  disciplined  defenders. 
The  narrative  affords  the  facts  by  which  to  judge  of  the  skill  employed 


652  CONCLUSION.  [1781 

in  the  direction  of  strategy.     The   example  cited  suggests  the  direc 
tion  of  inquiry. 

The  Logistics  of  the  American  army  were  embarrassed  by  the  great 
extent  of  the  country,  its  forests  and  mountains,  its  river  courses, 
and  marshes,  and  its  widely  diffused  population.  These  elements  did 
not  alone  delay  the  transportation  and  concentration  of  troops,  but 
the  productive  lands  were  unequally  worked,  and  in  some  sections 
there  would  be  no  surplus,  and  no  ready  means  of  accumulating  supplies 
from  other  sections  more  densely  peopled  or  under  more  general  culture. 
The  British  troops  availed  themselves  of  the  advantages  which  the 
control  of  the  navigable  waters  and  an  organized  commissariat  sup 
plied,  backed  by  the  power  of  a  great  empire.  But  the  waste  in 
handling  supplies  and  the  misconduct  of  officials  were  not  exclusively 
confined  to  the  Americans,  who  were  inexperienced,  and  therefore 
improvident.  Similar  complaints  were  made  of  British  officials. 
That  class  of  supplies  which  was  taken  by  partisan  corps  on  either 
side  was  seldom  carefully  accounted  for ;  but  this  neglect  is  largely 
incident  to  that  kind  of  military  service.  The  repeated  statements 
of  General  Washington  as  to  the  prevalence  of  venality,  corruption, 
and  malfeasance  in  office,  were  applied  more  directly  to  the  general 
condition  of  the  country,  and  largely  to  the  operations  of  detached 
state,  and  other  public  agencies,  and  very  seldom  to  the  army  which 
had  become  disciplined  and  reorganized  under  responsible  control. 
The  opportunities  for  fraud  in  the  department  of  logistics,  were  then, 
as  always,  more  numerous  than  in  any  other,  and  charges  of  miscon 
duct  in  the  matter  of  contracts,  for  example,  were  as  frequent  then  as 
in  later  times.  General  Greene  was  well  abused  while  quartermaster- 
general,  but  his  vindication  was  complete. 

In  Grand  Tactics,  as  well  as  in  other  subdivisions  of  the  Art  of 
War,  the  introductory  chapters  specified  leading  illustrations,  which 
are  afterwards  more  fully  drawn  out  in  detail.  While  the  American 
regulars  and  all  really  experienced  militia  displayed  steadiness  as 
well  as  courage,  equal  to  that  of  their  adversaries,  the  war  illustrated 
a  fact  which  has  been  a  reflection  upon  its  conduct,  but  is  common 
to  all  wars,  that  no  troops  are  exempt  from  a  liability  to  panic  and 
sudden  disaster.  At  Hobkirk's  Hill,  an  American  regiment  which 
had  distinguished  itself  at  the  Cowpens,  lost  the  battle  by  perfectly 
unnecessary  misconduct ;  and  at  Eutaw  Springs  the  British  Sixty- 
third  and  Sixty-fourth,  veterans,  after  a  too  hasty  advance,  meeting 
unexpected  resistance,  gave  way  in  equal  disorder.  Washington, 


I78I.1  CONCLUSION.  653 

even  at  the  risk  of  his  life,  could  not  halt  the  flying  regiments  of  Par 
sons'  brigade  (page  226,)  during  the  retreat  from  New  York ;  but 
saved  his  army  at  Monmouth,  by  turning  fugitives  immediately  upon 
their  pursuers.  This  instance  illustrates  nearly  all  similar  fights. 
Discipline  tends  to  avert  panic ;  but  when  self-possession  is  lost,  it  is 
the  invisible  and  undetermined  danger  which  takes  away  the  breath, 
and  then  a  shadow  or  a  fancy,  will  whirl  away  the  very  men  who 
would  face  any  foe  they  could  see  and  measure.  The  great  defect 
of  the  American  continental  system  was  the  constantly  changing 
army  basis,  and  this  was  the  cause  of  nearly  all  tactical  failures  which 
were  not  incident  to  the  ordinary  operations  of  every  war. 

Reference  is  particularly  made  to  Chapters  IX-XIII.  inclusive, 
for  the  laws  by  which  the  conduct  of  the  war  of  1775-1781,  no  less 
than  of  all  wars,  is  to  be  tested. 

Strength  of  Armies.  The  official  records  already  cited  show  that 
the  British  force  never  exceeded  about  forty  thousand  men  at  any 
period,  and  this  included  the  troops  in  Canada  and  Florida,  as  well 
as  at  the  Bahama  Islands,  and  was  not  until  1782.  The  American 
army,  after  1776,  never  equaled  thirty-eight  thousand  regulars  at  a 
single  time.  It  is  customary  to  give  a  great  excess  of  force  to  the 
latter.  The  people  at  large  constituted  a  nominal  militia  of  the 
nature  of  a  posse  comitatus — minute  men — coming  at  call,  and  dis 
solving  as  quickly.  They  were  not  a  proper  army.  They  did  indeed 
check  forays,  and  afford  temporary  garrisons ;  but  the  smaller  the 
army,  and  the  greater  the  number  of  these  isolated,  transient  detach 
ments,  the  longer  was  the  struggle,  and  the  more  wearing,  as  well  as 
more  unsatisfactory  was  every  local  result. 

The  usual  statement  of  the  forces  of  the  United  States  engaged  in 
the  war  is  excessive.  Mr.  Justin  Winsor,  Secretary  Mass.  Hist.  Society, 
in  Vol.  II. ,  N.  S.,  of  published  Proceedings,  thinks  it  may  enable  us  to 
judge,  approximately,  the  relative  contributions  of  States,  year  by  year, 
but  only  vaguely.  In  the  same  volume,  the  author  of  this  work  suggests 
that  several  enlistments  of  the  same  man  unduly  swelled  the  aggregate, 
as  found  true  on  settlement  with  States  at  close  of  the  war,  1861-5. 

The  following  is  one  form  of  the  statement  referred  to  : 

New  Hampshire 12,497     Delaware 2,386 

Massachusetts 69,907     Maryland 13,912 

Rhode  Island 5, 908     Virginia 26,678 

Connecticut 3J.939     North  Carolina 7,263 

New  York 17, 781     South  Carolina 6,417 

New  Jersey 10,726     Georgia 2,679 

Pennsylvania .      25,678  


654  CONCLUSION.  [1781. 

The  British  and  American  armies  were  alike  limited  in  their  ability 
to  concentrate  their  forces.  A  reference  to  the  map  "  Outlines  of 
Atlantic  Coast,"  furnishes  a  key  to  this  difficulty. 

Washington  controlled  an  interior  line  while  at  Middlebrook  and 
Morristown,  which  nearly  doubled  both  his  offensive  and  defensive 
capacity;  and  the  British  fleets  would  have  been  compensated  for  the 
American  line  of  land-march  through  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas,  if  the 
uncertainties  of  the  sea  and  the  inadequate  garrison  at  New  York  had 
not  cost  them  nearly  as  much  delay  as  embarrassed  the  Americans  in 
crossing  the  rivers  and  rough  country  of  the  States  referred  to. 

Naval  Co-operation.  Under  the  head  of  "  Providence  in  war  illus 
trated,"  the  contingencies  of  maritime  movements  were  adverted  to, 
and  the  narrative  has  shown  that  a  fleet  of  transports  rarely  ventured 
even  from  New  York  to  Newport  without  a  delay  which  defeated  the 
enterprise  on  foot.  The  British  owed  their  chief  success  at  the  south 
to  their  control  of  the  sea  ;  and  Yorktown  fell  as  soon  as  the  remark 
ably  successful  voyage  of  the  Count  de  Grasse  snatched  away  that 
supremacy  in  the  Chesapeake.  The  American  navy  had  been  organ 
ized  with  fair  promise.  The  names  and  armaments  of  the  principal 
ships,  either  built  or  authorized  to  be  built  under  the  sanction  of 
Congress,  have  been  given  in  their  order  as  they  were  authorized. 
That  they  accomplished  very  little  as  a  navy  is  involved  in  the  general 
statement  of  a  British  naval  blockade  and  an  almost  undisputed  naval 
superiority.  At  Newport,  New  Bedford,  Philadelphia,  Charleston, 
Savannah  and  other  ports,  most  of  these  vessels  were  burned  or  sunk, 
almost  before  they  had  spread  canvas.  At  the  outset  of  the  war, 
seamen  and  good  ship-builders  abounded  ;  but  heavy  guns  were  not 
ready  when  the  ships  were,  and  the  success  of  privateering,  which 
gave  to  vessels  of  speed  and  light  draught  the  best  chance  for  prize 
money,  soon  reduced  the  number  of  men  from  whom  to  make  good 
sailors.  The  protracted  blockade  of  Newport,  the  expeditions  along 
the  coast,  and  the  incursions  which  threatened  the  homes  of  seafaring 
men  had  a  similar  tendency. 

The  Randolph,  32,  Captain  Biddle,  one  of  the  first  vessels  put  in 
commission,  blew  up  at  sea  during  a  night  action,  but  her  commander 
escaped.  The  adventures  of  Captains  Biddle,  John  Paul  Jones,  Hop 
kins,  Barry,  and  others,  are  creditable  to  their  memory ;  but  the  main 
fact  remains,  that  while  the  American  army,  in  1781,  was  less  than 
half  its  force  during  the  early  years  of  the  war,  the  navy  had  but  two 
really  efficient  ships,  that  survived  the  casualties  of  the  contest, 


I78i. J  CONCLUSION.  655 

(Reference  is  made  to  note  on  page  144,  close  of  Chapter  XXII.,  for 
the  career  of  the  American  navy.) 

Foreign  Officers.  During  the  early  efforts  to  interest  France  in 
behalf  of  the  American  cause,  Mr.  Silas  Deane  had  induced  many 
European  officers  to  visit  America  under  promise  of  commissions. 
The  jealousy  of  this  movement  was  so  great  that  even  General  Greene 
at  one  time  tendered  his  resignation,  and  was  sharply  rebuked  by 
Congress  for  interference  with  its  prerogative.  Many  failed  to  realize 
the  purpose  of  their  visit — others  failed  to  merit  the  appointments 
received,  and  still  others,  of  those  whose  names  have  appeared  in  this 
narrative,  were  an  honor  to  the  service.  The  names  of  Steuben, 
De  Kalb,  Kosciusko,  Pulaski,  Duplessis,  Du  Portail,  Armand,  Fleury, 
Gimat  and  others,  are  associated  with  honorable  mention,  while  the 
extraordinary  career  of  the  youthful  La  Fayette  is  so  suggestive  of 
the  success  of  the  French  alliance,  that  if  his  earnest  promptings  had 
not  sent  him  early  to  America,  it  does  not  appear  how  that  alliance 
could  have  been  so  completely  and  successfully  maintained  under  cir 
cumstances  which  repeatedly  threatened  its  rupture. 

Military  Changes.  Generals  Gage,  Howe  and  Clinton,  in  succes 
sive  general  command,  Generals  Burgoyne,  Rawdon  and  Cornwallis, 
each  in  turn  made  prisoners  of  war,  have  been  remembered,  and  their 
record,  with  that  of  Burgoyne,  Knyphausen,  Donop,  Rahl,  and  scores 
of  others,  has  been  inspired  by  the  motto  with  which  these  pages 
invited  notice,  "  Jnstitia  et  prater e a  nil." 

If  few  traditions  of  the  camp,  or  field,  have  enlivened  this  history 
neither  has  the  intrusion  of  social  gossip  been  needlessly  interposed 
to  impair  the  value  of  the  acts  of  soldiers.  The  changes  which  the 
war  wrought  among  the  British  characters  who  represented  the  prow 
ess  and  glory  of  England,  were  shared  by  the  leaders  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States.  Few  of  the  early  commanders  took  part  in  the 
closing  scenes  of  the  war.  Schuyler,  Sullivan,  Varnum,  Spencer  and 
others  were  in  the  halls  of  legislation.  The  earnest  and  patriotic 
Putnam,  who  had  so  persistently  labored  to  have  a  second  fight,  on 
Bunker  Hill,  on  the  memorable  i/th  of  June,  17/5,  had  retired  from 
the  service.  Wayne  and  St.  Clair  joined  Greene  in  the  Southern 
department  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis.  Muhlen- 
berg,  promoted  Major-general,  retired  to  his  farm  in  Pennsylvania. 
Lincoln,  as  elsewhere  stated,  became  Secretary  of  War.  Knox,  also 
promoted,  who  had  followed  the  fortunes  of  Washington  from  Bos 
ton  in  1775,  to  Yorktown  in  1781,  afterward  succeeded  Lincoln  as 


656  CONCLUSION.  [1781 

Secretary  of  War,  and  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  August,  1783,  received 
from  Sir  Guy  Carleton,  the  successor  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  the  sur 
render  of  New  York.  Joseph  Reed,  first  Colonel,  then  aid-de-camp, 
then  tendered  promotion,  and  then  Adjutant-general,  had  resigned 
his  commission  as  early  as  1/77,  but  as  a  member  of  Congress,  or  as 
Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  he  made  his  military  association  with 
Washington  to  enure  to  the  well-being  of  the  army.  Of  Governors 
Nelson  and  Clinton,  and  others,  who  combined  high  social  position 
with  great  military  zeal,  and  of  subordinate  officers  throughout  the 
north  and  south,  there  is  allowed  no  further  mention  than  that  already 
afforded. 

This  battle  record  has  drawn  to  its  support  many  interpreting 
facts  which  invite,  yet  exclude,  a  departure  into  the  field  of  general 
history.  Individuals  only  take  their  place,  as  links  in  a  necessary 
chain,  and  their  biography  is  so  clipped  as  simply  to  fill  the  space 
which  defines  the  principal  battles  of  the  war. 

If  this  venture  shall  inspire  fresh  interest  in  the  "principles  which 
underlie  national  defense"  in  the  spirit  of  its  dedication,  and  shall 
command  respect  for  the  valor  which  applied  the  Science  of  War  to 
the  Battles  of  the  American  Revolution,  it  will  have  accomplished  its 
purpose. 

Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  politically  separated  by  that 
war,  have  so  developed  their  national  life  through  the  arts  of  peace, 
that  the  ocean  is  no  serious  restriction  upon  their  intercourse,  and 
America,  once  the  child,  then  the  servant,  then  of  mature  age,  now 
competes  in  honorable  emulation,  for  an  equal  place  among  the 
nations. 

There  were  foreflashings  of  the  future,  even  during  the  years  of 
struggle  ;  and  few  gathered  the  rays  with  more  prophetic  skill  than 
Governor  Pownall.  In  the  year  1757  he  had  been  the  royal  Governor 
of  the  Colony  of  Massachusetts.  Its  industries  and  its  resources,  its 
warfares,  privations  and  sacrifices,  its  marvellous  endurance  under  the 
strain  of  cold,  famine  and  Indian  incursions,  and  its  elasticity  where 
opportunity  gave  play  to  its  real  powers,  had  wrought  into  his  very 
soul  a  recognition  of  the  straight  and  narrow  path  by  which  such  a 
people  must  rise  to  power.  In  writing  of  the  New  World,  during 
January,  1780,  he  thus  unfolds  his  views: 

"  Nature  hath  removed  her  (America)  far  from  the  Old  World  and 
all  its  embroiling  interests  and  wrangling  politics ;  without  an  enemy 
or  a  rival,  or  the  entanglement  of  alliances.  This  new  system  has 


i78i.J  CONCLUSION.  057 

taken  its  equal  station  with  the  nations  upon  earth.  Negotiations 
are  of  no  consequence  either  to  the  right  or  the  fact.  The  Independ 
ence  of  America  is  fixed  as  fate.  .  .  .  The  government  of  the 
new  empire  of  America  is  liable  indeed  to  many  disorders ;  but  it  is 
young  and  strong,  and  will  struggle,  by  the  vigor  of  internal,  healing 
principles  of  life,  against  those  evils,  and  surmount  them.  In  North 
America  the  civilizing  activity  of  the  human  race  forms  the  growth 
of  the  State  ;  we  see  all  the  inhabitants  not  only  free,  but  allowing 
our  universal  naturalization  to  all  who  wish  to  be  so.  In  a  country 
like  this,  where  every  man  has  the  full  and  free  exertion  of  his  powers, 
an  unabated  application  and  a  perpetual  struggle  sharpens  the  wits 
and  gives  constant  training  to  the  mind.  ...  In  agriculture  and 
in  mechanic  handicrafts,  the  New  World  hath  been  led  to  many  im 
provements  of  implements,  tools  and  machines — leading  experience 
by  the  hand  to  many  a  new  invention.  This  spirit  of  thus  analyzing 
the  mechanic  powers  hath  established  a  kind  of  instauration  of  science 
in  their  hands.  The  settlers  find  fragments  of  time  in  which  they 
make  most  of  the  articles  of  personal  wear  and  household  use,  foi 
home  consumption.  Here,  no  laws  frame  conditions  on  which  a  man 
is  to  exercise  this  or  that  trade.  Here,  no  laws  lock  him  up  in  that 
trade ;  and  many  a  real  philosopher,  a  politician,  a  warrior,  emerges 
out  of  this  wilderness,  as  the  seed  rises  out  of  the  ground  where  it 
hath  lain  buried  for  its  season." 

With  a  peculiar  forecast  as  to  the  necessary  unity  of  the  new 
States,  then  held  together  by  so  weak  a  band,  this  writer  proceeds: 
"  The  nature  of  the  coast  and  of  the  winds,  render  navigation  a  per 
petually  moving  intercourse  of  communication  ;  and  the  waters  of  the 
rivers  render  inland  navigation  but  a  further  process  of  that  com 
munication  :  all  which  becomes,  as  it  were,  one  vital  principle  of 
life,  extending  through  one  organized  being — one  nation.  Will  that 
most  enterprising  spirit  be  stopped  at  Cape  Horn  ;  or,  not  pass  be 
yond  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope?  Before  long  they  will  be  found  trad 
ing  in  the  South  Sea,  in  Spice  Islands,  and  in  China.  Commerce  will 
open  the  door  to  emigration.  By  constant  inter-communication 
America  will  every  day  approach  nearer  and  nearer  to  Europe." 

"  North  America  has  become  a  new  primary  planet,  which,  while  it 
taker;  its  own  course  in  its  own  orbit,  must  shift  the  common  centre 
of  gravity." 

If  such  were  the  anticipations  of  good  for  America  and  the  world 
from  the  separate  nationality  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
42 


658  CONCLUSION. 

when  seen  only  through  the  eye  of  faith,  during  a  critical  period  of 
the  war  of  1775-81,  there  is  infinitely  more  of  hope  for  the  nations  in 
the  assurance  that  all  the  progress  then  foreshadowed  has  strengthened 
the  kindly  relations  of  America  and  the  mother  country,  and  the  les 
sons  of  the  war  may  be  gladly  recalled  as  so  many  fresh  incentives  to 
a  perpetual  peace. 

The  war  of  1775-1781,  however,  did  not  end  without  a  similar 
aspiration  for  the  future,  as  a  part  of  that  official  act  by  which  the 
American  Commander-in-chief  announced  its  approaching  close  ;  and 
at  Meridian,  July  4th,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  seventy-six,  while  all  civilized  nations  are  represented  as 
the  guests  of  America,  to  honor  her  industry,  and  rejoice  in  her  liberty  ; 
thus  in  the  fraternity  of  that  intercourse  to  relax  all  bonds  but  those 
of  concord,  and  thus  to  renew  their  obligations  to  Righteousness,  which 
alone  exalteth  a  nation  ;  and  while  the  hall  which  a  century  ago  was 
the  birthplace  of  the  Republic,  only  a  century  later  has  become  the 
scene  of  august  ceremonies,  in  which  the  nations  bear  part,  to  ex 
change  greetings  and  pledge  fellowship  for  the  welfare  of  man,  in  the 
spirit  of  a  broad  humanity,  it  is  not  ill-suited,  that  the  closing  senti 
ment  of  a  memorial  record  of  that  struggle  should  adopt  the  last 
military  order  of  the  struggle  itself. 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  April  18,  1783. 

"The  Commander-in-chief  orders  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  King  of  Great  Britain 
to  be  publicly  proclaimed  to-morrow  at  twelve  at  the  New  Building  : 
and  that  the  proclamation,  which  will  be  communicated  herewith,  be 
read  to-morrow  morning  at  the  head  of  every  regiment  and  corps  of 
the  army  :  after  which,  the  Chaplains  with  the  several  brigades,  will 
render  thanks  to  Almighty  God  for  all  his  mercies,  particularly  for  his 
overruling  the  wrath  of  man  to  His  own  glory,  and  causing  the  rage 
of  war  to  cease  among  the  nations. 

On  such  a  happy  day  which  is  the  harbinger  of  peace,  a  day  which 
completes  the  eighth  year  of  the  war,  it  would  be  ingratitude  not  to  re 
joice,  it  would  be  insensibility  not  to  participate,  in  the  general  felicity. 

HAPPY,  THRICE  HAPPY,  shall  they  be  pronounced  hereafter,  who 
have  contributed  anything,  who  have  performed  the  meanest  office  in 
erecting  this  stupendous  fabric  of  freedom  and  empire  on  the  broad  basis 
of  independency,  who  have  assisted  in  protecting  the  rights  of  human 
nature,  and  establishing  an  asylum  for  the  poor  and  oppressed  of  all 
nations  and  religions." 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL   TABLE. 


T  N  stating  the  principal  authorities  consulted,  it  is  agreeable  to  acknowl- 
edge  facilities  furnished  by  gentlemen  in  charge  of  private  libraries' 
abroad,  especially  Thomas  Hughes,  Q.  C. ;  J.  C.  Webster,  Esq.,  Secretary 
Athenaeum  Club ;  Colonel  Charles  C.  Chesney,  R.  E ;  Secretary  Captain 
Douglass  Galton,  British  Sci.  Asso. ;  Secretary  H.  W.  Bates,  Esq.,  R.  Geog. 
Socy. ;  Sir  T.  Duffus  Hardy,  Colonel  H.  W.  Deedes,  A.  D.  C.,  and  William 
Blackmore,  Esq.  of  London ;  Professors  Rolleston  and  Smith,  of  Oxford ; 
Professor  Archer,  of  Edinburgh ;  Sir  William  Thompson  and  Professors 
Young  and  Thompson,  of  Glasgow  ;  Vice  President  Andrews,  of  Queens 
College,  Belfast ;  Professor  Leslie  and  Steward  Kingston,  of  Trinity  College, 
Dublin. 

The  courtesies  of  the  Athenaeum,  Athenaeum  Junior,  United  Service, 
United  Service  Junior,  the  Army  and  Navy  and  other  London  clubs  opened 
valuable  libraries  and  are  gratefully  remembered. 

The  cordial  aid  of  Adjutant-general  William  S.  Stryker,  of  New  Jersey,  in 
the  settlement  of  facts  and  names  in  connection  with  the  war  history  of  that 
State  has  been  appreciated. 

(Quotations  cited  are  given  as  written  by  the  Authors  referred  to.) 


REFERENCES. 


[English  Titles  are  retained  for  French  or  German  reprints.] 


A. 

ADAMS  ;  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams. 
Adolphus'  Hist,  of  Great  Britain  and  Geo.  III. 
Allen's  (Ira)  Vermont. 
Allen's  (Ethan)  Narrative. 
Almon's  Remembrancer. 
American  Archives. 

"         Orderly  Books. 
Andrews'  History  of  the  Wars  of  England, 

I775—I783. 
'          History  of  the  War  with  America. 

4  vols.     London.     1785. 
Annual  Register,  1774 — 1784. 
Army  Returns,  American. 

British. 
Auburey's  Travels. 

B. 

BAILEY'S  Records  of  Patriotism. 
Bancroft's  History  of  the  United  States. 
Barber's  and  Hoover's  Historical  Collections 
New  York. 

"         Historical  Collections,  Mass. 

"  "  "  Conn. 

"         History  of  New  Haven. 
Bartlett's  History  of  America. 
Barstow's  History  of  New  Hampshire. 
Bradford's  Massachusetts. 
Belknap's  New  Hampshire. 
Bell's  (Andrew),  Journal,  (Monmouth). 
Benton's  Herkimer  County. 
Bolton's  History  of  Westchester  County. 
Botta's  (M.)  American  Revolution. 
Boone's  Narrative. 
Butler's  History  of  the  United  States. 

"  "          "  Kentucky. 

Burgoyne's  Letters. 

"          Narrative  and  Documents. 


c. 

CALDWELL'S  Greene. 
Camp  Fires  of  the  Revolution. 
Campbell's  Annals  of  Tryon  County,  N    f . 
"          Border  Warfare. 
"          Virginia. 
Campaign  of  the  Naval  Army  under  Count 

De  Grasse. 

Cassell's  illustrated  History  of  England. 
Chapman's  Wyoming. 
Chastellux,  Count  de,  Visit  to  America. 
Clark's  (Joseph)  Diary. 

"       (John)  Narrative  of  Battle  of  Bunkei 
Hill. 

Clark's  Naval  History. 
Caulkin's  (Miss)  History  of  New  London. 
Cleveland's  Greenwood. 
Collins'  Sketches  of  Kentucky. 

"       New  Jersey  Gazette. 
Civil  War  in  America. 
Cooper's  Naval  History. 

"       Chronicles  of  Cooperstown. 
Connecticut  Gazette. 
Cornwallis'  Answer  to  Clinton. 

D. 

DAWSON'S   Battles  of  the  United  States  by 

Sea  and  Land. 

Day's  Historical  Collections  of  Pennsylvania. 
De  Bermere's  Narrative. 
De  Haas'  American  Revolution. 
Duer's  Lord  Stirling. 
Dufour's  Principles  of  Grand   Strategy   and 

Tactics. 
Dunlap's  New  York. 

E. 
EAGER'S  History  of  Orange  County,  N.  Y. 


REFERENCES. 


66l 


Ellet's  (Mrs.)  Domestic  History  of  American 

Revolution. 
Ellet's  (Mrs.)  Women  of  the  Revolution. 

Encyclopedias,  Biog.  and  general. 

F. 

FARMER  and  Moore's  Historical   Collections 

of  New  Hampshire. 
Franklin's  Life  and  Writings. 
Filson's  Kentucky. 
Felton's   (John)    Reflections,  or   History   of 

Battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 
Force's  American  Archives. 
Forrest's  Sketches  of  Norfolk  and  Vicinity. 
Frothingham's  Siege  of  Boston. 

O. 

GAGE'S  (General)  Official  Returns. 
Games'  New  York  Gazette  and  Mercury. 
Galloway's  Letters  to  a  Nobleman. 

"          Reflections  on  the  American  Rev 
olution. 

Galloway's  Reply  to  William  Howe's  Obser 
vations. 

Gardiner's  Anecdotes  of  the  Revolution. 
Gentleman's  Magazine. 
Graham's  Life  of  Morgan. 

History  of  America,  Vol.  IV. 
Graydon's  Memoirs. 
Girardine's  Virginia. 

Green's  (G.  W.)  German  Element  in  the  Rev 
olutionary  War. 
Green's  Life  of  Greene. 
Gordon's  History  of  New  Jersey. 

"  "         "  American  Independence. 

II. 

HALLECK'S  International  Law. 

Hall's  (Lieut.)  Civil  War. 

Hamilton's  Works,  by  Hamilton. 

Hamley's  (Colonel)  Operations  of  War. 

Hazard's  Register  of  Pennsylvania. 

Headley's  Washington  and  his  Generals. 

Heath's  Memoirs. 

Hempstead's  (Lieut.)  Narrative. 

Hildreth's  History  of  the  United  States. 

Hinman's  Connecticut  in  the  Revolution. 

Hinton's  History  of  the  United  States. 

History  of  the  Civil  War. 

Hollister's  Connecticut. 

Holmes'  Annals. 

Holt's  New  York  Gazette. 

Homan's  History  of  Boston. 

Howe's  (Sir  William)  Narrative. 

"       Historical  Collections  of  Virginia. 
House  of  Commons,  Proceedings. 


Howland  (John),  Life  and  Recollections  of. 
Habley's  History  of  the  American  Revolu. 

tion. 

Hughes'  History  of  England. 
Hutchinson's  Massachusetts. 
Humphreys'  Putnam. 

1. 

IMPARTIAL   History  of  the  American   War 

(Dublin.)  Rev.  J.  Murray. 
Irving's  Life  of  Washington. 

J. 

Johnson's  Life  of  Greene. 

Traditions  of  the  Revolution. 
History  of  Salem,  N.  J. 
Jomini's  Art  of  War. 

"         Life  of  Napoleon. 

"         Grand  Military  Campaigns. 

K. 

KNIGHT'S  History  of  England. 


LA  FAYETTE'S  Memoirs  and  Correspondence. 
Lamb,  (General)  Leaks'  Life  of. 

"      (Sergeant),  Journal  of  Occurrences. 
Lee's  Memoirs  of  the  War. 
Lee  (Charles),  Memoirs  and  Correspondence. 
"     Proceedings  of  General  Court  Martial 
"     (Lieut.-Col.)  Memoirs  of. 
"     (Genl.  H.) 
Lee's  Campaign  of  1778. 
Lodges'    Portraits  of   illustrious  personages, 

vol  8. 

Lossing's  Field  Book  of  the  Revolution. 
"         Washington  and  the  Republic. 
"         Life  of  Schuyler. 
"         Centennial  History  of  America. 

M. 

MAHON'S  (Lord)  History  of  England. 
Manuscript  Letters  and  Reports  at  London 

and  Paris. 

Marshall's  Washington. 
Marshall,  (H.)  Kentucky. 
Martin's  North  Carolina. 
Massachusetts,  Committee  of  Safety   Docu 

ments. 

Maxwell's  (Virginia)  Historical  Register. 
Memoirs  of  New  York  Historical  Society. 
Mills'  Statistics. 
Memoirs  of  the  Court  of  George  III.,  Dukes 

of  Buckingham  and  Chandos. 
Miner's  Wyoming. 
Morris'  (Robert)  Diary 
Moore's  (George  H.)  Treason  of  General  Lee. 


662 


REFERENCES. 


Moore's  Diary  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Moultrie's  Memoirs. 
Muhlenberg,  Life  of. 
Murray's  Elizabethtown. 

"        (Rev.  James),  History  of  the  War. 
Murray's  Impartial  History  of  the  War  in 

America.     3  vols.     Newcastle.     1782. 
Maps  of  Authors  Consulted. 

"      "  British  Museum,  London. 

"      "        "       Officers  and  Engineers. 

"      "  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  Paris. 

"      "  Congressional  Library,  Washington. 

"      "  U.  S.  Coast  Survey. 

"      "  U.  S.  Engineer  Corps. 

"      "  New  York  Historical  Society,  N.  Y. 

"      "  Pennsylvania     Historical     Society, 
Philadelphia. 

"      "  Public  Record  Office,  London. 

"      "  Royal  Ethnological  Society,  London. 

"      "  Royal  Geographical  Society,  London. 

"      "  National  Geographical  Society  Paris. 

"      "  Washington's  Head  Quarters,  Mor- 
ristown,  N.  J. 


NEILSON'S  Campaign  of  Burgoyne. 
New  York,  Documentary  History  of. 
New  Jersey,  Revolutionary  Correspondence. 
New  Hampshire,  Historical  Society  Collec 

tions. 
North  American  Pilot. 

O. 

ONDERDONK'S  Kings  County. 
"  Queens      " 

Suffolk      " 

Orations    of   Webster,   Everett,   King    and 
others  in  honor  of  men  and  battles. 


P. 


PARLIAMENTARY  Register. 

Palmer's  History  of  Lake  Champlain. 

Paris  Gazette,  1780,  Survey  of  Procceedings. 

Summary  of  Operations. 
Pennsylvania  Archives. 
Ledger. 
Packet. 

Peterson's  Rhode  Island. 
Peck's  Wyoming. 
Pictorial  History  of  George  III. 
Provincial  Convention  of  New  York,  Minutes 

of. 

Proceedings  of  New  Jersey  Historical  Society. 
Putnam  (General),  Life  of. 
Public  Record  Office,  London,  Official  Papers. 


R. 

RAMSAY'S  American  Revolution. 

"          Revolution  of  South  Carolina. 
"          Life  of  Washington. 
Randall's  Jefferson. 
Rankin's  History  of  France. 
Raynal  (Abbe)  American  Revolution. 

"  "       Letters  upon  North  Ameri 

can  Affairs. 

Reed's  (Wm.  B.)  Life  of  Joseph  Reed. 
Riedesel's  (Baron)   Military   Memoirs,  by 
Stone. 

"          (Baroness)  Memoirs. 
Ripley's  Fight  at  Concord. 
Rivington's  Royal  Gazette,  N.  Y. 

S. 

SAFFEL'S  Records  of  the  Revolutionary  War. 
Sparks'  Biographies. 

"       Life  and  Treason  of  Arnold. 

"       Washington. 

"       Writings  of  Washington, 

"       Life  and  Writings  of  Franklin. 
Scott's  Military  Dictionary. 
Shattuck's  Concord. 
St.  Clair's  Narrative. 
Stedman's  American  War. 
Sedgwick's  Life  of  Livingston. 
St.  Leger's  Account  of  Occurrences. 
Simcoe's  Journal  of  the  Operations  of  the 

Queen's  Rangers. 
Simms'  Diary. 

"       South  Carolina. 
Simms'  (J.  R.)  Schoharie  County,  N.  Y. 
Stone's  Life  of  Brant. 

"       Tryon  County  and  Border  Warfare. 

"       Wyoming. 

"        Sir  Wm.  Johnson. 

T. 

TARBOX'S  (J.  N.)  Life  of  General  Putnam. 
Tarleton's  Narrative  and  Campaign  of  1780 

-1781. 
Transactions  of  Historical  Societies  of  N. 

Y.,  N.  J.,  Penn.,  and   other   States  —  so 

far  as  published. 
Thatcher's  Military  Journal. 
Tome's  Battles  by  Land  and  Sea. 
Thompson's  Long  Island. 
Trumbull's  Autobiography. 

"  'History  of  Connecticut. 

V. 

VAN  CAMPEN  (Major),  Life  of. 


WALTER'S  History  of  England  and  Sketches 
of  New  Jersey. 


REFERENCES. 


663 


Warren's  (Mrs.)  American  Revolution. 

Ward's  (S.)  Battles  of  Long  Island. 

Washington's  Diary. 

Wheaton's  International  Law. 

Wheeler's  North  Carolina. 

Weems'  Washington. 

and  Kerry's  Marion. 

Whitehead's  Early  History  and  Sketches  of 
New  Jersey. 

Whiteley's  Revolutionary   History  of  Dela 
ware. 

White's  Historical  Collections  of  Georgia. 

Wither' s  Chronicles  of  the  Border. 


Wilkinson's  Memoirs 
Willett's  Narrative. 
Williams'  Vermont 

"        (Colonel  Otho)  Narrative. 
White's  Statistics  of  Georgia. 
Woolsey's  International  Law. 
Williamson's  History  of  Maine. 
Wraxhall's  Historical  Memoirs. 
Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson. 

Y. 

YOUNGE'S  History  of  the  British  Navy. 


ADDENDA. 

Arnold's  Campaign  against  Quebec,  by  John  Joseph  Henry. 

Barnes's  Centenary  History  of  the  United  States- 

Burgoyne's  Campaign,  by  W.  L.  Stone.    1877. 

Burgoyne's  Orderly  Book. 

Fonblanque's  Burgoyne.     1876. 

Journal  of  Claude  Blanchard.     Edited  by  Wm.  Duane. 

Memoir  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman,  Aid  and  Secretary  of  Washington. 

Siege  of  Savannah,  by  French  officers  of  the  fleet  of  D'Estaing. 

Siege  of  Savannah,  by  Dr.  Franklin  B.  Hough. 

Siege  of  Charleston,  by  same. 

NOTE. — Hon.  Isaac  N.  Arnold,  in  his  Life  of  Arnold,  Chicago,  iS8o,  emphasizes 
the  following  extract  from  The  Vermont  Historical  Society  Collections,  Vol.  i,  p.  239  : 
"  Gen.  Arnold,  with  his  division,  attacked  a  division  of  Burgoyne,  in  which  Gen.  Arnold 
gained  the  ground,  when  the  enemy  were  reinforced  by  the  main  body,  when  Gen. 
Arnold  was  obliged  to  retreat ;  but  being  reinforced,  recovered  his  own,  so  that  the 
ground  remained  at  eight  o'clock,  yesterday,  divided  between  them.  This  account 
came  by  express  from  Gen.  Gates'  Headquarters,  yesterday  afternoon,  by  Major 
Cochran." 

In  the  Magazine  of  History,  May,  1878,  p.  278  (John  Austin  Stephens,  Ed.),  a  work 
of  standard  value,  is  the  following:  "Col.  Philip  Van  Courtlandt,  who  commanded  a 
New  York  regiment  engaged  in  the  fight,  says  that  after  he  had  left  his  parade  and 
was  marching  towards  the  enemy,  he  received  his  orders  from  Gen.  Arnold." 

NOTE.  (Fifth  Edition.")  General  Horatio  Rogers,  of  Providence,  R.  I.,  has  edited  the  pub 
lication  of  the  Journal,  or  Orderly  Book,  of  General  James  Hadden,  written  while  on  duty  as  a 
subaltern  under  Generals  Carleton  and  Burgoyne,  and  among  his  valuable  foot-notes  are  facts 
concerning  General  Arnold's  relation  to  the  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm.  By  his  courtesy  they  are 
given. 

General  Jacob  Bailey  wrote  to  the  Committee  of  Safety  of  New  Hampshire,  September  22, 
three  days  after  the  battle:  "General  Arnold  has  fought  the  right  wing  of  General  Burgoyne, 
won  three  field-pieces,  and  250  prisoners, — great  loss  on  both  sides. " 

The  Boston  Gazette,  September  2Qth,  1777,  thus  describes  the  battle  :  "  At  three  o'clock,  the 
enemy,  being  re-inforced,  renewed  the  attack  ;  our  troops  being  at  the  same  time  supported  by 
the  left  wing  of  the  army,  consisting  of  the  whole  of  General  Arnold's  division,  received  them 
warmly,  and,  though  the  enemy  brought  on  their  whole  force  against  no  more  than  half  of  ours, 
maintained  their  ground  till  night,  when  both  parties  retired." 


664  REFERENCES. 

General  Rogers  also  calls  special  attention  to  the  Orderly  Book  of  Col.  Thaddeus  Cook,  of 
Wallingford,  Conn.,  now  in  the  possession  of  the  American  Antiquarian  Society  of  Worcester, 
Mass.,  in  which  is  given,  without  correction  of  clerical  errors,  the  following  Order  of  General 
Arnold,  dated  the  day  after  the  battle  : 

"  DIVISION  ORDERS  zoth  Septr.  A.  D.  1777. 

"  General  Arnold  returns  his  thanks  to  the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  his  Division  for  their 
brave  spirited  conduct  yesterday  in  withstanding  the  force  of  the  British  army,  whose  loss  a 
Deserter  from  their  army  says  is  upward  of  one  thousand  men  killed  and  wounded ;  which 
('  while  '  ?)  ours  is  very  trifling,  not  one  fourth  part  of  the  Enemies — a  convincing  Proof  of  the 
Mercifull  Interposition  of  Heaven  in  covering  our  Heads  in  the  day  of  Battle  and  loudly  calls  for 
our  gracious  acknowledgements.  The  Gen'l  observed  yesterday  that  two  many  officers  that 
('  with  ')  Zeal  and  Spirit  push'd  on  in  the  front  of  their  Companies,  whose  business  it  was  to  have 
brought  those  in  the  rear,  and  hopes  they  will  in  the  future  observe  their  proper  stations  and  suf 
fer  no  man  to  Retreat  until  an  order  is  given  by  the  Commanding  officer  of  the  Reg'ts  or 
Detachments — those  who  are  found  to  have  deserted  their  Posts  in  time  of  Action  may  expect 
instant  death. 

"The  Gen'l  makes  no  doubt  the  Troops  will  act  with  a  spirit  and  firmness  becoming  freemen 
struggling  for  their  just  Rights  and  Liberties  when  they  are  called  out  again  which  they  may 
expect  every  moment  and  wishes  them  to  make  every  necessary  Preparation." 

NOTE.  The  Sullivan  Papers  in  the  possession  of  his  grand-nephew,  Thomas  C.  Amory,  Esq., 
of  Boston,  are  replete  with  autographic  letters  of  Washington  which  show  that  the  confidence  of 
that  officer  in  the  bravery  of  General  Sullivan,  and  his  thorough  loyalty  to  himself,  should 
not  be  questioned,  and  that  his  occasional  criticisms  of  Gen.  Sullivan's  operations  were  marked 
by  a  sincere  desire  for  his  personal  and  professional  success.  ^ 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


IN  furnishing  a  Reference  Index,  the  birth,  b,  and  death,  d,  of  some  of  the  characters 
referred  to  in  the  Narrative,  have  been  indicated,  as  suggestive  of  their  age  at  the  date 
of  particular  service,  or  opinion. 

The  subsequent  verdict  of  contemporaries  has  also  been  indicated  in  some  instances  ;  as 
Cornwallis,  sub  Govr.  Genl.  of  India  ;  Monroe,  sub,  Pres.  U.  S.  A. 

Am.  (American),  Br.  (British),  Fr.  (French),  H.  (Hessian),  distinguish  officers  of  similar 
name  and  rank. 

The  omission  of  names,  sometimes  associated  with  service  in  leading  battles,  is  in  accord 
ance  with  official  reports  or  real  fact.  Thus  Lord  Percy  is  not  named  by  General  Clinton 
in  his  very  minute  report,  as  associated  with  the  attack  upon  Fort  Clinton  ;  and  Colonel 
Haslet  (Delaware)  was  member  of  a  Court  Martial  at  New  York,  while  his  regiment  was  in 
battle  on  Long  Island.  Brigades  were  often  commanded  by  Colonels,  so  that  personal 
brigades,  (as  Hitchcock's  Brigade)  do  not  indicate  the  rank.  On  the  other  hand,  personal 
regiments  participated  in  action  during  the  absence  of  their  colonel,  who  commanded  a 
brigade  or  division.  The  rule  in  the  British  army  is  given  on  page  171.  There  is  a  fre 
quent  use  of  titles, which  were  those  of  militia  rank.  The  historical  identity  of  the  men  is 
thus  preserved,  although  they  were  not  in  the  Continental  service  proper. 

Christian  names  are  given,  when  required  to  distinguish  two  of  similar  name. 

Many  names  are  given,  in  order  to  maintain  due  harmony  with  general  history,  and 
because  they  interlink  family  associations  which  are  cherished  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean. 
The  skeleton  of  battle  operations  would  be  barren  without  these  associations,  even  although 
the  battles  themselves  were  shaped  by  others,  of  more  prominent  responsibility. 

Abbreviations,  k.  (killed),  w.  (wounded),  pris.  (taken  prisoner),  com.  commissioner. 


A. 


ABENAKE,  Indians   addressed   by   Bur- 

goyne    306 

Abercrombie,  Col.  44th  Foot,  k.  at  Bun 
ker  Hill no 

Abercrombie,  Lieut.  Col.  {Br).  in  skirm 
ish  at  Crooked  Billet  Tavern. .  . .   405 
leads  a  sortie  from  Yorktown 640 

Able  bodied  men,  compelled  to  serve  . .   265 

Abolition  of  American  slavery,  a  mili 
tary  act 41 

Acknowledgments 2  and  659 

Aets  of  Parliament  to  be  resisted 117 

Ac(k)land,  John  Duck   Maj.  at   Bemis 

Heights 346 

mortally  wounded 347 

,  Ac(k)land,  Lady,  with  the  army 350 

Actseon, frigate,  38,  burned  off  Fort  Moul- 

trie 189 

Adair,  John,  sub.  Maj.  Genl.  b.    1757,  d. 
1840. 


Adair,  John  at  Williamson's  plantation.    507 

Adams,   John,    (statesman),    sub.   Pres. 
d.  1735,  d.  1782. 

on  naval  committee 144 

commissioner  to  meet  Lord  Howe, 

1776 223 

criticises  Washington  severely 383 

exerts  valuable  influence  abroad  . . .   540 

Adams,  Samuel,  (orator),  b.  1722,  d.  1803. 
advised  of  Lord  Percy's  movement 

against  Concord u 

jealous  of  an  army 526 

Adams,  Lieut.   Col.  (Am.)  k.  at   Free 
man's  Farm 342 

Adolphus,  gives  opinion  of  Trenton. . . .   265 

Agnew,  James,  Maj.  Genl.  (Br). 

with  Genl.  Howe  at  Brandywine. .   367 
k.  in  battle  of  Germantown 390 

Alarm  posts,  from  the  Hudson  to  L.  I. 

Sound 233 

Alarm  stations,  in  New  Jersey 499 


666 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Albany,  the  first  objective  of  Burgoyne  305-10 
Allen,  Ethan,  Col.  b.  1737,  ^.1789. 

organizes  expedition  against  Canada  119 

captures  Ticonderoga 119 

asks  for  troops  to  conquer  Canada.  120 
joins  expedition  against  Montreal. .  121 

attempts  to  surprise  Montreal 128 

taken /m.,  and  sent  to  England. . .    128 

comments  of  Washington 128 

explanation  of  failure 128 

Alliance,    frigate,  takes  La   Fayette   to 

France    465 

Alliances,  rarely  of  lasting  coherence. . .     79 

Allied  army,before  Yorktown 634 

Amiel,    Ensign,    brings    dispatches     to 

Cornwallis    605 

America  fails  in  duty  to  France 539 

American  affairs,  in  July,  1776 191 

December,  1778 461 

July,  1781 617 

American  army,  under  instruction 48 

contains  many  educated  men 62 

deficient  in  Logistics 71-72 

Light  Infantry  organized 87 

loose  organization  of 90 

condition  before  St.  John's 128-9 

takes  license  to  mean  liberty 132 

condition  at  Montreal 133 

immorality  rebuked 139 

re-organized,  1775 144 

condition  before  Boston 146-7 

its   strength   at   New   York,   April, 

1776 157 

driven  from  Canada 161-3 

condition  while  in  Canada 168 

at  Charleston,  1776 184 

its  strength,  August,  1776 197 

on  Long  Island 204 

its  strength,  September,  1776 220 

its  strength  examined 224 

at  Harlem  Heights 231 

its  strength,  October,  1776 232 

abandons  Harlem  Heights 236 

in  New  Jersey,  October,  1776 242 

southern  troops  in  New  Jersey 247 

Northern,  in  November,  1776 255 

Lee's  grand  division 256 

Heath's  division 256 

Washington's  division  at  Newark.  .  256 

at  Trenton  December,  1776 256 

total  strength,  December,  22d,  1776.  267 

controls  the  Delaware 268 

on  a  skeleton  basis 269 

to  be  made  eighty  battalions 279 

junior  appointments,by  Washington.  280 
on  the  Assanpink,  January  1st, 

1777 284 

condition  at  Pluckemin 291 

by  divisions  and  brigades 297 

strength, at  Brandywine 366 

total  strength,  December,  1777  .  .  398-9 

celebrates  the  French  alliance 404 

at  Valley  Forge 404 

strength  early  in  1778 409 

in  pursuit  of  Clinton 414 

equal  to  Clinton's  in  numbers 416 

at  Newport,  10,000,  with  militia. . .  448 


American  army,  in  winter  quarters,  1778- 

1779 457 

at  Middlebrook 458 

placed  at  eighty  regular  battalions.   463 
marches    from    Monmouth   to    the 

Hudson    446 

at  Morristown,  winter  of  1779-1780.  483 

on  point  of  extinction 484 

suffers  from  cold  and  hunger 486 

suffers  at  the  south  for  clothing. ...   5,10 

suffers  daily  want  at  the  south 524 

re-organized  in  1780 526 

located  for  winter  quarters 527 

in  a  state  of  mutiny .  .    536 

reduced  to  5,000  effectives 539 

condition  in  1781 587 

crosses  the  Hudson,  1781 622 

marches  to  Springfield 622 

passes  through  Philadelphia 623 

position  before  Yorktown 634-5 

by  states, during  the  war 653 

basis,not  stable 653 

American  artillery,  in  October,  1776 232 

American    batteries  open   before  York- 
town 637 

American    Centennial  Year,  celebrated 

July  4th,  1876 658 

American  frigates,  ordered  to  be  built.  .    144 

their  fate  during  the  war 145 

American  Generals  in  Congress 655 

American  Light  Infantry  attack  redoubt 

at  Yorktown 638 

American  militia  system   involves  inev- 

able  faults ." 15 

American  mistakes  illustrated 647—8 

American  Navy  recommended  by  Wash 
ington  143 

impaired  by  privateer  service 278 

insignificant  in  1781 618 

American    pickets    along   the    Brandy- 
wine 368 

American  regulars,  equal  to  their  adver 
saries  652 

American   Revolution,    general  features 

reviewed 646-7 

American  ships  destroyed  at  Charleston.  495 
American  War,  its  result,   the  best  for 

both  nations 6 

applied  true  military  science 17 

British  theory 1 12 

Amherst,  Jeffrey,  Lord,  sub.  Field  Mar 
shal,  b.  1717,  d.  1797;  states  40,000 

troops  to  be  needed 412 

Andre,  John    Maj.  Asst.  Adjt.    Genl.  b. 
1751,^.1780. 

his  memory  honored 78 

taken  prisoner  at  St.  John's 129 

describes  Howe's  fete   at   Philadel 
phia  408 

reports     the     prisoners     taken     at 

Charleston 497 

agent  of  Clinton  and  Arnold 505 

captured  and  hung  as  a  spy 506 

universal  grief  over  his  fate 506 

Angell,  Colonel  (Rhode  Island)  ; 

part  of  his  command  at  Fort  Mercer.  394 
at  battle  of  Springfield 500 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


66; 


PAGE 

Annapolis  the  rendezvous  for  La  Fay- 

ette's  army 592 

Anonymous  (London)  opinion  of  battle 

'  of  Trenton 282 

Anstnuher,    John,    Col.     at     Freeman's 

Farrm 341 

Antietam,  Battle  of,   illustrates  a  good 

retreat 73 

Arbuthnot,  Mariot,  Admiral,  b.   1711,  d. 
1794. 

arrives  at  New  York 476 

reaches    Charleston   with  a  British 

fleet 494 

lands  marines  at  Mount  Pleasant. .    496 
at  Gardiner's  Bay,  follows    French 

fleet 585 

engages  M.  Destouches 585 

Archduke  Charles,  comments  on  a  fine 

retreat 73 

Armaments  necessarily  waste  States. ...     20 
Armand  (Charles)  Taffin  Ronarie,  Mar 
quis,  Col.  b.  1756,0?.  1793. 
with  La  Fayette  in  New  Jersey. . . .   396 

at  Battle  of  Camden 514 

his  regiment  recruited  at  large  ....   526 

with  cavalry  at  Jamestown 608 

remembered 655 

Armies,  when  large,  bleed  nations  slowly 

to  death 20 

Armies  of  Europe  merge  the  citizen  in 

the  martinet 15 

Armies  of  the  Revolution,  as  given  by 

Stedman 300 

Arms  purchased  in  France,  1777 279 

Arms  received  from  France 275 

Armstrong,  Maj.  (Am.),  at  Camden.  ...    514 
Armstrong,  Maj.  (-#/*.),  makes  sortie  from 

Yorktown     640 

Armstrong,  John,  Brig.  Genl.  b.  1758,  d. 
1843. 

at  Charleston 181 

at  Haddrell's  Point 184 

at  Brandy  wine 368 

on  the  Schuylkill 382 

at  Germantown 387 

Arnold,  Benedict,  Maj.  Genl.  b.  1740,  d. 

1801. 

arrives   at  Cambridge  with  a  com 
pany    119 

commissioned   Colonel    by    Massa 
chusetts  119 

starts  for  Ticonderoga 119 

joins  Allen,  without  troops 119 

claims  command  by  seniority 119 

over-ruled  by  Massachusetts 120 

takes  and  abandons  St.  John's  ....    120 
gathers    a    small     navy    on    Lake 

Champlain 120 

applies  for  men  to  conquer  Canada.    120 

disbands  his  forces  in  anger 120 

his  business  antecedents  at  Quebec.    120 
represents    Carleton's  force  as  less 

than  600  men    120 

commands  expedition  to  Quebec. .  .    122 
marvelous  endurance  in  the  Wilder 
ness  123 

arrives  at  Point  Levi 124 

demands  surrender  of  Quebec  ....    131 


Arnold  asks  aid  from  Montgomery 132 

his  army  become  mutinous 132 

his  captains  refuse  to  serve  longer. .  134 
army    restored    to    duty   by    Mont 
gomery  134 

daring  assault  on  Quebec,  repulsed  136 

is  wounded  by  musket  ball 136 

issues  an  unwise  proclamation 161 

goes  to  Montreal  on  leave 162 

signs  the  cartel  of  Sorel 166 

fights  a  naval  battle  on  Lake  Cham- 
plain 255 

instructed  to  attack  Newport,  R.  I.  294 

omitted  in  promotions,  1777 296 

resigns  in  disgust 296 

fights  well  at  Ridgt-field,  Ct 297 

prompt  promotion  follows 297 

commands  at  Philadelphia 298 

ordered  to  watch  Trenton 299 

sent  north  to  act  with  Schuyler.  . . .  320 

starts  to  relieve  Fort  Schuyler 324 

his  division  at  Freeman's  Farm. . . .  341 

his  relations  to  that  battle 341-3 

various  opinions  cited 342-3 

his  grievances 342-3 

complimented  by  Washington, Note.  344 
promoted  after  the  surrender  of  Bur- 

goyne    344 

his    passionate    daring    at     Bemis 

Heights 347-8 

excited  interview  with  Gates 349 

vindicated  from  Wilkinson's  state- 

349 

Clinton  re 
tires  .    413 

reprimanded  mildly  by  Court  Mar 
tial  490 

excuses   himself  from   active    com 
mand  504 

assigned  to  West  Point  and  depend 
encies 505 

treasonable      correspondence     with 

Clinton 505 

demands  reasonable  pledges  of  re 
ward 505 

fixes  the  price  of  his  treason 506 

escapes  arrest  for  treason .    506 

lands  in  Virginia 548 

not  trusted  by  Clinton 548 

at  Richmond 549 

hurries  to  his  entrenchments 549 

his  force  in  May  1781 589 

at  Petersburg 590 

destroys  property  at  Osborne 590 

attempts    correspondence   with    La 

Fayette 596 

returns  to  New  York 597 

his  relations  to  British  officers.    ...   625 
commands  expedition  to  New  Lon 
don 625 

reports  operations  at  New  London .    627 

expected  no  opposition 627 

reports  casualties  at  Fort  Griswold.  629 
closes  his  military  career  in  America.  630 
receives  justice  for  his  valor  and  his 

treason    630 

his  birth-place  near  New  London. .  627 
Articles  of  confederation  adopted 539 


ments    

enters  Philadelphia  as 


668 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  JENERAL  INDEX. 


Artillery,  British,  at  Bemis  Heights. . .  347 
determined  the  battle  of  Guilford. .  561 

Artillery,    American,    during    October, 

1776 232 

Art  of  war,  Apology  for 18-23 

sub-divisions  stated 48 

Ashe,  John,  Brig.  Genl.,  b.  1721,  d.  1781. 

routed  at  Brier  Creek 464 

at  Eutaw  Springs 580 

Assanpink  or  Trenton  River 284 

Atlee,  Samuel  J.  b.  1738,  d.  1786. 

joins  the  army 197 

in  skiimish  at  Red  Lion 208 

is  taken  prisoner 209 

casualties  of  his  battalion 211 

assigned  to  Miffiin's  brigade 224 

Augusta,  64,  ship-of-war,  blows  up  near 

Fort  Mercer 395 

Augusta,  Ga.  occupied  by  the  British  .  .  5*9 
resists  assault  of  American  troops.  .  520 
surrendered  by  the  British 574 

Authority  :  there  is  a  divine  right  of  au 
thority  33 

Authority  is  intrinsically  arbitrary 33 

Aux  Trembles,  reached  by  General  Ar 
nold  132 

Aux    Trembles,     reached    by    General 

Carleton 132 


B. 


BACHE,  MRS.,   daughter  of  Franklin,  as 

to  Washington 540 

Bailey,  Lieut.,   (Br).  k.  at  siege  of  Sa 
vannah 482 

Bailey,    Col.     in    northern    army    with 

Gates 337 

Baird,    Sir  James,    at    battle   of    Brier 

Creek    464 

Baker,  Col.  at  siege  of  Augusta,  1781. .    574 

Ball,  Lieut.,  iv.  at  Hobkirk's  Hill 573 

Balcarras,    Earl,  iv.   at    battle  of  Hub- 

bardton 317 

in  battle  at  Freeman's  Farm 340 

Bemis  Heights 346 

before  the  House  of  Commons. . . .  340 
Balance  of  power,  involves  absurdities.  28 
Balfour,  Lieut,  Col.  succeeds  Patterson 

at  Charleston 518 

pursues  bad  military  policy 522 

executes  Colonel  Haynes 575 

Baltimore  the  seat  of  Congress 266 

generous    to    La    Fayette's     com 
mand  592 

renders  honors  to  Rochambeau. . .  .   630 
gives    formal    reception    to   Wash 
ington  630 

Bancroft,  George,  (Diplomate  and   His 
torian)  b.  1800. 

defines  the  war  of  1775-1783 4 

renders  just  tribute  to  Putnam 97 

as  to  powder  before  Boston 99 

describes   the    repulse    at    Bunker 

Hill 108 

states  forces  at  Bunker  Hill 100 

as  to  the  invasion  of  Canada. ...      126 
as  to  the  Battle  of  Three  Rivers. . .    167 


Bancroft  as  to  American  northern  army.  168 
as  to  Arnold  at  Freeman's  Farm. .  .  342 
as  to  Washington's  nationalism. . . .  461 
pays  tribute  to  the  service  of  women.  488 

Barbarism,  unrestrained  in  war 24 

fraught  with  danger  in  all  ages.  . .        22 
Barber,  Francis,  Col.  b.  1751,  d.   1783. 

iv.  in  the  assault  upon  Yorktown . .  .   639 
bears  a  message  to  Baron  Viomenil.  639 
Barber  (Historical  Compiler)  as  to  Fort 

Griswold 628 

Barnes,  A.    S.  (Publisher)    N.    Y.,   con 
tributes  materials 154 

Barras,  Paul   Francois,  Jean    de    Count, 

Admiral,  b.  1755,  d.  1829. 
arrives    with    French    squadron    in 

America 

corresponds  with  Washington 614 

waives    rank    and    cooperates    with 

other  forces 614 

attempts    Fort   William,    Long    Is 
land  626 

renders  efficient  aid   in  the  Chesa 
peake 


signs   Articles    of    capitulation    at 


635 
641 


Yorktown 
Barren  Hill,  skillfully  occupied  by   La 

Fayette 406 

Barren  issues,  frequent  in  wars 43 

Barry,  John,  (Am.}  naval  captain,  serves 

with  credit 654 

Barton,  Lieut.  Col.  (Am.},  captures  Genl. 

Prescott,  (Br.} 409 

Base  of  Operations  illustrated 50-1 

Baskingridge,  the  place  of  Genl.  Lee's 

capture 258 

Battle  of  Wagram    illustrates  defective 

logistics 71 

Battles  to  be  tested  by  fixed  laws 13 

Battle  of  Lexington,  (skirmish)  April  19, 

J775.  its  lessons S-n 

Bunker  Hill,  June  ryth,  1775.  . .    104-10 

the  Cedars,  May  i6th,  1775 !O3-4 

Long  Island,  Aug.  27th,  '76 207-11 

Harlem  Heights,  (skirmish)  Sept.  16, 

1776    207-11 

Chatterton    Hill,    (White    Plains), 

Oct.  2gth,  1776 241 

Trenton,  Dec.  26th,  1776 27£-6 

Princeton,  Jany.  3d,  1777 288-c, 

Hubbardton,  July  7th,  1777 316 

Oriskany,  July  6th,  1777 324 

Bennington,  Aug.   i6th,  1777 332 

Freeman's  Farm,  Sept.  igth,  1777..   339 

Bemis  Heights,  Oct.  7th,  1777 345 

Brandywine,  Sept.  nth,  1777 369 

Paoli,  (skirmish),  Sept.  2Oth,  1777.  .   383 

Germantown,  Oct.  4th,  1777 384 

Monmouth,  June  28th,  1778 416 

Wyoming,  July  4th,  1778 459 

Quaker  Hill,  Aug.  29th,  1778 454 

Brier  Creek  March  3d,  1779 464 

Chemung,  Aug.  2gth,  1779 476 

Springfield,  June  28th,  1780 500 

Camden,    (Sanders'     Creek),     Aug. 

i6th,  1780 513 

King's  Mountain,  Oct.  7th,  1780.  . .   520 
Fish  Dam  Ford,  Nov.  i8th,  1780  . .   521 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


669 


Blackstocks,  Nov.  2oth,  1780 522 

Cowpens,  Jany.  I7th,  1781 542 

Guilford,  March  I5th,  1781 556 

Hobkirk's  Hill,  April  25th,  1781  .  .    571 

Eutaw  Springs,  Sept.  8th,  1781. 578 

Jamestown,  July  gth,  1781 607 

B-aume  (Baum),  Lieut.  Col.  (H),  sent  to 

Bennington 327 

reports  the  progress  of  his  march. . .   329 

fortifies  his  position 331 

is  defeated  by  Genl.  Stark 332 

Baxter,  Col.,  (k.)  in  defense  of  Fort  Wash 
ington 251 

Baylor,  Col.,  (Am.)  cavalry  cut  up  near 

Tappan,  N.  Y  459 

Beacon  signals  through  New  Jersey. . .  .   499 

Bee,  Thomas,  on  com.  safety,  S.  C 179 

Beadle,  Col.,  (Br.)  attacks  post  at   the 

Cedars 165 

Beal,  Col.,    (Am.)    with  army   of  New 

York 224 

his  brigade  has  but  a  week  to  serve.  256 
Beasley,  Capt,,  (Br.)  reports  Arnold  at 

New  London 625 

Beatty,  Capt.,  (S.  C.)  with  Georgia  troops 

at  Cowpens 542 

Beatty,  Captain,   (Gunby's  regiment)  (k) 

at  Hobkirk's  Hill 572 

Beaufort,  scene  of  brisk  action 464 

Beckwith,  Capt.,  demands  surrender  of 

Fort  Griswold 628 

Bedell,  Col.,  (Am.)  at  the  Cedars    164 

Bedford,     Mass.,    destroyed    by      Genl. 

toey    455 

Bellue,  Capt.,  (Br.)  iv.  at  Monmouth.  .  .  .   444 

Bemis,  Heights  and  vicinity 336 

Battle 345 

Bennington,  Battle 332 

Benson,  Capt,    (Am)  before   Hobkirk's 

Hill     571 

Beraud,   Capt.  (Am.)  k.  at  siege  of  Sa 
vannah  482 

Bereton,    Capt.    (Br.)   w.    at    battle    of 

Monmouth 444 

BIBLE  gives  definition  of  good  and  bad 

watchmen 77 

Bibliographical  Table  honors  true  valor  .   21 

Biddle,  Nicholas  appointed  naval  captain.  144 
served  with  credit 654 

Bigelow,  Major  in  Arnold's  expedition 

to  Quebec 121 

Biggin's  Bridge,  outpost  of  Charleston 

captured 496 

Billingsport  on  the  Delaware,  captured.   393 

Billings,    Capt.    (Am)    killed  by   muti 
neers  537 

Bird,  Dr.  reports  casualties  at  Chatter- 
ton's  Hill 240 

Bird,  Lieut.  Col.,  (Br.)  k.  at    German- 
town    390 

"Birmingham   Meeting  House,  (Battle  of 

Brandywine) 380 

Blackstock's   Plantation,  scene   of  skir 
mish          522 

Bland,  Theoderic  Col.  (Am.)  b.  1742,  d. 

1790. 

reports      reconnoissance      of      the 
Brandywine 370-2 


PAGE 

skirmishes  with  Tarleton's  Legion.  496 

Blount,  Major  (Am.)  at  Eutaw  Springs.  580 

Board  of  war  appointed 580 

Bond,  Col,    his  brigade   will  serve    two 

weeks  longer 276 

Bonner,   Lieut.  Col.   (Am)  k.   at    Mon 
mouth   444 

Boone,  Daniel  Col.  b.  1735  (?)  d.   1820. 
captured,  escapes,  defends    Boones- 

borough , 460 

Bordentown    occupied  by  Col.   Donop 

(ff)   276 

by    Col.  Cadwallader 276 

visited  by  British  troops 404 

Borderie,  de  la,  Lieut.  (Pulaski's  corps) 

k.  at  Little  Neck 459 

Bose,    Baron    de,    Lieut.  Col.   (Pulaski's 

corps),  k.  at  Little  Neck 459 

Bose,  Regiment  (H.)  at  Battle  of  Guil 
ford  558 

at  Battle  of  Eutaw  Springs 582 

Boston,  fortified  in  1774 9 

under  practical  siege,  1775 90 

strength  of  garrison  January  1776.  .  10 

and  vicinity,  see  map 154 

Us  garrison  re-inforced 146 

depends  upon  Dorchester  Heights.  112 

siege  prosecuted  in  1776 '. . . .  146 

its  garrison  under  strict  discipline.  .  146 

is  threatened  by  American  army. . .  150 
is  bombarded  for  three  nights  . . .  151-2 
is  lost  by  occupation  of  Dorchester 

Heights 152 

is   evacuated   153 

not  a  fit  base  for  general  operations.  155 

insurrection  1770,  condemned 31 

Bowling  Green,  Ky.  an  objective  from 

Louisville,  1861-5 51 

Botta,  Carlo    Guiseppe  Guliemo  (Ital.) 
historian,   b.  1768,  d.  1837. 

as  to  battle  of  Bunker  Hill loS 

Trenton   282 

reviews      New     Jersey     campaign 

1776-7 292 

Boville,    De,    Maj.    Genl.    (Fr)    recon 
noitres  with  Washington 620 

Bowdoin,  James,  Pres.  Mass,  council  ad 
dressed  by  Lee 261 

Bowers,    Brigadier    Maj.   (Br.)    brings 

dispatches  to  Cornwallis 610 

Boyd's  Provincials   surprised    at   Kettle 

Creek    464 

Boquet  River,  the  site  of  Burgoyne's  first 

camp 306 

Braddock's  operations,  of  the  old  type.  .  6l 
Bradley's  brigade  to  go  out  of  service 

(60  men) 256 

Brant,  Joseph,   (Mohawk    Indian)  with 

St.  Leger  323 

lays  waste  Cherry  Valley 459 

Minnisink 474 

renews  hostilities 524 

Brandywine  River  described 367 

Battle  of 369 

conflict  as  to  position  doubted 380 

not  a  serious  defeat 381 

Bratton,  Col.  in  skirmish  at  Williamson 

Plantation 507 


6/o 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Breed's  Hill,  (Breed's  pasture) 97 

Brewer,  Col.  part  of  regiment  at  Bunker 

Hill     ioo 

Breyman,  Lieut.  Col.   (H.)  sent   to  sup 
port  Baume 329 

is  delayed  by  a  severe  storm 330 

skirmishes  near  Van  Schaick's  Mill.   330 
gives  a  sad  report  of  Baum's  dis 
aster   331 

at  Battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 340 

k.  in  Battle  of  Bemis  Heights  .....   349 

Brickell's  brigade  joins  Gates 337 

Bridge,  Ebenezer,    Col.    furnishes    men 

for  Bunker  Hill 95 

Brier  Creek,  the  scene  of  defeat  of  Genl. 

Ashe 464 

Brinsmade,  James   B.    Esq.    New    York 

city 2 

Bristol,  50,  flag-ship  of  Admiral  Parker 

at  Charleston , 186 

British  Army,  at  Boston,  re-inforcecl.  .  .  .    146 
excelled  in  Logistics  and  Discipline.     71 

is  shut  up  in  Boston,  1775 116 

evacuates  Boston 153 

approaches  New  York,  1776 159 

in  Canada,  re-inforced 164 

as    assigned    to   America  (Colonels 

named) 170-1 

in  its  regimental  basis 171 

as  estimated  for  in  1776 173 

organization  and  strength    at    New 

York 199 

advances  on  Long  Island 202 

sends  force  to  Montressor  Island  .  .   225 
occupies  Murray  Hill,  New  York  .  .   227 

in  possession  of  New  York 227 

lands  at  Frog's  Neck 234 

Pell's  Point 235 

advances  toward  White  Plains  ....   236 
takes     a     position     before     White 

Plains   239 

attacks  Chatterton  Hill 240 

crosses  to  the  Hudson 242 

captures  Fort  Washington 251 

movements    uncertain  ;  by  land  or 

sea 247 

at  Brunswick,  N.  J 257 

counter-march  on  the  Delaware.  . . .   263 

inactive  in  Rhode  Island 279 

restricted  in  its  operations 293 

compared  with  American  army  by 

Stedman 301 

Official    Return    of  June  3d,    1777, 

(Note) 321 

at  Saratoga 352 

sails  for   Philadelphia 362 

on  the  Brandy  wine 367 

at  the  Battle  of  Germantown 385 

evacuates  Philadelphia 413 

Official  Return  of  March  26th,  1778  411 
at  Newport  1778,  and  garrison  spe 
cified  ....   448 

reduced  by  5000  men  sent  to  West 

Indies 458 

Official     Return    of    August    15th, 

1778 462 

February  5th,  1779 467 

re-inforced  at  New  York 476 


British  Army,  Official  Return  of  Decem 
ber  ist,  1779 483 

as  distributed  in  1780 485 

in  Southern  States,  1780 485 

undergoes  hardship  at  New  York. .   485 
Official  Return  of  May  ist,  1780. . .    502 

August   ist,   1780 512 

December  ist,  1780 512 

draws  supplies  from  N.  J.  and  Conn.,  524 

formation  at  battle  of  Guilford 558 

Official  Return  of  May  1st,  1781 . . .    575 

situation  during  April,  1781 588 

officers  not  responsible  for  fate   of 

Col.  Ledyard 629 

in  position  at  Yorktown 633 

surrenders  at  Yorktown 642 

Official   Return    of  September    1st, 

1781 646 

under  Cornwallis 646 

evacuates  New  York 656 

British  Cabinet  advise  Indian  auxil 
iaries  304 

proposes  operations  at  the  south.  . .   412 

initiates  a  southern  campaign 446 

adopts  a  new  policy  in   1781 535 

fails  to  realize  the  danger 598 

British,  commissioner  in  1776 194 

conciliatory  bills   sent    in  place    of 

troops 403 

dragoons    and    Indians    rout    each 

other 407 

frigates  occupy  East   River  and  the 

Hudson 225 

frigates  destroyed  at  Newport 448 

increase  their  military  stores 279 

Logistics  excellent 73 

operations  in  western  territoiies.  . .   460 
policy  affected  by  Arnold's  intrigue.  505 

policy  illustrated 647-8 

ships  at  Boston  1775,  stated 96 

ships  at  Charleston  1776,  stated  . .      187 
future,  one  in  interest  with  that  of 
America 657 

Bromfield,  Maj.,   (Br)  succeeds  Eyer  at 

Fort  Griswold 629 

Bronx  River  as  a  line  of  defense 236 

Brooklyn  defenses  ordered  by  Genl.  Lee.   197 
defenses  built  by  Genl.  Greene.  . . .    196 
defenses  abandoned  by  Genl.  Wash 
ington  219 

Brooks,  John,  Col.,  (Am.)  at  Bunker  Hill.     96 
at  Bemis  Heights 352 

Brown,    John,     Maj.,    (stib.)    colonel    at 

Montreal 127 

at  siege  of  Quebec 134 

Brown,  Thomas,   Lieut.   Col.,  with  Pro 
vincials  at  Newport 448 

in  command  at  Augusta,  Ga 519 

wounded  in  repelling,  assault 520 

Bruff,  Capt,  (Am.)  wounded  at  Hobkirk's 

Hill 573 

Brunswick   furnishes    troops   for    Great 

Britain    173 

Brunswick,  N.  J.,  British  depot  of  sup 
plies , 291 

Bryan's  Refugees  with  Cornwallis 519 

at  Hanging  Rock 5°8 

Bryant,  Lieut.,   (Am.)    at  Frogg's  Neck.  234 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


67I 


PAGE 

Bmyn,  Lieut.   Col.,  (Am.}  at  Fort  Clin 
ton 359 

Buckminster,    William,    Lieut.    Col.    at 

Bunker  Hill 100 

Buffington's  Ford,  (see  note) 368 

Buford,  Abraham,  Col.  regt.  cut  up  by 

Tarleton 497 

Bull  Run,  battle,  1861,  illustrates  text  . .     62 

Bunker  Hill,  described 93~4 

conditions  cf  its  occupation 95 

orders  involved 96 

ships  engaged 96 

situation  of  the  armies 97~8 

reinforcements  required 99 

the  American  forces  engaged IOO 

landing  of  the  British  troops 103 

the  moral  issue  involved 103 

British  plan  of  action 104 

advances  repulsed IO5~7 

Clinton  and  Burgoyne  spectators  . .  108 
opinions  of  authors  and  observers. .  108 

incidents  of  final  assault 109—11 

notes  upon  the  battle 112-116 

resistance  useless    after  loss  of  re 
doubt 115 

Clinton's  counsel  neglected 113 

bad  policy  of  the  attack 116 

the   best   possible   result    for   both 

armies 116 

value  of  discipline  inculcated 116 

casualties  of    regiments    given    by 
Washington  (Note) in 

Bunyan,  John,  (Poet)  b  1628  d  1688. 

borrows   metaphor  from  profession 
of  arms 2'2 

Burgoyne,  Sir    John,    Lieut.    Genl.,    b. 
1730,  d.  1792. 
arrives  at  Boston  with   Howe  and 

Clinton 10 

is  witness  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker 

Hill 108 

gives  his  opinion  of  the  battle 108 

advises      to       occupy      Dorchester 

Heights 112 

a  reminiscence   of  his   experience, 

(note) 154 

assigned  to  expedition  from  Canada.  303 

constitution  of  his  army 304 

sails  from  London  for  Quebec 305 

at  Three  Rivers,  Canada 166 

occupies  St.   John's 168 

his  plans  known  in  America 299 

deficient  in  light  troops  and  trans 
portation  305 

appeals  to  Indian  tribes 306 

issues  an  impolitic  proclamation. .  .   306 

is  answered  by  Washington 306 

explains  expedition  to  Bennington.  328 
still  deficient  in  transportation  ....  328 
sends  back  all  surplus  baggage. . . .  328 

undergoes  great  trials 329 

arrives  at  Crown  Point 307 

his  views  of  a  proper  campaign. . . .  307 
arrives  before  Ticonderoga,  July 

ist,  1777 308 

his  artillery  wrongly  criticised,  64  and  308 

seizes  Mount  Hope. .    .          308 

occupies  Mount    Defiance 3 


Burgoyne,  controls  Ticonderoga 313 

forces  the  bridge 314 

pursues  the  American  army 314 

makes  Hd.  Qrs.  at  Skenesborough.    316 
issues  a  proclamation  July  loth.  . .   318 

is  answered  by  Schuyler 318 

forced  to  build  forty  bridges 318 

arrives  at  Fort  Edward 319 

his  auxiliaries  untamable 320 

not  responsible  for  personal  outrages.  325 
"  hiring  Indians  to  be  abhorred  by 

posterity," 326 

writes    to    Lord   Germaine    as    to 

Indians 326 

"  would  lose    every   tribe,  but   not 

connive  with  them," 327 

deceived  by  Philip  Skene 327 

puts  the  army  on  reduced  rations.  .  .327 
instructs  Li&ut.  Col.  Baume  fully. .   327 
inspects  and  increases  Baume's  com 
mand  329 

bridges  the  Hudson  with  rafts 329 

sends  Breyman  to  reinforce  Baume.  330 

reports  as  to  armed  royalists 333 

receives    harsh    letter    from    Genl. 

Gates 335 

makes  a  noble  response 335 

writes   Lord  Germaine  as    to   New 

England 337 

his  "  messengers  to  Howe  are  hung."  337 

secures  rations  for  thirty  days 337 

rebridges  the  Hudson 337 

approaches  the  American  camp. . .  .    338 
fights  a  battle  at  Freeman's  Farm. .   339 

his  order  of  battle  excellent 341 

puts  his  army  on  short  rations 345 

fights  a  battle  at  Bemis  Heights.  . .    345 

retires  to  Saratoga 350 

states  the  strength  of  his  army 351 

calls  council  of  war 351 

surrenders  his  army  to  Genl.  Gates,  352 
receives  message  from  Clinton.  .  .  .   352 

is  fully  vindicated 353 

his  character  to  be  honored 353 

appears  in  the  House  of  Commons  353 
opposes  prosecution  of  the  war. . . .   353 

his  position  fairly  defined 354 

his  standard  of  military  obedience. .   354 

his  instructions  interpreted 356 

his  defeat  known  in  Europe 399 

Burd,  Maj.    (Am.}    captured   on    Long 

Island 207 

Burke,  Edmund   (statesman)  b.  1730,  d. 
1797. 

describes  attack   on  Fort  Moultrie.    187 
his  opinion  of  the  battle 281 

Burk,  Gov.  N.  Carolina  taken  prisoner.  .    582 

Burnet,    Major,    Aid-de-camp   of  Genl. 

Steuben 520, 

Burr,  Aaron,  sub.  Col.  and  Vice  Pres.  b. 
1756  ;  d.  1836. 
a  volunteer  in  Expedition  to  Quebec.  I2t 

Bush,    Lieut.  (Am.)  k.   at    siege  of  Sa 
vannah    481 

Buskirk,  Lieut.  Col.  induced  the  slaughter 

at  Fort  Griswold 628 

Butler,  John,   Brig.  Genl.  at    Battle   of 

( iuilforcl    556 


672 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Butler,  John,  Col.  with  St.  Leger.  1777  .   323 
Butler,  Thomas,  Colonel,  at  Monmouth.  43,: 

at  Stony  Point     472 

engages   Cornwallis  near  Williams- 
burg  603 

Byron,  John,  Admiral,  b.  1723,  d.  1786. 

relieves  Lord  Howe 447 

his  fleet  scattered  by  a  storm 447 

goes  to  Boston  to  engage  D'Estaing  450 

his  fleet  again  disabled 450 

fought  the  Ocean  in  1778 456 

C. 

CADWALLADER,  John,   Brig.  Gen.,  b. 
1743,  d.  1786. 
guarding  the  Delaware  River  ...   265 
to  cooperate  against  Trenton. . .  .   267 

to  cross  below  Bordentown 271 

is  thwarted  by  ice 271 

crosses  the  Delaware  Dec.27, 1776  276 
joins  Washington  at  Trenton,  Jan. 

i,  1777 284 

is  promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

Cadwallader,  Lambert,  Col.,  at   Fort 

Washington 248 

Caldwell,   Chaplain,   has  his  church 

burned,  1780 485 

has    his  wife   shot   at   Connecticut 

Farms 499 

Call,  Major  (Am.},  at  battle   of  James 
town  6oS 

Cambridge,  Mass.,  effect  of  reported  re 
moval  of  powder 89 

Cambridge  common  the  rendezvous  for 

Bunker  Hill  detail 95 

Camden,  Battle  of,  at  Sanders  Creek  .517-18 

commanded  by  Lt.  Col.  Turnbull.  .    519 

Campaign  of  1775  considered 139 

1776  regains  New  Jersey  for  Ameri 
cans  293 

1777  opened 294 

1778  involved  several  plans 404 

1779  involved  several  plans 463 

1780,  condition  of  affairs 484 

1781  opened 534 

1781  illustrated  wise  strategy 617 

1781  briefly  reviewed 617 

Campbell,  Gov.,  of  South  Carolina 178 

Campbell,  Lieut.  Col.   7ist    Foot   (Br.\ 

taken  prisoner 192 

captures  Savannah 459 

Campbell,  William,  Col.  (Am.}  b.  1745, 
d.  1781. 

at  King's  Mountain ....   520 

at  Guilford 556 

w.  at  Hobkirk's  Hill 573 

uses  bayonet  at  Eutaw  Springs. . .  .   580 

Campbell,  Capt.  (Br.)  reaches  Burgoyne 

from  Clinton 352 

Campbell,  Maj.  (Br.}  taken  prisoner  be 
fore  Yorktown 639 

Campbell,  Capt.  (Br.}  7ist   Foot,  w.  at 

Charlotte,  N.  C 519 

Campbell,  Adj.  (Br.}   "Guards,"  w.  at 

New  Haven,  Conn 470 

Canada  as  a  British  base 51 

as  a  base  of  operations  in  1775  ....    117 
not  in  sympathy  with  New  England  117 


Canada,  invaded  by  American  troops. . .   118 
only    made    graves    for    American 

armies 168 

as  judged  by  Washington 125—0 

involved   two   mutually   dependent 

approaches 126 

invasion  of,  a  failure 169 

expedition  from,  too  late  in  1777  .  .   279 
expedition  to,  in  1778  abandoned.  .   461 
invasion  under  La  Fayette  proposed  402 
Canadian  Acts  of  Parliament  obnoxious  117 
Carleton,  Sir  Guy,  Gov. ,-of  Canada,  sub. 
Gov.  N.  Y.,  b.  1724,  d.  1808. 

adopted  wise  policy 118 

escapes  from  Montreal  to  Quebec. .    129 

unable  to  raise  local  troops 129 

conspicuous  for  gallantry  at  Quebec  137 
noble  in  conduct  toward  prisoners  .  137 
"  Americans,  if  not  brothers,  first 

cousins."     137 

retires  from  Crown  Point 243 

opposes  Indian  auxiliaries,  1777. ..   270 

actively  aids  Burgoyne 305 

succeeds  Clinton  in  New  York.  . .  .   646 
with  Admiral  Digby  as  peace  com 
missioner 646 

surrenders  New  York  to  Gen.  Knox  656 
Carleton,    Major    (Br.),    captures    Forts 

George  and  Ann 52; 

Carr,  Lieut.  Col.  (Br.}  35th   Foot,  k.  at 

Chatterton  Hill 241 

Carrington,    Edward,    Col.,    Quar.  Mas. 
Gen.  (south),  b.  1749,  d.  1810. 

endorsed  by  Justice  Johnson 530 

endorsed  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall  530 

explores  the  rivers  of  Virginia 530 

collects  stores  on  the  Roanoke  ....  530 
reports  boats  secreted  along  the  Dan  552 

provides  boats  at  the  ferries 552 

commis'er  on  exchange  of  prisoners  555 
takes  artillery  to  Rugely's  Mills.  ...    570 
brings  artillery  to  Hobkirk  Hill. .  .    570 
Carpenter,  Capt.  (Am.}  with  artillery  at 

Long  Island 209 

Carroll,  Charles,  Md.  b.  1737,  d.  1832. 

commissioner  to  Canada 158 

advises  to  abandon  Canada 167 

Carroll,  Rev.  John,  sub.  archbishop  Bait. 

visits    Canada 158 

asualties,  at  Bunker  Hill m 

in  siege  of  Boston 1 54 

in  Canada  campaign 1 6 1 

at  Three  Rivers 167 

in  attack  upon  Fort  Moultrie 189 

at  battle  of  Long  Island 211-212 

at  Fort  Washington 251 

at  battle    of    Trenton 274 

at  Freeman's  Farm 341 

at  Bemis  Heights 35° 

of  Burgoyne's  campaign 353 

at   Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery  359 

at  battle  of  Germantown 39°- 3 

at  Fort  Mercer 364 

at  Fort  Mifflin 395 

at   Monmouth 444 

at  the  capture  of  Savannah 460 

at   Brier  Creek 465 

at  New  Haven,  Conn 47° 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


6/3 


Casualties,  at  Stony  Point 473 

at  Minnisink 474 

at  Paulus  Hook 475 

at  siege  of  Savannah 482 

at  siege  of  Charleston 497 

at  battle  of  Springfield 501 

at  Hanging  Rock 5°S 

at  battle  of  Camden 518 

at  battle  of  King's  Mountain 520 

at   Blackstock's  Plantation 521 

at  battle  of  Cowpens 545 

at  battle  of  Guilford 562-3 

at  battle  of  Hobkirk's  Hill 573 

at  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs 582 

at  Williamsburg 604 

at  siege  of  Yorktown 643 

Caswell,  Richard,  Brig.  Genl.,  b.  1729,  d. 
1789. 
defeats   Royalists  at  Moore's  Creek 

Bridge 174 

unites  with  Gates 510 

at  battle  of  Camden 517 

Cathcart,     Capt.     (Br.)      w.     at     Mon- 

mouth 444 

Catharine  II.,  of  Russia,  b.  1729,  d.  1796. 
adopts  armed  neutrality,  as  against 

England 527 

Caulkins,  Miss,  states  the  assault  of  Fort 

Griswold 628 

Cavalry  of  the  war  of  1775-1783 63-4 

Centennial  year  of  Am.    Independence 

honored 658 

Cessation  of  hostilities  formally  declared  658 

Chambly,  (Chamblee)  occupied  in  1775  218 

Charleston,  a  secondary  British  base...  51 

harbor  in  1776 176-7 

state  of  affairs  in  June,  1776 181 

siege  of,  in  1 780 494 

garrison  in  1781  increased 583 

Charlestown.  Heights  to  be  occupied ...  97 
burned    during    battle    of    Bunker 

Hill 107 

Neck    abandoned 144 

Charles,  Archduke  of  Prussia  upon  Re 
treats  73 

Charles   City   Court    House,    visited   by 

Simcoe 549 

Charlottesville,  Va.,  the  prison  depot  for 

Burgoyne's    army 599 

visited  by  Tarleton 599 

Chase,  Samuel,  Md.,  b.  1741,  d.  1811. 

commissioner  to  visit  Canada 159 

advises  to  abandon   Canada 167 

Chastellux,  Francois  Jean,  Marquis  de, 
Maj.  Genl.  b.  1734,  d.  1789. 

arrives   with   Rochambeau 503 

at  Ridgebury,  Conn 618 

commands  a  division 620 

visits  Mount  Vernon 630 

visits  America  after  the  war 338 

Chatfield  House,  near  Bemis  Heights. .  336 

Chatham,  Lord  (William  Pitt)  statesman, 
3.1756,  d.  1835. 

gives  his  opinion  of  the  war 82-3 

Chatham,    the    gateway    to    Morristown 

fastness 487 

Chetterton     Hill     attacked     by     British 

Droops 239 

43 


Cheeseman,  Lieut.  (Am.),  k.  at  Quebec.  135 
Cheevers,  Ezekiel,  commissary  instructed 

by  Washington 246 

Chemung,  near  Elmira,  N.  Y.,  a  battle 
field  475 

Cheraw    Hill     abandoned     by    British 

troops 510 

Chesapeake    Bay    memorable    in    naval 

history 616 

Cheever,  David,  Mass.,  com.  supplies  ...        9 

Cherry  Valley,  massacre 459 

Chew   House,  not   material   to    issue  at 

Germantown 390 

Chewton,  Lord,  at  Williamsburg 604 

Chester,  John,  Capt.  at  Bunker  Hill. ...    no 
Chester's  brigade  in  Spencer's  division.  221 
Chicago  Board  of  Trade  battery  noticed     76 
Chimney  corner  patriots  disgust  Wash 
ington  587 

Chivalry  based  upon  true  manhood  ...     22 
Christiana  Creek,  arrival  of  Washington's 

army 366 

Christianity,  the  true  life  of  all  national 

life 44 

Church,  Benjamin,  on  Mass.  com.  safety       9 
Cilley's  regiment  with  army  of  Gates  . . .   336 

Civil  war.     See  War 29 

Civil  war  illustrated,  at  White  Plains. . .   241 

by  Tryon's  expedition 471 

at  the  South 581 

Clark,  David,  Col.,  with  St.  Leger,  1777  323 
Clark,  Sir  Francis,  w.  mortally  at  Bemis 

Heights 346 

Clark,   George   Rogers,   Col.,  b.  1752,  d. 

1808 461 

captures  Vincennes  (Indiana)  1779.   465 
Clark,  Elijah,  Col.,  in  skirmish  at  Green 

Spring 507 

before  Augusta,  Ga 519 

repulsed  at  Augusta 520 

Clark's    North    Carolina     regiment     at 

Charleston,  1776 184 

Cleveland,  Benj.,  Col.,  at  King's  Moun 
tain  520 

Clinton,  James,   Brig.   Gen.,  b.  1736,  d. 
1812. 

in  Greene's  division 237 

in  command  of  Fort  Clinton 355 

iv.  in  the  assault  upon  Fort  Clinton  360 

joins  Sullivan  against  Indians 475 

Clinton,  George,  Gov.,  Brig.  Gen.,  sub. 
Vice-Pres.,  b.  1739,  d.  1812. 
in  Heath's  division  at  New  York. .   221 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

commands  in  the  Highlands 296 

on  Court  of  Inquiry  as  to  Schuyler.   312 

orders  militia  to  aid  Putnam 356 

modifies  Putnam's  furloughs 356 

adjourns  New  York  legislature  ....   358 

commands  Fort  Montgomery 358 

rejects  demand  for  its  surrender.  . .   359 
escapes  from  Fort  Montgomery. . . .   360 

cooperates  with  Washington 619 

distinguished  for  services 656 

Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  Lieut.  Gen.,  b.  1738, 
d.  1795. 

sent  to  America.     775 10 

gives  sound  advice  at  Boston 114 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


PAGE 

Clinton,  Sii    Henry,  as  a  volunteer   at 

Bunker  Hill 108 

advises  to  seize  Dorchester  Heights  112 
visits  Gov.  Tryon  at  New  York.  .  . .  148 
is  ordered  to  destroy  rebel  towns  . .  150 
visits  Lord  Dunmore  in  Chesapeake 

Bay 175 

joins  Earl  Cornwallis  at  Wilmington  175 

issues  a  proclamation 175 

arrives  at  Charleston,  S.  C 184 

fails     in    operations    against     Fort 

Moultrie 188 

returns  to  New  York 190 

arrives  at  Staten  Island 195 

makes  an  estimate  of  Gen.  Howe's 

forces 199 

in  the  battle  of  Long  Island 211 

routs  Parson's  brigade  at  New  York  225 
is  contrasted  with  Howe  as  to  action  239 
commands  expedition  to  Rhode 

Island 255 

his  differences  with  Howe  immaterial  298 

commands  at  New  York 298 

wiites  to  Burgoyne,  Sept.,  1777. .  . .   345 
makes  an  expedition  up  the  Hudson  355 
captures  Forts  Clinton   and   Mont 
gomery.  ... ;    359 

sends  expedition  to  burn  Kingston.   359 

returns  to  New  York 361 

relieves  Gen.  Howe  at  Philadelphia  406 
attempts  to  capture  La  Fayette  at 

Barren  Hill 406 

abandons  Philadelphia 412 

conducts  his  retreat  with  ability  .  .  .  413 
halts  at  Monmouth,  June  27,  1778  .  418 

is  pursued  by  Washington 421 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 433 

makes  report  of  the  battle 441-2 

retreats  to  New  York 446 

writes  Lord  Germaine  of  his  weak 

force 448 

sails  to  rescue  Newport 455 

returns  to  New  York 455 

again  writes  to  Lord  Germaine  of  his 

weak  force 458 

reports  his  condition  as  critical. . . .  460 
seizes  Verplancks  and  Stony  Point.  466 

abandons  Rhode  Island 476 

abandons    Verplancks    and  'Stony 

Point 476 

proposes  to  attack  Charleston  again  476 

sails  for  South  Carolina 483 

leaves  Lieut.  Gen.   Knyphausen  in 

command 483 

reports  the  strength  of  his  army.  ...   485 

reports  his  Provincial  force 486 

detailed  organization  of  his  expedi 
tion 493-4 

is  reinforced  by  Gen.  Patterson. . . .  495 

captures  Charleston 497 

issues  a  fatal  proclamation 498 

reports  the  submission  of  Carolina  .  498 
returns  in  confidence  to  New  York.  500 
finds  Gen.  Knyphausen  in  New 

Jersey 500 

invades  New  Jersey 500 

advances  upon  Springfield 501 

reports  as  to  his  future  plans 502 


Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  starts  to  attack  New 
port,  R.  1 503 

abandons  the  expedition 503 

sends  Lord  Germaine  La  Fayette's 

mock  proclamation 504 

negotiates   with   Arnold    for  West 

Point 505 

reports  to  Lord  Germaine  Arnold's 

plans 505 

sends  Andre  to  close  a  contract. . . .  505 
reports  to  Lord  Germaine  failure  of 

the  plan - 506 

declines    to    exchange   Arnold    for 

Andre 506 

his  relations  to  the  British  cabinet, 

1781 535 

writes   Lord   Germaine    as   to  Am. 

mutiny 538 

places    Simcoe    and    Dundas   with 

Arnold 548 

writes   Gen.  Phillips    to    aid  Corn 
wallis  567 

suggests  a  move  against  Philadelphia  568 
writes  Lord  Germaine  as  to  the  army.  588 
writes  Gen.  Phillips  as  to  the  Middle 

States 589 

again  proposes  Philadelphia  as  the 

objective 596 

unjust  to  Cornwallis 597 

deficient  in  strategic  skill 599 

makes  an  estimate  of  La  Fayette's 

army 605 

orders  Cornwallis  to  send  troops  to 

New  York 605 

his  plan  against  Philadelphia 606 

is  reinforced  from  England 607 

hurries  troops  from  Virginia 609 

checks   movement    of    troops    from 

Virginia 610 

his  correspondence  with  Cornwallis 

noticed 610 

sends  dispatches  to  Cornwallis 620 

rebukes  Cornwallis 621 

writes   that   Washington   has   gone 

South    624 

will  join  Cornwallis  soon  as  possible  624 

sends  Arnold  to  Connecticut 625-6 

his  relations  to  Arnold 625-6 

states  his  plan  to  succor  Yorktown, 

Oct.  5 632 

expects  to  leave  Oct.  12,  1781 637 

reaches  the  Chesapeake  too  late  . . .   642 
his  embarrassments  recognized  ....   644 
is  relieved  by  Sir  Guy  Carleton    .  .  .   656 
Cloisy  de  (Fr)  Genl.,  before  Gloucester.  636 
Coalition    against  Great    Britain  formi 
dable  527-8 

Cochran,  Col.,  (Am.}  occupies  Fort  Ed 
ward 351 

Cochran,  Maj.,  surprises   the  Onondaga 

Indians 463 

Cochran,  Maj.,  (J3r.}  brings  dispatches  to 

Cornwallis 637 

k*  at  Yorktown 643 

Coffin,  Capt.,  (Br.)  skirmishes  at  Eutaw 

Springs 578 

Colburn,    Lieut  Col.,  (Am.)  k.  at  Free 
man's  Farm , 342 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


6/5 


Collett,  William,  Capt.  S.  C.  troops 179 

Collett,  Benjamin,  Capt.  S.  C.  troops. ..    179 
Collier,  Sir  George,  aids  to  land  troops 

at  Long  Island 200 

estimates  the  force  landed 200 

conveys  troops  up  the  Hudson.  . .  .   466 

accompanies  invasion  of  Connecticut  468 

reports  destruction  of  Norwalk.  ...   471 

relieved  by  Admiral  Arbuthnot.  .  .  .   476 

Colonial  warfare  has  its  advantages.  ...     61 

Colonel,  as  graded   in  the  British  army.   171 

Colt,  Capt.  at  Bunker  Hill no 

Colquhoun,  Adj.   (Br.}  w.  at  battle   of 

Guilford 562 

Commissioners  (Am.}  sent  to  Canada.  .    158 

advise  to  abandon  Canada 167 

meet  Genl.  and  Admiral  Howe 223 

arrange  surrender  of  Cornwallis. .  .   641 

stipulate  for  peace 656 

Committee  of,  Public  Safety  appointed 

by  Massachusetts 9 

supplies  appointed  by  Massachusetts     10 
Public  Safety  vote  military  supplies     10 

Congress  meet  Lord  Howe 223 

Congress  visit  Valley  Forge 403 

Congress  confer  with  Washington.  .   490 
Safety  for  South  Carolina  named..    179 
Common  Law   as  to  defense,  applies  to 

States 245 

Commons,  House  of,  on  employment  of 

auxiliaries 172 

Concave  order  of  battle   (See  Order  of 

Battle) 65-8 

Concentric  and  divergent    lines  defined     58 
Conciliatory  bills  incite  mutiny  in  Brit 
ish  army 403 

Concord  skirmish  and  its  lessons 1 1 

Concorde   La,  frigate,  brings  dispatches 

from  De  Grasse 621 

Condition  of  Great  Britain  in  1780 527 

Conditions  upon  which  the  war  of  1775- 

1783  opened 82 

Confederate  currency  at  discount 463 

Confederation,  Articles  adopted 539 

Confusion  of  Amer.  troops  at  Camden  517 
British  troops  at  Eutaw  Springs..  572 

Sometimes  unavoidable 653 

Congress  sends  committee  to  Cambridge.  121 
disclaims  operations  against  Canada.  126 
sends  committee  to  meet  Washington.  143 

proposes  to  employ  Indians 158 

reinforces  the  army  in  Canada.  ...    159 
assigns   13,800  militia  to  the  army 

at  New  York 159 

defines  treason 178 

publishes  Genl.  Howe's  proclama 
tion  194 

authorizes  eighty-five  regiments  for 

five  years 222 

leaves   to  Washington  the  policy  in 

New  York 224 

sustains  Schuyler  in   the  Northern 

Department 255 

confers  large  powers  on  Washington.  263 

holds  its  session  at  Baltimore 266 

enlarges  both  army  and  authority  of 

Washington 280 

adjourns  to  Lancaster  and  York...    384 


Congress  authorizes  call  for  militia. .  .  .  403 
declines  to  confer  with  Geni.  Lee.  409 
fixes  the  army  at  eighty  battalions  463 
jealous  of  Washington's  virtues. . .  489 
indorses  court-martial  of  Arnold.  490 
equalizes  the  pay  of  the  army. . . .  190 
appoints  Gates  to  Southern  com 

mand 492 

orders  Pennsylvania  troops  south. .    584 

Connecticut  supports  the  war 84 

militia  greatly  reduced 221 

troops   in  mutiny 491 

Connecticut    Farms   visited   by    British 

troops 499 

Conspiracy  in  Tryon  County,  New  York. 

.  ••: :  237-8 

Conscientious    scruples    as    to    bearing 

arms 265 

Conscript  system  of  France 14 

Constitution  adopted  to  take   effect    in 

November 461 

Continental     armies    (Europe)    involve 

social  waste   ....    20 

Continental  Congress  meets,  with  powers 

assured 87 

Controversy  as  to  Putnam  and  Prescott 

idle 94-9 

Conway,  Brig.  Gen.,   leads   advance   at 

Germantown 387 

cabal,  incidentally  mentioned 397 

made  Inspector  General 398 

antagonistic  to  Washington 398 

assigned  to  Canada  under  La  Fayette  402 

resigns  and  goes  to  France 403 

Conway,  Lieut.  (Br.}  exchanged 631 

reports  the  strength  of  the   French 

fleet 631 

Convex  order  of  battle.     (See  Diagram, 

Chap.  XI.)  and 66-8 

Cook's  regiment  at  Bemis  Heights 347 

Corbett,  Thomas,  intercepts  British  mails  178 
Coudray,  de  M.,  plans  river  defenses  . .  382 
Corinth,  Mississippi,  represents  a  good 

retreat 73 

Cope,    Lieut.    (Br.}    k.   at    Blackstock's 

plantation 522 

Cornell,    Ezek.,    signs    protest    against 

D'Estaing 453 

Cornwallis,  Frederick,  a  commissary  of 

exchange 555 

Cornwallis,  Charles,  Earl,  Lieut.  Gen., 
sub.  Gov.  Gen.  India,  b.  1738,  d. 
1805. 

sails  for  America,  Feb.,  1776 173 

lands  at  Wilmington,  N.  C 175 

accompanies  Clinton  to  Charleston.    175 
arrives  at  New  York  in  August.  . . .    195 
moves  with  British  Reserve  to  Flat- 
bush  201-2 

defeats  Lord  Stirling  near  Cortelyou 

House 210 

lands  on  New  York  Island 225 

joins  the  assault  of  Fort  Washington  250 
delayed  by  Howe  at  Brunswick. .  . .    257 

crippled  by  Howe's  orders 258 

encamps  at  Pennington 258 

gives    up    leave    of    absence,   after 
Trenton 284 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


PAGE 

Cornwallis,  resumes  command  of  a  di 
vision  284 

skirmishes  near  Trenton 285 

inarches  against  Washington 285 

outmanoeuvred  at  the  Assanpink. . .   290 

regains  New  Brunswick 291 

engages  Stirling  near  Woodbridge.   301 

with  Howe  at  Chadd's  Ford 367 

makes    a    brilliant    move    on    the 

Brandy  wine 370 

pursues  Washington  to  Chester.  .  .  .   382 

enters  Philadelphia 384 

joins  Howe  at  Germantown 386 

at  Billingsport,  N.  J 396 

skirmishes    with    Morgan    at    Edge 

Hill 397 

joins  Knyphausen  at  Chestnut  Hill.  397 
at  Allentown,  en  route  for  Monmouth.  413 
reaches  New  York  with  Clinton  .  . .  446 
makes  an  incursion  into  New  Jersey  459 
with  Clinton  before  Charleston.  . .  .  496 
succeeds  Clinton  ;  marches  to 

Camden 511 

rightly  appreciates  Gen.  Gates  ....  513 
reports  the  battle  of  Camden.  . .  .515-16 

invades  North  Carolina 5*9 

skirmishes  at  Charlotte 519 

at  Winnsborough,  S.  C 521 

his  march  criticised  by  Tarleton.  .  .    521 

his  position,  Jan.,  1781 535 

error  as  to  restored  British  authority  536 
plans  to  strike  Morgan  and  Greene  541 

marches  up  the  Catawba 541 

sends  Tarleton  to  strike  Morgan. .  .  542 
waits  for  Leslie  at  Turkey  Creek  .  .  542 
is  too  late  to  cut  off  Morgan's  retreat  542 

reports  the  battle  of  Cowpens 545 

is  criticised  by  Tarleton 545 

arrives  at  Ramsour's  Mills 545 

burns    his     surplus     baggage     and 

wagons 546 

pursues  Morgan  across  the  Catawba  546 
explains  second  invasion  of  North 

Carolina 550 

states  his  opinion  of  Cowpens 551 

fails  to  realize  the  support  expected.   551 

is  stopped  at  the  river  Yadkin 551 

stops  at  Salisbury  four  days 552 

burns  additional  baggage 552 

is  stopped  at  the  river  Dan 552 

marches  toward  Salem 552 

writes  to  Lord  Germaine 552 

retires  to  Hillsborough 554 

his  commissary  (Stedman)  explains.  554 
crosses  the  Haw  and  Allamance.  . .  554 

marches  toward  Guilford 556 

fights  the  battle  of  Guilford 556 

saves  the  battle  by  artillery 561 

makes  a  narrow  personal  escape. . .   563 

declines  to  pursue  Greene 564 

retires  to  Wilmington 565 

gives  the  strength  of  his  army 565 

communicates  his  plans  to  Clinton.    566 

vindicates  his  position 5°° 

writes  to  Lord  Germaine 567 

is  sustained  by  Lord  Germaine  ....    567 

explains  his  situation 568 

marches  for  Virginia 569 


Cornwallis,  directs  Gen.  Phillips  to  join 

at  Petersburg 569 

is  reinforced  by  Gen.  Leslie 595 

will  dislodge  La  Fayette  from  Rich 
mond  505 

states  the  "  horrid  enormities  of  our 
(Br.}  privateers  " 595 

gives  Arnold  leave   to  go    to    New 

York 595 

states  his  plan  of  campaign 598 

realizes  his  position 598 

joins  Tarleton  and   Simcoe  at   Elk 

.Km : 602 

gives  a  foraging  order  to  Tarleton.  .    602 

retires  to  Westham , 603 

retires  to  Williamsburg 604 

engages  Butler  in  a  brisk  action  .    .   604 

fights  the  battle  of  Jamestown 608 

retires  to  Portsmouth 609 

correspondence  with  Clinton  noticed  610 

reaches  Yorktown 611 

reconnoitres  La  Fayette's  position  .   613 

advises  Clinton  of  his  peril 631 

reconnoitres  Washington's  position.   632 

reports  to  Clinton  the  facts 633 

withdraws  his  advance  detachments  634 
is  unjustly  criticised  by  Tarleton.  . .   634 

is  encouraged  by  Clinton 637 

reports  progress  of  the  siege 638 

advises  Clinton  to  take  no  risks  .  . .   639 

makes  sorties  without  benefit 640 

attempts  to  escape  to  Gloucester.  . .   640 
reports  his  purpose  to  surrender  .  .  .   640 

writes  to  Washington .   641 

signs  Articles  of  capitulation 641 

compliments  the  strategy  of  Wash 
ington 642 

acknowledges  courtesies  received  . .   643 
fully  vindicated  by  the  facts 644 

Coryell   Ferry  guarded  in  1776  by  Lord 

Stirling 264 

Council  of  War  (Am.*)  as  to  Bunker  Hill     93 
called     by    Arnold    on    march    to 

Quebec 123 

before  Quebec 163 

at  Sorel  in  Canada 166 

as  to  retreat  from  Brooklyn 216 

as  to  retreat  from  New  York 224 

as  to  North  river  defenses 237 

retains  Fort  Washington 237 

as  to  offensive  policy 242 

as  to  defense  of  Ticonderoga 311 

convened  by  Washington 365 

decides  to  cross  the  Brandywine. . .    366 

as  to  future  movements 408 

advises  a  defensive  policy 400, 

before    Savannah 419 

Court  of  Inquiry  as  to  panic  in  Parson's 

brigade 226 

vindicates  Schuyler 312 

Court-martial,  as  to  Arnold  (reprimand).  490 
as  to  Lee  (suspension) 445 

Cowardice  of  commander  at  the  Cedars.  166 
rebuked  by  Washington 147 

Cowpens,  Battle  described 542 

Cramahe,  Lieut.,  Governor  of  Quebec  .  .    130 

Crane,  Oliver,  Rev.    M.  D.,  Morristown, 

N.  J ? 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


677 


PAGE 

Crimean  war  illustrates  an  exceptional 

alliance 79 

Crochet.     See  orders  of  battle  and  dia 
gram 65—8 

Cromile,  Maj.  k.  at  King's  Mountain. .  .    520 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  Lord  Protector  of  Eng 
land,  b.  1599,  d.  1659. 

the  interregnum  noticed 5 

Crosswick's   bridge   repaired  by  British 

troops,  Dec.  1776 264 

Crown  Point  evacuated  by  Genl.  Carle- 
ton  (Br.) 243 

evacuated  by  Genl.  Gates  (Am.}. . .    195 
Cruger,  Lt.  Col.,  (Br.)  at  Sunbury,  Ga.    478 

at  Eutavv  Springs 578 

Crusaders,    defied    social     and   national 

rights 27 

Cunningham,   Maj.,  joins   Morgan 541 

at  battle  of  Cowpens 543 


DAGGETT,  Naphtali,  Rev.  D.D.  sub.  Pres. 

Yale  Col.  b.  1727,  d.  1780. 
pris.  at  New   Haven,  harshly  treat 
ed  470 

Danbury,     Conn.,     invaded     by     Gov. 

Tryon 297 

Dartmouth,  Lord  George,  b.  1648,  d.  1691. 

his  opinion  of  the  war 82-3 

proposes  a  southern  expedition. ...    150 
objects  to  Boston  as  a  base  of  opera 
tions  155 

Davidson,  William,  Brig.  Genl.  (Am.)  b. 
1746,  d.  1781. 

joins    Morgan 541 

is  k.  at  McCowan's  Ford 551 

Davis,  Col.,  (Am.),   captures    arms    and 

horses  at  Wahab's  Plantation.  ...   518 
Davis,    Maj.,   notifies   Sumter  of    Gates 

defeat 511 

D..ms,  Capt.,  (Am.)  at  Battle  of  Spring 
field  501 

Dawson,   Henry    B.,  (historical   student 
and  writer) 

faithful  as  a  historian 333 

gives  account    of  Arnold    at    Free 
man's  Farm 342 

as    to     Battle     of     King's     Moun 
tain  521 

Day,  Henry,  Esq.,  lawyer,  New  York. . .        2 
Dayton,  Elias,  Col.,  b.  1735,  d.  1807. 

at  the  battle  near  Elizabethtown.  .   499 

Dean,  Silas,  on  naval  committee 144 

contracts  with  foreign  officers 655 

Dearborn,  Henry,  Maj,  (sub.  Maj.  Genl.) 
b.  1751,  d.  1829. 

at  battle  of  Bemis  Heights 347 

Deborre,  Brig.  Genl.  attempts  the  posts 

at    Staten    Island 366 

disgraced  at  Brandy  wine 377 

De   Bose,   part   of  the  regt.    at   Eutaw 

Springs 582 

Declaration  of  Independence  dated  July 

4th,    1 776 160 

Declaration  of  Independence  adopted  by 

States 195 


De  Estaing,  Charles  Hector,  Count,  (Fr.) 

Lieut.  Genl.,  b,  1729,  d.  1794. 
reaches  the  Delaware  with  French 

fleet 446 

sails  at  once  for  New  York 446 

unable  to  cross  the  bar 447 

arrives  at  Newport  R.  1 449 

consults  Sullivan  as  to  attack 450 

not  offended  by  Sullivan's  landing.  450 

is  confronted  by  British  fleet 450 

both  fleets  disabled  and  dispersed.  451 
returns  to  Newport  to  collect  his 

ships 452 

noble  letter  to  Sullivan 452 

his  departure  brings  a  protest....   453 

sails  for  Boston  to  refit 453 

offers  to  fight  his  land  forces 453 

fully  vindicated  in  his  course.  .  .  .  452-3 
/vdmiral  Howe  appears  off  Boston.  455 
is  threatened  by  Admiral  Byron  be 
fore   Boston 455 

sails  for  West  Indies 455 

appears  off  the  coast  of  Georgia. . .  477 
summons  Savannah  to  surrender.  .  479 

leads  an  assaulting  column 481 

is  twice  wounded ...  481 

returns    to     France 483 

Defense,  Lines  of 54 

Defensive,  quasi,  and  double  lines  of  de 
fense 56 

with  offensive  return 51 

policy  of  Washington 222 

De  Fermoy,  Roche,  Brig.  Genl.  on  the 

Delaware 264 

at  Ticoncleroga. 311 

De   Fleury,  Louis,  (Fr.)  see  Fleury  De. 
De   Gall,  Brig.  Genl.  (Br.)  at  Battle  of 

Bemis  Heights 345 

De    Grasse,    Francois   Joseph    Paul,    b. 
1723,  d.  1788. 

arrives  in  the  Chesapeake 612 

approves  the  action  of  La  Fayette. .  613 
engages  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Graves.  615 

is  visited  by  Washington 635 

proposes  to  leave  the  Chesapeake  . .  635 
conforms  to  judgment  of  military 

men 635 

signs  capitulation  of  Yorktovvn  ....   641 

is  honored  by  Congress 644 

leaves  the  American  coast 644 

De  Hart,  Col.,  gives  notice  of  reenlist- 

ments 276 

De  Haas,  appointed  Brig.  Gen 296 

De    Heister,    Lieut.    Gen.,    assigned    to 

service  in  America 173 

arrives  at  Gravesend 199 

lands  on  Long  Island 200 

occupies  a  position  before  Flatbush  202 
captures  Maj.  Gen.  Lord  Stirling  .  .  210 
transfers  his  command  to  New 

Rochelle 235 

advances  to  White  Plains 235 

De  Kalb,  Baron,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1732,  d. 
1780. 

Inspector  Gen.  vice  Con  way. 399 

assigned  to  expedition  to  Canada.  .   402 

sent  to  Southern  department 491 

marches  to  Hillsborough,  S.  C 509 


6;8 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


D«  Kulb,  Baron,  Maj.  Gen.,  laments  the 

Difficulties  of  his  position 509 

.   at  Morristown,  N.  J.,  April  16,  1780  509 

at  Buffalo  Ford,  July  6,  1780 509 

joined  by  Gen.  Gates,  July  25,  1780  509 
his  advice  neglected  by  Gen.  Gates.   510 

gallant  conduct  at  Camden 515 

mortally  wounded  at  Camden 518 

remembered 655 

Delancey,  Brig.  Gen.,  organizes    a   bat 
talion  of  loyalists 199 

operates  in  Westchester  County  ...    619 

Adj.  Gen.  vice  Maj.  Andre 619 

Delatouche,  M.,  offers  to  secure  frigates 

for  Washington 592 

Delaware  river  impassable,  from  ice  ...    285 
obstructed  by  chevaux  de  frise  ....    364 
Delaware  troops  on  nearly  every  battle 

field 491 

Deming,  Capt.  (Br.}  k.  at  Chatterton  Hill  241 
Denmark  and  Sweden  unite  in  policy 

with  Catharine 527 

De  Peyster,  Abraham,  Capt.,  at   King's 

Mountain 520 

Desborough,  Lieut.,  w.  at  Monmouth. .  .  444 
Destouches  succeeds  to  command  of 

French  fleet 584 

sends  M.  Tully  to  aid  La  Fayette. .   584 

sails  for  the  Chesapeake 6n 

in  well-balanced  engagement  with 

Arbuthnot 612 

De  Ternay  arrives  in  America 503 

dies,    and    succeeded    by    M.    Des 
touches  584 

De  Treville,  Capt.,  shows  gallantly  at 

Beaufort 464 

De  Trott,  (H.}  Ensign,  k.  at  Guilford  .  .  563 
Deux  Fonts,  Count  de,  w.  at  Yorktown.  639 
Devens,  Richard,  Mass.  Com.  Safety..  9 
Dictator  recommended  in  Penn.  in  1776  280 
Dictatorial  powers  granted  Washington 

for  six  months 280 

Dickinson,  John,  takes  an  interest  in  the 

war 86 

Dickinson,  Philemon,  Brig.  Gen.,  b.  1732, 
d.  1808. 

operates  in  New  Jersey 404 

at  the  battle  of  Monmouth 433 

at  the  baltle  of  Springfield 501 

Digby,  Admiral,  arrives  at  New  York  . .   635 
associated    as   peace   commissioner 

with  Gen.  Carleton 646 

Dillon,    Gen.,    commands    Franco-Irish 

brigade  before  Savannah 480 

Discipline  alone  holds  men  under  fire  . .    116 
gained  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill.  113-19 

of  the  American  army 147 

of  the  British  army 146,  513 

inculcated  by  the  war 647-8 

tends  to  avert  panics 653 

Discovery,   the    handmaid    of    military 

science 18 

Ditmas,  Capt.  (Br,}  w.  at  Monmouth. . .   444 

Diversions  illustrated 75 

Donnom,  Capt.  (Am.}  k.  at  Savannah  .  .  482 
Donop,  Col.  (Hessian)  at  Long  Island.  .  200 

at  New  York  Island 225 

at  Chatterton  Hill 239 


Donop,   Col.    (Hessian)  at  Fort  Wash 
ington  251 

advises  Rahl  to  fortify  Trenton.  . . .   270 

abandons  Bordentown 276 

advice  to  Cornwallis 286 

at  German  town 386 

k.  in  assault  on  Fort  Mercer 394 

Dooley,  Col.  (Am.}  in  skirmish  at  Kettle 

Creek 464 

Dorchester  Heights  occupied  by  Ameri 
cans  152 

Dorchester,    S.    C.,    skirmish    in     1781 

(noticed) 575 

Douglas,  Lord,  k.  at  Guilford 562 

Douglas'  brigade  in  Spencer's  division. .  221 
Drayton,  Wm.  H.,  b.  1742,  d.  1779. 

Chief  Justice  of  S.  C.,  1776 180 

on  Com.  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Du  Buson,  Lieut.  Col.,/m.  at  Camden.   518 
Du  Corps  (Br}  regiment  at  Germantown  386 
Dumas,    Mathieu,   Count  de,  Col.,  sub. 
marshal  de  Camp,  and  historian,  b. 
1753,  d.  1837. 

w.  in  assault  at  Yorktown 639 

Dundas,    Lieut.   Col.,   sent    to   Virginia 

with  Arnold 548 

a    commissioner    at    surrender    of 

Yorktown 641 

Dunhohm,  Capt.  (Am.}  w.  at   Hobkirk 

Hill 573 

Dunmore,  Lord,  burns  Suffolk  and  de 
mands  troops 150 

arms  slaves 1 74 

takes  refuge  on  the  Fowey  man-of- 
war  86 

Du  Plessis,  Chevalier,  engineer 593 

on  duty  with  La  Fayette 396 

remembered 655 

Du  Portail,   Lebegue,   Brig.   Gen.  (Fr.} 

approves  Washington's  caution  ....  404 
with   Southern    army ;    captured   at 

Charleston 527 

is  succeeded  as  engineer  by   Kos- 

ciusko  .... 527 

approves  action  of  La  Fayette 613 

with  Washington  in  N.  J.,  1781  ...   620 
visits  Count  de  Grasse  with  Wash 
ington 635 

remembered 655 

Duquesne,  Captain,  repulsed  at  Boones- 

borough,  Ky 460 

Durgess,  Col.,  at  battle  of  Monmouth  . .   434 

E. 

EAST  RIVER  under  control  of  a  British 

fleet 232 

Eaton,  William,  Brig.  Genl.  at  Battle 

of  Guilford 556 

Echelon,see  Order  of  battle  and  diagram.  66-8 
Education  involves  preparation  for  full 

duty  as  a  citizen 15 

Effingham,  Lord,  gives  an  opinion  of  the 

war 83 

Elbert,  Brig.  Genl.  at  Tybee  Island...  460 

pris.  at  Brier  Creek 464 

Eldridge,  Edward,  commissioner  to  meet 

Lord  Howe,  1776 223 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


679 


Elizabethtown     visited   by    Lieut.    Col. 

Buskirk 4§5 

visited  by  the  British  army 499 

Elliott  Benjamin,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Emerick's  Chasseurs,  attack  Fort  Clin 
ton  358 

Emmett,   Dr.    Thomas   Addis   has   the 

inventory  made  at  Ticonderoga.    119 
England,   her  glory  in  her  intelligence 

and  industry 6 

lost  no   real  glory  in   the    Virginia 

campaign 611 

Engineer  corps  of  1775-1781 65 

Engineering   denned 48 

Enlistments   of    American    army   more 

than  half  to  expire 244 

Ennis,  Col.,  (Br}  surprised  at  Musgrove's 

Mills 518 

Enos,  Lieut.   Col.,   starts  with  Arnold's 

expedition 121 

Erskine,  Sir  Wm.,  Brig.  Genl.  captured 

at  sea 192 

advises    Lord     Cornwallis 210 

at  Barren  Hill :    406 

Europe  against  Great  Britain 527 

European  recruits  distributed  in  1777.  .    279 
European  armies  merge    the   citizen   in 

the  soldier .  .      15 

Evacuation  of  Boston  by  Genl.  Howe.  .    151 
New  York  by  Genl.  Washington. .  .    227 
New  York  by  General  Carleton.  .    .656 
Philadelphia,  a  military  necessity..   413 
Evarts,  Wm.  M.  Hon.,  (scholar  and  ad 
vocate,  b.  1818 2 

F.wing,  James,  Brig.  Genl.,  b.  1736,  d 271 

to  cross  below  Trenton,  Dec.  1776. .   271 
at  Mount  Holly,  Dec.  28th,  1776..    276 
Eutaw  Springs,  last  Southern  battle. . .  .    583 
Eyer,  Lieut.  Col.,  lands  near  New  Lon 
don  626 

w,  (mortally),  before  Fort  Griswold  629 


F. 


FABIAN  policy  of  Washington  derided. .  392 
Fairhaven  destroyed  by  Genl.  Grey. . . .  455 
Falconer,  William,  as  to  British  position 


at    Charleston, 


188 

Fanning's  Provincials  at  Newport 448 

Fanaticism  unrestrained  in  war 24 

Ferguson,  Maj.,  (Br.}  at  Chadd's  Ford. .   369 
reports  his   attack    upon    Pulaski's 

quarters 459 

in  skirmish  with  Col.  Clark 507 

is  killed  at  King's  Mountain 520 

Ferguson,  Thomas,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C  . .    179 

Febiger,  Christian,  Col.  at  Bunker  Hill.    109 

accompanies  Arnold  to  Quebec.  ...    131 

distinguished  at  Stony  Point 472 

Fellows,  John,  Brig.  Genl.  at  Long  Island  217 
in  Putnam's  division  at  New  York. .   220 

joins  the  army  of  Gates 337 

guards  east  bank  of  the  Hudson..   350 
Findley,  Capt.,  (Am.}  sent  to  Genl.  Ma 
rion  with  artillery     570 

Fish  Dam  Ford,  skirmish 521 


Fitzconnell,  Ezek,  signs  protest  against 

D'Estaing 453 

Fitzgerald,   Lieut.  Col.   (Am.}   at  Mon- 

mouth 439 

testifies  on  trial  of  Genl.  Lee 439 

Fleming,  Capt,  k.  at  battle  of  Princeton  289 

Fleury,  Louis   De.  Lieut,  sub  Col.  (Fr.) 

prisoner  at  Brandy  wine 381 

at  attack  upon  Fort  Mercer 395 

wounded  at  Fort  Mifflin 395 

at  siege  of  Newport 452 

distinguished  at  Stony  Point 473 

joins  Count  De  Rochambeau 525 

remembered 655 

Flemington   occupied  by  Sullivan  in  re 
treat  298 

Fog  over  East  River  in  1776 218 

Brandywine  River  in  1777 367 

Fiskkill  Creek  in   1777 351 

Germantown  in  1777 389 

Ford,  Lieut.  Col.,  (Am.)  with  new  levies 

at    Guilford 557 

IV.  at  Hobkirk's  Hill 572 

Fords  of  the  Brandywine  at  date  of  bat 
tle.  . 367 

Forbes,  Maj.,  (Br.}  in  action   near  Fort 

Ann 315 

before  the  House  of  Commons. . . .  315 
at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 340 

Foreign  aid  secured  by  England 171 

opposition  made  in  Parliament.  .  . .    172 

invoked  by  America 278 

of  advantage  to  America 655 

Forrest's  (Am.}  battery  at  Trenton 273 

Forlorn  Hope  ;  its  requirements 63 

Forman,  Brig.  Gen.,  at  battle  of  German- 
town 387 

operates  in  New  Jersey 396 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 414 

testifies  on  trial  of  Gen.  Lee 429 

Formation  of  troops  under  fire  considered  580 

Forts  at  New  York  useless  against  ships  222 

Fort  Ann,  abandoned  before  Burgoyne's 

march " 315 

Ann,  burned 315 

Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery 355 

Clinton  and  Montgomery,  loss  un 
necessary  361 

Fort  Defiance,  opposite  Ticonderoga  . . .   309 
Edward,  abandoned  by  Gen.  Schuy- 

ler 319 

Edward,  16  miles  from  Fort  George  328 
Edward,  occupied  by  Col.  Cochran.  351 
George,  captured  in  Oct.,  1780  . . .,  523 
Griswold,  obstinately  defended.  . . .  629 

Griswold,  surrendered 629 

Gunby,  surrendered  to  Lee 574 

Independence,  abandoned 242 

Independence  (new),  abandoned. .  .  360 
John's,  St.  captured  by  Montgomery  129 

Forts  Lee  and  Independence,  their  strat 
egic  value 49 

Lee    and    Washington    passed    by 
frigates 232 

Fort  Mercer,  on  Red  Bank 393 

Mercer,  reinforced 394 

Mercer,  abandoned 396 

Mifflin,  on  Mud  Island 393 


68o 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Fort  Mifflin,  reinforced 394 

Mifflin  resists  attack,  1777 395 

Mifflin  captured,  Nov.,  1777 395 

Montgomery  and  Clinton 355 

Motte,    surrendered     to    Lee    and 

Marion , 574 

Moultrie,  in  1776 185-7 

Moultrie,  captured  in  1780 496 

Schuyler,  at  bend  of  the  Mohawk.  .  322 
Schuyler,  supplies  received  for,  in 

Aug.,  1777 323 

Schuyler,  garrison  of,  in  1777 323 

Schuyler,  timely  reinforcement  ....  323 
Schuyler,  Herkimer's  scouts  pass  in  323 

Stanwix,  strengthened 280 

Ticonderoga,  condition  of  garrison  .   311 

Ticonderoga,  captured  ... 318 

Trumbull,  captured  by  Capt.  Willett  626 
Watson,  taken  by  Lee  and  Marion.  569 
Washington,  exposed  eastward  ....  249 

Washington,  garrison  of 247 

Washington  and  adjacent  defenses.  248 
Washington,  described  by  Graydon  248 

Washington,  captured 251 

Washington,         attack        skillfully 

planned 249 

Fosbach,  William  de  Deux  Fonts,  Col., 

at  Yorktown 638 

w.  in  storming  redoubt   639 

Foster,  Capt.  (Br.)  attacks  the  post  at 

the  Cedars 165 

enforces  a  severe  cartel 165 

Founderies  established  in  1779 279 

Fowey,  frigate,  the  refuge  of  Lord  Dun- 
more  86 

at  siege  of  Savannah 478 

surrendered  at  Yorktown 642 

Fox,  Charles  James  (statesman),  b.  1749, 

d.  1806. 

gives  opinion  of  battle  of  Guilford  .   364 
favors  Independence,  as  last  resort.   399 
Fox,  Adjt.  (Br.}  TV.  at  battle  of  Guilford  563 
Fraser,  Brig.  Gen.  (Br.}  at  Three  Rivers, 

Canada 166 

at  Ticonderoga  with  Burgoyne  ....   314 

pursues  St.  Clair's  army 316 

gains  credit  at  Hubbardton 316 

at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 339 

at  battle  of  Bemis  Heights 345 

mortally  wounded 349 

Fraser,  Col.    (Br.}   sub.    Brig.   Gen.,   at 

Huntington,  R.  1 471 

Fraser,  Capt.  (Br.}  with  sharpshooters  at 

Bennington 329 

with  sharpshooters  at  Bemis  Heights  350 
Franklin,  Benj.  (Diplomate  and   States 
man),  b,  1716,  d.  1790. 

chairman  Com.  Safety,  1775 86 

visits  American  camp  near  Boston  .  143 
his  estimate  of  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  116 

commissioner  to  Canada 151 

commissioner  to  meet  Lord  Howe, 

.1776 223 

his  estimate  of  Washington 540 

his  influence  in  Europe 540 

secures  a  foreign  loan 623 

France  pledges  aid  to  America 400 

sends  messenger  with  treaty 404 


France  sends  Rochambeau  with  troops.  490 
does   not   favor   New   York    as   an 

objective 614 

desires  peace   after  siege  of  York- 
town  closes 646 

Francis,  Col.  (A m.}  withdraws  from  Fort 

Independence 316 

k.  at  battle  of  Hubbardton 317 

Frederick  II.  the  Great,  b.  1712,  d.  1786. 

as  to  reticence  of  purpose 268 

Freeman's  Farm,  battle  of 339 

French  fleet,  off  the  Delaware 446 

at  New  York  unable  to  enter 447 

enters  Newport  harbor 448 

(See  D'Estaing.) 

engages  Admiral  Howe's  fleet 451 

repairs  at  Boston 453 

blockaded  at  Newport 504 

at  Savannah 477 

off  the  Chesapeake 612 

engages  Admiral  Graves'  fleet 615 

leaves  American  coast 644 

(See  De  Barras  and  De  Grasse.) 

French  Army  at  Newport 450 

its  relations  to  American  success. .  .    535 

marches  through  Connecticut 618 

unites  with  Washington 620 

threatens  New  York 620 

marches  through  Philadelphia 622 

is    reviewed    by    the    President   of 

Congress 623 

opens  batteries  before  Yorktown. . .   636 

winters  in  Virginia 644 

marches  to  Boston 644 

its  discipline  and  conduct 644 

embarks  for  France 644 

Frigates  built  by  America  and  their  fate  278 
Frigates  Phoenix  and  Rose  pass  Paulus 

Hook 193 

pass  Forts  Lee  and  Washington  .  .  .   232 

ascend  the  Hudson  to  Tarrytown.  .    235 

ascend  the  Hudson  to  Kingston .  .  .    327 

Frigate  La  Sensible  brings  French  Treaty  404 

Alliance  takes  La  Fayette  to  France  465 

Frink,   Captain,   at    New    London   with 

Refugees 621-6 

Frothingham,  Richard  H.  (author)  as  to 

forces  at  Bunker  Hill 100 

as  to   Gen.  Ward's   orders   to   Col. 

Prescott 96 

as  to  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill 108 

Front  of  operations 54 

Frye,  Col.,  furnishes  his  men  for  battle 

of  Bunker  Hill 95 


iADSDEN,  Christopher,  Col.,  b.   1724,  d. 
1805. 

commands  1st  S.  C.  Infantry 179 

in  command  at  Charleston 182 

in  command  at  Fort  Johnson 186 

on  Naval  Committee 144 

iage,  Thomas,  Lieut.  Gen.,  Gov. 

denounces  the  Provincial  Congress.  9 

requires  20,000  men 10 

adopts  a  bad  military  policy 10 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


681 


Gage,  precipitates  war  by  an  expedition 

to  Concord n 

fortifies  Boston  Neck 83 

offers  limited  pardons 87 

resolves  to  occupy  Charleston  and 

Dorchester 93 

threatens  to  burn  Charleston 113 

ordered  home  ;  returns  to  England.  142 

Gaines,   Lieut.   (Am.}   with    artillery   at 

Eutaw  Springs 579 

Galloway,  Joseph,  Royalist  and  writer. 

as  to  Trenton 274 

criticises  Gen.  Howe 298 

Galloway,  Lieut.  (Am.}  w.  at  Hobkirk 

Hill 573 

Gallup,  Nathan,  Col.,  near  Fort  Griswold  628 

Galvan,  Maj.,  with  La  Fayette 586 

at  battle  of  Jamestown 608 

Gambier,  Capt.,  lands  at  Mount  Pleas 
ant,  S.  C 496 

lands  on  Sullivan  Island 496 

Gansevoort,  Peter,  Col.,  b.  1749,  d.  1812. 

defends  Fort  Schuyler 322 

Gardiner's    Bay,    L.    I.,    anchorage    of 

British  fleet  off  Newport 539 

Gardner,  Thomas,  Col.,  k.  at  Bunker  Hill  109 

Mass.  Com.  Safety 9 

Gardner,  Maj.,  TV.  at  Monmouth 444 

Gardner,  Maine,  base  of  Arnold's  expe 
dition  121 

Garth,  Brig.  Gen.  (Br.)  landed  at  New 

Haven,  1779 469 

with  Gen.  Fraser  at  Norwalk,  1779.  471 

Gates,   Horatio,   Maj.  Gen.,  b.   1728    d 

1806. 

Adjt.  Gen.  on  organization  of  army.  90 

supersedes  Sullivan  in  Canada 169 

evacuates  Crown  Point ...  195 

letter  from  Lee  deriding  Congress  .  238 

his  relations  with  Lee 238 

gives  strength  of  Northern  army.  .255-6 

seeks  to  supplant  Schuyler 255 

left  without  a  command 255 

joins  Washington 256 

letter  from  Washington 265 

on  leave  to  go  to  Philadelphia  ....  267 
absent  from  Trenton  without  leave.275-7 

declines  command  of  Ticonderoga.  310 

his  captious  conduct 310 

writes  rudely  to  Washington 310 

neglected  northern  posts 310 

captious  letter  to  Mr.  Lovell 311 

takes  leave  of  absence 311 

deportment  toward  Schuyler 334 

commands  northern  department  .  .  .  335 

ignores  the  Commander-in-Chief. . .  335 

advances  beyond  Stillwater 336 

his  army  by  brigades 336 

reports  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm. .  341 

at  Saratoga,  like  Saul  after  one  battle  344 

altercation  with  Arnold 346 

gives  Arnold  leave  of  absence 347 

excited  interview  with  Arnold 349 

at  deathbed  of  Sir  Francis  Clark  .  .  349 
endangers     his     army    at    Fishkill 

Creek 351 

strength  of  army  at  Saratoga 351 

surrender  of  Burgoyne 352 


Gates,  Horatio,  Maj.  Gen.,  receives  letter 

of  caution  from  Putnam 352 

retains  troops  not  needed 397 

President  of  Board  of  War 398 

opposes  Washington 398 

commands  at  Fishkill 403 

declines  to  fight  Indians 475 

sent  to  southern  command 492 

joins  De  Kalb  at  Hillsborough  ....   509 

criticises  southern  operations 509 

adopts  a  bad  line  of  march 509 

crosses  the  Pedee 510 

issues  a  proclamation 510 

advances  to  Lynch's  Creek 510 

unites  with  Caswell's  militia 510 

criticised  by  Tarleton 510 

at  Rugely's  Mills 511 

overestimates  his  force 511 

overconfident  and  rash 513 

actual  state  of  his  army 514 

the  gauge  of  his  capacity 514 

orders  immediate  advance 514 

calls  council  of  war 515 

a  battle  without  orders 515 

hastens  from  battle-field 517 

summoned  before  Court  of  Inquiry.    522 
Gatanae's  regiment  (/>.),  distinguished 

at  Yorktown 638 

General,  qualifications  of  a,  defined  by 

Jomini So 

Generals,     as      originally      named      by 

Congress 89 

commissions    withheld     by     Wash 
ington  139 

promotions  made  (named)  give  dis 
satisfaction  296 

George    III.,    King    of    Great    Britain, 
France,  and  Ireland,  b.  1738,  d. 
1820. 
applies  to  Catharine  of  Russia  and 

Holland  for  aid 173 

unwisely  adjourns  Parliament 400 

Georgia  enters  upon  war 86 

Gerard,  Monsieur,  Conrad  A.,  first  minis 
ter  from  France 400 

pledges  Louis  XVI.  to  aid  America  400 
Germaine,  George,  Lord  (statesman). 

his  opinion  of  the  battle  of  Trenton  281 
initiates  the  Burgoyne  Campaign  . .  303 

initiates  St.  Leger's  incursion 303 

writes  to  Gen.  Howe  as  to  Burgoyne  357 
writes  to  Clinton  as  to  Tryon's  raid  470 
sustains  the  intrigue  with  Arnold  .  .  505 

rebukes  Sir  Henry  Clinton 567 

sustains  Cornwallis 568 

Germantown,  battle,  criticism  of  forma 
tions  58-9 

its  location  and  description 384-5 

plan  unfolded 386 

practically  an  American  victory  . . .   391 

creates  a  sensation  in  Europe 400 

Gerrish,  Samuel,  at  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  109 
Gibson,  Lieut.  (J3r.)  k.  at  Blackstocks. .  522 
Gilchrist,  Lieut.  (J5r.}  w.  at  Monmouth  .  444 

Gill,  Moses,  Mass.  Com.  Supplies 9 

Gimat,  Col.,  with  La  Fayette  in  his  first 

enterprise 396 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 443 


682 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Gimat  Col.,  serves   with  La  Fayette  in 

Virginia    586 

in  assault  of  redoubt  at  Yorktown. .   638 

w.  before  Yorktown 639 

remembered 655 

Gis*\  Mordecai,  Brig.  Gen.,  b.  1743,  d. 

1792. 

on  Court  of  Inquiry  (Schuyler)  ....    312 
skirmishes  with  Cornwallis  at  Edge 

Hill 397 

at  battle  of  Camden 516 

escapes  capture 518 

recruits  for  Gen.  Greene's  army  .  .  .    529 
Glazier,  Maj.  of  Marines,  at  Savannah  .   481 
Gloucester  Point,  N.  J.,  American  ship 
ping  burned 396 

Gloucester  Point,  Virginia,  described.  .  .   634 

occupied  by  Simcoe's  Rangers 611 

invested  by  allied  armies 635 

Glover.  Col.,  sub.  Brig.  Gen. 

conspicuous    in    retreat  from   Long 

Island 214 

in  skirmish  near  New  Rochelle.  . .  .   235 

at  battle  of  Trenton 272 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

on  the  Hudson 298 

joins  Schuyler  at  Stillwater 319 

with  army  of  Gates 337 

at  Saratoga 351 

assigned  to  La  Fayette's  division  .  .   448 
commands  brigade  at  Valley  Forge. 

(See  Map.) 448 

plans  retreat  from  Newport 455 

ordered  to  cooperate  with  militia  in 

Connecticut 471 

at  Providence,  Rhode  Island 471 

Goar,  Capt.  49 th  (Br),  k.  at  Chatterton 

Hill 241 

Goodrick,  Capt.,  k.  near  Guilford 562 

Gordon,  Wm.,  Rev.  Dr.  (author  of  history 

of  the  United  States.) 
comments  on  the  crisis  in  1775  ....      10 
gives   opinion  of  battle   of  Bunker 

Hill 108 

opinion  of  battle  of  Trenton 281 

as  to  Arnold  at  battle  of  Freeman's 

Farm 342 

opinion  of  battle  of  Mon mouth.  .  .  .   445 
Gore,  Capt.,  k.  at  battle  of  Monmouth.  .   444 

Gore,  Lieut.,  k.  at  Guilford 563 

Goroffe,  Lieut.  (Br.)  w.  at  Monmouth  . .   444 

Goshen,  armies  separated  by  storm 383 

Gossip  rebuked  by  Washington 195 

Governor's  Island,  New  York,  evacuated 

by  Col.  Prescott 219 

Grabouski,  Count,  k.  before  Fort  Clinton  359 
Graham,  Col.  (Am.)  at  Frog's  Neck  ....  234 
Graham,  Maj.  (Br.)  makes  a  sally  from 

Savannah 479 

Graham,  Joseph,  Maj.  (Am.)  iv.  at  Char 
lotte  519 

Graise,  Lieut.  (H.)  k.  at  Guilford 563 

Grand  Tactics  denned 48 

maxims  to  be  applied &o 

at  Bull  Run  explained 62 

of  the  war  of  1775-1781 652 

Grant,  Ulysses  Simpson,  Gen.  U.  S.  A., 
sub.  President  twice.  ^.1822,^.1885. 


Grant,  Ulysses  Simpson,  Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
and  Sherman,  in  1861-5,  in  re 
spect  of  Grand  Strategy  57 

Grant,  Maj.  Gen.  (£r.)  at  Long  Island  .  203 

joins  Cornwallis  at  Brunswick 257 

puts  (//.)  off  their  guard  at  Trenton  260 
report   of  attack  on   Trenton   con 
sidered  269 

at  the  battle  of  Brandywine 366 

attacks  Gen.  Wayne  near  Paoli. .  . .  383 

at  the  battle  of  Germantown 385 

threatens  La  Fayette  at  Barren  Hill  406 

outgeneraled  by  La  Fayette 407 

Grant,  Lieut.  Col.  (Br.)  4Oth  Foot,  k.  at 

Long  Island 209 

Grant,  Maj.  (Br.)  w.  at  Hubbardton  ...  317 

k.  in  storming  Fort  Clinton 359 

Grant,  Ensign,  (Br.)  k.  in  battle  of  Guil 
ford  563 

Graves,  Admiral. 

commands  naval  forces  at  Boston, 

1775 143 

plans     small     incursions     in     New 

England 143 

is  relieved  by  Admiral  Shuldham. .  146 
returns  to  America  with  reinforce 
ments  303 

at  New  York,  1780 503 

engages  Count  de  Grasse  off  Chesa 
peake  Bay 615 

before  the  House  of  Commons  ....  614 
Graydon,  Col.  (Am.)  b.  1752,  d.  1818. 

describes  Fort  Washington 248 

Grayson,  William,  Col. 

on  Washington's  staff 259 

Court  of  Inquiry  (Schuyler) 312 

testifies  on  the  trial  of  Lee 426 

at  the  battle  of  Monmouth 435 

Great  Britain  against  the  civilized  world 

in  1780 527 

desires  to  have  peace 646 

and  the  United  States  compete  in 

the  arts  of  peace 656 

Greaton,  Col.,  sent  to  Canada 157 

regt.  will  serve  two  weeks  longer  . .  276 

Court  of  Inquiry  (Schuyler) 312 

Greene,  Nathaniel,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1740, 
d.  1786. 

excellent  in  Logistics 72 

as  a  type  of  the  General 80 

his  antecedents So 

enters  the  service,  1775 85 

states  certain  requisites  to  success. .  85 

condition  of  his  brigade 147 

builds  field-works  on  Long  Island  .  197 

off  duty,  sick,  when  Howe  landed. .  198 

urges  retreat  from  New  York 221 

gives  report  of  skirmish  at  Harlem 

Heights 230 

commands  in  New  Jersey 231 

reports    embezzlement    of    medical 

stores 232 

applies  to  join  Washington 237 

ordered  to  remove  or  destroy  hay,  etc  243 
prepares    itinerary  for  movement  to 

Philadelphia 243 

estimates    supplies   for   column    of 

20,000  men  .    ,    244 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


683 


PAGE 

Gieene,  Nathaniel,  Maj.  Gen.,  admits  ob 
structions  of  the  Hudson  to  have 

failed 245 

anticipates    attack    on   Fort  Wash 
ington  247 

opinion  as  to  their  value,  same  as 

Howe's 248 

oiders     Morgan    to     defend     Fort 

Washington 249 

reports  capture  of  Fort  Lee 252 

is   maliciously  criticised 252 

commands     division     at    battle    of 

Trenton 271 

holds  outposts  at  Trenton 285 

leads  up  the  Millstone  after  battle 

of  Princeton 290 

sent,  to  state  to  Congress  the  condi 
tion  of  the  army 297 

sent  to  inspect  Highland  posts.  .  .  .   297 

ordered  to  follow  Howe 300 

selects  American  position  at  Chadd's 

Ford 367 

commands  the   reserve   at  Brandy- 
wine  367 

covers  retreat  of  American  army. .  .  380 
commands  division  at  Germantown.  387 
advises  to  attack  New  York  and 

Philadelphia 404 

commands  right  wing  at  Monmouth  438 
ordered  to  Newport,  Rhode  Island.  448 

at  the  siege  of  Newport 451 

unites  in  protest  sent  D'Estaing.  . .  .  453 
goes  to  Boston  to  supply  the  French 

fleet 457 

applies   for   active   service    at    the 

south 465 

quartermaster-genl.  in  the    terrible 

winter  of  1780 488 

appeals  for  aid  for  the  army 492 

resigns   as  quartermaster-genl 492 

in  command  near  Springfield,  New 

Jersey,  .  , 500 

bucceeds  Arnold  at  West  Point.  . .  .  506 
plan  for  a  flying  army  approved. .  .  528 
writes  letters  to  southern  governors  529 

describes  the  southern  army 529 

his  department  and  powers  enlarged  529 

issues  a  laconic  order 529 

peculiar  letter  to  Govr.  Jefferson.    .    530 

excelled  in  Logistics 530 

ordered  the  whole  country  explored.  531 

reached  Charlotte 531 

writes  to  Jefferson 531 

discusses  a  soldier's  life. 531 

in  camp  for  two  months,  to  organize 

his  army 532 

opens  the  southern  campaign 532 

writes  to  Marion  as  to  often  shift 
ing  quarters 532 

letter  to  La  Fayette 533 

his  position  stated 541 

hears  of  battle  of  Cowpens 547 

army  without  clothing,  Indian  style.  547 
rides  125  miles  to  join  Morgan. . . .  547 
letters  tc  Varnum,  Gist,  Smallwood 

and  others 548 

on  the  banks  of  the  Catawba 550 

orders  operations  commenced    ...      550 


Greene,    Nathaniel,   Maj.    Gen.,  hurries 

Governors  of  States 550 

takes  advantage  of  heavy  rains  .  .  552 
concentrates  his  army  at  Guilford.  .  552 
calls  council  of  war,  battle  declined  552 

organizes  a  picked  light  corps 552 

army  crosses  the  Dan  in  safety.  ...   553 
occupies  Halifax  Court  House.  ...    553 

army  mustered,  total  given. 55^ 

takes   position   between    Haw   and 

Deep  rivers 554 

controls  roads  from  Salisbury,  Guil 
ford  and  Hillsborough 555 

near  Guilford  Court  House,  invites 

battle 555 

fights  the  battle  of  Guilford 557~9 

retreats  after  action   at    Guilford.  .    561 
his  opinion  of  battle  of  Guilford. . .  .   564 

moves  into  South  Carolina 566 

marches  to  Rugely's  Mills 569 

orders  Marion  to  join  him 570 

operations  near  Camden 571 

battle  plan  of  Hobkirk  Hill  good.  .    573 

retires  to  Rugely's  Mills 573 

raises  the  siege  of  Ninety  Six 574 

goes  to  the  High  Hills  of  Santee. .    574 

advances  to  Eutaw  Springs 577 

orders  Lee,  Marion  and  Pickens  to 

join  him 577 

at  Burclell's  on   the  Santee 577 

reinforced  by  Genl.  Sunnier 577 

fights  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs 578 

his  report  of  the  last  attack 580-1 

retires  to  the  High  Hills 583 

hears  of  surrender  of  Cornwallis. . .   583 

his  army  less  than  1000  men 583 

reconquered  a  large  territory 583 

approves  of  La  Fayette's   detail    to 

the   south 586 

directs    La    Fayette    to    report    to 

Washington 594 

his  jealousy  of  foreign  appointments 

rebuked 655 

remains  at  the  south 655 

Greene,  Christopher,  Col.  b.  1737,  d.  1781. 

goes  to  Quebec  with  Arnold 121 

commands   Fort  Mercer 393 

ordered  south,  reaches  the    Pedee, 

Jan.  1781 533 

k.  at  post  on  Croton  River 618 

Greene,  Colonel,  of  Virginia,    at    Fort 

Mifflin 394 

Green  Mountain  Boys,  prefer  Warner  to 

Allen 127 

disgusted  with  Canada 132 

Green     Farms,     Ct.    visited    by     Genl. 

Tryon 471 

Greeting  to  the  public 1-2 

Gregory,  Genl.,  at  battle  of  Camden. ...    517 

pris.  at  battle  of  Camden 518 

near    Portsmouth 623 

Grey,     Maj.    Genl.    (£r.)    at   battle    of 

Brandy  wine 367 

at  battle  of  Germantown 385 

in  skirmish  at  Chestnut  Hill 397 

threatens   La  Fayette's  right 406 

destroys    Bedford,    Fairhaven     and 
Martha's  Vineyard 455 


684 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Grey,  Maj.  Genl.  surprisesBaylor's   light 

horse  at  Tappan 459 

Grey,  Lieut.,  k.  at  Savannah 481 

Giidley,  Richard,  Col.  b.  1711,  d.  1796. 

Engineer  in  Chief,  1775 84 

plans  redoubt  at  Breed's  Hill 94 

Griffin,    Col.    threatens    outposts     near 

Trenton 267 

to    occupy    attention    of     Colonel 

Donop 271 

fails   to   cross    the    river   when  ex 
pected  276 

Griffiths,  Dr.,  gives  evidence  on  trial  of 

Lee 425 

Griffiths,  Col.,  regt.  at  Harlem   Heights  229 
Grotius,  Hugo,  (Jurist),  b.  1583,  d.   1645. 

defines  wars 25 

Guards  and  Outposts,  their  duties 39 

BIBLE  discrimination  between  watch 
men  77 

Guinea,    coast    of,    (Br.)   campaign,  ex 
hibited  good  Logistics 69 

Gunby,  Col.,  distinguished  at  Battle  of 

Guilford 557 

loses  credit  at  Hobkirk's  Hill 572 


H. 

HALE,  Col.  at  Hubbardton 316 

regt.  with  Gates 33° 

JTale,  Nathan,  Capt.  (Am.),  b,  1755,  d. 

1776. 

executed   as   a  spy  in  Rutger's  Or 
chard  227 

his  memory  honored 78 

Hall,  Benjamin,  Mass.  Com.  Supplies.  .        9 
Hall,  (writer),  as  to  Arnold  at  Freeman's 

Farm 342 

Halleck,   Henry  W.   Maj.    Genl.  (Am.), 
military  author  and  jurist),  b.  1814, 
d.  1772. 
placed  in  command,  1862 — reasons 

of  Pres.  Lincoln ...    57 

distinguishes  perfect  and  imperfect 

wars 25 

defines  rebellion 31 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  Col.  sub.  eminent 

financier,  b.  1757,  d.  1804. 
introduced  to  Weshington  by  Genl. 

Greene 72 

saves   his  guns  at    Chatterton  Hill  239 

sent  to  Gates  foi   troops 397 

as  to  D'Estaing  at  New  York 447 

commands  assault  upon  redoubt.  .  .    639 

sent  to  get  shoes  for  the  army 384 

Hamilton,  Genl.  (Br.),  at  battle  of  Bemis 

Heights 345 

Hamilton,  Govr.  at   Detroit  annoys  the 

west 460 

left  Detroit  and  recovered  Vincennes  461 
Hamilton,  Lieut.  Col.,  N.  C.  Provincials 

pris 496 

Hamilton's  Provincials  join  Cornwallis.    589 
Hamley,     Col.,     Br.    Army,     President 
Queen's  Staff  College,  1876. 

author  of  "  Operations  of  War  " 53 

as  to  occupation  of  a  capital 53 


PAGB 

Hamley  Col.,  as  to  order  of  battle 66 

as  to  a  good  retreat 73 

Hammond,     Sir    Andrew,    Commodore 
(Br.). 

commands  Howe's  fleet 36-1 

before  House  of  Commons 364 

arrives  in  New  York  with  reinforce 
ments  476 

Hammond,  Col.  (Am.)  before  Augusta.  .    574 
Hampstead,  Stephen,  Lieut.,  report   of 

Fort  Griswold 628 

Hampton,  Wade,  Col.,  'distinguished  at 

Eutaw  Springs 581 

continues  operations  at  the  South  .    583 
Hanau,  troops,  to  be  hired  by  England.    171 
Hancock,  John,  Maj.  Gen.,  Pres.  of  Con 
gress  (statesman),  b.  1737,  d.  1793. 

on  Mass.  Com.  Safety 9 

has  notice  of  Percy's  expedition  ...      II 
gives  notice  of  bounty  on  reenlist- 

ment 244 

advises     Washington     of     Howe's 

movements 365 

as  a  General  before  Newport 451 

signs  protest  to  D'Estaing 453 

Hancock's   Bridge,   skirmish   at,   March 

25,  I77S 405 

Hand,  Edward,  Col.,  b.  1744. 

at  Gravesend,  Long  Island 201 

falls  back  to  Flatbush 203 

at  Prospect  Hill 205 

at  Frog's  Neck 234 

has  skirmish  with  Hessians 236 

rifle  regiment  at  Trenton 275 

promoted 279 

riflemen  pushed  toward  Princeton. .    285 

skirmishes  with  Cornwallis 285 

gallantry  at  Princeton 289 

appointed  Adjt.  Gen.  vice  Scammel    526 

Handshaw,  Col,  at  Prospect  Hill 

Hanging  Rock,  attacked  by  Sumter. .  . .    508 
Hanneman,  Lieut.,  sent  to  Col.  Baume.   330 
Harlem    Heights,    occupied    by    Wash 
ington  226 

and  vicinity 228 

Harlem  River  defended  by  earthworks  .    233 
Harnage,    Maj.   (Br.)    w.   at    Freeman's 

Farm 341 

Harnet,  Cornelius,  excluded  from   Gen. 

Clinton's  pardon 175 

Harrington,   Earl  of,  before   House   of 

Commons 340 

Harris    (Rawdon's    Capt.),    (Br.),   k.    at 

Bunker  Hill 115 

Harrison,  Robt.  H.,  Col.,  sends  a  report 

to  President  Hancock 375 

becomes  Chief  Justice  of  Maryland.   526 

at  battle  of  Monmouth  ....      439 

Harrison,  Speaker  House  of  Delegates, 

Va.,  consulted  by  Washington. . .   461 
Harrison,    Benjamin,    visits     American 

camp 143 

Hart,  de,  Col.,  reports  reenlistments. . . .   276 
Haslet,   Col.,   Del.  regt.  joins   army  at 

Brooklyn 197 

attacks     Major     Rogers'     Queen's 

Rangers 236 

his  Delawares,  at  Chatterton  Hill. .   24C 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


685 


Haslet  Col.,  Del.  regt.  k.  at  Princeton. .   289 
Hastings,  Warren  Gov.  Gen.  Bengal,  b. 
1733,  d.  1818,  contends  for  Britain 

in  India 527 

Hathorn,  Col.,  at  Minnisink 474 

Hawes,  Col.,  at  the  battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill  572 
Haynes,  Col.,  executed  by  Col.  Balfour.  575 
Hazen,  Moses,  Col.,  b.  1722. 

reports  movements  of  Cornwallis. . .  370 
regt.  good  conduct  at  Brandywine.  377 
regt.  retained  in  the  regular  army. .  526 

sent   into  New  Jersey 622 

Hazlewood,  commander  on  the  Delaware  363 

complimented  for  bravery 395 

neglected  duty 395 

Head  Quarters  of  American  Army.   (See 

American  Army) 291 

Heard's  brigade  in  Spencer's  division  . .   221 
ordered    to    reinforce    Fort    Wash 
ington  249 

Heath,  \Vm.,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1735,  d.  1814. 

Mass.  Com.  Safety 9 

a  Gen  from  Mass 10 

appointed  Brig.  Gen.  by  Congress. .      89 

as  to  Dorchester  Heights 152 

ordered  to  New  York     156 

efficient  in  retreat  from  Long  Isl'd  216-17 

ordered  to  King's  Bridge 221 

reaches  White  Plains , 238 

assigned  to  the  Highlands 247 

at  Peekskill 256 

ordered  to  collect  boats  for  his  com 
mand  .  .    291 

makes     an    attempt    against    Fort 

Independence 292 

reproved  by  Washington 292 

ordered  from  Boston 467 

stationed  in  the  Highlands 622 

his  army  on  the  Hudson 622 

Heister,  Gen.  de,  at  Long  Island 212 

Henry,   Patrick  (orator  and  statesman), 
b.  1736,  d.  1799. 

his  views  of  duty,  in  1775 85 

denounced  by  Lord  Dunmore 86 

and  Lee's  influence  in  Virginia.  .  .  .  174 
Henry,  Capt.,  dispatch  to  the  Admiralty  478 
Henderson,  Lieut.  Col.,  w.  at  Eutaw 

Springs 581 

Herkimer,  Nicholas,  Brig.  Gen.,  defeated 

against  his  advice  at  Oriskany. .  .   320 
makes  a  counter  proclamation  to  St. 

Leger 332 

Herrick,  Col.,  at  battle  of  Bennington.  .  332 
Hesse  Cassel,  British  contract  for  troops  171 

Hessian  troops  contracted  for 171-3 

regiments  at  Fort  Washington 251 

scattered  through  the  Jerseys,  Dec., 

1776 266 

surprised  at  Trenton 270 

casualties  at  Trenton 274-5 

effect  of  their  capture  at  Trenton  .  .   276 

prisoners  go  to  Philadelphia 276 

Hewes,  Joseph,  on  Naval  Committee. .  .  144 
Hey  wood,  Thomas,  Jr.,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C.  179 
Hill,  Lieut.  (£r.),  Asst.  Engr.,  made 

map  of  battle  of  German  town  .  .384-5 
Hill,    Col.,   engages    Maj.    Forbes    near 

Fort  Ann 315 


Hillsborough,  captured  by  royalists. . . .   583 
Hillhouse,  James, Capt. ,sub.  eminent  law 
yer  and  senator,  b.  1754,  d.  1832. 

during  attack  on  New  Haven 469 

Histoiy,  to  be  placed  by  its  interpreting 

philosophy 17 

Hitchcock,  Col.,  gallantry  at  Princeton.   289 
sent  with  Greene   and  Varnum  to 

Boston 84 

Hobkirk  Hill,  battle  described 571 

opinion  of  Tarleton 573 

opinion  of  Stedman    574 

Holmes,  Lieut.  (Am,)  k.  at  Savannah. .  .   481 
Hood,  Samuel,  Sir,  arrives  in  America  .   615 

engages  fleet  of  De  Gi'asse 615 

Hopkins,  John  B.,  Naval  Capt.,  serves 

with  credit 654 

Hopkins,  Stephen,  on  Naval  Committee  144 
Horry,  Daniel,  Capt.,  in  S.  C.  regiment.    179 

commands  regt 184 

Horry,  Peter,  Capt.,  in  S.  C.  regiment.  .    179 

active  at  the  South 575 

Horse  racing  and  extravagance  rebuked 

in  Maryland 86 

Hotham,  Commodore,  up  the  Hudson.  .   357 

arrives  with  Hessians 195 

Howard,  Lieut.  Col.,  at  Cowpens. .....    544 

at  Guilford 55" 

Howard,  Brig.  Gen.  (JBr.),  volunteer,  ?v. 

at  Guilford 563 

Hour  of  Preparation 82 

Houk,  Christopher,  and  party  destroyed  507 
Howe,    Robert,    Brig.    Gen.,   serves    in 

North  Carolina 175 

his  plantation  laid  waste 175 

is    exempted    from    Gen.    Clinton's 

pardon 175 

defeated  at  Tatn all's  plantation  . .  .  460 
Howe,  Richard,  Lord,  Admiral,  b.  1725, 

d.  1799- 

arrives  at  New  York 192 

acts  as  peace  commissioner 194 

works  for  peace 195 

confers  with  committee  of  Congress  223 

strongly  in  favor  of  peace 223 

convoys  Gen.  Howe's  army 363 

leaves  Philadelphia 413 

escapes  before  D'Estaing's  arrival. .  447 
recalled   to    England    at    his    own 

request 447 

reinforced  by  Admiral  Byron 450 

engages  D'Estaing  off  Newport. .  . .  450 

fleet  disabled  and  dispersed 450 

regains  New  York 451 

sails  for  Boston  seeking  D'Estaing.  455 
Howe,  Wm.,  Sir,  Lieut.  Genl.,3.  1730,  d. 

1814. 

sent  to  America 10 

landing  at  Moulton's  Point 103 

gallant  conduct  at  Bunker  Hill. . . .  104 
commits   a   grave  error  at  Bunker 

Hill 114 

failed  to  improve  success 114 

discussion  of  his  plan 114 

eminent  in  strategy 114 

succeeded  Gage  at  Boston 143 

his  ill-judged  proclamation 143 

maintains  perfect  discipline 146 


686 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Howe,  Wm.,  Sir,  Lieut.  Genl.,  regards 

New  York  as  a  prime  objective  . .    150 

as  to  Dorchester  Heights 152 

evacuates  Boston  ...        .      153 

orders  to  spare  private  property  .  . .    153 

sails  for  Halifax 154 

from  Halifax  to  New  Y;rk 192 

writes  to  Lord  Germaine 192 

confers  with  Gov.  Tryon 192 

divided  operations  criticised 193 

reports  his  arrival  at  New  York  ...    193 

a  peace  commissioner 194 

corresponds  with  Washington 194 

his  course  has  a  parallel  in  1861-5  •  J94 
joined  by  Clinton  and  Cornwallis.  .  195 

his  admirable  strategy 199 

detailed  statement  of  his  army  ....   200 

lands  troops  with  signal  skill 200 

at  battle  of  Long  Island 207 

gains  Sullivan's  rear 211 

neglects  to  improve  success 212 

goes  into  trenches 215 

reports  American  retreat 219 

his  error  on  Long  Island 219 

proposes  terms  of  settlement 223 

his  instructions  limited 224 

lands  in  New  York 225 

Head    Quarters    at    the    Beekman 

Mansion 227 

reports  skirmish  at  Harlem  Heights  228 

discussion  of  reports 230 

calls  for  more  troops  and  ships  ....   233 

lands  at  Frog's  Neck 234 

reinforced  by  Hessians 235 

reinforced  by  Knyphausen 235 

valuable  time  lost 235 

good  strategy  and  bad  logistics. . .  .   236 

loses  time  at  White  Plains 238 

battle  at  Chatterton  Hill 239 

waits  arrival  of  Lord  Percy 241 

Washington's  army  escapes 241 

marches  to  Dobbs  Ferry 242 

plans  movement  on  Philadelphia. .   243 

marches  to  King's  Bridge 247 

his  opinion  of  Forts  Lee  and  Wash 
ington  248 

matures  a  plan  for  the  war. .......   254 

requires  50,000  men   254 

halts  Cornwallis  in  New  Jersey. . . .   257 

loses  almost  inevitable  victory 258 

compliments  Cornwallis  on  his  cam 
paign  258 

posts  his  army  in  winter  quarters.  .  258 
returns  to  New  York,  Dec.  I4th, 

1776 265 

learns  condition  of  American  army  269 

paused  at  the  hour  for  action 269 

his  erroneous  opinion  of  Trenton. .   275 

opposed  to  Indian  auxiliaries 279 

calls  for  more  troops 279 

his  winter  quarters  1776,  an  error. .    279 

issues  a  proclamation 279 

withdraws  troops  from    Rhode    Is 
land  294 

marches  toward  Princeton 298 

reports  to  Lord  Germaine  his  plans.  298 
controversy  with  Clinton  immaterial  298 
criticised  by  Galloway 20,8 


Howe,  Wm.   Sir,  Lieut.  Genl.,  suddenly 

retires  to  Brunswick 300 

is  followed  to  Piscataway 300 

this  retreat  criticised 300 

advances  toward  Washington 301 

abandons  New  Jersey 301 

asks  for  reinforcements 361 

writes  a  letter  to  be  intercepted  .  . .   362 

sails  for  the  Delaware 362 

plan  of  campaign,  1777 363 

is  assured  by  Burgoyne's  letters  .  . .   363 

reaches  the  Delaware 363 

sails  for  the  Chesapeake 363 

states  trials  of  American  warfare. .  .   364 

his  movement  considered 365 

lands  up  Elk  River 366 

skirmishes  with  Maxwell .   366 

attempts  to  flank  Washington 370 

brilliant  strategy  employed 373 

reports  his  movements 375 

his  report  of  battle  of  Brandy  wine.   376 

a  scientific  soldier 381 

demonstrates  toward  Reading 382 

unjustly  criticised  for  delay 382 

capture  of  Wilmington 382 

meets  Washington  near  Goshen. .  .   383 

armies  separated  by  storm 383 

reaches  German  town 384 

his  plan  of  battle 385 

bis  report  of  battle 386 

threatens  Washington    at  Chestnut 

Hill 397 

reports  skirmish  at  Edge  Hill 397 

retires  to  Philadelphia 398 

inactive  during  winter 401 

reasons  stated  by  himself 402 

recalled  to  England 403 

expeditions  to  the  country 415 

splendid  parting  pageant  at  Phila 
delphia 408 

Hubbard,  Col.  at  battle  of  Bennington.   332 
Hudson,  Capt.  lands  at  Mount  Pleasant.  496 

lands  on  Sullivan's  Island 496 

Huger,  Francis,  Capt.  in  S.  C.  regiment   179 
Huger,    Col.   (Br.\    Provincial  regt.    at 

Newport 454 

Huger,  Isaac,  Lieut.  Col.  b.  1725,  d,  1782. 

S.  C.  regt.  at  Tybee  Island 459 

(Brig.  Genl.)  at  siege  of  Savannah.  .   481 

at  Monk's  Corner 496 

at  battle  of  Guilford 557 

zu.   at   Guilford 563 

at  battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill 572 

Huger,  Maj.  (Br.\  w.  at  Charlotte 519 

Huger,  Ensign,  k.  at  Guilford 5°3 

Huger,  John,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Hughes,   wrongly    credits   Arnold   with 

plan  to  surprise  Trenton 265 

his  opinion  of  battle  of  Trenton. . .   281 

Hughes,  Lieut,  w.  at  Guilford 563 

Hull,  Maj.  at  storming  of  Stony  Point.  .   472 
Humphreys,   Andrew    H.,    Brig.    Genl., 

Engr.  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Army 2 

Humphrey's,   Maj.   (Br.\   at   Freeman's 

Farm 340 

Hume,  Lieut.  (Am  ),  k.  at  Savannah.  .  .  .   482 

Huntington's  reg't  at  Long  Island 208 

promoted  Brig.  Genl 296 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


68; 


Hyder  Ali,  sweeps  through  Madras. ...  527 


I. 


IMPROVEMENT  of  success 75 

Independence  has  its  conditions 32 

Indian  auxiliaries  bring  radical  trouble.  325 

to  be  abhorred,  said  Burgoyne 326 

opposed  by  Genl.  Schuyler 158 

Indian     massacres     in    Wyoming    and 

Cherry  Valleys 459 

Indian  scouts  and  British  dragoons  rout 

each  other 407 

Inham,  Lord,  opposes   the  hire  of  Hes 
sians  172 

Insurrection,  see  civil  war 30-1 

has  no  apology 30 

imperils  all  ;  benefits  none 30 

Interior  and  exterior  lines  defined.    ...  58 
Irvine,  James,  Brig.  Genl.  pr 'is.  at  Chest 
nut  Hill 397 

Irvine,   Wm.,  Co\.pris.  at  Three  Rivers  167 
Irving,  Washington,    (historian),    diplo- 
mate  and  scholar,  b.  1783,  d.  1859. 

as  to  the  retreat  from  Brooklyn.  .  .  .  218 

as  to  the  march  of  Gates  south   . .  .  509 

as  to  Jackson,  a  boy  in  battle 509 

Itinerary   from    Fort    Lee   to    Philadel 
phia  243 


J. 


JACKSON,  Maj.,  rallied  troops  at  Bunker 

Hill no 

Jackson,  Lieut.,  with  artillery  at  Frogg's 

Neck 234 

at  Fort  Clinton 359 

Jackson,  Andrew,  sub.  Maj.  Genl,  and 
Prest.  twice,  b.  1767,  d.  1845. 

at  skirmish  at  Hanging  Rock 509 

Jacquerie   insurrection,    1358,  illustrates 

civil    war 30 

Jamaica  road  neglected  at  Long  Island.   206 
Jameson,  Maj.  reports  a  scout  along  the 

Brandywine 372 

Janizaries   in    1826  ;    illustrate   military 

policy ".     42 

Jasper,  Sergt.,  at  Fort  Moultrie 189 

k.  at  siege  of  Savannah 481 

Jay,  John,  statesman  and  jurist,  b.  1745, 
d.  1829. 

proposed  to  burn  New  York 212 

in  Spain 540 

Jefferson,  Mason  and  Wythe  the  patrons 

of  the  west 461 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  (statesman),  Gov.  sub. 
Prest.  twice,  b.  1743,  d.  July  4th, 
1826. 

rejects  Arnold's  proposals. .' 549 

deprecates  larger  powers  in  Wash 
ington       599 

narrowly  escapes  capture  by  Tarle- 

ton 6or 

Jesuits,  not  expelled  for  their  religion. .     42 
Johnson,  Sir  Wm.,  b.  1714,  d.  1774 323 


Johnson,  Sir  John,  excites  Indian  hostil 
ities  164 

with  St.  Leger  at  Fort  Schuyler 323 

incites  hostilities  in  1780 524 

Johnson,  Col.  Francis,  Court  of  Inquiry, 

(Schuyler) 312 

Johnson,     William,    U.    S.    Sup.    Court 

(historical  writer). 

as  to  skirmish  at  Williamson's  Plan 
tation  517 

comments  on  civil  discord 542 

Jomini,    Henri   Baron  de,  General,  mili 
tary  writer,  b.  1779,  d.  1869. 

ignores  representative  governments  27 

defines  military  policy 41 

distinguishes   war  on  the  map,  and 

war  on  the  field 44 

definition  of  base  of   operations...  50 

upon  a  base  of  operations 51 

maxims  in  strategy 60 

on  tactical  positions 67 

on  the  logistics  of  Napoleon 71-2 

opinion  of  a  good  retreat 75 

defines  qualities  of  a  good  general.  So 

Jones,  Maj.  k.  at  Savannah 482 

Jones,  Capt.,  gallant  at  Freeman's  Farm  341 
Jones,  John  Paul,  b.  1747,  d.  1792. 

appointed  Lieut 144 

distinguished  as  a  commander 654 

Jubilee  at  Valley  Forge    over   French 

alliance 404 

Jubilee    at    Philadelphia     in    honor    of 

Lord  Howe 408 


K. 

KASKASKIA  (Illinois),  taken  by  Clark  . .  401 

Kelley,  Lieut.,  w.  at  Monmouth 444 

Kelley,  Ensign,  w.  at  Guilford 563 

Kennedy,  Lieut.,  k.  at  Monmouth 444 

Kennett  Meeting  House 369 

Kent,  James,  Chief  Justice,  N.  Y.  (jurist 

and  author),  b.  1763,  d.  1847. 

opinion  of  Schuyler 319 

Kentucky  forts  gallantly  defended 460 

Kepple,  Admiral,  gives  an  opinion  of 

the  war „ ,  83 

Kettle  Creek,  skirmish  between  Pickens 

and  Boyd 464 

Kiechlines  rifle  battalion  at  Brooklyn  .  .  208 
Kingston,  Adjt.  Gen.,  reports  battle  of 

Freeman's  Farm 341 

Kingston  (Esopus)  burned 360 

King's  Bridge  fortified  ...    236 

King's  Mountain,  battle  described 520 

Kirkwood's  Delawares,  at  battle  of  Guil 
ford  559 

at  battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill 571 

at  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs 581 

Kitchell,  Mrs.  Uzal,  noted  for  patriotism  487 

Knowles,  Capt.,  lands  on  Sulln^m  Island  496 
Knowlton,  Thomas,  Capt.,  stw.  Colonel, 

at  Bunker  Hill 95 

Knowlton,  k.  at  Harlem  Heights 229 

Knox,  Col.,  sub.  Maj.  Gen.  (secretary  of 

war),  b.  1750,  d.  1806. 

Col.  of  artillery 144 


688 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Knox,  hauls  cannon  from  Fort  George  to 

Boston 148 

at  New  York 196 

to  divide  his  artillery 246 

enlists  artillerymen  in  Mass 294 

at  Germantown 388 

advises  to  attack  New  York 404 

at  Monmouth 439 

visits  Count  de  Grasse 635 

is  promoted 655 

with  Washington  through  the  war  .   655 
succeeds    Lincoln    as    Secretary  of 

War 655 

receives  the  surrender  of  New  York  656 
Knox,  Lieut.,  gth   Penn.,   distinguished 

at  Stony  Point 472 

Knyphausen,    Lieut.    Gen.,   b.    1730,    d. 

1789. 
selected  to  command  auxiliaries  ...    173 

arrives  at  Staten  Island 235 

is  transferred  to  New  Rochelle  ....   235 
marches  toward  Fort  Washington  .    242 

at  Fort  Washington 249 

at  Kennett  Square 367 

at  Chadd's  Ford 367 

engages  Maxwell 369 

at  Brandywine 370 

at  Brandywine,  forces  Chadd's  Ford  376 

at  Germantown 386 

at  Chestnut  Hill 397 

en  route  for  Monmouth 413 

at  Monmouth 434 

.retreats  to  New  York 442 

in  command  at  New  York 483 

crosses  on  the  ice  to  New  Jersey.  .  .   485 
invades  Westchester  County,  N.  Y.   459 

invades  New  Jersey 498 

at  Springfield,  New  Jersey 499 

not    responsible    for   fate    of    Mrs. 

Caldwell 499 

retreats  to  Staten  Island 500 

Kohler's  (//.)  heavy  artillery  at  Trenton, 

p  1777 285 

Kosciusko,  Thaddeus,  Maj.  Gen.  (Pole), 

b.  1750?  d.  1817. 

fortifies  West  Point 403 

plans  camp  for  Gates 336 

succeeds  Du  Portail  as  Engineer-in- 

Chief 527 

explores  the  Catawba 531 

joins  Greene 552 

at  Ninety-Six 574 

remembered 655 


LACEY,  Brig.  Gen.  (Br.}  in   skirmish   at 

Crooked  Billet 405 

La  Fayette,  Gilbert  Mottier,  Marquis  de, 

Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1757,  d.  1835. 
from  Newport  to  Boston  and  return     58 

assured  the  French  Alliance 79 

a  voluntee-  at  battle  of  Brandywine  380 
attacks  rear-guard  of  Cornwallis  in 

N.J 396 

assigned  to  a  division  vice  Stephen.    396 
assigned  to  invasion  of  Canada. . . .  402 


La  Fayette,  concurs   with   Washington 

as  to  policy 404 

in  command  at  Barren  Hill 405 

his  characteristics  stated 406 

skillful  conduct  at  Barren  Hill  ....  406 

pursues  Clinton  toward  Monmouth,  414 

writes  as  to  his  movements 414 

is  generous  to  Gen.  Charles  Lee  ...  415 

confers  with  Lee  as  to  battle 425 

shows  gallantry  at  Monmouth 434 

is  ordered  to  Newport 448 

visits  D'Estaing  at  Boston 453 

conducts  the  retreat  from  Newport.  455 

goes  to  France  in  the  frigate  Alliance  465 

returns  to  America 490 

adjusts  (fr.)  military  assistance. .  . .  491 

issues  a  mock  appeal  to  Canada  .  . .  504 
proposes  an  expedition  against  New 

York 523 

applies  to  join  Greene  at  the  South.  528 

explains  the  American  mutiny 538 

is  sent  to  capture  Arnold 584 

goes  to  Virginia 585 

visits  Yorktown  and  Suffolk 585 

reconnoitres  Portsmouth 585 

his  instructions 586 

ordered  to  join  Greene 586 

retained  in  Virginia 586 

deals  judiciously  with  deserters.  .  . .  586 

advances  toward  Richmond 589 

at  Hanover  Court  House 59° 

repulses  an  attempted  landing 591 

reports  his  rapid  march  to  Virginia.  591 
receives   2,000  guineas  from   Balti 
more  592 

plans  an  expedition  to  Wilmington  592 

his  letters  to  Washington 592 

attempts  to  cut  off  Cornwallis 593 

finds  Phillips'  division  in  his  way.  .  593 

is  confronted  by  two  armies 593 

aids  Greene  with  supplies 593 

is  sustained  by  Washington 594 

assigned  to  command  in  Virginia.  .  594 
advances    to    Wilton,  below    Rich 
mond  594 

unfolds  his  plans  to  Hamilton 594 

appreciates  the  campaign 598 

makes  a  prediction  of  the  result.  . . .  600 

effects  a  junction  with  Wayne 603 

follows  Cornwallis  from  Elk  Hill  .  .  603 

effects  a  junction  with  Steuben  ....  604 

reports  skirmish  at  Williamsburg  . .  604 

reports  movements  of  Cornwallis  . .  606 

hopes  to  assume  the  offensive 607 

is  complimented  by  Tarleton 6oS 

conspicuous  in  battle  of  Jamestown  609 

retires  to  Malvern  Hill 609 

at  Forks  of  Pamunky  and  Mattapony  6n 

threatens  the  rear  of  Gloucester. ...  611 

avoids  false  movements 611 

compliments  Cornwallis 61 1 

thanks  Washington  for  the  command  612 

delays  the  attack  upon  Yorktown. .  612 

anticipates  the  action  of  Cornwallis  613 

in  full  accord  with  Washington. . . .  614 

his  relations  with  Greene 617 

his  excellent  logistics  noticed 621 

reports  the  condition  of  his  army   .  623 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


689 


LaFayette,  reports  the  landing  of  French 

troops 624 

his  24th  birthday,  Sept.  6th,  1781. .   625 
directs  the  attack  of  a  redoubt.  .  .  .   638 
his  pleasantry  with  Baron  Viomenil  639 
returns  to  France  after  fall  of  York- 
town  646 

his  services  recognized 655 

Lamb,  John,  Col.,/;.  1735,  d.  1800. 

with  Arnold  in  assault  upon  Quebec  136 
commands  post  at  Anthony's  Nose.   355 
at  assault  upon  Fort  Montgomery.  .   359 
accompanies    Washington    to    Vir 
ginia 622 

Lamb,  R.,  sergt.  Royal  Welsh  Fusileers 

publishes  his    diary 168 

reports  sufferings  of  Am.  army  in 

Canada 168 

describes  battle  at  Freeman's  Farm  341 
his  opinion  of  battle  of  Monmouth.   445 
his  experience  of  battle  of  Guilford  563 
Lameth,   Chevalier   de,   (Fr.)   to.  before 

Yorktown .-  631 

Langdon,   Samuel  Rev.,    Pres.   Harvard 

College,  b.  1723,  d.  1797. 
invoked  God's  blessing  upon  march 

to  Bunker  Hill 95 

Langdon,  John,  on  Am  naval  committee  144 
Landing  of,  British  troops  at  Bunker  Hill  103 

Long    Island ....   200 

New  York 225 

Frog's    Neck 234 

Pell's  Point 237 

Verplanck's  Point 357 

Head  of  Elk 366 

in  South  Carolina 493 

French  troops  at  Newport,  R.  I.. . .  450 

Savannah,  Ga 478 

Jamestown,  Va oil 

La  Sensible,  frigate,  brings  the  French 

treaty 404 

Lasher,  Col.  (Am.}  in  the  Highlands..   247 
Latimer,  Col.,  in  the  army  of  Gates. . .  .   336 
Laurens,  Henry,  (statesman),  b.  1724,  d. 
1792. 

on  Com.  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Vice-president  of  South  Carolina.  .    180 
captured  on  a  mission  to  Holland.    528 
Laurens,  John,  Lieut.  Col.,  aid- de-camp 

of  Washington,  b.  1753,  d.  1782. 
Judge  Advocate    Court    of   Inquiry 

(Schuyler) 312 

with  La  Fayette  in  New  Jersey.  .  .  .   396 

sustains  D'Estaing 447 

conspicuous  at  siege  of  Newport. . .   454 

in  the  assault  upon  Savannah 481 

sent  on  special  mission  to  France.  .    539 
holds  an  interview  with  Count  Ver- 

gennes 540 

brings  back  gold  for  the  American 

army 623 

conspicuous  at  siege  of  Yorktown .  .   639 
a  commissioner   at    capitulation    of 

Yorktown 640 

Lake,    Lieut.  Col,  (Br.)   leads  a   sortie 

from  Yorktown 640 

Lauzun,  Duke  de,  with  army  of  Rocham- 

beau   .  .618 


Lauzun,  at  Ridgebuiy,  Connecticut   . . .  619 
routs  Delancey's  Refugees  at  Morris-  * 

sania 620 

defeats     Tarleton's     Legion     near 
Gloucester 638 

Lawson's  Virginia  battalion  at  Trenton.   273 

Lawson  Brig.  Genl.  at  battle  of  Guilford  557 

Learned,  Brig.  Genl.,  ordered  to  relieve 

Fort  Schuyler 324 

at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 336 

Bemis  Heights 347 

Saratoga 351 

Ledyard,  William  Col.,  (Am.),  b.  1750  d. 

1781,  commands  Fort  Griswold.  .   628 
wantonly  killed  by  Royalists 629 

Lee,  Richard  Henry,  (statesman),^.  1732, 
d.  1794- 

urges  Virginia  to  arm 85 

on  Am.  naval  committee 144 

cooperates  with  Patrick    Henry  in 

Virginia 174 

sent  to  find    Charles    Lee 262 

wishes  the  powers  of   Washington 
enlarged 598 

Lee,  Henry,  Col.  stib,  Brig.  Genl.  b.  1756, 
d.  1818. 

his  skill  with  light  troops 64 

at  storming  of  Stony  Point 472 

makes  a  dash  at  Paulus  Hook....   475 

his  regiment  recruited  at  large 526 

ordered  to  southern  department.  . . .    533 

ordered  to  join  Morgan 550 

with  Genl.  Greene  on  the  Dan. ...  552 
recrosses  the  Dan,  for  offensive 

action 553 

skirmishes  before  Guilford 560 

in  the  battle  of  Guilford 560 

at  capture  of  Fort  Watson 569 

at  capture  of  Fort  Motte 574 

at  siege  of  Augusta ....   574 

captures  Fort  Granby 574 

Lee,  Charles,  Maj.  Genl.  b.  1731,  d.  1782. 

with  (Am.)  army  before  Boston.  ...  89 
resembled  Arnold  in  volcanic  temper  119 
sent  to  Connecticut  to  recruit  troops  149 

ordered  to  New  York 149 

denounces  Congress 149 

his  conduct  at  New  York,  (Note). .  160 
ordered  to  Canada,  then  to  the  south  174 

arrives  at  Charleston,  S.  C 182 

is  controlled  by  President  Rutledge  182 
gives  wise  counsel  to  the  troops.  ...  183 
visits  Fort  Sullivan  during  the  battle  189 

joins  Washington  at  the  north 237 

is  assigned,  under  restricting  orders  237 

reaches  White   Plains 238 

writes  to  Gates,  deriding  Congress.  238 
criticises  the  rosition  of  the  army. .  239 

is  ordered  to  New  Jersey 250 

in  camp  at  North  Castle 256 

commands  a  large  division 256 

in  New  Jersey  with  his  army 258 

is  captured  at  Baskingridge 258 

writes  to  Gates  improperly 259 

disobeys  Washington's  orders 260 

insolent  to  Genl.  Heath 261 

writes  to  R.  H.  Lee  and  B.  Rush. .  262 
writes  again  to  Heath  262 


690 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND   GENERAL   INDEX. 


Lee,  his  capture  mildly  noticed  by  Wash- 

*     ington 263 

opposes  Washington 398 

joins  the  army  after  exchange 409 

advises  Washington 409 

on  parole,  before  his  exchange 409 

asks  Congress  to  confer  with  him  .  .  410 
proposes  a  compromise  of  the  war  .  410 
gives  improper  information  to  Howe  410 

opposes  the  pursuit  of  Clinton 417 

begs  La  Fayette  to  yield  his  com 
mand  4*5 

his  policy  defective 417 

commands  a  division  of  5,000  men  .  418 
understands  Washington's  wishes..  422 

quibbles  as  to  orders 424 

retreats  at  Monmouth 437 

has  an  altercation  with  Wash.ington.44O- 1 
is  convicted  before  court-martial. .  .  445 

his  circumstances  considered 445 

his  death  a  lesson ....    445 

declares  the  campaign  of  1778  to  be 

final 446 

Leighton,   Capt.  (Br.)  iv.  at   battle   of 

Monmouth 444 

Leitch,  Maj.  (Am.}k.  at  Harlem  Heights  229 
L'Enfant,  Maj.  (Fr.}  tries  to  burn  abatis 

at  Savannah 479 

Leslie,  Maj.  Gen.   (Br.)  lands  on   New 

York  Island 225 

in  skirmish  at  Harlem  Heights.  .  .  .  229 
commands  the  assault  at  Chatterton 

Hill 240 

is  stationed  at  Maidenhead,  N.  J..  .    285 

is  ordered  to  join  Cornwallis 541 

takes  possession  of  Charleston 497 

invades  Virginia 529 

fortifies  Portsmouth  and  Norfolk  .  .    529 

marches  to  join  Cornwallis 541 

effects  a  junction  with  Cornwallis.  .  546 
is  advised  of  reinforcements  for 

Virginia , 549 

at  the  battle  of  Guilford 558 

reinforces  Cornwallis  from  New  York  456 
Leslie,  William,  son  of  Earl  of  Levin,  k. 

at  Princeton 289 

Lexington  and  Concord,  their  lesson  ...  8 
expedition,  as  judged  by  Stedman  .  n 
expedition,  as  judged  by  Dr.  Dwight  12 
battle,  news  spreads  through  the 

Colonies    Si-6 

Light  troops,  their  value  illustrated  .  . .  .63-4 
Light    Infantry   (Am.},    authorized    and 

distributed 87 

Lillington,  Col.  (Am.)  at  Moore's  Creek 

Bridge,  Va 174 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  Pres.  U.  S.,  twice  b. 

1809  d.  1865. 

acts  upon  the  basis  of  sound  strategy     57 
Lincoln,   Benjamin,   Maj.  Gen.,  'b.   1733, 
d.  1 8 10. 

on  Mass.  Com.  Supplies 9 

joins  the  army  near  New  York  ....   231 

before  Fort  Independence 292 

promoted  Maj.  Gen 296 

Pres.  Court  of  Inquiry,  as  to  Schuyler  312 
sent    to   threaten   Burgoyne's   com 
munications  321 


PAGB 

Lincoln  urges  Gen.  Stark  to  join  the  army  331 
succeeds  to   command  of  Arnold's 

division 347 

at   Saratoga,  after  battle  of    Bern  is 

Heights 350 

makes  a  raid  about  Ticonderoga  .  .  351 
succeeds  Gen.  Robert  Howe  at  the 

South 464 

opposed  by  Maj.  Gen.  Prevost 464 

unwisely  divides  his  command 464 

retreats  to  Charleston 465 

proposes  the  capture  of  Savannah. .  477 
sends  vessels  to  land  Fr.  troops.  . . .  478 
commands  an  assaulting  column  ...  481 

raises  the  siege  of  Savannah 483 

in  command  at  Charleston 494 

surrenders  Charleston  to  Gen.  Leslie  497 

in  expedition  from  Peekskill 619 

in  skirmish  near  Fort  Independence  619 
commands  the  right  wing  at  York- 
town  635 

receives  the  surrender  of  Yorktown.  642 
Conducts  Am.  army  to  winter 

quarters 645 

on  duty  as  Secretary  of  War 655 

Lines  of  communication 58 

Lines  of  defense 55 

not  to  be  held  passively 56 

Lines    of    operation,    the    pathways    of 

armies 54 

parallel  and  deep,  illustrated 54 

Lines  of  Sherman's  march   to   the  sea, 

really  but  one 57 

Linsing,  Col.  (//".)  in  attack  upon  Fort 

Mercer 394 

Lisle,  Lieut.  Col.,  joins  Am.  army  with 

his  recruits 508 

Little,  Moses,  Col.,  sent  men  to  Bunker 

Hill 100 

Little  Neck,  N.  J.,  visited  by  Ferguson.   459 
Lively,  frigate,  opens   fire  upon  Breed's 

Hill 98 

Livingston,     James,     Col.,     recruits     a 

Canadian  battalion 

at  Chambly  with  Maj.  Brown  ....    129 

at  siege  of  Quebec . .    134 

at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 336 

Livingston,   Henry   B.,  Col.,  at   Ticon 
deroga  312 

his  opinion  of  the  post 312 

at  the  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm.  . .   336 

at  the  battle  of  Monmouth 439 

at  the  siege  of  Newport 451 

at  the  battle  of  Quaker's  HiJl.    ....   454 
Livingston,  William,  Gov.  N.  J.,  b.  1741, 
d.  1790. 

supports  Washington 246 

Locke,  Francis,  Col.  (Am.)  k.  at  Char 
lotte,  N.  C 519 

at  Ramsour's  Mills 519 

Logan,  Maj.  (Am.}  reconncitres  before 

Fort  Clinton 359 

Logistics  defined 48 

illustrated 68-72 

when  bad,  imperils  all 69 

embraces  all  executive  functions. . .     69 

of  America,  in  war  of  1861—5 69 

of  Prussia  in  1870 69 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


691 


Logistics,  the  great  care  of  Washington  140 
preeminent,  at  British    landing   on 

Long  Island 200 

good,    during     Am.     retreat     from 

Brooklyn 216 

of  Washington  illustrated 245—6 

of  La  Fayette  in  Virginia 591 

of  Great  Britain  in  Abyssinia  cam 
paign  69 

of  Great  Britain  on  Coast  of  Guinea     69 

of  march  to  Yftrktown 621 

of  the  war  of  1775-1783 652 

Long,   Col.   (Am.)  post    commander   at 

Ticonderoga. 

retreats  to  Skenesborough 313 

abandons  vessels  and  stores 314 

in  skirmish  near  Fort  Ann 315 

abandons  Fort  Ann 315 

Lords,  House  of,  votes  as  to  mercenary 

troops -. 172 

Losberg,    Maj.   Genl.   (H.)  at  Newport, 

R.  I 454 

Lossing,  Benson  John,  (historian  of  Am. 

Rev.),  b.  1813. 

as  to  Bunker  Hill 108 

as  to  Hale's  execution,  (Note).  . .  .  227 
states  true  basis  of  casualties  at  Sen- 

nington 333 

as  to  Arnold  at  Freeman's  Farm.  .  342 
his  life  devoted  to  American  history  342 
his  opinion  of  battle  at  King's 


Mountain, 


his  account  of  the  Associated  Roy 


alists, 
his  assistance  recoj 


nized  gratefully 


521 
626 

2 


a  grat 
Louis  XVI.,  King  of  France,  b.  1754,  d. 

1793- 
designates   12,000   men    as    aid  to 

America §03 

furnishes  6  millions  of  livres  for  the 

war 623 

Louisville,    Ky.,   (named     in    honor   of 

Louis  XVI.) 

a  type  of  good  base  in  1861-5 51 

Lunt's    company   at    battle   of    Bunker 

Hill 100 

Lynn  Bay,  the  anchorage  of  Counjt  De 

Grasse,    1781 615 

Lynch,    Thomas,    at    Am.    camp  "near 

Boston 143 

Lowndes,  Rawlins,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C.. .    179 
Lucan's  Mill,  scene  of  skirmish. .......   390 

Lovell,  Solomon,  signs   protest   against 

D'Estaing 453 


M. 

MACKENZIE'S,   strictures  on   Tarleton's 

campaign 522 

Mackey's  Provincials  at  Saratoga 350 

MaGaw,  Col.  at  Long  Island 214 

thinks  he  can  hold  Fort  Washington  245 
in  command  at  Fort  Washington. .  249 
declines  surrender  of  Fort  Washing 
ton  249 

qualifies  Howe's  ultimatum 249 

Mahon,    Lord,   Philip    Henry,    Earl   of 


Mahon,  Stanhope,  (statesman    and   his 
torian),  b.  1805.  « 
his  opinion  of  battle  of  Trenton. . .    281 
his  opinion  of  battle  of  Monmouth.   444 

Maitland,  Lieut.  Col.,  at  Beaufort 478 

makes  his  way  into  Savannah 475 

distinguished  at  Savannah 482 

Maitland,  Capt.,  (Br.\  w.  at  Guilktd. .  562 
Maidenhead,  included  in  plan  against 

Trenton 271 

Major      Generals      appointed,     Arnold 

omitted 296 

Majoribanks,   Maj.,  gallant   conduct   at 

Eutaw   Springs 578 

Malmady,  Col.  at   Eutaw  Springs 578 

Malvern  Hill,  occupied  by  La  Fayette.  609 
Mamelukes  in  1811,  suppressed,  why.  . .  42 
Manly,  Capt.  John,  takes  many  prizes.  .  140 
Marie,  Antoinette,  Queen  of  France,  b. 

1755,  d.  1793. 

intercedes  for  the  American  cause.    490 
Marion,   Francis,  Brig.  Genl.,  b.   1732,  d. 

1795- 

captain  in    1775 179 

his  antecedents 186 

at  Fort  Moultrie 186 

detached  by  Gates 509 

in  communication  with  Greene. . . .  532 

on  Black  River 532 

at  capture  of  Fort  Watson 569 

applies  for  artillery 570 

at  capture  of  Fort  Motte 574 

commanded   right   wing   at    Eutaw 

Springs 578 

continues  operations  at  the  south.  .  583 
Marlborough,  Duke,  (John  Churchill),  b. 
1650,  d.  1722. 

improved  success 76 

Marshall,  John,  Chief  Justice,  U.  S. 
(historian  and  jurist.)  b.  1755,  d. 
1836. 

opinion  of  Bunker  Hill 108 

as  to  movement  on  Three  Rivers.  .  166 

gives  casualties  before  White  Plains  240 

opinion  of  Schuyler 319 

report    of    Arnold     at     Freeman's 

Farm 342 

statement  of  mutiny  early  in  1781.  537 
report   of    the   American    army   in 

1781 537 

Martin,  statement  as  to  Bunker  Hill. . .  97 
Martin,  Gov.  of  N.  C.,  pledges  10,000 

men  to  the  crown 174 

Martha's  Vineyard,  destroyed  by  Genl. 

Grey 455 

Maryland,  appoints  Committee  of  Obser 
vation  86 

troops  at  Brooklyn 197 

troops  at  Harlem  Heights 229 

troops  on  nearly  every  battle  field.  491 

troops,  gallant  conduct  at  Camden.  516 

troops  at  Eutaw  Springs 578 

Mason,    George,    (Va.),    supports    Col. 

Clark  at  the  west 461 

Massachusetts,  Provincial  Congress  or 
ganized  for  war,  1776 9 

calls  upon  New  England  for  30,000 

men 84 


092 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


Massachusetts,  makes  war 84 

drafts  one-fifth  able  bodied  males. .   222 
troops    detained     at    Newport    by 

British  movements 255 

orders  a  monument  to  Chevalier  de 

St.  Sauveur 455 

liberal  to  its  troops  during  mutiny.    539 
Matthews,  John,  on  special  War  Com 
mittee 49° 

Matthews,    Maj.    Geul.    (Br.\    at    Fort 

Washington 250 

alarmed  for  stores  at  Brunswick. . .   291 

at   Brandy  wine 367 

lays  waste  Portsmouth  and  Norwalk  466 

at  Connecticut  Farms 498 

Mathews,  Col.  (Am.},  captured  light  in 
fantry  at  Germantown 389 

Mawhood,     Col.,     attacks     Mercer    at 

Princeton 288 

at  Quinton's  Bridge 405 

Maxwell,  Wm.  Brig.  Genl,  b.  in  Ireland, 
d.  1798. 

Col.  in  Canada  in  1776 166 

collected  boats  on  the  Delaware. . .   264 

commands  at  Morristown 264 

near  Elizabethtown 294 

to  pursue  Howe  to  Piscataway. . . .   300 

retires  before  Howe 301 

skirmishes  at  Red  Clay  Creek 366 

gallantry  before  Chadd's  Ford 369 

good  conduct  at  Brandy  wine 380 

in  the  reserve  at  Germantown 388 

sent  to  protect  Bordentown 404 

ordered  to  harass  Clinton's  retreat.   413 

skirmishes  at  Mount  Holly 413 

present    when     Lee     received    his 

orders 424 

witness  on  trial  of  Lee 424~7 

goes   with    expedition    against    In 
dians  475 

in  the  action  near  Springfield 499 

brigade  at  Springfield 500 

Maxwell,     Capt.,    patrols     Charlestown 

Neck 96 

Mayham,    Col.,    designed   the    May  ham 

tower 574 

Mayson,  James,  Lieut  Col.,  S.  C.  Rangers  179 
McArthur,  Maj.,  makes  a  gallant  sally 

from  Savannah 479 

in  charge  of  British  sick 510 

McCall's  mounted  men  at  battle  of  Cow- 
pens  543 

slaughter  royalists 541 

McConkey's  Ferry,  Washington  crossed 

at/Dec.  26,  1776 271 

McCowan's  Ford  forced 551 

McCrea,  Jane,  her  murder,  Burgoyne  not 

responsible 325 

McDonald,    Capt.,    uses    stratagem    at 

Hanging  Rock » . . .   508 

w.  at  Charlotte 519 

McDonald,  Sergeant,  at  Fort  Moultrie, 

w.  mortally 189 

McDonald,  Donald,  raises   a   corps   of 

royalists 174 

pris.  by  Col.  Caswell 174 

McDougal,    Alexander,    Brig.    Gen.,   b. 
1750,  d.  1786 


McDougal,    in   retreat    from    Long    Is 
land 217 

brigade  in  Spencer's  division 221 

brigade  near  Chatterton  Hill 235 

succeeds  Heath  at  Peekskill     296 

on  the  Hudson 298 

at  Peekskill,  1777 398 

at  West  Point  with  Kosciusko  ....   403 

commands  in  the  Highlands 458 

Secretary  of  Marine 588 

McDowell,  Irwin,  Maj.  Gen.,  U.  S.  Army, 
b.  1818. 

at  Bull  Run 62 

McDowell,   Charles,   Col.,    at   battle   of 

King's  Mountain 520 

McDowell,  Maj.,  joins  Morgan 541 

at  battle  of  Cowpens 543 

Mclntosh,  Col.,  taken/r/j.  at  Brier  Creek  465 
Mclntosh,  Alexander,  Maj  ,  2cl  S.  C.  regt  179 
McLaughrey,  Lieut.  Col.,  at  Fort  Clinton  359 
McLean,  Gen.,  at  Penobscot,  Maine  .  . .  474 
McLean,  Maj.,  with  Royal  Scotch  at 

Quebec 130 

McLean,  Capt.,  with  light  corps  at  Barren 

Hill 40^ 

McLeod,  Lieut.,  with  artillery  at  battle 

of  Guilford 561 

McLeod,    Donald,    raises    a    corps    of 

royalists 174 

McLeod,  Capt.,  attempts  the  capture  of 

Jefferson 601 

McPherson,  k.  at  Quebec 135 

McPherson,  Lieut.  (Br.)  k.  at  Savannah.  482 
McPherson,  Maj.  (Am.}  at  Jamestown.  .  608 
McPherson,  Maj.  (Br.)  at  Brier  Creek  .  .  464 

Meeker,  Maj.,  at  Minnisink 474 

Mecklenburg  County,   N.  C.,   character 

of  people 519 

Meigs,  Col.,  at  Quebec 137 

makes  an  incursion  at  Sag  Harbor.    297 

at  Stony  Point 472 

Mellon,  Lieut.,  reaches  Fort  Schuyler  .  .  323 
Mental  philosophy  directs  military 

success    18 

Mercer's  (Capt.)  evidence  on  trial  of  Lee  431 
Mercer,  Hugh,  Brig.  Gen.,  b.  1721,  d. 

1777. 

guarding  the  Delaware,  Dec.,  1776.    264 
attacked  by  Mawhood  at  Princeton  288 

IV.  mortally  at  Princeton 288 

Mercer,    Lieut.    Col.    (Am.}    cavalry    at 

Jamestown   608 

Merlin,  frigate,  burned  near  Fort  Mercer  395 

Mexico  illustrates  civil  war 29 

Middleton,  Arthur,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C. .  .  179 
Mifflin,  Thomas,  Gen.,  b.  1744,  d.  1800. 

prepares  for  assault  on  Boston 150 

ordered  to  provide  barracks,  N.  Y  .    156 

brigade  at  King's  Bridge 221 

instructed  by  Washington 246 

promoted  Maj.  Gen 296 

on  the  board  of  war 398 

neglected  his  duties. 398 

reports  at  Valley  Forge 408 

Miller,  Col.,  k.  at  Fort  Washington 251 

Miles,  Col.,  at  Long  Island 203 

Military  Art  levies  upon  all  art 16 

the  enigma  of  essential  force 16 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


693 


Military  armaments   bleed    nations    to 

death 20 

Military     achievements      honored      in 

Scripture 21-2 

Military  changes  of  both  armies  during 

the  war 655 

Military  commanders,  selection  of  ...  .79-80 
Military  conduct  not  to  be  controlled  by 

the  State 4° 

Military   education   necessary   for    best 

national  defense 15 

Military   force    gives    sanction    to    civil 

force 20 

Military  history  instinct  with  nobility.  .  20 

Military  men  must  conduct  war 43 

Military,  personal,  and  municipal  action 

nave  the  same  logic 16 

Military  Policy,  of  Gage,  1776 10 

the  State  responsible  for 40 

not  to  be  confounded  with  military 

conduct     , 4°-3 

illustrated  by  parable  of  Scripture. .  41 

illustrated,  1861-5 41"2 

in  the  Mamelukes  in  1811,  the  Jani 
zaries  in  1826,  and  the  expulsion 

of  the  Jesuits 42 

at  Bunker  Hill,  faulty 114 

of  Indian  auxiliaries  bad 279 

in  the  war  of  1775-81 650 

Military  principles  unfolded,  not  created  1 8 
Military  science,  never  more  worthy  of 

study 23 

under  a  higher  law 650 

Military  service  of  different  arms 63 

Military    success,  a    matter   of    mental 

philosophy. 1 8 

Military  stores  ordered  concentrated  at 

Concord,  1775 9 

Military  and  civil  codes  related 17 

Military  valor  honored  in  sacred  history. 21-2 

Militia  of  Massachusetts  organized,  1774  83 
Militia  the  true  dependence  of  England 

and  America 14 

Militia  system  of  America,  too  transient  15 

Minor  tactics  defined 48 

Minnigerode,  Col.,  w.  at  Fort  Mercer  .  .  394 
Minnisink,    New  York,    laid   waste    by 

Brandt 474 

Minute  men  of  1775 9 

Mobilization  of  Germany 14 

Modern  development  pregnant  with  strife  22 

Molly  (Br.\  Captain 249 

Monck's  Corner,  skirmish  at 575 

Monckton,  Lieut.  Col.,  4ist  Br.  Foot, 

w.  at  Long  Island 209 

k.  at  Hedge  Row,  Monmouth    ....  442 

buried  by  Americans  with  honor  .  .  443 
Moncrief,  Maj.  (Br.\  Chief  Engineer  at 

Savannah 482 

Monmouth  and  vicinity  described.  . .   419-21 

Monmouth  Battle  of — First  skirmish. .  .  433 

second    skirmish 434 

third  skirmish 435 

Battle 438 

Monmouth,  opinions  of  the  result.  . .  .  444-5 
Montgomery,     Richard,    Brig.    Genl.   b, 

1737,  d.  1775. 

with  Schuyler,  to  invade  Canada. . .  120 


Montgomery,  arrives  at   Ticonderoga. .  127 

arrives  at  St.  John's 128 

repulsed  at  St.  John's 128 

captures  St.  John's 129 

finds  army  without  discipline 129 

captures    Montreal 129 

disgusted  with  the  army 133 

dissuaded  from  resigning 133 

joins  Arnold   in  a  snow  storm 133 

leaves  Wooster  at  Montreal 133 

demands  surrender  of  Quebec 133 

k.  in  assault   on  Quebec !35-6 

Montgomery,  Maj.,  k.   at  Fort  Griswold  629 

Montgomery,     frigate,    burned    in    the 

Hudson 360 

Monroe,  James,  Lieut,  sub.  Pres.  b.  1758, 

d.  July,  14,  1831. 

at   battle  of  Trenton 273 

Montesquieu,  Charles  Baron  de,  b,  1689, 

d.  1755- 

declares  the  spirit  of  laws 21 

Monticello,  Jefferson's  home  visited  by 

Capt.    McLeod 600 

Moore,    Robert,    Brig.   Genl.,    excepted 

from  Clinton's  pardon        175 

Moore,  George  H.,  Sect.  N.  Y.  Histori 
cal  Society. 

disclosed  Lee's  plans 410 

Moore's,  regt.,  in  part  at  Bunker  Hill. .  .    100 
Moore's  House   near   Yorktown,    head 
quarters  of  Lincoln 636 

Moore's  Creek  Bridge,  skirmish 174 

Morgan,  Capt.,  skirmishes  before  Hob- 
kirk's  Hill 571 

Morgan,   Daniel,  Brig.  Genl.  b.  1737,  d. 
1802. 

commands   rifle  corps 64 

sent  to   Boston   in    1775,  with    Va. 

Light  Infantry 87 

goes  to  Quebec  with  Arnold 121 

gallant  conduct  at  Quebec 131 

made  prisoner  at  Quebec 137 

attacks  Hessians  on  the  Raritan. .  .    300 

sent  to  army  of  Gates 335 

at  Battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 341 

at  Battle  of  Bemis  Heights 347 

joins  Washington  from  the  north. .   397 

skirmishes  with  Cornwallis 397 

reinforces  Maxwell  in  New  Jersey.  414 

on  Clinton's  right  flank 416 

promoted  and  sent  south 526 

threatens  British  posts 541 

fights  battle  of  Cowpens 543 

retreats  from  Cowpens 54^ 

eludes  pursuit  of  Cornwallis 546 

disabled  by  rheumatism  for  further 

service 54^ 

crosses  the  Yadkin 551 

suggests  to  Greene  a  plan  of  battle  557 
Morris,  Gouverneur,  advised  of  Mifflin's 

conduct 4°8 

Morris,    Robert,   (financier    and    states 
man),  b.  1734,  d.  1806. 
knew  of  attack  on  Trenton  in  ad 
vance  268 

Secretary  of  Financial   Bureau.  . . .   588 

endorses  for  the  United  States.  . .  .   623 

Morris,  Maj,  Am.},  k.  at  Princeton 289 


694 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Morrisania,  the  headquarters  of  Delan- 

cey's    Refugees 610 

Morristown,  its  strategic  position 50 

a  good  rendezvous,  Dec.  1776 264 

reg*-s.  from  Ticonderoga  to  halt  at.   266 

McDougall  at,  Dec.  27th,  1776 276 

reenlistments  at  Dec.  27th,  1776. . .   276 

winter  quarters,   1777 291 

again  American  winter  quarters.  . .  483 
and  Valley  Forge  equally  fearful.  .  486 
the  objective  of  Clinton  in  1780.  . .  500 

Morton's  Hill 98 

Morton's     Point,   or     Moulton's    Point, 

(Note) 98 

Moslem  wars,  their  type 27 

Motte,  Rebecca,  aids  to  burn  Fort  Motte  574 
Motte,  Maj.  (Am.},  k.  at  Savannah. . . .  482 

Motte,  Capt.  at  Quebec 136 

Motte,  Isaac,  Lieut.  Col.  2nd  S.  C.  regt.   179 

Motte,  Charles,  Captain 179 

Moulder,   Capt.   (Am.},  with  artillery  at 

Trenton 288 

Moulton's  Point,  (Note.) 98 

Moultrie,  Fort 185 

Moultrie,  Wm.,  Brig.  Genl.,  b.  1730,  d. 
1805. 

Col.  in  1775 175 

builds  Fort  Sullivan ...    179 

his  antecedents 180 

his  faith  in  resistance 183 

his  gallant  defense 186 

rescues  Beaufort 464 

describes  slaughter  at  Savannah.  ...   481 
Mount    Independence,   opposite    Ticon 
deroga  308 

Mount  Washington,   (Lake    Champlain} 

fortified 280 

Mowatt,  Lieut.,    burns   Falmouth,  now 

Portland 143 

Moylan,  Col.,  quartermaster 231 

Muhlenburg,  Peter,  Maj.  Genl.,  b.  1746, 
d.  1807. 

promoted  Brig.  Genl 296 

at  battle  of  Brandywine 371 

on  Court  of  Inquiry,  Schuyler 312 

at    Brandywine 367 

in  reserve  at  Brandywine 370 

at  Germantown 389 

advises  to  attack  New  York 404 

at    Monmouth 444 

his  brigade    at   storming   of  Stony 

Point 472 

in  Virginia 529 

at  Suffolk 585 

at    Petersburgh 590 

promoted   Maj.    Genl ;    retires  from 

the  army 655 

Mungen's  House  near  Bemis  Heights.  .  346 
Murfreesborough,  retreat  from  1861-5.  •  73 
Murphy's  N.  C.  troops  at  storming  of 

Stony  Point ...  472 

Murray  Lindley,  the  friend  of  Greene.  .  80 
Musgrave,  Col.,  occupies  Chew  House  at 

Germantown 388 

Musgrove  sent  by  Greene  across  Catawba  532 
Musgrove's  Mills,  skirmish  at,  in  favor 

of    Americans 518 

Mutiny  of  American  army 536 


Mutiny,  Connecticut  troops 491 

New  Jersey  troops 463 

Pennsylvania  troops 537 


NAPOLEON  I.  (Bonaparte),  Buonaparte, 
Emperor  of  France,  b.   1769,  d, 
1821. 
tested  good   strategy  and  logistics 

in  first  Italian  campaign 61 

his  methods  compared  with  Brad- 
dock's  61 

used  the  sword  of  Habib 61 

valued  good  logistics 69 

styled    by   Jomini,    "his    own    best 

chief  of  staff  " 72 

uniformly  improved  success 76 

Napoleon     III.,    Louis     Bonaparte,    b, 

1808,  d.  1873. 
made  war  in  1870  without  notice  . .     46 

failed,  through  poor  logistics 69 

Nash,  Abner,  Gov.,  N.  C.,  addressed  by 

Gen.  Greene 529 

Nash,  Francis,  Brig.  Gen.,  promoted.  .  .   296 
in  the  reserve  at  battle  of  German- 
town 387 

k.  at  battle  of  Germantown 389 

National  capital, rarely  the  prime  objec 
tive  of  a  campaign 53 

National  wars  considered 25 

Nations  responsible  for  a  ready  defense.  22 
Naval  committee  appointed  by  Am. 

Congress 144 

cooperation  during  the  war 654 

regulations  established 144 

Naval  diversion  (J3r.}  from  New  York . .  201 
Naval  engagement,  between,  D'Estaing 

and  Howe  450 

Destouches  and  Arbuthnot 612 

De  Grasse  and  Hood 615 

Naval   operations   at    the    sport   of  the 

elements I,  35,  39 

not  guaranteed  by  steam  propulsion       3 
Navy    (Am.}    organized,    and    its    fate 

144  (note)  and  278 

Neil,  Capt.  (Am.}  k.  at  battle  of  Prince 
ton  288 

Neilson,  Charles,  as  to  Arnold  at  Free 
man's  Farm 342 

his  log  building  fortified 336 

Nelson,  Thomas,  Brig.  Gen.,  Gov.  Va.. 
b.  1738,  d.  1789. 

at  Williamsburg 594 

succeeds  Jefferson  as  Governor 601 

his  brothers  captured 601 

honored  for  services  rendered 656 

Nelson,    Maj.    (Am.}    protects    river   at 

Richmond 591 

Nesbit,  Brig.  Gen.  (Br.}  at  Three  Rivers  166 
Newark,  N.  J.,  visited  by  Knyphausen  .  485 
New  England  to  furnish  troops  for 

Canada 244 

loyalist  battalion  a  failure 320 

free  from  British  troops 488 

languid  under  relief  from  pressure.   488 
New  England  as  judged  by  Burgoyne.  .    337 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


695 


New  Hampshire  enters  upon  the  war. . .     84 
liberal    to    her   troops   during    the 
mutiny 539 

New    Hampshire    Grants    disgust    Gen. 

Riedesel 320 

New   Haven,   Conn.,   invaded   by  Gen. 

Tryon 469 

New  Jersey  enters  upon  the  war 85 

families  honored  by  Pres.  Tuttle. .  .   487 

patriotism  of  her  citizens 487 

regiments  mutiny 491 

legislature  relieves  suffer'g  troops.  463 
for  five  years  the  theatre  of  war  .  .    502 

New  London,  Incursion  of,  by  Arnold  625 

Newport,  R.  I.,  the  key  to  New  England  155 

occupied  by  British  troops 255 

besieged  by  American  troops 448 

threatened  by  a  Fr.  fleet 448 

abandoned  by  Sir  Henry  Clinton  .  .   476 

New  Rochelle  the  scene  of  a  skirmish. .   235 
occupied    by    Lieut.    Gen.    Knyp- 
hausen 235 

New  Windsor,  near  Newburgh,  Wash 
ington's  Headquarters 467 

abandoned 622 

New  York  the  primary  British  base. ...      51 

enters  upon  the  war 85 

treated  as  the  British  base  in  1775  .  118 
adopts  Declaration  of  Independence  195 
in  possession  of  the  British  army. . .  227 
evacuated  by  the  American  army  .  .  227 
militia  attracted  by  Howe's  pro 
clamation  244 

Nichols,  John,  Col.  (Am.)  at  Richmond, 

Va 549 

Ninety-Six  garrisoned  by  British  troops.  497 

successfully  resists  a  siege 574 

is  evacuated  by  British  troops 574 

Nixon,  John,  Brig.  Gen.  (Am.)  b.  1735, 
d.  1815. 

Col.  at  Bunker  Hill 100 

in  Spencer's  division 221 

guarding  the  Delaware  in  1776.  .  . .   265 

ordered  to  Albany 302 

joins  Schuyler  at  Stillwater 319 

on  court  of  inquiry  as  to  Schuyler. .   312 

in  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 336 

at  Saratoga 351 

Norfolk,   Va.,   bombarded   by   order  of 

Lord  Dunmore 149 

North    American    Pilot    gives    plan    of 

Charleston  harbor 176 

North  Carolina  enters  upon  the  war.  ...     86 

maintains  her  position 175 

troops  sent  to  Western  territories.  .   466 
troops  at  storming  of  Stony  Point.  .   472 

militia  at  battle  of  Caraden 515-17 

militia  at  battle  of  Guilford 556 

regulars  at  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs.   578 

Noailles,  Viscount  de,  commissioner  at 

Yorktown 641 

North,   Lord    Frederick,  Earl  of  Guil 
ford,  b.  1733,  d.  1792. 

anxious  for  peace 400 

his    Conciliatory    Bills    reach    New 
York 403 

Northern  frontier  threatened  in  1781  . . .   460 

Northern  troops  (Br.)  sent  into   Indiana  460 


Norton,  Lieut.  Col.  (£r.)  attacks  Young's 

House 486 

Norwalk,  Conn.,  burned  by  Gen.  Tryon  470 
Va.,  laid  waste  by  Gen.  Matthews. .  466 

Norridgewock  Falls  reached  by  Arnold.   122 

Norwich,  Conn.,  the  birthplace  of  Bene 
dict  Arnold 627 

Nutting,  Capt.,  at  battle  of  Bunker  Hill     g6 


O. 


OBJECTIVES  of  War,  considered 53 

Objectives  of  the  war  of  1775-1781 53 

Objective,  not  to  be  a  capital,  when. . .  .53~4 

Oblique  order  of  battle 66 

Obstacles,  considered 55 

Obstructions,  peculiar  to  this  war 77 

of  Burgoyne's  campaign 328 

Offensive  and  defensive  action 47 

Offensive  return,  when  on  the  defensive     51 
"  Officers,   the   very  soul    of  an    army." 

(Greene) 530 

to  be  made  easy  in   their  circum 
stances  530 

neither  to  beg,  gamble,  defraud,  or 
resign,  to  live.     (Washington.)  .  . 
Ogden's  regt.,  good  conduct  at  Brandy- 
wine  377 

O'Hara,  Maj.  Gen.  (Br.)  b.  1756,^.  1791. 

pursues  Morgan 552 

w.  at  battle  of  Guilford 561 

destroys  fortifications  at  Portsmouth  611 

joins  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown 611 

surrenders  the  army  of  Cornwallis  .   642 
O'Hara,    Lieut.    (Br.)   k.    at    battle    of 

Guilford 562 

Oneida  Indians  friendly  to  America  . . .   523 

attacked  by  Brandt  ....    524 

Onondaga  Indian  settlement  destroyed 

by  troops 463 

On  to  Richmond,  bad  military  policy,  in 

1861 44 

Opinions  of  Trenton  :  Lord  Germaine, 
Gordon,  Burke,  Hughes,  Stedman, 
Walter,  Mahon,  Abbe  Raynal, 

and  Anonymous 281-2-3 

Opinions  of  Bunker  Hill,  (Ramsey) 108 

battle  of  the  Cedars 165 

Monmouth 444~5 

Operations,  base  of 50 

lines  of 54 

theatre  of 54 

front  of 55 

zones    of 56 

Opportunity  given  to  men  and  nations.  .      39 
Order,  Capt.  (£r.\  lands  at  Mount  Pleas 
ant,   S.   C 496 

Orders  of  battle,  defined 65 

principles  stated 67 

illustrated  by  plate  after  page 67 

Oriskany,  battle  of 323 

Orne,  Azor,  Mass.  Com.  Safety 9 

Osborn,  Sir  George,  expected  the  attack 

upon  Germantown 386 

Oswald,   Eleazer,  Lieut.  Col.,  at  Quebec 

with  Arnold 137 

testifies  on  trial  of  Lee 420 


696 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


P. 


PALMER,  JOSEPH,  Mass.  Com.  Safety. . .  g 
Panic   finds  its  sole   limitation  in   disci 
pline 653 

sometimes   unavoidable 653 

of  American  troops  at  New  York. .  226 

militia  at  Camden 517 

of  good  (Am.)  troops  at   Hi/bkirk's 

Hill 572 

Br.  regulars  at  Eutaw  Springs. .  . .  580 

Paoli,  scene  of  disaster  to  Genl.  Wayne.  383 
Parable  of  the  Saviour  illustrates  Military 

policy 41 

Parker,    Sir  Peter,  Admiral,  b.    1616,  d. 
1811. 

leaves  Cork  for  America 173 

approaches  Charleston 180 

fails  in  attack  upon  Fort  Sullivan. .  189 

reaches  New  York 195 

sails  for  Newport 255 

Parker,  Hyde,  Admiral,  convoys  troops  to 

Savannah 459 

Parliament,  Acts  of,  to  be  resisted,  1776  9 
Parrs,  Maj.  Am.  rifle  corps  with  Sullivan, 

1779 475 

Parry,  Caleb,  Lieut.  Col.  (Am.),  killed  on 

Long    Island 209 

Parsons,  James,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Parsons,  Samuel  H.  Brig.  Genl.,  his  ante 
cedents  207 

at  Long  Island 209 

votes  to  abandon  Brooklyn 217 

in  Genl.  Putnam's  division 220 

his  brigade  panic-stricken 226 

his  brigade  well  constituted  .......    226 

before  Fort  Independence 292 

on  the  Hudson 298 

at  Peekskill 502 

is  too  late  to  save  Norwalk,  Conn.  .   471 
Partisan  warfare  ;  regardless  of  parties.    575 
distinguished  from  legitimate  opera 
tions  647 

warfare     at    the   South    continued, 

1781 583 

Patterson,  Adj.   Genl.  (Br.),  holds  inter 
view   with  Washington 194 

demands  surrender  of  Fort  Wash- 

ington 249 

Patterson,   Brig.   Genl.   (Br.),  reinforces 

Clinton 495 

leaves  Charleston  for  his  health.  ...    518 
Patterson,  Col.  (Am.),  sub.  Brig.  Genl. 

part  of  regiment  at  Bunker  Hill. . .    109 

sent  to  Canada 157 

at  Princeton 289 

at  Ticonderoga 311 

with  Gates 337 

at  Saratoga 351 

advises  to  attack  Philadelphia 404 

at  Monmouth 444 

Passage  of  rivers  considered 76 

Paulus  Hook,  attacked  by  Maj.  Henry  Lee  475 
Paumier,   Lieut.  (Br.),  w.  at  Monmouth  444 
Peabody,  Nathaniel,  on  special  war  com 
mittee  490 

Peace  means  rest,  without  waste 20 

the  normal  condition  of  society. ...      2u 
assured,  as  armies  are  least  needed.     21 


Penalties  assured,  lessen  crime  and  war.     21 
Peekskill  abandoned  by  Genl.  Putnam.  .   360 
Pennebeck  Hill,  the  camp  of  Washing 
ton,  Oct.  1777 387 

Penobscot   the  objective  of  a  fatal  expe 
dition  474 

Pennsylvania  insurrection    considered..     31 
adopts  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence  195 

troops,  distinguished  at  Brooklyn  .  .    197 

troops,  mutiny =. 537 

sent  to  Virginia  under  Wayne 584 

Pepperill,  Col.  (Am.),  at  Frog's  Neck. .  .    234 
Percy,  Hugh,  Earl,  Lieut.  Genl.  (Duke  of 
Northumberland),  b.  1742,  d.  1817. 
commands  a  brigade  at  Boston. ...      10 
rescues  the  troops  sent  to  Concord.      12 
advises  to  occupy  Dorchester  Heights  112 

distinguished  at  Bunker  Hill 115 

ordered      to       recover      Dorchester 

Heights 153 

is  defeated  by  a  storm 153 

at  battle  of  Long  Island 202 

stationed  at  McGowan's  Pass 234 

joins  Howe  at  White  Plains 241 

at  attack  upon  Fort  Washington   ,  .    250 

at  Newport,  Rhode  Island 255 

Peter's  Provincials  with  Baume  at  Ben- 

nington 329 

Peter,  Capt.  (Br.)  w.  at  battle  of  Guilford  562 
Petersburg,  Va.,  taken  by  Phillips  and 

Arnold 589 

Philadelphia  engages  in  the  war 85 

the  objective  of  Gen.  Howe  in  1777     53 
regarded  as  a  determining  objective  363 

welcomes  the  American  army 365 

occupied  by  Lord  Cornwallis 384 

gives  a  fete  to  Gen.  Howe 408 

is  abandoned  by  Gen.  Clinton 412 

its  military  value  considered 412 

welcomes  the  Am.  army,  1781 623 

welcomes  the  French  army,  1781. ..   623 
Phillips,  Maj.  Gen.  (Br.)  at  Three  Rivers, 

Canada 166 

in  Burgoyne's  campaign 308 

occupies  Mount  Hope 308 

pursues  Col.  Long  to  Skenesborough  315 

returns  to  Ticonderoga 315 

reaches  Fort  George  with  artillery  .   320 

at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 340 

at  battle  of  Bemis  Heights 345 

invades  Virginia 5°° 

his  force  stated,  May,  1781 ........   589 

at  Chesterfield  C.  H .  . 59° 

returns  to  Petersburg 593 

dies,  and  succeeded  by  Arnold 596 

Phoenix  and  Roebuck,  frigates,  at  Dobbs' 

Ferry 232 

Physical  force,  as  a  sanction  of  law  ....     20 
Pickens,  Andrew,  Col.  (S.  C.)  b.  1739,  d. 
1817. 

surprises  Boyd's  Provincials 404 

joins  Gen.  Morgan 541 

at  battle  of  Cowpens 543 

before  Augusta 574 

commands     left    wing     at     Eutaw 

Springs 57$ 

continues  active  operations,  1781-2.   583 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


697 


Pickering,    Timothy,   Col.— Brig.    Gen., 
sub.  Sec.  War,  Sec.  State,  b.  1745, 
d.  1829. 
succeeds  Reed  as  Adjt.  Gen.  (Am.}.   296 

appointed  Quar.  Mas.  Gen. 492 

Pickering,  Brig.  Gen.,  S.  C.,  with  militia, 

1781 569 

Pigeon,  John,  Mass.  Com.  Safety 9 

Pigot,     'Maj.     Gen.     (Br.}      commands 

brigade  at  Boston 10 

distinguished  at  Bunker  Hill 104 

in  command  at  Newport,  R.I 448 

his  plan  for  defense  of  Newport  ...   451 
reports  the  defeat  of  Am.  army  ....   454 
Pinckney,    Charles   C.,    siib.    Diplomate 
and  Statesman,  b.  1746,  d.  1825. 

a  captain  in  South  Carolina 179 

Com.  Safety 179 

promoted    colonel  and    at    Charles 
ton  181 

Pinckney,  Thomas,  sub.  Diplomate  and 
Statesman,  b.  1729,  d.  1779. 

in  the  State  service  of  S.  C   , 179 

Pitt,  William  (Statesman  and  Orator),  b. 
1759,  d.  1806. 

gives  his  opinion  of  Guilford 564 

Pitcairn,  Maj.  (Br.  marines)  at  Concord, 

Mass n 

k.  at  Bunker  Hill no 

his  memory  honored 12 

Plans  and  Counter  Plans,  1776    255 

Plundering,  endangered  Bennington.  .  .  .   333 
lost  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  .  . .   581 
Pollard,  Ensign  (Br.},  k.  at  Savannah   .  .   482 
Pomeroy,  Seth,  Brig.  Gen. 

appointed  Gen  .-in-Chief  by  Mass. .       9 

his  antecedents 84 

appointed  continental  Brig.  Gen.  .  .      89 

brave  at  Bunker  Hill 100 

declines  an  active  commission loo 

Poor,  Enoch,  Brig.  Gen.,  b.  1736,  d. . 

as  Col.,  sent  to  Canada 157 

at  battle  of  Princeton 289 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

at  Ticonderoga 311 

at  Freeman's  Farm 336 

at  Bemis  Heights 347 

advises  an  attack  upon  New  York  .   404 

at  Barren  Hill 407 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 444 

with  Sullivan  in  expedition  against 

Indians 475 

Pope,  John,  Maj.  Gen.,  U.  S.  Army,  b. 

1823. 
his   assignment   in    1862    illustrates 

Military  Policy 57 

Porter,  Col.,  his  regiment  will  serve  two 

weeks  longer 276 

Porter's    militia   neglect    their   duty    at 

Barren  Hill 406 

Porterfield,     Col.,    nth    Va.    regt.,    in 

Arnold's  expedition  to  Quebec. .  .    137 
in  skirmishing  at  Chadd's  Ford  . . .   369 

in  Southern  Department 510 

effects  a  junction  with  Gates 510 

taken  pris.  at  battle  of  Camden. ...   518 
Port  Royal.  S.  C.,  occupied  by  British 

troops 465 


Portsmouth  laid  waste  by  Gen.  Matthews  466 

occupied  by  Gen.  Leslie 525 

fortified  by  Gen.  Arnold 549 

demolished  by  Gen.  O'Hara 610 

Potter,  Col.  (Am.}  k.  at  battle  of  Trenton  289 
Potts,    Stacy,    furnishes    Col.    Rahl    his 

Headquarters 273 

Powell,  Brig.  Gen.,  with  Burgoyne 215 

Powell,  Capt.  (Br.)  w.  at  battle  of  Mon 
mouth  444 

Powder  greatly  needed  at  Boston. . .      -95 
seized  in  South  Carolina  and  Georgia     79 
Pownall,    Thomas,    Ex-Gov.,    reads    the 

future  of  America 656-7 

Prescott,  Maj.  Gen.  (Br.)  captured  near 

Montreal 129 

commands  at  Newport,  R.I 255 

captured  again  by  Col.  Barton .    ...   409 

exchanged  for  Gen.  Lee 409 

Prescott,  William,  Col.,  b.  1726,  d.  1795. 

his  antecedents 84 

chief  actor   at  redoubt   on   Bunker 

Hill 93 

advised  the  movement 95 

marched  the  command,  under  orders  96 
conspicuous  for  gallant  conduct.  ...  97 
his  relations  to  the  battle  (Note).  . .  98 
with  Warren  the  last  to  retreat. ...  no 
makes  rash  proposal  to  regain  the 

position *  10 

commands  Governor's  Island,  N.  Y.  197 
in  Parsons'  brigade  at  New  York . .  226 

at  Pell's  Point  with  his  regt 234 

Preparations  for  the  war 82 

Piesident  of  Congress   reviews  Rocham- 

beau's  army 624 

Prevost,   Sir    Augustine,  Maj.   Genl.    at 

St.  Augustine,  Florida 446 

captures  Sunbury,  Georgia 464 

defeats  Genl.  Ashe  at  Brier  Creek .   464 
demands   the  surrender  of  Charles 
ton  465 

retires  to  Savannah 465 

gains  time  by  parley  with  D'Estaing.  479 

destroys  roads  and  bridges 479 

makes  gallant  defense  of  Savannah  479 
"  Pride   or     principle     must    nerve    the 

soldier,"  Greene 531 

Principles  of  Am.  Rev.  the  life  of  English 

liberty 4 

military  science  defined  in  Chap.  XI.     60 

the  Ant.  Rev.  reviewed 646—7 

Prince  Edward,  C.  H.,  visited  by  Tarle- 

ton 622 

Prince   of    Wales    regiment    nearly    de 
stroyed  508 

Princeton,  battle,  an  American  success  288—9 
college  occupied  by  British  troops.    289 
Prisoners   taken  at  Saratoga  sent  to  Vir 
ginia 353 

Privateering  in  high  favor 278 

Privateers  and  British  cruisers  in  1776..   399 
Proclamation    of,   day   for    fasting    and 

prayer,   1776 ic 

Burgoyne 306 

counter,  of  Washington 306 

of  Burgoyne 318 

Schuyler 318 


698 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


Proclamation  of  Howe 279 

Clinton 175 

Proctor,  Thomas,  Capt.,  commands  guns 

at  Chadd's  Ford 368 

accompanies    Sullivan    against    In 
dians 475 

Promotions  of  Am.  officers  give  dissatis 
faction  296 

of  general  officers  specified 296 

Prospect   Hill  occupied  by   Genl.    Put 
nam,  (Note.) in 

Protest  sent  to  Count  D'Estaing,  unten 
able 453-4 

Providence  in  war  illustrated,  Chap.  VII     35 

emphasized 650—51 

Provincial  Congress,  (Mass.)  vote  to  raise 

an   army 10 

Prussian  Logistics  excellent  in  1870.  ...      69 
Pulaski,  Casimir,  Count,    Maj.  Genl.,   b. 

1747,  d.  1779. 
rescues  the  post  of  Little  Neck...   459 

skirmishes  near  Charleston 465 

k.  at  siege  of  Savannah 481 

is    remembered 655 

Purchase  of  powder  and  cannon  author 
ized 87 

Putnam,  Rufus,  Col.  engineer  at  Boston  152 

on  Schuyler's  Court  of  Inquiry 312 

Putnam,  Israel,  Maj.  Genl.  b.  1718,^.  1790 

his  antecedents 84 

an  original  appointment 89 

at  occupation  of  Bunker  Hill 95 

his  relations  to  the  battle,  (Note). .     98 

asks  for  reinforcements 99 

generally  useful  during  the  battle..  102 
his  efforts  to  rally  the  troops  nearly 

fruitless 109 

retires  to  Prospect  Hill,  (Note) in 

in  command  at  Boston 153 

succeeds  Sullivan  at  Brooklyn 204 

in  command  during  battle  of  Long 

Island 205 

neglects  to  test  the  reconnoissance. .    206 
sends  Stirling  to  reinforce  the  pick 
ets 207 

commands  five  brigades 220 

advises  to  abandon  New  York 221 

covers  the  retreat  from  New  York.  .    225 

his  division  in  peril 227 

fails  to  close  the  Hudson  river.  .  .  .  243 
has  confidence  in  Fort  Washington.  249 
in  command  at  Philadelphia. ..  ..  271 
fails  to  cooperate  in  surprise  of 

Trenton 276 

holds  troops  ready  to  go  north 299 

warns  Gates  of  Clinton's  movements  352 

commands  in  the  Highlands 355 

furloughs  New  York  militia 356 

is  out-generaled  by  Gen.  Clinton. .   360 

retires  from  Fishkill 360 

reoccupies  Fishkill 361 

his  patriotism  superior  to  his  general 
ship 361 

withholds  troops  from  Washington .  384 
tnakes  weak  demonstrations  upon 

New  York 384 

itill   keeps   troops    from    the    main 
army 397 


Putnam,  Israel,  in  Connecticut  until  Dec. 

1777 392 

in  command  at  Danbury 458 

remembered  in  his  retirement 655 

Pyle's  loyalists  utterly  routed,  (no  quarter)  554 


<*• 

QUEBEC,  expedition  of  Arnold  organized, 

1775 ; 121 

statement  of  the  march  and  trials  .  122-24 

assault  upon  the  lower  town 130 

reinforced      by      McLean's      Royal 

Scotch 130 

surrender  demanded  by  Arnold.  .  .  .    131 
surrender  demanded  by  Montgomery  134 

plan  of  double  assault. .  .  .• .  .    134 

Montgomery's   assault   and  death  135-6 

Arnold's  assault  and  fall 136-6 

siege   raised .  .    163 

Queen's  Rangers  at  Chadd's  Ford 370 

at   Monmouth 441 

at    Elizabethtown 499 

sent  to  Virginia 548 

Quinby's  Bridge,  skirmish  at 575 

Quinton's    Bridge,   skirmish    at,    March 

1 8th,    1778 405 


R. 


RACCOON  rifles  at  Charleston 185 

Ragg  (-Br.},  Lieut,  of  marines,  pris 200 

Rahl,  (Rail)  Col.  (Hessian)  at  Chatterton 

Hill 239-40 

at  Fort  Washington 250 

a  good  fighter 268 

in  command  at  Trenton 273 

w.  mortally  at  Trenton 274 

his  error  at  Trenton 275 

controversy  as  to  his  name  (Note).  .    277 
Railways   supported   Prussian    Logistics 

in  1870 69 

Ramsey,  David  (M.  D.),  S.  C.  (historian), 
b.  1749,  d.  1815. 

opinion  of  Bunker  Hill 108 

opinion  of  battle  of  Guilford 564 

as  to  Canadian  sympathy 161 

Ramsey,  Col.,  at  battle  of  Monmouth  . .  439 
Ramsour's  Mills,  (Ramseur)  skirmish. .  .  498 
Randolph,  frigate,  under  Biddle. . .  .399,  654 
Rank  of  French  and  American  officers 

regulated 491 

Raw  troops  may  be  pushed,  when 116 

Rawdon,  Francis,  Lord,  Marquis  of 
Hastings,  Earl,  sub.  Gov.  Gen. 
India,  b.  1754,  d.  1825. 

uses  good  strategy  at  Camden 50 

gallantry  at  Bunker  Hill 115 

reinforces  Clinton  at  the  South  ....  491 

stationed  at  Camden 506 

gallant  conduct  at  battle  of  Camden  516 

plans  an  attack  upon  Greene 571 

attacks  Greene  at  Hobkirk  Hill.  . .   572 
pursues  Greene  a  short  distance  . . .   572 

retires  to  Camden 573 

details  of  the  battle 571-3 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


699 


Rawdon,    Francis,    goes    to    relief     of 

Ninety-Six 574 

pursues  Greene  to  the  Ennoree. . .  .   574 

retires  to  Monk's  Corner 574 

compromised  by  assent  to  Balfour's 

policy ; 575 

sails  homeward,  and  is  captured  . .  .    577 

meets  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown  ....    577 

Rawlings,  Col.  (Am.}  at  Fort  Washington  248 

w.  at  Fort  Washington 250 

Raynal,  Abbe,  opinion  of  Trenton 282 

Read,  Col.,  at  Bunker  Hill 100 

Reade's  Virginia  militia  at  Hobkirk  Hill  572 

Rear  Guards,  in  retreat 74 

their  importance 77 

Rebellion  defined 31 

Reed,  Col.,  at  Princeton 289 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

Reed,  James,  Col.,  at  rail  fence,  Bunker 

'Hill 102 

Reed,  Col.  (S.  C.)  k.  at  Rocky  Mount.  . .   507 
Reed,  Joseph,  Adjt.  Gen.,  sub.  Gov.  Pa., 
b.  1741,  d.  1785. 

at  Boston 157 

goes.to  New  York 157 

at  Harlem  Heights 230 

his  horse  shot, in  skirmish 230 

report  of  the  skirmish 230 

describes  the  want  of  discipline. .  .  .   232 

proposes  to  resign 232 

at  Chatterton  Hill 240 

reports  as  to  H.  in  New  Jersey  ....   266 
urges  operations  in  New  Jersey.  .  .  .   267 

distinguished  for  service 656 

Reed,  Mrs.  Esther,  wife  of  Joseph  Reed, 

honored  by  Bancroft 488 

Reenlistments  in  1776,  vital  to  American 

cause 277 

Regular  army,  a  national  police,  nucleus 

for  national  defense    14 

Regular  army  of  Great   Britain  and  the 

United  States 14 

Regular  army,  a  basis  for  national  defense  526 

Regular  army  necessary 651 

Republic  of  South  Carolina 176—80 

Retreat,  as  treated  by  Jomini 73 

as  treated  by  Archduke  Charles. ...      73 

as  treated  by  Col.  Hamley 73 

when  well  conducted,  to  be  honored 

with  victory 74 

through    New    Jersey   (See   Wash 
ington)  73 

from  Barren  Hill  (See  p.  406) 73 

from  Philadelphia  (See  p.  413)  ....      73 

discussed 73 

in  American  civil  war.  . .    73 

from  Long  Island  (See  pp.  217-18). 73-4 

from  Quebec 163 

from  Hubbardton 317 

of  Lee  from  Monmouth 437 

from  Newport 455 

from  Cowpens 545 

from  Guilford 564 

Retreating  army,  pursuit  of 75 

Revolution,  defined 32 

not  an  inherent  right,  but  a  contin 
gent  duty 32 

the  last  resort 33~4 


Revolutionary  Epoch  discussed 3-7 

Rhode  Island,  as  a  British  base 58 

enters  upon  war 84 

Richardson,  Col.,  at  Harlem  Heights    .   229 
Richmond,  Va.,  as  an  objective,  1861-5.      54 
Richmond,  Duke,  (Charles  Lennox,)  Sec. 
State,  b,  1735,  d.  1806. 

his  prophecy 400 

denounces  Hayne's  execution 575 

Richmond  occupied  by  Arnold 549 

Ridgebury  the  headquarters  of  Rocham- 

beau 618 

Riedesel,  Friedrich  Adolph,  Baron,  Maj. 
Gen.,  b.  1730,  d.  1800. 

arrives  in  Canada 164 

at  Three  Rivers 166 

with  Burgoyne's  expedition      309 

pursues  St.  Clair 314 

mistakes  New  England  sentiment. .   320 
detained  at  Castleton  by  w.  men. . .   320 

plan  to  mount  his  dragoons 327 

at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 340 

at  battle  of  Bemis  Heights 345 

Riedesel,  Madame 350 

Rivers,  as  lines  of  operation 54 

Rivers,  the  passage  of 76 

Roberdeau,    Brig.    Genl.,   reports   some 

startling    rumors 194 

brigade  with  Greene 237 

Roberts,  Owen, Maj.  1st  S.  C.  regt 179 

Robinson,  Col.,  w.  at  Green  Springs..  .    508 

Robinson,  Lieut.  (JE>r,\  at  Guilford 562 

Rochambeau,  de,  Jean  Baptiste  Donatien 
de  Vimeur  (Fr.),  Marshal,  &  1725, 
d.  1807. 
arrives     at    Newport    with    French 

troops 503 

reports  condition  of  American  affairs  503 
concerts  operations  with  Washing 
ton  584 

at  Wethersfield 603 

again  at   Wethersfield 618 

at  Ridgebury,  Connecticut 618 

joins  Washington 620 

reconnoitres  in  New  Jersey 620 

with  Washington  at  West  Point..  .   622 
lends  $20,000  in  gold  on  pledge  of 

Robert  Morris 623 

marches  his  army  through  Philadel 
phia  623 

his  army  reviewed  by  the  President.  624 

joins  Washington  at  Chester 624 

visits  Baltimore 630 

visits  Mount  Vernon 630 

visits  Count  De  Grasse 635 

honors  his  old  regiment 638 

signs  capitulation  of  Yorktown.  . .  .   641 

winters  in  Virginia,  1781-2 644 

sails  from  Boston 644 

his  army  highly  honored 644 

Rochambeau,  Col.  (Fr.),  goes  to  France 

for  supplies 525 

Rocheblave  commands  at  Kaskaskia . . .   461 
Rodney,  George  Bridges,  Lord  Admiral, 

sends  Howe  to  America 614 

before  House  of  Commons 615 

Rodney,   Thomas,  describes   the   stormy 

night,  Dec.  26th,   1776 272 


;oo 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Rodney,  Caesar,  Gov.  Del.  addressed  by 

Greene 529 

Roebuck,  frigate,  at  Red  Hook 201 

frigate,  at  Philadelphia 395 

Rohan  County,  N.  C.,  its  people 519 

Rocky  Mount,  skirmish 507 

Rose,  frigate,  at  New  York,  (map)  Bat 
tle  of  Long  Island. 

at  Savannah 478 

Ross,  Lieut.  Col.  reconnoitres  along  the 

Brandywine 371 

Ross,  Maj.  (-Br.),  signs   capitulation   of 

Yorktown 641 

Royal  Governors  on  ships  of  war 180 

Rugely's   Mills,  slaughter  of   American 

cavalry 497-S 

Rush,  Benjamin,  (statesman  and  philan 
thropist),  b.  1745.  d.  1813. 

sent  to  find  Lee 262 

Rutherford,  Genl.,  sent  to  Black  Swamp  464 
Rutledge,    John,   Gov.     S.  C.,    and  siib. 
Chief  Justice  Sup.  Court    S.  C.,  b. 
1739,  d.  1800. 

eminent  in  defense  of  Fort  Sullivan  181 
prevents  a  fatal  blunder  of  Lee. .  .  .  182 
sends  a  laconic  note  to  Moultrie.  .  .  1 88 

this  note  correctly  cited 188 

is  reflected  Governor  465 

applies  to  D'Estaing  for  aid  against 

Savannah 477 

has  full  powers  at  Charleston,  1780.   494 
Ru.sell,  Wm.  Col.  on  Court  of  Inquiry, 

(Schuyler) ;    ....   312 


SACRED  History  honors  military  valor. .  21 

Saint  Clair,  Arthur,  Maj.  Gen,,  b.   1734, 
d.  1818. 

Colonel  in  Canada 166 

at  battle  of  Trenton 274 

at  battle  of  Princeton 289 

appointed  Adjt.  Genl 296 

at  Ticonderoga 299 

gives  notice  of  Burgoyne's  advance.  302 
confident  of  the  strength  of  Ticon 
deroga  311 

calls  council  of   war 313 

abandons   Ticonderoga 313 

retreats  to  Castleton 316 

joins  Genl.  Greene  at  the  south.  ...  655 

Saint   John's,  captured  by  Arnold 120 

captured  by  Montgomery 129 

abandoned  by  Sullivan 168 

occupied  by  Burgoyne 169 

Saint  Leger,   Barry,  Colonel  (Br.),  com 
mands    expedition     to    Mohawk 

Valley 305 

reaches  Oswego,  New  York 320 

executes  a  well  planned  movement.  323 

makes  a  proclamation 324 

suffers  loss  by  a  sortie   from   Fort 

Schuyler 324 

fights  Genl.  Herkimer  at  Oriskany.  324 
writes    Burgoyne    hopefully   of  his 

prospects 324 

raises  the  siege  of  Fort  Schuyler. . .  325 


Saint  Leger, his  retreat  and  its  effect. . . .   325 
Saint     Luc     in     charge    of    Burgoyne's 

Indian   allies , 326 

is  offended  by  Burgoyne's  honesty.  .   327 
Saint  Sauvier,  Chevalier  de,  k.  at  Boston  455 

is  honored  by  a  monument 455 

Saint  Simon,  Count  de,  lands  at  James 
town  with  French  troops 612 

is  willing  to  serve  under  La  Fayette  612 
participates  in  siege  of  Yorktown.  .  612 
approves  of  La  Fayette's  action. . . .  612 

sails  for  the  West  Indies 645 

Salvin,   Lieut.   (Br.)  k.  at  battle  of  Guil- 

ford 563 

Sander's  Creek,  (battle  of  Camden) 514 

Sargent,  Colonel,  reports   British  move 
ments  225 

Saul,    King  of   Israel,  after  battle,  like 

Gates  at  Saratoga 344 

Savage,  Capt.  (Am.)  at  battle  of  James 
town  6oS 

Savannah  captured  by  Lieut.  Col.  Camp 
bell  (Br.) 459 

repels   assault  of  allied  armies.  .   477-83 
Scammel,     Alexander,      Col.     Aid     de 

camp,  Adj.  Genl. 
gives  false  alarm  at  Brooklyn. .  ...   218 

at  battle  of   Freeman's  Farm 336 

accompanies     Washington    to    Vir 
ginia  622 

mortally  w.  near  Yorktown 635 

Schaick,    Col.,    surprises    a    village    of 

Onondaga  Indians .*" 463 

Schmultz.   Capt.    (Br.}   k.    at    battle    of 

Guilford 562 

Schloozer  misstates  Indian  atrocities.  . .    325 
Schncener,  Lieut.  (Br.)  k.  at  battle  of 

Guilford 563 

Schuyler,   Philip,    Maj.   Gen.,  sub.    Sen 
ator,  b.  1733,  d.  1804. 

appointed  Brig.  Gen 89 

sent  to  invade  Canada 120 

is  delayed  by  ill  health 125 

joins  the  northern  army 127 

captures  St.  John's,  after  siege.  .  .  .128-9 
hears  from  Washington  as  to  Allen's 

capture 128 

writes  to  Montgomery  and  others.  132-3 
underestimates  the  patience  of  Job.  139 
has  the  sympathy  of  Washington  .  .  139 

opposes  Indian  auxiliaries 158 

negotiates  for  peace   with   the    Six 

Nations 159 

is  relieved  by  Gates,  but  reinstated.    310 

orders  forts  put  in  good  order 311 

doubts  the  strength  of  Ticonderoga.   312 

attempts  to  reinforce  the  post 312 

answers    Burgoyne's     second     pro 
clamation 318 

obstructs  Burgoyne's  line  of  march.  318 
shares  Washington's  confidence. .  . .  318 
is  judged  by  Marshall,  Kent,  and 

Webster 319 

abandons  Fort  George 319 

sends  Lincoln  to  rear  of  Burgoyne.  321 
sends  troops  to  relieve  Fort 

Schuyler 324 

is  superseded  by  Gates 334 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


701 


Schuyler  Philip,  his  deportment  toward 

Gates 335 

in  Congress,  on  War  Committee  .  . .   490 

his  character  vindicated 319 

declines  to  become  Secretary  of  War  588 
Scott,  Charles,  Brig.  Gen.,  sub.  Gov.  Ky., 
b.  1746,  d.  1820. 

Col.  at  battle  of  Trenton 273 

with  Washington  at  Valley  Forge. 

(See  Map) 

sent  to  reinforce   Maxwell  in  New 

Jersey 414 

heard  \Vashington's  instructions  to 

Lee 422 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 435 

testifies  on  trial  of  Gen.  Lee 422-6 

taken  prisoner  at  Charlottesville. . .  600 
Scott,  John  Morin,  Brig.  Gen.,  b.  1730, 

d.  1784- 

votes  to  abandon  Long  Island.  . .    .   217 
in   Gen.  Putnam's  division  at  New 

York , 220 

votes  to  abandon  New  York 224 

votes  to  defend  Fort  Washington  .  .   237 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

before     Fort     Independence     with 

Heath 292 

Scott,    Winfield,    Lieut.    Gen.    (Am.)  b. 

1786,  d.  1866. 
his     supersedure     in    Mexico     bad 

military  policy 44 

Seaboth's,  Anspach,  regt.  (//.)  at  siege 

of  Newport 454 

"  Sectional    troops   not   favorably    com 
bined  "  (Washington) 294 

Sevier,  John,   Col.    (Am.)   at   battle   of 

King's  Mountain 520 

Sharpe,  Granville  (Br.),  (Philanthropist), 

b.  1734,  d.  1813. 

resigned  office  rather  than  aid  the  war  83 
Shay's  rebellion  as  a  type  of  civil  war. .  .  31 
Shee,  Col.,  joins  the  army  at  Brooklyn 

Heights 214 

Shelby,    Isaac,   Col.,  sub.  Gov.    Ky.,   I). 
1750,  d.  1826. 

at  battle  of  King's  Mountain 520 

Sheldon,    Elisha,    Col.,    to    complete    a 

cavalry  battalion 266 

attacked    by    Tarleton    at    Pound 

Ridge 468 

to     cooperate    with    De     Lauzun's 

lancers 618 

scatters  Delancey's  Refugees 619 

on  duty  along  the  Hudson 621 

Shepherd,  Capt.  (Am.)  k.  at  Savannah.  .   482 
Sheiburne,   Henry,    Maj.  (Am.)   gallant 

near  "  The  Cedars  " 165 

k.  in  battle  of  Germantown 389 

Sherman,   William    Tecumseh,  General 

U.  S.  Army,  b.  1820. 
accepts  dedication  of  this  volume. 

Personal  Tribute 

his  march   to  the  sea,  as  a  line  of 

operations 57 

in    1861-5,    in    respect    of    grand 

strategy 57 

Sheridan,  Maj.  (Br.)  turns  a  house  into 

a  fort 578 


Shreve,   Col.   (Am.)   at    the    battle    of 

Springfield 501 

Ship-building  in  1776,  well-developed. .  276 
Shopley,   Adam,    Capt.    (Am.)   at    Fort 

Trumbull 626 

at  Fort  Gnswold 628 

Shuldham,   Admiral,    relieves    Admiral 

Graves  at  Boston 146 

his  opinion   of  Am.  occupation  of 

Dorchester 152 

-Siege  of,  Boston — (Chapter  XXIII.)...  146 

reminiscence  by  Edwd.  Storr.  (note)  154 

Fort  Schuyler  by  St.  Leger 322 

Newport  by  Am.  and  Fr.  troops.  .  .  440 

Savannah  by  Am.  and  Fr.  troops  . .  477 

Charleston  by  Gen.  Clinton 496 

Augusta  by  Am.  troops 520 

Ninety-Six  by  Am.  troops 574 

Yorktown  by  Am.  and  Fr.  troops. .  631 
Silliman   (Maj.  Gen.  Conn.   Mil.),  with 

brigade  at  New  York 220 

pris.  in  skirmish  near  Danbury  ....  297 
Sill,  Maj.  (Br.)  k.  in  assault  upon  Fort 

Clinton   359 

Simcoe,  J.  Graves,  Lieut.  Col.,  sub.  Gov. 
Canada,  with  Queen's  Rangers  at 

Quen  tin's  Bridge 405 

with  Queen's  Rangers  at  Hancock's 

Bridge 405 

with  Queen's   Rangers  at  Crooked 

Billet  Tavern 405 

iv.  at  battle  of  Monmouth 444 

at  Elizabethtown,  New  Jersey 499 

joins  Arnold's  expedition  to  Virginia  540 

enters  Richmond  and  Westham  . . .  549 

in  skirmish  at  Charles  City  C.  H. . .  549 

scatters  militia  near  Williamsburg  .  589 

drives  Steuben  from  Point  of  Fork.  601 

often  underrated  as  a  soldier 601 

retires  to  Westham  on  James  River.  603 

has  sharp  skirmish  with  Butler  ....  604 

has  skirmish  with  La  Fayette 606 

Simms,    John,    of    Virginia    Assembly, 

taken  pris 601 

Simpson,  Capt.  (Br.)  k.  at  Savannah  .  . .  482 

Sinews  of  war 78 

Singleton,  Capt.  (Am.)  at  the  battle  of 

Camden 516 

at  the  battle  of  Guilford 558 

Skene,  Philip,  Lieut.  Col.  (Br.)  com'r.  to 

enforce  allegiance 318 

brought  mischief  only 327 

deceives  Lieut.  Col.  Breyman 330 

surrenders  ignominious! y 352 

disappears  from  America 353 

Skenesborough  taken  by  Gen.  Phillips.  .  314 
Skirmish  at  Moore's  Creek  Bridge,  Va., 

Dec.  9,  1775  (noticed) 174 

Danbury,  Conn.,  April  25-7,    1777 

(incursion) 297 

near  Fort  Ann,  June  7,  1777  (sharp 

action) 315 

Lucan's  Mills 390 

Whitemarsh,  Dec.  8,  1777     397 

Quinton's  Bridge,  Va.,    March   18, 

1778 405 

Hancock's  Bridge,  N.  J.,  March  21, 

1778 40^ 


702 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND    GENERAL   INDEX. 


Skirmish  at  Crooked  Billet  Tavern,  Perm. 

May  i,  1778 405 

Tappan,  N.  Y.,  Sept.  27,  1778  (sur 
prise)  459 

Little  Neck,  N.  J.,  Oct.  15,  1778  (no 
quarter) 459 

Tatnal's  Plantation,  S.  C.,  Nov.  27, 
1778  (action) 460 

Beaufort,  S.  C.,  Feb.  3,  1779  (sharp 
action) 464 

Kettle  Creek,  Ga  Feb.  14, 1779  (rout)  464 

Stono  Ferry,  S.  C.,  April  20,  1779 
(assault) 465 

Pound  Ridge,  N.  Y.,  July  2,  1779. .   468 

New  Haven,  Conn.,  July  5,  1779 
(incursion) 469 

Fairfield,  Conn.,  July  8,  1779  (in 
cursion)  471 

Green  Farms,  Conn.,  July  9,  1779 
(incursion) 471 

Norwalk,  Conn.,  July,  1779  (incur 
sion)  471 

Minnisink,  N.  Y.,  July  22,  1779  (in 
cursion)  474 

Newark,  N.  J.  (incursion) 485 

Young's  House,  N.  Y.,  Feb.  3,  1780 
(surprise) 486 

Waxhaw  Creek,  S.  C.,  May  29,  1780 
(no  quarter) ...  497 

Ramsour's  (Ramseur's)  Mills,  S.  C., 
June  20,  1780  (sharp  action)  ....  498 

Connecticut  Farms,  N.  J.,  June  7, 
1780  (incursion) 499 

Williamson's  Plantation,  S.  C.,  July 
12,  1780 507 

Rocky  Mount,  S.  C.,  July  30,  1780 
(bold  assault) 507 

Rocky  Mount,  S.  C.,  Aug.  i,  1780  .    507 

Hanging  Rock,  S.  C.,  Aug.  6,  1780 
(formal  engagement) 508 

The  Wateree,  S.  C.,  Aug.  15,  1780 
(surprise) 511 

Fishing  Creek,  S.  C.,  Aug.  18,  1780 
(surprise) 511-12 

Musgrove's  Mills,  S.  C.,  Aug.  18, 
1780 518 

Wahab's  Plantation,  S.  C.,  Sept.  20, 
1780 518 

Charlotte,  N.  C.,  Sept.  26,  1780 519 

Fish  Dam  Ford,  S.  C.,  Nov.  9,  1780  521 

Blackstock's  Plantation,  S.  C.,  Nov. 
20,  1780  (sharp  action) 522 

Charles  City  C.  H.,  Va.,  Jan.  8,  1781   549 

McCowan's  Ford,  N.  C.,  Feb.  i, 
i?3i 551 

Allamance  Creek,  Feb.  25,  1781  (no 
quarter) 554 

Wetzell's  Mill,  N.  C,  March  6,  1781 
(spirited  action) 555 

Petersburg,  Va.,  April  25,  1781  (re 
treat  secured) 589 

Brandon,  Va.,  April  25,  1781  (re 
treat  secured) 589 

Osborne,  Va.  (stores  destroyed). . . .   589 

before  old  Fort  Independence,  July 
2,  1781 620 

New  London,  Conn.,  Sept.  6,  1781 
(incursion) 625 


Skirmish  at  Stonington,  Conn,  (incursion)  142 

Quinby  Bridge  (noticed) 575 

Monk's  Corner,  S.  C.  (noticed)  ....   575 

Dorchester,  S.  C.  (noticed) 575 

Williamsburg,  Va.  (sharp  action)  .  .    604 

Gloucester,  Va.  (sharp  action) 636 

Slaves  armed  by  Lord  Dunmore 174 

Small   Pox  in  Canada  affects  the  Am. 

army 168 

Smallvvood,    William,    Brig.    Gen.,   sub. 

Gov.  Md.,  b. -,  d.  1792. 

Colonel,  at  battle  of  Long  Island  .  .    197 

taken  pris.  on  Long  Island 209 

contrasts  Br.  and  Am.  officers 232 

states  his  opinion  of  Washington. .  .  233 
ic.  in  action  at  Chatterton  Hill  ....  240 
attempts  the  posts  on  Staten  Island.  366 

at  battle  of  Germantown 387 

in  expedition  to  Wilmington,  Del. .    398 

at  battle  of  Camden 518 

succeeds  De  Kalb 526 

recruits  for  Greene's  army 529 

Smeaton,  Capt.  (Br.}  k.  at  battle  of  Guil- 

ford 562 

Smith,  Brig.  Gen.  (Br.}  at  Newport,  R.  I.  454 
Smith,    Joshua    Helt,    a   mere    tool    of 

Arnold 506 

Smith,   Lieut.    Col.,    loth   Br.    Foot,    at 

Concord II— 12 

rescued  by  Lord  Percy 1 1 

Smith,  Samuel.  Lieut.  Col.  (Am.}  w.  at 

Fort-Mifflin 395 

Smith,    Maj.    (Am.)   k.    in    skirmish   at 

Green  Spring 508 

"  Soldier's  life  one  of  devotion  "  (Greene)  526 

South  America  illustrates  civil  war 29 

Southern  armies  continue  partisan  war 
fare,  1781 575 

South  Carolina,  enters  upon  war 86 

organizes  troops  in  1776 179 

takes  the  form  of  a  Republic 1 80 

militia  at  Eutaw  Springs 578 

Spain  joins  France  against  England  .  .  .   476 
Sparks,  Jared  (Historian),  b.  1789,^.  1866, 

as  to  conduct  of  royal  governors  ...  150 
as  to  Arnold  at  Bemis  Heights  ....  348 
as  to  Gen.  Sullivan  at  battle  of 

Brandywine 378 

Spear,  Maj.  (Am.}  reconnoitres  at  Buf- 

fington's  Ford 368 

Specht,  Brig.  Gen.  (H.}  at  battle  of  Free 
man's  Farm   340 

at  battle  of  Bemis  Heights 345 

Speedlove,  Maj.  (Br.}  k.  at  Bunker  Hill,   no 
Spencer's  Ordinary  Scene  of  Skirmish    . 
Spencer,  Joseph  N.,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1714, 
d.  1789. 

appointed  Brig.  Gen.,  1776 89 

before  Boston 156 

commands  division  at  New  York  .  .  221 
opposes  evacuation  of  New  York  . .  221 
is  assigned  to  expedition  against 

Newport 294 

enters  Congress 655 

Spies  in  war 7^ 

Hale  and  Andre  memorable 78 

Springfield,   Mass.,   selected    for   a   gun 

foundry ^ . . .   294 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


7^3 


Springfield,  N.  J.,  threatened  by  Knyp- 

hausen 499 

burned  during  the  campaign    501 

Stark,  John,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1728,  d.  1822. 

Colonel  at  Bunker  Hill,  1775 99 

renders  good  service  ...    101—2 

describes  the  slaughter 108 

at  battle  of  Trenton 274 

retires  from  the  army 331 

commands  N.  H.  militia 331 

wins  the  battle  of  Bennington 332 

promoted  in  the  army 33^ 

for  a  brief  period  with  Gates 33 

assigned     to    expedition    with    La 

Fayette 402 

at  battle  of  Springfield,  N.  J 501 

Statesmanship,  in  war  illustrated 40 

avoids  certain  issues 43 

defined  by  Jomini  as  military  policy 

its  significance  considered 45 

States-General  of    Holland,  furnish    no 

troops  for  England ,    173 

join  the  enemies  of  England 528 

Staunton,    Va.,     made    the     temporary 

capital 599 

Steam  propulsion  fails  to  master  nature .        3 
Stedman,  Charles,  (Br.},  (staff  officer  and 
historian)  gives  opinion  of  affair 

at  Lexington II 

battle  of  Bunker  Hill 108 

criticises  Genl.   Howe  at   Brooklyn 

Heights 219 

statement  as  to  Hessians  at  Trenton 

doubted ...   274 

as  to  battle  of  Trenton 281 

states  the    relative  strength   of  the 

two  armies 300 

on  staff  of  Howe,  Clinton  and  Corn- 

wallis    300 

gives  opinion  of  battle  of  Hubbard- 

ton 316 

reports  Arnold  at  Freeman's  Farm .   342 
reviews  Clinton's  move  up  the  Hud 
son  356 

as  to  battle  of  Monmouth 445 

unjust  to  D'Estaing 447 

describes  storm  off  Newport. 450 

unjust  to  Knyphausen 500 

criticises  Tarleton  at  Blackstock's. .    522 
explains  retreat  of  Cornwallis  from 

Hyisborough 554 

commissary  for  Cornwallis 554 

as  to  battle  at  Hobkirk  Hill 573 

as  to  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs. . .    578-81 
Stedman,  Capt.  of  Alice's  regt.  at  Long 

Island 208 

Stephen,  Adam,  Maj.  Genl. 

Brig.  Genl.  guarding  the  Delaware.   264 

promoted  Maj.  Genl 296 

at  the  battle  of  Brandywine,  distin 
guished 369 

at  battle  of  Germantown,  disgraced  377 
dismissed  the  American  service. . . .   390 
Stephens,    Edward,  Brig.  Genl.  b.  1744, 

d. 

promoted  Maj.  Genl 296 

ioins  Gates  with  Va.  militia 515 

rallies  militia  after  battle  of  Camden  517 


Stephens,  Edward,  surveys  the  Yad- 


kin    .....................    531 

escorts  prisoners  and  returns  to  duty  550 
brings  recruits  to  Greene.  .  .  .......    554 

at  battle  of  Guilford  ..............   557 

w.  at  battle  of  GuiJford  ..........   563 

Stirns,  Maj.  Genl.   (ff.)  at  Chadd's  Ford  369 
at  the  battle  of  Brandywine  .......   369 

at  the  battle  of  Germantown  .......   385 

Sterling,  Col.   (Br.}  sub.  Maj.   Genl.    at 

Fort   Washington  ..............   250 

in  New  Jersey  ...................   394 

•w.  at  battle  of  Springfield  .........  499 

Steuben,     Fredk.     Wm.    Augustus,    de, 
Baron,  Maj.  Genl.,  b.  1730,  d.  1794. 
arrives  at  Valley  Forge  ..........   403 

appointed  Maj.  Gen.  without  dissent  403 
in  harmony  with  Washington  ......   404 

at  battle  of  Monmouth  ...........   443 

on  duty  in  Virginia  ...............    530 

is  threatened  by  Arnold  .........    548 

acquiesces  in    La    Fayette's  assign 
ment  .........................   586 

at  Petersburg!!  and  Brandon,  Va.  .  .   590 
is   driven   from    Point   of  Fork  by 
Simcoe  .......................   602 

effects  a  junction  with  La  Fayette.   603 
is   remembered  ..................   655 

Stewart,  Capt.  (Br.}  uses   stratagem   at 

Hanging  Rock  ................   508 

Stewart,     Lieut.    Col.,     succeeds     Lord 

Rawdon  ......................   577 

in  command  at  Orangeburgh  ......   577 

retires  to  Eutaw  Springs  ..........   582 

reports  his  movements  ............   582 

makes  gallant  fight  at  Eutaw  Springs  582 
reports  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  582 
retires  to  Monk's  Corner  ..........    582 

Stewart,     Maj.    (Br.),    k.     before    Fort 

Clinton  ......................   359 

Stewart,   Ensign,   (Br),  k.  at  battle    of 

Guilford  ......................   562 

Stewart,  Lieut.  Col.,  (Guards),  k.  at  bat 

tle  of  Guilford  ................   562 

Stiles,  Ezra,  Pres.  b.  1727,  d.  1795,  Yale 

College,  the  friend  of  Greene.  ...      80 

Stirling,  William  Alexander,  (Earl),  Maj. 

Genl.,  b.  1726,  k.  1783. 
Colonel  in  New  Jersey  ...........    148 

Brig.  Genl.  at  battle  of  Long  Island  205 
fights  Genl.  Grant's  division  .......   210 

fights  Lord  Cornwallis  ............   210 

surrenders  to  Genl.  De  Heister.  .  .  .   210 

is   exchanged  .....  ...............   231 

reaches  White  Plains  .............   238 

at  battle  of  Trenton,  (see  map).  .  .  .   278 

guards   the    Delaware  ............   264 

at  battle  of  Princeton  ............   289 

promoted  Maj.  Genl  ..............   296 

in  command  at  Metuchin  .........   300 

engages  Lord  Cornwallis  .........  301 

at  battle  of  Brandywine  ...........   377 

commands  reserve  at  Germantown.  .   387 
advises  attack  upon  New  York  and 
Philadelphia  ..................   404 

commands  left  wing  at  Monmouth.   438 
Pres.  court  martial  to  try  Lee  ......   445 

crosses  to  Staten  Island  on   the  ice  485 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Stockwell,   Lieut,  goes   to  Albany  to  get 

aid  for  Fort  Schuyler 324 

Stony  Point  abandoned  by  Am.  garrison  466 
occupied    by    Generals  Clinton    and 

Vaughan 466 

stormed  by  Genl.  Wayne 472 

abandoned  by  Am.  troops 474 

abandoned  by  Genl.  Clinton 476 

Stonington,  Conn,  cannonaded 142 

Stono  Ferry,  post  (Br.}  attacked  without 

success 465 

Storms  scatter  fleet  of  Sir  Peter  Parker.    173 

part  Howe  and  Washington 383 

delay  Count   D'Estaing  four  weeks.   447 

scatter  Admiral  Byron's  fleet 447 

scatter  fleets  of  Howe  and  D'Estaing  450 
drive  Admiral  Byron  from  Boston. .  455 
disperse  fleet  of  Count  D'Estaing.  . .  482 
disperse  Clinton's  southern  expedi 
tion  493 

oft'  Newport  in  1777 539 

scatter  Arnold's  Virginia  expedition  548 
cut  off  the  escape  of  Cornwallis.  .  .  .   640 

Strategy   defined 48 

deals  first  with  the  theatre  of  war.  .      48 

of  the  war  of  1775-83 651 

"         "       limited  by  bad  logistics   141 

Strategic  front 54 

movements,  their  philosophy 50 

movements  of  Washington,  1781.  . .      50 
skill  shut  up  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  631 

Sullivan  Island  occupied  by  Genl.  Clinton  177 
Fort,  takes  the  name  of  Moultrie.  .    190 

Sullivan,   John,   Maj.    Genl.   b.  1740,  d. 

1795- 

Brig.  Genl 89 

succeeds  Thomas  in  Canada 159 

writes  Washington  from  Sorel 164 

sends  troops  to  Three  Rivers 166 

under- rates  the  British  army 166 

reports  battle  at  Three  Rivers 167 

abandons  Canada 167 

retires  to  Crown  Point •  •  •  •  168 

succeeds    Greene     (sick)    on    Long 

Island 203 

his  confidence  while  at  Brooklyn.  .  .  204 

is  superseded  by  Putnam . .  204 

reports  battle  of  Long  Island 205 

responsible  forbad  reconnoissance.  .  205 

taken  pris.  at   Long  Island 211 

bears  a  proposition  from  Genl.  Howe  223 

is  exchanged 231 

reaches  White  Plains,  N.  Y 238 

with  Lee  in  New  Jersey 258 

succeeds  Lee  in  command  of  division  263 

commands  right  wing  at  Trenton.  .  271 

is  advised  by  Washington 296 

;         retires  before  Genl.  Howe 298 

joins  the  main  Am.  army 365 

attacks  posts  on  Staten  Island 366 

makes   bad  reconnoissance   on    the 

Brandywine 370 

finds  Genl.  Howe  in  his  rear 372 

discusses  his  reconnoissance 372 

his  statement  to  Congress  considered  374 
withholds    the     credibility    of    dis 
patches 375 

his  division  in  disorder 376 


378 

379 
380 

337 
388 

399 
449 

448 

449 
451 
452 
453 
453 


Sullivan,  John,  did  not  bring  the  right 

wing  into  action 376 

his  report  examined 377— S 

his     position      misunderstood      by 

Sparks 

writes  to  Hancock,  (see  letter) 

his  personal  bravery  unquestioned.  . 

at  battle  of  German  town 

shows  gallantry  at  German  town. . .  . 
urges  attack  upon  Philadelphia.  . . . 

lands  on  Rhode  Island 

commands  at  Providence,  R.I.    ... 
his  relations  to  Count  D'Estaing. .  . 

his  position  before  Newport 

reports  his  active  force 

sends  sharp  protest  to  D'Estaing. . . 
issues,  and  modifies,  a  rash  order. . . 

reports  his  retreat 455 

commands  an  Indian  expedition.   475-6 
resigns  and  enters  Congress 524 

Sumner,  Jethro,  Brig.  Genl.,  joins  Greene  577 
at  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs.      .  .   580 

Sumter,  Thomas,  Brig.  Genl.,  b.  1734,  d. 
1832. 

organizes  a  rifle  regiment 180 

assails  Rocky  Mount 507 

assails  Hanging  Rock 507 

captures  a  valuable  train 511 

is  routed  by  Tarleton 512 

w.  at  Blackstock's  Plantation 522 

on  duty  between  Canada  and  Ninety 

Six 569 

occupies  Orangeburg 574 

Sunbury,  Ga.  captured  by  Sir  Aug.  Pre- 

vost,  Maj.  Genl 464 

Surrender  of  Burgoyne's  army 351 

Charleston  .  .    497 

Yorktovvn 643 

New  York 656 

Swearigen,  Capt.  (Aw.},  killed  at  battle 

of  Freeman's  Farm 341 

Sweet,  (historical  writer),  as  to  troops  at 

Bunker    Hill 100 

Symonds,  Thomas,  Capt.  (Royal   Navy), 
leads  the  attack  at  Fort  Sullivan 


signs  Articles  of  Capitulation,  York- 


186 

641 
Symonds,  (Col.)  New  Hampshire  militia, 

at  battle  of  Bennington 332 


T. 


TACTICS,  Grand,  defined  and  illustrated     48 

Tactics,  Minor,  defined 48 

Tait,  Captain,  (Am.\  conspicuous  at  bat 
tle  of  Cowpens 540 

Talbot,  Ensign,  k.  at  battle  of  Guilford.   563 

Tames,  Capt.,  k.  at  Savannah 482 

Tarleton,  Banestre,  Lieut.  Col.  b.   1754. 

d.  1833. 
attacks    Sheldon's  horse    at    Pound 

Ridge 468 

his  views  of  a  southern  campaign. .  493 
loses  confidence  in  royalist  militia.  508 
reports  attack  upon  Hanging  Rock  509 

has  trouble  with  militia 510 

justly  criticises  Gates 510 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


705 


Tarleton,  Banestre,  reaches  Cam  den...    510 

captures  Sumter's  command 512 

denounces    Mecklenburg    and    Ro 
han  Counties,  N.  C 5J9 

can  not  trust  nominal  royalists 519 

reports  battle  of  King's  Mountain.  521 
repulsed  at  Blackstock's  Plantation  522. 

sent  in  pursuit  of  Morgan 541 

crowds  Morgan  over  the  Pacolet. . .   541 

states  strength  of  his  force 541 

report  of  battle  of  Covvpens 544~5 

criticises  Cornwallis  for  the  disaster  545 

crosses  the  Catawba 551 

explains  Greene's  escape 553 

reports  skirmish  near  Guilford 556 

battle  of  Guilford 559 

states  the  issue  as  doubtful 560 

compliments  the  Maryland  troops. .  561 
compliments  Washington's  cavalry.  561 

criticises  the  action 562 

w.  at  Guilford 563 

opinion  of  Hobkirk  Hill 573 

report  of  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  .  .  582 
mounts  his  regt.  on  blooded  horses.  589 
makes  a  raid  upon  Charlottesville .  .  600 

reports  his  lapid  march 601 

compliments  La  Fayette   603 

reports  skirmish  at  Williamsburg  . .  604 
attempts  to  capture  Muhlenburg.  .  604 
again  compliments  La  Fayette  ....  608 
criticism  of  battle  of  Jamestown  . .  .  608 

in  reserve,  at  Jamestown 609 

incursion  through  Bedford  County  .   610 

reports  failure  of  expedition 610 

skirmishes  near  Williamsburg 611 

joins  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown 6n 

reconnoitres     La     Fayette's     posi 
tion 612 

unjustly  questions  actions  of  Corn 
wallis 613 

his  strictures  noticed 614 

again  criticises  Cornwallis  unjustly.  634 
reports  skirmish  with  French  lancers  636 
gains  no  fame  as  a  scientific  soldier.  636 

Tarrant's  farm,  scene  of  skirmish  with 

Tarleton 551 

Taylor,  Zachary,   Maj.  Gen.,  sub,   Pres. 

U.  S.,  b.  1784,  d.  1850. 
opens  war  with  Mexico 46 

Taylor,  Major,  at  Buffington's   Ford  .  .  .   373 

Ten  Broeck,  Col.,  joins  the  army  of  Gates  337 
in  battle  of  Bemis  Heights 348 

Ternay,  De,  Chevalier,  convoys  Rocham- 

beau's  army  from  France 503 

dies  at  Newport,  Rhode  Island.  . .  .  525 
is  succeeded  by  M.  Destouches. . .  .  525 

Tetes-de-Pont,  their  value 76 

Thayer,   Major  (Am.},  at   Quebec  with 

Arnold „ 137 

at  Fort  Mifflin 395 

Thomas,  John,  Maj.  Gen.,  appointed  by 

Massachusetts 10 

appointed    Lieut.    Gen.    of    State 

forces 84 

appointed  Continental  Brig.  Gen .  .     89 

ordered  to  Canada 156 

retreats  from  Quebec 163 

died  of  small  pox 164 

45 


PAGK 

Thomas,  George  H.,  Maj.  Gen.,  U.  S.  A., 

b.  1816,  d.  1870. 
is  represented  as  similar  to  Greene, 

in  type  of  manhood 81 

Thompson,  William,  Brig.  Gen.,  sent  to 

Canada 157 

pi  is.  at  Three  Rivers 166 

Thompson,  Col.  South  Carolina  Rangers  179 

on  Sullivan  Island 185 

at  Tybee  Island 459 

Three  Rivers,  battle  at,  described 166 

Ticonderoga,  taken  by  Ethan  Allen 119 

trophy  list  preserved 119 

taken  by  Burgoyne 313 

Tighlman,  Lieut.  Col.,  Aide-de-camp  to 
Commander-in -Chief,  at  Harlem 

Heights 230 

at  the  battle  of  Monmouth 440 

Tomes,  Robert,  M.D.  (Historical  writer), 

as  to  Arnold  at  Freeman's  Farm.   342 
Tonyne,   Gov.    (Br.}   of  St.    Augustine. 

dispatches  intercepted 178 

Towers,  Robert,  seizes  private  arms  for 

public  use 265 

Treason,  denned  by  Congress  in  1776. . .  178 
Trelawney,  Lieut.  Col.,  w.  at  Monmouth  444 
Trenton,  New  Jersey,  battle  fought,  Dec. 

26,  1776 J 

surprise  proposed  by  Washington . .   267 

strength  of  garrison 270 

general  plan  of  attack 271 

localities     described     and     success 

realized 273 

prisoners  removed  to  Newtown. . . .   275 

reoccupied  by  American  army 277 

skirmish  with  Cornwallis 286 

Triplett,  Capt.,  conspicuous  at  battle  of 

Cowpens 540 

Trophies  of  Bennington,  overestimated  .    332 
Trophies  of  Ticonderoga,  inventory  pre 
served  119 

Trumback's  regt.  (H.}  at  Fort  Clinton. .   358 
Trumbull,  Jonathan,  Gov.  Conn,  (states 
man),  b.  1710,  d.  1785. 

supports  Washington 142 

sends  troops  to  New  York 156 

reports  his  visit  to  the  northern  army  168 

writes  Washington,  1776 197 

inspired  many  key-notes  of  the  war.   253 
Trumbull,    Jonathan,   Jr.,    Col.    (states 
man),  b.  1740,  d.  1804. 

commissary  at  Long  Island 216 

on  Washington's  staff 526 

Tryon,  Wm.,  Gov.  of  New  York,  confers 

with  Gen.  Clinton 148 

confers  with  Gen.  Howe 192 

invades  Connecticut 297 

skirmishes  at  Danbury  and  Ridge- 
field  297 

in  expedition  against  Fort  Clinton.   358 
publishes  British  Conciliatory  Bills.   403 

invades  Connecticut  again 468 

lands  at  New  Haven 469 

4th  of  July  proclamation 469 

burns  Fairfield 470 

reports  a  raid  upon  Norwalk 470 

destroys  Green  Farms 47! 

damages  inflicted  stated 471 


706 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


Tryon,  Wm.,  in  expedition  to  Connecti 
cut  Farms 498 

Tryon  County,  New  York,  disaffected  . .   322 
Tucker,  Sergeant,  reports  a  scout  on  the 

Brand}  wine 372 

Tully,  de,  M.,  sails  with  French  troops 

for  the  Chesapeake 584 

Turnbull,  Lieut.  Col.  (Br.)  repels  Sumter 

from  Hanging  Rock 507 

in  command  at  Camden 519 

Tuston,  Col.,  at  skirmish  at  Minnisink. .  474 
Tuttle,  Joseph  F.,  Rev.  Dr.,  Pres.  Wabash 

College,  Indiana,  historical  writer 

and  author  b.  1818. 
furnishes   data   as   to    New   Jersey 

sacrifices 486 

has   previously   furnished   notes   to 

Irving  and  Bancroft 487 

Twiss,   Lieut.   (Br.)  reconnoitres  Sugar 

Loaf  Hill 309 

Tyer's  plantation  occupied  by  La  Fay- 

ette 603 

Tylct.  John,  signs  protest  to  D'Estaing    453 


U. 


UNREASONABLE  or  humiliating  ultima 
tum,  bad  policy 42 

Upham,  Lieut.  Col.,  sends  refugees  to 

aid  Arnold 625 


VALENTINE'S  HILL,  occupied  by  Wash 
ington  236-620 

Valley  Forge  experiences 401 

encampment  by  brigades,  (see  map) 
Van  Cortland,  Col.,  at  battle  of  Free 
man's  Farm 336 

Varick,  Richard,  Col.  b.  1752. 

states  Arnold's  relations  to  battle  of 

Freeman's  Farm 342 

Varnum,  James  Mitchell,  Brig,  Genl.  b. 
1749,  d.  1789. 

promoted  Brig.  Genl 296 

with  brigade  at  Peekskill 302 

joins  Washington's  army 396 

is  sent  to  Woodbury  near  Red  Bank  396 
advises  an  attack  upon  New  York. .   404 

at  the  battle  of  Monmouth 436 

is  assigned  to  La  Fayette's  division  448 

in  Greene's  original  company 448 

enters  Congress 655 

Vattel,  Emerick,  (jurist  and  writer),  b. 

1714,  d.  1767. 

classifies  wars,  as  lawful  or  unlawful     24 
Vaughan,  John,  Maj.  Genl.,  at  Wilming 
ton  with  Cornwallis 175 

accompanies  Clinton  to  Charleston.    175 

reaches  New  York 224 

on  New  York  Island  with  Clinton.   225 

burns  Kingston 360 

at  the  capture  of  Fort  Clinton 358 

captures  Stony  Point 466 

Vaughan,    Lieut.    Col.  (Am.},  pris.   at 

Camden 518 

Vaughan,  Lieut,  (Br.\  k.  at  Monmouth .   444 


Vergennes,  Charles   Gravier,  Count    de 

(Fr.  Ministry),  b.  1717,  d.  1787. 
comments  on  battle  of  Germantown  400 
regards  the  American  Congress  as 

too  exacting 532 

guarantees  a  loan  from  Holland.  . . .   623 
Vergne,  de  la    M.,  upon    the   action    of 

Congress 489 

Verplanck's    Point,    abandoned    by    Sir 

Henry  Clinton 476 

Victory  or  death,  Washington's  counter 
sign,  Dec.  25th,  1776 268 

Vincennes,   (Indiana)  captured   by  Col. 

Clark 461 

re-taken  by  Govr.  Hamilton  of  De 
troit  461 

re- taken  by  Col.  Clark 465 

Viomenil,   Baron,   sails   for  the     Chesa 
peake  with  troops 584 

in  charge  of  attack   upon    redoubt 

at  Yorktown 638 

Virginia,  enters  upon  war 86 

riflemen  at  Quebec 121 

troops  at  Harlem  Heights 229 

sends  troops  to  Indiana  and  Illinois  466 

militia  at  battle  of  Camden 516 

continentals  at  Eutaw  Springs 579 

exerts  her  powers  to  the  utmost.  .  .  .   598 
Voits,    Anspach    regt.    distinguished    at 

Newport 454 


W. 

WABASH  RIVER,  Indiana,  controlled  by 

Clarke's  boats 466 

Wadsworth's  brigade  in  Spencer's  divis 
ion 221 

Waggoner,   Capt.    (Am.),    skirmishes    at 

Chadd's   Ford 369 

Waldeck     is   to    furnish    England   with 

troops 172 

Walker,  Capt.  (Am.}  at  battle  of  Spring 
field,  N.  J 501 

Wallace,   Sir  James,    convoys   Clinton's 

army  up  the  Hudson 358 

is  captured  near  Savannah 477 

Walton,   George,    Colonel,    (Am.),    with 

riflemen  at  Tybee   Island 459 

Walters,  as  to  Trenton 281 

War,  as  a  fact,  not  to  be  ignored,  but  reg 
ulated  18 

an  extreme  resort 20 

how  induced 24 

offensive  and  defensive,  only  types  of 

action 25 

classification  of,  simplified 25 

national,    illustrated 26 

for  conquest,  wrong 27 

of  intervention,  considered 27 

to  humiliate  States,  unsound 42 

when  rightful 28 

generally  fails  of  its  purpose 28 

civil,  defined  and  illustrated 29 

civil,  insurrection  defined 30-1 

civil,  rebellion  defined 31-2 

civil,  revolution  defined 32~4 

Providence  in,  illustrated 35-9 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


707 


War,  its  fundamental  conditions  stated . .     40 

begins   in  the  c.^*zl 40 

its  prosecution   a  matter    of  sound 

policy 46 

theatre  of 46 

Ward,  Artemas,  Maj.   Genl.,   b.  1727,  d. 
1800. 

his  antecedents 9.  84 

appointed  Maj.  Genl 89 

unequal  to  his  position 94 

sends  reinforcements  to  Bunker  Hill  101 

enters  Boston  with  the  army 153 

Warner,  Seth,  Col.,  b.  1744,  d.  1785. 

a  volunteer  at  Bunker  Hill 119 

joins  Ethan  Allen 120 

captures  Crown  Point 120 

visits  Congress  for  a  commission. . .    120 

joins  Schuyler's  command 121 

elected  Lieut.  Col.  over  Allen 127 

defeats  General  Carleton 129 

is  distinguished  at  Hubbardton.  . . .   316 
collects  his  command  at  Manchester  332 

reports  to  Genl.  Stark 332 

efficient  at  Bennington 332 

at  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm 337 

Warren,  Joseph,  Dr.  (orator  and  philan 
thropist),  b.  1741,  d.  1775. 

Mass.  Com.  Safety    9 

his  opinion  of  the  war 9 

his  influence  at  Bunker  Hill 99 

served  with  Prescott. 101 

k.  at  Bunker  Hill no 

Washington,  William,  Col.,  b.   1752,  d. 
1810. 

Captain  at  battle  of  Trenton 272 

captures  two  guns  at  Trenton 272 

w.  at  battle  of  Trenton 274 

skirmishes  with  Tarleton 496 

is  surprised  at  Monk's  Corner 496 

destroys  a  loyalist  detachment.  ....   541 

with  Greene  on  the  Dan 552 

at  the  battle  of  Guilford 557 

at  the  battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill 572 

at  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  ....   581 
w.  and  taken  pris.  at  Eutaw  Springs  581 
Washington,  D.  C.,  as    an  objective   in 

war  of  1861-5 53 

Washington,    George,    Gen.,   sub.    Pres. 
twice  b.  1732,  d.  1799. 

antecedents  of  his  early  life 88 

appointed    American    Commander- 

in-Chief 89 

assumes  command  at  Cambridge. . .     90 
reports   casualties   at   Bunker   Hill 

(note) in 

sends    Arnold     on     expedition     to 

Canada 121 

his  theory  of  invasion  of  Canada. . .   125 
anticipates  the  action  of  Gen.  Carle- 
ton     127 

urges  Montgomery's  march  to  Mon 
treal    127 

urges  Schuyler  to  lose  not  a  moment  127 
writes  to  Schuyler  as  to  powder.  . . .   127 
writes  to  Schuyler  as  to  Allen's  cap 
ture , 128 

anticipates     Carleton's     retreat     to 
Quebec 132 


Washington,   compliments   Wooster  on 

waiving   rank 133 

urges  Montgomery  and  Schuyler  not 

to  resign 133 

withholds    commissions   from   gen 
erals  139 

writes  to  Schuyler  of  his  trials.  . . .  139 
describes  the  condition  of  the  army.  139 
rebukes  gambling  and  indecencies.  140 

attends  to  the  logistics  of  war 140 

rebukes  religious  bigotry  in  soldiers  141 
establishes  new  works  about  Boston  142 
writes  Gov.  Trumbull  as  to  priva 
teers  142 

restores  plunder  taken  from  citizens  143 
recommends  a  navy  to  be  built. . . .    143 
calls  council  of  New  England  gov 
ernors 143 

submits    a    plan    for   attack    upon 

Boston 144 

economizes  the  use  of  powder 144 

keeps  up  military  show  with  few  men  146 

his  idea  of  military  discipline 147 

denounces  cowards  and  card  playing  147 
writes  Congress  that  he  is  out  of 

powder 147 

wants     powder    or    ice,    to    attack 

Boston 147 

writes  to  Joseph  Reed  of  his  plans.  147 
proposes  to  attack  Dorchester 

Heights 148 

learns  that  Clinton  plans  an  expedi 
tion  148 

sends  Lee  to  New  York 148 

criticises  Lee's  conduct 149 

decides  to  attack  Boston 150 

acts  of  his  own  will  at  Boston 151 

successful,  when  acting  of  his  own 

will 151 

bombards  Boston  for  three  nights. .    151 

occupies  Dorchester  Heights 152 

enters  Boston  with  his  army 153 

regards  New  York  as  Howe's  objec 
tive  155 

leaves  a  garrison  in  Boston 156 

moves  his  army  to  New  York 156 

superintends  march  of  the  army  ...  156 
at  New  York,  April  to  July,  1776. .  156 
sends  supplies  and  troops  to  Canada  157 
rebukes  soldiers  for  righting  their 

own  wrongs 157 

puts  Putnam  in  command  at  New 

York 158 

puts  Greene  in  command  at  Brooklyn  158 
writes  Schuyler,  May,  1776,  as  to 

future  plans 158 

expected  a  bloody  summer 158 

writes  to  Congress  inclosing  letter 

of  Sullivan 159 

has    interview   with    Howe's   Adjt. 

Gen 194 

describes    to    Schuyler    the    peace 

commission 194 

denounces  gossip-mongers 195 

sends  more  troops  to  Cambridge. . .  195 
opposes  the  evacuation  of  Crown 

Point 196 

writes  to  Gov.  Trumbull,  Aug.,  1776  10,7 


70  8 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Washington,  places  Sullivan  at  Brook 
lyn,  vice  Greene,  sick 203 

instructions  to  Putnam 204 

rebukes  skulkers 204 

reports    to    Congress     the     British 

movements 204 

crosses    to    Brooklyn    after    battle 

begins 212 

his  retention  of  Brooklyn  is  delib 
erate  212-16 

at  Brooklyn  after  the  battle 214 

his  policy  is  to  postpone  and  gain 

time 216 

plans  retreat  from  Brooklyn 216 

his  self-possession  during  retreat. . .   218 

reorganizes  his  divisions 220 

denounces  robbing  orchards 22O 

urges  a  regular  army  establishment.   221 

advises  three  daily  roll  calls 221 

thinks  it  time  to  punish  deserters  . .   221 

affirms  a  defensive  policy 222 

prepares  to  abandon  New  York. . . .  222 
writes  to  Congress  as  to  New  York.  222 

his  army  fading  away 222 

calls  a  council  of  war 224 

begins  to  remove  public  stores 224 

headquarters  changed  from  Robert 

Murray's  to  Roger  Morris' 225 

reports  a  panic  on  New  York  Island  226 
his  personal  exposure,  to  stop  a  panic  226 
reports  his  position  at  Harlem  ....  226 
reports  a  skirmish  at  Harlem 

Heights 229 

derides  home-sickness 231 

censures  conflicts  in  authority 231 

as  to  discipline  at  Harlem  Heights.  231 
will  inspect  alarm  posts,  Oct.  n, 

1776 233 

offers  a  reward  for  captured  horses .  236 
shows  the  weakness  of  Hessian 

cavalry 236 

his  headquarters  at  Valentine's  Hill  236 
by  interior  line,  gains  White  Plains  236 
calls  a  council  of  war  before  march 
ing  237 

his  position  at  White  Plains 238 

writes  Gov.  Trumbull  for  flour  ....   238 
retires  to  North  Castle  Heights.  . . .   241 
advises  Congress  of  Howe's  move 
ments  242 

states  to  Gov.  Livingston  his  anxiety 

for  New  Jersey 243 

writes    to   Greene,  in   doubt   as    to 

Fort  Washington 243 

gives  Greene  directions  as  to  Mount 

Washington 243 

his  elaborate  orders  in  logistics  to 

Lee 245 

instructions  to  Lee,  when  to  follow 

him 245 

is  about  to  enter  New  Jersey 245 

to  Gov.  Livingston,  as  to  unequal 

bounties   246 

to    Mifflin,  as    to    care    of    public 

property 246 

to  Knox,  that  Lee  will  follow 246 

to  Commissary  Cheevers,  that  Lee 
will  follow 246 


Washington,  as  to  superfluous  baggage. .  246 
assigns  Heath  to  the  Highlands  . . .  247 
to  Congress,  as  to  Fort  Washington  247 

arrives  at  Fort  Lee 247 

reports  his  arrival  at  Fort  Lee 249 

proposes  to  withdraw  the  garrison  .  250 

reports  capture  of  Fort  Lee 25. 

reports  capture  of  Fort  Washington  252 

letter  to  his  brother 252 

his  views  considered 253 

marches  from  Fort  Lee  to  Princeton  256 
secures  all  boats  on  the  Delaware.  .  257 
reports  his  march  through  New  Jer 
sey 257 

is  at  Trenton,  Dec.  3d,  1776 257 

unable  to  find  Lee 257 

orders  Schuyler  to  send  certain 

troops 257 

is  behind  the  Delaware 257 

orders  Lee  to  join  him 259 

sends  repeated  letters  to  Lee  that  he 

needs  him 260 

mildly  notices  Lee's  capture 263 

receives  enlarged  authority 263 

writes  to  Govr.  Trumbull,  Dec.  I4th, 

1776 265 

writes  to  Genl.  Gates,  Dec.  I4th, 

1/76 265 

sends  Arnold  to  Rhode  Island,  Dec. 

1776 265 

writes  to  Heath,  Dec.  I4th,  1776.  .  .  265 
writes  Congress  Dec.  2Oth,  assuming 

responsibilities 266 

orders  three  battalions  of  artillery 

raised 266 

orders  the  Ticonderoga  regts.  to 

Morristown 266 

unfolds  to  Reed  his  plan  against 

Trenton 267 

his  characteristic  reticence 268 

entitled  to  credit  for  attack  on  Tren 
ton  268 

is  compelled  to  take  the  offensive.  .  269 
treatment  of  prisoners  settled  upon 

Dec.  1776 269 

plan  of  attack  of  H,  post  Dec.  26, 

1776 271 

fights  the  battle  of  Trenton 271-5 

substitutes  the  bayonet  for  powder.  272 
retires  to  Newtovvn,  Dec.  27th,  1 776 .  275 
writes  to  Maxwell  that  he  will  again 

invade  New  Jersey 276 

writes  to  Heath  to  drive  the  enemy  277 
his  interview  with  Maj.  Wilkinson, 

(Note) 277 

his  view  of  his  enlarged  powers.  .  .  .  283 
army  reinforced  by  Mercer  and  Cad- 

wallader 284 

again  at  Trenton,  Jan.  1st,  1777. ..  284 

falls  behind  the  Assanpink 285 

improves  his  opportunity 286 

intends  to  strike  Brunswick 287 

employed  a  ruse  while  abandoning 

camp 287 

notifies  Putnam  of  his  plans 287 

takes  a  bold  offensive 287 

his  personal  exposure  at  Princeton.  288 
burns  bridge  and  moves  to  Pluckemin  290 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


709 


PAGE 

Washington,  needs  mounted  troops 290 

makes  his  headquarters  at  Morris- 
town  291 

gives  instructions  to  Heath  and  Put 
nam 291 

his  report  after  Princeton 291 

orders  troops  from  Peekskill 291 

reproves  Heath  for  conduct  before 

Fort  Independence 292 

issues  counter-proclamation  to  Genl. 

Howe's 292 

controls  greater  part  of  New  Jersey.   293 
instructs  Schuyler  to  use  New  Eng 
land  troops 294 

sends  Knox  to  recruit  artillerymen .  294 
represses  plundering  by  militia. . . .  295 

protests  against  H.  outrages 295 

writes     Morris  his    opinion   as    to 

Howe's  plans 295 

rebukes  Sullivan 295 

makes   an   estimate   of  the  British 

forces 297 

his    army   given   by  divisions   and 

brigades    297 

removes  to  Middlebrook 298 

will  not  risk  his  army  to  save  Phil 
adelphia  298 

orders  a  division  from  Peekskill . .  298 
writes  Schuyler  as  to  Ticonderoga  299 
his  new  theory  of  Howe's  plans. .  299 

strengthens  Middlebrook 299 

orders  pursuit  of  Howe   300 

inarches  to  Quibbletown 300 

foils  the  plans  of  Howe 301 

regains  Middlebrook 301 

learns  of  Burgoyne's  movements. . .  302 
issues  a  counter-proclamation  to 

Burgoyne's 306 

writes  letter  to  Gates  and  receives 

sharp  reply 310 

has  confidence  in  Schuyler 318 

writes  Schuyler,foreshadowing  Ben- 

nington 319 

writes  Schuyler,foreshadowing  Oris- 

kany 325 

writes  Schuyler  as  to  relief  of  Fort 

Schuyler 325 

his  forecast  as    to  Fort  Schuyler. .   325 
is  ignored  by  Gates   in  official  re 
ports  335 

sends  troops  to  Albany 344 

sends  commission  of  Maj.  Genl.  to 

Arnold,  with  comments,  (Note). .    354 
understands    intercepted    letters  of 

Howe 362 

is   disconcerted   by    Howe's   move 
ments  365 

marches  through  Philadelphia 365 

reaches  Wilmington 365 

deceived  by  bad  reconnoissance.  . .  .  370 
his  purpose  to  cross  the  Brandywine  371 
countermands  movement  over  the 

Brandywine 372 

mild  letter  to  Sullivan 379 

sends    whole   right    wing   to    meet 

Howe 376 

writes  to  Sullivan  as  to  his  conduct.  379 
moves  to  battle  with  the  reserve. . . .  380 


PAGE 

Washington.covers  the  retreat  at  Brandy- 
wine  380 

retreats  to  Chester  and  reports   to 

Congress 380 

marches  to  Philadelphia 382 

halts  at  German  town  one  day 382 

orders  Putnam  to  send  him  troops.   382 
strengthens  defenses   of  the    Dela 
ware  382 

sends  surgeons  to  Howe 382 

crosses    at  Swede's    Ford,    inviting 

battle 383 

recrosses  the  Schuylkill  and  camps 

on  the    Perkiomy 388 

moves  to  Yellow  Springs  and  Nor 
wich  383 

again  orders  Putnam  to  send  troops.  384 
applies  to  Gates  for  Morgan's  corps.  384 

his  powers  again  enlarged 384 

marches    to  Germantown    by  four 

routes 387 

accompanies  Sullivan's  division. . . .   387 
his  plan  of  battle  of  Germantown. .   387 
retires  in  good  order  from  German- 
town  390 

his  Fabian  policy  sneered  at 392 

compliments     defenders     of     Fort 

Miffiin 396 

sends  Col.   Hamilton  to   Gates    for 

troops 397 

his  report  of  skirmish  at  Edge  Hill.   397 

complains  of  Mifflin 398-9 

pleads  for  the  army 399 

at  Valley  Forge 399 

sends  out  skirmishing  parties 402 

authorized  to  call  out  3,000  militia.   403 

awaits  action  of  British  army 404 

is  visited  by  a  committe  of  Congress  403 
celebrates  the  French  alliance  at 

Valley  Forge 404 

his  confidence  in  La  Fayette 405 

observes  the  operations   at  Barren 

Hill 407 

notices  Mifflin's  arrival,  sharply  . .  .  408 
calls  a  council  of  war  as  to  future 

plans 408 

under-estimates  British  forces 408 

learns   of  proposed   evacuation    of 

Philadelphia 408 

receives  letters  from  Lee 410 

answers  Lee's  letter  sharply 411 

pursues  Clinton  into  New  Jersey. . .  414 
intrusts  pursuit  of  Clinton  to  La 

Fayette 414 

his  army  near  Englishtown 415 

under  obligations  to  pursue  Clinton  417 
his  instructions  at  Monmouth  . . .  .422-4 
instructs  Lee  to  cany  out  La  Fay- 

ette's  plan 424 

instructs  Lee  to  consult  officers  and 

form  his  plan  of  battle 423 

restores  order  at  Monmouth 439-40 

his  altercation  with  Lee 440-1 

profanity  at  Monmouth,  not  in  the 

testimony.  .  .    441 

marches  to  White  Plains 446 

makes   Newport   his    objective    of 
operations 448 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Washington,  assigns  Varnum  and  Glover 

to  La  Fayette's  division 448 

directs  Sullivan  to  call  upon  militia  448 
sends  Greene  and  La  Fayette  to 

Newport 448 

is  advised  of  Lord  Howe's  expedi 

tion  to  Newport 449 

advises  retreat  from  Newport 453 

solemnly  notices  his  reoccupation 

of  White  Plains 457 

removes  headquarters  to  Fishkill 

and  Fredericksburg 457 

distributes  the  army  for  winter 

quarters 457 

removes  headquarters  to  Middle- 
brook  458 

laments  the  diverse  interests  of 

sections 461 

draws  a  fearful  picture  of  the  times.  461-2 
describes  the  paramount  claims  of 

concert,  dinner  or  supper 462 

proposes  to  punish  Indian  depreda 
tions  463 

unable  to  aid  the  South 465 

removes  headquarters  to  New 

Windsor 467 

organizes  an  attack  upon  Stony 

Point 472 

orders  N.  C.  and  Va.  troops  to  the 

south 483 

his  headquarters  at  Morristown  . .  .  483 
his  requisition  upon  New  Jersey 

filled 488 

criticises  thirteen  state  sovereignties  489 
his  written  opinion  of  Schuyler.  .  .  .  490 
explains  mutinous  conduct  of  troops  491 
complains  of  injustice  to  France. . .  492 
doubts  a  possible  defense  of  Charles 
ton  494 

is  posted  on  the  Short  Hills 499 

is  embarrassed  by  British  movements  500 

appeals  to  States  to  fill  quota 502 

makes  New  York  objective  of 

campaign 503 

in  consultation  with  Rochambeau. .  504 

takes  position  at  Prakeness 506 

confides  to  Schuyler  the  treachery 

in  Vermont 524 

sends  three  regiments  to  Albany. . .  524 
compares  rolling  small  and  big 

snow-balls 524 

confers  with  Rochambeau 525 

writes  Dr.  Franklin  the  condition 

of  affairs 525 

establishes  winter  quarters  for  1780-1  527 
his  headquarters  at  New  Windsor  .  527 
keeps  aloof  from  army  during  mutiny  538 
would  congratulate  Greene  if  he 

could  help  him 548 

writes  to  La  Fayette 585 

meets  Rochambeau  at  Newport. . . .  585 

sends  La  Fayette  after  Arnold 585 

does  not  judge  measures  by  after 

events 586 

gives  gloomy  abstract  of  public 

affairs 587 

thinks  there  are  too  many  chimney 

corner  patriots 587  i 


Washington,  urges  Schuyler  to  become 

Secretary  of  war 588 

approves     La     Fayette's     conduct 

toward  Arnold 596 

confers  with  Rochambeau  at  Weth- 

ersfield 603 

modifies  his  plan  of  campaign 614 

advises  La  Fayette  of  his  plan 614 

takes  the  offensive 617 

again  at  Wethersfield 618 

has    a   two-fold   plan   against   New 

York 618 

at  Valentine's  Hill 620 

reconnoitres   New  York    Island    in 

force 620 

reconnoitres  New  Jersey 620 

mortified  by  his  position  before  the 

world 621 

his  false  and  his  real  plan 621 

summons  aid  as  against  New  York.  622 
with  Rochambeau  at  West  Point  .  .  622 
enters  Philadelphia  with  his  army. .  623 
learns  of  the  arrival  of  De  Grasse. .  624 

proceeds  to  Head  of  Elk 624 

visits  Baltimore .   6-30 

at  Mount  Vernon 630 

joins  La  Fayette  at  Williamsburg. .  630 

visits  Count  De  Grasse 635 

his  plans  in  danger 635 

persuades  De  Grasse  to  remain. . .  .  635 
reports  the  first  parallel  opened ....  636 
proposes  conditions  to  Cornwallis.  .  641 
signs  capitulation  of  Yorktown  ....  641 

congratulates  the  allies 644 

exchanges  courtesies  with  De  Grasse  645 
his  plans  for  southern  operations  fail  645 

his  criticisms  of  officials 652 

his  control  of  interior  lines 654 

orders  a  cessation  of  hostilities  ....  658 
commits  America  to  God  and 

posterity   .    658 

Water  communication  with  Albany  cut  off  193 
Waterloo,  Battle  of,  modified  by  rain. .  .  39 
Watson,  Col.  (Br.)  diverted  from  his 

march  to  Camden 569 

joins  Lord  Rawdon 574 

Watson,  Abraham,  Mass.  Com.  Safety. .  9 
Wayne,  Anthony,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  at  Paoli, 

Penn.,  1745,  d.  1796. 
sent  from  Boston  to  New  York. . . .   157 

as  Colonel  in  Canada 166 

in  battle  at  Three  Rivers 166 

gallant  in  battle  at  Three  Rivers  .  .    167 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 296 

attacks  Hessian  rear  guard  in  N.  J.  300 
on  Court  of  Inquiry  as  to  Schuyler  .  312 

at  battle  of  Brandywine 367 

makes  stout  defense  at  Chadd's  Ford  380 
is  attacked  near  Paoli  (his  birthplace)  383 

at  battle  of  Germantown 387 

commands  left  centre 388 

is  fired  upon  by  Steven's  division  . .   389 

his  conduct  in  the  action 390 

opposes  Washington 398 

advises  to  attack  Philadelphia 404 

joins  La  Fayette  in  pursuit  of  Clinton  414 
heard  Washington's  instructions  to 
Lee.    423 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


711 


Wayne,  testifies  on  trial  of  Gen.  Lee  .  .423-8 

urges  the  offensive  movement 424 

in  the  hottest  fight  at  Monmouth . .  439 
posted  near  Dunderberg  mountain.  467 

storms  Stony  Point 473 

unable   to  suppress   mutiny  in    the 

army 537 

joins  La  Fayette  in  Virginia 603 

conspicuous  in  battle  of  Jamestown 

Ford 608 

sent  to  cut  off  retreat  of  Cornwallis.   611 

joins  Greene  at  the  south 645 

is  remembered 655 

Webb,  Col.  (Am.),  at  battle  of  Trenton  272 
Webster,    Lieut.  Col.  (Br.    Guards),  at 

Stony  Point 466 

surprises  Col.  Washington  at  Monk's 

Corner 49° 

at  the  battle  of  Camden 516 

pursues  Morgan 551 

at  battle  of  Guilford 559 

w.  mortally  at  Guilford 563 

Webster,  Daniel,  (statesman  and  orator), 
b.  1782,  d.  1852. 

his  opinion  of  Schuyler 319 

Weedon,  Col.  (Am.)  at  Harlem  Heights.  229 

promoted  Brig.  Genl 296 

in  reserve  at  Brandy  wine 367-70 

in  Virginia  in  1781 530 

at  Gloucester 636 

Wellington  (Arthur  Wellesley)  Duke, 
sub.  Field  Marshal,  Br.  Com 
mander-in-chief  £.  1769,  d.  1852. 

invariably  improved  success 76 

Wemyss,  Maj.  Genl.  (Br.),  failed  against 

Sumter  at  Fish  Dam  Ford 521 

Wemys,  Capt.  (Br.\  with  Queen's  Rang 
ers  at  Chadd's  Ford 369 

Werner,  Lieut.  (H.),  made  plan  of  battle 

of  Brandywine 370 

Wesley,  John,  (eminent  divine),  b.  1703 
d.  1791. 

as  to  the  war 82-3 

Wessons,  Colonel,  his  regiment  in  part 

at  Fort  Schuyler 324 

at  Freeman's  Farm 336 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 435 

West,  Col.  (Am,),  at   Newport,   Rhode 

Island 451 

West  Point,  its  strategic  relations 46 

fortified  by    McDougall   and   Kos- 

ciusko 403 

entrusted  to  Arnold 505 

entrusted  to  Greene 506 

visited  by  Rochambeau 622 

Westham,  destroyed  by  Col.  Simcoe 549 

Westover,  the  retreat  of  Simcoe 602 

Wetzell's  Mills,  scene  of  a  skirmish 555 

Wethersfield,  Conn.,  the  place  of  con 
ference  with  Rochambeau. . . .   603-18 
Wheaton,  Henry,  (jurist),  b.  1785,^.  1848. 

makes  all  citizens  belligerents  in  war     25 
Whipple,   William,    Brig.     Genl.,  joins 

Gates 337 

unites  in  the  protest  against  D'Es- 

taing 453 

Whipple,  Commodore,  (Am.),  commands 

fleet  at  Charleston 495 


Whitcombe,  Asa,  Col.,  his  regt,  in  part 

at  Bunker  Hill loo 

White  Plains,  battle  fought  at  Chatterton 

Hill 241 

White,  Maj. ,(Am.),  battle  of  Germantown  389 
Whitesborough,  N.  Y.   near  battle-field 

of  Oriskany 323 

Wickam,  Lieut.  (Am.),  k.  at  Savannah.  482 
Wilkinson,  James,  Maj.  Genl.  b.  1757,  d. 
1825. 

Maj.,  with  Lee  at  his  capture 259 

a  volunteer  at  Trenton 275 

has    interview    with     Washington, 

(Note) 277 

his  statements  as  to  Arnold 342 

like  a  boy  adventurer  with  Gates . .   343 
as  to  Arnold  at  Bemis  Heights. .  348—9 

promoted  Brig.  Genl.. t  .  < , . .   398 

Willett,  Marinus,  Col.,  b.  1744,  d.  1826. 

ordered  to  Fort  Schuyler 323 

reaches  the  post 323 

makes  a  sally 324 

operates  against  the  Onondagas. . . .  463 
Willett,  Capt.  (Br.),  at  Fort  Trumbull 

Conn 626 

Williams,  James,  Col.  (Am.),  k.  at  King's 

Mountain 520 

Williams,  Maj.  (Br.)  k.  at  Bunker  Hill  .   no 
Williams,  William,  Com.  Safety,  S.  C. .   179 
Williams,  Otho  H.,  Maj.  Col.  (Am.),  b. 
1748,  d.  1794. 

at  Fort  Washington 248 

w.  at  Fort  Washington 250 

Adj.  Gen.   of  Gen.  Gates  at  Cam- 
den  ' • • •   509 

at  battle  of  Camden 514 

makes  report  of  the  battle    515 

detached  with  light  troops 552 

at  battle  of  Guilford 557 

at  battle  of  Hobkirk's  Hill 572 

at  siege  of  Augusta 574 

at  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs 579 

Williams,    a  small  post,  threatened  by 

Morgan 541 

Williams.  Maj.  (Br.  Foot),  taken  pris.  at 

Bemis  Heights 347 

Williamson,    James,    Brig.    Gen.   (Am.) 

sent  to  Augusta    464 

Williamson's      Plantation,      scene      of 

skirmish 507 

Willis,  Capt.  (Br.)  zt>.  at  battle  of  Mon- 

mputh 444 

Willis,    Maj.,    of    Conn.,   at    battle    of 

Jamestown 608 

Wilmousky,  Capt.  (H.)  k.  at  battle  of 

Guilford 563 

Winnsborough,    Headquars.    of     Corn 
wallis  521 

Winbach's  regt.  (If.)  before  Fort  Mercer  394 

Winter  at  Valley  Forge,  Am.  army 401 

Philadelphia,  Br.  army 401 

Morristown,  Am.  army 486 

New  York,  Br.  army 485 

Wise,  Maj.  (Am.)  k.  at  Savannah 482 

Wolcott's  brigade  joins  Gates 337 

Woodbridge,  Benj.  R.,  Col.,  his  regt.  in 

part  at  Bunker  Hill 100 

Woodbridge,  N.  J.,  a  sub-post  in  1776. .   232 


712 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


Wbodford,  William,  Brig.  Gen.,  promoted  296 

at  Valley  Forge  (see  Map) 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 444 

reinforces  Charleston 495 

VVoodford,  Lieut.  Col.,  detached  by  Gates  511 
Woodhull,  Nathaniel,  Brig.  Gen.,  taken 

pris.  Long  Island 211 

Woolsey,  Theodore  Dwight,  Rev.  Dr., 
Ex.  Pres.  Yale  College.  Linguist 
and  writer  upon  International 
law,  b.  1801. 

defines  a  just  war 24 

his  encouragement  recognized 2 

Wooster,  Daniel,  Maj.  Gen.,  b.  1711,  d. 

1777. 

his  antecedents 84 

joins  Montgomery  at  St.  John's  ...  129 

arrives  at  Quebec 133 

his  patriotism  conspicuous 133 

takes  a  subordinate  command 133 

is  recalled  from  Canada 159 

demands  surrender  of  Quebec 162 

before  Fort  Independence 292 

resigns  his  commission 296 

is  mortally  wounded 297 

Wright,  Royal  Gov.  Georgia,  calls  for 

troops  ....   178 

Wykoff,  a  guide,  at  battle  of  Monmouth  439 


Wyllis,  Col.  (Am.)  at  Bedford  Pass,  L.  I.  205 
Wyngand,  Lieut.  (Br.)  w.  at  battle  of 

Guilford 563 

Wyoming  Massacre  (noticed) 459 

Wythe,  George,  Va.,  supports  Col.  Clark 

at  the  west 461 


Y. 


YALE    College    students,    under    Capt. 

James  Hillhouse,  at  New  Haven.  469 
Young's  House  captured,  with  garrison, 

486 


Yorke,    Lieut.    Col.   (Br)    commanded 

brigade  at  battle  of  Jamestown  .  .  608 

Yorktown,  surrendered  to  allied  army.  .  641 

conditions  of  capitulation  .........  641 

strength  of  garrison  surrendered.  .  .  643 
Year,  Anno  Domini,  1876,  July  4th,  cele 

brated  by  all  civilized  nations.  .  .  .658 


Z. 


ZONES  of  operations,  defined 56 

during  the  war,  1775-1781 56 

during  the  war,  1861-1865 57 

their  mutual  dependence 57 


NOTE. 

RUTLEDGE,  JOHN,  was  nominated,  but  not  confirmed,  by  the  United  States  Senate, 
a    Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court. 


In  Memoriam. 


CHESNEY,  CHARLES  C.  (Br.),  Royal  Engineers,  deceased  after  the   Biographical 
Table  went  to  press.     His  reputation  deserves  permanent  honor. 


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